

Globalization

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Chapter Concepts

Globalization needs to be understood on two levels:

- as a name for increasing global interdependencies
- as an influential key term in political speech.

Key Concept

The two main ways of understanding globalization need to be carefully distinguished. On the one hand, it is used by scholars to name the compound effects of intensifying and increasingly consequential global interconnections. By exploring these interconnections – including their component economic, political, legal, and ecological interrelationships – it is possible to understand how globalization has created global interdependencies that link the fates of people around the planet. On the other hand, we additionally need to understand how “Globalization” is simultaneously put to work as an influential codeword in political speech, a codeword that shapes policy-making and thus also alters the ways in which lives are actually lived globally.

1.1 Introducing a World of Interdependency and a Word

Why are you reading this book? It seems a simple question, and answers come easily to mind. It was recommended to you or is required reading for a class. It is about a topic that seems relevant, interesting or, at least, socially important. And, of course, you bought it. But think again. What actually enabled that simple purchase to happen? When you bought it, did you consider where and how the book was made: where the paper was made (China), where the typesetting took place (India), where the inks were manufactured (Switzerland), where the book was printed (Singapore), or who made the printing presses (Germans and Japanese)? You probably did not think of these things because the simple act of buying something usually conceals all this work. Likewise, when you buy a book you do not normally think about the global networks of air, sea, rail, and road transportation that put it in the bookshops; the oil and other forms of energy used in the process of transportation; or the global systems of electronic funds transfer that allow money to move from your account to the bookstore's account to the accounts of the publisher, to the pension plans, and the stocks and bonds into which people working for the publisher might be putting the profits.

As if the globalized ramifications of all the book-publishing economic links are not already hard enough to track, think about the still more complex political and cultural phenomena that have come together to make the *idea* of globalization seem relevant, interesting, and important. When did you first hear the word or some related term like the global economy, global system, or globalism? How many times a day do you see adverts and promotional publications that use images of the globe to sell things? Why do so many activists, economists, reporters, and politicians repeat the word "globalization" as if it is some sort of common-sense code-word that everyone just understands? What has made it the focus of street protests and widespread controversy across the planet? And on top of all that, have you thought about why your university or college has come round to the view that it is worth having a course that introduces globalization at a level that demands reading a book that is entirely focused on the subject? What has put globalization onto the academic radar screen? Why has it become relevant and interesting? What makes it important? And what, you should hopefully be asking yourself at this point, *is* it exactly?

In starting with this set of questions, these first paragraphs have already given a clue as to the way the rest of the book sets about defining and explaining globalization. Global interconnections of production, commerce, and finance like those that made your book purchase possible are key, but so, too, are the political and cultural controversies that have made globalization the latest big buzzword. Other academic surveys of globalization generally prefer to focus only on the interconnections themselves. Most scholars are wary of the way in which globalization has become so fashionable as an idea and so blurred as a concept (even if putting it in the title of a book or article helps draw attention to their work). For usually good

reasons, academics therefore tend to be suspicious about all the hype surrounding the term. One problem with this tendency, however, is that it treats the slogans, myths, and exaggerations about globalization as just irritants. By contrast, this book pays attention to the hype as more than a mere annoyance. The account that follows is still fundamentally organized around an analysis of real global interconnections. Each chapter is therefore focused on particular types of interconnection ranging from those of world trade and finance to those of law, politics, and health. However, along the way, the book also critically examines the buzz about globalization in order to underline how, as a dominant way of talking about and thinking about the world, the term has had its own global effects. The book as a whole, therefore, works with a double definition of globalization, a definition that addresses both (1) the actual networks of global integration and (2) the political and cultural concerns that have made “Globalization” a buzzword.

1.1.1 Globalization as integration

First of all, globalization refers to processes of economic, political, and social integration that have collectively created ties that make a difference to lives around the planet.¹ Another way of saying this is that *globalization is the extension, acceleration, and intensification of consequential worldwide interconnections*. These are interconnections that mean that what happens “here” (like you buying and reading this book) affects things over “there” (like the logging of trees in faraway forests). Reciprocally, the interconnections can work the other way round with events over “there” (like an environmental group’s campaign against deforestation) leading to effects “here” (like you wishing that the book was made out of recycled paper or available on the Internet). These sorts of two-way ties are often referred to by social scientists as “interdependencies.” It means that the lines of dependency run in both directions, even if, as is most common, the dependency is felt more strongly at one end of the connection (for example, amongst the different parties to disputes over logging) than at the other (amongst readers of a single book). Whether or not they are felt or even noticed, though, these sorts of interdependencies are creating a world where, despite huge inequalities in life chances, people’s lives are being increasingly bound together.

As we shall see in Chapter 3, the capitalist system of economic development has always depended from the sixteenth century onwards on forms of long-distance interdependency. Indeed, capitalism is generally understood to have begun through the gradual incorporation and capitalization of extensive pre-capitalist trading networks. From these early developments in the sixteenth century, the webs of economic interconnection have grown widely and deeply in terms of both their geographical scope and societal significance. The linkages have nevertheless always expanded *unevenly*, initially leading to economic growth in just one part of the world (Europe during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries) and then in others (the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also

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parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, too). Sometimes, most notably in the period of European empire building in the late nineteenth century, the global ties were very strong and had huge day-to-day impacts. Indeed, by the start of the twentieth century, global trade was so extensive that at its epicenter in London, England, most features of daily life – from the cotton people wore, to the sugared tea they drank, to the companies they worked for, to the banks where they deposited their money – were intimately tied to everyday life in places as far apart as Central Africa, the Caribbean, India, North America, and Latin America. At other times, both before and after the height of European imperialism, the consequences of the long-distance ties were less significant in terms of linking and shaping daily life in different parts of the world. Despite this episodic and uneven process of development, though, the important point is that global ties are not new. What *is* new, and what is quite remarkable in this regard, is the rise of a widely shared sense of the importance of something called “Globalization.” This really only happened in the late twentieth century, starting in the 1960s and becoming increasingly omnipresent as a focus of debate and concern in the periods from the 1990s to today.

One reason for the rising concern with globalization over the last two decades is that it was only after key industrial, financial, and technological shifts in the 1960s and 1970s that the door was opened for different forms of global interdependency to *come together* to have a collective globalizing impact. Economic, political, and social networks – networks of commodity production, of finance, of trade, of migrants, of communication, of media, of political organizing, and even of new disease vectors – all came together in the sense of accelerating and intensifying one another. In doing so, they linked more and more countries and communities to create an interdependent global whole that was greater than the sum of all the particular component network parts. No longer was it just trade, or money flows, or political systems, or the movements of migrants that linked different regions. Now, global interconnection was characterized by an evermore dense integration of *all* these different transnational ties into a larger interdependent system in which the spatial reach of the ties, the speed of the relays and reverberations through the ties, and the capacity of the ties to lead to significant impacts were all much greater. These comprehensive integrative effects also had powerful political consequences with governments around the world increasingly tying national policies to an acceptance of the idea that economic growth and development are dependent on integrating with global markets and liberalizing business from national regulation.

A key sign of this novel late twentieth-century interdependency and market-based integration was the invention of the actual word “globalization” itself. Despite all the global connections of nineteenth-century European imperialism, a word like globalization had never been used before. It only first appeared in a dictionary in Merriam Webster’s *New International Dictionary* in 1961. Around this time, it was often used in its English spelling (i.e. “globalisation” with an “s”) in British journals and papers such as *The Spectator* and *The Sunday Times* (to be followed by its first of many uses in *The Economist* in 1965). French academics were also early to start using the term (although in France, it came to be replaced by *mondialisation*). This

emergence of the word globalization into popular usage in the 1960s was a sign of the wider developments in the interconnectedness of global networks and their increasingly influential impact on policy making. Reciprocally, however, the subsequent explosion of debate and dispute over globalization also reflected the various ways in which politicians, activists, journalists, and other opinion leaders began to load the word with more and more political meaning based on their political perspectives on market freedom, market integration and the influence of market forces over much of social life. This process of politicization really only took off two decades later in the 1980s, and to understand it most effectively it is useful to introduce the second definition of globalization.

1.1.2 Globalization as buzzword

In a context where political leaders and polemicists from both the right and the left have increasingly used the term to pursue political goals, Globalization has become *an instrumental term put to work in shaping as well as representing the growth of global interdependency*. Some scholars refer to such politicized discourse on Globalization as “Globaloney” or “hyper-globalization,” while others view it as a reflection of a cultural common-sense they call “Globalism.”² Here, however, in this book, such political use of the term is indicated by simply spelling “Globalization” with a capital “G.” The key era for the development of this kind of politicized discourse about capital “G” Globalization was the 1980s. In this decade, influential politicians in the West – most notably, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and President Ronald Reagan in the United States – made the political argument that a huge range of trade, labor, finance, welfare, and social policies had to be radically reformed to make states more competitive and more open to integration in the context of a globalizing capitalist market economy. Free trade, privatization, tax cuts, welfare reform, low inflation, and the general deregulation of business and finance were all necessary, went the argument, if nation-states were to stand a chance of surviving the onrush of global competition.

Although this familiar package of political policies was originally promoted in the United States and United Kingdom by conservative politicians, it was quickly adopted by more liberal governments in wealthy democracies such as Canada and New Zealand. In other countries such as Chile, it was a policy package that was introduced and enforced using military violence, while elsewhere, particularly in Asian countries such as Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and, subsequently, China, it was adapted in ways that combined the commitments to export-led development and market integration with often authoritarian approaches to managing social and political life. In yet other developing countries in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, it was imposed in order to comply with conditions issued by international lending agencies – most importantly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank – and western-trained pro-market economists. The result has been the rise of a form of global political common-sense

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about the need for pro-market policy-making, economic liberalization, and global market integration, a common-sense that is referred to variously as “market fundamentalism,” “neoliberalism,” the “Washington Consensus,” “laissez-faire market capitalism” or simply just “Globalization.” In other words, the buzzword usage of Globalization has effectively made the word a synonym for a suite of pro-market policy norms and the wider influence of market-forces in political, social, and personal relations. Being pro-Globalization has therefore come to mean being pro-market, and being anti-Globalization has reciprocally become a simplistic description for activists who contest the benefits and highlight the suffering caused by global market forces. Similarly, whether used thus by earnest advocates in books with titles such as *Why Globalization Works* and *In Defence of Globalization*, or instead used by trenchant critics in books with titles such as *The Endgame of Globalization* and *Globalization and Its Terrors*, the association with pro-market policy norms remains constant.³ For this reason, we have to take a moment here to examine what exactly these norms look like and what capital “G” Globalization and its synonyms therefore seek to name.

The pro-market policy norms associated with Globalization are now so common and widespread that they sometimes seem like they are the only options available. Indeed, a very wide range of politicians – including most Democrats as well as Republicans in the United States, most Labour MPs as well as Conservatives in the United Kingdom, most Liberals and Socialists as well as right-wing politicians in Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden, and most democrats as well as autocrats in the poorer parts of the world – have all at various moments come to the same so-called “TINA” conclusion that Margaret Thatcher reached in the 1980s: namely, that in the context of global market integration, “There Is No Alternative” to pro-market policies. What then do these policies look like? The top 10 are well known, and for each there is also a sound-bite slogan that is also very familiar from everyday political speech:

1. trade liberalization – “adopt free trade”
2. privatize public services – “use business efficiency”
3. deregulate business and finance – “cut red tape”
4. cut public spending – “shrink government”
5. reduce and flatten taxes – “be business friendly”
6. encourage foreign investment – “reduce capital controls”
7. de-unionize – “respect rights to work & labor flexibility”
8. export led development – “trade not aid”
9. reduce inflation – “price stability & savings protection”
10. enforce property rights – “patent protection” & “titling.”

Throughout this book, and especially in Chapter 7, where we examine how these policy norms have come to shape practices of government around the world, the more historically accurate and theoretically nuanced term **neoliberalism** is used instead of Globalization to describe the resulting policy package (this also helps

avoid confusion with lower-case-“g” “globalization”). Like other terms shown in bold in the book, you can look up a longer definition of neoliberalism in the glossary. But because understanding this key term is also key to understanding the popular usage of synonyms such as Globalization, and because neoliberalism is counter-intuitive for many students (especially those in the United States who have grown up thinking that liberals are more inclined to regulate the market and impose taxes on business), a few more things must be noted about why scholars find this particular neologism (i.e. term of social science jargon) useful.

In a nutshell, the liberal in “neoliberal” refers to the liberal market (or “free market”) arguments of late eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo who were arguing, amongst other things, for the liberalization of economic activity from control by the aristocracy. However, coming after the welfare-state liberalism of the mid-twentieth century, *neoliberalism* names a new return to these historical ideas that also comes with a political repudiation of liberal welfare-state policies (also known as “liberal Keynesian,” “New Deal,” or “Great Society” policies) about redistributing wealth and using government investments and regulations to generate and guide national growth. Instead, the top 10 neoliberal policy norms – the “10 commandments of neoliberalism,” if you will – are based on the idea that the best way to generate the greatest growth in the context of increasing global interdependency is by shrinking government (making it “smaller,” “more efficient,” or “leaner and meaner” in the sound bites we hear most often), while simultaneously liberating business and market forces from governmental control. Even after the financial crises of 2008–2012, no major reforms were made to neoliberal norms, and the influence of global market forces over social life continued to expand everywhere unabated. There were some major misgivings articulated by pro-business commentators who feared that unemployment, debt problems, and banking excesses would undermine the global future for capitalism.⁴ But instead of heeding these warnings, advocates of pro-market policy-making effectively used the crisis to further expand and entrench neoliberal norms with calls for more privatization, more tax reductions for the wealthy, and more cuts to liberal welfare-state protections.⁵

While supporters of neoliberalism often prefer alternative terms such as “free market capitalism,” both they and critics alike agree that there have been some fairly consistent results.⁶ Twentieth-century ideas about comprehensive government control over national economies have been abandoned or at least eclipsed by the new emphasis on minimalist and market-friendly government. The class interests of business elites have also been consistently advanced. Inequalities within populations have become more pervasive globally. All sorts of social institutions and relations – citizenship, education, dating, and even lining up in queues – have been marketized. And almost everywhere, policies of social redistribution and nationally inclusive health, welfare, and environmental protection have been subordinated to the competitive pressures of the global market. In place of the plural “freedoms” once celebrated by twentieth-century liberal leaders such as the President Franklin Roosevelt – whose famous “Four Freedoms” included “Freedom From Want” and

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“Freedom from Fear” – neoliberalism has substituted the singular freedom of the “Free-market.” To be sure, neoliberalism still only names a set of policy norms and governmental tendencies. In practice, the ability of its advocates to achieve their idealized utopia of total market freedom has been globally uneven. They have often met with resistance, and where they have made progress towards their free-market ideals, the direction of reform has been shaped by local and national conditions. In reality, therefore, we do not see a single one-size-fits-all neoliberalism globally, but rather a patchwork of variegated and path-dependent neoliberalization processes.

Some of the variety in macro-scale forms of neoliberalization across countries and regions has been associated in turn with micro-scale variations in how individuals have been personally enlisted into new market-based behaviors. Scholars studying the social relations of neoliberalism also therefore sometimes use the term to describe market-based behavioral norms of competition and individualism, including speculative, entrepreneurial, or actuarial ideas about how to manage risk in one’s personal life.⁷ These accounts of the so-called “responsibilization” of individuals in neoliberal societies and the cultivation of “enterprising subjects” are not necessarily critical of the associated emphasis on personal accountability. Some point to the problems and inequalities introduced by taking aggressively individualistic approaches to allocating incentives and punishments, but others are simply interested in how the new market-oriented forms of individualism change older ideas of citizenship and social solidarity. By contrast, social justice campaigners in the so-called “Anti-Globalization” movement have frequently linked their arguments against neoliberal policy reforms (such as privatization) with equally damning criticisms of the ways personal freedom and creativity become targets of commercialization (such as Apple ads inviting wealthy consumers to think differently by buying a Mac).⁸ For the same reason, “Anti-Globalization” activism is generally better understood as “anti-neoliberal” activism. What brings the activists together on the streets and on the Internet is a shared opposition to both neoliberal policies and the neoliberal refashioning of responsibility as always and everywhere individualistic. This in turn helps explain better why it is an activism that has traveled across borders, too, thereby leading to a global movement against neoliberalism that is not at all opposed to the globalization of social justice and solidarity amongst those who feel alienated from global competition.

While “Anti-Globalization” does not really work very well as a label for the anti-neoliberal critics, for pro-market advocates of neoliberalization the term “Globalization” has often proved very useful, allowing them to shift easily from observations about global changes to arguments that neoliberal policies are the only ones that make sense in a globalizing world. This brings us back to the example of the TINA argument. One reason for the TINA-touts’ early success in selling the idea there was no alternative to neoliberal reforms was that with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, there really were no significant alternatives to market capitalism anymore. Overnight, these changes brought 30 former communist countries and over 400 million people into the global market economy. Communist China had also started to go capitalist with

a vengeance during this period, and with the very small and partial exceptions of countries such as Cuba noted, few governments in the world actively tried to foster non-capitalist economic organization. Yet, in addition to the dearth of counter-capitalist examples, the second basis for TINA-tout arguments has been their successful association of the need for neoliberal reforms with simplistic claims about globalization. In other words, what helped make neoliberalism seem like the only policy-making alternative after communism was the successful conflation of globalization with Globalization. Instead of a complex interplay of interdependencies, Globalization was thereby represented as a simple sort of natural phenomenon like the morning sunrise: something that was sweeping the world and was basically a good thing, but something, too, that was also unstoppable and unchangeable. The only response to the ties that bind, said the TINA touts, was to tie them more strongly by implementing pro-market reforms.

Not surprisingly, these sorts of associations and claims have subsequently been widely contested by anti-neoliberals. Groups as diverse as unions, environmentalists, feminists, landless peasants, and AIDS activists have all rejected the argument that globalization is unchangeable. They also therefore question the claim that it necessitates a single neoliberal rule-set for policy-making. For them, globalization does not equate with neoliberal Globalization. Instead, and despite their great diversity, the critics argue that there are real achievable alternatives to neoliberal policies (see Chapter 10). Other forms of more just, equitable, environmentally sustainable and democratic globalization are possible, they say. In doing so, they have also obviously questioned the meaning and definition of Globalization, too. The result has been a storm of debate involving all kinds of clashing definitions, data, interpretations, slogans, myths, and exaggerations. And it has been in the midst of all this controversy that Globalization has become the contested buzzword we know it as today.

As will become clear in the chapters that follow, it is not always as easy to distinguish between globalization (the name for heightened global interdependency) and Globalization (the politically loaded buzzword) as the spelling with the lower-case and upper-case "G"s implies. The two-way relationships between the different uses instead repeatedly blur the distinction between them. The instrumental political uses of the term, for example, are at least to some extent the political outcome of pressures created by basic shifts in the organization of global capitalist networks. In turn, the pro-market policies that have been put in place by politicians appealing to the TINA take on Globalization have enabled yet more global economic linkages to develop. These additional linkages really have generated market forces that are hard to change, and these have in turn led to the still more widespread political description of Globalization as an unstoppable juggernaut that necessitates neoliberalism. However, for the purposes of making academic sense of all these relays and relationships, the distinction remains a useful starting-point. The rest of this introductory chapter is therefore organized around a deeper examination of globalization in terms of the overlapping global interdependencies it brings together. All the more politically loaded questions about the use and abuse of

Globalization as a term of political discourse are deferred to Chapter 2, and it is there that you will discover more about why the term has become so significant and so fraught with controversy. The rest of this chapter, by contrast, outlines the main forms of global interdependency – commodity ties, labor ties, money ties, legal ties, governmental ties, ecological ties, health ties, and the ties of social and political response – which are used as the organizing themes for the subsequent chapters of this book (Chapters 3–10).

1.2 The Networks of Global Interdependency

Part of what social scientists always do when trying to make sense of complicated social phenomena is to make classificatory distinctions that “unpack” the phenomena in question into various component parts. With topics such as globalization, this is rather difficult. Indeed, the problems presented by globalization are a little like the challenge presented by the fabled elephant in the story about the six blind men. This traditional oral fable about the blind men and the elephant is itself something of a global legend, having been retold right across Asia from Han Dynasty China, to India, through retellings in the Buddhist Sutra, to more recent renditions as an exercise for US Peace Corps volunteers to practice in places as far apart as Lesotho and Lithuania! In any event, the story is a good allegory of the dangers of only looking at parts of a larger whole. In the story, the first blind man feels the side of the elephant and concludes that it is a wall. The second feels the trunk and thinks it is a snake. The third feels the tusk and says it is a spear. The fourth feels the knee and argues it is a tree. The fifth feels the ear and thinks it is a fan. And the sixth feels the tail and believes it is just a rope. Religious retellings of this story often suggest that the elephant represents a god that ordinary mortals cannot fully understand. To some extent, this is a good metaphor for the way Globalization is repeated like a holy mantra in political speech. However, here the main point of using this allegory is to make a more practical point about academic interpretations of the interconnections comprising globalization.

The way scholars have approached globalization through the questions and concerns of their own particular disciplines sometimes makes their preoccupations seem a little like the arguments of the six blind men. Political scientists, for example, often meet something like a wall in so far as their focus on the ways that national governments act in the context of global interdependency can obscure other forms of government that operate at other scales or that work through the market. Communications theorists discover a trunk in new networks like the Internet, but may not always see the economic and political projects, including older national projects, that such new media support. Economists, ever focused on the financial flows and market mechanisms of global commerce, seem to see the spear of globalization but only a fraction of its larger political and cultural consequences. Geographers (of which this author is one) are fascinated with the spatial connections and transformations brought about by globalization, but in exploring these

routes, they do not always adequately examine globalization's historical roots. Anthropologists find an ear of sorts in studying the ways in which new hybrid cultural practices like world music or patient–doctor relations are changing amidst global ties to the Internet. However, they do not so often investigate the commercial connections and political transformations that shape and confine cultural creativity. And sociologists, to pick one last example, chart all kinds of demographic outcomes of globalization, particularly in terms of the impact of migration, but sometimes allow long lines of numbers to obscure political and economic forces that put populations in motion in the first place. In all these disciplines, there are scholars who can readily claim that their work serves as a counter-example to such tendencies, but the point surely is clear. Disciplinary traditions can often elide the full complexity of globalization. Even as we develop specialist thematic analyses, therefore, we also need to constantly keep in mind the way in which globalization has developed as a complex tapestry of ties that exceed any simple disciplinary purview.

There is one more lesson in the fable of the blind men and the elephant that we can draw on as a guide to analyzing the complex tapestry of globalization. It is a lesson about collaboration. In this sense, the problem with the six blind men was not their blindness so much as their inability to share their experiences and information. The academic corollary of this is simple. To avoid the dangers of disciplinary division and elision, we need a more interdisciplinary approach. Ideally, this is exactly what a university education provides, and it is also what good scholarship provides in so far as it draws on ideas, arguments, and evidence developed in a wide range of disciplines. The chapters that follow are written in the spirit of this ideal. Each chapter still seeks to focus on a particular thematic focus, but the overall aim is to assemble an interdisciplinary assessment of globalization on which more specialist and advanced work can subsequently be built.

Of course, no one book, least of all one authored by a single scholar, can hope to address every single disciplinary contribution to our understanding of global interconnections. So, while the ideal here is unabashedly interdisciplinary, the account of globalization that follows still has a thematic focus that reflects this author's academic home in the social sciences. After all, it would be perfectly possible to introduce globalization with a natural science focus on global ecosystem interconnections, global climate change dynamics, and the planetary movements of microbes. Chapter 9 does in fact attempt to address some of these ecological ties, too. But, just like most other treatments of globalization by economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and other geographers, the substantive focus running through the book as a whole is on the social system of capitalism. Thus, a little justification is needed now of what this basic focus brings into view and why it matters.

Without a doubt, the driving force of global social interdependency from the sixteenth century onwards has been the development and expansion of the economic system of capitalism. Capitalism has at least four innate economic characteristics that help explain the ways in which it has led to more and more global interconnection. It is an economic system that depends first of all on *growth*. Capitalists have to

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keep on making profits to stay in business, and the sum of all these profits adds up to growth (which can be measured on a regional, national, or global basis over varying lengths of time). Second, in this ceaseless pursuit of profit, capitalists are constantly searching for *new markets* into which they can expand and sell their commodities. Third, in competing with one another to survive and make higher profits, capitalists are also always seeking ways to cut costs by finding *cheaper inputs* including cheaper raw materials and cheaper labor. And fourth, capitalists are also always driven by competition to *speed up* the production and sales process so that they can produce profits faster. These needs lead in turn to system-wide imperatives to accelerate transportation and overcome distance while also simultaneously creating a remarkable system of market-based coordination of the resulting ties. Just as Adam Smith and Karl Marx were both fascinated by these invisible effects of integration in early capitalism, contemporary commentators from radically different political perspectives also tend to agree that the main characteristics of capitalism create ties that bind and coordinate across the whole planet.⁹

It is quite easy to see how pressures that emerge from the basic forces of capitalism have led to key developments that are now associated with globalization. From the nineteenth-century railways that imperialists built across Africa, India, and Latin America to today's dense air transportation networks, we can chart many ways in which the capitalist need to overcome spatial barriers has revolutionized transportation. Between 1920 and 1990, for example, the cost of ocean freight transport was reduced by 70%. Likewise, from the early use of the telegram to today's use of the Internet and satellites, the need for companies and investors to do business across ever larger distances has led to the radical transformation of global communications. The cost of a 3 min phone call from New York to London, for instance, fell to \$0.20 in 2012 from the equivalent of \$60.42 in 1960.

Data like these on what is sometimes called the “destruction of distance” or “the annihilation of space” are remarkable and can be easily multiplied. Ironically, however, journalistic commentaries on globalization often tend to downplay the capitalist causes of such transportation and communication developments. They tend to focus too much on the technological innovations themselves as the primary causes and defining features of global integration. Here, by contrast, the emphasis is placed on examining the ways in which these technologies work *through* capitalism to connect lives across the planet. To do this most effectively, we must therefore examine how the interdependencies of capitalist networks organize and coordinate the global connections of commodities, labor, money, laws, government, spaces, and health. In other words, how can we trace the coordinating effects of capitalism through the main forms of global interdependency explored in the rest of the book?

1.2.1 The interdependencies of commodities

The economic interconnections of globalization present themselves first and foremost as an immense collection of commodities. From cars, coffee, and computers

to wheat, water, and Windows® software, practically everything that is bought and sold today represents the coming together of global economic ties. As soon as you stop to think about how cars are made, where your coffee has come from, or what goes into a computer, your mind immediately has to start making a global journey. Car buyers can sometimes do this when they read the stickers on new cars. Below the price, another shock on a car price sticker may well be the long list in small print of all the countries from which the car's components have come. Likewise, in walking into a Starbucks coffee shop, you not only walk into a global retail chain; you also come face to face with an emporium of global coffee production. Beans from Guatemala, from Hawaii, from Ethiopia, from Vietnam, and from Colombia are all available on the same shelves, not to mention the global brand design of the shops and wooden shelves, the global music, and the "made in China" global mugs. And in opening up a computer, one is similarly confronted with the global scope of high-tech production, the microchips often being inscribed with their country of origin. Sometimes, it is easy to trace these networks of commodity production, not least of all on university campuses where student activism has led to efforts like the Workers Rights Consortium database detailing all the factories where university apparel is made.¹⁰ At other times, especially with basic staple products like paper, petroleum, and plastic, it is very hard. Try as they might, fair trade activists are unlikely to be able to pressure companies to offer consumers fair trade plastic even to wrap-up certified and transparently sourced fair-trade food. But easy or hard, tracing where everyday products come from is nearly always an exercise that leads towards some sort of global exploration.

Chapter 3 invites readers to embark on some of these global explorations by investigating how capitalist commodity networks are put together. In order to explain the complexity of the global production networks that produce what consumers buy, the chapter introduces the concept of **commodity chains**. These are basically the chains of economic links that lead from the production and processing of raw materials all the way through to the manufacturing of sub-components to the work of assembly or packaging to the final sale of a product in the market. The chapter introduces some key features distinguishing different types of commodity chain and highlights their consequences in terms of different patterns of globalization in different economic sectors. This leads in turn to a survey of such divergent global business strategies as foreign direct investment, joint ventures, outsourcing, and subcontracting. The final part of Chapter 3 proceeds to introduce the ways in which transnational corporations (otherwise known as **TNCs**) have been instrumental in developing global commercial ties in the last 30 years. While this analysis underlines the importance of TNCs as key actors in the development of global economic interdependency, it also makes clear that the notion of a completely rootless and placeless global corporation remains more a fantasy of global business gurus and politicians than an economic reality. Instead, most TNCs remain very much tied to particular places, and to show how Chapter 3 concludes by surveying the important influences of national foreign policy, national economic policy and national culture on TNC development.

1.2.2 The interdependencies of workers

A key common denominator of any commodity chain is that it involves the employment of a whole range of different workers in different parts of the planet. Thus, behind the commodity chains that are the commercial face of globalization, we need to investigate the interdependent worlds of workers themselves. Workers are tied to commodity chains in two key ways. First and foremost, they are the producers of the profit that business needs to survive, but second, they are the consumers that – at some point, in some part of the world – must purchase the goods that businesses produce in order for profits to be realized. If a market for a commodity cannot be found, if no one anywhere can afford to buy it or wants to buy it, then, however much work has gone into its production, the commodity is effectively worthless in capitalist terms. Historically, this double dependency of capitalism on workers has led to a number of different social and political outcomes.

In the years after World War II, most of the richer western nation-states including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, developed national economic strategies that fundamentally depended on the idea that the majority of workers in a country would also double as the core consumer base for buying commodities produced in that country. This meant that the workers in question had to be paid enough to be able to consume domestically manufactured products. In some wealthy countries that especially depended on exports of raw materials – countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – this strategy had to be modified (with the fate of workers in a country like Canada becoming connected very closely to the consumption of their exports in the United States). In most of the poorer countries of the world where dependency on the exports of raw materials was even higher, it eventually proved impossible to combine such dependency with any kind of sustained domestic development. However, in the core capitalist countries of northern Europe and America, national development in the mid twentieth century centrally depended on harmonizing national mass production with national mass consumption. This social and economic effort at harmonization regulated by the state is sometimes referred to as **Fordism**, because it is based on the same economic idea Henry Ford used in his giant car plant in Detroit in the early twentieth century. The idea was that if workers were paid enough, they could afford to buy the products they made (so long as they also behaved properly and bought into a consumer lifestyle – something that Ford himself sought to foster with the use of education programs and social workers).

In the 1960s, as international trade increased, and the once war-ruined economies of Japan and Germany were up and running again, the Fordist system of balancing national production with national consumption began to change. Not just American businesses, but increasingly businesses everywhere, looked to foreign consumers for new markets. Global trade offered them an escape from their dependency on domestic consumer markets. In this context, the need to pay domestic workers at levels that enabled them to consume domestic products began to decrease at the very same time as new transportation and logistics technologies increasingly allowed

for the development of overseas factories. These changes have led to a significant realignment of the interdependencies between businesses and workers on a global scale. In the wealthier countries, new pressures on workers to be ever more adjustable and flexible have heightened at the same time as wages and benefits have been pushed downwards. Meanwhile, manufacturing work and increasingly **services** work, too, have been shifted to the poorer parts of the global economy where workers tend to be paid much less. In this new context of post-Fordism, the freedoms of business to search out and employ low-paid workers have come together with the abandonment of state commitments to universal national welfare, education, and healthcare services.

Outlining the collapse of Fordism, Chapter 4 describes the interdependent experiences of workers in the post-Fordist global economy in terms of changing geographical and social divisions of labor. The geographical changes reflect the ways in which the double dependency of business on workers has been fundamentally reorganized by global commodity chains. Gone are the territorialized two-way ties between national workers and national business, and in their place have emerged multi-faceted transnational networks of production and consumption. In concert with these geographical shifts, the end of Fordism has also been characterized by a complex recalibration of social divisions of labor. Class polarization and inequality have increased within nation-states, creating a highly mobile transnational business class at the same time as relegating unemployed and underemployed workers to communities of increased isolation and alienation. Despite the fact that the transnational business class has been joined by increasing numbers of women, economic globalization has not transcended traditional gendered divisions of labor and done away with the second shift of domestic work undertaken by the vast majority of women around the world. Instead, it has led to tighter transnational ties between the gendering of work in different places. Indicative of these new ties are the global “care chains” represented by migrant nannies and nurses. By examining these specific chains, Chapter 4 provides examples of how gendered work roles for women from poor nation-states are implicated in the professionalization of women’s work in rich countries. Racialized divisions of labor have also been remade in similar ways. However, even as transnational migrants of color have been incorporated into especially precarious work-roles in rich countries (e.g. garden work, fast-food work, and cleaning work), divisions between rich-country and poor-country workers continue to be marked by racializing assumptions and assertions (e.g. “Asians have nimble fingers”). Like class divisions and gender divisions, such racialization of the transnational division of labor represents a significant challenge for organized labor, and, for all these reasons, the final section of Chapter 4 addresses the ways in which unions have begun to transform their approach to organizing and building links between workers in the context of globalization. It describes how the new global commodity chains have led to a reapplication of old ideas about international solidarity. But, at the same time as outlining the factors that enable and shape transnational solidarity efforts by unions, the chapter notes some of the limits of language and nationalist politics that still curtail worker organization on a global scale.

1.2.3 The interdependencies of money

In contrast to the obstacles that continue to frustrate the transnational organization of labor, the instantaneous movement of money around the world has become the most powerful example of globalization's economic interdependencies. Money is an abstract representation of the value produced by human work. However, it is infinitely more mobile than workers themselves, and it moves around today's world at the speed of light in fiber-optic cables. According to data from the Bank of International Settlements, global foreign-exchange markets saw the equivalent of about \$4 trillion of money bought and sold *daily* in 2010.¹¹ While the "borderless world" idea that is so often referred to in political soundbites about Globalization is something of a myth, in the case of these deregulated and computer-facilitated money movements, the vision comes close to reality. In particular, global finance – the networked world of banks, investment houses, stock markets, currency markets, and so on – has become a kind of borderless nerve center for global capitalism (and, many commentators note, a very nervous center, too, following the global debt and credit crises of 2008–2012). Financial movements are still directed from fixed command and control sites such as New York, London, and Tokyo (and these sorts of Global Cities are discussed further in Chapter 8), but within the flows of money, all the transnational ties of production and consumption, all the tensions produced by uneven development, and all the contradictions ultimately come together in an integrated and extraordinarily complex world of border-transcending financial interdependence. Chapter 5 introduces this world and seeks to demystify as much of its complexity as possible.

To understand the emergence to today's global financial system, we have to go back to the Bretton Woods agreements orchestrated by the United States in 1944. Not only did these set up the **IMF** and establish the basis for the **World Bank**, but also they turned the US dollar into the world's reserve currency by formally pegging it to the value of gold. All the while the United States was the leading world exporter through the late 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, this dollar–gold peg was sustainable, but in the late 1960s it came under stress from global competition, America's faltering export performance, and the costs on the US treasury of fighting the Vietnam War and the Cold War more generally. As a result, in 1971 President Nixon abandoned the fixed dollar–gold peg. From that point on, the world entered into a system of floating exchange rates that have led over the last three decades to today's system of non-stop foreign-exchange trading and the associated rise of complex derivatives markets. Chapter 5 explains these developments and describes the workings of the most common forms of financial credit including stocks and bonds, as well as derivatives such as futures, swaps, and options. Arguing that the increasing proliferation of complex financial instruments has to be understood in the context of the increasing deregulation of financial markets, the chapter also explores how financial deregulation has reduced the influence of even wealthy nation-states *vis-à-vis* money markets. In this respect, the influence of the United States requires special

attention because of the system of dollar dominance established at Bretton Woods. Section 2 of Chapter 5 closes with some reflections on how the status of the dollar as a reserve currency has been increasingly undermined by US indebtedness and the huge global imbalances in trade and finance American borrowing represents.

The way the United States and other wealthy nation-states are coming to depend more on the decisions of global financial players such as investment banks, risk ratings firms, and accounting companies means that their relationship to global finance is gradually becoming more like the tortured ties of financial dependency that have been familiar to poorer nation-states in the **global south** or so-called developing countries for well over a century. These similarities and the increasing difficulties of extremely indebted countries in the Global South make it vital to examine the painful underside of the fast and integrated world of finance, namely the slow and often disintegrating world of **debt**. Chapter 5 describes the development of the Global South debt crisis in the 1970s and 1980s, and its links to the ups and downs of foreign currency trading in dollars. It also outlines some of the major global responses to date, including debt rescheduling and the ways in which this has increased the power of the World Bank and IMF to impose neoliberal development policies on indebted countries through so-called structural adjustment plans (**SAPs**). In the aftermath of the failures of structural adjustment to produce sustainable development, there have been calls for debt relief and new microcredit initiatives at the very same time. Chapter 5 concludes with an assessment of the progress and pitfalls of both debt relief and microcredit, documenting how, despite their differences in approach, both have become mechanisms of poverty management that operate on the basis of similar neoliberal codes of conduct as structural adjustment.

1.2.4 The interdependencies of the law

While systems of poverty management through debt have achieved a *de facto* law-like status in practice, there are also a wide variety of codified *de jure* laws that have developed in concert with the rise of global economic interdependencies. In order to understand how the worlds of commodities, labor, and money come together in a relatively ordered manner on a global scale, it is necessary therefore to turn directly to the theme of globe-spanning laws and legal institutions. This is a relatively neglected category in wider discussions of globalization, because the neoliberal vision of a “*laissez-faire*” free market order is dominated by the idea of deregulation. This vision is misleading, because even free trade requires laws to make it work in practice. Indeed, the huge policy-making changes undertaken in the name of liberalizing business since the 1970s onwards are best understood as *re-regulation* rather than deregulation. Not surprisingly, they have therefore depended on all sorts of new laws. In the shape of new free-trade agreements and the binding legislation and arbitration they have established, such laws have had an increasingly global reach as well as an ever-deeper local influence. Despite the significance of these new legal regimes, their many acronyms and complex interrelations

commonly defy easy comprehension. Chapter 6 therefore sorts through the alphabet soup of trade agreements with a view to making clear their underlying legal implications as well as explaining their basic enforcement mechanisms and relevance to the wider development of global economic interdependency.

The analysis begins at the global scale with an account of the development of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the **GATT**). The culmination of the Uruguay round of GATT talks is outlined as a way of introducing the emergence of the World Trade Organization (**WTO**) and the legal significance of its acronym-heavy agreements. In this way, the major controversies surrounding WTO policy are introduced, including the failure of the Seattle, Doha, and Cancun WTO meetings and the fierce debates over Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), Trade Related Intellectual Property protections (TRIPs), and a new General Agreement on Trade in Services (**GATS**). In Section 2 of Chapter 6, the relationship between these global free trade laws and regional free trade laws is examined in more detail. Their similarities are examined through a discussion of the ways in which they both circumscribe national democracy. But their differences are also addressed through an analysis of the divergences in regional free-trade agreements. The North American Free Trade Agreement (**NAFTA**) is thus compared with the rather different European Union (**EU**) model of legislating trade law. This comparison leads in turn into a wider discussion of the debate over whether regional free trade can be made into a more democratically accountable system of regulation. The final section of Chapter 6 moves on to consider other much more radical alternative models for regulating trade and investment. It examines transnational lawsuits that have been filed against TNCs as well as other efforts by transnational advocacy networks (TANs) to use both existing national legal tools and transnational consumer pressure to improve protections for workers and raise environmental standards. Throughout this discussion, attention is paid to the ways in which the tapestry of transnational connections woven by economic interdependency has led to the development of global legal actions and plans that far exceed the narrow concerns of trading freedom and property rights protection afforded by free-trade agreements.

1.2.5 The interdependencies of governance

All the questions surrounding transnational legal regulations lead in turn to the broader topic of political globalization. In political speech about Globalization as well as in many academic analyses of global interdependency, it is quite common to read that a defining political feature of today's global system is the end of geography or the so-called deterritorialization created by borderless global networks. These arguments, whether implicitly or explicitly, make the parallel suggestion that what we are witnessing today is the looming end of the nation-state. National-state regulation over clearly demarcated territorial space is, so the argument goes, becoming overtaken by the transnational forces of market regulation and coordination. In these ways, claims about the political implications of globalization are woven closely

together with claims about geography. Despite their appealing simplicity, however, there are two big problems with these sorts of interwoven arguments. The first is that they rest on too much hype and exaggeration. Ask anyone in any part of the world today about who they pay taxes to, about who regulates their road system, or who controls their army, and they will most often point to their national government. The nation-state is obviously not dead, and, in fact, some of the most significant forms of transnational re-regulation that have developed alongside economic interdependency – ranging from Intellectual Property Rights protection to trade agreements such as NAFTA – fundamentally depend upon nation-states for their operational implementation. The second big problem with the deterritorialization and “end of the nation-state” claims is that they tend to ignore important forms of **reterritorialization** that involve new forms of governance, too.

Governance is a collective catch-all term for the many different forms of political organization that have a capacity to regulate human life. Historically, this has tended to refer to just formal political entities such as monarchs, dictatorships, elected governments, and their bureaucracies. However, with increasing interest in the informal and social ways we are disciplined by market forces (what scholars of neo-liberalism call **governmentality**), including all the ways in which institutions such as schools and universities cultivate enterprising approaches to investing in your “self,” governance has come to mean any kind of systematic power dynamic including both formal governmental and informal social types of regulation. In the context of globalization, this broad approach to political power is important, because while nation-states have not by any means come to an end, their regulative capacities have undoubtedly been transformed and augmented by new kinds of governance. This is the approach taken in Chapter 7 to assessing the debate over the supposed end of the nation-state. The chapter begins by evaluating some of the exaggerations about the death of the nation-state and eclipse of national sovereignty. Focusing on the ways in which global ties are transforming traditional forms of state sovereignty, authority, and hegemony, this section proceeds to explore how advocates of neoliberalism have sought to harness the national state to the project of securing transnational conditions for market rule. Such “facilitative” state making often remains national and yet it clearly also facilitates a form of transnational market discipline at the same time. And whether this happens through peaceful transnational agreements on cross-border development, or through draconian national reforms, or through violent military interventions, we repeatedly see national governments enabling market forces to govern through the extension and entrenchment of neoliberal policies.

Beyond the role played by national states, the politics of globalization nevertheless still also involve additional forms of transnational governance from above. In this respect, it is important to consider the increasing authority of institutions such as the **IMF**, the **World Bank**, the **WTO**, and, though to a much lesser extent, the **G8** and **G20**. Much of the authority of these institutions rests on the ways in which they serve as key switching points for broader market calculations of the sort introduced in Chapters 3 and 5. The controversies over the IMF, the World

Bank, and the WTO need in particular to be evaluated with this in mind. Moralistic depictions of the institutions as variously good, bad, heroic, and evil do little to draw out the ways in which they represent institutional and thus political embodiments of highly unstable, uneven, and unaccountable economic ties. For the same reason, this section also emphasizes the importance of assessing the power of these international institutions in terms of how they internalize and thereby institutionalize the influence of global market relations.

The third section of Chapter 7 takes up in turn the question of what is sometimes called “transnational governance from below.” To some extent, this label is unhelpful because the ways in which transnational governance by institutions such as the IMF works involves all kinds of highly localized micro-practices such as accountancy that also represent a form of governance from below. However, what is normally meant by transnational governance from below is instead the development of transnational political campaigns by grassroots roots organization such as environmentalists, feminists, human rights campaigners, unions, and aid groups. These so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an important role in the politics of globalization. They have been the groups who have campaigned hardest against the narrow neoliberal interests and exclusionary economic focus of organizations such as the WTO. They have also often been held up as examples of the more inclusive rainbow politics that global interdependency makes possible. They are frequently described in this respect as the representatives of global civil society. However, critics contend that NGOs often operate as Trojan Horses for neoliberalism, and serious questions remain about how representative they actually are of the diversity of global civil society. These are vital questions, given that NGOs do actually end up shaping global governance despite being grouped together under an acronym that announces their supposedly non-governmental nature. Exploring these governmental effects of non-governmental institutions still further, the final part of the chapter explores how the same rankings and accountability metrics used to measure and manage NGO performance now also operate in deeply influential ways to govern personal behavior, too.

1.2.6 The interdependencies of space

Chapter 8 examines the uneven development outcomes of global interdependency in closer detail, the central aim being to offer a more realistic account of globalization’s geography than provided in popular visions of a borderless and flattened world. The first section addresses the ways in which uneven development plays out at a global scale. Based on the enduring tension between spatial fixity and geographical expansion that lies at the very heart of capitalist growth, global struggles over territory go through repeated cycles of consolidation, expansion, and reconsolidation of capitalist state-making and state control. Growth and expansion led by powerful states leads to new forms of spatial control and integration, but it can also lead to geopolitical conflict with other states along the way. The resulting

tensions lead in turn to competing geostrategic discourses that pit geopolitical claims to consolidated territory with expansionary geoeconomic visions of integrating new spaces into global economic ties.

Having explored the tensions between spatial fixity and geographical expansion at a transnational scale, the chapter turns next to how they play out in urban contexts. Focusing particularly on contemporary global cities, we review the ways in which they compete with one another in global business rankings of best cities, and how this in turn subjects cities to the disciplinary and often volatile effects of speculative urbanism. We then consider the destructive underside of speculative urban growth and competition: namely, the splintered urbanism that has led to local landscapes of stark inequality where enclaves of privilege and possessive individualism exist right beside slums and communal spaces of dispossession.

1.2.7 The interdependencies of health

Global health is the ultimate way in which the interdependencies of globalization come together to shape destinies. They are also the most longstanding in the sense that they are vitally linked with the global ecologies of interdependence created by the Earth as a shared global environment. Chapter 9 therefore begins by reflecting on how global environmental change, and climate change in particular, has intensified and further integrated these ties of ecological interdependence. It reflects on how this has created a new geological–ecological era that is increasingly referred to as the anthropocene, and then turns to how the simultaneous biomedical innovations of this era promise to provide coping solutions for the ill-effects of changes such as global warming. While the global ties involved are inescapable, they are embodied in radically different and unequal experiences of interdependency. Exploring this pattern of interdependency plus inequality, the chapter then examines how the global ties of biomedicine mean that the improved health and global biological citizenship of some are often dependent on the sub-citizenship and exploitation of others. We then turn to consider the many global health initiatives that have been launched to reach out to those whose health has been undermined by global market ties, and we explore how the resulting development of disease-specific donor-driven vertical programs and grant competitions remains profoundly shaped by market forces.

The reflections on ways in which global market forces shape approaches to global health intervention lead to the concluding chapter of the book and to a review of the ways in which neoliberalization processes more generally both provoke and shape responses to the exclusions and asymmetries created by global market ties. Some of the responses represent conservative and often nationalistic reactions to the perceived threats of the meta-Globalization juggernaut. Others by contrast tend towards forms of resistance based on ideas about global justice. As such, they generally seek to suggest that other non-neoliberal approaches to global integration are possible. In between, are diverse forms of resilience, many of which can be found in

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contemporary universities. It is thus with a final focus on the university as a venue caught at the intersection of neoliberalization, resilience, and resistance that the book ends.

To summarize the arguments of this overview of the book, the basic point is that globalization fundamentally involves increasing global interdependency. We have seen how these ties can be picked apart, too. But as you go forward in the chapters that follow, it is important to track the ties *between* the different types of global interconnection. Likewise, it is also important to remember that there are other global ties which are not given chapter-length attention in what follows – the transnational movements of migrants, of Internet-enabled communications, and of religious practices, for example – but which nevertheless also influence the overall movement towards greater global interdependency. Global climate change and global terrorism ties are two especially significant forces shaping globalization in this way, and they will keep forcing their way into our interconnected lives whether we acknowledge them or not. This means we are faced with a very complicated picture of global interconnection that demands the same sort of open-ended analysis that has come with the global spread of science itself: analysis that, like scientific best practice, repeatedly opens itself up for deliberative review on an increasingly global and critical but collaborative basis. Another way of putting this is that we need to avoid the dangers of acting like the blind villagers. We must work deliberately and collaboratively in an open-ended way in order to avoid confusing the overall elephant of globalization with any one component part. In addition, though, the goal of the rest of the book is also to avoid treating globalization as some sort of ungraspable and unknowable spirit. The elephant is more than the sum of its parts, but it is not a god! In other words, the chapters that follow also aim to avoid confusing globalization with the often religious-like myths that circulate around Globalization. In Chapter 2, we consider some of these myths in more detail and identify some of the best tactics for avoiding their misleading depictions while still tracking their influence.

Student Exercises

Individual:

1. Pick something you ate for breakfast and try to brainstorm on all the different sorts of global networks that made it possible for you to eat. Draw a global sketch map diagramming these connections in one color. Then, draw on the same sketch map in a different color where you imagine the money you have spent on your breakfast has gone. Students can draw their own sketch-maps or work as a group, but either way, it is useful at the end to reflect with others on the disjunctions between the map of money flows and the map of commodity connections.

Group:

2. Pick a street, office, factory, shop, building, or public space in your city. Visit it as a group and collectively consider the ways in which it is unique and the ways

in which it is similar to other places in other cities and other countries. Think about what signs of global interdependency are revealed by the site, and discuss the ways in which members of the group normally take these signs for granted without thinking about the ties to other people.

Notes

- 1 Some of the most thorough and thoughtful analyses of globalization that inspire the approaches taken here include: John Agnew, *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005); Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); Robin Cohen and Paul Kennedy, *Global Sociology* (London: Macmillan, 2000); Peter Dicken, *Global Shift: Reshaping the Global Economic Map in the 21st Century* (New York: Guilford Press, 2007); Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, eds., *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003); David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Andrew Herod, *Geographies Of Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009); James H. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006); Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave, 2000); Leslie Sklair, *Globalization: Capitalism and Its Alternatives* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); William Tabb, *Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); and Göran Therborn, *The World: A Beginner's Guide* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).
- 2 Manfred Steger, *Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the 21st Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); Michael Veseth, *Globaloney: Unraveling the Myths of Globalization* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).
- 3 Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Teresa Brennan, *Globalization and Its Terrors: Daily Life in the West* (New York: Routledge, 2003); Neil Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Martin Wolf, *Why Globalization Works* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
- 4 *The Economist*, "Market Fatigue: The Anglo-Saxon Model Has Taken a Knock," *The Economist*, October 3 (2009); Michael Lewis, *The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010); Gillian Tett, *Fool's Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J.P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe* (New York: Free Press, 2009); Martin Wolf, "Why a new Bretton Woods is vital – and so hard," *Financial Times*, November 5 (2008); and Martin Wolf, *Fixing Global Finance* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).
- 5 For discussion of how neoliberal norms (and associated forms of financialization) remain remarkably dominant despite the 2008–2009 financial crisis and subsequent depression, see: John Bellamy Foster and Robert W. McChesney, "The Endless Crisis," *Monthly Review* 64, no. 1 (May, 2012): <http://monthlyreview.org/2012/05/01/the-endless-crisis>, Paul Krugman, *End this Depression Now!* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012); Jamie Peck,

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- Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner, "Neoliberalism Resurgent? Market Rule after the Great Recession," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 111, no. 2 (2012): 265–88; Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010); and William Tabb, *The Restructuring of Capitalism in Our Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
- 6 Further details about the historical–geographical evolution of neoliberalism are provided in Chapter 7, but useful overviews are provided by both advocates and critics. For a particularly accessible online overview that is enthusiastic about neoliberalism, see the PBS materials associated with its series *Commanding Heights* <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/>. For a clear and influential account from a widely respected critic, see David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 - 7 Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, eds., *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Lisa Duggan, *The Twilight of Equality: Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics and the Attack on Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003); Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Ian Hacking, "Making Up People," in *Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought*, ed. Sosna Weller (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); Barry Hindess, Neo-liberal citizenship. *Citizenship Studies* 6 (2002): 127–43; Jamie Peck, *Constructions of neoliberal reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Wendy Larner, and William Walters, editors, *Global Governmentality: New Perspectives on International Rule* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Simon Springer, "Neoliberalism as discourse," *Critical Discourse Studies* 9, no. 2 (2012): 23–46; and Jason Read, "A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity," *Foucault Studies* 6 (2009): 25–36.
 - 8 Most powerfully, this was the argument of Naomi Klein, *No Logo: No Space, No Choice, No Jobs, No Logo* (New York: Picador, 2002). For all her ongoing reports, videos, and interviews on anti-neoliberal organizing, see <http://www.naomiklein.org/no-logo>.
 - 9 From a decidedly pro-market point of view, the economist Donald Boudreaux writes thus about how capitalist ties now coordinate production and consumption across global distances and multitudes of people: "This beneficial coordination of the plans and actions of millions of different people from around the world is a system of global cooperation – each person doing a specific task, that, when combined with the tasks performed by others, results in a steady output of vast quantities of valuable goods and services." Donald Boudreaux, *Globalization* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008) at page 3. Meanwhile, Marxian critics highlight how this coordination across distance benefits capitalist class interests in particular: "What we now call 'globalisation' has been in the sights of the capitalist class all along," says David Harvey. "The conquest of space and time, along with the ceaseless quest to dominate nature, have long taken centre stage in the collective psyche of capitalist societies. The result has been an inexorable trend for the world of capital to produce what I call 'time–space compression' – a world in which capital moves faster and faster and where distances of interaction are compressed." David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
 - 10 <http://www.workersrights.org/>.
 - 11 Bank of International Settlements, *Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2010 – Final Results* <http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx10t.htm>.

Keywords

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