

Chapter 1

Naturalizing Cultural Heritage

*France has never believed in the notion of a pristine nature that has so confused the “defense of the environment” in other countries: what we call a “national park” is a rural ecosystem complete with post offices, well tended roads, highly subsidized cows and handsome villages. (Bruno Latour, *It’s Development Stupid!* 2007)*

*In the attempt to hold nature still, as representation, uncanny effects are created and the alienation effect of the map becomes congenial. (Michael Taussig, *My Cocaine Museum*, 2004)*

On my very first visit to South Africa my hosts enquired about the places and things I most wanted to see. Looking back now I recall that Kruger National Park came top of the list. So too did seeing herds of wildebeest, causing my colleagues understandable chagrin because I was mistakenly picturing the savannahs of East Africa. Significantly, and to my eternal embarrassment, I had omitted South Africa’s archaeological sites. It was nature that had me entranced, particularly the idea of African wilderness, charismatic mammals, and safaris. In the years that followed, my research began to address that self-same subject making, asking why the desire for certain forms of nature might come at the expense of the cultural past? Why has the notion of wilderness achieved this privileged position and protected nature entreated a global embrace, whereas human histories are perceived as particular, often factional, conflictual, and in need of reconciliation. Conducting research in national parks, home to many of South Africa’s archaeological treasures, I began to question the tendencies towards isomorphism between natural and cultural heritage that were reflected in international declarations, national

legislation, site management, and promotion. One major theme of this book is an exploration of the primacy of global imperatives surrounding natural heritage and why these are often overlaid onto archaeological heritage. Several historical strands of influential thinking from the Anglo-American tradition are thus outlined here as a necessary background to the chapters that follow. They draw together romantic and colonial sentiments that continue to have ramifications today in postcolonial contexts like South Africa. The other two themes of this book are also entwined in our understandings of past places: moral ideas about the value of heritage, whether derived from cultural or natural patrimony and, to a lesser degree, the role of public-private partnerships in their management. During my fieldwork in South Africa these matrices became evident, particularly in the political entanglement of natural and cultural heritage. Today ideas about conservation are sutured to development, diversity, and sustainable futures that have enchanted the global imagination.

Archaeologists would do well to investigate the intellectual traditions that have shaped ideas of cultural heritage through the lens of nature and conservation. Geographer David Lowenthal (2006) usefully draws attention to the comingling of natural and cultural heritage inheritances and asks what each domain might learn from the other. We typically deem archaeological and natural heritage distinct undertakings with very different modes of operation. This separation may be fitting in certain contexts, for example in Turkey (Thys-Senocak 2010) or Greece (Cengiz 2007), and is reflected in national ideologies and state managerial institutions (but see Catsadorakis 2007). However, cultural understandings of both categories vary, as do the implications of integrating heritages. An example there would be the spiritual inseparability of traditional Aboriginal culture and landscape in Australia (Byrne, Brayshaw, and Ireland 2001; Head 2002; Lilley and Williams 2005). Beginning in the 1990s there have been increasing moves toward integrating the preservation of culture and nature, globally spearheaded by UNESCO's influential Cultural Landscapes program (Rössler 2003). Tracing a genealogy of these interconnected heritage taxonomies would require a book-length treatment, yet it is important here briefly to outline some salient thinkers and historical trends that have been instrumental in forging ideas about heritage protection and our anxieties about occupation, rights of access, use, and loss. A suite of universalisms has emerged about the scarcity, non-renewability, and loss of natural heritage that pervades international legislation and monitoring, research, activism, and donor economies (Tsing 2005). We can no longer parse out natural heritage from the cultural sphere, ignore its dominance, or fail to address how tropes of nature's diversity, endangerment, and protection have irrevocably influenced our understanding of the cultural past.

In this chapter I argue that the legacies of enclosure, eviction, and salvage that developed around sites of natural value have indelibly informed our understanding and management of cultural places. Today nature-based narratives of diversity, sustainability, and community-based conservation have also permeated archaeo-

logical sensibilities. Archaeology has been reticent to acknowledge its intellectual debt to conservation, largely because of its willingness to hive off the material culture of dead societies rather than embed our practice in more living and contemporary concerns. Like geography and conservation science, archaeology was forged in a colonial crucible, when Europeans mapped and recorded the worthy remains (of aesthetic or scientific achievement) of cultures past before they disappeared or were destroyed. These material remains documented past lifeways and were considered vital in understandings of our own humanity. In the following sections I describe some historical strands of thought around natural heritage that have particular salience in the development of cultural heritage ideology and the fundamental ways in which we have come to devalue human presence in natural places.

South Africa offers a rich seam for exploring the development of protected natural heritage. Contemporary thinking about the environment, rather than an exclusive product of Western predicaments and philosophies, emerged as a direct response to the destructive social and ecological conditions of colonial rule in places like South Africa (Crosby 1986; Grove 1995: 486). During the 1600s at the Cape of Good Hope, colonial expansion and appropriation prompted a reevaluation of nature. Early botanical gardens were established and the task of locating Eden became a cultural preoccupation. At the heart of this relationship between people and nature were three concepts that can be traced back to the classical era: “the idea of a designed earth, the preoccupation with those environmental influences which affected the development of man and society and, lastly, the idea of man as a geographical agent” (Grove 1995: 24). South Africa, like other imperial colonies, later became a petri dish for studying the effects of famine, disease, the depletion of resources, and in reacting to these perceived threats, environmental policies were drafted between 1650 and 1850. Through the already international and inter-colonial channels among scientists, the sense of a global environmental crisis gained momentum. Here, the concept of nature as “that which we are not” also took root. Nature was considered external to humanity and so nature ceased to be fully “natural” as soon as human labor was applied to it (Soper 2000: 16). Ideas of conservation and progress thus came to rely upon the fundamental separation of humanity from nature (Igoe 2004: 77) in an ontology where nature was reified and human intervention predominantly vilified.

Of the many historical threads one might unravel in this history of intersection between natural heritage and a peopled past, I focus here on three that have particular relevance to my work in South Africa. The first two stem from the colonial era and can be traced through to the post-apartheid present. The first thread addresses the enclosure movement that began in England during the fifteenth century and was later exported to its colonies. Enclosure found full expression in fortress conservation (Brockington 2004), typically mobilized in the national parks of ex-colonies whether in Africa or North America. Enclosure, I argue, has also been adapted as a strategy for the protection of archaeological sites with the

resultant fencing out of previous occupants and stakeholders. The second thread recalls the implicit moral judgments about particular natural and cultural sites that we deem worthy of salvage, on the basis of their representative, scientific, or aesthetic value. The third strand differs considerably in its predominantly modern constitution and reflects upon emergent global discourses that privilege diversity and sustainability. Unity in diversity was a concept first promulgated by Alexander von Humboldt to describe ecosystem functioning and was adopted in the new South Africa to reflect its multiethnic constituency. The concept has been similarly influential in articulating networks of cultural expression, conservation movements, and global pressures to enhance sustainability. Bolstered by UNESCO declarations and international development ventures, modern nations are being encouraged to draw from the legacies of nature and culture to forge possible futures.

Enclosures and Fortresses

Beginning in the fifteenth century a new capitalist order carved up the English medieval landscape, transforming common property systems of fields and pastures into private property, and this was accompanied by a system of fences and fines. The movement marked a new register of state intrusion into the lives of peasants, resulting in dispossession and new classificatory zones of wilderness and empty lands. Enclosure underscored existing inequalities around wealth, class, and ethnicity resulting in the displacement of rural communities. Enclosure, then, can be thought of as a legal measure or governmental regime as much as a physical one. Enclosure is still viewed negatively as a dominant topography that many have vigorously resisted in cultures of protest (Johnson 2008: 13–15). The Levellers, so named, according to some traditions, for their destruction of hedges, fought enclosure on a platform of equality and popular sovereignty and struggled against the familiar forces of repression, poverty, and land dispossession. They produced a remarkably modern *Agreement of the People* in 1649 (Winstanley 1945) and presaged modern environmental movements by asserting that the earth was a “common storehouse for all.”

The seventeenth century was the preeminent period of English enclosures. At this time all land that could profitably be used was considered “agricultural land,” with only a small proportion designated “waste land.” The economic gains for landlords at this time were formidable, and in terms of the cash value of produce may have ranged from 50 to 100 percent. By 1760 at least 75 percent of land in England was already enclosed, though the percentage increase in economic output had declined somewhat. Conversely, the commons has steadily decreased from 1.7 million acres in 1873, to 1.1 million in 1958 (Wordie 1983: 501). Today England retains less than 1 million acres of common land of its total 32.5 million acres, the

vast majority of which have been declared “areas of outstanding beauty” or sites of special scientific interest (SSSI).

Enclosure was ripe for export, particularly to British colonies where “productive” and “aesthetic” landscapes could be profitably parsed out from traditional land use. Indigenous groups at home or abroad, whether Native Americans or the Irish, were rendered uncivilized peoples without property, bounded lands, fences, or organized agriculture; these lacks supplied full justification for state or colonial appropriation. The British elite in the early 1800s likened the segregation and subjugation of their domestic foe to their imperial subjects, so that subduing Finchley Common and Hounslow Heath became as critical as controlling Malta and Egypt (Igoe 2004: 81). Peasants at home and abroad must be directed toward commercial agriculture rather than their traditional practices. Political moves to enclose land fundamentally changed rural and nomadic people’s relationship with the land and their socio-economic situation, whether in England or East Africa. Parallels to modern-day structural adjustment programs have not gone unnoticed that similarly segregate, deprive, and displace the rural poor (Igoe 2004: 81). Large-scale farming replaced individual African agro-pastoralists and sport hunting sought to exclude indigenous hunting practices. The destruction of traditional hunting rights had a devastating effect on African culture, irrevocably changing diet, economic and social relations, and severing connections with the physical environment (Adams and McShane 1996: 32). At first native peoples were seen as too natural, too like nature. Soon this would be reversed and they would be perceived as threatening the balance of nature, hunting in unacceptable ways, and engaging in unsustainable practices (Adams 2003a: 35).

Enclosure in South Africa has been relatively understudied, but the coercive shift from indigenous communal tenure to private property gained momentum in the 1860s. British settlers were encouraged to recreate “home” and British notions of property by digging ditches or planting hedges. These actions were seen as improving the land, not only in terms of profit but as part of the civilizing mission (Beinart 2003: 47). The Fencing Acts of 1883 and 1910 were key in strengthening landowners control of the environment and of its commercial productivity. They also produced new categories of trespass and reordered rural social relations that saw Africans further disempowered (Chapter 3). As Van Sittert argues (2002: 95), before the British reformed the land system the boundaries of farms were undefined and permeable. Colonial administrators reissued grants on perpetual quitrent after accurate survey in an attempt to fix them on the surveyor’s map. Buffer zones of crown land between neighbors gradually disappeared and farm boundaries became uniformly coterminous. This new form of territoriality served colonists well since enclosure facilitated the landed control of an indigenous majority with a minimum of effort (Van Sittert 2002: 98). Boundary demarcation accelerated dramatically from 1875 onwards. In the 1890s some 5000 square miles was surveyed and divided into 8000-acre divisions creating hundreds of farms marked by stone beacons and given exotic, worldly names (Stevenson-Hamilton

1929: 185). This created the first reliable map of the country and cast it in the nomenclature of European civility. There were no less than eight recognized categories of fence instigated as a wholesale means to control livestock disease, predators, and theft. Fences were also material measures to control shadow economies and severely delimit traditional lifeways. Enmity ensued with Africans either dispossessed or forced to pay for fencing through increases in hut tax.

Black South Africans were effectively being *fenced out* by enclosure and simultaneously *fenced in* by a new system of native reserves. In the Transvaal, the 1881 Pretoria Convention between British and Republican governments provided for a Native Lands Commission that demarcated boundaries for native reserves (Matthew 1915: 10). Those reserves comprised only 7 percent of South African land and could not accommodate the native population. From these laws, the 1887 Squatters Law developed and the Native Land Act of 1913, which prohibited blacks from buying or leasing land outside the reserves from whites. The foundations of apartheid segregation had been laid. The beginnings of “bad neighbourliness” that is bemoaned around Kruger can be traced to the aforementioned developments, coming as it did on the heels of drought, rinderpest, war, and the transition from farm labor to migrant labor (Van Sittert 2002: 112). Enclosure and fencing created new categories of “wandering natives” and “squatters” in Kruger National Park, and new designations of trespass, poaching, and other forms of criminality hinged upon changes in colonial topographies. And like much conservation and heritage rhetoric, enclosure was administered as a betterment strategy, a rehabilitation of the landscape from degradation, disease, and depredation, for which Africans were largely blamed and from which white settlers ultimately benefitted. As an early form of environmentality, enclosure and fencing separated commercial farming and conservation, it articulated productive and aesthetic domains, and further alienated black South Africans from their lands and lifeways.

This history of fencing and enclosure in South Africa heralded the creation of fortress reserves like Kruger, Kalahari Gemsbok, and Mountain Zebra national parks. The whole idea of a fenced park, according to Adams and McShane (1996: 56), signals our failure to balance human needs with those of nature. It exposes a mythical Western ideal of wild Africa that imagines a timeless barrier against both humans and nature; the land inside the fence shall endure, untainted by people, regardless of what happens beyond. Both culture and nature suffer as a result. From the 1930s the dominant policy of national parks has been preservation without human habitation (Brockington 2004), and sometimes without even the acknowledgement of historic occupation. Fictions of *terra nullius* (or empty lands) and unspoiled nature powered the broader vision of protected areas in the decades that followed. Fenced reserves seek to preserve a pristine wilderness that never existed, while circumscription endangers cultures that long ago successfully adapted to living with animals. The monolithic desire to save wildlife, regardless of the harm that effort might cause living communities, has led conservationists

to idealize national parks as the ultimate moral good while eschewing the immorality of destroying human lifeways. Creating parks, even the newly conceived Great Limpopo Transfrontier Peace Park (GLTP), requires permanently removing communities that live on or near newly protected land. By fencing out people, real attempts at reconciliation or peace are sabotaged (Draper, Spierenburg, and Wels 2004; Rodgers 2009; Spierenburg, Steenkamp, and Wels 2008; Wolmer 2003). Connections to historic or ancestral sites and ongoing traditions are attenuated and cultural and natural heritages remain oppositional. Since the mid-1980s there has been a gradual expansion of protected areas that now cover 12 percent of the Earth's surface. Some of those participating countries have disallowed human occupation in more than 30 percent of their territory, making this a much more actively "conserved" world than ever before (Brockington 2009: 14).

Histories of enclosure have critically informed the desire for people-free landscapes and the evidential erasure of human activity, culminating in the ideal partition of either productive landscapes or aesthetic ones. Enclosure is still operational today (Vasudevan, McFarlane, and Jeffrey 2008), not only in conservation areas, but also in rural places like eMacambini in KwaZulu Natal. Attempts to deprive thousands of people of land through the commercial development of AmaZulu World by Ruwaad Holdings Dubai constitute a form of dispossession by accumulation (Harvey 2003). Commodification of the Zulu past, with statues of Shaka and promises of capital injection instead, threaten to displace thousands and destroy ancestral graves. Enclosure, gentrification, and other forms of dispossession by accumulation continue to re-order urban (Blomley 2008), rural (Donahue 2001) and protected areas (Spierenburg, Steenkamp, and Wels 2008), further compromising the poor and the commons alike. Enclosure refers not simply to the material force of fencing, but the imposition of an ideology that shapes and alienates territory so that the map, as Taussig (2004) so aptly describes, becomes congenial. In the context of Kruger, boundary lines created a pleasing prospect for generations of white South Africans while black communities were alienated and segregated from their sites and ancestral places.

The tenets and tactics of enclosure, I suggest, have also impacted our consideration of ancient sites, cultural landscapes, and heritage management. Matthew Johnson (1996; 2008) has described the British enclosure movement as critical for understanding systems of property and landscape that have infused national archaeological traditions. However, archaeologists have not considered the moral and material effects of exporting enclosure across the empire in the way anthropologist Jim Igoe (2004) has usefully done for conservation history (but see Giles and Finch 2008). Nor have archaeologists fully explored the concept of enclosure in concert with contemporary heritage management strategies that seek to separate and sever former occupants from ancestral territory (but see Byrne 2003; Segobye 2006). Archaeologists themselves are fence builders, cordoning off sites for protection as a regular feature of site management strategies internationally (Libsekal 2008; Lydon 2005).

Like conservationists, archaeologists have typically enjoyed the high moral ground of rescuing heritage for the future. However, unlike many of our colleagues in conservation science who feel embattled and consider that their agendas have been hijacked (Brockington and Igoe 2006: 425), archaeologists enjoy the professional benefits and kudos of collaborative projects and have rushed to adopt the mantra of community participation. Others have purported to practice “indigenous” archaeology whether apposite or not. According to Byrne, heritage practitioners promoting the community conservation approach want to believe it works; yet the vehemence of the positive spin often obscures the shallowness of its penetration (Byrne 2009: 87). The modalities of archaeological protection, the treatment of sites, and their occupants/custodians, have all been prefigured by the tenets of nature conservation from colonial times onwards. The Native American expulsion from Yellowstone starting in the 1800s (Keller and Turek 1998) must be seen as a pivotal episode since the conjunction of eviction, enclosure, erasure of history, and the invocation of *terra nullius* were exported worldwide as “the Yellowstone model.” In 1926 it would influence South Africans lobbying for the establishment of Kruger National Park under the National Parks Bill: their proposal to the House of Assembly was that Kruger would be even larger than its American counterpart (Ramutsindela 2004: 23).

Since heritage conservation does not occupy the same register as nature conservation, it is difficult to quantify the land and livelihoods that have been sacrificed for the sake of archaeology globally. Protected heritage does not necessarily produce the degree of conservation refugees as protected nature nor occupy comparable physical territory. It has been estimated that the number of people displaced worldwide from traditional homelands over the past century for conservation is estimated to be close to 20 million, 14 million of them in Africa alone (Dowie 2009: xxi). Similar relationships exist today between many nations and their traditional communities who live amidst archaeological ruins, who sometimes continue traditional practices, and at other times make their living from heritage tourism and archaeological projects. Archaeologists have been slow to identify the victims of our own excavation and conservation efforts, since this detracts from our perceived good work of rescue, preservation, and uplift (Gonzalez-Ruibal 2009; Herzfeld 1991; 2006; 2009). Archaeologists have yet to calculate the global human scale of heritage dislocations or even its territorial extent. But the coercive removals of settlements to fulfill UNESCO requirements for Mahabodhi temple in India, around the Pyramids in Giza (Shetawy and El Khateeb 2009), in Luxor (Meskell 2005e; Mitchell 2002b), and in East Jerusalem (Abu el-Haj 2001; Greenberg 2009) are not insignificant. In the case of Luxor, the Egyptian government has systematically removed thousands of people from Gurna over the last century, many of whom were engaged in heritage tourism and have since been pressed into agricultural labor (Meskell 2005e; van der Spek 1998). Repeated attempts to relocate the Jordanian Bedouin from Petra (Massad 2001) and Wadi Rum (Brand

2001) were also conducted under the banner of national development and modernity.

Mirroring the discourse of fortress conservation, I argue that residents around cultural sites have been either evicted or persecuted because of these same embedded proximities and histories of access and utilization of sites that have now been recast as endangered places. Employing Brockington's (2004; West, Igoe, and Brockington 2006) thesis developed for nature conservation we can identify the epistemic shifts that enable these intercalations. First, people are viewed as encroaching and threatening the integrity of heritage sites. They are typically charged with misreading the past or being ignorant of its value, further providing grounds for their expulsion. Second, those communities are often positioned as interlopers rather than the "original" peoples who built or traditionally used such sites. They are rendered illegitimate and suspect, as are their claims. Third, and in a bizarre twist, international agencies often step in to assist these same local people after dislocation through development projects. The joint strategies of dislocation and development can be seen globally whether one studies South Africa, North Africa (Lafrenz Samuels 2009; 2010), Mexico (Breglia 2006), or the United States (Colwell-Chanthaphonh and Ferguson 2006). From this perspective, since valuable resources have been poured into heritage sites, foreign tourism revenues must be prioritized. Monuments are bearers of national pride and so heritage (whether natural or cultural) cannot be compromised by the presence of local people. Wilderness, pristine landscapes, and lost civilizations must be protected *from* humanity *for* all humanity, beyond the needs of a few individuals or communities. But like fortress conservation (Igoe 2004: 73), exclusionary heritage projects fall short of their promises and cannot guarantee the safety of sites without the very collaboration of local stakeholders that they have come to eschew.

Beauty and Duty

In this section I outline briefly the historical positions of critical Euro-American figures who have shaped moral sentiments about nature, its protection and value, and have ineluctably influenced our thinking about archaeological sites and their connected communities. A longer historical analysis of the philosophy of nature or attempts to write histories of nature lies beyond the scope of this work. My starting point here recalls the secularization of arts and sciences in the eighteenth century that prompted Western aesthetics to objectify nature through science and subjectify it through aesthetics. I argue that this history presages our current discussions around natural and cultural heritage and informs the tenets of our universal heritage body, UNESCO. Significance, value, preservation, and moral uplift are qualities that we now readily attach both to natural and cultural sites. So how did we move from the position of heritage as beauty to duty?

Illustrated in the writings of Rousseau and Goethe, the mid-eighteenth century witnessed a crescendo of self-proclaimed naturalism and social ferment that acquired moral overtones. Goethe claimed (1998: 21) that romantic landscapes reflected “a tranquil sense of the sublime in the form of the past, or what amounts to the same, of solitude, remoteness, seclusion.” By the early 1800s concepts about human impacts on the environment were already taking shape in Europe. Influenced by Herder’s liberalism, concern for moral progress, and his respect of foreign culture, Alexander von Humboldt argued that indigenous groups like Native Americans had suffered all manner of degradation through European destruction of their traditional lifeways. With a background in natural philosophy and botany, he criticized the destructions of forests, the brutality of European dominance, and the imposed hardships upon those who were forced to labor in the service of their colonial forebears. Nature, he asserted, was to be gently followed and improved, not plundered for the sake of wealth (Grove 1995: 368–9), famously quoting that “nature is perfect till man deforms it with care” (Humboldt 1850: x). Humboldt’s writings are full of longing and nostalgia for both ancient people and landscapes, lamenting “the golden age that has ended. In this paradise of American jungles, as everywhere else, a long, sad experience has taught all living beings that gentleness is rarely linked to might” (Humboldt 2007: 66). Yet typical of his time, he described native peoples as friendly, tame, and peaceful, but also wild, lazy and indigent (Humboldt 2007: 79). Inspiring modern movements around the preservation of natural (and cultural) heritage, his views on the environment combined scientific knowledge and personal observations. Humboldt propounded the idea of “unity in diversity” and the inextricable connections between human and natural phenomena, the seminal idea of our linkage and responsibility that was later harnessed in modern ecological thought. Reflecting upon his voyage down the Amazon he became critical of human presence, arguing that “you get used to seeing man as not essential to the natural order . . . this view of a living nature where man is nothing is both odd and sad” (Humboldt 2007: 99). During his American visit many embraced Humboldt’s cosmopolitan views as paralleling their own thesis of “Manifest Destiny” understood as the “free and democratic future of all humanity and of the United States as ‘Nature’s Nation’” (Buttimer 2006: viii). Given the romantic appeal of his writing and sketches on the tropics, Humboldt has been lastingly influential on our ideas of landscapes, diversity, and conservation.

Romanticism sanctified “both nature and antiquity, promoting their protection against not only decay and dissolution but from improvidence and iconoclasm” (Lowenthal 2006: 81). Romanticism, however, had its own internal differences that were largely wrought by the massive upheavals of society and thought between 1790 and 1815. The French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Industrial Revolution all fashioned a sense of the past that was remote and irrecoverable, while the rise of nationalism evoked new attachments to archaeological monuments as collective symbols. Writers including Rousseau, Goethe, Wordsworth,

and Scott celebrated the landscapes and antiquities of the past and entrenched the veneration of both cultural and natural heritage (Lowenthal 2006: 81). Landscape architects like Humphrey Repton and Capability Brown created genteel landscapes replete with fabricated fallen monuments and follies. At the same time romanticism revered the “brutishness” of wild places as mysterious and a source of wonder and moral instruction (Adams 2005: 103). Heritage was perceived as a conduit for connecting us with the past and edifying our future.

North American figures such as Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau took the aesthetics of nature in a different direction and combined it with developments in the natural sciences. In the 1860s George Perkins Marsh sparked controversy by submitting that humans were the major threat to nature and its fundamental harmony (Carlson 2008: 212; Lowenthal 2000). Environmental optimism continued unchecked, however, while reverence for wild nature gained ground, thus illustrating the bifurcation between productive and aesthetic environments. Yosemite National Park commissioner Frederick Olmstead asserted that the power of nature to affect people was an index of their civilization and cultivated taste (Igoe 2004: 89). Nature was thus set aside for the educated white classes and further detached from its indigenous stewards. Influential American naturalists John Muir and John Burroughs continued with this position in which wild nature was privileged and human intrusion was vilified (Carlson and Lintott 2008). Influential environmentalists like Aldo Leopold appealed to biocentric ethics in claiming the inherent value of “wilderness” and rare species, with native species being prized over invasive and exotic varieties (Caldicott 2008: 111). His famous “land ethic” can be encapsulated in the dictum that “a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 1949: 224–5). The rampant conquest of nature in the early nineteenth century was replaced by concerns over nature’s collapse (Lowenthal 1997) and, from the later twentieth century, was characterized by the widespread acceptance of human agency in nature’s degradation and its potential salvation.

The moral economy of nature has continued to strengthen under modernity, contrasted, as it has effectively been with the evils of industrialization, commercialism, commodification, labor, and resource depletion. Popular ecological thinking turns on the idea that nature exists in pristine opposition to human culture, and that across Africa wild nature is concomitantly devalued in proportion to human involvement. Goodin’s (1991) “green theory of value,” posits that value is accrued through natural processes rather than by “artificial” human ones. Interdisciplinary scholarship in geography, biology, and ecology is attempting to challenge the popular arguments of deep ecology and its anti-anthropocentrism (De Jonge 2004; Kareiva *et al.* 2007). It is a truism that human impact on the environment in modern times has been devastating. Environmental and climate change summits, the inexorable marketing of green lifestyles, and globally coordinated rock concerts are just some of the responses. Judgments about human

impacts have also been projected across time and space and include everyone from our prehistoric ancestors to indigenous peoples today. People are part of nature, as many scholars have argued (Hannigan 2006; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003), yet that view and its practical implications have not always filtered down to those who manage conservation areas. Indeed what are the grounds for valuing environments less for their anthropogenic histories? Conservation biologists might reply “ecosystem services” facing such a proposition, arguing that all natural assets are negatively impacted by human presence. Yet ecosystem services are themselves defined around people: they describe the range of provisioning and regulating, cultural and supporting ecosystem functions that support people (Gibson *et al.* 2008: 180). Thompson (2008: 260) argues that science cannot provide us with the foundation for making these evaluations and there is no reason for preferring one development of our evolutionary heritage to another. Rather, she claims it is the “aesthetic” approach to valuing nature that offers an argument for the protection and preservation of certain things and environments (Thompson 2008: 265). Nature’s intrinsic value is not a non-anthropocentric value, and we need not dismiss human agency or the history of intercalation between the human and nonhuman.

Significantly for heritage purposes, the aesthetic value of nature has been transferred to the cultural realm, where the purity of material remains are often considered to be threatened by the impositions of human access, resource use, potential employment, economic benefit, or commodification. Like wild places, the archaeological past should only be lightly improved or shored up. Past places must resist the impacts of contemporary peoples who are viewed as predominantly destructive and self-interested. Lowenthal is correct that “scientific experts continue to view nature as superior to culture, the alterations of humanity as inferior to the previous untouched fundament” (2006: 87). The tenets of conservation have subsequently been accepted on a global scale and permeated well beyond discussions of the environment, to archaeological remains that are, ironically, human creations in the first instance. The historical conjuncture between natural and cultural heritages has had an inescapable and potentially detrimental impact, particularly for indigenous groups and those with felt connections to place. These are often the very communities that have suffered persecution or expulsion at the hands of preservationists. Beginning in North America, the first steps toward site protection were initiated with Roosevelt’s 1901 Forest Service, followed by the 1906 Antiquities Act. The act gave the American president discretion to protect “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures” that were situated upon lands owned or controlled by the government and also to create reserves. This act also recognized that “significance” is tantamount to “historical, scenic and/or scientific values.” The first sites nominated were the Grand Canyon, Death Valley, and Joshua Tree National Park (McGimsey and Davis 1984). Natural places such as these are overlain with cultural significance that cannot be neatly disaggregated, and this tension continues to be problematic in US environmental policy (King

1998). Natural resources and places provided the model for the paradigm of non-renewability and uniqueness, thereby necessitating protection from human affairs.

The 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage forged perhaps the most important and overt conjoining of the two heritages. UNESCO is the international organization par excellence for cultural heritage, yet it has recently focused increased attention upon biodiversity and protected areas in conjunction with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and other powerful ancillary organizations like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Nature Conservancy and countless NGOs whose mission is protecting nature. The IUCN was founded in 1948 by Julian Huxley and now includes over 1000 agencies and 10,000 experts globally. This is in stark contrast to UNESCO's smaller cultural offshoots, such as the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). For UNESCO, cultural heritage consists of monuments or sites of outstanding universal value from the perspective of history, art, or science. Similarly, natural sites are deemed to be areas of outstanding universal value from the vantage of science, conservation, or aesthetics. The organization's singular mandate is "to take the appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of this heritage" (UNESCO 1972). We might consider here that the two heritages may be incommensurate in some contexts and the conflation elides the social construction and value systems inherent to each. Such compounding further depicts the role of archaeologists as good conservationists (literally saving the planet). However, the global salvage mission that UNESCO and others such as Conservation International and the WWF promote has attracted criticism because of their support of nation-state domination and of policies that devalue humanity and endorse commercialism and because of their failure to incorporate indigenous heritage perspectives. Today heritage is increasingly part of an international agenda that both participates in and is critical of globalization and global politics.

Underpinning UNESCO is a suite of judgments resting on the presumed universals of beauty, scientific knowledge, and representativeness (Ericksen 2009). The World Heritage List of 890 properties includes 689 cultural, 176 natural, and 25 mixed from 148 state parties. These have accumulated over the duration of the organization's history. However, a closer examination of those newly listed "cultural" sites for post-1994 South Africa, such as Mapungubwe Cultural Landscape (a national park run by SANParks) and the Richtersveld Cultural and Botanical Landscape (a national park run by SANParks) highlights that cultural heritage has also come to stand for nature. Cruikshank (2005: 251) has similarly drawn attention to the politics of "natural" designations in Canada that devalue human presence and historic traditions. Her findings at the Glacier Bay world heritage site document the decisive rift for First Nations custodians whose cultural practices

and subsistence patterns were imperiled by the stroke of a pen. The domination of “natural” sites occurs largely in Australia, Brazil, and on the African continent, contrasting with Europe, where the declared sites are indisputably cultural, including palaces, historic centers, churches, and archaeological sites. While the work of UNESCO is about saving sites and the majority of its patrimony is cultural, in 2010 its focus seems squarely upon sustainability, biodiversity, risk and disaster, marine and forest conservation, and cultural landscapes.¹ Despite the dual mandate representing cultural and natural heritage, UNESCO’s central interest is moving toward landscape, climate, environment, and biodiversity. UNESCO’s Help Save Sites donation page directs you straight to an image of a panda (the symbol of the WWF),² while climate change dominates their program news and publications (UNESCO 2009). One could position these integrated developments as reflecting positive steps toward acknowledging socio-nature (Swyngedouw 1999) and regard them as demonstrating that finally nature’s social shaping is being recognized. However, in expanding the enormity of nature in crisis, biodiversity and climate change have become hegemonic and the peopled aspects of place have become further eroded.

Diversity, Sustainability and Future Generations

The most recent set of convergences for natural and cultural heritage stem from global debate around biodiversity, sustainability and endangerment originating in the early 1990s. In this section I discuss the implications for archaeology and natural sites together through discourse and developments spanning little more than two decades. Every day we are surrounded by ever-increasing calls for action, donation, restraint, and mindfulness about the environment and natural resources. It is not surprising, then, that cultural agencies have adopted the same affective mantras: vanishing heritage, destructive development, threats from visitation, and loss of integrity.³ Rather, it is the scale and proliferation of these ancillary effects and our reticence to disentangle these borrowed prescriptions that I find striking. No one could deny our global environmental precariousness or the credibility of scientific predictions. So severe is our crisis that influential propositions like Weisman’s *The World Without Us* (2007) now proffer extremist fantasies where humanity disappears from the planet and natural diversity prevails, thus celebrating our own demise (Chakrabarty 2009; Zizek 2010). In what follows I am concerned that human agency is typically cast as deleterious and that this model has been readily embraced within cultural heritage discourse.

Recalling Humboldt’s legacy, I turn first to the prioritization of diversity in natural and cultural arenas. Material nature (West 2006: 164) is powerfully connected to arguments of human livelihoods and survival, genetic capital, and human adaptation in the face of global change. Banking on biodiversity thus

entails bringing together social movements and capital knowledge within a transnational assemblage of organizations, actors, knowledges, endangered species, and genes (Escobar 2008: 14). It is difficult to challenge the premise that our own future biological success is premised on the management of nature rather than upon the management of a material past. Biodiversity then leverages weightier claims than archaeological heritage. A radical and complementary view, though, might posit that unless we come to terms with cultural difference, historic trajectories, and genealogies of oppression, our survival as a species also looks rather grim. New exigencies and pieties around global ecological responsibility and species survival fuse in the largely accepted tenets of one-worldism. Bruno Latour (2004b: 462) problematizes this singular view of the globe, critiquing the “first modernity” dream of an already existing common sphere. In the cultural field many practitioners assert that preserving material heritage is a universal good and therefore constitutes global patrimony. The quotidian and centrifugal efforts by metropolitan museums to house the world’s treasures (Appiah 2006; Cuno 2008), wresting them from local and national stakeholders, is one damaging result of that position. Heritage studies are just touching on those domains, their cosmopolitan constitution, and the tensions between global and local ethical positions (see papers in Meskell 2009a; Mortensen and Hollowell 2009).

There have been notable efforts to incorporate culture within the locus of biodiversity. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) produced *Cultural and Spiritual Dimensions of Biodiversity* (Posey 1999), which incorporates ancient spiritual attitudes to diverse nature and ecology-based worldviews, but then moves quickly into an ecocentrism that configures nature as central and cultural contributions secondary. Culture is understood as the traditional practices that shape biodiversity, indigenous ecological information, and attempts to safeguard intangible knowledge, language loss, and knowledge transmission. Ecological citizenship and ecosystem resilience is paramount, while people and the cultural practices that have maintained the diversity are discussed only after descriptions of plants and animals (West 2006: 164). Culture is transposed into the “culture of sustainability” because “cultural diversity should be regarded as a powerful guarantee of biodiversity” (UNESCO & UNEP 2002: 7). Biodiversity thus enlists cultural diversity for support, especially in the face of the acknowledged failures of development since the 1970s. UNESCO suggests that both diversities, biological and cultural, are mutually reinforcing and interdependent. During the 2002 UNESCO summit held in Johannesburg the familiar elements of both mystical ecology and governmentality emerged: Indigenous stewards “live in harmony with nature . . . [and their] traditional spiritual values often serve to prevent overexploitation of resources” (UNESCO & UNEP 2002: 14). Cultural diversity has intrinsic potentials “as a source of innovation, creativity and exchange,” which points to its asset standing and market value from the balanced scorecard approach. Biodiversity “does not pose any theoretical difficulty” in their view, yet UNESCO has lately admitted that “cultural diversity” rests on the problematic tension

between diversity and universality (Droit 2005: 201). Respect for diverse cultural traditions and ways of being is central, yet we should not imply that all people have to maintain some measure of ethnic difference or live in cultural stasis to be valued. Linguistic and legal anthropologists have critiqued the green metaphor of endangered language and culture since both are always already in a dialectics of formation and dissolution, porous and only relatively stable (Coombe 2003: 279). Levi-Strauss (1963) famously remarked that diversity is less a function of the isolation of groups than of the relationships that bind them together. We might do well to be wary of any *modus operandi* in which individuals and communities are commensurate with animals and environments.

It is not often the case that anthropologists, much less archaeologists, are involved in such high-level global discussions. In Johannesburg Arjun Appadurai (2002) contributed to the UNESCO/UNEP roundtable and nuanced the debate in forceful ways by emphasizing cultural needs and goods. Appadurai argues that diversity must also extend to the political realm, necessitating a maximum diversity of moral visions, not simply organisms or identities. Given mounting anxieties surrounding renewable resources, he imputes that there are no more vital “renewable resources than our children, our dreams and aspirations, our talents and imagination, in short, other than our humanity itself” (2002: 49). Indigenous communities have been exceptional trustees of the biodiversity of their own environments, rather than people that need to be coerced into protectionism. Quoting Wally Serote, South African poet and CEO of Freedom Park, Appadurai charges that for more than half of the world’s population, biodiversity and environmental sustainability seem to be cruel jokes, mere circuses for the elite. Linking back to his own politicized scholarship (1990; 1991; 1996), he posits that natural and cultural diversity might offer the best counterpoint to the ideological and technological uniformity resulting from unrestrained market-driven globalization. While market logics seem to dominate global relationships, we must be mindful of the tensions between environmental concerns, market concerns, and development concerns. And while cultural diversity should be fundamentally connected to questions of law, ethics, and freedom, the forces of global consumerism have made it difficult for many societies to maintain their cultural dignity. The eco-environmental drive for diversity can result in the perilous panoply of products, slogans, and lifestyles that are geared to foreign tourism and consumption. Proliferating tribal villages in South Africa, “primitive” performances, and the presentation of groups like the San are troubling examples that are discussed in the next chapter. These initiatives are far from harmless or uplifting, since many living cultures are being forced to redesign themselves for the entertainment of visitors instead of exploring their own forms of cultural creativity (Appadurai 2002: 19). Appadurai echoes the concerns of others working in archaeology and heritage (Breglia 2006; Byrne 2009; Hall 2005; Hall and Bombardella 2005; Rassool and Witz 1996; Segobye 2006) and flags the potential of shared expertise, where

cultural and natural sites, knowledges, and legacies might be considered evenly, exposing the differences rather than assuming simplistic convergences.

Diversity affords goods and services that have been embraced by development agencies, corporations, and transnational organizations. UNESCO has employed the language of cultural diversity through its Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO 2005) and is keen to ensure free trade and the free flow of information. Reduced to its commodity base, diverse culture must be made freely available for public sector interventions into the market economy. Minorities and indigenous groups who might benefit from their own traditional expressions are often considered secondary (Coombe 2005: 41–2). It is instructive to see how this rhetoric is taken up in South Africa. The highly influential former Minister for Arts and Culture, Dr Z. Pallo Jordan (2007), claims that the term “cultural diversity is a concept that undergirds certain intangible, yet very important human rights. Indeed it is enshrined in our own constitution along with recognition of the right of freedom of expression.” Given how cultural difference was deployed under apartheid, Jordan further states that,

Our South African experience demonstrates the dangers that can lurk behind misguided attempts to seal-off cultural communities from each other like silos of different grains. The Verwoerdian nightmare of “separate development” was built on such absurd assumptions. Colonial conquest, the commercialization of agriculture, industrialization and a host of other factors having thrown African, White, Coloured and Asian together in one society, the notion that this historic omelet could somehow be unscrambled was bound to result in tragedy . . . But our country’s past abounds in experiences that warn against the converse attitude. Intolerance towards cultural diversity can be as destructive a force, resulting in forced “assimilation,” cultural denigration, racial chauvinism, racial oppression and cultural aggression. (2007)

The notion of cultural diversity for its own sake has taken root since the concept of biodiversity achieved global recognition and force. As the foregoing speech exemplifies, there are real dilemmas implicit in simply overlaying diversity onto the sphere of cultural heritage. There are other dangers in South Africa in the aggressive marketing of cultural and ethnic difference, especially where cultural and natural heritages are combined for commercial purposes. Culture gets naturalized in this process, but nature remains primary. Nature sets the stage, allowing for the possibility of thriving “tribal cultures” while voyeuristic onlookers remain enthralled by indigenous people’s preservation of beauty and diversity in a colorful, feathered, beaded sort of way. In South Africa, as I will go on to describe, the decoupling of nature and indigenous culture still remains difficult in the diverse realms of cultural villages, rock art projects, nature-based development, and tourism. Visiting San rock art sites depicting exotic game in national parks while viewing their living counterparts in a “safari” setting, troublingly reinforces the position of San as natural subjects (or as extinct in many narratives, see Kuper

2003: 393) and therefore closer to the bush and wildlife (Cock 2007: 138; Meskell and Weiss 2006, Robins 2001, Weiss 2007). We ignore the genealogies and confluences of nature and culture at our own peril, but more seriously at the expense of those individuals who have already suffered grave historical injustice.

From our colleagues working to stem the tide of diversity loss and extinction, heritage agencies have borrowed language of loss and destruction. Coupled with the unfortunate tropes of civilization and barbarism, the Global Heritage Fund's (GHF) worldwide mission is to "work to save the last remaining cultural heritage sites in developing countries. Each year, we lose more of these ancient Cradles of Civilizations to destruction, unplanned development, looting, vandalism, and neglect."⁴ A trend across heritage NGOs and UNESCO alike is the centrality of environmental crisis. Imperiled monuments watch-listed by the WMF (started in 1996) were clearly modeled on the IUCN's Red List of Threatened Species™ (started in 1994). Here too conservation agencies have increasingly naturalized and absorbed culture instrumentally. Conservation International has translated human communities into "Cultural Services" as part of an ecosystem services model. People are part of the ecological equation only in how they relate to natural resources rather than as entities in themselves (see also Bamford 2007). Communities are factors in regards to the management of ecotourism in Madagascar, in providing a buffer for forests in Kenya, deferring developers in Venezuelan protected areas or deploying traditional practices of taboo to safeguard natural resources in Fiji.⁵ By naturalizing culture as an endangered object, natural scientists can then select data that effectively conflate their own environmental and social agendas (Cruikshank 2005: 256; Raffles 2002). Culture and communities now have some visibility in nature conservation agencies, but they are typically rendered as either one aspect of ecosystem services or as partners who are supporting the goals of international organizations, potentially above their own local needs. I suggest that there has been a trend in cultural heritage organizations toward prioritizing ecological and climatic risk that has displaced cultural heritage and its immediate stakeholders. In both contexts culture has increasingly been framed as subservient or instrumental to environmental crisis and management.

Heritage is always disappearing, and the fear of this loss drives the heritage industry. Against the backdrop of risk culture (Beck 1995, 2009) we have welcomed the global profusion of sites, parks, museums, archives, interpretive centers, and digital heritage. National summits on cultural heritage and risk are multiplying. ICOMOS has launched a series of international conferences around archaeological heritage management and climate change in the twenty-first century. In 2007 the European Parliament in Strasbourg exhibited *Archaeology and Climate Change: Heritage Under Threat*. The environmental message has permeated organizations like English Heritage as well as popular presentations of archaeology by Tony Robinson's *Man on Earth* series on UK Channel 4 in 2009 (which incidentally mirrors David Attenborough's *Life on Earth* series). Risk registers are prepared for

individual countries that identify threatened heritage places, monuments, and sites. They present typical case studies and trends and share suggestions for solving individual or global threats to our cultural heritage.⁶ From polar heritage to the Pacific, archaeological sites that are deemed valuable are in a state of emergency (see also Layton, Stone, and Thomas 2001). Archaeological heritage, as we have understood it from a specifically modern, Judeo-Christian perspective, largely inhabits a risk category because of its material fragilities (Holmberg in press). Of course, this would not be the same if we adhered to a Buddhist or Australian Aboriginal heritage ethic, for example (Byrne 1991; 2007; 2009; Hasinoff 2009; Herzfeld 2003), with the caveat that these positions are never monolithic either. Whatever the perspective, a tenuous logic presumes that cultural materials can be regarded as equivalent to a species or an ecosystem.

Global ecological health and global heritage have come to inhabit a shared moral ethos (Lowenthal 2006: 85), albeit not a comparable urgency. In view of scale, it might seem unthinkable to compare the global exigencies of environmental protection and cultural heritage, yet there is a shared history that extends back to UNESCO's 1972 convention. Starting in 1959, UNESCO's efforts to save Egyptian monuments before completion of the Aswan Dam (Droit 2005) was the first instance of massive international mobilization around cultural sites. Conversely, the recent threat to archaeology and local people from the Merowe Dam went almost unnoticed. UNESCO reports that the 26 international safeguarding projects it has launched since its establishment have cost close to \$US1 billion.⁷ Member states pay a compulsory contribution of US\$7 million every two years to the World Heritage Fund (Bandarin 2007: 22). If we take a single conservation agency, like the WWF, they have invested over US\$1.165 billion in more than 11 000 projects since 1985.⁸ In the first half of the twentieth century archaeology captured an elite international imagination, whereas in recent decades the seismic shifts toward nature conservation, risk, extinction and climate change have triumphed (Beck 1995; Clark 2002). I would thus take issue with Lowenthal's view (2006: 84) that cultural heritage encourages more empathy than its natural counterpart or that humans respond more easily to relics and rise to their defense.

Ecological services promise to deliver returns while cultural benefits have proved difficult to quantify. That perceived difference is reflected in the vast global capital conservation agencies like WWF (5 million members globally) and the Nature Conservancy (over one million members) have to distribute, as compared to heritage bodies like the WMF or GHF. In 2008 WMF spent some \$12.4 million on projects, a decade earlier their working budget was \$3.4 million.⁹ Heritage budgets are paltry in comparison to the millions wielded by donor agencies or philanthrocapitalists like Bill Gates who focus on environmental issues. Conservation organizations are some of the largest NGOs in the world, employing tens of thousands of people, controlling billions of dollars and mobilizing international projects and influence (Brockington 2009: 15). Their global concerns and rallying of resources inhabit a different order of things, unquestionably.

Extensive media coverage, philanthropic efforts, and celebrity support have also been effectively harnessed around nature. Preservation of cultural heritage or archaeological objects cannot come close to matching this, although there is no reason why the return of the Parthenon marbles or saving sites in Afghanistan should not enlist millionaires or celebrities.

The concept of biodiversity is part of a larger set of processes that are changing the way we understand and engage not just with nature (Escobar 2008: 143) but also with culture. I have argued that these imperatives influence our thinking about the past, specifically the ways we currently reconfigure heritage value around diversity, or inventory cultural sites, create at-risk categories or link climate change with preservation (Addison 2007; Arantes 2007; UNESCO 2009). Diversity also magnetizes the virtues of sustainability and the promise of rewards for future generations. Sustainability is commonly defined as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising future generations' ability to meet theirs. The gravity of these interconnections and their potentially disastrous ramifications was made clear by the 1987 Brundtland Commission and the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, then encapsulated in the 1994 statement by the Union of Concerned Scientists.¹⁰ The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment went on to report that 60 percent of the earth's ecosystem services are degraded by human activity (Link 2006). Critics charge that the rhetoric of sustainable development relies on flawed logics: the anthropocentric notion that the earth's value is instrumental and utilitarian; that conserving nature is dependent on generating economic capital; and that it perpetuates political and socio-economic structural inequalities (Golliher 1999: 447). From its base in ecology, the sustainability lobby has relied heavily on diversity and renewability, but is beginning to incorporate human rights, economic justice, and peace building.

Sustainability has entered the global lexicon rapidly and dissonantly. Everything now must be sustainable, including our housing, lifestyles, corporate structures, economic growth, museums, and even heritage sites. An entire issue of *Museums and Social Issues* in 2006 was devoted to the museum's role in fostering cultural sustainability. Heritage practitioners are beginning to engage the tenets of sustainability because they offer linkages between local and global scales and bridge past and future, the socio-economic and the environmental (Brattli 2009; Candelaria 2005; Helmy and Cooper 2002; Rico 2007; Tomalin, Simpson, and Bingeman 2000; Wurz and Merwe 2005). A parallel interest has emerged in studying ancient societies that practiced "sustainable" lifeways (Erickson 2003). Archaeologist Charles Redman, who directs the School of Sustainability at Arizona State University, and his colleagues examine ancient human impacts on the environment in an effort to understand long-term resilience and sustainable landscapes. Other developments include the Sustainable Preservation Initiative, an NGO with links to UCLA and the Archaeological Institute of America, whose self-proclaimed "mantra is Saving Sites by Transforming Lives." Perceived threats include disappearing heritage, economic crisis, unsustainable preservation, war and looting, and general

loss. Their solutions call for “extreme” tourism, a digital SWAT team to virtually map sites, and a global network of experts.¹¹ The proliferation of such NGOs fostered by academics and others is intriguing, although tangible solutions and working-case studies remain elusive.

Grafted to narratives of moral nature and moral heritage is the obligatory burden of present generations to provide a legacy for future generations. Here too there are logics worth unpacking. First, despite future-gear promises being central, the precise form that obligation takes remains vague and disputable. Second, the exact substance of the legacy presupposes that aesthetic or intrinsic value must necessarily override an argument of utility. At a fundamental level there are genuine difficulties of imputing any general obligation to the human species, many of whose members have already been deprived the access to those utilities they are supposedly obliged to bequeath to the future (Soper 2000: 259–60). Ironically, those who consume the greatest resources through excessive lifestyles are very often guilty of chastising the world’s poorest for simply attempting to survive. Called to mind are the impoverished villages on the edge of Kruger that are reprimanded by park ecologists for using firewood or utilizing “alien” species as food sources. Put simply, why should the needs of living people’s be trumped by those of coming generations? Bryan Norton (2005: 332), the guru of sustainability predicts that if “our generation and successive generations act on these beliefs, it is reasonable to hope that humans of the future *will* share a community with us and that the special places that are preserved may remain for them shrines to cultural, intellectual, and moral ideals that unify and give meaning to our culture.” But this teleology assumes a stasis and, since green politics really only began during the 1960s and 1970s (Deese 2009), this presumption is optimistic. Environmentalists today lament their failures in reaching the global public or impacting politics, as the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference laid bare. The post-environmental lobby regrets that “in the name of indisputable facts portraying a bleak future for the human race, Green politics has succeeded in depoliticizing political passions to the point of leaving citizens nothing but gloomy asceticism, a terror for trespassing over Nature and a diffidence toward industry, innovation, technology, and science” (Latour 2007).

Future Thinking

In the foregoing I have argued that commonalities have emerged between nature conservation and cultural heritage formulations. Greatest value is accorded to sites considered unique and of scientific or aesthetic merit. Value is assumed to be intrinsic to sites and is not tantamount to either use value or exchange value (see also Lafrenz Samuels 2008). Such qualities are typically embodied in pristine spaces unmarked by human modifications since “man” is considered

a destructive agent of change. Land use legacies and human histories are erased in these romanticized productions of place. Indigenous communities of the past, however, have been considered more attuned to the balance of conservation than modern indigenous groups. Either they are deemed worthy natural objects and part of the fauna or rapacious consumers with an undifferentiated drive to destroy everything around them (Tsing 2005: 255). Given the centrality of European thought to these constructs, it is ironic that European national parks are today often landscapes of traditional agriculture and small-scale settlement. The ecology and aesthetics of these places has developed through human interaction rather than absence with the goals of preserving the traditional local culture and a vibrant sustainable economy (Hamin 2002: 340). These lived-in, working landscapes present a very different balance of nature and culture than that presented for much of Africa, evidenced by this chapter's opening quotation from Latour.

I have suggested here that global crises surrounding natural resources have become entangled with cultural resources, landscapes, and values. This "fossil fuels" template of the world attempts to restrict utilization and save our stocks for future generations. Concerns over dwindling resources, risk, and sustainability now regulate cultural heritage discourse about site usage, occupation, and lived traditions, often undervaluing them when it comes to indigenous owners and stakeholders. The past is thus transformed into a raw material and finite resource that must be cordoned off or enclosed. Heritage agencies the world over typically struggle with the realities of human occupation, encroachment (Latour 2007), ongoing traditional practices, visitation, and appropriation in and around significant sites. There are exceptions at the local level, though these struggles have often been hard won in places such as Australia (Lilley 2000b; Lilley and Williams 2005), or remain ongoing sites of contestation between local and international bodies, evinced in debates over preservation and management of sites across Southeast Asia (Byrne 1991; 1995). Just as animals, plants, and landscapes have been deemed part of the national estate for moral and scientific uplift from the Victorian era onwards (Garland 2008; Ritvo 1987), archaeological and historic sites are often wrested from their immediate inheritors for the global good of others.

While the above propositions first developed in the sphere of natural heritage protection, I suggest that they have been overlain upon the material remains of the past and, since a great many such sites survive in seemingly "natural" settings, it is not surprising that such congruent treatment has emerged. However, the stakes are considerably different for archaeological contexts, steeped as they often are in living traditions, continuities of visitation and use, and archaeology's centrality for identity formation and maintenance. A different suite of relations can be established with the materiality of the past and its continued possibilities for successive cultural reworking, though this is not to say that connections to nature and place making are not deeply complex and socialized. In fact, archaeologists have slowly recognized that any simplistic demarcation between cultural and natural sites can be problematic to disentangle in the past, as now. Irrespective of

position, whether one claims that “nature” and “culture” are clearly differentiated realms or that no distinction can be made between them, all our thinking remains premised upon the humanity–nature antithesis (Soper 2000: 15). Tracing the consequences of that antithesis in South Africa – for people, heritage, and conservation – is at the heart of the chapters that follow.

With legacies of pristine wilderness, exotic tribes, and colonial attitudes that positioned Africans as closer to nature, archaeology must exert considerable effort to overturn the stereotypes of good nature, bad natives. When ecotourism, safaris, and natural assets are seen to bring much needed foreign currency injection, cultural heritage must struggle to present itself as valuable, complimentary, and constitutive of the nation. In high-profile destinations like Kruger National Park, efforts to trade off natural against cultural heritage – and against the histories, occupations, and anthropogenic modifications of the park – reveal complexities that ultimately challenge a strictly green model of value. Multiple histories of the park from our human origins, to Iron Age settlers, colonial administrators, and resistance fighters all add to the rich and deeply stratified picture of the park. This should not be a zero-sum game. Struggles to comprehend what is “natural” in order to maintain some designated ecological balance and preserve an aesthetic “wilderness” in counterbalance to human intervention proves neither scientifically credible nor socially progressive. Indigenous knowledge and intangible heritage may instead offer inroads to traditional practices and understandings around natural and cultural patrimony (Deacon and Foster 2005; Deacon, Mngqolo, and Prosalendis 2003; Deacon *et al.* 2004; Masuku Van Damme and Neluvhalani 2004). While these models have been proposed and successfully implemented at some rock art sites in Southern Africa, their broad implementation in mainstream archaeology and across national parks has been negligible. Australian management of cultural and natural heritage is often held up as a model for South Africa. Yet because of their respective histories their heritage context also differs: Aboriginal people have a very different relationship to history, their intangible heritage is often linked to the deep past that present co-occupiers of the land do not share. South Africa has carved out its own unique path toward past mastering. However, a new democratic nation cannot remain crippled by being deprived of its deeper history. By choosing to gloss over the complexities of the past, recuperation will always be attenuated leaving apartheid’s legacy to prevail.

Notes

- 1 <http://whc.unesco.org/en/activities> (accessed November 20, 2009).
- 2 <http://whc.unesco.org/en/donation> (accessed January 15, 2010).
- 3 http://globalheritagefund.org/index.php/our_approach/our_vanishing_heritage_principal_threats (accessed January 17, 2010).

- 4 http://www.globalheritagefund.org/news/publications/annual_reports.html (accessed November 20, 2009).
- 5 <http://www.conservation.org/learn/culture/pages/overview.aspx> (accessed November 23, 2009).
- 6 <http://www.international.icomos.org/risk/index.html> (accessed December 7, 2009).
- 7 <http://whc.unesco.org/en/107> (accessed November 20, 2009).
- 8 <http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/History> (accessed November 20, 2009).
- 9 <http://www.wmf.org/content/annual-report> (accessed November 20, 2009).
- 10 <http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/ngo/940909224555.html>, (accessed November 23, 2009).
- 11 www.sustainablepreservation.org (accessed November 23, 2009).