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# THE GLOBAL JIHAD

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## INTRODUCTION—WHERE IS THE JIHAD TODAY?

In the years since the tragic events of 9/11 the United States and the International community has landed heavy blows against the world-wide Islamist movement, or what we will call the Global Jihad. By destroying the Taliban State in Afghanistan, crippling the insurgency in Iraq, and making it more difficult for International financial support for the Jihad—along with a general increase in security measures, as well as advances in Intelligence gathering, not to mention killing and capturing senior al-Qaeda figures—the United States and the International community seems to be prevailing. But is this really the case?

The Global Jihad is a many-headed Hydra and, in the finest tradition of asymmetrical conflicts, is almost infinitely capable of change. More importantly, the same fanatical zeal that caused 19 Jihadists to bring about the deaths of nearly 3000 Americans has not diminished and may have increased and spread. Indeed, there may be unintended consequences of our success against the physical bastions of the movement. If the movement can recruit effectively on an international basis, arm its adherents with know-how about bomb-making

techniques, and use the laws of democracies in its favor, it may be even more dangerous than it was before and may also be more capable of using the weapon of Suicide Terror and in more devastating ways than we have thus far seen despite our countermeasures—mostly based on the reaction to 9/11.

In today's post 9/11 era, from a Dorm room at Georgia Tech near Atlanta, two U.S. citizens were able to contact a group in Canada named "Toronto 18" who are alleged to have planned attacks against targets in Canada. Twenty-one-year-old Syed Haris Ahmed and his friend Ehsanul Sadequee admitted that they had taken films of Capitol Hill and other Washington landmarks to help plan terror attacks and had uploaded these to websites. They joined an International cast of characters that only begins with the Toronto 18, a group that included 14 adults and 14 youths. (See Appendix 2 for details.)

The videos they shot were found on the computer of one Younis Tsouli, better known on line as Irhabi007 or Terrorist007, who is now serving 10 years in the United Kingdom. According to a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs,<sup>1</sup> Tsoulis had helped the late Abu Musa al-Zarqawi, head of al-Qaeda Iraq, and his spiritual mentor, Abu Muhammed Maqdisi, disseminate the writings of both, along with ghastly films of the beheadings of innocent Western journalists and U.S. workers in Iraq. Tsoulis also helped the progenitors of the Global Jihad: Abu Qatada; Abu Hamza al-Masri from the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in London; Abdullah Azzam, the mentor of Osama bin Laden, and his early sources of inspiration; and Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood. These are all hallowed names for Jihadists over the world. The links go even deeper: Irhabi007 was known to have the trust of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's leading theoretician. On the versatile 22-year-old's computers were also found the declaration of 45 doctors that wanted to fire bomb London.

This has caused an incredible proliferation of Internet activity and organization—certainly enough to firmly threaten our cities and institutions.<sup>2</sup> Anyone doubting that the virtual can become real should look carefully at the London Bombings of July 7, 2005, where four born-in-Britain terrorists caused havoc and destruction on a scale unknown in London since World War II utilizing Suicide bombing, inspired by just this type of Internet Jihad. The London attack, like others in Europe, is a disturbing precursor—almost a warning that home-grown terrorism and the use of Suicide Bombers in our own cities may not be long in coming.<sup>3</sup>

The Global Jihad has changed its method of operations, but the reasons for the Global Jihad are the same; they have not changed much since the 1970s and may not have changed much since the beginning of the seventh century.

## **DO WE NEED TO KNOW WHY?**

Why should the context of Suicide Terror attacks interest First Responders, concerned as they should be with detecting, preventing, or responding to acts of

terror? Are the “Why’s” of Terror attacks at all relevant to carrying out the mission of protecting the U.S. Homeland?

In 1989, in Southern Florida, at the University of South Florida’s Tampa campus, on a narrow, dead-end, 130th Street, a sign was affixed to the last house on the block memorializing Izz al-Din al-Quassam, the name of an early Jihadist who was killed by the British in Yabrod, Palestine in 1935.<sup>4</sup>

To anyone that understands the International Global Jihad, this name appearing on a building is a sign. The name has become a symbol of heroism, resistance, occupation, and invasion to an entire generation of terrorists. Indeed a whole modern terror brigade is named after Izz al-Din al-Quassam, a brigade with a fearsome record of killing and maiming innocent Israelis (see Chapter 2, page 94).

Seeing this on a University Building, being used as a Mosque by then Professor Sami Al-Arian of the University of South Florida (served a sentence for activities in support of terrorism), should have meant something.<sup>5</sup> Sami al-Arian’s background should have indicated a problem; his whole life was a series of Jihadi networks. He was at the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University with Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (the operational head of the 9/11 attacks) and Mazen al-Najjar, later deported for supporting terrorism. All three were known as the *Mullahs* at North Carolina, and al-Arian and al-Najjar were members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These terror networks meant that al-Arian was associated with Khalil Shikaki, brother of the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Fathi Shikaki, and that he was closely associated with Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, former adjunct professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Southern Florida who later turned up as the General Secretary of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

We also have to ask if understanding the meaning of that sign might have had some tangible and important intangible results. If we had better understood, might we have curtailed the career of an important front-man, organizer, and financier for some of the most vicious terror groups in the world? We also have to ask how many radicalized members of the international Global Jihad are still in Tampa and how many have spread to other cities within the United States and other Western countries since 1989—ready to become active at any time? We have to ask how much money was raised between that sign appearing in 1989 and how much made its way to the coffers of al-Qaeda, possibly contributing to the events of 9/11?

There appear to be real measurable gains in having an understanding of an ideology and its goals. But there are also important intangible advantages.

These events, occurring here in the United States in 1989, before the first Iraq War, a dozen years before the 9/11 attacks, and much before the First Gulf War let alone the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, should, at the very least, help inform us that the Global Jihad began in another time and must be using the weapon of suicide terror for its own reasons—removed from whatever has happened in Iraq and Afghanistan recently. As we have already seen in the introduction to this book, suicide bombing became a tactical weapon of the

Global Jihad in Lebanon in 1983. By understanding the history, we understand that this is not a land dispute as some have judged.<sup>6</sup>

Without understanding why suicide terror is used by terror groups, there is no hope that we will achieve the goal of detecting and preventing these attacks; therefore we will be reacting to attacks, not even responding. To understand why these attacks are used, we need to understand what the Global Jihad is really about. Without this, First Responders will be denied any chance of achieving the goal of keeping the United States safe from attack. We have to develop public policy that confronts these acts and then influences the procedures and planning that regulate First Response accordingly.

If we do not have an accurate understanding but believe what the adversary wants us to believe, we will make costly policy and procedure errors. Believing, for example, that the prime motivation of terrorists is to liberate their land, not have foreigners on their shores, not be humiliated by our Western culture, and so on, brings us to the conclusion that this is a Foreign Policy/Political issue that can be settled by “talking to them.” Terrorists *do* want to achieve all these goals, but they have much greater ambitions that make the achievements of these goals interim successes in a much longer struggle with a very clear final result. As Sami al-Arian put it, speaking in Arabic to his followers before he was unmasked as the terrorist instead of the friendly, harmless professor: “The War of the ‘ummah’ against the Kufar (the infidel) ... won’t happen in a single attack but will be a long struggle.”<sup>7</sup>

A historical analogy can make this very clear. In the pre-World War II period, the appeasement movement in the United Kingdom, led by the then Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, interpreted Hitler’s expansionist goals as a “land Issue” over the future of the Sudetenland, then a disputed part of Czechoslovakia. Although Hitler had been crystal clear in his own *Mein Kampf* (*in Arabic, this book’s title is Jihadi—or my Jihad*) written almost 20 years before, about what he ultimately wanted to achieve, the British Prime Minister found it convenient to base policy on a mistaken understanding of the context of Hitler’s Czechoslovakian actions. As a consequence, Britain did not re-arm quickly enough, did not make any preparations for countering Hitler’s policy of extreme rearmament, and so was unprepared when Hitler attacked Poland and put the rest of his policy of conquest on full display. It is estimated that more than 60 million people lost their lives during the 6 years of World War II in Europe and Asia. A little understanding of context can go a long way.<sup>8</sup>

The Global Jihad is much more complex than Hitler’s European ambitions because it is not being waged by one dictator but being waged, as we will see, by an amorphous, transnational force using al-Qaeda and others in much the same way as we understand a *brand* but with a radical twist: an idea, or a label under which they fight us. This should not obscure their real goals and ideology.<sup>9</sup>

Understanding the Global Jihad, and the origins and goals of the Jihadist cause, will therefore give First Responders and policy makers the basic understanding they need to *begin* confronting this threat.

## THE MEANING OF THE JIHAD FOR THE JIHADISTS (*MUJAHEDDEEN*)

The following is a fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden on February 23 1998, concerning Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their Allies—civilians and military—is an *individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it*. ... We—with Allah’s help—call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and wishes to be rewarded to comply with *Allah’s order to kill Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it*. We also call on the Muslim ulema (scholars), leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch a raid on Satan’s U.S. troops and the devil’s supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so they may learn a lesson.

In the aftermath of 9/11, analysts in the West sought to understand how 19 individuals could slaughter nearly 3000 Americans in a hideous suicide terror attack that was unprecedented in scale and brutality and, most of all, clearly directed at innocent noncombatants with complete premeditation and with killing *per se* being one of its goals. As it became clear that al-Qaeda was responsible, the *fatwa* issued in 1998 declaring war against Crusaders and Jews took on new meaning.

“We have the right to kill 4 million Americans—two million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands” said al-Qaeda spokesman Sulaiman Abu Ghaith.<sup>10</sup> Abu Ghaith’s statement, proclaiming a veritable genocide against Americans, escalates the horror of 9/11 by stating numbers that signal unconventional attacks or worse. Where does this “right” to kill indiscriminately come from? This is especially important because these statements by Jihadists are backed up by the most careful religious exegesis.

## THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE GLOBAL JIHAD

The concept of Jihad is embedded in the Quran throughout. Some of the critical verses are:

Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold forbidden that which hath been forbidden by Allah and his Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of truth (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued. Quran 9:29

Fight and Slay the Pagans wherever you find them, and seize them, beleaguer them and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. Quran 9:5

Fighting is prescribed for you, and ye dislike it. But it is possible that ye dislike a thing which is good for you, and that ye love which is bad for you. But Allah knows and ye know not. Quran 2:216

Based on Islamic *Fiqh*, or *Islamic Jurisprudence*, Jihad has been defined in legal terms:

Jihad is fighting anybody who stands in the way of spreading Islam or fighting anyone who refuses to enter into Islam. Based on Surah 8:39

O you who believe! Fight the infidels who dwell around you and let them see how ruthless you can be. Know that Allah is with the righteous. Quran 9:123.

The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution or crucifixion, or the cutting off of the hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land. Quran 5:33

To go with many verses that speak in this vein, there are also at least 114 verses in the Quran that speak of love, peace, and forgiveness, especially the Surah named the Heifer (Surah 2:62, 109).<sup>11</sup> As with any faith, there are always matters of interpretation, but our concern *here is not a religious one. It is clear that all Jihadists are Muslim, but it is never asserted that all Muslims are Jihadists.* Rather we are concerned with the religious justification of Jihad against the “The Crusaders and Jews” by the radicals’ own exegesis.

The interpreters use a variety of practices: *qiyas* or analogy and *nasikh* or overriding to reconcile difference in verses; and along with the many Hadith (sayings and examples), this forms the Sunna. This determines all the Usl al-Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and its outcome, as well as Islamic law (Sharia) that regulates all of life for a believer. This is mentioned because this is just how the practitioners of Jihad make their arguments for issues like Offensive Jihad; the duty of all Muslims to undertake this; *Ishtihad* or martyrdom; Suicide Bombings; the killing of innocent noncombatants; the killing of Muslims during these attacks; and the declarations of an Islamic hegemony in the world. Which interpretation *do* the Jihadists (which is their own name for themselves), “Mujahedin,” take to be correct, and how have they interpreted the Quran to serve their cause?

Only Jihadists waging the war can answer the following questions: Is this a clash of civilizations or a religious war comparable to the crusades? Is it being driven by hatred of the West and everything we represent, or is it about a new Caliphate and a new world order, subject to *Sharia* or Islamic law, a love for a new Islamic World Order?

## **OSAMA BIN LADEN AND DR. AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI— THE AL QAEDA VIEW OF THE JIHAD**

One of the best sources for understanding the thinking of Osama bin Laden, and hence of his followers, is his answer to Saudi intellectuals and religious leaders in his essay “Moderate Islam is a prostration to the West.”<sup>12</sup>

Osama bin Laden’s letter, written in Arabic, is the expression of his outrage at a declaration by Saudi intellectuals that was written in answer to U.S. intellectuals, entitled “Why do we fight”? The Saudi response was entitled “How can we coexist”

and was written by intellectuals and religious figures. Bin Laden's answer was clear and straightforward, unlike his Media releases which are full of *taqiyya* or prudential dissimulation—a well-practiced tactic in the Holy War and religiously mandated for any Muslim to say anything as long as in his heart there is faith.<sup>13</sup>

Addressing the writers of what he sees as a complete prostration, he says:

It's best you prostrate yourself in secret. ... There are only three choices in Islam; either willing submission or payment of the *jizya*, thereby physical submission to the authority of Islam or the Sword—for it is not right to let him (an infidel) live. The matter is summed up for every person alive: either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam or die. This it behooves the Saudi signatories to clarify this matter to the West—otherwise they will be like those who believe in part of the book while rejecting the rest.

He continues:

The West is Hostile to us on account of Loyalty and Enmity and Offensive Jihad. So how can the writers of the declaration address those infidels who attack our faith by word and deed with such trivial matters that have nothing to do with the *heart of the conflict*. What the West desires is that we abandon (the doctrine of) loyalty and enmity and abandon offensive Jihad. This is the essence of their request and desire of us. *Do the intellectuals think its actually possible for Muslims to abandon these two commandments simply to coexist with the West?*

Bin Laden is clear in his opinion; for him, there is no moderate Islam and the choices for anyone in the conflict are clear. The apologists, as he sees them, are counting the amount of angels on a pin because it is simply impossible for the true believer to conduct himself in any way other than what is written in the Doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity (*walaa wa baraa*), which will be explained fully.

According to bin Laden, the debate really revolves around the word of the Messenger:

“I have been sent in the final hours with the sword so that none is worshipped but Allah alone, partnerless.”

For bin Laden, it is clear that Radical Islam's war with the West is not limited to political grievances (whether justified or not) but is timeless and deeply rooted in his faith.

Osama's thinking harks back to the writings of Ibn Tamiyya, who wrote during the Mongol invasions 1263–1328 and whose writings were extremely influential to the Hanbali School and also to the later Abdul al-Wahhab, founder of the Wahabbi sect in Islam.<sup>14</sup> What we have is an emulation of tradition (*Tagleed*) and a harkening back to the first three generations of Islam, the Golden Age, which is essential to fight against the Far Enemy (*al-Abou al-Baeed*), the United States, today.

More evidence of the religious and historical inevitability of a conflict with the nonbelievers can be found in Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is the most prolific of the al-Qaeda leadership on the subject.

Here is Ayman al-Zawahiri speaking in an interview on the Internet.

He answers one questioner<sup>15</sup>: “I respond to it by stressing that we invite all people to Islam, and we invite the Muslims and their organizations to unite around the word of Tawhid [Islamic monotheism—i.e., there is no god but Allah], and from the requirements of this word is that they work to help Islam by ruling by his Shari’ah and not making it equal to any other rule, and that they confront the invaders usurping the homelands of the Muslims and neither recognize nor respect any obligation or agreement which gives up even a hand span of them, and that they work to dethrone and remove the corrupt, corrupting, hireling rulers who dominate their homelands.”

Moreover, Zawahiri is clear on the way the enemy should be handled and points to the doctrine of Loyalty and Enmity to provide methodical proof from the Hadith (examples or sayings) and the Quran about the relationship with unbelievers. Loyalty and Enmity is an all-encompassing doctrine in Islam that outlines what is acceptable and what is completely unacceptable or unclean for a Muslim. It is as though anything outside Islam must be regarded as unclean and with Enmity. Any relaxing of this doctrine (pluralism for example) is a prime reason, according to Zawahiri, for the problems Muslims have endured.

And so he elaborates that the Almighty has informed us that the infidels despise the Muslims,<sup>16</sup> and that part of the duty of all Muslims is to hate the infidel and renounce their love because Muslims are forbidden from showing affection to those that oppose Allah and his Messenger. “Allah only forbids you those who made war upon you on account of your religion, and drove you forth from your homes and supported (others) in your expulsion—these do not befriend. And whoever befriends them is unjust [60:8:9]. According to the writings of Ahmad, there is no greater duty than to repulse the invading enemy.”

Both leaders of al-Qaeda parallel their harkening back to a world that is free of “Innovation,” which is what all heretical acts come from—in Arabic *Bidaa*—and reject completely any Western ideas such as Democracy, which they regard as abhorrent because it is man-made and not made by Allah.

Zawahiri continues: “In the Hadith there is evidence for not deposing a sultan even if he transgresses. The jurors have agreed unanimously on the necessity of obeying the victorious Sultan and waging jihad with him. Obeying him is better than fighting him. However, should the Sultan become an infidel, then he is not to be obeyed and it is obligatory to wage jihad against him.<sup>17</sup> Exchanging the Islamic Shaaria with something else is infidelity, especially in the despicable manner we see in the lands of Islam, according to al-Zawahiri.<sup>18</sup> If such a one persists in this (implementing laws borrowed from the Europeans (this is from Hamid al-Fiqi) and does not return to governing according to what Allah has revealed, he is without any doubt an apostate infidel.”

The bottom line regarding democracies is that the right to make laws is given to someone other than Allah most high. *So whoever is agreed to this is an infidel—for he taken gods in place of Allah. Legislation is the exclusive right of the most high.*<sup>19</sup>



Al-Zawahiri justifies himself by quoting Sayyid Qutb from “In the Shade of the Koran.” Qutb is probably the foremost theorist of reverting to purer Islamic belief in an aggressive way and was sentenced to death by the Egyptian Government in 1966 but not before his writings influenced a whole generation of Jihadists. “It is an issue (Democracy) of *Jahiliyya* (the period of pre-Islamic Chaos)” according to Zawahiri’s quotation. We will encounter a lot more about Qutb in the next section, which discusses how much support among Muslims the Global Jihad really has achieved.

Part Two of the treatise on Jihad Martyrdom and the Killing of innocents (probably written before 9/11) begins with the heading “The permissibility of bombarding infidels when Muslims and others who are not permitted to be killed are dispersed among them” and continues on in that vein. In this, Zawahiri tries to justify suicide terror as a legitimate weapon, despite the many injunctions in Islam that ban the taking of your own life. Here is the exegetic birth of a tactic first employed by Shia Muslims and now exonerated by al-Zawahiri.

Zawahiri begins by quoting the Muslim prophet’s famous statement about how war is deceit. He must (and he knows this) justify not only the use of Martyrdom Operations (as suicide bombings are known among the Jihadists) but also the killing of Muslims, women, children, and *dhimmmis* (infidels that have sworn fealty and prostrated themselves to the Muslim faith if not converted), something much trickier than other justifications. Not surprisingly, using a stretch of even his peculiar logic, he manages to find stories and analogies that justify his way of thinking. This is obvious in the following passage:

*This is killing of an individual whose individual status is unknown, because clarification of status is in regard to the one under our control only, and these are not under our control, so the obligatory defensive Jihad is not suspended in order to determine their status. And Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah (may Allah have mercy on him) dealt with this matter in detail in his fatwas regarding the Mongols in the 28th volume of Majmuu’a al-Fataawa, so refer to it.*

Bin Laden and Zawahiri are not the only theoreticians of the Jihad, but also the foremost on the Sunni side. However, on the Shia side, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah of the Hezbollah (Party of God) Lebanon is increasingly a force to be reckoned with and estimated by many to be much shrewder and actually winning the battle for the hearts and minds of even some Sunni Muslims over bin Laden and Zawahiri.

Neither of these men are particularly fond of Nasrallah: Hassan Nasrallah welcomes the international Crusader forces which occupied Lebanon and came between its people and the Jihad in Palestine, and Rafsanjani states that we don’t aim to remove Israel, and Iran is a member of the United Nations with Israel, and the United Nations charter obligates all members to respect the unity and safety of the other members territories and sovereignty.<sup>20</sup>

The leader of the Hezbollah, born in Lebanon and educated in Iran, certainly knows how to compromise in order to maintain power and the finance so critical to his movement. It is estimated that he has received between \$100 and \$200

million dollars from Iran and other backers in the Arab and Persian worlds. However, it should always be remembered that the modern era of suicide terror began with Amal (later became Hezbollah) in Lebanon and the deadly suicide terror attacks against the U.S. Embassy and later the U.S. Marine Barracks.

For example, on the subject of 9/11 and speaking to a reporter from the Washington Post, Nasrallah—who has been called the most intelligent and therefore the most dangerous of the International Terrorists<sup>21</sup>—took a shot at his Sunni rivals: “What do the people who worked in those two [World Trade Center] towers, along with thousands of employees, women and men, have to do with war that is taking place in the Middle East? Or the war that Mr. George Bush may wage on people in the Islamic world. Therefore we condemned this act—and any similar act we condemn. I said nothing about the Pentagon, meaning we remain silent. We neither favored nor opposed that act. Well, of course, the method of Osama bin Laden, and the fashion of bin Laden, we do not endorse them. And many of the operations that they have carried out, we condemned them very clearly.”

However, here in a speech in Arabic and not an interview going out specifically to the readers of the Washington Post, the self-described “freedom fighter” that dissimulates his respect for innocent life sounds very different. “Let the entire world hear me. Our hostility to the Great Satan (America) is absolute. I conclude my speech with the slogan that will continue to reverberate so that nobody will think that we have weakened. Regardless of how the world has changed after the 11th of September, Death to America will remain our reverberating and powerful Slogan” (Al-Manar September 27, 2002).

Here is his statement to the United Press International on November 4, 2001 just after 9/11: “It is our pride that the Great Satan (America) and the head of despotism, corruption and arrogance in modern times considers us an enemy that is listed in the terrorism list. I say to every member of Hezbollah be happy and proud that your party has been placed on the list of terrorist organizations as the US views it.” In a rally in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon he continues: “Matrydom operations (suicide bombings) *should be exported outside Palestine. I encourage Palestinians to take suicide bombings worldwide. Don't be shy about it.*” The message may be sometimes overlaid, but the end justifies the means and the end is the destruction of the United States of America, the Big Satan, and its ally, the little Satan, Israel, which means that he and his rivals have the same goals. Regarding the enemy of my enemy to be my friend, as the saying goes in Arabic, would be naïve in Nasrallah's case. The present-day theorists of the Global Jihad, both Sunnite and Shia, have the following approach to a Holy War with the West and have justified their actions by taking the following views:

The resurgence in Islam will come about when the Muslims return to the values and practices of the first generation of the religion's founding. This “pure Islam” makes clear certain precepts:

1. This purer and renewed state will be achieved by strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith as the Jihadis see them.

2. Muslims should follow the “purer” Jihadi interpretation of the Quran and Hadith and emphasize the Jihad—bringing it back to its former glory and actively restoring it from being a forgotten obligation.
3. Citing of original sources shall determine the nature of the conflict, and these determine that there is no quarter given to any infidel that does not subjugate himself to Islam.
4. This means that suicide terror is also justified against anyone, even Muslims or Dhimmis (subjugated infidels).
5. Any compromise with the infidel is tantamount to apostasy and warrants death.
6. There shall be no compromise in the establishment of Sharia law over the earth, and the rule of the Caliphate must be as it is described in the Koran.

## SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL JIHAD

Is the Global Jihad the work of a small group of Guerilla fighters with similar fundamentalist views, or is there wider support for the Global Jihad throughout the Muslim world? This question is not a political one; it assumes renewed importance because the Global Jihad has “gone freelance.”<sup>22</sup>

The view that the Jihad today is not the work of hierarchically denominated networks such as the al-Qaeda of September 11, 2001 is widely supported by the way the Jihad has gone to the Internet. Some have called this *al-Qaeda Social* opposed to *al-Qaeda Central* and see radicalization continuing in a leaderless way. The process is more of an example or idea according to this view than actual leadership. It can lead to radicalization on a scale never before known.<sup>23</sup>

A 2004 Pew Research survey revealed in 2004 that Osama bin Laden is viewed favorably by large percentages in Pakistan (65%), Jordan (55%), and Morocco (45%). In the same study, 31% said that suicide terror attacks against American and other Westerners in Iraq are justifiable.<sup>24</sup> A leading London Newspaper showed that 6% of British Muslims fully supported the July 2005 Bombings in the London Underground.<sup>25</sup>

Apart from the collective support, there is the phenomenon of the Lone Wolf who becomes incited by the Jihadi goals. Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, an Iranian-born American Citizen awaiting trial for nine counts of attempted murder in the March 3, 2006 University of North Carolina incident in which he ran over fellow students using a newly purchased SUV, is just one example of many such Lone Wolves in the United States. This has become known as “Sudden Jihad Syndrome.” As usual, the University authorities were quick to point out that there was no link to terrorism, but he has quoted several verses from the Quran to justify himself using several of the verses quoted in the opening pages of this chapter.<sup>26</sup>

Support for the notion of Jihad is implicit in many texts that have influenced the Muslim world and that have even spread to become official versions of the

Islamic religion such as Wahhabism. Together, the influence exerted by these ideas is called by the radicals themselves the *Salifiyyah*, after the Arabic denomination of the Righteous Ancestors *al-Salaf al-Salih*. This Salafist inspiration has come from numerous sources and certain ideas which have to be understood to further give meaning to the Global Jihad and to the role that some States may play in this now or in the future, as well as its effect on individual actors, or small cells that are self-igniting and are not commanded by a centralized agency. These ideas and sects or groups upholding extreme versions have vast support in many Islamic communities worldwide.

## SEMINAL IDEAS AND MOVEMENTS THAT HAVE LED TO THE GLOBAL JIHAD

### Tauhid—The Oneness of God

Islam is a monotheistic religion and one that makes clear that there is only one God. Before the teachings of Muhammed Abd al-Wahhab, who was born in the Eastern part of what is now known as Saudi Arabia in 1703, there had been a rich tapestry of beliefs around Muhammed the Prophet's role, the followers and companions of the prophets, and the rituals and practices surrounding holy places for Sunnah Muslims. It was not clear before Wahhab that *Tauhid* was not an exclusionary idea as it became in Wahhabi thinking.<sup>27</sup> To understand Wahhabi thinking [it was once described by an Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company) analyst as a kind of Arabic Unitarianism; and the work of Abdul Wahhab was described as an "Islamic Reformation," the kind of critical error of interpretation that we are trying to avoid],<sup>28</sup> we need to understand the evolution of this interpretation, its alliance with the House of Saud, and its possible impact on future events.

Al Wahhab's main idea was that Islam had strayed and had allowed *Shirk* or the belief in agents of God or participants/partner to develop, thereby creating polytheists. This would make the believers and practitioners of Islam *Mushrakin*, or idolatrous. Most of the writings that he left are proscriptions (what may not be done). He spent most of his life moving around the Saudi Arabian peninsula inveighing against the demise of Islam and finally found himself expelled from al-Uyayna to Dir'irya, where he was able to conclude an alliance (including marriage between the families) with Muhammad b. Sa'ud, ruler of the city.<sup>29</sup>

In 1802, the predominant style of the new alliance between the future Kings of the Saudi Peninsula and Wahhab's beliefs were seen in raids carried out on the city of Karbala in Southern Iraq. The Saudi Chronicler, writing contemporaneously, described the effect of the results of war against fellow Muslims. "In a morning more than two thousand people were killed, and the Mosque where Imam Husayn had worshipped was sacked. When the booty was given to Sa'ud, he gave one share to every foot soldier and a double share to the horseman before returning home." (Abdullah b. Bishr)

Hamid Alger writes “The corollary of identifying Muslims other than the Wahhabis as *Mushrakin* or idolatrous was that warfare against them became not simply permissible but obligatory.”<sup>[29, p. 34]</sup>

Wahhabism is practiced today in Saudi Arabia, where most of the 9/11 hijackers originated from, and it has been the official religious orientation of the House of Saud—the Saudi Monarchy—since this eighteenth-century union.

## TAKFIR

The idea of the apostate has had many different implications for the Global Jihad. Bin Laden, as we saw, was clear that anyone not taking part is an apostate—somewhat worse than a Kuffar (from the same root) or nonbeliever. The idea of labeling a Muslim who does not believe in the radical agenda (for example: does not believe in Jihad against innocents) a Kuffar has radicalized parts of the *Ummah* or Muslim community because there is considerable pressure, including excommunication if the Imam or spiritual leader is radical to impose the sanction—one that can mean death.

The idea has been used to characterize Anwar Sadat, who referred to himself and encouraged others to call him, the Pious President. However, having made peace with Israel at Camp David and, almost worse, refusing to enact Islamizing reform in Egypt (almost unbelievably the fact that his wife Jihan danced with Jimmy Carter at the White House was cited as another reason) meant that he was declared Takfir and therefore his death was a matter of time.<sup>30</sup>

## JIHAD

The different interpretations for the word Jihad in both Arabic and in Islam are due to the fact that Jihad is much more than a word “struggle” but a concept, rife with the interpretational and evolutionary changes that any concepts are subject to and the additional complication.

In the Koran, the Concept of Jihad is a core concept. It manifests itself at several different levels; and these are very clear, unambiguous, and categorical. There is a personal Jihad that could be translated as “Striving” or an inner struggle to follow the path of God. Almost all religions have a component of this “Inner Struggle.” This might be named the Greater Jihad, the idea of an individual’s struggle to live a good Muslim life and adhere to the five Pillars of Islam: Shahada (professing the faith), praying regularly, fasting during Ramadan, being charitable, and performing Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and Jihad, is sometimes known as the sixth Pillar of Islam but does not have this status anywhere officially.<sup>31</sup>

However, this should not confuse the fact that a lesser Jihad is quite clearly denominated in the Koran. The world according to Islam is divided in dar al-Islam (the Land of Islam) and dar-al-harb (the Land of Conflict). The Umma

(the Muslim community) must help to expand dar al-Islam so that the rest of the world can benefit from living within the just Islamic order. This is the origin of the Holy war meaning of Jihad.<sup>32</sup>

There are also careful distinctions made about Offensive and Defensive Jihads, not only the inner and the outer Jihad. Here is a passage in the Koran that describes the Defensive Jihad clearly if somewhat aggressively:

“God does not love the transgressors. Kill them wherever you find them and drive them out [of the place] from which they drove you out and [remember] persecution is worse than carnage. But do not initiate war with them near the Holy Kabah unless they attack you there. But if they attack you, put them to the sword [without any hesitation].” Qurán 2:190–194 (8)

This forms the basis of the Fatwas (religious edicts) issued all over the Arab world when the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan in 1979. Many people left Arab nations to go and fight the Soviet’s in that Muslim country, arguably the most important factor in the modern Jihad of our times—to which we will return later in this chapter.

Then there is an aggressive form of Jihad which has been employed of late by al-Qaeda and many other terrorist organizations in the Muslim world. But long before Sheikh Abdallah Azzam (see page 49) called for Muslims to fight in Afghanistan, and his former student Osama bin Laden took it much further by calling for killing Crusaders and Jews whenever and wherever you find them (see 1998 Fatwa), a group formed in Egypt and made this aggressive Jihad, with the object of imposing Sharia (Koranic Law) and truly Islamic Societies on the World, one of its fundamental tenets. With tentacles around the world, this group has contributed more than any other to the rise of the Global Jihad.

## Jahaliyyah

### *The Muslim Brotherhood and Sayyid Qutb*

*Jamiat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (Arabic for the Society of Muslim Brothers)

Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.—Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1928 by Hasan al-Bana, an elementary school teacher in Egypt. In essence the Brotherhood was a society that built on Salafist values about keeping to the older, stricter meanings in Islam and existed to bring Muslims together to achieve this goal. It became, in time, a kind of Islamic Masonic society crossed with very Radical tendencies that we can feel today.

The 1920s saw the end of the Ottoman Empire and a nadir in the fortunes of the Muslim world and marked the complete end of any Muslim empires. This

led many in Islam to search for values that might bring the people out of their *Jahiliyya* or corruption and chaos (similar to the state that had existed before Mohammed's preachings). A search for some kind of values that would enable Muslims to rise to grandeur again and escape the Colonial domination that was becoming a reality throughout the Islamic world, and find a way to counter pernicious Western corruption, was seen as the answer. This urge for a purer form of Islam was something that had existed for some time, in particular with the writings of Mohamed ibn Abd-al Wahhab.

In this combustible mixture of a search for a stricter Islam (Salafist) and an austerer form of Islam (Wahhabists) came the influence of Sayyid Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was to be especially influential on some of the modern al-Qaeda leaders—Ayman al-Zawahiri and Ali Amin Ali al Rashidi, who were Egyptian followers of Qutb, and certainly (by extension) Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden. Azzam, a Palestinian, was Osama Bin Laden's mentor and heavily influenced by Qutb. His radical writings came in the 1950s and were the beginnings of what we know today as modern Radical Islam.

Understanding his ideas and their influence and how they have spread due to the Brotherhood is a key component of understanding the Global Jihad. Some of his treatises, written while he was in prison, such as "Milestones," sound eerily contemporary. Here are some of the main ideas of Qutb as expressed in "Milestones" written in 1964 and summarizing his thinking<sup>33</sup>:

- The world had reverted to the pre-Islamic Law phase of Jahiliyyah or primordial chaos and therefore even Islamic regimes were not truly Islamic. No regime was fit to live under for a true Muslim. This de-legitimization of Islamic regimes is a key to understanding the use of force. They may be attacked and destroyed and should be.
- The world had reverted to the pre-Islamic Law phase of Jahiliyyah or primordial chaos and therefore even Islamic regimes were not truly Islamic.
- No system of government, and especially not democracy, is suitable for Muslims. Muslims should resist any system where men are in "servitude to other men" as un-Islamic. A truly Islamic polity would not even have theocratic rulers. If a government is necessary, it should be a just dictatorship but certainly not democracy upon which he goes to great lengths to expose as non-Islamic.
- The way to end this primordial chaos was to preach the Quran's meaning everywhere and resort to physical power and Jihad to destroy any remnants of the corrupt order.
- Qutb saw Islam as a way of life, and not a religion. Everything derived from and was in the service of Islam. There was no question that this meant that ideal society would be governed by Sharia or Islamic Holy Law.
- A vanguard would be created that would spread throughout the Islamic homeland and then the entire world. A secret branch of the Brotherhood was created as a result.

- The struggle would not be easy. True believers could look forward to lives of poverty, difficulty, frustration, and sacrifice.

The idea that he would attack Muslims made him a heretic for many schools of Islamic thought, and he was officially declared a deviant after his death. His death at the hands of the Egyptian regime, accused of plotting to kill the Egyptian President, has also given him a martyr's status.

His brother Muhammed Qutb moved to Saudi Arabia and promoted his brother's religious teachings, while one of his students was Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri has acknowledged and published his views on the importance of Qutb.

***The Muslim Brotherhood across the World.*** Qutb's ideas found forceful expression in the writings of Muhammed Abd al-Salam Faraj, who was the Cairo head of the Tanzim al Jihad (Jihad Organization)—the group that killed Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. In Faraj's work the idea of violent jihad replaces the DAWA (evangelizing) and he even goes further and argues that there is no greater and lesser Jihad because this does injustice to the passages about the Sword in the Koran. "Waging jihad against them (those that have illegally seized the leadership of Muslims) is an individual duty."<sup>34</sup>

By the time of the Afghanistan invasion (1979), the ground was ripe for an introduction of a vanguard. The Brotherhood spread to many Muslim and Western countries, thereby spreading these ideas. Most of the leaders emanated from the Egyptian branch of the Brotherhood and already had considerable anti-Government experience.

## THE SPREAD OF THE JIHAD ACROSS THE WORLD

The Global Jihad, against any and all targets considered "Crusader or Jewish," began with the Near Enemy or the so-called "apostate" regimes that existed in the Arab world, regimes such as Nasser in Egypt, the Shah in Iran, and even the Hashemite King of Jordan. Indeed, one of Zawahiri's favorite statements was that the "road to Jerusalem goes through Cairo"—or, in other words, that first the leaders of the Arab world that were *takfir* had to be overthrown and the countries have *tajdid* (renewal) and *al-taghullah* (Islamic superiority) imposed on them. These ideas are prominent in Qutb's writing and the Muslim Brotherhood was intent on changing the Islamic regimes by Jihad but made no mention of a war against the West, except for many statements of the disgust with Western corruption. Neither did Faraj, Sadat's assassin, nor other founding members of the *Tanzim al-Jihad* or the *Jamaa al-Islamiyya* in Egypt nor others that advocated local change first.

How did the Jihad become a Global War fought in New York City, London, Madrid, Nairobi, The Philippines, and Northern Africa, just to mention a few afflicted places?



The development of Egyptian Jihadis, along with the decision to fight against the Far Enemy (the United States), provides a good basis for understanding similar processes that occurred in other countries and areas such as Northern Africa, Somalia, Yemen, and Iraq. The changes in Iran that came about with the Khomeini revolution also played a critical part in taking the Jihad global. In addition, the Saudi Arabian role in exporting Jihad across the world should be taken into careful account.<sup>35</sup>

### Case Study of Jihad Development: Egypt

Egypt, under the regime of Gamel Abdul Nasser, was supposed to be the beacon for Pan-Arabic nationalism and secularism and lasted from 1952 to 1970. Upon Nasser's death, Anwar Sadat assumed the Presidency of Egypt. Interestingly, the first conflict between an Egyptian leader and radical Islam occurred in 1954, when the Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser. His real downfall came when Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab States were crushed during the 6-day war with Israel (1967).

One of the first to take up Qutb's call was Shukri Mustafa, who created a group named *al-takfir wa'l Hijra* (excommunication and exile). In 1978, this early fundamentalist group was prosecuted and Mustafa was killed by the Sadat Regime. Another group in Egypt, led by a Palestinian named Salih Sirriya, illustrates how cross-fertilization of these disparate groups took place. Sirriya was a Palestinian who arrived in Egypt after the failed attempt against King Hussein of Jordan during Black September 1970. In Egypt, he formed a group named the Islamic Liberation Organization and tried to kill Sadat in 1974. He met the same fate as Mustafa.<sup>36</sup>

In these waters swam people like Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman (the blind Sheikh who was arrested after the First World Trade Center Bombing and planning the multi attacks that were thwarted on New York Cities subways, bridges, and tunnels) and the ever-present Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. These two were part of the Jihad Organization (*Tanzim al-Jihad*).<sup>37</sup>

The spark that created firm contacts between these different but essentially local Egyptian groups and the wider world jihad was provided by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In a momentous "founding year" for Global Jihad, the Khomeini revolution also took place in Iran and had its effects on other groups such as Amal and eventually Hezbollah in Lebanon.

A Palestinian named Abdullah Azzam, later to be a teacher of Osama bin Laden and his mentor, was instrumental in whipping up the frenzy for participation in the Afghanistan War, seen as a clear case of the invasion of a Godless power into an Islamic country. As Azzam put it: "Before us lie Palestine, Bukhara, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia and the Philippines, Burma, South Yemen, Tashkent and Andalusia "(Southern Spain—once part of the Islamic conquests).

In Egypt, the pivotal event was the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981. The resulting crackdown on the Islamist groups resulted in painful, torturous

prison sentences for what would become the vanguard of the jihad in later years. Zawahiri, upon his release, went to Afghanistan where he and many others learned their tradecraft—a deadly tradecraft that would be employed against the West during the latter half of the 1990s as the focus from local to Global change, fed by the experience in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan, associations between future Jihadis were cemented. Mohammed Abu Sittah, better known as Abu Hafs al-Masri (later killed by U.S. Air Strikes in Afghanistan) and Mohammed Mustafa (later to be known as Ali Mohammed, who somehow found his way into the U.S. Army at Fort Bragg), joined forces with other members of the Egyptian Jihad. The connections with bin Laden were also formed in Afghanistan to the extent that in later years a follower would complain that the Egyptians were too favored.

Likewise, on the other side of the Sunni-Shia divide there were other unions being formed. The Khomeini revolution wanted support from the Arab states, but the war with Iraq made that difficult. According to *Asharq Al-Awsat*, the Arabic/English news daily, the Amal (Lebanon) Teheran axis was formed against the background. The supporters of Iran's revolution were Syria, Libya, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Amal, a small Shia Lebanese faction, had just lost their leader, who disappeared on a trip to Libya. This was further complicated by the fact that the PLO had been battling the AMAL or Shia militia in Lebanon, in its attempt to colonize Lebanon for its own purposes. At first, Iranian support for this group was very lukewarm because the Iranians did not want to offend Libya or the PLO.

Later, as the War with Iraq wound down, the support from the Khomeini regime for a little known band that had joined Amal named Hezbollah increased. The Lebanese battlefield had the same effect on Shia factions as Afghanistan had on Sunni Jihadists. It gave them experience. It was Hezbollah's suicide terror missions that were to inspire the entire Global Jihad.

The last factor in the dispersal of the Jihad to the entire world has to be the Saudi Arabian support for (at the best case) Dawa, or evangelizing the Wahhabi sect throughout the world, and the cash and resources that Saudi Arabia has at its disposal to do that. The Saudi regime has, in the best case, been actively involved in supporting groups across the world that are in line with the Wahhabi positions and has, in the worse case, been heavily involved in funding terrorist activity, including bin Laden, and certainly terrorism in Israel. According to British Intelligence, the Kenya and Tanzania bombings that killed more than 240 people and wounded 4500 had two al-Qaeda operatives that drove the suicide vehicle in Nairobi; they were both Saudi as was the planner, Khaled al-Midhar. The rubber dinghy that claimed the lives of 17 American sailors on the USS *Cole* came from Saudi Arabia and U.S. Intelligence apparently concluded that the whole operation had been funded by a Saudi family. Six of the 15 Saudis involved in 9/11 had been through their process of recruiting while they were in Saudi Arabia. Very few, if any, of the 9/11 attackers were veterans of Afghanistan, and much of the preparation took place in Saudi Arabia itself. These are heavy indicators that the prevalent thinking in Wahhabism, detailed in this chapter, plays

a role in radicalizing and spreading the Jihad world-wide. Two months before the World Trade Center attack, an email speaking about “a Big Meal that would be impossible for any but the faithful to bear” was circulated.<sup>38</sup>

These same trends, the coalescing of disparate forces in various battles, backed by Arab wealth, can unfortunately also be seen in the Global Jihad in the United States.

## The Jihad in the United States

Brooke Goldstein, director of the Legal Project, stated these words at the Middle East Forum in a speech called “Welcome to Lawfare, a New Kind of Jihad”:

The Islamist movement has two wings—one violent and one lawful—which can operate apart but often reinforce each other. While the violent arm attempts to silence speech by burning cars when cartoons of Mohammed are published in Denmark, the lawful arm is skillfully maneuvering within Western legal systems, both here and abroad.

Just before Memorial Day Weekend, in late May of 2008, Solomon Bradman, the CEO of Security Solutions International, found out what “*Lawfare*” means in practice. Security Solutions International has been training U.S. Homeland Security forces since 2004 and trains in everything from terrorist activity on the Internet, to understanding Radical Islam and even tactical training. Bradman said:

We were not expecting anything out of the ordinary for our training in Seattle just proceeding Memorial Day. Our aim is to train U.S. Homeland Security to protect all Americans, Christians, Jews, Muslims, and any others in our free country, against the possibility of terror attacks—to detect, prevent, and if necessary respond in a professional way with no political agenda.

Bradman claims that the first inkling that there were problems with a training program named “The Threat of Radical Islam to the World” given by a Muslim member of U.S. Law Enforcement was when a local newspaper called him and asked him why his company was associating terrorism with Islam. “I don’t believe I can take the credit for linking Radical Islam with terrorism,” said Bradman, “the Jihadist did that a long time ago.” This was the call to arms for a concerted campaign by a group named CAIR, the Council for American Islamic Relations, to have the SSI training programs banned from the city of Seattle.

Bradman had become the victim of Lawfare. *The formula is simple: Use the laws, freedoms, and loopholes of the most liberal nation on earth to help finance and direct the most violent international terrorism groups in the world.*<sup>39</sup>

According to Goldstein, “there has been a steady increase in Islamist Lawfare and the litany of American researchers, authors, activists, publishers, congressman, newspapers, television stations, think tanks, NGO’s, reporters, student journals, and others targeted for censorship is long. ...”

Some of the incidents she mentions are as follows: (a) American Online was sued after permitting an online chat room in which participants discussed Islam). (b) U.S. Congressman Cass Ballenger was sued for describing CAIR as a fund-raising arm of Hezbollah after he had reported the group to the FBI and CIA as such. (c) Andrew Whitehead, an American activist and a blogger was sued for maintaining the website anti-CAIR-net.org; but ironically, after CAIR refused Whitehead's discovery requests, seemingly afraid of what internal documents the legal process (that CAIR had initiated!) would reveal, CAIR withdrew its claims. Goldstein points out more: *Boston Herald*, Fox 25 News, *New York Times*, Police counterterrorism trainers, and many more have all been victims of legal actions designed to silence their speech on radical Islam. Goldstein points out: "Most of this litigation is predatory, filed without a serious expectation of winning, and undertaken as a means to intimidate, demoralize, and bankrupt defendants."

The Global Jihad in the United States has been characterized by (a) a heavy reliance on fund raising since its earliest days (Abdullah Azzam and Ayman al-Zawahiri conducted fund-raising tours here in the early 1980s), (b) incitement aimed at radicalizing the faithful, and (c) a combination of lawful and illegal activities, usually very well disguised and sometimes on the borders of infiltration but always under the banner of political correctness and U.S. Constitutional rights.

David Yerushalmi, the legal counsel to the Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies and the Center for Security Policy, both Washington, D.C.-based policy think tanks, works hard to uncover "Sharia Compliant" financing, which he views as a Trojan Horse for the establishment of a worldwide Caliphate: "It doesn't matter if you look at Averroes or, much later, Ibn Tamiyaa, and indeed any Islamist text through the centuries, you find a clear-cut relation between Sharia and the obligation to subdue any nonbeliever through the payment of the Jiziya, and through Jihad." Yerushalmi points out that the Mufti Mohammed Taqi Usmani, the son of Pakistan's Chief Mufti, was the legal authority behind the Dow Jones licensed Shaaria Compliant Index. At the same time, he wrote a book entitled *Islam and Modernism*, where Chapter 11 is dedicated to clarifying the obligation of all Muslims to subdue the nonbeliever.

According to Yerushalmi, the Financial Sector in the United States has created what amounts to a "Black Box" through which the Jihadists will have access to capital and the inner workings of Western financial institutions. "They pretend that somehow you can have Shariah finance laws without its laws of Jihad."

If the Courts and Financial sector provide comfortable areas for Jihadists to function, what about the law as it concerns actual acts of terrorism?

Not surprisingly, incidents tend to be broken down into before and after 9/11. Although there have been many incidents of terrorism since 9/11, the classification of incidents seems arbitrary at best. Here are some examples of incidents classified as having no terrorist-related evidence.

1. Mohammed Taheri-azar, despite his claims that he wanted "to punish the Government of the US and to avenge the deaths of Muslims around the

world,” is claimed by University Authorities to be deranged when he runs his car into nine students on March 3, 2006 at the University of North Carolina.

2. Naveed Afzal Haq, a Muslim American who said he “hated Israel,” forces his way through the door of a Jewish Center while holding a gun at a 13-year-old girl’s head and kills one and wounds five. This was declared a hate crime and was dismissed as having nothing to do with terrorism.
3. Suleiman Talovic, an 18-year-old Bosnian Muslim, starts shooting in a Salt Lake City Mall and kills 5. Bruce Tefft, a former CIA counterterrorism official who advises the New York City Police Department, told WND he was “flabbergasted” by the FBI’s statement that it saw no possible connection to terrorism (Art Moore © 2008 WorldNetDaily.com).
4. In October 2005, Joel Hinrichs, a 21-year-old student, blew himself up outside the University of Oklahoma’s football stadium where 84,000 were watching a game. Police insisted it was merely a suicide, but investigators found “Islamic Jihad” material in his apartment, and he reportedly attended a nearby mosque—the same one attended by Zacharias Moussooui, the only person charged in connection with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

All four incidents show evidence of radicalization but no definitive (except in the case of Tahari Azar) evidence in the form of statements of responsibility or videotaped testimonials such as is common in cases in Israel and elsewhere.

Success against the Global Jihad in the United States and in the War on the Jihad rests on how the Law deals with the amorphous nature of the Global Jihad here and internationally.

## **TOWARD A LEGAL DEFINITION OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES**

Since 9/11, it has been difficult to prosecute incidents of terror in the United States and many prosecutors have returned cases sent to them for prosecution.<sup>40</sup> We have seen above how easy it is for quasi-terrorist organizations to function at the same time within our system and actually use it for their ends.

For international terrorism the declination by prosecutors (prosecutors may decline cases as a way of filtering what they view as viable prosecutions) rate has been high, especially in recent years. In fact, data show that in the first eight months of FY 2006 the assistant U.S. Attorneys rejected slightly more than nine out of ten of the referrals. Given the assumption that the investigation of international terrorism must be the single most important target area for the FBI and other agencies, the turn-down rate is hard to understand.

The typical sentences recently imposed on individuals considered to be international terrorists are not impressive. For all those convicted as a result of cases initiated in the two years after 9/11, for example, the median sentence—half got

more and half got less—was 28 days. For those referrals that came in more recently—through May 31, 2006—the median sentence was 20 days.<sup>41</sup>

Is there a definition of terrorism, terrorist organizations, and terrorist incidents that will allow our legal system to cope with both the overt and insidious Jihad by organizations that may be thinly veiled fronts for the Global Jihad?

“It is my position that an act of terrorism can be committed by an individual ‘lone wolf.’ The deciding factor is not how many people it takes to carry out a suicide bombing (one), but who is targeted (civilians) and what appears to be the motivation of the perpetrator (to influence or coerce a government’s policies or to instill fear in a population). To point out what an actor’s motivational factors are (whether it be religion, jihad, Shaaria law, etc.) is useful in light of the fact that we are facing a version of terrorism steeped in Islamism—the ideology that Islam is a political, legal, as well as religious authority,” states Brooke Goldstein, the Director of the Middle East Forum’s Legal Project.

Goldstein’s definition largely matches the discussion on the International Definition of Terrorism made in the introductory chapter of this book, where 109 different definitions are mentioned.

Goldstein points out that: “There are several definitions of terrorism. My personal definition of an act of terrorism is ‘An intentional, unlawful, violent act targeting civilian persons or property and which appears to be for the purpose of (i) intimidating or coercing a population by instilling fear or (ii) influencing the policy of a government.’”

“I do not include the term ‘politically motivated’ because it is vague and ambiguous and can lead to the omission of acts of terrorism from prosecution as such. For example, if a suicide bomber is motivated by the notion that Allah will reward him with 72 virgins, a prosecutor would then have the challenge to argue this was a politically motivated act and would in the process be required to delve into the psychology of the suicide bomber.”

According to Goldstein, “The central focus in determining an act of terrorism should be whether civilians are intentionally targeted, and what appears to be the purpose of the act. What distinguishes an act of terrorism from that of plain murder is whether it has the effect of, or appears to be calculated to, coerce or intimidate a population or government. The motive of the terrorist may be political or religious or both. Using these elements, it is then appropriate to judge an act of terrorism with regard to the greater context in which it was perpetrated; and in the process, one should be able to consider other similar acts of terror by like-minded individuals with like-goals, motivations and religious convictions, etc. This is far more practical in terms of what definition is more likely to result in a just conviction rather than having the determination hinge on post-facto speculation about the political motivations of what may be a very psychologically disturbed individual.”

Jerry Goldman is one of the attorneys representing the landmark litigation by the family of John O’Neil and victims of 9/11 in a Class Action suit against the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia. In addition, Goldman has represented Bruce Teft, a counterterrorism advisor to NYPD, now being prosecuted because a

voluntary signee to his emails was upset about how these emails characterized Islam.

According to Goldman, “There is nothing wrong with the Law. It’s all there but the ability to use the Law, to be able to characterize and tell the story of complicated relationships, and to be able to make the connections is difficult. The Courts are not familiar yet with the nuances; there are challenges in properly conveying the information; there is a learning curve that we have to deal with.”

“This is a similar situation to the one we found ourselves after the passage of the RICO act. It took time to be able to come to grips with it and make the cases.”

Goldman cannot comment on the Class Action litigation, but he did underline how “very well financed” and how much investment is going into major league defense attorneys for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

We are adapting our laws to deal with amorphous nature of terrorism, and thankfully legal activists are making the case for a sharper understanding of what constitutes a terrorist or a terrorist organization.

## FINANCING AND ORGANIZATION

One of the earliest functions of the Global Jihad in the United States was that of organizing a fund raising operation to conduct activities elsewhere. This included everyone from Osama bin Laden to a group that deserves a prime place in the Global Jihad—the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, better known as Hamas, today the elected Government authority of the Palestinian authority in the Gaza strip.

The group was founded by Sheik Ahmed Yassin in 1987. His intentions were always very clear: “Become human bombs, using belts and suitcases aimed at killing every enemy that walks on the earth and pollutes it.”<sup>42</sup> Funding for Hamas comes from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Syria, Iraq, and the Emirates; surprisingly, it is very much influenced by Iran—a country that pores money into Hamas. But at one time, the United States was also a prominent donor.

The Holy Land Foundation provides a glimpse into the network of relationships that form the Jihad in the United States. Founded in Texas in 1989, the “charity” collected donations while masquerading as a humanitarian and charitable organization, something it had in common with Sami-al-Arian’s WISE (World and Islam Studies Enterprise) and the ICP (Islamic Concern Project) and much else in common besides (al-Arian himself had close ties to Palestinian Islamic Jihad—a different but still deadly group). All these groups or individuals were convicted of crimes related to terrorism.

Apart from both organizations collecting money for “matrydom operations” or suicide terrorists, there were family relationships. Along with Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, al-Arian had been at North Carolina with Mazen al-Najjar—a brother-in-law of al-Arian’s, who was deported because of his ties to terrorism.<sup>43</sup> But let’s get back to the Hamas side of Palestinian Jihad. Musa Mohammed Abu

Marzook took the example of his friend Abduraman Muhammed Alamoudi—another prominent figure in Washington that had terrorist ties. Marzook, coming to the States at the beginning of the 1980s learned the American way of playing the game. By 1992, the genial Marzook was spreading money around Washington—a lot of money.<sup>44</sup> His association was named the Islamic Association for Palestine and he donated \$210,000 to the Holy Land Foundation. Israelis claim that the foundation was linked to al-Qaeda through England and Chicago. Involved in the Holy Land Foundation was one of the founding members of Texas CAIR, Ghassan Elashi, and he was also the chairman of the Holy Land foundation.

When Marzook was detained to look into these links with terrorism, his chief advocate (other than CAIR of course) was none other than Abdurahman Alamoudi. Alamoudi's role is even more entrenched in our system. This man became a goodwill ambassador to several countries and was even invited by the President to join him at a prayer service for the victims of 9/11. Alamoudi turned out to be connected to terrorism through Libya and had ties to al-Qaeda. He also helped appoint the U.S. chaplains to the Muslim population in U.S. prisons, including the holding facility at Guantanamo, Cuba.

This enterprise for raising money is something very much alive and well in the United States today. Whether it is for al-Qaeda, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or Hamas, this type of activity goes on in jurisdictions all over the United States. In January 2008, Kenneth Wainstein, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, said in a statement that the “indictment (of former Congressman Mark D. Siljander) paints a troubling picture of an American charity organization that engaged in transactions for the benefit of terrorists and conspired with a former United States Congressman.”

The allegations against Siljander are part of a 42-count indictment handed up by a federal grand jury in Kansas City, which has been conducting an investigation of the charity. It closed in October 2004 when it was added to the designated terrorist list according to the *Washington Post* (WP, January 17, 2008).

The operational arm of the first phase of the Jihad in the United States, (the one that was carefully created during the 1980s when none other than Abdullah Azzam and Zawahiri came to fund raise in the fertile soil of the United States) was best exemplified by the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Here decades of activity in the United States, the war in Afghanistan, and a local cell all conspired to bring about not only the incident but planning for a great deal more.

Going back to Egypt, we encounter the name of Ali Muhammed, who is highly educated (two bachelor's degrees and a master's degree), speaks several languages fluently, and was taking part in a foreign officers course at Fort Bragg in 1981 when Egyptian President Sadat was assassinated. Some time after this, as he comes under suspicion in Egypt, he is forced to quit the Egyptian army. He was well-connected to Egyptian Islamic Jihad under Zawahiri and is said to have worked with bin Laden's personal security in Yemen and even earlier in Afghanistan.



He had students in Jihad here too. One of them turned up many years later as the assassin of the problematic Jewish right-wing Rabbi Meir Kahana. El-Sayyid Nosair had some 47 boxes of evidence in his apartment that was not immediately translated but was eventually found to contain plans for the 1993 bombings. Another student of Ali Muhammad's was Mahmud Abouhalima, convicted with Ramzi Yousef, the nephew of Shaikh Khalid Muhammad of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.

In late 1989, Ali Mohammed left the Army and moved to Santa Clara, California. He shared an apartment with another Egyptian, Khaled Abu al-Dahab. They were extremely busy, and they not only recruited others but also hosted al-Zawahiri in Silicon Valley. Today, Santa Clara has the legacy of these roots.

In 1993, all this came to fruition when a NYC terror cell, which had been led by a blind Egyptian radical cleric named Omar Abdel Rahman, was responsible for the attempt to destroy the WTC. Omar Abdel Rahman was from Egypt and was a member of Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad and at one time the presiding cleric named to pass the fatwas needed to kill and maim in the cause of bringing down the Egyptian and other governments.

These were busy years in New York City for the Jihad. Rahman and his cell had planned much more: There was the 1993 attack on five CIA employees; they planned the Day of Terror in New York City—the arrests of Omar Abdul Rahman and his cell saved the United Nations, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, and the George Washington Bridge.

But there were other incidents such as in 1994 when an Arab member of the Rahman mosque in Brooklyn opened fire on 15 observant Jews on the Brooklyn Bridge or in 1997 when a Palestinian school teacher opened fire on the observation deck of the Empire State Building.

The FBI had actually photographed Mohammed with his trainees during a 1989 firearms training course.

Look carefully at the origins and the connections here. Not only had Mohammed known the blind cleric in Egypt, but Rahman had been his spiritual mentor and four soldiers from Mohammed's Army unit had assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Rahman was charged along with Zawahiri and later acquitted. It is almost a direct line of descent from Qutb to the Islamic Jihad and finally to Brooklyn, New York.

Eventually Ali Mohammed told the courts, when he was charged in the Nairobi and Tanzania Embassy bombings, that he was an agent of al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad as part of his plea agreement. He admitted to helping plan the embassy bombings. He admitted training al-Qaeda members in the United States and abroad in the arts of terrorism. He admitted coaching al-Qaeda recruits on how to build effective cells. He admitted training bin Laden's personal guards, and he admitted helping Zawahiri visit the United States to raise funds. Despite this, and with much speculation about his cooperation with the CIA, incredibly Ali Mohammed has never been sentenced, nor is it sure that he is in the custody of the U.S. Government despite the Guilty Plea. He has completely disappeared without a trace since 2001.<sup>45</sup>

The strange case of Ali Mohammed underlines the ability of the Jihad to function well within the landscape of U.S. laws and rights and raise money, conduct terror operations, and, in the case of 9/11, get by the best efforts of U.S. intelligence.

The Global Jihad has come to rely on organizations that utilize our own laws protecting freedom of speech, expression, and association; or, as previously quoted, the Jihad is now practicing Lawfare.

As you can see, the ideas, organizations and sometimes the people that have shaped the Jihad Globally are the same that have propelled terrorist actions in the United States both before and after 9/11.

As a result, the biggest growth has been in some of the Muslim organizations dedicated *prima facie* to promoting cultural, economic, and even individual rights issues or warding off hate and discrimination but at heart comprise a very potent arm of the Jihad in the United States because they undermine the very legal foundation of our ability to counter them. More importantly, they are actually active in promoting an agenda that prevents proper training of U.S. forces.

Some, like the Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA), have already been declared terrorist associations, but others swim in the waters of freedom with little constraint.

CAIR is said to have a key role in the what has been deemed the Wahhabi lobby—the network of organizations, usually supported by donations from Saudi Arabia, whose aim is to propagate the especially extreme version of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia, and indeed the Saudi Embassy paid for CAIR's impressive Washington Headquarters.<sup>46</sup>

Unfortunately, they have had many individuals tied up in the network that can best be described as the Global Jihad: those like Ghassan Elashi, a founding board member of CAIR-Texas; Randall (Ismail) Royer, once a communications specialist for the national group; and Bassam Khafagi, the organization's one-time director of community relations. Ties to the previously mentioned Hamas, Holy Land Foundation, and many individuals mentioned in this section are very evident.

This network of organizations makes its way from our courts and law enforcement (such as CAIR does) to the Jails, thereby promoting Dawa but sometimes going much further in incitement such as the Ashland (Southern Oregon) branch of the Dawa organization headed by Pete Seda and Soliman al-But'he. Both men fled the country before they could be tried for terrorist activities.

## THE JIHAD: VERSION 2.0

Like the Internet 2.0, we now have Jihad 2.0, which places Terrorism squarely in the twenty-first century.

In 2008, The United States mounted an initiative to reveal how terrorist groups use the Internet. Code named Reynard, this initiative came to light when a recent report by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence was sent to

Congress. In the report, the initiative is described as a “seedling effort to study the emerging phenomenon of social (particularly terrorist) dynamics in virtual worlds and large-scale online games and their implications for the intelligence community.”<sup>47</sup>

The global Jihad, however, is beyond seedling efforts when it comes to using the Internet to promote, organize, and execute its mission. Despite the paradox of a fundamentalist Jihad, rooted in the seventh century, efficiently using the tools of a secular twenty-first century, they are doing this with ever greater success daily.

In the 1990s, the Israelis made a national defense effort to go after the head bomb maker of the Hamas, the “engineer” Ihyea Ayash, and finally caught up with him when he answered a call on a cell phone that Israeli intelligence had someone he trusted give him. His head exploded as he answered the call.<sup>48</sup>

Today, taking out the “engineer” or bomb maker would be a fruitless enterprise. There is “Hanbali” and the encyclopedias of “Bajadin”—rich troves of Internet materials and everything from tutorials on bomb making to material acquisitions, as well as analysis of failed tactics and how to remedy this. Whether this is from the legendary Bali bomber that is now thought to be imprisoned in Jordan or an Internet handle, we have a whole online encyclopedia of bomb-making techniques.

We have mentioned the use of footage taken by incited individuals and uploaded from Dorms in Georgia to gangs in Canada and England. However, there is also a sophisticated organization to the Internet Jihad.

Al-Qaeda has a multi-tiered online media organization.<sup>49</sup> This is something that has evolved from the 1990s when the first sites were opened for incitement. al-Zawahiri knows that we are in a “battlefield of the media.” There are regional production centers, As-Sahab media, affiliated with the High Command of al-Qaeda, a Media committee and Sawt-al-jihad—for the Arabian Peninsula. Once content is created by one of the above, it is sent to a “clearing house” such as al-Fajr media center and then on to preapproved sites. The clearing house serves the purpose of authenticity by providing the media logos and banners, and it also serves to confirm the origin of the message. On the constantly shifting forums (see Appendix 1, list of forums) this message will then be transmitted across the Internet. There are thousands of violent Islamist websites, and bombings in Algeria serve to illustrate how virtual becomes real.

Today, terrorists do not even need surveillance video. The proliferation of webcams pointed at many valuable targets, made available by our airport authorities and other helpful institutions, means that an operator anywhere in Pakistan can instruct a comrade in Brooklyn to park his car outside a terminal at JFK and watch from Pakistan if and how authorities react. The tested methodology is just a short step from carrying out an attack using this technique.

### **The Jihad’s Virtual 007**

Twenty-two-year-old Irhabi007—a play on the word terrorist and 007—was not trained in Jihadist camps in Afghanistan, nor was he one of the Mujahadeen that

learned his trade in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. But Irahbi007, a son of a Moroccan tourist official and a student of information technology, arguably did more to enable the global Jihad than even al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri.

As a student in Great Britain, he started a frightening and lethal development in the War on Terror: He used the Internet to organize and recruit for the Jihad.

In doing so, he unleashed a dangerous movement that today seems to be replacing al-Qaeda as “The Base” and relegates al-Qaeda to a strictly inspirational role. The new Jihadi networks allow for financing, planning, and executing devastating attacks with relative ease.

Today, the most rudimentary Jihadists can exchange recipes for nitroglycerol and thermite, as well as finance, recruit, and learn how to conduct effective Jihad against the West. Tutorials in 20 installments are downloadable and are envied by educational designers in the United States as proper examples of distance learning. Even more disturbing, terrorists recently began distributing flight simulation software—making flight school obsolete. These virtual schools are disseminated with encryption software provided on Jihadi forums.

“For example, a school teacher was found on one of the forums asking for help in carrying out a mission,” says Gadi Aviran, a former EOD officer in the IDF, a veteran of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN), and today the founder and President of Terrogence, the world’s leading actionable intelligence company.

Aviran says the man learned that the U.S. President was visiting his school in the Palestine authority during a recent visit to the Middle East.

“On the forum, the teacher asked what he could do, given that he would be in close proximity to the President,” he said. “We take seriously the level of sophistication and what is being done on the Web in the name of the Jihad.”

Is the West keeping up with Jihadis?

The Western world, by most accounts, is not keeping up with the Jihadis. Instead, much attention is given to sites like alekhlaas. Though it seems an ominous site due to the extreme nature of member chats, it’s not where the serious players post. In addition, poor translations, and even poorer analysis, are giving rise to potentially deadly situations.

For example, the word for “*missile*” and “*rocket*” are the same in Arabic. There are grave consequences, however, of mistaking the intent to use a rocket when a missile is the intended weapon. A mistake such as this was recently made by a U.S. intelligence agency based on a faulty translation provided by a private intelligence company.

As with anything in Internet time, extremism has advanced with lightning speed since 2005.

The antics of “Maximus,” a Swedish teenager of Bosnian extraction named Mirsad Bektasevic and inspired by Irahbi007, who along with three others plotted attacks in Europe in 2005, now seem like child’s play.

When police recovered 19kg of explosives, along with video recordings claiming affiliation to al-Qaeda in Northern Europe, they also discovered

Bektasevic's contact with Irhabi007. The arrests in Sweden led to the arrest of Irhabi007 and a sentence for 10 years after pleading guilty to charges of incitement to murder and conspiracy to commit murder. The gang was also running credit card and other fraudulent businesses to finance other Jihadi sites.

"Today it will be more difficult to track (the terrorists) down," says Aviran. "They are giving each other good guidelines on how to cloak their identity on the Web and how to clean up after a session. It's now a case of drawing and then connecting the dots. Doing this, we can stay ahead of our adversary in this conflict."

### Real-Time Threat Example

A real-time example of terrorists' use of the Internet starts with an activist from Algeria who asked online about raw ingredients needed for manufacturing an acetone-peroxide explosive. The activist wanted the resulting explosive to be used as part of a body-worn IED.

In this specific case, the Maghreb activist wanted to know if TATP (tri-acetone, tri-peroxide explosive) could be easily used in a suicide belt; he also wanted to know specific ingredients, as well as commercial names the raw materials are sold under.

In less than three hours the activist received textual instructions providing him with all necessary information and a link directing him to tutorial videos with "step-by step" visual instructions for TATP "kitchen lab" manufacturing.

The understanding that these support networks may replace the more easily detectable overseas communications with global Jihad organizations, including *al-Qaeda*, is critical for the unveiling of local self-radicalizing cells. It is by tracing this newer type of communication between seemingly anonymous surfers that these may be identified in time.

## UNDERSTANDING TECHNO-INTELLIGENCE SIGNATURES

"It is essential that we learn to understand the traces that all activity on the Web leaves," says Aviran. "We need to associate with the entire terrorist life cycle."

Aviran gives an example of a recent incident in Florida: "Two men were fishing in the Everglades to the west of Miami with saltwater rods. A state law enforcement agent, whose job it is to enforce anti-poaching laws in the Everglades, detained the two men. Both were from countries of interest and the officer requested that they show him their car. There were no alligators in the trunk but on the back seat were maps of Miami International Airport, including arrival and departure times of airlines. The Everglades, of course, forms part of the pattern flown by flights into and out of Miami. An RPG could probably bring down an airplane there easily. The officer completely missed the signs, released the men, and wrote up a report. Fortunately, someone in the agency recognized the signs and followed-up."

One of the key factors is to discern the difference between an intelligence threat and a theoretical threat. Aviran's company recently discovered on Jihadi sites a documentary on Paris sewer system. The documentary had been in heavy distribution.

"The film was seemingly benign," he says. "In the hands of a group threatening to create havoc in the French capitol, however, the information on how exactly the location of the sewage system affects the city and where it passes could be devastating if it ended up in the wrong hands. A TV show is a theoretical threat, but when it shows up in forums it becomes an intelligence threat."

Aviran suggests agencies look for the specific signatures that terrorist life-cycle activity leaves. Some signs of that activity include:

- Internet browser history
- Programs found on the suspect's machine
- Membership in forums
- Evidence of videos about potential targets
- Evidence of financial dealings and unusual credit card activity
- Manufacture and access to components and materials for creating IEDs

Aviran also advises agencies to make careful collection lists before approaching the complex problem of getting into closed Jihadi forums. Terrogeance specializes in conducting collection projects for clients like the U.S. Department of Defense and European and Israeli intelligence agencies.

## **Internet Activity and Terrorist Finance—Synergy in Cyberspace**

In one of the worst terrorist attacks, more than 200 people died in a 2003 bombing of a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia. They were the victims of Imam Sumadra, a militant Islamist with strong links to al-Qaeda.

As with other terror masterminds who have contributed to the Internet information network, Samudra wrote a jailhouse memoir instructing followers on online credit card fraud to finance terror operations.

The nexus between crime, insurance fraud, credit card fraud, and counterbanding of luxury goods to cigarettes has an inescapable online presence.

What could be done to slow this repository of information on everything from bomb-making to crimes that could finance terror and much more?

Self-regulation needs to be imposed on hosting sites. Many sites, however, are genuinely unaware of the problem. Recently in Florida, an ISP was hosting a forum on which Jihadis could download their own brand of encryption software. Notified by law enforcement, the site closed down the forum. There are also many barriers to controlling the Internet. As a society, we have yet to make unifying decisions about Internet issues, including spam and online criminal activity and fraud protections. A consensus on what and who constitutes a threat to citizens in an Internet democracy may be far away.

## THE GLOBAL JIHAD HAS A NEW HOME BASE—THE INTERNET

The expert use of the Internet is evidenced by propaganda issued by groups that espouse the Jihadi ideology. A recent propaganda film (*Lee's Life of Lies*) released by such groups in Iraq uses a real U.S. soldier and gives details about his life (based on stolen documents), to construct a very impressive hour-long, high-value production movie that purports to show U.S. soldiers criticizing the war in Iraq. When we show these documentaries at SSI training sessions, most viewers do not believe them to be fake.

Our challenge is to keep up with the Global Jihad. Failure to do so will have tragic consequences for the War on Terror. We need a concerted national effort—similar to the one made during the Cold War—to train pro-Western Arabic speakers to help decipher terrorist cyber codes. Without that, we are constantly reacting to the advances of the Jihadi's.

Michael Doran, a Near East scholar and terrorism expert at Princeton University, says this: “When we say al-Qaeda is a global ideology, this is where it exists—on the Internet.”

## CONCLUSIONS

The Global Jihad which began in the hearts and minds of fanatics intent on reestablishing a “golden period” of Islamic hegemony, at the dawn of the Ottoman Caliphate, based on a return to the original values and ideas found in the Quran, has resulted in some of the most violent terror organizations—al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and many others—and may now be spreading to many individuals inspired by the methods and ideologies of these groups.

These groups, aided and sheltered by States that support them, along with a global network of finance and legal organizations within Democratic countries that are sometimes woefully naïve about the Takfiri ideology and how it views other Muslims, let alone the inhabitants of Western Europe or the United States that are not Muslim, are also thriving.

Against this, there are woefully inadequate resources and ever-increasing bureaucratization of the effort. For example, the FBI is woefully short of qualified translators to keep up with the amount of material heading their way from local Law Enforcement and of course, on the Internet.<sup>50</sup> According to agents, the Bureau is “inexcusably understaffed.” Meanwhile, the Department of Homeland Security, which might be expected to take on the challenge, has already become ossified and incapable of handling this, giving the task of Intel on Open Source to private contracting companies.

This is despite the fact that experts agree that one of al-Qaeda's main aims is to create havoc either by demonstrating or actually carrying out an attack using weapons of mass destruction.<sup>40</sup> The Director of the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence addressed a special forum recently and was very clear about the danger. He points out that al-Qaeda is not the only threat. There

are multiple, home-grown possibilities for this type of attack, now that 9/11 has entered the consciousness of terrorists, be they U.S. fringe groups, Jihadi-inspired small independent cells, or even disturbed individuals—which may have been the case with the 2001 Anthrax attacks.

School violence and recent incidents at Virginia Tech have also focused attention on the al-Qaeda perfect-day scenario of multiple attacks in the United States.

In addition to all these threats lies the increasing possibility of the lone wolf we have discussed, which is specifically cited in the Canadian ITAC CIEM bulletin of June 2007 where they point out what we know: The Internet has become an important catalyst for incitement of lone wolves who are not communicating with members of a cell and therefore are almost impossible to prevent.

In order for the United States to defend itself against what may become a lethal combination of lone wolves, Hezbollah sleeper cells, al-Qaeda organization cells, and inspired fringe groups, a consistent national policy similar to that employed throughout the Cold War has to be employed against the Jihad. This means training Law Enforcement by giving them real, hands-on expert training rather than federally mandated, peer-group-reviewed scholarly programs that merely spend federal, state, and local resources without hitting the mark. Cadres of experts in analysis and Arabic, Turkish, Pashtun, Farsi, and other languages need to be trained and employed as they were during the Cold War. Intelligence, in which major organizational moves have been made such as the fusion centers, needs to have the teeth to be able to intercept attacks as they are being planned.

Much progress has been made. But also much still needs to be done. One soldier in Iraq put it this way: The Jetsons are not keeping up with the Flintstones. We are going to have to do so if we want to defeat the Global Jihad.

## APPENDIX 1: INTERNET SITES AND THE GLOBAL JIHAD

<http://www.m3ark.com/forum/> A partially closed forum supportive of Global Jihad. A vital participant in the distribution of propaganda and weaponry/explosives manufacturing material.

<http://hanein.info/vb> A forum supportive of Global Jihad and of regional insurgent groups. Prominent distributor of Jihadi films, including self-produced multimedia.

<http://www.muslim.net/vb/> A forum supportive of Global Jihad and of regional insurgent groups. This is one of the leading platforms for the distribution of Jihadi multimedia material.

<http://www.paldf.net/forum/> A forum supportive of the Palestinian resistance. This site is a prominent distributor of Jihadi multimedia and propaganda produced by Palestinian insurgent groups.

<http://www.military.ir/> A general forum in the Farsi language. Members of the forum discuss military and political subjects concerning Iran.



<http://www.cecenya.net/> A website in the Turkish language supportive of the Chechen resistance. This site is a distributor of Jihadi multimedia and propaganda concerning Chechnya.

<http://www.velfecr.com/> A website in the Turkish language supportive of the Palestinian resistance and of the Lebanese insurgent group Hezbollah. This site publishes news flashes, articles, and Jihadi multimedia.

## APPENDIX 2: INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 9/11

The common perception is that there have been no incidents of terror since 9/11. In reality, many have been thwarted. This list does not purport to be all-inclusive because many acts are reported as hate crimes and therefore have not been counted in this list.

1. September 18–November 2001: Anthrax attacks. Letters tainted with anthrax kill five across the United States, with politicians and media officials as the apparent targets. The case remains unsolved.
2. 2001: The Center for Urban Horticulture at the University of Washington burned. Replacement building cost \$7,000,000. Earth Liberation Front suspected.
3. December 22, 2001: Richard Reid attempted to bomb an American Airlines aircraft inbound from Great Britain. Reid is a professed al-Qaeda member.
4. May 8, 2002: José Padilla accused by John Ashcroft of plotting to attack the United States with a dirty bomb, declared as an enemy combatant. Recently, Padilla was convicted of lesser charges.
5. 2002 Buffalo, New York: Lackawanna Six, The FBI arrested Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, and Mukhtar al-Bakri. Five of the six had been born and raised in Lackawanna, New York. The six American citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested for conspiring with terrorist groups. They had stated that they were going to Pakistan to attend a religious training camp but instead attended an al-Qaeda “Jihadist” camp. All six pled guilty in 2003 to providing support to al-Qaeda.
6. May 2002: Mailbox Pipe Bomber. Lucas John Helder rigged pipe bombs in private mailboxes to explode when the boxes were opened. He injured six people in Nebraska, Colorado, Texas, Illinois, and Iowa. His motivation was to garner media attention so that he could spread a message denouncing government control over daily lives and the illegality of marijuana as well as promoting astral projection.
7. July 4, 2002: Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, a 41-year-old Egyptian national, kills two Israelis and wounds four others at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport. The FBI concluded that

this was terrorism, although they found no evidence linking Hadayet to any terrorist group.

8. October 2002: Beltway Sniper Attacks. During three weeks in October 2002, John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo killed 10 people and critically injured 3 others in Washington, DC, Baltimore, and Virginia. An earlier spree by the pair had resulted in 3 deaths in Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, California, Arizona, and Texas to bring the total to 16 deaths. No motivation was given at the trial, but evidence presented showed an affinity to the cause of the Islamic Jihad.
9. 2001–2004: The Virginia Jihad. In Alexandria, Virginia, 13 men were arrested for weapons counts and for violating the Neutrality Act, which prohibits U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at peace. Of these 13 men, four pled guilty. The other nine members of the group were indicted on additional charges of conspiring to support terrorist organizations. They were found to have connections with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terrorist organization that targets the Indian government. The FBI stated that the Virginia men had used paintball games as a form of training and preparation for battle. The group had also acquired surveillance and night vision equipment and wireless video cameras. The spiritual leader of the group, Ali al-Timimi, was found guilty of soliciting individuals to assault the United States and was sentenced to life in prison. Ali Asad Chandia received 15 years for supporting Laskar-e-Taiba but maintains his innocence. Randall Royer, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, Yong Ki Kwon, Khwaja Mahmoud Hasan, Muhammed Aatique, Ahmed Abu Ali, and Donald Surratt all pled guilty and were sentenced to prison terms. Masoud Khan, Seifullah Chapman, and Hammad Abdur-Raheem were found guilty at trial. Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem was acquitted at trial in 2004.
10. April 24, 2003: William Krar is charged for his part in the Tyler poison gas plot, a white-supremacist-related plan. A sodium cyanide bomb was seized with at least 100 other bombs, bomb components, machine guns, and 500,000 rounds of ammunition. He faces up to 10 years in prison.
11. May 1, 2003: Ayman Faris pleas guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and plotting to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge by cutting through cables with blowtorches. He had been working as a double for the FBI since March, but in October he was sentenced to 20 years in prison.
12. August 2004: A terrorist cell under the leadership of Dhiren Barot was arrested for plotting to attack the New York Stock Exchange and other financial institutions in New York, Washington, and Newark, New Jersey, and later accused of planning attacks in England. The plots included a “memorable black day of terror” with the employment of a “dirty bomb.” A July 2004 police raid on Barot’s house in Pakistan discovered a number of incriminating documents in files on a laptop

- computer that included instructions for building car bombs. Dhiren Barot pled guilty and was convicted in the United Kingdom for conspiracy to commit mass murder and sentenced to 40 years.
13. 2004, New York: James Elshafay and Shahawar Matin Siraj were arrested for plotting to bomb a subway station near Madison Square Garden in New York City before the Republican National Convention. The New York City Police Department's Intelligence Division helped to conduct an investigation leading to the arrests. An undercover agent infiltrated the group, provided information to authorities, and later testified against Elshafay and Siraj. Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, pled guilty and received a lighter sentence for testifying against his co-conspirator. He received five years. Shahawar Matin Siraj was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
  14. June 2005, Lodi, California: Umer Hayat and Hamid Hayat, a Pakistani immigrant and his American son, were arrested after lying to the FBI about the son's attendance at an Islamic terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The son, Hamid Hayat, was found guilty of supporting terrorism and was sentenced to 24 years. Umer Hayat's trial ended in a mistrial. He later pled guilty to lying to a Customs agent in his attempt to carry \$28,000 into Pakistan.
  15. October 1, 2005: Joel Hinrichs attempted to enter a University of Oklahoma football game where 84,000 spectators were in attendance. After refusing to let his backpack be searched, Hinrichs walked away and sat on a nearby bench. Hinrichs then detonated the TATP device that was in his backpack, killing only himself. It is unknown if Hinrichs detonated the device intentionally or by accident.
  16. December 2005: Michael C. Reynolds was arrested by the FBI and charged with being involved in a plot to blow up a Wyoming natural gas refinery; the Transcontinental Pipeline, a natural-gas pipeline stretching from the Gulf Coast to New York and New Jersey; and a New Jersey Standard Oil refinery. He was arrested when he tried to pick up the \$40,000 owed to him for planning the attack. His contact, Shannen Rossmiller, was a Montana judge who was working with the FBI. The FBI found explosives in a locker in Reynolds' home town, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Reynolds stated that he was working as a private citizen to find terrorists. Reynolds was convicted of providing material support to terrorists, soliciting a crime of violence, unlawful distribution of explosives, and unlawful possession of a hand grenade and was sentenced to 30 years in prison.
  17. August 31, 2005: Kevin James and three others was indicted on charges to wage war against the U.S. government through terrorism in California.
  18. February 21, 2006: The Toledo terror plot where three men were accused of conspiring to wage a "holy war" against the United States, supply help to the terrorist in Iraq, and threatening to kill the U.S. president.

19. March 2006: Taheri Azar, an Iranian Psychology student, runs over and injures nine students in North Carolina, claiming he wanted to punish the U.S. Government.
20. June 23, 2006: The Miami bomb plot to attack the Sears Tower where seven men were arrested after an FBI agent infiltrated a group while posing as an al-Qaeda member. No weapons or other materials were found.
21. July 7, 2006: Three suspects arrested in Lebanon for plotting to blow up a Hudson River tunnel and flood the New York financial district. The "plot" was talk, and it was entirely unfeasible because it would require enormous amounts of explosives, and the target was above the water level anyhow.
23. July 2006: Naveed Afzal Haq storms a Jewish center and shoots, killing one and wounding five others.
24. 2006, New Jersey: Conducting online surveillance of chat rooms, the FBI discovered a plot to attack underground transit links with New Jersey. Eight suspects, including Assem Hammoud, an al-Qaeda loyalist living in Lebanon, were arrested for plotting to bomb the New York City train tunnels. Hammoud was a self-proclaimed operative for al-Qaeda and admitted to the plot. He is currently in custody in Lebanon, and his case is pending. Two other suspects are in custody in other locations, and investigators continue to hunt down the other five suspects.
25. April 2006: Syed Haris Ahmed and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee from Atlanta, Georgia, were accused of conspiracy, having discussed terrorist targets with alleged terrorist organizations. They met with Islamic extremists and received training and instruction in how to perform pre-operative surveillance of potential targets in the Washington area. They videotaped places such as the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank headquarters as potential targets and sent the videos to a London extremist group. They were indicted for providing material support to terrorist organizations and have pled not guilty.
26. November 29, 2006: Demetrius Van Crocker, a white supremacist from rural Tennessee, was sentenced to 30 years in prison for attempting to acquire *Sarin* nerve gas and C-4 explosives that he planned to use to destroy government buildings.
27. December 8, 2006: Derrick Shareef, 22, a Muslim convert who talked about his desire to wage Jihad against civilians, was charged in a plot to set off four hand grenades in garbage cans December 22 at the CherryVale Mall in Rockford, Illinois.
28. March 5, 2007: A Riker's Island inmate offered to pay an undercover police officer, posing as a hit man, to behead New York City police commissioner Raymond Kelly and bomb police headquarters in retaliation for the controversial police shooting of Sean Bell. The suspect wanted the bombing to be considered a terrorist act.

29. 2007, Goose Creek, South Carolina: This incident involved the arrest and indictment of two engineering students from the University of South Florida on charges of possessing explosives. Ahmed Adba Sherf Mohamed and Yousef Samir Megahed were stopped for speeding near Goose Creek, South Carolina. Officers found suspicious materials in their car, including what prosecutors allege were pipe bombs, as well as ammunition and remote delivery system. The two were stopped near the Naval Weapons Station Charleston, site of the brig where convicted U.S. terrorist Jose Padilla was detained and interrogated. Mohamed is from Kuwait and Megahed is from Egypt. Both are in the United States legally, Mohamed on student visa and Megahed as a permanent resident alien. According the FBI, this is still an ongoing joint state–federal investigation that is examining the possibility that Mohamed and Megahed’s presence near the Naval Weapons Station may be linked to Islamist terrorism.
30. May 1, 2007: Five members of a self-styled Birmingham, Alabama area anti-immigration militia were arrested for planning a machine gun attack on Mexicans.
31. May 7, 2007: Fort Dix attack plot. Six men inspired by Jihadist videos were arrested in a failed homegrown terrorism plot to kill soldiers. Plot unravels when Circuit City clerk becomes suspicious of the DVDs the men had created; he reports it to authorities, who place an informant in the group.
32. June 3, 2007: John F. Kennedy International Airport terror plot. Four men were indicted in plot to blow up jet-fuel supply tanks at JFK Airport and a 40-mile connecting pipeline. One suspect is a U.S. citizen and one, Abdul Kadir, is a former member of parliament in Guyana. “Anytime you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the United States. To hit John F. Kennedy, wow. ... They love JFK—he’s like the man.” The unraveled when a person from law enforcement was recruited.
33. October 26, 2007: A pair of improvised explosive devices were thrown at the Mexican Consulate in New York City. The fake grenades were filled with black powder and detonated by fuses, causing very minor damage. Police were investigating the connection between this and a similar attack against the British Consulate in New York in 2005.
34. March 3, 2008: Four multimillion-dollar show homes in Woodinville, Washington are torched. The Earth Liberation Front is suspected in the fires.
35. March 6, 2008: A military recruiting station in Times Square was bombed in the early hours, resulting in minor damage to the facility. It is believed that a simply constructed device was used. Surveillance video that recorded the explosion also captured a bicycle-riding man who, prior to the blast, stopped and walked up to the facility. Police are investigating a possible link between this attack and recent attacks on the Mexican and British consulates in New York.

36. 2008, Falls Church Virginia: Abu Ali, 27, grew up in the Washington suburb of *Falls Church* and was valedictorian of a private Islamic high school. He joined al-Qaeda after traveling to Saudi Arabia to attend college in 2002. As a member of a Medina-based al-Qaeda cell, Abu Ali discussed numerous potential terrorist attacks, including a plan to assassinate Bush and a plan to establish a sleeper cell in the United States. He is in prison in the United States, awaiting an appeal on his sentence of 30 years. Appeal judge says the sentence of life in prison was deviated from by a lower court judge.

## ENDNOTES

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3. House of Commons Report, *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on the 7th July 2005*, Annex B, Radicalization in Context, Clause 3, May 11, 2006, p. 31.
4. Steven Emerson, *American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us*. Columbus, OH: Free Press, 2003, p. 110.
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the ballot box and other institutions, to the revolutionary, which try to infiltrate militaries to stage coup d'états, to militant groups. Nawaz and other experts on Islamism who appeared at the hearing said that a combination of social factors lead to Muslims subscribing to Islamist ideology, a point upon which committee members agreed. [www.cqpolitics.com](http://www.cqpolitics.com).

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