

Sympathy for the Devils

Free Will and *Dungeons & Dragons*

Greg Littmann

The fundamental conflict underlying the worlds of *Dungeons & Dragons* is that between good and evil. On one side are gods of good like Pelor and Bahamut, supported by their clerics and paladins and decent adventurers everywhere. On the other side are the cruel gods of evil, like the cadaverous Vecna and spidery Lolth, along with legions of demons and devils, grinning undead, and ugly, rampaging humanoids. Good-aligned adventurers know that demons and devils alike must be made to leave the prime material plane immediately and that the philosophical differences between the evil-aligned drow and the chaotic evil-aligned orcs are less significant in the great scheme of things than the shared evil nature that makes them both so dangerous.

Life is hard when you are born to be bad in *D&D*. The evil-aligned species of the monster manuals generally live in misery. Evil humanoids like orcs and goblins spend their lives being bullied by their peers, before eventually charging to a bloody death in melee. Intelligent undead are often left for centuries just staring into space, while evil people not lucky enough to become undead end up in the Abyss or the Nine Hells, where conditions are, to be blunt, hellish, as souls are tormented by chain devils or ripped apart by shrieking vrock. Even being promoted through

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the ranks of devils brings no respite – your immediate superiors are always evil bastards, the more so the higher you go. If you think *your* boss is bad, try working for Asmodeus!

Not even the *good* guys show the bad guys any sympathy. A party of good characters will chop and char a tribe of orcs to so much smoking hamburger without the slightest hesitation or regret. Not even the cleric says a few words over the corpses – she’s too busy looting them for small change. Likewise, good characters will carve their way through packs of rotting undead and gangs of howling demons and devils without giving a thought to how awful being carved up feels to the monsters, or where the poor blighters end up now and how much worse their next assignment might be.

Why is there so little sympathy for the forces of evil? Presumably, it is precisely *because* they are evil. It is considered justice for bad things to happen to evil people (using the word “people” in its broadest sense, so as to include the various non-human intelligent individuals found in the worlds of *D&D*). Appeals to reciprocity might be made: the orcs we slaughter wouldn’t hesitate to slaughter *us* if they ever got the upper hand. The undead hate us just for being alive, while the things the devils would do to us if they had their way would make death in battle look like a merciful release.

How you treat your imaginary enemies doesn’t matter in itself. If it pleases you to imagine taking Asmodeus’ ruby rod and ramming it up his nose, then you go ahead and imagine that all you like, for all the harm you are going to do anybody. But considering the justification of the moral attitudes of *D&D* characters is philosophically useful because attitudes shown towards combating evil in *D&D* mirror the attitudes that many people take towards combating evil in the *real* world. Whether your make-believe wizard is fulfilling his moral duty to a pretend vampire doesn’t matter in itself, but how we treat people we label as “evil” in *this* world does.

Philosophers test moral theories by subjecting them to “thought experiments,” hypothetical situations set up and considered in an attempt to decide whether particular moral theories give the

right answers in all possible circumstances. *D&D* games are nothing *but* thought experiments, hypothetical situations in which hypothetical people do hypothetical things. Of the various story-telling art forms that can serve as a source for thought experiments, *D&D* is *particularly* suitable because the *D&D* player is an active participant in the story, forced to make decisions based on the situations described by the Dungeon Master.

Pity the Pit Fiend

Why *should* we feel sympathy for the evil-aligned monsters of *D&D*? One factor that might move us is that so many of them seem to be evil by *nature*. That is, they are evil given the very type of being they are. While a corrupt human or malicious halfling might have taken a wrong turn in life, other humanoids like orcs, goblins and trolls, along with non-humanoids like red dragons, ropers, or grell are born to their alignment; a red dragon is an *evil* creature – it says so right in the *Monster Manual*. Of course, the *Monster Manual* also states, “A monster’s alignment is not rigid, and exceptions can exist to the general rule,”¹ so beings labeled as “evil” in the manuals don’t *necessarily have* to be evil. Your PC *could* meet a red dragon looking to defect to the side of good, or a grell philosopher so tormented by the moral implications of her thought experiments that she can no longer eat people and is wasting away from hunger. But if the probability of a creature being anything other than evil is so slight that it is dealt with by a general disclaimer regarding monster alignment in the front of the *Monster Manual*, then there seems to be something unfair about holding it to blame for *being* an evil creature.

If the overwhelming majority of the members of a species behave a certain way, then either it is an astounding fluke, or something about being a member of that species *explains* that tendency; which is to say that something about being a creature of that type in that environment generally *causes* the associated behavior. Ropers spend their lives killing innocent adventurers

to devour their flesh. Either it is an incredible coincidence that ropers are generally found murdering people for a living instead of tilling the soil or running an adventurer's supply shop, or there is something about *being* a roper that explains their murdering behavior; which is to say that something about being a roper *causes* ropers to kill.

Once we can see the external causes of a behavior, we tend to be less willing to blame someone for exhibiting that behavior. It is hard to blame the poor roper for its record of murder and stalactite fraud if it was being born as a roper that caused young Rocky to turn to a life of crime. After all, the roper didn't *choose* to be a roper rather than a half-elf or a dryad; that it was a roper was entirely beyond its control. Likewise, when a glabrezu demon is spawned from the elemental chaos, waving its crab claws and swearing blasphemous and chaotic words, there can be no doubt that the poor bat-headed bastard never had a *choice* about being chaotic evil. As much as we might object to all the pincer violence and foul language, we can't reasonably *blame* the demon for being born a demon.

In fact, nobody can rightly be held to blame for the way they act if they could not have acted any differently. If this principle is in doubt, it can be demonstrated by the following thought experiment. Imagine that you are playing a good-aligned cleric in a dungeoneering party. You are in a dark stone corridor, guarding the rear as the team advances into unknown territory. Out ahead, the rogue is scouting in stealth mode, searching for traps and watching for monsters. Suddenly, the dice hit the table the wrong way and the rogue fails a crucial Perception check. The fighter and paladin take another step forward and there is a loud "click" as the corridor begins to tilt downwards, swiftly becoming a stone slide into a lower-level room filled with ferocious, slaving ghouls. The floor is dropping so fast that the rogue is the only one to make the roll to stay standing. Unfortunately for the rogue, the DM announces that you crash right into her, a cannonball in chainmail, as you slide helplessly toward the pit, and now you and the rogue slide *together* toward the bone-strewn nest of the ravenous dead.

Just when it looks like things can't get any worse, the rogue's player gives you the stink-eye and says "As I slide down, I'm going to take my rapier and stick it in the *cleric*. I'm using *crimson edge* to make sure the wound bleeds for the ghouls." And *then* the DM tells you "I'm revoking all of your clerical powers! There's no way that pushing the rogue into a pit filled with ghouls isn't a major violation of your good alignment. Don't think that Pelor is going to help you *turn* those puppies down there. Pelor thinks you are *ooze*." It seems natural to object "But my cleric couldn't *help* it! Once the trap went off, I fell down and that's when I hit the rogue. You can't blame the cleric – the cleric never had a choice."

Damnation Without a Saving Throw

What makes the evil monsters of *D&D* philosophically interesting is how obvious the connection often is between their evil behavior and factors entirely outside of their control. One second you are raw elemental chaos, the next, a spikey demon who exists to destroy. Like the falling cleric, the predicament of monsters born to be evil illustrates that when we can see the external causes of behavior, we deny that the subject is acting from free will and, if we are being consistent, we withhold moral blame. However, it isn't whether we can clearly *see* the external causes of a behavior that makes the moral difference. The morally important thing is that the behavior *has* external causes – it isn't right to blame someone for something they couldn't help doing. What makes this philosophically interesting is that it means that *nobody* has free will in the morally relevant sense. There is no such thing as free will! We are, all of us, falling clerics pulled helplessly along by natural laws.

After all, our bodies are physical things and physical things always act in strict accordance with the laws of physics. Any alteration in a physical system requires energy, so unless energy comes streaming into the physical universe from outside, there is no force we can *add* to the physical universe in order to make

an alteration in what it is already set up to do. Your body is a machine made of meat and giblets, and machines do what their physical structures dictate they do – to do otherwise would be to defy natural law. More specifically, your brain is a fleshy computer, and like any other computer, must act in accordance with the way that it is programmed to act. We have learned enough about the universe to be able to recognize that we are, all of us, golems, slaves to the orders that bind us.

To say that an action is “determined” is to say that the action must occur, given previous events and the laws of nature. Since ancient times, philosophers have worried that if the universe is entirely deterministic – that is, if every event in the universe is causally determined – then free will is impossible. The Roman philosopher Lucretius (99–55 BCE) wrote in his *On the Nature of the Universe*, “If all motion is always one long chain, and new motion arises out of the old in order invariable ... whence comes this free will?”² The French philosopher Baron d’Holbach (1723–89) – whose name would be good for an evil warlord – accepted determinism and thus denied free will. He wrote in *The System of Nature*: “All the steps taken by man to regulate his existence, ought only to be considered as a long succession of causes and effects, which are nothing more than the development of the first impulse given him by nature.”³ So, for instance, if you decide to play *D&D* one day instead of going to work, it would have defied the laws of nature for you to decide any other way, given the mechanical structure of your body. You are no more choosing freely when you decide to hack lizardfolk with your friends today than the cleric is choosing freely when he falls in accordance with the law of gravity.

Free Will in the Lair of the Succubus

Many philosophers have denied that there is any incompatibility between having free will and our actions being determined. Appropriately known as “compatibilists,” these philosophers generally believe that your actions are *free* if your own preferences play an

appropriate role as links in the causal chain that results in your actions. As the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) put it in his *Leviathan*, “Lastly, from the use of the word *free-will*, no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.”⁴ Thus, your decision to play *D&D* instead of going to work would be free if your *desire* to play *D&D* played a decisive role in the outcome that you *did* play *D&D* – if, for instance, your mad craving to try out a minotaur barbarian was so great that it overcame your fear of poverty and drove you to the gaming table. Even if your decision was already set at the Big Bang, as long as your actions are *in accordance* with your desires, then you are free on this model.

Unfortunately, the compatibilist model of freedom still fails in cases where the causal chain is particularly obvious. For instance, let’s say that you are playing a good-aligned fighter, and you are down the old dungeon one day when the party comes across a room containing what appears to be a helpless prisoner chained to the wall. You release her, because that is what good adventurers do, and she turns out to be a succubus, because that is what helpless prisoners in the dungeon are. Correctly guessing that you have the lowest wisdom in the party, the succubus throws her *dominate* at you, and takes control of your actions, at which point the DM announces that you turn your back on the devil and use your axe to chop at the party warlock. Once the fight is over and the succubus banished back to Dis to fill out forms, your team-mates turn on you, taking the 50 feet of hempen rope from your adventurer’s kit and tying a noose in it to hang you with. “You don’t *ever* turn against the party!” growls the ranger.

Something seems unfair about the party blaming your fighter in this way. But why? Turning on an innocent person and chopping at them with an axe is an archetypical example of what we would normally call immoral behavior. Note, furthermore, that the fighter was acting entirely in accordance with his desires. Ever since the succubus put the whammy on him, he *wanted* to protect her. When he took a swing at the warlock, it

was because he *wanted* to chop him up. People who willingly do such things to other people are reviled as the worst of the worst. Sometimes they say “The devil made me do it,” but this defense rarely gains them any sympathy. Yet in the case we are looking at, the devil really *did* make the fighter do it. She charmed him with her black magic and the DM took control of the character, announcing the attack against the warlock. Because the fighter couldn’t help what he did, because no other course of action was open to him, it is unfair to hold him responsible for trying to trim the warlock with an axe.

How Thorin Axebeard Randomly Defended the Bridge

So we cannot be free if our actions are entirely determined. That might make it seem that the possibility of freedom hangs on whether determinism is true or not. If that were so, it would be good news for fans of free will, since it turns out that determinism is *not* true – our universe is not entirely deterministic. According to most popular interpretations of quantum mechanics, sometimes things happen *randomly* at the subatomic level. That is, they do not happen for any previous reason, but instead happen for no reason at all. They are *undetermined*. For example, the rate at which a radium atom will undergo radioactive decay is undetermined. While every element has an average decay rate, an individual atom will decay at random. In principle, undetermined events at the quantum level could influence human behavior. They could direct you to step right or left, or to play a ranger or a warlord, or to make a moral decision one way or the other – to tell the other players about the rune-encircled ring your shaman just found, or to have the character just slip it onto her finger and not mention it. Might this subatomic randomness be freedom? This has been the hope of some philosophers almost from the time Werner Heisenberg (1901–76) published his uncertainty principle in 1927, introducing randomness to quantum theory.

Alas, randomness may rescue us from strict determinism, but acting randomly brings us no more *freedom* than we would have if events were entirely determined. To illustrate, consider the following thought experiment. Your DM introduces some new house rules she's made up, in the form of pages of detailed percentile tables describing the reactions of PCs to the events around them. When your party meets a mysterious black-clad elf on the roadway, you don't trust him and want to steer clear, but the DM rolls a couple of D10s and tells you that the party have graciously asked the sinister elf to tag along. Later, your dwarven fighter is standing at one end of a subterranean stone bridge, having just held off a goblin onslaught to protect the team behind. The corpses of goblin warriors lie piled around his feet, but not one of them made it through. Now a deep horn sounds and the rock trembles as the enemy herd a dark wave of towering ogres to the other side of the bridge to make the next assault. The foe is too strong! You want your dwarf to shout "Retreat!" and make good use of unencumbered speed running back to the surface as fast as he can. But the DM rolls her D10s again and tells you that no, the dwarf is going to charge straight down the bridge at the ogres, dropping his shield and yelling "Death for Moradin!" All night, every single action your character takes is decided entirely by the roll on the DM's tables.

Eventually you object, "You don't need me here. I make no difference at all to what my character does or says or thinks. Thorin Axebeard is nothing but a puppet controlled by your Dwarven Culture and Psychology tables, dancing along to the dice. You aren't giving *me* the freedom to decide what my character does."

"But I am giving you *complete* freedom!" retorts the DM indignantly, holding up the two D10s. "The rolls are effectively random. You can't *get* anything freer than a random result – that's all the freedom there is in the universe. We can either roll dice on my tables or quantum particles in your head to decide what Thorin does, and the role-playing is better when we use my tables." Clearly, though, the DM is *not* giving you the freedom to decide what your character does. When the DM makes your

character's actions random, the DM has taken away your control of the character.

Likewise, our actions are not free if we act at random in everyday life, a puppet of the great tables in the sky. So indeterminacy offers no more freedom than determinacy does. One could argue, following the compatibilist, that we are acting freely as long as our actions are caused by our desires, even if our desires occur at random. However, as we saw above in the case of the fighter charmed by a succubus, compatibilist approaches don't work when we can see the causal mechanisms at play. As Max Planck (1858–1947), one of the founders of quantum physics, concluded, “The freedom of the human will has been put forward as offering logical grounds for the acceptance of only a statistical causality operative in the physical universe ... I do not at all agree with this attitude. If we should accept it, then the logical result would be to reduce the human will to an organ which would be subject to the sway of mere blind chance.”⁵ As long as our desires are not under our control, we aren't acting freely when we do as we desire. So whether our actions are caused by prior events or uncaused, we were not acting freely and are not to blame for them.

Four-Dimensional Dungeons and Powerless Dragons

If there is any lingering doubt in your mind as to whether anybody could ever be acting freely, whether they be devil, orc, or human being, one final consideration should put it to rest. Nobody can ever act freely because there is already a fact about how we are going to act over the entire course of our lives. For every second to come, there is already a fact about what you will be doing in that second, whether you will be working, or committing a crime, or running a wise and mystical druid on a quest for a ring that shoots fireballs.

We normally tend to think of the future as being open – to think that there are a variety of different ways that the future

might turn out. This is contrasted with the past, which we think of as being closed – we think of the past as being “set” in a way that the future is not. We take it that there is a fact about whether you spent yesterday hacking your way through the halls of the fire giant chieftain, but not yet a fact about whether you will spend tomorrow arguing over the division of treasure from the run and whether the party sorcerer needs a set of magic bagpipes just as much as your bard does.

However, the only difference between what we call the future and what we call the past is where they are in time relative to *us*, whether they are located after us in time, “the future,” or before us in time, “the past.” We view yesterday – when you met the giants in combat and handed them their enormous asses – as “the past” because it is located earlier in time than the moment in which you read this sentence. We view tomorrow – when you shout and fling dice around the room in rage at the sorcerer’s player – as “the future” because it is located later in time than the moment in which you read this sentence. However, Albert Einstein’s (1879–1955) Special Theory of Relativity implies that no time is ever objectively “past,” “present,” or “future.” On Einstein’s model of the universe, whether two events are occurring at the same time depends on the frame of reference from which you are observing them. Because there is no objective fact about which things are happening at the same time, there can’t be a time that is uniquely *present*. Likewise, there can be no objective *past* or *future*, since events are only ever past or future relative to *us*. It is tempting but wrong to think of the universe as a three-dimensional space moving forward in time as the future becomes the present, and the present becomes the past. In reality, the universe is four-dimensional space-time and the whole never moves or changes. What we call our “future” is every bit as set as the past, because from some frame of reference in the universe, what we call our future is already “the past.” There is already a fact about whether you will have your bard try to kill the sorcerer tomorrow, just as much as there is a fact about whether you had your bard try to kill the sorcerer yesterday.

How does this relate to free will? Let's go back to our newly spawned glabrezu demon, fresh from the elemental chaos. For the glabrezu to have free will, there must be a sense in which it gets to control what it does in its life, a sense in which it is up to the demon how it acts. It must be able to choose whether it will give in to its wicked and anarchic instincts, roaming the planes in search of clerics to carve, fighters to fillet, and druids to disembowel, or whether it will turn its back on violence and destruction, and use its jagged claws to make bandages at a hospital for impoverished gnomes.

However, if we assume that space-time functions in the worlds of *D&D* in the same way that it functions in our universe, then at the moment the glabrezu is created there is already a fact of the matter about how it will spend the rest of its life. Indeed, there has *always* been a fact about how the glabrezu will live – there was a fact about it millions of years before the demon came into being. In what sense, then, can we insist that the glabrezu really has a choice about how to act, when it has always been a fact that it will, say, dedicate its existence to pinching the noses off paladins? Even if the glabrezu's will to perform involuntary cosmetic surgery on the best and bravest of good's soldiers will be a link in the causal chain leading from the demon's coalescence from fundamental forces of nature to an infamous career of nose-related violent crime, the fact that it was already true long before the demon existed that it would commit a string of nasal atrocities means that the demon never had any genuine say in the matter. The glabrezu *couldn't* have done otherwise, because the future was already *set*. Importantly, nothing about the future being set requires that events do not happen at *random*. Even if we rule that the elemental chaos is an entirely random system that spits out monsters who have the form they have for no prior reason at all, relativity implies that there will still be a *fact* about the sort of creatures that will be vomited forth and what cruel and riotous acts they will perform after they arrive.

What goes for fresh demons goes for everybody else – as the saying goes, what's good for the glabrezu is good for the grell.

Since the future is set, nobody has free will. The infant roper, newly hatched, can't truly have a choice about whether to be a killer if it is already a fact that in the next twenty years it will slaughter twenty dwarves, devouring their flesh and, for some reason known only to itself, storing their treasure in its "special gizzard." The same applies to those who turn to evil after having had every advantage in life. An evil human cleric of Bane, god of war and conquest, may have been raised by a loving family to be a devoted follower of the merciful Pelor, only to turn to Bane out of greed and a hunger for power. Yet the cleric is blameless because she never had a free choice in the matter – even when she was an innocent child, sincerely singing hymns of Pelor's light; it was already a fact that she would one day raze her home city with an army of goblins and put the whole population to the sword.

As for you and me, we experience the world as if we were free, but this is an illusion. Our conception of freedom requires that the future must be in some way open for us, but the future is not open to us because there are already facts about what we will do. Either it is a fact that you will play *D&D* tomorrow or it is a fact that you won't. Either way, your "choice" tomorrow is set. Either it is a fact that you will steal your friends' dice the next time you play or it is a fact that you won't. Either way, it isn't in any meaningful sense "up to you." Perhaps most importantly of all, what goes for demons and monsters and you and me goes for those who are labeled "evil" in this world. For every crime that has ever been committed, it has been a fact throughout time that that crime would be committed in just that way by just that person at just that moment. This means that no crime has ever genuinely been committed out of free will.

Free Will and Other Imaginary Monsters

Abandoning the myth of "free will" should lead us to change the way we think about wrongdoers. The notion of retributive justice – that is, just punishment – relies on the existence of free will. It cannot be just to punish someone for doing something

that they couldn't help doing, as the falling cleric said to the spiteful rogue. Meting out suffering to make sure that people suffer as much as they deserve makes no sense, because nobody deserves to suffer at all – not the pit fiend reigning in hell, not the drow making conquest deep underground, not the worst criminal on Earth. Our attention needs to be focused instead on reducing suffering for everyone. That doesn't mean that we must never make someone suffer for their crime, but the goal must always be the alleviation of suffering as a whole, never the infliction of suffering because suffering is *deserved*. Drawing the distinction between useful suffering and *deserved* suffering isn't just a matter of chopping hairs. It is, for instance, the difference between a humane and constructive prison system and an inhumane and destructive one.

At its most extreme, the deserved suffering model of justice might approve an institution like the Nine Hells from *D&D*. Indeed, as noted above, we *have* to assume that the justice of deserved suffering is what explains the lack of concern shown by the forces of good for conditions in hell. Bone devil taskmasters terrorize the bearded devil soldiers, ice devils twist the limbs off squealing imps just for being weak, and the chain devils gleefully skin alive anyone they can get their talons on. Meanwhile, the lesser damned are choking in the acid swamps of Minauros on level 3, being horribly burned in the firepits of Phlegethos on level 4, freezing their asses off on the Stygian tundra on level 5, or are otherwise in torment from the environment alone, all the while waiting for the moment when they are noticed by a higher-ranking citizen of hell and brutally tortured. Hell in *D&D* is a bad place for bad people to live in so that bad things can happen to them. Such an infernal institution could not be justified if we only ever inflict suffering to *reduce* suffering. Ripping someone apart with chains or biting them with a beard made of snakes not only hurts *them*, but it makes it less likely, rather than more likely, that they will be successfully rehabilitated. Making people suffer is one of the weakest tools we have for improving behavior, and one of the most counter-productive if over-applied.

It is too much to hope for that humans can give up on using the notion of “blame.” It seems too tied to our emotional makeup for us to be able to abandon it on intellectual grounds. When the Greek philosopher Zeno of Citium (334–262 BCE) caught one of his slaves stealing, and the slave protested that according to Zeno’s own theories he was destined the steal, Zeno simply answered, “Yes, and to be whipped for it too.”⁶ We humans, with our psychological need to see blameworthiness, are like boneclaws and wights, bound by their very nature to hate the living. There is nothing about being alive that makes someone deserving of hatred, but the wights just can’t *see* things that way, just because of the way they are built.

However, that we are forced to experience the universe a certain way because of the sort of creature that we are does not prevent us from recognizing that our experiences are *misleading* and don’t capture reality. A grell is blind, but the grell can still understand *that* it is blind; it can appreciate that there are things it isn’t seeing. Just as relativity has shown that our experience of time as consisting in past, present, and future is illusionary, so it can be seen that human belief in free will likewise rests on a misunderstanding of physics. We cannot be free if our actions are caused and we cannot be free if our actions are uncaused, and we cannot be free because our future is every bit as set as our past. Thus, it would make sense for us to move away from a justice-based approach to dealing with crime to a utility-based approach that is concerned only with improving conditions for everyone.

Perhaps the next time you defeat a mind flayer, you will not just run it through with your longsword and use its tentacles for fishing bait, but will seek out a home for criminally insane cephalopods, somewhere that the mind flayer can live in the dark and dankness, expressing itself through disturbing paintings of subterranean cities and graphic scenes of brain-eating. Perhaps the next time you have the fiery immolith demon at your mercy, you will spare it extinguishment by *polar blast* and *greater ice storm* spells, and instead set it free on a deserted rocky island, to spend its days in harmless conflagration, incinerating small

crabs and spiders and screaming *deathfire* curses at the clouds. Or perhaps not. *D&D* is a game, and games should be played in whatever way is most fun. If you have more fun turning mind flayers into calamari with a +3 longsword of mollusk slaying and dealing with immolith by flushing the dungeon with water spells, then more power and xp to you. The same goes if you have more fun slaughtering innocent halflings or tearing the wings off harmless pixies – whatever you like to *pretend* to do is just fine with me. It is what you do in *this* world that reveals your true alignment.

Notes

1. Wizard's RPG Team, *Monster Manual*, 4th edn. (Renton, WA: Wizards of the Coast, 2008), p. 7.
2. Titus Lucretius Carus, *On the Nature of the Universe*, trans. R.E. Latham (New York: Penguin Classics, 1994), p. 45.
3. Paul-Henri Thiry (Baron) d'Holbach, *The System of Nature*, vol. 1 (Seattle, WA: CreateSpace, 2011), p. 2.
4. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 140.
5. Max Planck, *Where is Science Going?* (Woodbridge, CT: Ox Bow Press, 2004), p. 30.
6. Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, trans. R.D. Hicks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925), Book VII, p. 175.