Chapter One

When No One Is in Charge

The Meaning of Shared Power

> *If there is no struggle, there is no progress. . . . Power concedes nothing without a struggle. It never did and it never will.*
> FREDERICK DOUGLASS

> *We live in an era in the history of nations when there is a greater need than ever for coordinated political action and responsibility.*
> GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND

Anyone who tries to tackle a public problem or need sooner or later comes face to face with the dynamics of a shared-power world. Consider the public health officer or physician picking up the signs of a new disease affecting gay men. Or perhaps you're an elected official concerned about all the unemployed men congregating on the streets of your district. Perhaps you're a successful businessperson who realizes the environmental destruction caused by industry will ultimately lead to disaster. Perhaps you're a university teacher or administrator who believes the university isn't prepared to serve the growing numbers of retirees who could have many years of productive life ahead of them.

Or you may have no professional role related to these issues; you may be the sister of a man dying of AIDS, you may have lost your job, you may be the homeowner who finds out your water supply has been contaminated by a nearby factory, or you may be

someone wondering how to have a satisfying life after sixty in an ageist world.

When any of these people, whether professionals or concerned citizens, try to do something about these public problems, they may soon have the feeling of being stuck in a quagmire. They clearly cannot wave a magic wand and make everything better. Today, anyone who's involved in the fight against AIDS realizes that a host of groups and organizations need to be part of any new initiative to reduce the incidence of the disease or deal with its effects. Anyone who digs deeply into the causes of local unemployment soon finds that causes of the problem (and therefore the solutions) are tied to governmental systems, specific employers, economic institutions, schools, individual experiences and aspirations, and voluntary organizations. Anyone who tries to attack environmental destruction, reform a university, or help a society become more humane likewise soon realizes that many individuals, groups, and organizations have contributed to or are affected by the problem or need at hand, and somehow these individuals, groups, and organizations, as well as many others, will have to be part of any significant beneficial change.

This chapter elaborates our understanding of this complex, no-one-in-charge, shared-power world. To begin, we describe two contrasting types of organizational structure, planning, and decision making: what might be called an "in-charge" model, and the shared-power model. Then we explain more fully our view of public problems and shared power. We explore the causes and consequences of today's shared-power world and highlight some leadership opportunities and responsibilities in this world. Along the way, we introduce some people who have been engaged in leadership for the common good as they wrestle with public problems such as AIDS and environmental destruction. You will also have a chance to think about a public problem that is important to you and begin analyzing it in light of a shared-power view of its context.

Two Types of Organizations, Planning, and Decision Making

An enduring "ideal" organizational structure is the hierarchical pyramid, or bureaucratic model, which might be called the "in-charge organization." At the apex of such an organization resides

an individual (president, CEO, director) or small group (board or top management team) that establishes organizational direction, determines guiding policies, and sends directives downward to a group of middle managers, who in turn translate policies and orders into more specific orders that are passed down to the large number of lower-level workers. Embedded in this ideal type is the assumption that the organization "contains" a problem area, or need, and engages in highly rational, expert-based planning and decision making to resolve it. The organization efficiently and effectively handles the problem or fulfills the need (Weber, 1947). Peter Marris talks about this form as a means of managing uncertainty and displacing risk downward (Marris, 1996).

Increasingly, however, this organizational structure is proving inadequate, both as a reflection of how organizations really operate and as a model of the forms most suited for today's interconnected, interdependent world. Thus another ideal type, the networked organization, has emerged. In this view, the organization itself is often a network of units, departments, and individuals; moreover, the organization is part of a variety of external networks that are fluid and chaotic. Organizations viewed in this way are part of a "multiorganizational field," or "multiactor network," of overlapping domains and conflicting authorities (Feldman and Khademian, 2000; Klandermans, 1992). Anyone who wants to influence an organization's behavior has to understand and design these internal or external networks. See Figure 1.1 for representations of an in-charge organization and of two types of networked organization.

Let's consider the example of U.S. physicians who detected unusually virulent forms of skin cancer and pneumonia among gay patients in their clinics and hospitals in the early 1980s—notably Linda Laubenstein in New York City; Marcus Conant, a dermatologist affiliated with the University of California at San Francisco; and Michael Gottlieb, an immunologist and assistant professor at the University of California at Los Angeles. The physicians soon realized as they talked with local colleagues that other physicians were encountering similar patients, who were dying because no treatments worked. Already Laubenstein, Conant, and Gottlieb were operating within a professional network. They spread their net further, however, as they sought to learn more and alert others to their observations—turning to local public health officials, the

Figure 1.1. Hierarchical and Networked Organizations.



An In-Charge Organization



A Single-Node Network Organization



A Multinode Network Organization

national government's Centers for Disease Control, and medical journals. Now the relevant network extended to doctors' offices, clinics, university departments, journals, and public health departments. The network expansion continued, as these and other doctors worked with gay rights activists to help raise money for research into the cause of what appeared to be a new, lethal, sexually transmitted disease. New gay-led organizations emerged to support the people suffering from the new disease and promote needed research and education. The gay press began covering what their writers called the "gay plague."

The network grew even more as evidence emerged that the disease was affecting drug addicts and Haitian New Yorkers, and that it was being transmitted to hemophiliacs through the blood products they received. Now hemophiliac organizations and the blood bank industry were involved. Before long, the physicians became part of local-to-national networks, what Robert Quinn (2000) would call an adhocracy, of clinicians, infectious disease researchers, local elected officials, and gay activists who were putting pressure on members of Congress, top officials in the Reagan administration, and even the president himself to channel resources toward the effort to identify the disease and control its spread.

The organizational structure that best fit the developing AIDS crisis is illustrated in Figure 1.2, in which the problem is represented by the amorphous large blob. Within the blob are many individuals, groups, and organizations, represented by the dots, circles, and triangles—in other words, the stakeholders in the problem. (Of course, in the case of the AIDS crisis, the actual picture would be immensely more complicated since a tremendous number of people, groups, and organizations were involved.) The solid and dotted lines between some of the stakeholders represent respectively the formal and informal connections, or networks, among groups and organizations. As time went on, newly created or newly involved groups and organizations would be added to the picture.

Note that the problem spills far beyond the boundary of even the existing networks. No single person, group, or individual is "in charge" of the problem, yet many organizations are affected or have partial responsibility to act. In effect, they have a share of the power that is required for remedying the problem. Of course, this

Figure 1.2. Public Problems in a No-One-in-Charge, Shared-Power World.



is not to say that all organizations have equal power (they don't) or that power is shared equally (it isn't). The organizations come in various sizes and structures, from large hierarchies to loose networks. In such a shared-power situation, part of the battle is just gaining rough agreement on what the problems are. Indeed, some of the organizations may have radically conflicting aims. The physicians trying to marshal resources to combat AIDS would have encountered some groups and organizations, such as conservative "family values" groups, that they might have wished were not involved. To the conservative groups, the real problem was gay lifestyles. In another example, public health officials who realized that practices at bathhouses frequented by gay men were a major contributor to the rapid spread of the disease faced intense resistance from bathhouse owners against any restrictions on the operation of their businesses.

In addition to coping with supportive, neutral, or hostile organizations, change advocates encounter existing networks that may be supportive, neutral, or resistant to their proposed changes. The AIDS crisis developed in the midst of a formidable set of networks, including those of officials in the Reagan administration, scientific and public health associations, groups of bathhouse owners, the gay press, and the blood bank industry. Some of the networks were political alliances, such as those between gay activists and politicians in San Francisco or among some U.S. senators and the right-wing Moral Majority.

To coordinate action and make headway on resolving a complex public problem, the organizations involved need to be aware of the whole problem system and recognize that it has to undergo significant change. The change advocates have to engage in political, issue-oriented, and therefore messy planning and decision making, in which shared goals and mission are being developed as the process moves along. New networks must be created, old ones coopted or neutralized. These networks range from the highly informal, in which the main activity is information sharing, to more organized shared-power arrangements (which are described more fully in the next section).

Further (as with the AIDS crisis, which has now reached global proportions), no matter what is done the problem is not likely to

be "solved" so much as "re-solved" (Wildavsky, 1979), "dissolved" (Ackoff, 1981; Alexander, 1982), "redefined" (Mitroff and Featheringham, 1984), "continued" (Nadler and Hobino, 1998), or "finished" (Eden, 1987). Many people have power to thwart action in such a world, but few have the will, faith, hope, and courage to say yes to new initiatives. The result is that even powerful people can feel frustrated and impotent.

In a no-one-in-charge world, planning and decision making are often very different from the "rational planning" approach associated with bureaucratic hierarchy (Simon, 1947). The rational planning model, presented in Figure 1.3, begins with well-informed experts' setting goals (for example, eliminating AIDS by the year 2000, or cutting industrial air pollution by 10 percent). Policies, programs, and actions are then developed to achieve the goals. The assumption is that once the actions are taken, programs and policies will be implemented, the goals will be achieved, and the problem solved. The model makes sense, but it works well only when there is consensus on the goals, policies, programs, and actions needed to solve a problem. Moreover, it presumes agreement on how a problem should be defined, as well as what causes it.

The consensus and agreement implicit in the rational planning model are very hard to come by in a no-one-in-charge, shared-power world. The dynamics of this world accord more closely with the political decision-making model articulated by Charles Lindblom in a series of classic articles and books (Lindblom, 1959, 1965,

Figure 1.3. Rational Planning.



1977; Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). This model (Figure 1.4) begins with issues, which almost by definition involve conflict, not consensus. The conflict may be over ends, means, timing, location, political advantage, or philosophy—and it may be severe. If the effort to resolve the issue produces policies and programs, they will be *politically* rational; that is, they are acceptable to a dominant group of stakeholders (Stone, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 1998). Over time, more general policies may be formulated to capture, shape, or interpret the policies and programs initially developed to deal with the issues. These various policies and programs are, in effect, treaties among the various stakeholders, and although they may not record a true consensus at least they represent a reasonable level of agreement (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993).

To illustrate the political decision-making model and its difference from the rational planning model, let's consider the experience of Mark Stenglein, a county commissioner for the Minnesota county containing Minneapolis; and Gary Cunningham, the county's planning director, as they wrestled with the issue of unemployment among young African American men in the county.

Stenglein's Hennepin County district includes the northwestern part of the city, one afflicted by concentrated unemployment

Figure 1.4. Political Decision Making.



and poverty. In recent years, the area also has become home for many African American residents of Minneapolis. As he drove through the area in 1999, Stenglein wondered about all the African American men he saw standing on street corners in the middle of the day. At the time the state's economy was doing very well, and he questioned why these men weren't working. He approached Gary Cunningham and asked him for an explanation.

One might have predicted a confrontation between the two men—a conservative Euro-American raising questions about the behavior of African American men with a public servant who himself was African American and had a long history of working on behalf of that community. Cunningham did remark that he had recently been in an area of Minnesota hard hit by shutdowns in the mining industry and had seen lots of white guys standing around on the streets there.

Nevertheless, Cunningham saw a chance for fact finding and proposed a formal inquiry. He already knew that although many African American men in Hennepin County were doing very well in terms of employment, financial success, and leadership roles, a substantial number were in trouble. He already knew many of the statistics:

- Each year 44 percent of the county's African American men between eighteen and thirty were arrested, mainly for minor offenses.
- Only 28 percent of male African Americans in the Minneapolis public schools were graduating on time.
- The death rate among young African American men was twice that of their white counterparts.

Moreover, a host of goals, objectives, policies, and programs had been established for these men over the years. Schools had set graduation targets, public health agencies had programs aimed at improving health care for African Americans, the court system had specific objectives for processing cases, and so on. Already, an array of government and nonprofit organizations were involved, as well as some businesses participating in hiring and retention programs. Yet none had made a real dent in the group's high unemployment, low education level, and terrible health conditions. Moreover,

given the conflictual history of U.S. race relations, almost any proposed solution to problems affecting African American men was likely to invoke old and acrimonious debate over civil rights, the legacy of slavery, racism, affirmative action, welfare policy, and personal morality.

Cunningham well knew that any solutions to the problems affecting African American men would have to be multifaceted and would require contributions from a multitude of stakeholders—including African American men themselves, county commissioners and employees, businesspeople, African American families, education officials and teachers, other government bodies, and journalists. He consulted his staff, African American community leaders, other county commissioners, business leaders, and university faculty. Stenglein and fellow commissioner Peter McLaughlin persuaded the county board to authorize an in-depth study of the status of African American men in the county. Cunningham's department organized a thirty-seven-member steering committee that would guide the study and final report. Herman Milligan Jr., a vice president at Wells Fargo, agreed to chair the committee. Working teams including committee members, community advisers, and academic researchers were assembled to research issues affecting African American men and develop recommendations. These teams collected information about the issues, participated in a process to clarify the issues, and then moved to specific goals.

Even though we have drawn a sharp distinction between the rational and political decision-making models, we actually see them as complementary, rather than antithetical. They may simply need to be sequenced properly. In the typical sequence, political decision making is necessary to determine the issues and the politically acceptable policies and programs that resolve them. Rational planning can then be used to recast that agreement into technically and administratively workable goals, policies, programs, and actions. As the work teams studying the condition of African American men in Hennepin County held conversations with stakeholders, they had no clear idea of what policy changes were needed. The aim of their initial research was to understand more about the reasons these men had such a high unemployment rate or such poor health. As they consulted diverse stakeholders, the work teams encountered a number of perspectives and were caught up in sometimes heated

debate over the causes of problems and the efficacy of specific solutions. Various stakeholder analysis techniques were used to array the perspectives and find common interests that could be the basis of acceptable policies and programs (Bryson, Cunningham, and Lokkesmoe, 2002). (These techniques are described in detail in Part Two of this book.) The preliminary and final reports created a unifying framework that was based on the theme "What is good for young African American men is good for the county, and vice versa" (Hennepin County, 2002). A rich array of data were presented, to support:

- Deeper understanding of African American men's lives and the social and economic conditions affecting them
- Recognition of the link between the well-being of African American men and the well-being of the broader community
- Specific recommendations for an initiative sponsored by the county board

Appreciating Problems and Solutions

It may be helpful at this point to describe more fully our view of public problems. Our understanding of public problems is expansive, moving well beyond the realm of government responsibility. To us, a public problem is one that affects diverse stakeholders and cannot be remedied by a single group or organization. Indeed, extensive collaboration and consultation among numerous stakeholders is necessary to achieve significant improvements. These problems resist any short-term, piecemeal solution because they are embedded in a complex system of interconnection and feedback effects.

Our emphasis is on large, difficult, even seemingly intractable public problems, or what Wilfred Drath (2001) calls *emergent problems*: complex problems that are as yet ill-defined and for which no clear solutions exist. Other authors have called them developmental problems (Jantsch, 1975; Bryson, 1981; Nutt, 2001). Emergent, or developmental, problems are most suitably addressed through what Geoffrey Vickers (1995) calls "acts of appreciation." Appreciation, in Vickers's usage, merges judgment of what is *real* with judgment of what is *valuable*. Recognizing and naming a new

problem involves new *appreciation* of how a part of the world works, and what is wrong with it, or how it might be considerably better. This appreciation subsequently shapes the way a public problem is defined, the solutions considered, and the accommodation of stakeholder interests.

In 1990, Swiss industrialist and multimillionaire Stephan Schmidheiny was invited by Maurice Strong, secretary general of the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), to be the principal adviser on global business perspectives on sustainable development at the conference, to be held in Rio de Janeiro. As he and a group of like-minded businesspeople began a global campaign to change the prevailing business mentality, it was clear that destruction of the natural environment was still an emergent problem in the eyes of many business owners and managers. To the extent these people linked business practices to environmental problems, they were likely to question the severity of the problems or identify the real challenge as combating forces that would stifle economic growth. They had yet to appreciate that business success and their own future prosperity and well-being might depend on environmental protection (Schmidheiny, 1992).

Emergent or developmental problems are one of three closely linked problem types (the other two are *programming* and *operational* problems). Programming problems are created once emergent problems are understood and applicable values, norms, goals, and directions are articulated. To make progress on a programming problem, change advocates must create an effective strategy embedded in policies and programs that can resolve the problem in light of desired values, norms, goals, and directions. Once a strategy is set, the problem becomes operational; the question becomes how the strategy can best be implemented. Change agents dealing with an operational problem focus on priority setting, budgets, timetables, regulations, standard procedures, and so on.

The rational planning model would suggest addressing problems in the order presented—namely, emergent problems first, programming problems second, and operational problems third. This was the approach taken by Schmidheiny as he tried to make businesspeople aware of the threat that environmental degradation posed to business success. It was also the approach taken by the physicians who raised the alarm about the mysterious disease

that would later be identified as AIDS. Often as not, however, in the real world of public policy making the process begins with operational failure. The Rio Conference on Environment and Development was convened because existing government regulations and modern business practices were failing to stem pollution and the loss of natural resources. Wildlife, seacoasts, and local fishing industries continued to be destroyed by oil spills. Reforestation programs were driving out native species. Modern food production and dissemination systems were contributing to increased obesity among U.S. and European citizens while millions of people in Africa faced famine. Fossil fuel consumption fostered global warming. Production using outmoded technologies left former Soviet countries with innumerable polluted waterways and denuded forests.

Operational failure can lead to reviewing and rehashing appropriate strategies and programming problems; rethinking appropriate and politically acceptable values, norms, or goals; or redefining appreciation of emergent or developmental problems. For example, the World Business Council has recommended a host of alternative strategies as a result of its stakeholder consultations and other research. Among them are more reliance on underused economic tools, such as full-cost pricing and polluter-pays principles. The council also has objected to setting radically different goals, and it has developed new ways of understanding the problem of environmental degradation through a call for sustainable consumption and "eco-efficiency."

We return to this discussion in Chapter Five, when we describe in more detail the process of tackling public problems. For now, we simply emphasize that change advocates can begin with operational problems and political decision making, or with emergent problems and rational planning. To be effective, however, they need to adopt a shared-power approach that includes elements of both political decision making and rational planning. At some point in the policy change process, they have to create shared-power networks of groups and organizations that engage in issue-oriented political decision making aimed at developing widely shared appreciation of what the problems are and what can be done about them. They also need to help their constituents develop shared understanding of why it is important to solve the problems, and what vision of the future they want to achieve. Additionally, change advocates face the ongoing challenge of how to

establish incentives and systems of mutual accountability that keep the participants in a shared-power network working together.

Some readers may consider our focus on public *problems and needs* to be unduly negative. They might prefer that we emphasize instead *challenges,* or else the *assets* of an organization or community and how they might serve the aspiration for a better future. Indeed, we direct attention to assets and how they can be multiplied in shared-power arrangements. We will prompt policy entrepreneurs to focus on desired outcomes and better futures. We think of *problem* in keeping with its Greek roots, as something thrown forward for citizens to work with. (See Chapter Seven for elaboration of our view of public problems.)

What Do We Mean by Shared Power?

Our conception of the shared-power world began developing in the early 1980s and was influenced considerably by a 1984 Humphrey Institute conference on shared power, inspired by Harlan Cleveland and organized by John Bryson and Robert Einsweiler (see Bryson and Einsweiler, 1991, for selected conference presentations). The conference theme reflected an atmosphere of disillusionment with the grand U.S. government schemes of the 1960s and growing recognition of global interdependence and complexity. Old notions of leaders who were in charge of situations, organizations, and even nations seemed not to apply.

We were convinced that a new understanding of power was required to explain why some groups and organizations were able to accomplish significant change in such a world. Moreover, we hoped to enable many more groups and organizations to make beneficial progress on difficult public problems. As we studied successful change efforts, we realized that organizations had to find a way to tap each other's resources (broadly conceived) in order to work effectively on public problems. That is, they had to engage in sharing activities, which vary in level of commitment and loss of autonomy. Moving from least to most commitment and loss of autonomy, these are the methods of sharing:

1. Information sharing and informal coordination
2. Formal coordination through shared activities or resources to achieve a common objective

3. Shared power
4. Shared authority

We focus on shared power because this level of sharing is usually most effective in tackling difficult public problems and because it does not require the tremendous effort and cost of merging authority. (Merging authority is difficult because participants can be expected to resist the massive loss of autonomy that merger entails.) We define *shared power* following Giddens (1979, p. 90; 1984) and Bryson and Einsweiler (1991, p. 3) as *actors jointly exercising their capabilities related to a problem in order to further their separate and joint aims.* The actors may be individuals, groups, or organizations working together in order to achieve joint gains or avoid losses. Power sharing requires a common or mutual objective held by two or more actors, whether or not the objective is explicitly stated, agreed upon, or even clearly understood. Yet shared-power arrangements remain a "mixed-motive" situation, in which participants reserve the right of "exit" (Hirschman, 1970) to protect their other, unshared objectives. Of course, exit may not be easy or even possible, as when the shared-power arrangements have been mandated by a government body, foundation, or other powerful organization.

Viewed another way, shared-power arrangements exist in the midrange of a continuum of how organizations work on public problems. At one end of the continuum are organizations that hardly relate to each other or are adversaries, dealing with a problem that extends beyond their capabilities. At the other end are organizations merged into a new entity that can handle the problem through merged authority and capabilities. In the midrange are organizations that share information, undertake joint projects, or develop shared-power arrangements such as collaborations or coalitions (see also Himmelman, 1996). Particular policy change efforts are likely to involve all the relationship types along the continuum (see Figure 1.5).

To adapt a phrase from the international relations literature, leaders can think of an enduring, multiparty shared-power arrangement as a "policy regime." Stephen Krasner defines regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area" (Krasner, 1983, p. 2; see also Lauria, 1997). A regime

Figure 1.5. Continuum of Organizational Sharing.

What is Shared	Mechanism for Sharing			
Authority				Merger
Power			Collaboration	
Activities & resources		Coordination		
Information	Communication			
Nothing	None			

is a system embracing many groups, organizations, and one or more institutions (when an institution is defined as a persistent pattern of social interaction).

Just as Krasner found the concept of the regime critical to understanding stability, change, and creation of desirable outcomes in international relations, we find it helpful in understanding how interorganizational networks can tackle complex public problems. A policy regime embodies ways of appreciating these problems and implementing strategies for remedying them. The most useful policy regime is likely to be a *regime of mutual gain,* which will tap and serve people's deepest interests in, and desire for, a better world for themselves and those they care about. A regime of this kind achieves widespread, lasting benefit at reasonable cost (Ostrom, 1990; Bellah and others, 1991; Cleveland, 1993). It is also vital to attend to those who aren't benefited by a regime of mutual gain, if it is to be truly sustainable, and to consider that differing regimes may be in destabilizing conflict with each other. Thomas Friedman describes the emergence of a "globalization" regime that has produced benefits for a large number of people of diverse backgrounds (Friedman, 2000); yet for many others, the disruption caused by this regime has been painful, even deadly (Klein, 2002; Roy, 2001). Samuel Huntington, meanwhile, describes other contemporary expansive regimes, which he calls civilizations, constituting opposing blocs that define themselves through differing cultural and political traditions (Huntington, 1996).

Let's consider how a Minnesota leader helped create a shared-power arrangement that she hopes can foster a regime of mutual

gain. In 1998 Jan Hively, who has a lengthy record of public service in Minnesota, became concerned about the "graying" of her state's rural communities. Young people were migrating away from small towns, just as so-called baby boomers were nearing retirement age. Hively was working in rural Minnesota as part of her outreach job in the University of Minnesota's College of Education and Human Development. She soon joined a project sponsored by the Minnesota Board on Aging that was studying how to help older adults lead productive and satisfying lives. She was especially interested in how new technologies might be used to connect older adults with employment and service opportunities. With encouragement from an assistant commissioner in the Minnesota Department of Human Services, Hively joined Hal Freshley, from the Minnesota Board on Aging, and Darlene Schroeder, from the Elder Advocacy Network in rural Minnesota, in launching the Vital Aging Initiative, an effort to gather information about older adults' activities and interest in further education. Hively also worked with educators in the University of Minnesota Extension Service on a proposal to bolster the Vital Aging Initiative with a program that would "connect older adults across the state with education programs that support their employability, self-sufficiency, community participation, and personal enrichment" (Hively, 2002, p. 3). The university provost approved funding for the program, which sponsored forums around the state, issued publications, and started several collaborative education programs.

These efforts were the impetus for founding the Vital Aging Network (VAN), which grew out of a meeting convened by Freshley in fall 2000. The network was a shared-power arrangement; participants came from several parts of the University of Minnesota (Extension Service, Continuing Education, and other departments), the Minnesota Board on Aging, the Department of Human Services, and nonprofit senior organizations and networks. The participants began meeting regularly to share information and plan specific projects, such as a Vital Aging Summit and a VAN Website. The university supplied funds, staffing, and technical support for starting the Website; other organizations provided planning assistance and convened meetings. Following the summit, the VAN organizers developed an ambitious plan to promote a "strengths-based perspective" on aging instead of "the traditional

needs-based perspective" (Hively, 2002, p. 7). Hively, Freshley, and Schroeder clearly envisioned a new regime of mutual gain, which Hively described as a "grassroots liberation movement" breaking down stereotypes and linking older adults with resources that help them be productive citizens (Hively, 2002).

You may now want to analyze a public problem that concerns you in light of the shared-power model. Exercise 1.1 poses some questions that should help. You may also want to consult Exhibit 1.1, which defines the main concepts introduced so far in this chapter. The next section continues the discussion of a shared-power world by considering why shared-power regimes are increasingly necessary.

Causes and Consequences of a Shared-Power World

Today's shared-power world arises from a number of interconnected causes and produces many interconnected consequences. At the outset of the twenty-first century, many wise observers have described the growing interdependence, complexity, and diversity of human societies, which is due to the information revolution, the

Exercise 1.1. Understanding Public Problems in a Shared-Power World.

1. Identify a need or problem in your organization, community, nation, or beyond that requires cooperation or collaboration among diverse individuals, groups, or organizations.
2. Who are the main stakeholders (those affected by the problem; those with responsibility for resolving it; those with resources, including knowledge, that relate to the problem)?
3. Describe the existing connections among these stakeholders:
   - Which networks and coalitions exist?
   - Which policy regimes are important?
4. In what ways is this an emergent, programming, or operational problem?
5. Which individuals and groups might have a passion for remedying the problem?

Exhibit 1.1. Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-Power World: Some Definitions.

Term	Definition
Public problem	Affects diverse stakeholders Cannot be solved by single organization Likely to demand extensive collaboration Resists short-term, piecemeal solution
Emergent or developmental problem	Complex problem that is as yet ill-defined and for which no clear solutions exist
Programming problem	Created once emergent problems are understood and applicable values, norms, goals, and directions are articulated
Operational problem	Concerns how strategies can best be implemented
Stakeholders	Individuals, groups, or organizations that are affected by a public problem, have partial responsibility to act on it, or control important resources
Shared power	Actors jointly exercising their capabilities related to a problem in order to further their separate and joint aims
Shared-power world	Highly networked policy environment in which many individuals, groups, and organizations have partial responsibility to act on public problems, but not enough power to resolve the problems alone; power is fragmented; decision making is messy and seemingly chaotic; shifting coalitions form and dissipate

Exhibit 1.1. Tackling Public Problems in a Shared-Power World: Some Definitions, Cont'd.

Term	Definition
Shared-power arrangements	Partnerships, coalitions, collaborations, regimes
Policy regimes	Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given policy area (based on Krasner, 1983, p. 2)
Regimes of mutual gain	Achieve widespread lasting benefit at reasonable cost; tap and serve people's deepest interest in, and desire for, a better world for themselves and those they care about

burgeoning global arms trade and terrorist threats, the dominance of the global market economy, the scale of environmental problems, massive refugee flows within continents and across oceans, rising demands for human rights, and a declining capacity to govern. The result is a world in which rapid, often unpredictable, change is ubiquitous and not always beneficent.

The Wired and Wireless World

In April 2002, the one billionth personal computer was shipped from a manufacturer. About half of the first billion are actually installed, and most are connected to the Internet. Another billion are expected to be shipped by 2007 (Blasko, 2002).

The explosion in computing power, the spread of personal computers, and the advance of wired and wireless telecommunications technologies have produced a massive and rapid flow of information around the world. Because the Internet can permit

access to a host of networks and because centralized authorities have difficulty controlling it, in some ways it allows individuals or small groups to become more powerful political and economic actors. This marriage of computers and communications technology (Cleveland, 2002) has led to what some observers call the knowledge economy, which is increasingly supplanting the manufacturing economy and which requires a labor force of knowledge workers. In this wired world, "virtual teams" and "virtual organizations" are not only possible but often required.

The explosion of computing and communications technology has a host of benefits, but it also brings new difficulties. For example, many of us are burdened by the expectation that we will be constantly hooked up and available. We can see danger in the assumption that because information is more quickly obtainable, decisions will be made and implemented more quickly. We also find it difficult to assess the reliability of some of the information that is so accessible. We struggle to manage relationships, teams, and organizations without much face-to-face interaction. Our tendency toward short-term thinking and a desire for instant gratification may be reinforced (Hutton, 2003).

Social critics highlight the division between those who have access to the new technologies and those who don't. If the new dominant theme is "I am connected, therefore I exist" (Rifkin, 2000, p. 208), then to be disconnected is to not exist. Of those billion computers, 63.4 percent went to buyers in the United States; Japan received 9 percent of the shipments. Only 4.1 percent went to buyers in all of Latin America. "In a society built around access relations," Jeremy Rifkin says, "whoever owns the channels of communication and controls the passageways into the networks determines who is a player and who sits out" (2000, p. 178). Additionally, those who have knowledge skills are far more attractive employees in a wired world than those without such skills.

Global Arms Trade and the Threat of Terrorism

Scientific advances of the twentieth century gave human beings tremendous collective power to make the world better (through, for example, vaccines against terrible diseases such as smallpox, or systems for delivering safe drinking water) as well as frightening

power to destroy it (through, for example, nuclear warfare). As we noted in our earlier version of this book, over the last several decades supposedly advanced nations have used technological breakthroughs to build enough nuclear and chemical weaponry to destroy virtually every living thing. Now people worry that a relatively small group of terrorists affiliated with political or religious factions will also gain access to some of these weapons. Meanwhile, vast numbers of "conventional" arms are produced (mainly by U.S., European, and Russian companies) and help to fuel ongoing conflict in some of the world's poorest nations. (For extensive information on global arms production and trade, see the Website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Initiative, http://www.sipri.se.)

Global Economy

The global market economy has risen to ascendance in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Thomas Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (2000) offers statistics and stories to demonstrate the tremendous recent growth in the flow of capital, goods, services, and information in the global marketplace. The growth of transportation systems and advanced telecommunications and computing facilitates this flow. In *The Age of Access,* Rifkin argues that networks are in a sense replacing markets in this economy; he identifies a shift away from actual exchange of tangible property to "short-term access between servers and clients operating in a network relationship" (2000, p. 4).

The global economy brings both expanded opportunities and threats. New communications technology, for example, makes it possible for a technical adviser in India to efficiently serve computer users in the United States; improved transportation contributes to the global spread of AIDS. Workers in one country may lose their jobs when a factory relocates halfway round the world, bringing jobs to another group of people; meanwhile, international mechanisms for preventing worker exploitation and destruction of natural resources are weak. Local cultures may be threatened by the influx of multinational food chains and entertainment media.

Several observers worry about the effect global economic forces have on social cohesion. Rifkin describes the emerging world as a

place in which "virtually every activity outside the confines of family relations is a paid-for experience, a world in which traditional reciprocal obligations and expectations—mediated by feelings of faith, empathy, and solidarity—are replaced by contractual relations in the form of paid memberships, subscriptions, admission charges, retainers, and fees" (Rifkin, 2000, p. 9).

Environmental Degradation

Such environmental problems as global warming, acid rain, and pollution of waterways and seas know no national boundaries. The pollutants spewed from a factory's smokestack in one country may destroy forests in another country. CO_2 emissions from cars in an urban center contribute to climate change for the entire world. (Meanwhile, the oxygen produced by rainforests in Brazil benefits people in other countries as well.) In November 2002 a crippled oil tanker spilled thousands of tons of fuel oil near Spain's Galician coast, damaging one of Europe's richest coastal habitats and devastating the local fishing industry. The boat, on its way from Latvia, had been built in Japan, was flagged in the Bahamas, was piloted by a Greek captain and owned by a Greek company, and was insured by a British company. A Dutch company tried to salvage oil from the wreckage.

The need to reduce environmental damage also causes tension between the industrialized nations and poor nations. Representatives of poor nations question the fairness of international efforts to control pollution from their developing industries, when the nations that are already industrialized did not face such restrictions as their economies developed, and when some of those nations are still unwilling to do their part to cut pollution.

Population Shifts

The number of refugees fleeing their home country because of war, famine, or oppression has grown tremendously in recent years. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that about twenty million of the world's people are refugees and another thirty million have been displaced within their own country (http://www.unhcr.ch/un&ref/numbers/numbers.htm). Ad-

ditionally, immigrants seeking better economic opportunity continue flowing across national borders. The receiving countries gain workers and increased ethnic diversity, but they also experience tension between old and new cultures, and social services may be overtaxed. Our own state of Minnesota is a prime example. The aftermath of the Vietnam War brought an influx of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; according to 2000 census data, the state is home to 42,000 Hmong Americans, 18,500 Vietnamese Americans, and 5,500 to 6,500 Cambodian Americans. Recently, Somalian refugees have settled in the state, along with smaller groups from Sierra Leone, Zaire, and Sudan. The state also continues to attract a sizeable number of immigrants from Central and South America.

Another important population shift is migration within a country from rural to urban areas, a movement that in many cases overwhelms the urban infrastructure. City residents thus find they have an interest in improving business opportunities in rural areas in order to decrease the exodus from the countryside.

Growth in the Demand for Human Rights and Democratic Governance

An international human rights regime has taken hold in the last three decades. Comprising most of the world's nations, a series of U.N. treaties, U.N. conferences, a host of civil society organizations, and various (often weak) enforcement mechanisms, this regime in a sense makes the citizens of every country responsible for all the other citizens of the world. The regime is also a force for democratization and thus for the spread of power to many more of the world's people, since it supports everyone's right to participate in the decisions that affect his or her life.

Other forces contributing to democratization are the downfall of the Soviet Union, the information revolution, the demands of a market economy, and the spread of education (Cleveland, 2002). New and emerging democracies (South Africa, Nigeria, Poland, the Czech Republic, and others) still are struggling to build sustainable democratic systems, but they have made tremendous progress. Even in China, the last remaining major Communist power, the state has considerably loosened control over citizens' lives.

Decline in Capacity to Govern, Blurred Boundaries

Interconnectedness, speed, and complexity have reduced the capacity of any single organization, especially a government, to manage and to govern (Peters, 1996b; Kettl, 2000). Management professor Peter Vaill expresses this state vividly when he describes today's organizations as operating in "permanent whitewater" (Vaill, 1996). The shared-power, no-one-in-charge world is one of shifting currents, impermanent coalitions, seemingly chaotic decision making, and what Janowitz (1978) calls "weak regimes." Moreover, the distinctions between domestic and global affairs are eroding. The same is true for distinctions among the responsibilities of local, state, or provincial governments and national governments; among business, government, and civil society; and between policy areas (Kellerman, 1999; Kettl, 2000, 2002). The United States may have emerged as the world's sole superpower, but this does not mean that unilateral action by the United States is well received or even effective (Sarder and Davies, 2002). The United States will continue to need allies in pursuing its goals. Meanwhile, China and regional groupings, notably the European Union, continue to gather strength.

Charles Handy, another well-known management professor, predicts more federalist structures will be developed to cope with this turbulent world: "Societies will break down into smaller units but will also regroup into even larger ones than now for particular purposes. Federalism, an old doctrine, will become fashionable once again, in spite of its inherent contradictions" (1996, p. 7). He believes that businesses too need to be more federalist. Jean Lipman-Blumen, a professor of organizational behavior and management, echoes his view as she heralds "the connective era" characterized by "loosely structured global networks of global organizations and nations tied to multiple subnetworks, living in a clumsy federated world (and sharing space in the archetype of interdependence, the natural environment). These networks link all kinds of groups, with long chains of leaders and supporters who communicate, debate, negotiate, and collaborate to accomplish their objectives" (Lipman-Blumen, 1996, p. 9).

In such a world, governance is increasingly shared among governments, civil society organizations, and businesses (Peters, 1996b;

Rifkin, 2000; Cleveland, 2002; Holliday, 2002). Handy adds, "The softer words of leadership and vision and common purpose will replace the tougher words of control and authority because the tougher words won't bite any more" (1996, p.7).

In other words, the demand for shared-power arrangements is growing. Such arrangements are designed to increase governance and management capacity in this world that is *functionally* interconnected but *structurally* divided, and in which structural separations are often based on strongly held ideological beliefs. Such shared-power arrangements are not easy solutions to easy problems. Instead, they are usually difficult-to-implement-and-manage responses to thorny problems.

The Need for Leadership

For some people, attention to the shared-power world may evoke cynicism and despair. They say this is just more of what we already knew: powerful elites have their shared-power arrangements, from interlocking corporate directorships to organized crime. These elites make the rules, control the resources, and even determine what counts as knowledge and rationality (see Flyvbjerg, 1998).

This perspective is refuted by the cases of policy change we have studied and the complex, comprehensive view of leadership we have developed. In our view, potential for effective leadership lies alike with those who do and do not have formal positions of power and authority. Indeed, this view of leadership may be most useful in reminding those with little formal authority how powerful they can be through collaboration (Marris, 1996), and in reminding those in a supposedly powerful position just how much they rely on numerous stakeholders for any real power they have. Ours is not a zero-sum view. A shared-power arrangement enhances the power of the participants beyond the sum of their separate capabilities. Moreover, our view is based on an expansive model of what constitutes power. We see power as not just the ability to make and implement decisions (a traditional view) but also the ability to sanction conduct and, most important, to create and communicate shared meaning (an understanding that is elaborated in Chapter Three).

Leaders who focus on building shared-power arrangements enhance the power of the groups involved by reducing the risk for

the participants and by sharing responsibility. If things go well, no person or group gets all the credit, but if things go badly they won't get all the blame either. Second, leaders of a change effort can use a shared-power arrangement simply to manage complexity and interconnectedness—as in a policy network, interorganizational or intergovernmental agreement, federation, business-government partnership, or a variety of other collaborations.

Finally, leaders can change how they view interconnectedness. A perception of risk and complexity may be more a consequence of a particular worldview than of a changed reality (Luke, 1991). For people in societies (such as the United States) that value autonomy and capacity for unilateral action, interconnectedness often means undesirable complexity and risk. It is possible, however, to value interconnectedness as a good in itself because it is a reflection of our situation in societies and in the natural environment (Wheatley, 1999, 2002; Youngblood, 1997). In *Bowling Alone,* Robert Putnam highlights research that indicates people who have multiple social connections are likely to be healthier and happier than people with few connections (Putnam, 2000). He also argues persuasively that rich social networks (social capital) benefit the societies in which they are embedded—by, for example, establishing a culture of reciprocity and helping people be more productive.

Using and creating social networks was crucial for the progress that change advocates such as Marcus Conant and Michael Gottlieb were able to make in California during the early years of the AIDS crisis. These and other physicians, public health officials, and gay activists teamed up in 1982 to generate resources for research and for support of AIDS sufferers. Tangible results included creation of the Kaposi's Sarcoma Research and Education Foundation (later the AIDS Foundation); funding from San Francisco's board of supervisors for an AIDS clinic, a nonprofit program supporting people with AIDS, and an education program to be conducted by the new foundation; and funds from the California legislature for AIDS research. Cooperative arrangements among medical researchers also contributed to progress in identifying the AIDS virus. In 1985, when Rock Hudson's death and a growing number of nongay deaths (along with a horrifying level of deaths among gay men) finally made it impossible for citizens and their elected representatives to ignore the disease, the preexisting col-

laborations among AIDS activists, medical professionals, congressional staff, and others were a foundation for concerted progress on a number of fronts.

By approving the African American Men Project, Hennepin County commissioners were establishing a shared-power arrangement that brings leaders from community and nonprofit groups together with elected officials, university researchers, and public professionals to break an oppressive cycle that has trapped African American men and deprived their families and the broader community of their potential as citizens, workers, and fathers. The arrangement has produced public conferences, impressive research studies, and commitment from the county board and community partners to a host of specific actions.

The corporate executives who have joined the World Business Council for Sustainable Development not only are participating in a shared-power arrangement (the council) but are promoting numerous additional shared-power arrangements—for example, an international system of quality standards and binding international agreements to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases—that are good for business and the environment.

The founders of the Vital Aging Network have maximized their impact by creating a network of networks. Some of those networks—such as university campuses, libraries, and senior centers—have considerable resources that can be marshaled on behalf of VAN. Other networks may have little money and minimal infrastructure, but they bring the energy of active citizens who can supply firsthand knowledge of community needs, as well as personal experience and hope for the future. The VAN Website is a powerful tool for making the resources of these networks accessible to older adults throughout the state; the Website also attracts users from elsewhere in the United States and even outside the country. Aging activists in other states have created Websites based on the VAN design and linked them to that site.

Our view of leadership speaks to people's yearning for empowerment and improved prospects for themselves and their children (Burns, 2003). It is democratic work of the type championed by political philosophers Mary Dietz (2002) and Harry Boyte (1989). Both are interested in a revitalized citizenship, or democratic work, that "entails the collective and participatory engagement of historically

situated and culturally constituted persons-as-citizens in the determination of the affairs of their polity" (Dietz, 2002, p. 35).

Notions of a shared-power world and the desire to revitalize or expand democracy have caused the old image of the leader as the one in charge of a hierarchical organization to diminish considerably since we wrote the first version of this book. At the start of the twenty-first century, images such as "catalytic leader," "co-leader," "connective leader," "quiet leader," and even "invisible leader" have become prominent. Shared, collaborative, collective, and distributed leadership are recognized and lauded.

Leaders rooted in a networked world may or may not have positions of authority. They inspire and motivate constituents through persuasion, example, and empowerment, not through command and control. They lead up and out rather than down, to borrow imagery from Mark Moore (1995) and Dee Hock (2002). Such leaders foster dialogue with their constituents and the situations in which they find themselves, and they encourage collective action to tackle real problems. Further, they claim and make use of the powers they do have to push for changes in a world often resistant to their demands. As the antislavery leader Frederick Douglass found, leaders must forcefully wield their own power if they expect to overcome entrenched power.

All this does not mean that the in-charge leadership image has disappeared or completely lost its usefulness. The connective or quiet leader sometimes has to make a decision and implement it using whatever powers and controls he or she has. Similarly, leaders who are formally in charge know they often must consult and compromise with other powerful people before acting. In a shared-power situation, however, leadership that encourages the participation of others must be emphasized because only it has the power to inspire and mobilize those others. In the effort to tackle public problems, leadership and power must be consciously shared with a view to eventually creating power-sharing institutions within a regime of mutual gain. As Robert Bellah and his coauthors argue, "The public lives through those institutions that cultivate a constituency of conscience and vision. To achieve the common good, leaders and citizens create and sustain such institutions and use them to change other institutions" (Bellah and others, 1991, p. 271).

Summary

If you seek to bring about major social change—whether it be halting the spread of AIDS or improving economic opportunities in your community—you need to understand and act in accordance with the dynamics of today's shared-power world. In this world, public problems such as AIDS or poverty are embedded in a complex system of diverse, interconnected parts. Many individuals, groups, and organizations have some stake in the problem, but no one of them has enough power to resolve it alone.

In such a world, leaders cannot rely on hierarchic bureaucratic models to bring about needed change. Rational planning on its own is ineffective. Instead, leaders must increasingly focus on building and altering shared-power arrangements within and among organizations, and they must engage in political decision making. These strategies should be aimed at developing a widely shared understanding of a public problem and potential solutions, and at building coalitions to support proposed changes and eventually establish a regime of mutual gain. To foster understanding of a complex public problem, leaders should promote an appreciative approach that helps participants delve into multiple causes and consequences of the problem and develop a sense of desired improvements.

The heightened importance of a shared-power perspective stems from several interrelated developments: the effects of advanced telecommunications and computer technology, the proliferation of nuclear and conventional arms and fear of terrorism, the ascendance of the market economy, continued degradation of the natural environment, a massive flow of refugees across national borders along with an exodus from rural to urban areas, increased demand for human rights, and a decline in the capacity to govern. These developments and the complexity of the shared-power model can be daunting for those undertaking major change efforts, but they can also be viewed as offering multiple opportunities and levers for an expansive and inclusive style of leadership. The next chapter considers several of the leadership capabilities encompassed by this new approach.