



Chapter 1

The Maoist Legacy

Contemporary Chinese history began when the late Deng Xiaoping initiated the reform and open-door policy in 1978. These policy initiatives had their roots in the pre-reform Mao era. After the People's Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949, Mao embarked on one of the largest experiments in human history to bring forth a total transformation to Chinese politics, economy, and society. In the early decades of his rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its state (hereafter, the Party-state) successfully undertook a number of far-reaching social changes. But the Maoist development model was soon found to be unsustainable as it came at extremely high human costs. By the late 1970s, all signs indicated a collapse of the system, and reforms were imperative. The Maoist experiment was a great lesson for the post-Mao leadership and became an integral part of contemporary Chinese history. After Mao, Chinese leaders introduced enormous reforms to remedy Mao's errors and to make institutional innovations and renewals.

While drastic economic changes have taken place in the post-Mao era, China's political structure remains intact. The post-Mao reform has been seriously constrained by the Maoist legacy. While the system was a product of the twentieth-century revolution, both Nationalist and Communist, it is also linked to China's deep imperial history and carries powerful imperial traditions that influence basic ideas and practices.¹ Many features of institutions and policies of historical patterns adopted during the Maoist rule have reappeared in the post-Mao era.

This chapter identifies the main institutional features and policy orientations during the Maoist era. It first traces the origins of the system to China's transformation since the late nineteenth century. It also shows how Maoist rule further transformed the country with its establishment of new state

institutions which penetrated Chinese society, mobilizing social forces and constraining China's socioeconomic development. Finally, it discusses how the system led to the post-Mao reform. To a great degree, Maoist communism met its end not because of the post-Mao reform but because of its self-destructive nature.

Political System

The political system that Mao established was a product of China's long struggles with a modern state system since the late Qing dynasty.² China's modern history began with the coming of Western powers. For a country with a long history of established civilization, it was hard for China to become modernized under external forces. China was defeated repeatedly by Western powers, first by the British during the two Opium Wars and then by the alliances of Western powers. It was also thoroughly defeated by its own modernized neighbor Japan.

These defeats had set Chinese political and intellectual elites thinking of the need to rebuild and revamp the Chinese state, which was no match to the Western form of modern state.³ Nationalism, an idea which China imported from Japan and other Western powers, played a crucial role in the country's long search for a modern state. In its later years, the Qing court made attempts to introduce various measures toward a constitutional monarchy, much in line with the successful Japanese model. With the rise of nationalism, however, Chinese elites began to doubt whether the Qing state had an adequate foundation on which to build a modern state. For political radicals, particularly nationalists, China should be not only a strong state, but also a state of Chinese ethnicity rather than the Manchurian ethnicity on which the Qing state was built. A constitutional monarchy or reforms within the existing Qing state would not be able to help save China and its people. This version of nationalism was shared by many Chinese political activists at home and abroad and even prevailed among Chinese officials. For nationalistic revolutionaries, constitutional monarchy was not enough; only a republic purged of all traces of the self-serving and inept Manchurians could make the state strong and bring about their patriotic goals. Only nationalism could forestall racial destruction by foreign powers and build a strong China.

Dr Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary followers employed two principles of nationalism – statehood based on ethnicity and popular sovereignty based on democracy – to rebuild China, and their efforts eventually led to the 1911 revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912.⁴ Central to the new republican state was the parliamentary system. Nevertheless, the revolution itself was a product of decentralization of political power. State-making, which required a centralized political force, became very difficult. During and

after the revolution, the forces for decentralization became dominant in Chinese politics. Provincial officials, who had acted autonomously during the revolution, sought to strengthen their autonomy and block the resurgence of an all-powerful and autocratic center. The state itself was no longer monolithic, but composed of competing levels of authority. Below the provincial level, local elites dominated the self-government organs that proliferated after 1911, expanded control over local finances, and held sway over the appointment of local officials.⁵

Great political liberalization convinced Yuan Shikai, the most powerful military man, that “the devolution of power from the center to the provinces and localities was inimical to the restoration of Chinese national strength.”⁶ Following the advice of his American advisor Frank Goodnow⁷ and others that a constitutional monarchy was more appropriate to China’s tradition than republicanism, Yuan attempted to re-establish the political dominance of the center. Yet Yuan’s various efforts to restore the monarchy failed because of political opposition from all sides. By the early 1920s, the republican state began to disintegrate as a constitutional and parliamentary entity and as a bureaucratic force. This trend soon brought chaos and warlordism to China.

Dr Sun Yat-sen initiated a long process to establish a new political order. In his early days, Sun placed much emphasis on popular sovereignty and believed that a republican government, based on the Western European and North American multiparty model, would provide a channel for popular political participation and make China strong. But this was not to be. Indeed, the new democratic political arrangement “failed to bring unity and order, not to mention legitimacy. Representative government degenerated rapidly into an autocracy hostile to popular participation and ineffective in foreign policy.”⁸ Sun came to the conclusion that without strong political institutions, no democratic regime would be stable and China would not become a strong state. Consequently, he turned to the organizational side of state-building. His new strategy was “state-building through party organization,” a concept he adapted from the Russian revolution.

According to Sun, Russians placed the Communist Party above the state; the Russian model was more appropriate to China’s modernization and state-making than the liberal European and American model. China should follow the strategy of “governing the state through the party” whose first priority was to establish a new state structure. He argued that “[w]e now do not have a state to be ruled. What we need to do is to construct a state first. After the construction of the state, we can govern it.”⁹ Only after a strong and highly organized party had been built could China begin to make a strong state, and only a strong state could lead to a working democracy. He also categorized China’s political development into three stages: first, military government; second, authoritarian government; and third, constitutional government.¹⁰

With Sun's great efforts, the Nationalist Party was reformed and became highly organized and centralized. Sun's successor Chiang Kai-shek kept to the same course and used the party to restore unity and order, end foreign humiliation, abolish unequal treaties, regain lost territory, and ultimately restore China's lost grandeur. After the Northern Expedition (1926–28), China was recentralized under the Nationalist Party regime. The new state was established through two primary methods. In the military sphere, the regime maximized the center's control over the instruments of force; in the civilian sector it extended and deepened the national government's penetration of local society by quasi-fascist projects such as the Blue Shirts and the New Life movements and self-government reforms like new country campaigns. However, the Nationalist regime put much emphasis on the control of urban areas, and failed to realize that "in a predominantly rural society the sphere of influence of cities was much more severely circumscribed than in the West where such a strategy might well have proved successful."¹¹ Local elites, on whom the regime heavily relied, were not able to succeed in fundamentally transforming the lives of the peasants.¹²

More importantly, the Nationalist government failed to arrive at a viable state idea.¹³ As the ruling party, the Nationalist Party stressed a centralized state structure and limited political participation. However, the idea of popular sovereignty was spreading in the country, and was very appealing at that societal level. By contrast, the CCP was able to transform the idea of popular sovereignty and use it to mobilize urban people and intellectuals against the Nationalist regime. Joseph Levenson showed that the Communist version of the state idea was more appealing to Chinese intellectuals than the Nationalist version.¹⁴ Furthermore, the Nationalist regime lacked effective means to spread its nation-state ideas among the Chinese. The regime's urban-centered modernization strategy left rural areas untouched. In contrast, by sending its officials to rural areas, the CCP successfully transmitted its nation-state ideas to the peasants. The rise of peasant nationalism during the anti-Japanese war (1937–45) finally led to the downfall of the Nationalist government and the triumph of the CCP in 1949.

The CCP quickly established a highly centralized political system by placing much emphasis on organizational and ideological control. The new state system until today has the following unique institutional features.¹⁵

The nomenklatura system

The CCP's most powerful instrument in structuring its domination over the state is a system called the *nomenklatura* system.¹⁶ It was based on the Soviet model, with little changes made from time to time.¹⁷ Within this system, the two most important principles are Party control of the government and Party

management of cadres.¹⁸ The CCP selects all government officials; almost all government officials and all top officials are Party members; and in each government agency, Party members are organized under a Party committee that is subordinate to the Party committee at the higher administrative level. The hierarchy of government organs is overlaid by a parallel hierarchy of Party committees that enables Party leaders to supervise Party members in the government and lead the work of the government from within.

From the mid-1950s until 1984, the *nomenklatura* system allowed the CCP leadership to appoint officials two levels down in the system, that is, each level of the Party structure is responsible for political appointments that are two levels down. For example, all positions above vice-ministerial level (such as State President, Vice State President, Premier, Vice Premiers, State Councillors, and others) fall under the jurisdiction of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee (more specifically the Standing Committee). In this case, the Political Bureau first selects the candidates, then passes the nominations to the National People's Congress (NPC), China's parliament, for approval.

This "Party management of cadres" system is also the most effective means for the CCP to constrain localism. The Political Bureau and its Department of Organization keep a tight rein on the selection and appointment of provincial Party secretaries and governors. The CCP leadership exercises the "cadre exchange system" or "term limits" to prevent the latter from having local vested interests.

Central leading small groups (CLSGs)

There are two types of leading small groups (LSGs), namely, Central Leading Small Groups (CLSGs) and State Council Leading Small Groups. Both types are ad hoc supra-ministerial coordinating and consulting bodies formed to build consensus on issues that concern the entire Party, the government, and military system when the existing bureaucratic structure is unable to do so. The two groups have radically different functions. While the State Council Leading Small Groups focus on coordinating policy implementation for the government, the CLSGs focus on initiating and managing policy for the Political Bureau, thus enabling the CCP to effectively exercise its domination over the government.

CLSGs do not formulate concrete policies; instead, they often focus on setting up guiding principles for concrete policies. Any recommendations of leading groups are likely to be reflected in the policy-making process because they represent the consensus of the leading members of the relevant Party, government, and military agencies. In some cases, the policy-making body may simply adopt a CLSG recommendation in its entirety.

CLSGs covers a wide range of important issue areas, including foreign affairs, financial and economic affairs, rural work, Party building work, publicity and

ideological work, overseas publicity, Party history work, and other emerging important issues. CLSGs do not have permanent staff, and often have to rely on their offices to manage daily operations and to make research and policy recommendations. While the effectiveness of a CLSG often depends on the effectiveness of its office, the way it operates also gives individual leaders, usually the head of a given CLSG, room to influence policy recommendations.

Xitong

Another mechanism which performs similar functions to the CLSGs is the *xitong*. CLSGs exist only at the central level, but *xitongs* also function at local levels such as the province and city. The purpose of *xitongs* is to enable the Party to exercise its domination over the government. Under it, society is divided into different functional spheres supervised and controlled by the corresponding functional Party organs and cadres.¹⁹

A *xitong* is different from its counterpart administrative department in the Party. These departments are part of the formal and legal structure and have limited capacity in overseeing a specific administrative agency. By contrast, the Party leadership in the *xitongs* is usually not part of the formal, legal organizational structure, since in general Party leaders' names are not publicized here, and also a *xitong* often oversees several related governmental ministries, departments, and agencies.

After it came into power, the CCP established a set of Party departments at the central and provincial levels such as the Industrial and Transportation Department, Trade and Financial Department, Education and Cultural Department, Agricultural Work Department, and City Planning Department. These departments performed the same functions as the government at the same level. In this way, there is little distinction between Party and government departments, with the latter's governmental functions taken over by Party departments.

Today, each *xitong* is usually headed by a member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee at the central level. At the provincial level, this function is performed by a member of the Provincial Party Committee. The main *xitongs* include:

- The military system which covers the entire armed forces.
- The political and legal system that covers the ministries of State Security, Public Security, Justice, and Civil Affairs, the Supreme Court and Procuratorate, the National People's Congress, and People's Armed Police Force.
- The administrative system which is divided into various smaller, secondary systems such as foreign affairs, science and technology, sport and public health, and finance and economy.

- The propaganda system which covers the State Council's ministries of Education, Culture, State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television, State Administration of Press and Publication, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Xinhua News Agency, the *People's Daily* and *Qiu Shi* (Seeking Truth) journal.
- The United Front system that covers the Chinese People's Political Consultant Conference (CPPCC), the eight "democratic parties," the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the State Council's Commission for Nationalities Affairs, the Religious Affairs Bureau, and the Offices for Overseas Chinese, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao Affairs.
- The mass organization system which covers the All-China Trade Union Federation, the Communist Youth League, the All-China Women's Federation, and various subordinate trade unions, youth, and women's organizations.
- The organizational and personnel system, mainly Party organization departments and the government personnel ministry or department at each level, which manage cadres of all the organizations mentioned earlier.

Dangzu

If CLSGs are mechanisms through which the Party exercises its domination over the government at the top, then Party groups (*dangzu*) are Party vehicles set up for the same purpose. The fact that China is a one-party system does not mean that there is no conflict between the Party and the government. Conflict frequently arises when the Party makes key decisions, and the government implements them.

Party groups are sometimes called Party "core groups" and should not be confused with another important body, "Party committees" or "unit Party affairs committees" (*jiguan dangwei*). Both Party groups and Party committees in all government agencies in China were established by the CCP. While Party committees existed in all other communist states, Party groups were unique to the CCP. Party committees belong to the Party organizational system and not to the governmental agencies to which they are appended. Their members are at least in principle elected by Party members working in the same government body. They focus on Party affairs, such as supervising the behavior of Party members within the same agency, recruiting new Party members, directing political studies and ideological work, and collecting membership fees. Party committees answer to the next higher Party committee.²⁰

By contrast, the Party group within a government agency is more powerful than the Party committee. The Party committee is under the direction of the Party group in the same governmental agency. In other words, the Party group has the responsibility of actually administering the work of the whole

governmental agency. Party group members are not elected by Party members in the same organization, but appointed by the next higher level Party committees. For example, at the national level, all Party groups in different ministries are appointed by the CCP Organization Department and the Central Secretariat. Below that, Party groups are appointed by the relevant provincial and local Party committees. The Party group at each level answers to the Party committee one level above, to which they owe their appointments.²¹

A Party group in a governmental agency is usually made up of four to five Party members who hold senior positions in that agency. The secretary of the Party group always has the final say in all the agency's important affairs and approves and issues important documents. The main purpose of the Party group is to oversee the important activities (e.g., policy-making, policy implementation, and personnel appointment) of the governmental agency to which it belongs. The Party group has to ensure that the preference of the Party is reflected in all such activities. Indeed, without the Party's endorsement, no important activities can take place in that governmental agency. By doing so, "the Party actually took over administrative power."²²

The party and the military

The Party–military relationship merits particular attention as it shows how the Party maintains its domination over the government. However, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) does not form an integral part of the government, or vice versa. The Party–military relationship has long been defined as symbiotic.²³ The close ties between these two most powerful political institutions can be seen in the many defining shared features such as ideology and personnel structure and a nearly equal political status.

The role of the military is visible in many key areas of Chinese politics ranging from leadership succession to control over the government and social stability. Thanks to his revolutionary experience, the command of Mao Zedong over the military was unshakable. Until his death, Mao relied on his revolutionary ideological and personnel network to exercise a tight control over the military. When China was in political chaos during the Cultural Revolution (CR), Mao relied on the support of Defense Minister Lin Biao to work against other senior civilian leaders such as Peng Zhen, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping. During the last years of the CR, Lin Biao and his lieutenants attempted to institutionalize the role of the military in civilian affairs. Although Lin died in 1971, after allegedly plotting against Mao, the military remained an essential part of China's political system. When Mao died in 1976, the military's support was essential to Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor, in arresting Jiang Qing and the other members of the "Gang of Four," namely, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan.

State–Society Relations

In traditional China, the reach of the emperor was very limited and hardly went beyond the county level. Since each county had only one official member of the national bureaucracy (the *zhixian*, or county magistrate), the emperor made extensive use of intermediate elites, particularly the gentry class,²⁴ or “individuals who held official degrees gained normally by passing examinations, or sometimes by recommendation or purchase.”²⁵ When the Nationalist Party attempted to build a new state, it left the structure of governance unchanged. The county was still at the lowest level of administration, and the government was still highly dependent on local elites and centered in cities. Simply put, its power did not penetrate the rural society.

The CCP on the other hand was able to penetrate every corner of society and dominate social forces through various mechanisms.²⁶ The so-called “multiparty cooperation” was the most important part of the United Front developed by the CCP in its long struggle for power. With this system, the CCP was able to exercise control over the so-called “democratic parties” (*minzhu dangpai*) through state institutions such as the People’s Congress and the CPPCC. Furthermore, the CCP divided the whole society into various functional groups which are incorporated into the regime as in the case of the “democratic parties.”²⁷ Altogether, China today has 32 functional groups.

The household registration (*hukou*) system was used to control population movement and bind people to their place of birth and work. Without a household registration booklet, no one could obtain food, clothing, housing, employment, schooling for children, marry, or enlist in the army. The system thus created a spatial hierarchy of urban places.²⁸ A related institution for controlling population was the work unit (*danwei*) system for ideological indoctrination and administrative disciplining such as warning, open criticism, and negative records in the dossier.²⁹ The *danwei* system was also a mechanism for ensuring political compliance and allegiance from individual citizens by providing them with economic and social security such as inexpensive housing, free medical care, generous retirement pensions, and a wide range of subsidies for everything from transportation to nutrition.

A highly organized society, together with a planned economy, enabled the Party-state to mobilize numerous social groups into the political arena, thus creating new power resources within Chinese society to implement profound tasks of social engineering such as land reform, collectivization, and nationalization of business and commerce. Nevertheless, over time, the highly organized and efficacious Party-state gradually degenerated into a regime obsessed with ideology and lacking in almost any genuine social base beyond its Party-state apparatus.³⁰

Economic System

The economic system that the CCP built had a new structural dimension, namely, planned economy, which was based on the then Soviet model.³¹ Central planners controlled all major sectors of the economy and made all decisions relating to the use of resources and the distribution of output. They would decide on the products to be produced and direct lower-level enterprises to produce those goods in accordance with national and social objectives.

The novelty of this system can be exaggerated. There was a dimension of continuity. China's state-led economic development and industrial modernization began in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The system of "official supervision and merchant management" (*guandu shangban*) was developed in the early industrialization stages before it gradually developed into a system of "bureaucratic capitalism."³² The Nationalist government continued this tradition and played an important role in directing economic development. Under Mao's planned economy, however, the role of the state became excessive, even though Mao eventually found that a highly centralized Soviet-style economy did not work well for China, and initiated waves of decentralization. China's economic system was also different from that of other East Asian economies such as Japan and the "four dragons" (South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). In these economies, the issue is about the role of the state and the market in the process of economic development; in China, it is about the role of the central government and local governments since all market mechanisms had been eliminated under the planned economy. The absence of market forces led to another characteristic of the Maoist economic system: political campaigning as the main driving force behind economic development.

The Chinese economy before 1949 was predominantly pre-industrial agrarian. When the European powers came to China in the mid-nineteenth century, China was already in a state of decline, and the economy had been in stagnation for a long time. Indeed, the CCP inherited an economy which was not only backward but also badly ravaged by a long period of war and internal turmoil. After the CCP took power, it immediately moved to consolidate its control by launching several campaigns, including the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and implementing land reform. In the rural areas, the process of socialist transformation started with a comprehensive land reform which redistributed land from landlords and rich peasants to the poor and landless peasants. After the land reform, peasant households were organized first into agricultural cooperatives and then, in 1956, into the Soviet-type collectives. In 1958, the collectives were further merged to form people's communes. In urban areas, the nationalization of trade and industry started with the "three-anti"

(*sanfan*) and “five-anti” (*wufan*) campaigns. By 1956, most private enterprises had been transformed into cooperatives or joint state–private enterprises operating under the umbrella of the state sector.

Through such socialist transformation the CCP was able to consolidate its control in both rural and urban areas. The mobilization of resources for maximum economic growth under central planning was through the Five-Year Plan (FYP) system. The Soviet model, however, was biased against small industry and labor-intensive technology, as it was against agriculture and rural development. Mao came to realize that the Soviet model was not in congruence with China’s basic resources, its large population, and its low level of technology. He went on to experiment with his own development model by launching the Great Leap Forward (GLF) movement from 1958 to 1960, which called for a simultaneous development of agriculture and industry, both small and large industries. Mass mobilization was to replace the more systematic centralized planning as the main development strategy. The purpose of the GLF was to surpass Britain in 15 years. Mao believed that by mass mobilization, the country could achieve unlimited economic growth. In the urban areas, the industrial GLF was marked by a rise of a new industrial front made up of numerous small to medium labor-intensive enterprises. The agricultural GLF was centered on the people’s communes which mobilized peasants en masse for large-scale rural capital construction projects such as building dams and irrigation work, and making iron and steel.

With such all-out mobilization of resources for economic development, the first year of GLF brought 22% economic growth. But the excesses soon surfaced as chaos, waste of resources, and increasing neglect of farming mounted. Precipitated by bad weather and followed by bad harvests, the GLF collapsed in 1959. The economic crisis deepened in 1961 with economic growth plunging by as much as 30%. For the first time after the Communist revolution, China had to import wheat from the West to avert mass starvation. Radical decentralization soon led to the decline of the central government’s control of China’s overall economy. Decentralization resulted in a deficit crisis due to the decline of the central government’s capacity to collect revenue. Within four years (1958–61), the central government suffered a deficit of more than 18 billion *yuan*.³³

The GLF also led to the great famine which cost millions of human lives.³⁴ The period 1962–65 marked a retreat from the GLF, emphasizing economic retrenchment and recovery. Mao was criticized by some pragmatic leaders, particularly Marshall Peng Dehuai.³⁵ After the collapse of the GLF, the Soviet model of development was totally discarded.

However, Mao was undaunted and unconvinced by the setback of the GLF. In 1966, he started the CR which gave him an opportunity to carry forward his own development strategy which emphasized economic self-reliance.

Decentralization was to be further expanded, while rural development and labor-intensive industries were to be given top priority. The CR did not disrupt production in the same way or to the same degree as the GLF because most CR activities were mainly confined to major cities, leaving the agricultural sector basically intact. In urban areas, though the main targets of the CR were the Party and government organizations, industrial production also suffered as factory management everywhere came under attack and workers got embroiled in incessant political campaigns. The overall adverse effects of the CR on the economy were not as serious as the GLF. The economy plunged into negative growth in 1967 and 1968, but bounced back in the 1970s.

Both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai died in 1976. Immediately after Mao's death, Premier Hua Guofeng together with other more moderate leaders staged a putsch against leading CR radicals led by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, in what was often termed the downfall of the "Gang of Four." When Hua was in control during the immediate post-Mao years, he strived to continue with developing the Chinese economy under a modified form of central planning. He launched the Ten-Year Plan in 1978, which was, however, soon scrapped for being too ambitious. Power eventually returned to the pragmatic old guards led by Deng Xiaoping in 1978. By that time, Deng had realized that there was something fundamentally wrong with the Chinese economic system. He was thus determined to open a new chapter in China's modern economic history by the launching of economic reform and the open-door policy.

Elite Politics

Mao's experiments in state building, economic development, and social transformation took place in the context of China's elite politics. Under Mao, elite politics were complicated. He wanted the Party-state machinery to achieve his personal vision of state building and social transformation. The state Mao envisioned was one without a strong bureaucracy. He tended to regard all his colleagues as mere tools for the realization of his utopian state. He took disagreements between him and his colleagues as challenges to his authority. Mao was ruthless to dissenters, and power struggles, more often than not, paralyzed the system.³⁶

Mao's authority was absolute in the post-1949 period until his death in 1976; he did not allow his colleagues to challenge his utopian visions, let alone his political authority. He also frequently emphasized the importance of unity of the Party since it was unity that led the CCP to its success. Nevertheless, in his perceptions, the unity of the Party had to be achieved by various mechanisms through which his colleagues and his people demonstrated their loyalty to himself. It is also worth noting that Mao did not engage in power struggle for

the sake of power itself; rather, he did it purposefully. Surrounding each power succession, Mao would situate himself between radicals and pragmatic leaders, and maneuvered political forces toward his goal.

Elite politics in Mao's era was characterized by repeated political purges.³⁷ The first major leadership purge was the Gao Gang Affairs of 1953–54.³⁸ Around 1953, Mao wanted to implement the “two-front” leadership by which he would retreat to the “second front” to consider large questions of policy and direction while other younger leaders would run the daily affairs of the Party and stay on the “first front.” Liu Shaoqi, who had been Mao's chosen successor since at least the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, was expected to become the leader on the “first front.” Nevertheless, by that time, Mao had become critical of Liu and made his disenchantment known to Gao, who was also a Political Bureau member and Mao's personal favorite. Gao was not satisfied with his position in the Party, and the new policy initiative gave him an opportunity to challenge Liu's position. Gao launched an effort to undermine Liu with the clear aim of becoming the new successor. Mao was aware of the damage Gao's actions were causing to Party unity, and turned decisively against his favorite. This only resulted in solidifying Liu's status as successor further.

In the early 1960s, Mao began to have serious doubts about Liu. The “two-front” leadership arrangement led to a situation in which Mao perceived that he was increasingly marginalized in decision-making. By 1965, Mao had completely lost confidence in Liu and decided to have him removed. In 1966, Mao managed to install Lin Biao as the new successor with the support of another personal favorite whom he seemingly regarded as totally loyal, and the support of the army for the unprecedentedly disruptive CR. Once reluctantly installed as the successor, Lin essentially adopted the passive tactic of echoing whatever positions Mao adopted. This involved fulsome praise of the CR. Nevertheless, by 1970, Mao had come to doubt and took precautionary measures against his successor. Conflicts involving turf warfare and petty personal frictions unfolded between civilian radicals led by Madam Mao (Jiang Qing) and a group involving Lin's household, particularly his wife and son, and top central military officials from among his revolutionary colleagues. Sensing that the military had gathered too much power, Mao sided with his wife at the 1970 Lushan Plenum and demanded self-criticisms from Lin's group, which he found inadequate. This eventually forced a showdown with Lin that led to the latter's fateful flight from China in September 1971.

In the post-Lin Biao conflict of the radicals around Jiang Qing against the remaining pre-CR elite represented by Zhou Enlai, and after his 1973 rehabilitation by Deng Xiaoping, Mao considered a range of younger leaders as eventual successors, particularly the radical Wang Hongwen, and eventually Hua Guofeng, who also had support from veteran revolutionaries for such a role.

Mao used power struggle as an incentive for other leaders in order to achieve his political goal. As a major player in all these power struggles, he was able to manipulate these political factions. He frequently changed his political alliances to eliminate any perceived political threat to his authority and move toward his goal. He was able to maneuver since his authority was absolute. With his passing, his political enterprise faded with him.

Maoism: Experiment and Failure

Maoism is undoubtedly one of the greatest experiments in human history. Like Dr Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek before him, Mao was aware of the importance of having a strong state. Nonetheless, it was never clear what form of a strong state Mao had attempted to build. He was never satisfied with the form of the state his revolution had brought about. Whereas states rest on bureaucratic systems, Mao's form of the state was one without a bureaucratic system. He thus called for a continuous revolution to consistently remake the state.

The Party-state was successful in establishing a hegemonic regime and an overall control over local society through its coercive organization and ideology. The domination of the state, however, does not necessarily mean that the state is able to modernize the country. The state's capacity to develop the economy and society depends on not only the will and skill of the top leadership, but also the lower-level state organizations and social institutions. Without the initiative of social institutions and the cooperation of lower-level organizations, leaders will have difficulties mobilizing people and getting them to rally behind them.

The planned economy was in opposition to such initiatives since the system met collective objectives by individual sacrifice. Under such a system, rewards, whether wages or perquisites, were to be distributed according to the value that the state ascribed to the service performed. The planned economy eliminated the profit motives of the individuals and placed production decisions in the hands of state planners. Maoism thus allowed ideology to take precedence over economics. Without material incentives, Mao turned to other means to facilitate the transformation of the country, such as political campaigns, decentralization, and power struggles.

All political movements were initiated from above, particularly by Mao himself, and with multiple purposes. Until the late 1950s, political movements were targeted at the consolidation of the new regime, and the transformation of society. The success of the early movements had given Mao undue confidence in social engineering. He became increasingly ambitious, and believed that he could wield political power to achieve his utopian version of the socialist state. He thus initiated the GLF, and then the CR. While Mao wanted con-

tinuous revolutions to sustain his version of the state, in the later years of his life political movements had lost their great momentum.

Political campaigns came at great costs, both physical and human. While the leftists sided with Mao in political campaigning, many other leaders became pragmatic and lost their confidence in the Maoist version of the state and society. The Chinese also lost their enthusiasm. In the early years of the PRC, the Chinese genuinely believed that Mao could lead the way to a new society. But in reality, endless political movements undermined society, and made the lives of ordinary folks increasingly difficult. Chinese society, particularly the younger generations, began to reflect on and doubt the Maoist system. This became apparent during the spontaneous social movement after the death of Zhou Enlai in 1976. Urban citizens and university students in Beijing and elsewhere gathered at Tiananmen Square to pay their condolences to Zhou and to protest against the leftists. While the movement was finally clamped down by the government, it was an indicator of a decline in the legitimacy of Maoism.

Mao's political movements left behind positive legacies. Many old guards like Deng Xiaoping who had survived these movements came to realize the folly of too much political and ideological contention, as manifested in numerous mass movements and campaigns, and that political and social stability was crucial to economic development. The post-Mao leadership thus placed an overwhelming emphasis on social stability. The fear of social chaos has been a major driving force behind most policy initiatives in the post-Mao era.

The Deng leadership thus abandoned political campaigning and prioritized stability. This meant avoiding power struggles and eventual social chaos. Deng thus reiterated the importance of collective leadership and regarded social order as the minimum prerequisite for economic development. To regain its legitimacy, the leadership no longer relied on ideological education but turned to performance, namely, delivering economic goods to society. When rapid economic development gave rise to a divided society, the post-Deng leadership introduced social policies to address the issues of social injustice. Needless to say, changes in policy agendas have also led to great changes in terms of state-society relations in the contemporary era.

Notes

- 1 Lieberthal (2004: xvii).
- 2 For the complexity of China's history from imperial days down to the reforms, see Spence (1990) and Fairbank and Goldman (1998).
- 3 For discussions of the nature of the Chinese traditional state, see Schram (1985, 1987).
- 4 For an examination of Sun Yat-sen's role in the Chinese revolution, see Bergère (1998).

- 5 Kuhn (1975) and Young (1977).
- 6 Cohen (1988: 522).
- 7 Frank J. Goodnow (1859–1939) was one of the principal founders of the American Political Science Association and became its first president in 1903. From 1914 to his retirement in 1929, he was the president of Johns Hopkins University. He also served on President Taft’s commission on economy and efficiency in 1911–12. In 1913, Goodnow was invited by Yuan Shikai to be his legal advisor.
- 8 Hunt (1993: 68).
- 9 Sun (1986: 103).
- 10 Chen (1988).
- 11 Whitney (1970: 71).
- 12 Averill (1981).
- 13 Whitney (1970: Chapter 2).
- 14 Levenson (1964).
- 15 Schurmann (1968) provided a classic analysis of the interrelationship of the role of ideology and organization in China. Lieberthal (2004) analyzed how China is governed from an institutional perspective.
- 16 Burns (1989: ix).
- 17 For the development of the *nomenklatura* system, see Burns (1989, 1994).
- 18 For discussions of these two principles, see Lieberthal (2004: Chapter 6); Huang (1996: Chapter 4); and Shirk (1993).
- 19 Huai (1995).
- 20 Pen (1995).
- 21 Ibid., 159–60.
- 22 Ibid., 160.
- 23 For the changing role of the PLA under Mao and in the post-Mao era, see Gittings (1965); Joffe (1987); Finkelstein and Gunness (2007); Mulvenon and Yang (1999); Shambaugh (2002); and Bickford (1999).
- 24 Fairbank (1983: 32–39).
- 25 Ibid., 33.
- 26 For analysis of state–society relations in the context of Chinese tradition, see Tsou (1986); Womack (1991); Shue (1988); and Walder (1986).
- 27 China has eight “democratic parties,” namely Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang, China Democratic League, China National Democratic Construction Association, China Association for Promoting Democracy, Chinese Peasants and Workers Democratic Party, China Zhi Gong Dang, Jiu San Society, and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League. See Information Office of the State Council (2007).
- 28 Cheng and Selden (1997).
- 29 All organizations in urban China where people worked such as enterprises, retail shops, hospitals, schools, civil associations, and government organs were called *danwei*. Roughly speaking, three types of *danwei* can be identified: 1) enterprise units, including all units engaged in making profit; 2) non-profit units, including scientific, educational, professional, cultural, athletic, and health care organizations; and 3) administrative units or governmental organs. For analysis of the *danwei* system, see Bray (2005); Wang (2005); and Lü and Perry (1997).

- 30 Shue (1994).
- 31 For a review of China's economic development from 1949 to 1985, see Riskin (1987).
- 32 Feuerwerker (1968).
- 33 *Statistical Yearbook of China 1991*, p. 12.
- 34 On China's great famine, see Dikötter (2010); Yang (1996); and Yang (2008).
- 35 Peng Dehuai (1898–1974) was a prominent military leader of the CCP, and China's Defense Minister from 1954 to 1959. In June 1959, he tried to tell Chairman Mao that the Great Leap Forward was a dramatic mistake. Peng was criticized by Mao and other members of the Political Bureau and was disgraced. He was arrested in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution. He died of cancer on November 29, 1974.
- 36 R. MacFarquhar provided a detailed analysis of China's elite politics from 1949 to 1966, see his trilogy (1974, 1983, 1997). For elite politics during the Cultural Revolution, see MacFarquhar and Schoenhals (2006).
- 37 Teiwes (1993).
- 38 Teiwes (1990).

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