

I

1. It having been shown in the foregoing discourse,
 1. That *Adam* had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, nor by positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or dominion over the world, as is pretended.
 2. That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.
 3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive law of God, that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined.
 4. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of *Adam's* posterity being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to have the right of inheritance.

All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be the fountain of all power, *Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction*; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion (things that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against), must of necessity find out another rise of government, another original of political power, and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what *Sir Robert Filmer* hath taught us.

2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down what I take to be political power. That the power of a *magistrate* over a subject may be distinguished from that

of a *father* over his children, a *master* over his servant, a *husband* over his wife, and a *lord* over his slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another, and show the difference betwixt a ruler of a commonwealth, a father of a family, and a captain of a galley.

3. *Political power* then I take to be a *right* of making laws with penalties of death¹ and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.

¹**penalties of death:** Thus, from the outset Locke makes it clear that the imposition of the death penalty is a legitimate function of properly constituted government. The justification for such a penalty is to be found in Chapter II. It derives from every man's natural right to execute the law of nature.