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Introduction

Power and Difference in Global Production

The violence of abstraction produces all kinds of fetishes: states, race, normative views of how people fit into and make places in the world. A geographical imperative lies at the heart of every struggle for social justice; if justice is embodied, it is then therefore always spatial, which is to say, part of a process of making a place.

– Ruth Wilson Gilmore, “Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference,” p. 16

This is a geography, not of jobs but of power relations, of dominance and subordination, of enablement and influence, and of symbols and signification.

– Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour*, p. 3

Sundays in Los Almácigos, Dominican Republic

In the late afternoon on a Saturday in May, Ambrosina and I met up at the bus station in the city of Santiago, the inland industrial capital of the Dominican Republic’s northern region, called the Cibao. We were headed back to her hometown of Villa de Los Almácigos, west of the city, about an hour from the Haitian border. Ambrosina lost her job in February along with 6,000 other trade zone workers when the garment factory where she worked, IA Manufacturing, closed down. She agreed to help me interview her former co-workers in her hometown.

On the bus ride, Ambrosina told me about her current job. After two months of pounding the pavement and handing out dozens of résumés, she had gone to work for her former supervisor as a final auditor at the country's largest surviving garment firm, Dominican Textile. This would be her fourth garment company since finishing high school and moving to Santiago seven years earlier to start university. For the next two hours, as we traveled through the verdant countryside, Ambrosina explained in detail the many things she disliked about her new job: more work, less pay, submissive employees, and frantic managers.

The previous week, her manager had increased her module's quota for Old Navy shirts from 5,000 to 6,000, offering the workers 200 pesos – a little more than 7 dollars – for the new weekly production goal. Ambrosina was galled by the operators' acceptance of such a measly bonus. Despite being proud of her rural roots, she attributed her co-workers' acquiescence to the fact that many were from the *campo* (rural area) where the factory was located just outside the city. She also resented the long commute to her new job, adding an extra two hours onto her already grueling 10- to 12-hour work shifts.

When I think of the things we used to complain about at IA, she lamented, it seems unreal. Ambrosina would repeat her complaints about her new job to family members and former co-workers whom we would visit the following day in Los Almácigos. They would shake their heads and chime in periodically with sympathetic exclamations, “Jesús!” “Muchacha!” She would quit a few months later.

The next morning, we started on foot down the two-lane, paved road that eventually links Los Almácigos to the border with Haiti, 60 kilometers away. Ambrosina was somewhat mortified to be seen walking in town but I hoped she would just blame it on me. Our time was tight and I felt that we could ill afford to wait for her father to return with his motorbike so that we could use it for travel to the houses nearby. As on our other weekend visits, our interviews were squeezed between morning house cleaning, lunch preparation, and other domestic chores at her parents' house, intensified by the fact that Sunday was the only day with some consistent electricity supply, and thus also the best day to do laundry and ironing.

After three brief visits to the houses of former co-workers, we arrived at Leidy's family's home. Leidy had returned to Los Almácigos just two weeks prior. She had worked in three different factories in the trade zone over six years. Her longest stint was at IA Manufacturing, where she sewed front pockets onto Dockers-brand pants. After the factory closed, she worked in a five-machine workshop sewing shorts and pants for the domestic market in one of Santiago's working class neighborhoods. She learned new operations, but didn't always get paid regularly and decided she couldn't risk more of her time working for free.

Leidy's mother joined our conversation. She and her husband, Leidy's father, had gone to the trade zone in Santiago with Leidy and three of her siblings in 1992, closing up their small house in Los Almácigos, and leaving behind the mother's plot of land. Her parents worked in a garment factory for a little more than a year. *Despite the problems today*, her mother said, *conditions were worse and wages were lower back then*. *We returned with nothing*, she concluded bitterly. At the age of 18, nearly a decade after her parents' failed attempt, Leidy told the family she was going to the trade zone. Her parents warned her against the move, but she went anyway as she was determined to find her independence. Now, back at her parents' place with her young daughter, Leidy was making arrangements to bring her belongings from Santiago. There was a small, one-room wood house behind her parents' modest *rancho* that she would make her home. *I'm not going back*, she told us. Although seemingly resigned, Leidy said she was waiting to hear from her brother-in-law about a possible modeling opportunity in the city. Ambrosina consoled Leidy by sharing her complaints about her new job at Dominican Textile. As we were leaving, Ambrosina offered to help Leidy obtain a social security benefit from the government for her daughter who had been born while she was still an employee (and thus she was entitled to a small monthly payment). *If only there were jobs here, there'd be no reason to have to go to Santiago*, Ambrosina told her as we departed. I wasn't so sure Leidy shared Ambrosina's love for her *campo*, but for now she would have little choice but to make her life there.

Situating Global Displacements

Why did Leidy not heed her parents' warnings? What expectations of progress motivated the migrants from Los Almácigos and other precariously employed trade zone workers? And what is at stake in situating a study of contemporary globalization that takes the threshold of these workers' idled garment factory as its point of departure? These questions are the fertile soil from which the present study has sprung.

The experiences of former garment workers in Los Almácigos do not square easily with conventional accounts of the globalization of production. These accounts generally begin with the observation of a fundamental reorganization in the geography of production starting in the late 1960s. The substantial surge in manufacturing output outside of "core" capitalist countries prompted a broad swath of observers to proclaim the dawn of a new structural relationship between what was then commonly called the First and Third Worlds (Fröbel et al. 1980; Piore & Sabel 1984; Lipietz 1987; Harvey 1989). Up until the late 1970s,

Third World states forged this reorganization of industry primarily through the promotion of strategic industrial sectors and the protection of domestic markets, while multinational corporations adapted to and, in turn, shaped these geographies through foreign direct investment. The demise of this import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy by the end of that pivotal decade dramatically transformed the configuration and organizational form of the global division of labor. As the United States sought new conditions to maintain its dominance in the face of the limits of the post-World War II economic arrangement (Arrighi 1994; Krippner 2011), much of the Third World faced insolvency brought on by high interest rates, capital scarcity, higher oil prices, declining resource prices, and a weakened industrial sector (McAfee 1991; Corbridge 1993).

By the end of the 1980s, Latin America's primarily US creditors, together with multilateral development banks, implemented a series of policies that privileged so-called export-oriented industrialization, or the production of labor-intensive manufactured goods for Northern markets. This model, already in operation in a handful of experimental zones in the region such as the United States–Mexico border and the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince, would soon become dominant as states progressively re-regulated trade and investment in line with multinational corporations' priorities. This turn towards what is commonly called neoliberalism was further entrenched in new generation trade agreements, beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which sought to codify the priorities of multinationals and finance capital in global trade (Cox 2008).

The “global factory” – manufacturing facilities in Latin America, Asia, and Africa making the innumerable products filling seemingly endless store shelves in North America and Europe – has since become iconic of this reorganization of transnational production, and of globalization in general. Feminist ethnographers were quick to elucidate the gender dynamics of this new model, which was not simply export-led but also female-led (Standing 1999). From Indonesia and Malaysia to Mexico and Haiti, the workers in these factories were overwhelmingly women. In East and Southeast Asia, these young “factory daughters” (Wolf 1992) faced an intensification of household duties while also experiencing newfound forms of limited independence (e.g., Lee 1998; Ngai 2005; Ong 1987). In Latin America and the Caribbean, women in export factories were often taking on the “breadwinner” role under dramatically eroded wage conditions as their male kin faced the indignities of decline in import substituting industrial sectors (e.g., Elson & Pearson 1981; Fernández-Kelly 1983; Cravey 1998; Mullings 1999; Salzinger 2003; Wright 2006; see Bair 2010 and Cravey 2005 for reviews and discussion).

The present study is deeply indebted to this diverse body of feminist work and draws on its insights to extend feminist analysis to a period of major restructuring following more than 30 years of the low-wage export model. In the extensive body of English-language literature on the global factory, feminist and otherwise, scholars have tended to follow capitalist investment and contracting relationships to “far-flung” locations (from the perspective of metropolitan scholarship) and have theorized the resulting new divisions of labor therein. Far fewer, however, have paid attention to the transformation of these factory arrangements as initial low-wage production has given way to new combinations of technology and skill, together with mass retrenchment and disinvestment.¹ The aim of this book is to study this contemporary process of restructuring of the global factory, and in so doing, to inform thinking and action on the persistent and dynamic relations of inequality that articulate the global North and the global South.²

One obstacle to understanding the mutable yet structured global division of labor is the way that it is mapped onto sequentialist understandings of change and fetishized geographical categories. Consider, for example, the common “three worlds” classification of developing, newly industrializing, and post-industrial countries. As Fernando Coronil (1996) argued, such nomenclatures obscure the politics of these geohistorical categories: the ways in which places and their positioning in the global economy are forged through *connections* rather than distinct and sequential *transitions*. As we will see in the chapters that follow, while scholars, development experts, and activists dispute the merits of the global factory, few dispute the notion that these installations will either push, or fail to push, places along a path from farm to factory to the post-industrial. The global factory, then, is not only a relationship of subcontracting, outsourcing, investment, or exploitation; it is *also* a set of assumptions, discourses, and spatial imaginaries that reproduce the notion of development as one of traversing through a stage of industrialization.³

The notion of a stage-like trajectory of capitalist development is inseparable from the reproduction of Eurocentric dualisms of West/non-West and developed/developing. I follow Anibal Quijano’s notion of Eurocentrism as “the paradoxical amalgam of evolution and dualism” that reproduces Europe and its settler colony extensions, principally the United States, as a self-actualizing center, which defines the Other in relation to the Self (2000a: 551). In exploring the links between Eurocentric dualisms and the global factory, my intention is neither to assert a particular “Caribbean” path of capitalist development nor to claim the failure of “Western” development in the Caribbean. Rather, my aim is to show how the operation of global factories is inseparable

from a discourse that frames global production as a stage of development. In so doing, this discourse produces normative assumptions of how racialized and gendered subjects, and the places where they live and work, fit into the global division of labor (see Gilmore, epigraph). This discourse does not simply *describe* the world; rather, it seeks to *transform* it by reworking multiple livelihood strategies, colonial legacies, and discontinuous industrial trajectories into dual economy models, narratives of transition, and, ultimately, newfound objects of capitalist development.

The critique of the development discourse that I offer in the following chapters is a contribution to, but not a substitute for, a political project to reframe and forge global connections differently. Towards this end, *Global Displacements* offers the reader a set of conceptual tools and analytical insights to engage with the complex geography of industrial and deindustrial processes that find temporary stability in given arrangements of factories, workers, and consumers. I develop these tools by recuperating the notion of uneven development from the archives of Marxism towards the construction of a critical, feminist approach to the study of global production.

The concept of uneven development stems from early twentieth-century debates over the possibilities of socialist revolution in countries that remained primarily agrarian (Trotsky 1969 [1906]; see also Burawoy 1989). In the immediate post-World War II period, the concept was incorporated into theories of structural dependency between the Third and the First Worlds (e.g., Frank 1967; Amin 1976). In the throes of deindustrialization in the North Atlantic in the 1970s and 1980s, Marxist geographers provided a spatially nuanced understanding that eschewed taken-for-granted scales of uneven development as either a relation among nations or between world regions. Instead, their work showed how the ordinary process of capitalist accumulation reproduced spatial unevenness. Capital sought to resolve contradictions between fixity and mobility, competition and monopoly, and exploitation and consumption through the production of novel spatial arrangements and scales (Massey 1995 [1984]; Harvey 1999 [1982]; Smith 2008 [1984]).

In the present text, I develop a formulation of uneven development through an understanding of global production arrangements as concrete determinations of social and spatial divisions of labor. The concept foregrounds relations of power – among capitals and between capital and labor – *and difference* – forged through colonial legacies and everyday politics – that are obscured by path-like notions of industrial change. I engage with Marxist and feminist approaches shaped and reinterpreted through my ethnographic work on production restructuring in the export garment industry in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

By confronting the messiness of daily life, the irreducibility of experience, and the complexity of difference, I consider the transformation of this accumulation strategy woven through these two deeply inter-related countries. My grounded and theoretically informed account of employment collapse and restructuring in the Dominican Republic, combined with a new factory boom in Haiti, reveals the historically patterned and contingent production of new geographies of uneven development in the Caribbean. What emerges is an understanding of uneven development as a process that is *made* through the production of place and social difference as workers and the unemployed forge their livelihood possibilities under conditions not of their own choosing. Before undertaking a more extended discussion of uneven development, I turn first to an explanation of why this approach has emerged from my study of the Caribbean.

From a Comparative to a Relational Geography of Haiti and the Dominican Republic

Perhaps nowhere in Latin America have emerging geographies of uneven development become more evident than on the island of Hispaniola. In the late 1960s, the Dominican Republic and Haiti had nearly the same gross domestic product (GDP), but by the 2000s, Dominican GDP was *eight times* that of Haiti.⁴ Indeed, the Dominican Republic has enjoyed the second highest growth rate in Latin America since the turn to neoliberal regulation, a fact that is drawn upon by mainstream economists like John Williamson to extol the so-called Washington Consensus, or the structural adjustment policies that swept the region in the 1980s (Kuczynski & Williamson 2003). Haiti, on the other hand, has faced deteriorating economic and social conditions, a protracted political crisis and, as a result, profound vulnerability to socionatural disasters. In contrast to the celebratory narrative of neoliberal reform in the Dominican case, few mainstream economists attribute Haiti's dismal trajectory to the very similar, in fact even more radical, neoliberal policies adopted by the country in the 1980s and 1990s.⁵

These divergent trajectories have brought these two countries to broader public consciousness. In the popular book *Collapse* (2005), for example, author Jared Diamond dedicated a chapter to the profound disjuncture between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in Malthusian terms: Haiti is a place that suffers from too many people and not enough land, he argued, with deforestation as the starkest marker of land pressures. Taking the island – and its two nations – as akin to a natural experiment involving two separate societies “growing” under similar

conditions, Diamond ultimately attributed Dominican “success” to a more reasonable elite and cultural difference.⁶

Such comparisons between Haiti and the Dominican Republic produce sequentialist and Eurocentric framings of development *par excellence*. The Dominican Republic apparently has progressed along a natural path from an agrarian to an industrial to a service-oriented (or post-industrial) economy, while Haiti has apparently failed to traverse these stages of development. These are powerful motifs of linear and territorially discrete social change that inform the governing logics and discourses of development policy. The always becoming of capital is annexed to dual economy models and transition narratives, premised on a political amnesia. As a result, we will see that the global factory is presented as a development imperative for Haiti, and as a stage that has passed for the Dominican Republic.

The power of such development narratives, and the comparisons that they engender, lies as much in what they foreground as in what they render invisible. In this case, to begin with, such a framing erases the distinct incorporation of what we now call Haiti and the Dominican Republic into colonial capitalism, as colonial Saint-Domingue, a slave plantation society and the jewel of the French empire, and as Santo Domingo, a mixed-race, impoverished frontier society, respectively (Derby 1994). Accounts like Diamond’s also minimize the significance of imperial legacies and neo-colonial occupations: for example, in the case of Haiti, a crippling indemnity paid to France as a condition for receiving metropolitan recognition.⁷ Such comparisons mask the mass migrations from both sides of the border that have effectively created transnational nations, on the one hand, and states highly dependent upon migrant remittances, like the rest of the Caribbean, on the other. This transnationalism has been produced by migrant flows to the global North since the 1960s, where between one-ninth and one-eighth of Dominicans and Haitians, respectively, now live.⁸ There is another dimension to this transnationalism, however: the nearly century-long migratory flows from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, instituted by the US occupation of the island. This intra-insular integration has constituted and reproduced racialized and segmented labor markets, the implications of which we will examine in the chapters to come.

In short, the comparative framework relies on the notion of these two countries as territorial containers and interprets their differences as evidence of national success or failure in a world of sequential development. In contrast, my argument in the pages that follow is for a *relational geography* of capitalist uneven development that foregrounds the ways in which places are iteratively forged in relation to one another. For if the Dominican Republic and Haiti have long been complex,

heterogeneous, “modern” and unevenly integrated societies, it is since the latter part of the twentieth century, with the rise of neoliberal globalization, that their divergence has increasingly become a basis for capital accumulation through the restructuring of global production. Before sharing with the reader how I undertook a grounded study of this process of restructuring in and through Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I introduce the reader to the theoretical tools that I have drawn upon to develop the notion of the uneven development that I use in this text.

Theorizing Uneven Development: Global Production Networks, Coloniality, and the Production of Place

To interpret the analytical significance of these divides in the Caribbean, I draw upon a mix of theoretical tools that I briefly sketch out here. Uneven development is a classic approach to understanding the material ways that places relate to one another through transfers of “surplus” from periphery to center. Throughout much of the twentieth century, scholars of Latin American development debated the forms of dependency that reproduced uneven development between Euro-American metropolises and the Third World. So-called *dependentistas* assigned primacy to these imperial-type relations among nominally sovereign states and attributed the persistence of global income inequality to them.¹⁰ Their work was influential in the formulation of world-systems theory in Anglo-American scholarship, which argued for an understanding of capitalism at the world scale formed through exchange relations between a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery. World-systems scholars Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977; 1986) introduced the concept of the commodity chain to disrupt predominant understandings of economic development as a national and sequential process by foregrounding the linked activities – from inputs to production, distribution and consumption – that produce a commodity.¹¹ Through unequal exchange along the commodity chain, they argued that hierarchy in the world system was reproduced. Core, semi-periphery, and periphery positions were not fixed, however. A certain mobility between positions existed as states and capitals collaborated and competed to shift from concentrating the production of lower value-added goods to higher value-added ones, or suffered reversals in such efforts (Arrighi & Drangel 1986).

Since its introduction by world-systems scholars, sociologists developed the idea of the *global* commodity chain as a meso-level framework to analyze how functionally integrated but spatially dispersed production activities shape development trajectories (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994). Analysis of global commodity chains, now more commonly called

global production networks, has facilitated scholars, as well as activists and policymakers, to gain analytical purchase on the complex and concrete determinations of the global economy (see Bair 2005; 2009).¹² The emergence of this analytical perspective parallels and documents a substantive shift in the organization of production over the past 40 years. Since the 1970s, multinational corporations either systematically disinvested from production, or increasingly made more profits from their financial and non-productive activities (Milberg 2008). In turn, these organizations shifted in form from vertical integration and direct control of production to relations of exchange and arms-length coordination and control between formally independent units (Piore & Sabel 1984; Harvey 1989; Arrighi 1994).

The study of the firm networks spanning the global North and South that have resulted from this shift from “fixity” to “flexibility” has yielded important insights into novel forms of unevenness produced through these relationships. Drawing on the work of Joseph Schumpeter (2008 [1942]), scholars have theorized the existence of higher value nodes in production networks, defined as activities that offer entrepreneurial “rents” – or above-average profits – through innovation and/or monopolization by a small number of firms (Kaplinsky 2000). In concrete terms, retailers and brands, based largely in the global North, occupy these more concentrated and monopolized nodes of the network, which offer greater returns. This “lead firm” position is reinforced by these firms’ ability both to control the terms of participation of suppliers by setting prices and standards and to pocket the bulk of profits. In contrast to lead firms, supplier firms – some of which have consolidated into multinational companies themselves based largely in East Asia – generate their profits primarily through the increasingly competitive activity of production. Over time, as we will see in the case of the principal garment firm in the Dominican Republic, these producers also seek to enter niches of the chain where rents are possible. Firm strategies to create or access higher value activities vary between production networks. They can involve, for example, using a higher ratio of capital to labor, which usually also corresponds to a shift in the mix of activities that a given firm undertakes.¹³

The most useful insight from global production network studies for theorizing uneven development is the observation that different returns created and distributed via these networks produce geographic concentrations of wealth and poverty at a variety of scales (Arrighi & Drangel 1986).¹⁴ Each node of a production network is not a set of “firms” but rather a given economic activity, or set of activities, that represents a mix of capital, labor, and land (Arrighi & Drangel 1986: 16). How returns generated by participation in production networks are created and

distributed can only be understood through an analysis of relations of production (i.e., between capital and labor), together with those of exchange between productive units (i.e., firms, farms, households). Moreover, states play a central role in trying to attract capital and stabilize the conditions for investment (Arrighi & Drangel 1986: 24; see also Glassman 2011). In short, hierarchies in the global economy are determined neither by participation in particular sectors (i.e., agriculture versus industry), nor by fixed geographical locations (i.e., G-8 countries versus the rest of the world). Rather, uneven development is shaped by the different returns accrued to the mix of spatially situated “core-like” and “periphery-like” economic activities or functions. These value characteristics of economic activities are not static, moreover. They stem from the techno-organizational strategies of capital, supported by states, to hold highly competitive functions – that is, those with razor-thin margins – at arm’s length through subcontracting and outsourcing, while capturing the monopolized, core-like functions that offer above-average returns.

As we think through the actual geographies of global production in light of these insights, one truism emerges: while the positions of places are not pre-ordained, a hierarchical *field* of possible positions exists. *By definition*, not all places can form part of the core at the same time. Uneven development, or the reproduction of places that concentrate core-like, periphery-like, or a mix of these activities, together with places that are excluded entirely from such arrangements, is thus the necessary architecture of a global economy dominated by capitalist production. In fact, as even staunch critics of world-systems theory have acknowledged, this unevenness has a certain regulatory function in the global economy (Lipietz 1986). The immanent contradictions of capitalism, between competition and monopoly, for example, “find” their core, periphery, and semi-periphery arrangements for a time. To reproduce the global economy, then, different positionalities among places must also be reproduced.

If a production network perspective has much to commend it in foregrounding how these relationships reproduce uneven geographies of development, the approach is limited in several key ways. Let me focus here on the two limitations that are most relevant to the present study: the question of labor and the politics of place.

First, the focus on competition between capitals (i.e., firms) linked through production networks generally leaves the question of labor under-theorized. In response, much scholarship concerned with the role of labor considers labor as either an object impacted by global production arrangements, or as an active agent shaping the form and content of these arrangements through collective struggles (see Bair & Werner 2015). I offer a third approach here that eschews an understanding of

labor as equivalent to its role in a given production network. Instead, I consider labor through the lens of colonial legacies that intersect with particular transnational production arrangements but are not reducible to them. This approach is a first step towards conceiving of labor as an active structuring agent in the production of place.

The work of Anibal Quijano and his notion of the coloniality of power, or the historical and material (dis)continuities between colonialism and contemporary capitalism, is a helpful starting point. Quijano argues that the racial hierarchies forged through the conquest of the Americas constitute a terrain of articulation, one that adapts historic patterns of exploitation to the contingent necessities and attendant conflicts of contemporary capitalist accumulation. Capitalism is realized through the stitching together of the wage relation with other forms of labor control, structured by the value hierarchies of racialized and gendered labor. Contemporary arrangements of production reproduce – with difference – gendered and racial hierarchies of labor rooted in colonial legacies and exerting a structuring effect on the global division of labor of our times (Quijano 1998; 2000a; 2000b). As Sylvia Federici has argued, what Marx described as primitive, or originary, accumulation, was not solely the instantiation of capitalist relations of production through the separation of peasants, crafts- and tradespeople from the means of production, but also the introduction of social divisions of labor through the production of hierarchies of domination:

Primitive accumulation ... was not simply an accumulation and concentration of exploitable workers and capital. It was *also an accumulation of differences and divisions within the working class*, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, as well as “race” and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of a modern proletariat. (Federici 2004: 63-64; emphasis in the original)

Federici offers an account of the devaluation of European women’s labor in the process of the formation of capitalist relations of production in Europe, rendering women as devalued or value-less labor. In contrast, Quijano places greater emphasis on the originary relation between wages and European-ness/whiteness/maleness, and the correlating link between racialized and feminized subjects and unpaid work, forced labor, petty commodity production, and slavery.¹⁵ For both, primitive accumulation is not a thing of the past but rather the on-going and uneven mix of forms of “extra-economic” violence and domination, together with the production of surplus value through labor exploitation, that create the conditions for capitalist accumulation and remake racialized and gendered hierarchies of labor.¹⁶

Quijano conceives of coloniality in the Americas as a “historical-structurally heterogeneous model of power with discontinuous relations and conflicts among its components” (2000a: 571). To put it simply, there is no straight line from the *encomienda* to the day laborers on Chiquita brand’s contract banana plantations in Ecuador, or from slavery to the sewing operators in Levi’s apparel suppliers in Haiti.¹⁷ Moreover, Euro-centered racial categories and patriarchal gender formations constitute hierarchical systems of meaning, inextricably linked with, but irreducible to, capitalism. The notion of coloniality, then, does not presume any essential connection between subjects produced as Other through racialized and gendered material-symbolic hierarchies, and the actual relations of exploitation, domination, and exclusion of devalued subjects from market and wage relations. Neither capitalism, nor racism, nor patriarchy exists in a relation of necessary dependence. And yet, these structures are not simply analogical, as Spivak (1988) reminds us. Rather, there is a way in which accumulation proceeds through the iterative reproduction of coloniality: that is, through the reworking of hierarchies of social difference and forms of labor in order to recuperate profits from their interminable tendency towards stagnation and decline. In short, in global production networks, social difference serves as a resource to rework arrangements of exploitation, and to redraw the lines of inclusion and exclusion in the capitalist wage relation. To grasp this iterative reworking of coloniality, however, we must shift our analysis from the abstract lineaments of value and difference in global hierarchies of capital and labor to the concrete determinations and everyday politics of place production.

Places and regions are best considered as processes rather than pre-given objects for our analysis. As geographer Doreen Massey (1995 [1984]) argues, regions are themselves produced by complex, multi-layered social histories, and overdetermined by their integration in multiple space-times of accumulation. Their participation in (often) multiple circuits of capital accumulation is part of, but not reducible to, their on-going formulation (Massey 1995 [1984]). Massey’s notion of place as process dovetails well with Gillian Hart’s (1998; 2002) work on rural industrialization. Drawing on the Marxist agrarian tradition, Hart argues that rigid, binary approaches to industrial change fail to comprehend the specificity of place as the outcome of historically specific forms of property relations and on-going power struggles over how the social product will be produced and distributed. These “layered” histories of social relations, and on-going struggles to shape these relations, produce “multiple, nonlinear and divergent trajectories of capitalist development” (Hart 1998: 334). Moreover, these political economic struggles are inseparable from cultural ones. “[S]truggles over material resources,

labor discipline and surplus appropriation [and distribution],” Hart writes, “are simultaneously struggles over culturally constructed meanings, definitions, and identities” (1998: 340).

In the Caribbean, the anthropological literature has long debated the multiple, divergent trajectories of regions incorporated into the global market via smallholder agriculture versus plantation production. This distinction was made famous by the comparison between social relations in the tobacco- and sugar-producing regions of Cuba in Fernando Ortiz’s classic work *Cuban Counterpoint* (1995 [1947]). In this and much subsequent study on the plantation/peasant complex in the Caribbean, a theme I return to in Chapter 2, we see the inseparability of relations of production, global market integration, political struggle, and cultural production woven through particular regional formations (e.g., Mintz 1974; Hoetink 1980; Trouillot 1988). Such attention to regional trajectories of change disrupts binary understandings of uneven development as a process of incorporating peripheries into a totalizing and homogenizing “core” or “the West.” In particular, a focus on the social relations that constitute regional formations in relation with – but irreducible to – foreign capital and markets disrupts the still pervasive understanding of global production as fundamentally linking low-wage production in the South to consumption in the North (Coronil 1996). As Priti Ramamurthy (2004) has argued in her call for a feminist commodity chain analysis, such binaries must be resisted for they fundamentally obscure the complex social processes in the global South that are constitutive of global capitalist relations.

The challenge that I take from Hart, Coronil, and Ramamurthy, together with the Caribbean and Latin American literature on regional change, is to specify the particular geographies of uneven development formed through colonial legacies, capitalist relations, and the ways that these forces produce regional conjunctures. In the chapters that follow, my aim is to convey an understanding of uneven development in and through global production networks that eschews a narrow economism and a one-dimensional conception of power. For if coloniality emphasizes on-going relations of domination and exploitation, I follow Stuart Hall in theorizing colonial legacies as “active structuring principles of the present” in particular historical and place-specific conjunctures (1980: 339).¹⁸ Regions, then, are *not* slotted into global divisions of labor. Rather, regions are dynamically reproduced in relation to value hierarchies of production, *themselves not fixed* as I have discussed above. Regional formations must be interrogated as dynamic sets of relations that articulate firm hierarchies, heterogeneous racialized and gendered forms of labor, and political struggles over the form of capitalist accumulation and the distribution of the social product.

While I embrace Hart's (2002) notion of "multiple trajectories" in my analysis of export restructuring in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, my aim is to mobilize such an approach in relation to global production networks and the reworking of coloniality in the Caribbean. For if there are multiple trajectories of place formation, these paths are not plural. To deepen our understanding of global connections, then, my goal is to consider place production as a process that articulates with a shifting, heterogeneous, yet structured global economy. The reproduction of these multiple trajectories is itself a spatial resource of difference for the reproduction of uneven development and thus the global capitalist economy itself. If, as Melissa Wright (2006) has argued, capital requires "corporeal breadth" – that is, social differences of labor – to rework value hierarchies in production, capitalism also requires variegated places – *geographic breadth* if you will – to reproduce its relations. Far from fixed objects and positions, a feminist approach to uneven development calls for the continual interrogation of the dynamic basis of domination, exploitation, and creative forms of subject-making within and between places. An analysis of these historically patterned and contingent geographies offers us a way to understand global production networks as arrangements that exist in dialectical tension with regional trajectories of change, and the collective labor and subaltern struggles that shape and are shaped by these processes.

Global Displacements as Multi-Sited Fieldwork

While *Global Displacements* is influenced by my engagement with these Marxist, feminist literatures, my feminist understanding of uneven development has emerged from my fieldwork with workers, owners, managers, and policymakers linked to the transnational garment industry and its operations in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

I began this project wanting to expose the reality of factory closures and their effects on workers and communities as a way to disrupt teleological understandings of global production. I believed that an engaged study of a deindustrial process would simply reveal the mistaken assumptions behind the development discourse of global production. As I became more deeply involved with the project, however, and the forms of livelihood that circulated through different sites of production and social reproduction associated with the garment industry, the experiences that workers, managers, community leaders, and the un- and underemployed shared with me did not fit into such a singular perspective. To begin with, there is no underlying reality of exclusion and decline that is *masked* by industrialization and progress narratives. Rather, narratives of progress and uneven geographies of inclusion/exclusion are, I discovered,

deeply imbricated with one another. What struck me immediately when I began interviewing workers and managers in the Dominican Republic, for example, was the pervasive understanding that the export garment model was part of a quickly retreating past for the country, echoing published development reports and industry analysis. Belief in this notion was underscored by garment production moving to Haiti, reinforcing a notion of path-like development despite the much more circuitous and interrupted routes that both countries have traversed. The current and former garment workers, managers, and owners who shared their experiences with me certainly did not all agree with this framing; nevertheless most constructed their thoughts and opinions about work and livelihood in relation to this dominant narrative. Thus, rather than a method that disrupted or disabled this hegemonic understanding of development by revealing a more authentic reality, my fieldwork dug deeply into everyday narratives and practices that pervaded the sector's restructuring. These accounts were rife with complex understandings of progress, ambivalent experiences of work, and the inextricable struggle over material livelihood and social positions of worth.

My fieldwork focused on three sociospatial locations: first, garment firms in Santiago enmeshed in local and international supply networks; second, the circuits of livelihood navigated by unemployed garment workers, especially those linking the city of Santiago to rural *campos* predominantly in the surrounding Cibao region; and finally, the historical and social conditions of place-making underlying the advent of industrial border production on the island in the town of Ouanaminthe (see Figure 1.1).



Figure 1.1 Map of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, northern region

To study garment firms, I spent several months based in the offices of the regional trade zone association. The association was located in a converted garment factory within Santiago's main trade zone, just off the busy *circunvalación* highway that circled this inland city. The director provided office space and opened innumerable doors for me to conduct initial interviews with firm owners and top executives of four firms, and general managers of 12 additional firms. The interviews covered basic company data and history, as well as the informant's assessment of the firm's competitiveness, the role of the state in promoting exports, and the future of the sector. Because the trade zone association largely represented Dominican garment firms, I spoke primarily to owners and managers of Dominican firms with the exception of a US-owned branch plant and a Hong Kong-based subsidiary, where managers granted me interviews as a favor to the association's director. Interviews were often followed by a factory tour. I returned to eight firms for more open-ended follow-up interviews. My questions developed over time as I incorporated the perspectives shared by owners and managers about the particular characteristics of the northern region, the Cibao, and its cultural attributes that secured the sector's competitiveness. Thus, I came to understand the location of these garment firms as one produced through their commercial relations to US apparel multinationals, as well as through a particular (subnational) regional culture and an associated trajectory of development.

Participant observation within firms was more restricted for reasons I explain below. In order to gain more unstructured access to the sector, I took a series of night classes with engineers, offered by a government- and US-funded Textile Center established to reskill a garment industry that hitherto had thrived on simple assembly. Effectively, the Textile Center was a classroom area with a handful of computers, a couple of dress-makers' dummies, and standing tables in the same factory building as the trade zone association. In the course of attending these classes, I befriended several young women engineers who helped me to negotiate access to their worksites in pattern-making rooms and product development departments at three different firms. From these new "value-added" sites in the industry, I was able to document how gendered meanings of skill and class position were drawn upon to restructure the labor process in the small handful of Dominican firms that were shifting from simple assembly to more complex production.

To study the livelihood circuits of retrenched garment workers, I followed Ferguson's (1999) longitudinal method in his study of displaced miners, adjusting my method and approach in the context of a weakly organized, mixed-gender factory workforce.¹⁹ I focused my study on workers from a single firm that I call IA Manufacturing.²⁰ Two union

federations, each with an affiliate union at the company, helped me to contact workers. Consequently, my key informants were former union activists who facilitated relationships with their former co-workers, both former union members and non-union workers. My interviews and repeat visits with former garment workers took place over the course of six months in two urban neighborhoods next to the trade zone and in three rural towns, or *campos*, where some workers had returned. In the initial phase, I conducted mostly individual and some small group interviews with workers about their work and migration histories, and their current strategies including sources of income, dependents and family obligations, amount of severance pay, indebtedness, and experiences in the labor market. My ability to keep track of workers' trajectories following these initial interviews rested on the deeper relationships I forged with key contacts. As evident in the opening vignette, Ambrosina and other key informants were also organic community leaders and problem solvers who maintained strong connections to their former co-workers, especially those from their hometowns, most of whom had found their trade zone jobs through these very ties to neighbors and kin in their *campos*.²¹ Over a period of six months, I made multiple visits to their homes in Santiago and to their *campos*. Ambrosina and others helped to arrange follow-up interviews and would keep me updated on the whereabouts of their former co-workers.

The final site of this study is the border town of Ouanaminthe, Haiti, just across the river from the Dominican town of Dajabón. Intrigued by the claims of Dominican owners and US buying agents that Haiti was the future for their industry, I gained access to a new trade zone on the border situated between the two towns, owned and operated by the largest Dominican garment firm, which I will call Dominican Textile. I visited the zone on two occasions, spending several days based in the Human Resources department. Eventually, I moved to the town of Ouanaminthe in the summer of 2007 to better understand local dynamics. I conducted interviews in French, Haitian Creole, and Spanish, with the assistance of Mr Delien Blaise as a research collaborator and as an interpreter for the first two languages. It became clear that the conflict over the trade zone development was just one piece of a tumultuous local trajectory of change since the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986. What my industry informants in Santiago, supported by their US clients, saw as an obvious "greenfield" site for the global factory, community leaders in Ouanaminthe described as a dramatic urban expansion fueled by mass immigration and marked by the near complete collapse of infrastructure and services, setting the stage for the conflicts that would surround the new factories.

My research in Haiti took place before the devastating earthquake of 2010 that practically leveled the capital city of Port-au-Prince and the

wider southern region. In the wake of the earthquake, the patterns of migration, trade zone development, and local tensions in the north that I explored in 2007 took on new dimensions. As international donors sought to demonstrate reconstruction through job creation and foreign direct investment, the pace of global factory creation accelerated and the northern region was constructed as a key growth area for transnational apparel companies. I consider these events in relation to my broader work on the garment industry's recent restructuring to show the power of the global factory as a development discourse not only to erase the legacies of capital investment in, and disinvestment from, Haiti, but also to foreclose the possibility of imagining alternative models of rebuilding the country. My focus on these three sociospatial locations contributed to what I now see as an important gap in my study: the state enters into my account through development plans and trade policies but its role in managing dis/investment – particularly in the case of the Dominican Republic – remains under-theorized.

My multi-sited approach was deeply influenced by work in anthropology, geography, and sociology over at least the past two decades to grapple with the question of where to locate “the global” in order to study “it” (cf. Tsing 2005).²² As the idea of fieldwork became dissociated from the notion of the field as a bounded site “containing” a unique, hermetic culture, critical scholars encouraged a rethinking of the practice of fieldwork through feminist notions of location and situated knowledge (e.g., Gupta & Ferguson 1997). This displacement of the field as a cultural container has opened up the space for “global ethnographies” and “multi-sited fieldwork” made up of a series of engagements with different sociospatial locations linked not solely to different localities (i.e., sites), but more importantly, attentive to the multiple social relations that make up any particular place (Massey 1993). At the heart of such a formulation is the notion that all places are constituted by unequal power relations (Massey 1993), and that the researcher's own social location is not static, but rather is produced through interactions across hierarchies of difference, which are themselves always social and spatial.²³

Because my research involved “mobile positioning” (Marcus 1998), I negotiated different relations of power depending on my engagements with subjects across intersecting hierarchies of race, class, gender, and national provenance. For example, Dominican academic colleagues were quick to point out that a Dominican graduate student would never have gained similar access to firms as I had, clearly based on my North American provenance and my racialization as white.²⁴ My North American-ness also raised suspicions. Managers and owners were well aware of, and highly sensitive to, criticisms of labor abuse in the garment industry. Moreover, the US labor movement had long supported Dominican union

federations in the latter's efforts to organize the industry. My own previous involvement in the North American anti-sweatshop movement heightened my awareness of these tensions. On three occasions, managers mused about the status of my research and whether or not I might be infiltrating their businesses to expose them to the US consuming public.²⁵ In time, I was able to gain more unsupervised access through my relationship with the engineers from the Textile Center, but managers' and owners' suspicions about my intentions never fully dissipated.

Several predicaments of my mobile positioning arose – with the industry association, on the one hand, and with lower-level engineers and workers, on the other – that contributed significantly to my understanding of the politics of export restructuring *and* those of a multi-sited study. After completing the study of garment firms, facilitated graciously by the trade zone association's director, I left the association and began to spend time in working-class neighborhoods near the zone. Every few weeks, I dropped by the association to maintain my relationship with the director. On one of these visits, I mentioned that I was interviewing unemployed workers about their livelihood strategies after garment work. Following that conversation, the director began calling me to request my support in recruiting unemployed workers to speak about their experience to the local and national press. These requests signaled the employer association's dilemma: garment owners in the region had been highly effective in squashing strong independent union formation. Atomized labor relations meant that no significant, legitimate organizations existed to represent workers' interests during the industry's dramatic restructuring, a moment when, in other contexts, strong unions with the capacity to mobilize their base could have bolstered owners' efforts to gain government support for the sector. I was candid with the director about why I would not facilitate contact with the ex-workers who were participating in my research, since I would be using my mobility to assist in the sector's lobbying efforts. My relationship with the director was distant thereafter, but the exchange helped me to understand the precariousness of owners' efforts to make broader social claims in support of the industry.

This example shows how the mobility between research sites and social locations can make the relationship of unequal power inherent in “participant observation” of any kind more acute. If we disentangle participation from observation, and from the attendant contradictions that the phrase “participant observer” too easily neutralizes as an academic norm, “participant observation” can also be understood as a kind of problematic waiver held by the researcher to accrue social debts that are, from the outset, insoluble within the space-time of research encounters. As James Clifford argues, “participant observation is a kind

of hermeneutic freedom to circle inside and outside social situations” (1997: 23). In a project that is multi-sited, the circulation between sites and social locations allows the researcher to defer these debts indefinitely. As in the case of the director’s unspoken assumption that I should assist in the association’s lobbying efforts in exchange for having facilitated my interviews with employers, other participants in my research contested my problematic waiver as well; in contrast to the director, these challenges came from their social positions of relative powerlessness. On many occasions, unemployed workers and engineers asked me to assist them in their (often transnational) strategies to find work, visas, and loans. These encounters demonstrated the incredible weakness of state-sponsored welfare to address Santiago’s employment crisis, and thus the centrality of constructing social networks of support – and especially networks that could link to the global North – in order to navigate the precarity that accompanied mass unemployment. In response, I worked closely with organic community and union leaders who had much experience at finding fixes in the context of scarce resources and limited institutional capacity.²⁶

In short, my efforts to forge a critical fieldwork practice were caught within persistent power differentials of knowledge production between North and South. This inequality is of course inseparable from the very relations of exploitation, exclusion, and livelihood spanning the global North and South that I explore in this book. Just as there can be no privileged outside to development discourses and progress narratives, so too can there be no escape from the relations of power that both structure the unequal production networks of the global economy *and* my efforts, as a researcher from the relatively more powerful consumer “end” of those networks, to destabilize them through my own displacement to sites of production and devaluation.

Chapter Outline

In the chapters that follow, I bring together stories of worker livelihood strategies, union struggles, labor process restructuring, and policy and planning to unsettle the development discourse produced by the global factory in order to recuperate a politics of uneven development. I begin with an analysis of how the apparel industry became the centerpiece of trade policy and development narratives in the circum-Caribbean in the late twentieth century (Chapter 2). The chapter explores the gaps and failures of development accounts, which attributed the mushrooming of export factories either to the inexorable forces of globalization or to the entrepreneurial spirit of a particular provincial elite. My discussion leads

into a feminist analysis of garment production restructuring in the Dominican Republic (Chapter 3). If the early garment boom relied upon low-wage feminized labor, I show how the subsequent reorganization of the industry mobilized gender to renew conditions of capitalist accumulation through the expulsion of feminized workers. I then turn from the factory floor to World Bank reports that interpreted these changes by revising the discourse of global production as development. This revised development narrative relied upon gender norms to rationalize the process of production restructuring – and labor devaluation – as a necessary stage in the country’s progress. Chapter 4 reconsiders the global factory through the lens of precariously employed Dominicans who must navigate the boundary between wage and non-wage work. I argue that former trade zone workers’ search for work in the wake of the garment industry’s employment collapse is inextricably linked to their strategies to forge positions of social worth in and through rural and urban gendered and racialized spaces.

If export restructuring in the Dominican Republic functioned largely through the retrenchment of workers, in Chapter 5 I discuss the efforts of a Dominican company and its US corporate and state sponsors to transform the island’s border area into a profitable margin for capital. The extreme uneven geographies between Haiti and the Dominican Republic created limits to this idealized “spatial fix” (Harvey 1999 [1982]), however; workers and managers cycled through these factories in search of opportunities that would allow them to reproduce their social positions and to meet their basic needs. In retrospect, border production represented a tenuous and small-scale attempt to reintroduce the global factory to Haiti. These efforts were radically scaled up in the wake of the country’s devastating 2010 earthquake, the subject of Chapter 6. Key continuities existed with the export manufacturing strategy that swept the country in the 1970s, while the contemporary reconstruction discourse invoked an emboldened security imperative that cast the global factory as necessary to contain Haitians as a “black threat.”

Several narratives of crisis run through these chapters and circulate widely in mainstream discourses of the Caribbean, from the sovereign debt crises of the early 1980s, which boosted the export manufacturing model, to the crisis narrative that justifies the global factory as a form of development in post-earthquake Haiti, to the relatively under-reported sovereign debt crises that have swept the Caribbean since the onset of the 2007–2008 financial meltdown sparked by the US housing market bubble. Chapter 7 reflects upon the pervasive trope of crisis in the Caribbean and argues that such dominant crisis events translate sociospatial change into sequential teleological narratives. Drawing on my fieldwork, Jamaica

Kincaid's poetic account of crisis, and contemporary reparations struggles in the Anglo-Caribbean, I offer three alternative framings of crisis that aim to unsettle Eurocentric temporalities of development and to cultivate solidarities around the political and ethical dimensions of uneven development. In the conclusion, I offer the reader some brief reflections on the implications of this text for our understanding of the role of labor in global production, variegated neoliberal regulation, and uneven development within and between countries of the global South.

Notes

- 1 See Bair and Werner (2011) for an extended critique of this issue, which we have called the "inclusionary bias" of global production network studies. In contrast, we develop the notion of disarticulations as the study of constitutive inclusions and exclusions that make up any given production network (see also Bair et al. 2013).
- 2 The global North/South distinction I use here signals the historical and present-day divisions of labor and wealth both globally and in the Americas, where rent and surplus extracted from south of the Rio Grande concentrate in and through centers of accumulation and finance in the United States, Europe, and increasingly, Canada. Nonetheless, as I argue below, these categories *do not presume* a fixed geography. Rather, at the heart of my inquiry is an exploration of the relational and on-going construction of North-South divides as we witness the acceleration of uneven development and the fractured sociospatial divisions that are constructed through this process (see also Mohanty 2003; Sheppard & Nagar 2004).
- 3 I provide numerous examples of how the global factory as discourse operates throughout the text with respect to the Caribbean. For an empirical treatment of the industrialization-as-development discourse in terms of income and wealth inequality, see Arrighi et al. (2003). The authors demonstrate the divergence in national incomes worldwide, despite an apparent convergence in the proportion of manufacturing activity. Their article was the subject of debate with Alice Amsden (2003).
- 4 Indexed to constant 1968 dollars (Pinto Moreira 2010). GDP is the sequentialist development indicator *par excellence*. I use it here to demonstrate how the comparative case between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is made, which I subsequently unravel below and throughout the text.
- 5 I return to this argument at length in Chapter 6.
- 6 Thus, for Diamond, the comparison serves to defend his work against those who would consider him to be an environmental determinist by showing how "the environment" (understood here as first nature, or nature as an exogenous backdrop to social processes) shared by the two countries did not determine their divergent development trajectories. Culture, instead, as homogeneous and relatively stagnant, takes nature's place (Sheppard 2011; see Holmes 2010 for a refutation of Diamond based upon his research

on Dominican conservation policy). And while “hispanidad” generally functions as the debased cultural “other” of anglo/protestant capitalism, in the relativist logics of this comparison, the Dominican Republic serves as the more rational capitalist actor. Beyond this specific example, as I explore below and in Chapter 2, such cultural comparisons are also racialized, since hispanidad is constructed as a form of whiteness.

- 7 I discuss the significance of this inaugural debt in the conclusion.
- 8 For a comparative review, see Martin et al. (2002).
- 9 Trouillot used these terms to characterize Caribbean societies and the problem they posed for an anthropology that sought “traditional” or “native” societies. The Caribbean, Trouillot wrote, “has long been multiracial, multilingual, stratified, and some would say, multicultural” (1992: 21). On the claim of modernity, Mintz provocatively argued that the Caribbean was the site of the first modern, industrial societies. By the seventeenth century, the region’s plantations were forward integrated enterprises that merged field and factory and coordinated a complex labor process that combined skilled, semiskilled and unskilled labor, free and slave, all regulated by a strict time clock (Mintz 1985; see also Williams 1994 [1944]).
- 10 In the English language, the radical work of André Gunder Frank (1967), and the more reformist approach of Cardoso and Faletto (1979 [1971]), are best known within this tradition. Numerous other scholars, however, such as Anibal Quijano, José Nun, Theotonio Dos Santos, Ruy Mauro Marini, and Celso Furtado carry as much or more weight in Latin America. Gunder Frank would later become closely associated with world-systems theory (see below) and the work of Immanuel Wallerstein following his exile from Chile after the 1973 coup against Allende. For a review of Latin American dependency thinking in English, see Kay (1989); for a discussion of the distortion of dependency thinking in English-language scholarship, see Slater (2004); on the distinctions between the Marxist dependency tradition and world-systems theory, see Sotelo Valencia (2005).
- 11 Specifically, world-systems theorists coined the term “commodity chain” as a “network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity” to describe the emergence and expansion of a worldwide division of labor dating from the end of the fifteenth century (Hopkins & Wallerstein 1986: 159; see Bair 2005).
- 12 In geography, see Dicken et al. (2001), Henderson et al. (2002), and Coe et al. (2004).
- 13 In the literature, the power exercised by lead firms over the chain is called firm governance (Gereffi 1994; see Gereffi et al. 2005 for a revised version of the concept). The possibility for firms to shift to higher value nodes is called upgrading (Gereffi 1999; Humphrey & Schmitz 2002). A firm may upgrade by, for example, increasing the range of activities that it performs for a client, or it may upgrade by increasing efficiency/lowering production costs in order to ensure continued orders from a lead firm that is benchmarking it against other suppliers. These core concepts are linked because the governance structure of a chain shapes the upgrading prospects of suppliers – a process that is by no means a guaranteed, or even likely,

outcome of participation in global production networks (Kaplinsky 2000). I am grateful to Jennifer Bair for her guidance through the intricacies of this literature.

- 14 Arrighi and Drangel, for example, explicitly sought to reinterpret uneven development through the workings of production networks, a theoretical project central to my own approach. The contemporary literature, from Gereffi onwards, has substituted the world-systems focus on uneven development for an inquiry into firm strategies to upgrade, conflating firm upgrading itself with development (see Werner et al. 2014). Geographers have contributed a partial corrective to firm-centered analysis by emphasizing regional development (e.g., Coe et al. 2004). This scholarship has largely focused on regional incorporation into production networks, however, thus largely ignoring the dynamic reproduction of uneven development in the contemporary global economy.
- 15 Federici more effectively demonstrates the centrality of gender to this process, a category that is tangential in Quijano's formulation. While Quijano's notion that coloniality shapes the distribution of the wage – centered upon Europe – is useful, the centrality of the wage and a singular notion of Europe is a significant weakness in his account. I am grateful to Massimiliano Tomba for pushing me on this point.
- 16 For an in-depth discussion of Quijano that situates his work within Latin American dependency/world-systems and postmodernism debates, and critically examines how Quijano's ideas have circulated in the Anglo-American academy, see Restrepo and Rojas (2010). One of their critiques of Quijano is his reduction of the notion of power to one of domination, marginalizing other notions of power that examine subject formation (e.g., hegemony and the role of consent in Gramscian-inspired formulations). In English, one example of a revised world-systems approach that troubles the notion of domination in post-emancipation societies is Michaeline Crichlow's *Globalization and the Post-Creole Imagination: Notes on Fleeing the Plantation* (2009). Below, and in Chapters 4 and 5, I disrupt the notion of coloniality as exclusively a relationship of domination through engagements with how current and former garment workers navigate coloniality and reshape its contours in particular ways.
- 17 The *encomienda* system granted Spanish colonists the right to extract labor and tribute from indigenous peoples, effectively producing populations that were “rightless and landless” (see Wynter 2003). For a powerful account of the shifting relations of production of banana workers in the twentieth century from full-time wage employees on banana plantations owned and controlled by US multinationals, through land reform and a period of production as independent producers, to precarious day laborers on contract farms selling to the modern-day incarnation of those same multinationals, see Striffler (2002).
- 18 Hall is worth quoting in full on this point: “One needs to know how different racial and ethnic groups were inserted historically, and the relations which have tended to erode and transform, or to preserve these distinctions

- through time – not simply as residues and traces of previous modes, but as active structuring principles of the present organization of society” (1980: 339). The specificity of formations of social difference is crucial in any study that addresses the particular articulation of racism and exploitation at work in Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Again, to follow Hall, we conflate racialized forms of labor devaluation in the Americas as “essentially the same” at great peril, especially if we read these forms as mere variations of US racism (see also Trouillot 1995).
- 19 In 2003, before the downturn, 9 out of 531 trade zone firms had collective agreements. At the time of my research, no collective agreement had ever been signed with a trade zone enterprise in the Cibao region. The unions that existed in the Santiago trade zone represented small groups of workers who often hid their affiliation for fear of management reprisal. Moreover, Dominican labor law permits the formation of multiple unions in a single enterprise, further dividing the workforce.
 - 20 Prior to closure, IA Manufacturing had at least four or, by one account, as many as nine registered unions.
 - 21 Recruitment into export factories via rural ties is a very common occurrence in many countries. Through my fieldwork, I found very specific *campo*–factory links. In one case, for example, the factory ran a direct bus on the weekend to and from a relatively remote *campo* located four hours away in the province of San Francisco de Macorís by direct bus, a trip that would have taken considerably longer if workers had had to rely on public transportation.
 - 22 My method is influenced by three kinds of scholarship: ethnographies of global connections in various disciplines, including Clifford (1997), Gregory (2007), and the work of Michael Burawoy (1998; Burawoy et al. 2000) and his elaboration of the extended case study method; ethnographies of production and regional formation, especially Chari (2004), Hart (2002), and Narotzky and Smith (2006); and feminist critics of the globalization literature who insist upon grounded studies of global industries that decenter masculinist conceptions of labor such as Freeman (2000), Silvey (2000), Wright (2006), Cravey (1998), Salzinger (2003), Ramamurthy (2011), and Collins (2003), as well as classic works in this field including Elson and Pearson (1981), Fernández-Kelly (1983), Ong (1987), and Wolf (1992).
 - 23 See Rich (2001 [1985]), Haraway (1991), Katz (1994), and Mohanty (2003); see also Freeman and Murdock (2001) for a review of this literature in studies of Latin America and the Caribbean.
 - 24 For example, in several interviews, owners and managers clearly presumed a kind of “white solidarity” in their candid, negative comments about East Asian garment investors, exacerbated by the emergence of China’s export capacity. If my racialization and provenance afforded me some limited access to garment managers and owners, my gender and youth often circumscribed the depth and quality of information shared by these largely male business elites.

- 25 Accusations of spying or covert sympathies either for labor or for the competition are not an uncommon part of fieldwork in export firms. See, for example, Carla Freeman's (2000) introduction and Wright (2001).
- 26 Recall, for example, Ambrosina's pledge to help her neighbor in Los Almácigos, Leidy, to get social security payments for her child who had been born while she was still entitled to this benefit through her job at IA Manufacturing.