

PART I

Overcoming the Geopolitical Barriers to Peace

Until recently, the conflict between the Arabs and the Israelis was not over boundaries. It was over Israel's right to exist in peace as a Jewish democratic state. Muslim leaders refused to recognize any Israeli sovereignty over any land—even “the size of a postage stamp,”¹ as one Muslim leader put it—that they regarded as Muslim or Arab. In order to prevent the establishment of Israel, the Palestinians who testified before the Peel Commission in 1937 were even willing to deny themselves a state. When, a decade later, the United Nations partitioned the land into Jewish and Palestinian areas, the Arabs chose to fight rather than accept two states. In 1967, when the Security Council proposed an exchange of land for peace and recognition of Israel, the Arab states unanimously refused. Finally, when Israel offered the Palestinians a state on nearly all the land they claim, again Yasser Arafat responded with suicide bombings.

Now, following Arafat's death, the new Palestinian leadership seems interested in territorial compromise. The time is ripe therefore to focus hard on the specifics of such a compromise—the issues on the ground. In this section, we will explore the geopolitical barriers to peace and how they can be overcome. In the next section we will explore the even more difficult barriers of hatred.

1 The End Result

Two States with Secure and Recognized Borders

We all know what the final agreement will look like, but meanwhile young people are dying. That's what makes this so painful. It just breaks my heart.

—*Former president Bill Clinton*¹

Like it or not, [Israelis and Palestinians] must recognize that their fate is intertwined. Their choice is either to live in perpetual struggle, with endless victims, pain, sorrow, and destruction, or to live in peaceful coexistence. From all the efforts I made over the years, I am certain that the mainstreams of both sides understand that reality. However, translating that understanding from an abstraction into a practical reality has proven far more difficult than I had hoped.

—*Dennis Ross, Middle East adviser and chief negotiator under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton*²

[T]he question today is not what the final agreement will look like, but rather how much more time do we have before any agreement becomes impossible to implement.

—*Marwan Jilani, executive director of the Geneva Initiative*³

Sometimes it is better to start at the end. There seems to be more agreement among Palestinian and Israeli negotiators about what a final resolution will look like than about the steps that must be taken to get to that point. An absence of trust—the result of years of missteps, missed opportunities, and domestic posturing—has created a “chicken-egg” problem: each side wants the other side to show good faith before it is prepared to give up any important bargaining chips. Neither side can afford to give up too many chips without getting at least an equal number from the other side, lest it lose credibility among skeptical members of its own constituencies. Yet both sides understand that they will, eventually, have to exchange these chips if peace is to be accomplished. For example, all reasonable people acknowledge that the final borders will incorporate Israel’s large permanent settlements (really towns—such as Maale Adumim) into Israel, and that these suburbs of Jerusalem will become contiguous with Jewish Jerusalem. That is the reality on the ground, as former president Bill Clinton, President George W. Bush, and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas recognize. But by announcing that Maale Adumim will be expanded in the direction of Jerusalem *before* a final agreement is reached, the Israeli government has usurped a bargaining chip from the Palestinians and engendered distrust among some Palestinian moderates.⁴ At the same time, by announcing now these future plans for expansion of Israeli areas, the Israeli government has given an important chip to Israeli moderates on the right who are somewhat skeptical about the unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Thus, even when it comes to gathering support among moderates, many steps have a zero-sum quality.

Also, opponents to peace on both sides understand how easy it is to exploit mutual distrust by provocative actions calculated to draw a response from the other side and create a cycle of recrimination. A disturbing instance of this exploitation was reported by the Associated Press on April 8, 2005:

Tens of thousands of Hamas supporters paraded through downtown Gaza City on Friday, threatening to end a monthlong truce if Jewish extremists follow through on a pledge to hold a rally at a disputed holy site in Jerusalem next week. . . .

Jewish extremists say that in July, when the Gaza evacuation is to begin, they will bring tens of thousands of people to the Temple

Mount, forcing police to divert their attention from the pullout to Jerusalem. . . .

Abbas said Friday that the Palestinians have been in contact with Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz of Israel about the rally.

“We have a pledge from the Israelis that they will prevent any aggression on Al Aqsa Mosque, and we hope so,” Abbas said.⁵

So before we get to the difficult steps, and the order in which they should be taken, let us first address the end result.

The Arab-Israeli conflict should end with a two-state solution under which all the Arab and Muslim states—indeed the entire world—acknowledge Israel’s right to continue to exist as an independent, democratic, Jewish state with secure and defensible boundaries and free of terrorism. In exchange, Israel should recognize the right of Palestinians to establish an independent, democratic, Palestinian state with politically and economically viable boundaries. For these mutually compatible goals to be achieved, extremists on both sides must give up what they each claim are their God-given or nationalistic rights. Israeli extremists must give up their claimed right to all of biblical Eretz Yisrael (the land of Israel) and their claimed right to maintain Jewish settlements on, or to continue the military occupation of, disputed areas that would be allocated to the Palestinian state. Palestinian extremists must give up their claimed right to all of “Palestine,” including what is now Israel, as well as the alleged right of millions of descendants of those who left or were forced out of what is now Israel during the war of 1947–1949 to “return” to their “ancestral homes” in Israel. Unless these claimed rights are mutually surrendered in the interest of achieving a pragmatic, compromise resolution to the conflict, there can be no enduring peace. But if these claimed rights are surrendered, peace can be achieved. The remaining disputes—and there are many—will be much easier to resolve if agreement is reached on these fundamental issues.

It would follow from Israel’s renouncing all claims to remain on Palestinian land that the military occupation would end and the Palestinian government would exercise political control over its land and the movement of its people. And it would follow from the Palestinian renunciation of claims to all of Israel and to any right of return that there could be no justification for terrorism, “resistance,” or any other violence against Israelis, and that the Palestinian government would be responsible for preventing and punishing any such violence.

I do not mean to suggest that the occupation “justified” terrorism, only that even those who erroneously claimed justification could no longer credibly do so.⁶

The precise borders would, of course, have to be negotiated, but there is already in existence an agreed-upon international formula for resolving this divisive issue. Resolution 242, enacted by the UN Security Council in 1967, provides as follows:

[The Security Council] (1) *Affirms* that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of *both* of the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from *territories* occupied in the recent [1967] conflict: (ii) *Termination of all claims or states of belligerency* and respect for and *acknowledgement of the sovereignty*, territorial integrity and political independence of *every State* in the area and their right to live in peace within *secure and recognized boundaries* free from threats or acts of force.⁷

The “legislative history” of that important resolution provides guidance on how the borders should be determined. Soon after the end of the Six-Day War in 1967, the Soviet Union agreed to rearm Egypt. Egypt, in turn, embarked on an intermittent war of attrition against Israel. As Egyptian attacks escalated in frequency and severity, America’s ambassador to the UN, former Supreme Court justice Arthur Goldberg (for whom I had, three years earlier, served as a law clerk and with whom I continued to consult on legal matters at the UN), drafted language that he hoped would frame subsequent peace negotiations. The United States found a willing cosponsor in Great Britain and negotiated language that eventually was adopted by unanimous vote of the Security Council.

Notably, the Security Council recognized that it could not reasonably ask Israel to return to the old armistice borders—agreed to as part of the end of the War of Independence in 1949—from which it had been threatened just months earlier. Resolution 242 demands Israeli withdrawal only from “territories,” not “*the* territories” or “*all* the territories.” This is no legal technicality; the definite article was omitted quite intentionally, and after extensive discussion, so that Israel would be free to negotiate reasonable and mutually secure borders with the defeated states that had threatened it.⁸ The Soviet Union had insisted

that the resolution demand the return of “all” or at least “the” captured territories, but that view was rejected.⁹

During the UN debate, Ambassador Goldberg argued, as described in Security Council records, that “[t]o seek withdrawal without secure and recognized boundaries . . . would be just as fruitless as to seek secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. Historically there have never been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the armistice lines of 1949 nor the cease-fire lines of 1967 have answered that description . . . such boundaries have yet to be agreed upon.”¹⁰ Goldberg explained further, “The notable omissions—which were not accidental—in regard to withdrawal are the words ‘the’ or ‘all’ and ‘the June 5, 1967 lines’. . . [T]he resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal.”¹¹

Following the adoption of Resolution 242, in an address on September 10, 1968, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated, “It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders.” The *New York Times* even printed a correction of its coverage of the resolution: “An article yesterday about peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians referred incorrectly to United Nations resolutions on the conflict. While Security Council Resolution 242, passed after the 1967 Middle East war, calls for Israel to withdraw its armed forces ‘from territories occupied in the recent conflict,’ no resolution calls for Israel to withdraw ‘to its pre-1967 borders.’”¹²

This legislative history clearly establishes that the pre-1967 “green lines”—the borders that contributed to the 1967 war—are not to be the “secure and recognized boundaries” contemplated by Resolution 242. Nor would *major* additions to the Israeli territory be consistent with the resolution. Relatively small adjustments, designed to assure mutual security would, however, be acceptable. This has been the operative assumption behind the two previous efforts to define new borders in the interests of peace: the Clinton-Barak and Geneva proposals. Both contemplated Israel’s annexing the areas around Jerusalem on which thousands of Israelis now live in densely populated suburbs such as Maale Adumim, composed of large apartment complexes.

The Clinton-Barak proposals would have allocated to Israel small areas crucial to its security and made small adjustments to the Green Line amounting to less than 5 percent of the West Bank. In return, Israel offered to cede to Palestine certain areas inside Israel, adjacent to

the West Bank. In the end, Israel agreed to an unspecified international presence and some early warning stations with virtually no permanent Israeli military presence.¹³ The Geneva proposals, drafted by private Israelis and Palestinians in 2003, contemplated borders based on the 1967 lines “with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis.”¹⁴ The difference between these proposals, though significant, amounted to a tiny portion of the total land at issue. It is, of course, uncertain what the final borders might look like now, since the Palestinians would no longer be negotiating with Barak or Clinton. That train left the station when Arafat rejected the Clinton-Barak offer, the second intifada was started, and both Clinton and Barak left office. The Palestinians will almost certainly get less now—after years of bloodshed and more than four thousand deaths—than they would have gotten had they accepted the Clinton-Barak offer or if they had offered a reasonable counterproposal. That is as it should be, if terrorism is not to be rewarded and negotiation discouraged. But if the Palestinians now enter into good-faith negotiations, and make best efforts to end terrorism, they will still get all of the Gaza Strip and nearly all of the West Bank.

A front-page story in the *New York Times*¹⁵ analyzing Israel’s building decisions concluded that the most Israel will claim is approximately 3 percent more than what was offered at Camp David. “Clinton was down to 5 percent of the West Bank, and here you are down to 8 percent before final-status negotiations,” according to David Makovsky of the Washington Institute of Near East Policy. “It has to be modified and agreed upon by the parties, but before our eyes we see the rough shape of a two-state solution,” he concluded. Under this plan, “99.5 percent of Palestinians would live” in the new Palestinian state, with “fewer than 10,000 of the two million [West Bank] Palestinians” living within Israel. Moreover, 177,000 of the 240,000 Israeli “settlers” who now live in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem itself) would be within the new Israeli borders and the remaining 63,000 would be evacuated to Israel. The *Times* concluded that “the likely impact of the provisional new border on Palestinian life is, perhaps surprisingly, smaller than generally assumed.”¹⁶

Once a permanent border is agreed on, the issue of a security fence diminishes in importance, because any such fence (like the existing Gaza fence) would be on the border, not inside Palestinian territory. To the extent that the Palestinian government could control violence from within its borders, the fence would become unnecessary, and

eventually the borders could reopen without the need for security checkpoints. But until that time, the border fence would help make good neighbors by reducing both terrorism by extremists and retaliation by the Israeli military.

Until the death of Yasser Arafat, no Palestinian leader was willing to accept statehood for the Palestinians if it also meant acceptance of Israel. In 1937, the Peel Commission suggested, in essence, a two-state solution, with the proposed Jewish state (in which Jews would be a large majority) being tiny and noncontiguous, and the proposed Palestinian state being large and contiguous.¹⁷ Although the Jewish Agency (the unofficial “government” of the pre-Israel Jewish Yishuv) was greatly disappointed by the proposal, and despite the strong opposition of many Jews, it ultimately agreed to the recommendation. The Palestinians, led by the grand mufti of Jerusalem, categorically rejected the two-state solution, arguing that establishing an independent Palestinian state would require acceptance of a Jewish state, tiny and noncontiguous as it would be. Such an acceptance of any Jewish sovereignty, regardless of the size of the land, would be inconsistent with Islamic law as the grand mufti interpreted it. Palestinian leaders “clung to the principle that Palestine was part of Syria” and that there should be neither a Palestinian state nor any Jewish self-rule, “political power,” or “privilege.” The grand mufti even refused to “provide guarantees for the safety of the Jewish population in the event of an Arab Palestinian state.”¹⁸

It is not surprising in light of this attitude that the Peel Commission believed that it had no choice other than a division of the disputed area:

On that point we would suggest that there is little moral value in maintaining the political unity of Palestine at the cost of perpetual hatred, strife, and bloodshed, and that there is little moral injury in drawing a political line through Palestine if peace and goodwill between the people on either side of it can thereby in the long run be attained. . . . Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. We can see none in any other plan.¹⁹

Once again, in 1947, the Palestinians were offered a state, this time somewhat smaller than the one offered a decade earlier, but still quite large. Again they rejected it, preferring instead to try, with the help of other Arab nations, to destroy the nascent Jewish state. Israel

immediately accepted the United Nations partition, even though it was left with a small state in which large portions of its Jewish populations could easily be cut off from each other.

Twenty years later, after Israel won the Six-Day War, the Palestinians rejected Security Council Resolution 242, which could have provided the basis for a two-state solution. The Arabs rejected 242 because it required the recognition of Israel. They issued their three infamous “no’s”: “no recognition, no negotiation, no peace.” Israel accepted 242. As Abba Eban characterized this unhappy result, “[The Six-Day War was] the first war in history which has ended with the victors suing for peace and the vanquished calling for unconditional surrender.”²⁰

It is interesting to speculate what the situation would be like today for the Palestinians if Israel had not captured the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in the 1967 war. There is no reason to believe that either Egypt or Jordan would have voluntarily ended their two-decade-long occupation over the Palestinians. Nor is there any reason to believe that the world would have cared, since the international community expressed virtually no concern over these occupations. It is even possible that the Palestinians would never have sought statehood from their Egyptian and Jordanian occupiers, since there was virtually no independence movement among the Palestinians during that twenty-year period. I am not meaning to suggest that Israel’s capture and occupation of these territories has been good for the Palestinians. What I am suggesting is that it was no worse, and in many ways was probably better, than the preexisting occupation.

In 1979, during its negotiations with Egypt at Camp David, Israel offered to end the occupation of the Gaza Strip and return it to Egypt, which would then have been free to grant some degree of independence to the Palestinians living there. But Egypt refused to take back the Gaza Strip. Instead, it essentially gave up all claims to that volatile area²¹ and agreed to the election of a Palestinian administrative authority and a process for negotiated autonomy. The Palestinians denounced this agreement and boycotted the subsequent autonomy talks, thereby assuring a continuation of the occupation.²²

Then in 2000, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians statehood on 100 percent of the Gaza Strip and more than 95 percent of the West Bank and the adjoining land. Arafat refused to accept the offer, because it would have required him to give up the so-called “right of return,” which, if exercised by the four million Palestinians claiming to

be descendants of those who once lived in Israel, would have quickly ended Israel's independent existence.

As the historian Benny Morris summarized the situation with regard to partition and the two-state solution:

It is certainly true that neither side liked the idea [of partition], but in 1937, in 1947, and in 1993–2000 the Zionist leadership and then the Israeli leadership accepted—and in the latter years, even proposed—compromises based on the idea of partition, whereas the Palestinian leadership, under [Jerusalem grand mufti] Husseini and again under Arafat, rejected all proposals for partition.²³

In *The Case for Israel*, I predicted that “[w]hen the Palestinians want their own state more than they want to destroy the Jewish state, most Israelis will welcome a peaceful Palestinian state as a good neighbor.”²⁴ I also predicted that so long as Arafat remained in control of the Palestinian Authority, he would place his dream of ending Israel's existence above the pragmatic needs of his people for an end to the occupation and statehood.

Now, it seems, the pragmatic new leaders of the Palestinian movement finally do want a Palestinian state more than they want the end of Israel—or at least they are prepared to accept Israel, for now, as a means toward achieving Palestinian statehood. This is a step that no Palestinian leader was willing to take before the death of Arafat.

The precise borders of a Palestinian state should be decided by a combination of factors. First and foremost must be Israel's security needs. After all, it was Israel that was threatened with annihilation in 1948, 1967, and 1973. Israel poses no threat to its neighbors if it is not attacked. Resolution 242 expressly recognizes the need for “secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.” That resolution also implicitly acknowledges that the pre-1967 borders—which were never “recognized” as final—were not secure. Border changes were expected, though not ones that were major in scope.

Fortunately, Israel's reasonable security needs can now be met without significant effect on Palestinian population centers. The Alon Plan, proposed by a former Israeli general and cabinet member following the 1967 war, contemplated security adjustments to the pre-1967 borders, including the retention by Israel of a “six–seven mile deep strip along the West Bank of the Jordan river” as a “security belt” against the

Jordanian army.²⁵ Not all of these security measures are still required, because Israel is no longer in a state of belligerency with Jordan, but some new ones may be necessary because of the increasing threat of terrorism. As we will see in chapter 3, the overall impact of any needed changes on Palestinian life will be relatively small and should not prevent the creation of a viable Palestinian state.


In addition to these minor security changes, there will have to be some border adjustments that recognize the new residential realities on the ground. Following the Six-Day War, Israel annexed several areas adjacent to Jerusalem and built large numbers of permanent apartment buildings on the land, which have now become suburban parts of greater Jerusalem. Forty thousand Israelis live in the southern Jerusalem suburb of Gilo;²⁶ thirty thousand Israelis currently live in Maale Adumim.²⁷ The reality—recognized by all reasonable negotiators—is that they are there to stay. As the *New York Times* reported on April 19, 2005, “[T]he Palestinians, in every negotiation so far, have seemed ready to cede Maale Adumim to the Israelis for other land.”²⁸ This is probably also true of the other large settlement block outside of Jerusalem. The amount of land involved is relatively small, especially in comparison with the number of people who now live on it. In exchange for keeping this small amount of land, Israel should offer a comparable amount of Israeli land, consistent with security needs, to the new Palestinian state. More important, the vast majority of Palestinians—99.5 percent of them—now living on the West Bank would be living within the new Palestinian state and outside of the security fence. Their lives should not be affected in a significant way by the new borders.

It has been suggested that the exchange should also focus on Israeli land now populated by Israeli Arabs, who may want to become part of the new Palestinian state. That would seem a logical exchange—Israeli land populated by Palestinians becomes part of the Palestinian state, while Palestinian land (or, more accurately, disputed land) populated by Israelis remains part of Israel. Logic, however, is subordinate to democracy and Israel is a democracy in which Arab citizens have the same rights as Jewish and Christian citizens. Arab-Israeli citizens and their land could not lawfully be “traded” to the Palestinian state without the consent of these citizens, perhaps by a local referendum that supported such an exchange. At the moment, the vast majority of Israeli Arabs want to remain part of Israel.²⁹ The journalist Yossi Klein Halevi reported on this attitude on assignment to Um Al-Fahm, quoting a


Palestinian pastry shop owner as saying, “The Israeli mentality has become part of us. When I traveled in Egypt and Jordan, I realized I couldn’t live in an Arab country. We’ve gotten used to speaking our minds.” This attitude may change over time, were the Palestinian state to become economically viable, politically secure, religiously free, and protective of individual rights. If a majority of Israeli Arabs living in an area contiguous to the Palestinian state were to vote to become Palestinian citizens, and if annexing their land to the Palestinian state would not endanger Israeli security, then such a voluntary annexation—with appropriate compensation to those Arabs who chose to remain in Israel—might make sense. But this utopian solution is far in the future.

The other important considerations that must be factored into any final agreement regarding borders are ones of principle—and these are often the most difficult about which to reach agreement. It has long been a fundamental principle of Israeli, as well as American, policy that terrorism must never be rewarded. To the contrary, it must be disincentivized and deterred by punishment. The Palestinians should understand this well, since they have lost much by relying more on terrorism than negotiation. As Yossi Klein Halevi summarized the situation, “Under the Peel Commission, the Palestinians would have received 80% of the territory between the river and the sea; under the 1947 partition plan, 45%; under Camp David, around 20%.”³⁰ They would have had a large state before the Second World War had they accepted the proposal of the Peel Commission. Instead, they responded with terrorism and with support for the Nazis. They were punished with an offer by the United Nations of a somewhat smaller—though still quite large—state in 1947. Again they responded with violence and terrorism. Again they were punished with a smaller landmass (which was quickly carved up between Jordan and Egypt). Then in 1967 the Arab states were offered Resolution 242, which could have resulted in an Arab state over nearly all of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Again they rejected the offer, and the result was a long-term occupation. Finally, in 2000 and 2001, the Palestinians were firmly offered a state on all of the Gaza Strip and nearly all of the West Bank. Again they replied with terrorism instead of negotiation.

Now many Palestinians would like the same offer they rejected in 2000 and 2001. But the principle of disincentivizing and deterring terrorism demands that they be offered less—and certainly not more—than they could have gotten had they opted for negotiation instead of



Peel Commission Proposal, 1937



UN Partition Plan, 1947

suicide bombers in 2000 and 2001. If Israel were to offer the Palestinians *more*, after four years of terrorism, than they would have had by negotiating, a terrible message would be sent: namely, that terrorism produces better results than negotiation. Such a message would encourage resorting to terrorism by aggrieved groups all over the world and must be rejected as a matter of high principle.³¹

Many Palestinians understand this principle. The *New York Times* interviewed several residents of the West Bank and Gaza in February 2005, following the election of Mahmoud Abbas:

[T]he Palestinians interviewed recognized with bitterness that their own political perspectives have narrowed, and that they had lost ground, despite so many deaths over the last four and [a] half years. They expressed nostalgia for the relative prosperity and freedom of travel they had before the outbreak of this last intifada, in September 2000—even though those conditions were onerous enough to fuel the intifada itself.

“Before the intifada we used to go to Israel to work or to shop, and people had some money,” said Nasir al-Bayouk, 41, sitting in a taxi in a long line at Abu Houleh, as cold rain and hail hammered down. He used to own a restaurant, but it failed. “We’ve lost a lot in this intifada,” he said. “Before, we were negotiating for a state. Now we’re negotiating over Abu Houleh, and that’s it.”³²

Some Palestinians would prefer a different principle—one entirely inconsistent with the war against terrorism. They believe that they deserve to be *paid* a price, rather than having to *pay* a price, for the terrorism: “We hear Israel wants peace, and we want it, we want this cease-fire. But at the same time, all the sacrifices we made during this intifada can’t be for free. People lost their loved ones, and we need a price for this.”³³ In other words, they want a reward for having initiated a campaign of suicide bombings in which both Palestinians and Israelis died. This would be in direct conflict with the principle on which both Israeli and American antiterrorism policy is based.

This conflict over principles and perspectives will be difficult to resolve. Many Palestinians believe they have already paid a heavy price for their terrorism in the form of Israeli reprisals and the deaths caused by them, while many Israelis believe that the Palestinians, by employing terrorism, are responsible for all the deaths—those caused by the

terrorists and those caused by Israel's legitimate efforts to prevent and deter terrorism against its citizens.

In the end, there seems to be widespread agreement that the only way to resolve these and other disagreements is by negotiation rather than by a renewal of the violence. The *New York Times* quoted a West Bank Palestinian as follows:

"Everyone agrees that violence will not solve our problem, but worsen it," he said. "We'll never achieve stability unless we negotiate, and that's true with Israel and also with Hamas."

People's desires are simple, Mr. Filfil said—live, work, travel freely and raise their children. "Most people don't want to die," he said. "But people don't want to be cheated or sold short. They don't want to forget the national issues—a Palestinian state with open borders, with its capital in Jerusalem."³⁴

Even if the Palestinians and the Arabs recognize Israel's right to exist as an independent Jewish state with secure and defensible boundaries and free from terrorism, there will be no real and enduring peace until Israel's other enemies—academic, religious, political, and diplomatic—finally come to grips with the reality that Israel is here to stay and that its existence is a force for good in the world. Grudging acceptance of Israel, on tactical or pragmatic grounds, will not be enough, especially if such acceptance is seen as merely a "stage" in the ultimate object: namely, Israel's eventual replacement by a Muslim state. So long as Israel is treated or even regarded as somewhat less "legitimate," "normal," or "acceptable" than Australia, South Africa, the United States, Jordan, or Pakistan, there will be some who will remain dedicated to Israel's ultimate disappearance, and even some who will continue to take action calculated to achieve that destructive and bigoted goal. If such attitudes and actions persist, Israel will be required to remain on guard against its sworn enemies. This will, in turn, generate concerns among Israel's Palestinian and other Arab neighbors, thus continuing the cycle of suspicion—and belligerency.

This cycle must and can be ended, but it will take more than a cold peace between former enemies. It will require these former enemies to call off their extremist allies and to urge them to accept—really accept—Israel as a full and normal member of the international community. This will require an end to *all* efforts at divestment, boycott,

exclusion, and every other form of singular condemnation of the Jewish state. (As I will show in part 2, these bigoted efforts to demonize and delegitimize Israel have persisted, sometimes even accelerated, as Israel has moved toward ending the occupation of Gaza and negotiating a full peace based on the two-state solution.) On the positive side, a real peace will require that Israel be invited—indeed welcomed—into all international organizations from which it is today, in fact, if not in law, banned. As Professor Anne Bayefsky, an expert in international organizations, summarized the situation in January 2005, “In March the UN will begin its annual session of the UN Human Rights Commission, at which Israel will be the only UN member state not allowed to participate in full because UN states continue to prevent it from gaining equal membership in a regional group.”³⁵ Not surprisingly, the commission immediately condemned Israel but none of its Arab neighbors.³⁶ Other organizations from which Israel has been effectively excluded include the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

No one can reasonably expect Israel and its former enemies to “beat their swords into plowshares,” or to see the “wolf dwelling with the lamb,”³⁷ as the Bible prophesied. A real peace, based on universal acceptance of Israel, is feasible, but it will take more than Israelis and Palestinians alone to achieve it. It will take an end to the hatred directed against the Jewish state by so many academics, religious leaders, diplomats, and others determined to see it destroyed.

The writer and philosopher Amos Oz does not expect old enemies “to fall in love” with each other. “Let’s not be sentimental.” He sees the conflict as a “tragedy in the exact sense of the word”—a “collision between one very powerful claim and another no less powerful.” Employing a literary analogy, he believes that tragedies “can be resolved in one of two ways: there is the Shakespearian resolution and there is the Chekhovian one. At the end of a Shakespearian tragedy, the stage is strewn with dead bodies and maybe there’s some justice hovering high above. A Chekhov tragedy, on the other hand, ends with everybody disillusioned, embittered, heart-broken, disappointed, absolutely shattered, but still alive. And I want a Chekhovian resolution and not a Shakespearian one for the Israeli-Palestine tragedy.”³⁸