

# Twenty-First Century Capitalism and Transnational Relations

In a world of entertainment media filled with consumer advertising, who does not know about iPhones, Coca-Cola, Budweiser, or the World of Warcraft and Guitar Hero? At the front end of the twenty-first century, media broadcasting and wireless messages relentlessly promote these and other must-have consumer goods. Yet, how many happy consumers know that Apple uses poisonous chemicals in its Chinese manufacturing plants (Walters, 2012)? Know that Coke depletes ground water aquifers in Rajasthan, India, threatening agriculture and the lives of thousands of farmers (Indian farmers, 2008)? Which coffee drinker is aware that a German equity firm bought Caribou Coffee to close down 80 stores in the Midwest? Do beer drinkers taste the added water in their Budweiser, put there as part of a profit strategy by the Brazilian CEO of the company's Dutch owners? Do gamers linked on-line in the World of Warcraft or Call of Duty find irony in a French firm producing and marketing those military games even as French citizens protest real military action in the Mideast? Most likely, few consumers are aware of the investment, production, and marketing campaigns of the corporations responsible for the personal goods and services of daily life.

Even fewer know that making possible the slick advertisements and the immediate gratification of these and similar consumer products are thousands of workers around the world, some making as little as 21 cents an hour. Women and children work 12 hour days in firetraps for Disney, Sears, WalMart, and Sean Combs in Bangladesh (Hart, 2012). Likewise, workers for Apple's iPhone and iPad Chinese supplier are

forced to work in unsafe factories under inhumane conditions (Qiang, 2013). While major media tout competitive free market globalization as the way to improve the quality of life for all, major transnational corporations (TNCs) pursue an eternal fight for greater profits as global poverty and inequality worsen (Chossudovsky, 1997). Worldwide viewers have seen *Yo soy Betty, la fea* (*Ugly Betty*), the telenovela by Fernando Gaitan, that has been translated into 13 languages and broadcast in 74 countries (Kraul, 2006). Few know that Colombian media success is partly driven by the low-cost, non-union labor of creators, producers, and technicians working under repressive anti-labor laws. We watch. We enjoy. We buy.

Knowledge of and attraction to consumer goods result from global entertainment media that extol the “myth of consumer agency to convince consumers that they are empowered by what they consume” (Galbraith & Karlin, 2012, p. 25). These are the same transnational media corporations (TNMCs) that do not inform us about the conditions of production or the social and environmental consequences of our consumerist lifestyles. Entertainment for profit, the norm for all capitalist media, does not encourage news and information for the common good. Advertising-driven entertainment wed to codes and conventions of mundane formats does not even meet elementary levels of artistic creativity. This is not a question of high or low culture, but a recognition of the structural constraints on access to cultural production and creativity by all. In the interests of democracy and an informed global citizenry that deserves access to the creative use of media, this book investigates how entertainment media contribute to the globalization of capitalism and the creation of a global consumer culture.

The world is undergoing dramatic changes in the organization of production, trade, communication, and culture. Because these changes seem to be occurring everywhere, globalization has become the catchword to describe various dimensions of a dynamic, complex process. In popular and academic literature, globalization has been used to explain “a process, a condition, a system, a force, and an age” (Steger, 2005, p. 7). In fact, enough has been written about globalization to fill a small library (see Ritzer, 2009). This book will not attempt to review or unearth the lineages or contours of the ongoing conversations on globalization. However, the many competing and sometimes contradictory versions of what globalization involves should not obscure its existence or its consequence.

## **Capitalism and Social Class**

Scholars in International Political Economy and world systems theory have identified and documented the development of transnational corporations (TNCs) led by an emerging transnational capitalist class (TNCC) (van der Pijl, 1998; Sklair, 2001; Robinson, 2004; Carroll et al., 2010). To make sense of these discoveries and put them into meaningful context for understanding global entertainment media, which also is an industry mass producing standardized cultural goods (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2007), this chapter reflects on capitalism, social class, and class formation. Entertainment media are integral to almost all social, cultural, and political activities of society (Golding & Murdock, 1991, pp. 17–22; Artz, 2006, pp. 14–23).

Capitalism is a social system in which resources and the means of production are privately owned. Capitalism, as a social system based on the creation of private profit from production by wage labor, requires the constant expansion of production and consumption. Capitalism's ceaseless drive for profits leads to a never-ending search for resources and markets. In the late nineteenth century, many advanced industries, having reached the limits of expansion within their own national boundaries, turned to other regions for resources and markets. Competition and conflict led to two world wars among emerging imperialist powers. The industrial expansion of capitalism following WWII was complemented by a renewed search for more resources and markets in the developing world. Still, capitalism has not escaped the recurring contradiction of overproduction – more goods and services are produced than the working and middle classes can purchase, even with extended credit. Consequently, capitalists continue their quest for more consumer markets, even as they continue the onslaught on wages and social welfare. Since the 1970s, leading sections of the capitalist class found the international integration of national production to be appealing and ultimately more profitable: outsourcing, off-shore production, subcontracting, and decentralization of production for local markets brought increased profits by decreasing labor and transportation costs. In the United States, employment declined, job security and wages went down, while work hours increased and production became more regimented. This new global system of production and distribution has led to new social relations and a global capitalist class.

## **Production and Class Formations**

All societies have used natural resources like wood, metal, water, and agricultural products from nature and developed by humans, but as long as the raw materials remain in the ground or standing in the forest, as long as the fruits and vegetables remain on the trees or vines or in the ground, they are useless. It takes human labor to transform natural resources into usable goods (a fact obscured by advertising and the consumer culture, from Nike and Budweiser to Honda, Disney, and McDonald's). A variety of techniques and practices to sustain human life have been used over the thousands of years of our existence. In expropriating nature and the production of goods and services, men and women have entered into social relations reflecting the organization of productive activities. All productive practices include and reproduce particular social relations – practices and relations, even when contradictory, are organically interconnected. Societies have arisen through this combination of production and social relations in a multitude of ways, from primitive communism, feudalism, chattel slavery, capitalism, colonialism, and socialism to name the more well-known. In the twenty-first century, transnational corporations have instituted new productive activities from joint venture investment relations to integrated decentralized production chains and standardized distribution methods. Transnational corporations comprise new social class formations (integrating capital classes across national borders) and new global social relations (the de-industrialization of developed countries and the rapid industrialization and consumerization of developing nations), including the remarkable transformation of social classes – peasant and farmers have become repositioned as agricultural and industrial workers at the rate of 50 million per year (Kalb, 2011, p. 2), although many will become casual or unemployed workers. In 2012, as corporate media rhapsodized about the economic recovery, more than 200 million were out of work.

Capitalism is a social system in which resources and the means of production are privately owned and operated for individual profit, not necessarily for social use or the common good. Capitalism requires labor power to obtain the natural resources and put the machinery in motion for production. Wagerworkers are paid for their labor time and skill, but not the total value of their work. The commodities produced are sold on the market, but workers are paid less than the value of what they produce. Capitalist profits come from this sleight of hand. Capitalists keep the difference

between the value of the commodity and the price of labor, including the labor necessary for manufacturing machines and transporting materials. The value of labor appears in Wall Street business reports as labor productivity – expressed as the value produced by one hour of work. After factoring in the costs of material, machinery, and transportation – all costs dependent on labor, as well – the difference between the hourly wage and labor productivity is the hourly profit appropriated by the corporate owners. Workers are paid for their labor time and skill, but not their productivity. This understanding makes abundantly clear why corporations would strategically become transnational: by moving production to low-wage countries, the value of the commodities remains about the same in the international market, but the cost of labor is significantly lower, providing increased profits on all goods sold (International Labor Organization, 2013; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012).

Transnational corporate relations are necessary if firms hope to maximize local economic, political, and cultural benefits. Thus, international and multinational corporations “merge” with national or other multinational firms, increasing access to local labor and markets, and usually defeating national competitors in the process. Machinery, technology, and skill embodied in machines and technology, through science, invention, and innovation improve the efficient use of labor power. National firms often willingly integrate into transnational firms to have access to capital and the latest technology and technique – or face failure given superior capitalist operations. Modern capitalism organizes the immense productive capacity of international wage labor with the latest technology and machinery available. In striving for increased labor productivity, businesses now even use technology to monitor employee behavior, enforcing a work regime of stricter productivity (Semuels, 2013). Not technology for democracy. Technology to improve profit. Technology to extract more from labor.

The social relations of production of capitalism are not as advanced, progressive, or socially egalitarian as the productive capacity and the means of production would allow. Production is highly socialized: the labor process is collectively organized with an extensive division of labor, increasingly on a global scale. For the most part, individuals do not sew their own clothing, grow their own food, or build their own furniture. Instead, to meet the needs and desires of society, clothes, cereal, sofas, music, and most other socially useful goods are mass produced by tens of thousands of working people – albeit contained in privately owned enterprises. Individuals with many different skills perform many different tasks: discovery, design,

extraction, transport, manual labor, skilled machining, assembly, packaging, quality control inspection, and machinery maintenance. This is a social process. Producers are “not simply individual workers, side-by-side, in a given enterprise,” but workers who “have been made into a real ‘collective’ worker by the division and organization of labor” (Jalée, 1977, p. 12) and by the production of commodities to be sold for profit. Commodities are produced for exchange, for profit; their use or social need is incidental although complex social interactions are needed to produce even the most incidental commodity.

In the globalized capitalist system component operations occur in multiple sites of production, such that even the smallest item destined for mass consumption requires a highly socialized, coordinated collective effort. A typical cell phone, for example, is manufactured from diverse natural resources and synthetic materials, including oil, metal, plastic, silicone, quartz, copper, gold, coltan, and other materials – each having complex extractive, refining, manufacturing, and development processes, as well as a number of levels of design, development, and transportation. The little 2”×4” media device represents the combined creative and productive efforts of millions.

## **The Contradictions of Capitalist Social Relations**

In contrast to the highly socialized and collective activity of production, neither the actual producers of goods nor citizens as a whole direct or decide the goals and practices of production. Instead the means of production – from raw materials to machinery and technology, from factories to ships and railroads, from oil and oil rigs to tankers – are privately owned, operated, and managed for individual private profit. Tens of thousands of workers participate in the actual transformation of nature and production of material goods, but the decisions on when and how to use those resources, the costs (including environmental and human consequences), and profits resulting from the collective human effort are all siphoned off by a very few. In other words, production is socialized, but decisions and profits are privatized under corporate control. As capitalism becomes increasingly transnational, the capitalist class improves its coordination and communication, while initially the growing transnational working class remains divided geographically, linguistically, culturally, and politically. Consequently, the benefits from the collective knowledge and efforts of humanity are even more unevenly distributed among social groups and

individuals – even in advanced capitalist countries. The income gap in the United States is the highest since the Great Depression. According to a 2013 Associated Press survey, “four out of five U.S. adults struggle with joblessness, near-poverty or reliance on welfare” (Yen, 2013). As pensions are reduced and other social services slashed, shoplifting by senior citizens in Japan has doubled since 2002 (Nohara & Sharp, 2013). Yet, the world’s top 240 billionaires have four times enough wealth to end global poverty for all of humanity (Oxfam, 2013). There’s a concept for a children’s story about morals! Two hundred hoard wealth, while millions have no food. As transnational activity gathers steam, poverty and inequality continue to set new historic proportions.

The combination of advanced productive forces and private ownership of the means of production contributes to social relations that require millions of workers and managers, who own no productive resources beyond their own labor, to sell their labor power to capitalist owners in order to live. On one side, with some 90% of the world’s population, we have workers (including laborers, machine operators, technicians, engineers, clerks, and more) without whom no production would be possible, struggling to maximize their wages and salaries, often by working more hours or more jobs. On the other side, there are capitalists – in Occupied Wall Street terms, “the 1%” who own the means of production – seeking maximum profits from their machinery and property by increasing the productivity of the labor power they employ, either by lowering wages or increasing efficient production practices. These contradictory relations are not relations between individuals per se, but are social relations between classes of individuals linked to each other by an insurmountable contradiction between private ownership of the means of production and the highly collective, social nature of production.

These two disparate social classes appear as separate groups defined by their relation to the means of production. The capitalist class owns the means of production but does not use the machinery or technologies. The working class does not own the means of production, but does all the work. Labor gives material expression to production by physically using tools, machinery, and mental and manual labor on raw materials and technology. In terms of production, the working class owns only its labor power, which must be sold to the capitalist for a wage, whereas the capitalist depends on the worker to create goods at a wage below its value, so goods may be sold for profit. Other classes can be identified according to their relationship to the means of production. Middle class managers are excluded from

ownership of the means of production and as administrators are generally excluded from actually using the means of production; instead their social position is one of organizing the production process, including directing workers, solely to maximize the profits for the capitalists. In return, managers receive salaries (drawn from the profits generated by labor productivity).

These broad categories are crude outlines. More specific class groupings can be identified in each larger social structure (Wright, 1985). There are obviously multiple and complex differences within and between classes and sections of classes and in different conjunctural moments in different capitalist countries. Nonetheless, defining social class according to its relation to the means of production and its position in the productive process provides an analytical lens for understanding the character and significance of transnational capitalism and global entertainment media and helps make sense of contemporary economic, social, political, and cultural conditions.

Let's be as radical as reality: capitalism causes hunger. Although there are currently 1 billion hungry people in the world, there has long been enough global food production to feed everyone (Sadik, 1991). There are enough resources to feed everyone in the world, but shareholders refuse: corporate profits would dramatically shrink. Shareholder rights trump human rights. The technology for solar, wind, and geothermal power and increased public transportation are readily available, but corporate profits from fossil fuel production would decline. The structures of modern capitalism, including its state formation, preclude many rational, democratic decisions and practices. Of course, structurally situated classes do not completely explain or predict all social relations or social upheavals. Structures don't act; people do.

Transnational production also brings together a powerful, consolidated transnational capitalist class and a numerically immense, but (for now) politically disoriented, transnational working class. By 2018, developed countries' production will account for less than half of the world's production (Chance, 2013). Transnational production structurally undermines the economic power of the working class in the developed world – deindustrialization reduces the economic weight and political power of the working class in the United States and Europe. Cross-border production and control over resources permits the transnational capitalist classes to short-circuit working class activity, as labor everywhere is subjected to competitive “best practices,” anti-labor laws, and privatized for-profit social services. Resistance by labor in one region can be muted by moving production

elsewhere – avoiding confrontation while effectively undermining working class economic and political demands within each single nation. In some countries, national chauvinism, fostered by domestic conservative politicians, politically interferes with working class cross-border coordination (Kalb & Halmay, 2011). Meanwhile, new centers of industrial production, particularly in East Asia, are quickly forming new working classes. By 2002, China had twice as many industrial employees as all the G7 developed countries combined (Banister, 2005).

From this brief account we can draw three conclusions useful for understanding the development of transnational capitalist activity. First, the social organization of the means of production provides a useful approach for identifying the formation of social classes. Secondly, based on their relationship to the means of production and to other classes, social classes have varying degrees and kinds of power. Finally, the political power and socio-cultural impact of each class depend on the outcome of its interactions (battles, alliances, negotiations) with other classes and its ability to articulate and popularize an ideological-cultural project that appeals to other important social forces and classes. Each conclusion helps explain the appearance and impact of transnational capitalism and the formation of a transnational capitalist class, including its transnational media.

## **Transnational Capitalism**

Corporations have long sought access to valuable natural resources and consumer markets around the world, while Western media have exported entertainment promoting Western cultural norms (Schiller, 1976), but transnational corporations are new phenomena. Transnational corporations are distinguished from international or multinational corporations by their relations of production. An *international* corporation does business across national borders by selling products produced in one nation to consumers in another (e.g., Warner Bros. exports Hollywood productions to Europe). *Multinational* corporations are owned and based in one nation, but a multinational also owns subsidiaries in another nation. The subsidiary produces commodities in and for the other national market. Ownership, control, and profits of the subsidiary, however, remain with the national parent corporation (e.g., CNN-Europe produces news in several countries, but production decisions and profits remit to Time Warner in the United States). In both instances, the capitalist class structure provides more

material and political resources to the dominant national capitalist class than to subordinate working classes. The relative benefit that international and multinational corporations hold compared to the productivity of their own domestic working classes ultimately proves insufficient for increasing profits. Sales cannot keep pace with costs; prevailing wages cannot sustain consumer-driven demand. Even where labor activism secured improved working class benefits in wages and working conditions, global overproduction plagued multinational operations. Because capitalism needs unending growth, corporations seek increased labor productivity with decreased labor benefits at home (through Reagan- and Thatcher-era attacks on labor) and an increased expansion of markets for an overabundance of commodities.

By the end of the twentieth century, globally active companies were developing new systems and relations of production to increase profits by increasing consumption and exerting additional downward pressure on wages. Distinct from nationally based firms, these transnational corporations and industries operate across borders as part of internationally integrated production regimes. *Transnational* corporations are owned by multiple companies from two or more nations producing and distributing products as “local” commodities in each nation and sharing profits among the multiple national owners (e.g., Reliance India buys 50% of DreamWorks and enters into a joint venture with Chinese filmmakers to produce movies for all three markets; Szalai, 2012). Transnationals declare, “We are not multi-national, we are multi-local” (as cited in Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 90). Mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and foreign direct investments (FDI – investments by one company in a company based in another country) have blurred the national identity of many transnational firms that enlist local labor to make local products. The tally by the United Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development reports over 78,000 transnational companies (UNCTAD, 2008).

Transnational corporations have no national home per se and certainly no national allegiance. Their only allegiance is to capitalist shareholders from the two or more nations seeking profits from commodities produced and sold in multiple nations. Philosophically and amorally, corporations have no obligation to make art, history, or any social contribution; “to make money is our only objective,” according to former Disney CEO Michael Eisner (as quoted in Sun, 2001). As Thomas Middelhoff, chairman of Bertelsmann, remarked when his German company took over US-based Random House in 1998, “There are no German and American companies.

There are only successful and unsuccessful companies” (as cited in Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 35). Transnational firms do not override national or cultural boundaries; they depend on and exploit national characteristics of the appropriate national class for operation in that country. The transnational capitalist class “seeks to accumulate profit on a global scale and ... has no particular interest in destroying or sustaining local cultures apart from the drive for increased profitability” (Sklair, 2001, p. 256).

In the twenty-first century, capitalism has become the first truly world system: capitalism has not only finally displaced all precapitalist formations, it has also completed the commodification of every meaningful instance of social life, replacing nation-state public institutions and responsibilities with privatized, for-profit operations across the board – from natural resources such as land and water to social necessities such as education and health care (Robinson, 2004). By the 1990s, the volume of off-shore production by TNCs exceeded the amount of trade between states (Miller et al., 2008, p. 113). A key ingredient and outcome – not the cause – of this restructuring of capitalism has been the transnationalization of corporate media and its commercial-entertainment-consumerist model of communication (Artz, 2003, 2007; Rantanen, 2005).

## **The Transnational Corporate World**

Transnational production is not some new “Western” business tactic, some neo-imperialist strategy of US companies. Rather, transnationalism results from the logic of national capitalist expansions that have reached global dimensions. Social contradictions are inherent to capitalist social relations; crises provide factual proof. But contradictions and crises may also lead to change (Fuchs, 2013, p. 295) and frequently class struggles over resources. In the midst of each crisis which impacts countries, industries, and individual corporations unequally, all corporations desperately seek out new, more efficient means for securing profits, methods, and relations that could lower wages and increase profits, while still trying to maintain some social equilibrium between classes. The impulse towards a pan-Asian film industry “is not just good business, but simple survival ... [I]ntegration with and assimilation into the Asian and mainland Chinese market is unavoidable” if any national filmmaker expects to remain viable (Davis & Yeh, 2008, p. 93). Hong Kong-based Applause Pictures, for example, invests in films in Korea, China, Japan, Thailand, and other countries with

co-productions using location shooting, multinational talent, and low-budget crews. In general, capitalists can fracture social relations within their national territories by entering production and distribution markets abroad, simultaneously creating profits from lower costs and enforcing lower social expectations at home. Consequently, by the 1980s, forward-thinking capitalists began moving capital and production across national borders as a means to expand their markets and improve their profits, handicapping working classes at home. National interests restrict their operations; globalizing capitalists become cosmopolitan transnationalists.

For capitalism, “every limit appears as a barrier to overcome” (Marx, 1973, p. 408), including ecological limits, national welfare systems, public services, and national boundaries. Transnationals from the North and South pool their capital around the world in enterprises that are connected with “a myriad of other firms: transnational and domestic, large and small, public and private ... a bewildering variety of interorganizational collaborative relationships” (Dicken, 2003, p. 223). In fact, “it is increasingly difficult to separate local circuits of production and distribution from the globalized circuits that dictate the terms and patterns of accumulation worldwide, even when surface appearance gives the (misleading) impression that local capitals retain their autonomy. There are of course still local and national capitals, and there will be for a long time to come. But they must ‘de-localize’ and link to hegemonic transnational capital if they are to survive” (Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 38). Some corporations merge across borders, combining two national companies into one transnational enterprise. In other cases, one national company or TNC acquires another national company, bringing local social forces into the transnational process while circumventing regulations on foreign ownership.

Transnational capitalism engulfs the world through a wide variety of economic practices now quite familiar: subcontracting, outsourcing, licensing, co-productions, along with increased joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions, and FDI, including through private equity firms – all indicating the increased linkage of national capital into transnational operations. In their study of 37 million companies and investors worldwide, Andy Coghlan and Debora MacKenzie (2011) mapped which companies “interlock” with others through shared investments and directors. The web of ownership revealed a core of 1, 318 companies that owned roughly 80% of global revenues of the TNCs. “Often, cooperation between [TNC] corporations allow them to ... collectively dominate the entire market” (Marshall, 2012), through their multiple national brands and multiple transnational operations.

Rob Van Tulder and Alex van der Zwart (2005) note that most industries have become concentrated globally among a handful of TNCs. In telecommunications, the top 10 companies control 86% of the global market, while just three global news agencies (Reuters, Associated Press, and Agence France-Presse) dominate global information.

Consider American icons Heinz and Burger King, both now owned by Brazilian private equity firm, 3G Capital Management. Heinz still owns food manufacturer Glaxo India and has joint ventures with Getz foods in the Philippines and Sangan Foods in China to sell Heinz ketchup and other products. IBM ThinkPad? That's owned by Chinese-led transnational Lenovo. The AMC Entertainment cinema chain? Chinese, again. Smithfield, the largest pork producer in the world? Chinese. Sara Lee? Now a subsidiary of Mexico's transnational food giant, Grupo Bimbo. Tata Motors of India owns Jaguar and Land Rover.

European-led transnationals already share ownership in many "American" name brands: Gerber, Holiday Inn, Alka-Seltzer, Ray-Ban, LensCrafters, Lysol, Woolite, Motel 6, Trader Joe's, and many more. Even *American Idol* is owned by Bertelsmann, a German transnational media company. Bertelsmann's RTL division, Fremantle Media, also distributes Colombia's Radio Cadena Nacional (RCN) telenovela *Yo soy Betty, la fea* across Europe, while Chinese networks purchase Televisa's Mexican version, *La fea mas bella*, which includes marketing guidelines (McCabe, 2013). Lufthansa looks to an alliance with Turkish Airlines as an option to compete with Qatar Airways and Emirates Airlines for long-distance travelers to Asia.

In media and culture, accelerated transnational production and distribution flows "have made it difficult, and possibly insignificant, to specify the original source of transnationally circulated cultural products" (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 19). Baseball is indigenous to the Dominican Republic; *Donald Duck and Friends* is considered a national television tradition in Sweden; Tokyo youth believe KFC is Japanese. National and local cultures are inundated with transnational production. Unless one investigates closely, the relations are often unrecognized and unrecognizable.

### **Pockets of Micro Transnationalism**

Pockets of secondary activity may at first glance appear to be outside of transnational circuits or be idealistically conceived as alternatives to TNC relations, but on further review indicate their connections to the

transnational order. Bangladeshi small-business women renting cell phones for income, Moroccan women using websites to market their carpets and pottery, and diasporic media selling commodities to their dispersed cultural communities appear as examples of creativity and diversity available to small-scale media projects (Srebreny, 2009, p. 51). Yet, each of these practices work within and support the market universe, less as alternative media and much more as micro-instances of market values and capitalist norms. These micro-entrepreneurs willingly accept the tenets of capitalism and class inequality. As if only other poor women were more entrepreneurial, poverty could be averted and the market would solve all individual problems!

### Nollywood and Transnational Alliances

Several scholars (Miller, 2012; Larkin, 2008; Marston, Woodward, & Jones, 2007) have argued that Nollywood, the Nigerian video film industry, represents an alternative global network of production, now the second largest film industry in the world after India in terms of number of films. Because ethnically diverse productions are made quickly, at low cost, and informally with distribution primarily pirated and unlicensed, Nigerian video is seen as an alternative to transnational production. For \$15,000 a typical Nigerian video can be filmed on location and then sold in small markets or appear on two UK television channels (Orgeret, 2009).

Nigerian videomakers and sales people illustrate the attraction of the global capitalist system that has been invited to a remote corner of global media entertainment. Nollywood “thrives” as a low-cost, low-profit, pirate capitalism in those “markets” that have little purchasing power, yet it is governed by the same industrial logic: actors and writers are low-wage workers creating commodities that bring profits to producers and marketers operating in a low-income environment. A warren of small business owners create their inventory (second- and third-hand) from reproductions and create their own markets from those unable to afford first-hand merchandise, not unlike the pirate export markets of India’s Bollywood in “the niche markets of South Asian migrants ...

too small to be of interest to mainstream distributors” (Athique, 2008, p. 705).

Nollywood, pirated Bollywood, and other “alternative” market endeavors are essentially “low value scraps from the main banquet” of capitalism (Keane, 2006, p. 844). As these micro-markets are exposed to a diet of pirate videos, they emulate the larger mass market. As they raise global awareness of their creativity, they attract transnational finance and partners. Piracy, marginalism, and alternative niche practices have never been an impediment to capitalism. Piracy and local practices are not even truly alternatives to transnationalism; they assist and legitimize capitalist practices (O’Regan, 1991). In India, video reproduction had a similar cachet to Nollywood’s rough-and-tumble entrepreneurship, but eventually followed a trajectory from piracy to regulated legitimacy as pirates, producers, and businesses collaborated whenever markets and profits warranted. Disney invested in Yash Raj Films in India, once the market (built by piracy) proved sizable enough to generate profits.

Today, in Lagos, Nigeria, “in the heart of these alternative networks, there seems to be a general sense ... that the international” model is preferred (Miller, 2012, pp. 121–122). They may yet be linked to transnational media, but they want to be. This “alternative” business model is one step up from resale thrift shops, pawnshops, and yard sales seen in low-income communities across most developed countries.

Nollywood and other networked local productions and alternative distributors (from fair trade coffee coops to Angie’s List and Napster) do not stand apart from transnational capital – they prosper (relatively speaking) on the margins of capitalist exchange, serving up commodities to those unable to partake in the richer consumer culture. Creatively, Nollywood labors on the edges of larger media markets, much like independent record labels and garage bands do; most flounder, many fail, a few find critical acclaim (e.g., Facets Cinematheque African Diaspora Film Festival in Chicago) and corporate suitors who offer contracts.

Since 2003, the transnational media firm Naspers has been broadcasting Nigerian films to 47 African countries over AfricaMagic, a

continent-wide satellite station. Naspers has added AfricaMagic Yoruba and AfricaMagic Hausa to broadcast in those languages to Nigeria and neighboring countries (Adejunmobi, 2011). Nollywood's manufacture of thousands of films each year contributes to the transnational media system by nurturing the culture of movie watching to wider audiences, making it affordable to African working class diasporas, and bearing all of the risks and costs. If Nollywood films raise a sizable and desirable demographic, regional and transnational media selectively appropriate any creativity diversity that can turn a profit. As Naspers or other TNMCs find local co-producers and lower subscription costs, they will "have successfully placed [themselves] in a position to dictate trends for television programming in some Nigerian languages as well as determining the acceptable format for films in these languages and in English" (Adejunmobi, 2011, p. 76). Why would Nollywood producers refuse? They are, after all, small capitalist operators. By 2010 more profits came from selling videos to AfricaMagic than from selling DVDs in any "alternative" market (Nwachukwa & Njoku, 2010).

Even economic crises do not deter transnational corporate expansion. On the contrary, each shock from Mexico to Asia, from Greece to Spain to Cyprus has accelerated transnational integration of surviving local capitalists in affected countries into the ranks of TNCs. In 1998, following the East Asian economic crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required South Korea to "liberalize" its economy in return for a \$58 billion loan. More than half the largest *chaebols* (traditional family-run and state-supported monopolies) were privatized and Korea now allows TNC investment and majority ownership, bringing sections of the Korean capitalist class into the transnational circuit. In Europe, although national networks persist, "the tendency is towards interlocking at the transnational European level" (Carroll et al., 2010, p. 175). The transnational consolidation of corporate Europe followed the 1980 recession, advanced in East Asia with the 1997 crisis, and in the United States after the dot-com bubble of 2001 (Carroll, 2010, p. 176) and continues apace globally since the 2008 world financial crisis. In the midst of that recession, transnational investors acquired \$38 billion in electricity, telecommunications, and other formerly public utilities (Kikeri & Perault, 2010).

## Quantifying Transnational Production

Transnational production is not some analytical or ideological concoction; it can be quantified. In 2003, UNCTAD began reporting a “transnational” index or TNI, which expresses the ratio of the value of corporate foreign to total assets, annual sales, and number of employees. The TNI gives a good indication of the extent to which an enterprise accumulates profits and capital transnationally as opposed to “home” market (UNCTAD, 2011). General Electric, a “US-based” corporation, holds more assets abroad than any non-financial firm in the world – over \$500 billion in 2010 – with a TNI of 59.7% – meaning that over half of GE’s wealth is held and created globally. Other 2011 examples from the 100 TNCs with sizable TNIs include: Vodafone (90.2%); Honda (70.7%); BP (83.8%); Nestlé (96.9%); Philips Electronics (87.7%). In 2004, only a very few of the top 100 TNCs had low TNIs. Chrysler (29%), Wal-Mart (24%), and Verizon (6%) made profits primarily in their domestic market. By 2011, Verizon was off the list, reflecting its almost exclusively national operation, but Wal-Mart expanded globally (35.1% TNI) and after Fiat purchased more than 60% of Chrysler, Chrysler-Fiat became a major TNC operating in multiple countries (76.4% TNI). By 2012, transnational production was even more prominent in world business: some 80,000 TNCs (compared with 40,000 in 1995) made \$1.5 trillion in FDI, while holding more than \$12.3 trillion in assets, and \$28 trillion in sales. TNCs are now responsible for 40% of world GDP (UNCTAD, 2012), compared to less than 33% in 1995. By 2000, Viacom’s Paramount studio had close to 50% of its sales in international markets (Havens, 2006, p. 48), a ratio not uncommon for other leading film producers, even without considering their extensive co-productions and joint ventures with other media firms.

Empirical evidence of FDI, cross-national mergers, strategic alliances, joint ventures, and interlocking directorships confirms the continued spread of TNCs. UNCTAD (2012) reported an increase in FDI to a record \$684 billion in developing countries alone – more than twice the world FDI in 1995. TNCs employed more than 69 million workers, generating over \$28 trillion in sales. In 2012, transnational mergers increased 53% to \$526 billion. Capitalist production is continually being transformed from national capital to transnational capital. Meanwhile, existing TNCs are becoming even more transnational. Of the top 100 transnational companies, 17 have more than 90% of their assets in multiple countries. Sixty-two of the top 100 TNCs have a transnational index over 50%, compared to only 42 with 50% TNI in 1995.

## Grupo Planeta

Even a little-known company like Grupo Planeta, headquartered in Spain's Catalan region, is transnational. Grupo Planeta, through its aggressive merger and joint venture strategies, has become the seventh largest firm in global publishing. Grupo Planeta has more than 70 worldwide newspaper and print subsidiaries/mergers, including in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. The group owns Editis (the second largest publisher in France), has joint ventures in film, documentary, and children's programming in Europe, including an alliance with EM.TV AG in Germany, and has diversified into non-media partnerships such as Vueling Airlines, which offers cheap European flights (Szalvai, 2012).

## Consolidation and Competition

While transnational capitalism consolidates, national and transnational competition remains. National capitalists compete within one nation, while transnational capitalists compete for resources and markets within many nations against national capitalists and against other transnational capitalists. Chrysler-Fiat, for example, competes with Ford and Fiat for customers in the United States. GM, in a 50-50 joint venture with Shanghai Auto Industry Group (SAIC) of China, competes for customers with Wuling (34% GM owned) in China, while Wuling also exports cars to Europe competing for customers against Chrysler-Fiat, Fiat, GM, Peugeot (7% GM), and other automakers. In 2011, GM/SAIC sold more cars in China (2,547,000), than GM sold in the United States (2,504,000). Meanwhile, Chrysler-Fiat entered a joint venture with Tata motors in India and Chery Motors in China ... Even if we believe corporations are individuals, where exactly is the national home of Chrysler, Fiat, GM, Wuling, SAIC? Similar structures and transnational production and distribution patterns mark other industries, from mining, oil, and machinery, to financial, chemical, pharmaceutical, electronics, and telecommunications (Phillips & Soeiro, 2012). Transnational production occurs in multiple nations, distribution and sales occur within the nation of production competing with "foreign" imports, while ownership is held among multiple capitalist financial interests and profits are shared among transnational owners, investors, and shareholders.

Different approaches by national regulators require a continuous churning of transnational negotiations across borders: Hyundai Motors maintains subsidiaries in Brazil, the United States, and India (from where it also exports), but to establish local production and sales in Turkey (Kibar), Egypt (Ghabbar), China (Beijing Auto), and elsewhere, Hyundai co-produces, co-owns, and shares profits. In other words, globalization of finance and trade does not specify each transnational relation: micro-economic integration of capitalist classes across national borders determines the configuration of new social relations of production.

The key process is the globalization of production – the decentralization of production chains and the worldwide dispersal of different productive segments of these chains as a coordinated, integrated capitalist practice. Flexible, part-time, and temporary labor result from transnationals traversing borders for low wages and limited benefits, pitting workers against unknown and unseen others, gutting the solidarity that arises from social interaction over time among collaborative, stable workforces. In the process, transnational capitalism has molded a disjoint global working class having fewer national distinctions and more social class similarities in their lived experience in a transnational environment – what Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye (2004) call a new international division of labor. Thus, globalization of capitalism has not ended center-periphery inequalities; it has spread those inequalities across borders. The wealthy in Beijing or Rio are arguably part of the developed “Global North” nations, while the unemployed working class in Gary, Indiana or Youngstown, Ohio have been pushed into a lifestyle formerly considered part of the developing “Global South” world.

The vast majority of U.S. workers, however devoted and skilled at their jobs, have missed out on the windfalls of this winner-take-most economy – or worse, found their savings, employers, or professions ravaged by the same [transnational] forces that have enriched the plutocratic elite ... 65 percent of income growth in the United States went to the top one percent of the population. (Freeland, 2011)

The United Nations’ *Human Development Report* places the United States at the bottom of the human poverty index for the leading 17 industrialized countries (Kirby, 2004, p. 212). It seems the new mantra of entrepreneurship, creative work, and freedom for flexible labor is actually a chant of crass disregard for the majority of working class families in the *überland* of capitalism.

## **The Transnational Capitalist Class**

The global restructuring of production has led to new social class formations, including an emerging transnational capitalist class. The transnational capitalist class (TNCC) is that group of people who share a common relationship to the process of social production and reproduction that is structured and practiced across national borders. The TNCC has “identifiable actors working through institutions they own and/or control” (Sklair, 2001, p. 1). Transnational capitalists share ownership of the dominant means of production in the world, integrated cross-border ownership, production, and profit-sharing, consolidated in major corporations. These corporations include: General Electric, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Exxon Mobil, Toyota, Total, Vodafone, ArcelorMittal, Nestlé, Volkswagen, Honda, Anheuser-Busch, Deutsche Telekom, Ford, Siemens, BMW, Vivendi, Nissan, Mitsubishi, Unilever, Proctor & Gamble, McDonald’s, and other familiar transnational firms, as well as some perhaps less familiar, including Samsung, Aventis, E.on, Suez, Hutchinson Whampoa, ENI, Roche, Carrefour, Mitsui, Glaxo Smith Kline, Petronas, Metro AG, CITIC, and dozens more (UNCTAD, 2011). These TNCs are headquartered in Britain, Japan, United States, France, Germany, Switzerland, as well as Spain, Italy, Netherlands, Malaysia, Canada, Singapore, Korea, Ireland, and Australia and China.

The TNCC can be found in the leadership of the economic and political structures of the world economy, apparent in ownership, investment, and interlocking directorships. The TNCC is not simply a collection of individual corporate owners who have embarked on a campaign of accumulation and production. In most instances the world’s top billionaires control corporations and investments that are fundamentally transnational in production and distribution (Forbes, 2014). The formation of a TNCC has occurred because individual corporate owners have entered cooperative relationships with others – sharing strategic plans, organizational control, investments, costs, production protocols, and profit or loss. This structural integration means that sections of national capitalist classes are moving into transnational capitalist formations, not yet global in scope or synchronicity, but transnational, often within but always beyond national operations, identities, and interests. Because this class exists in material institutions and social relations, they share “conduct, thought, feelings, and judgments” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 18).

A transnational capitalist class, comprising a segment of capitalist class in almost every nation, has formed in and around these systems of

production and distribution. The TNCC is now “the dominant, hegemonic, fraction of capital on a world scale” (Robinson, 2004, p. 21), because transnational capital now “constitutes the ‘commanding heights’ of the global economy, and that fraction of capital imposes the general direction and character on production worldwide and conditions the social, political, and cultural character of capitalist society worldwide” (Robinson & Harris, 2000, p. 22). This predominant TNCC can be identified in other structural manifestations, as well.

The new TNCC has consciously and collectively forged transnational institutions to plan the development of the material relations of production, advancing market globalization as the practice and free market consumerism as the ideology for transnational capitalism. Within this crust of interlocking elites are some 6,000–7,000 capitalists who help set the agendas for TNCC political, economic, and social institutions such as the World Bank, World Trade Organization, Trilateral Commission, World Economic Forum, the G8, G20, NATO, the European Union, and other transnational organizations (Rothkopf, 2008).

### **Interlocking Directors for the TNCC**

Leslie Sklair (2001) and Kees van der Pijl (1998) empirically establish that globalization is driven by identifiable actors working through corporations they own and institutions they control. Most importantly, transnational capitalists coordinate production and policy across companies and regions through interlocking cross-company management structures that facilitate capitalist interaction and planning.

Corporations are managed by boards of directors, including representatives of major shareholders and corporate bureaucrats with appropriate industrial, technical, or financial expertise. When directors sit on two or more boards, they are said to “interlock,” indicating that the companies necessarily share information, direction, and decision-making interests through the physical presence of directors from different companies. According to William Domhoff (2006), through interlocking directorships, corporate owners and directors form an elite, cohesive community with common worldviews and understandings – essentially a formation of the capitalist class. For example, transnational class formation accompanied the changes in the ownership and production of Chrysler: US corporate members sat on Daimler’s board during the late 1990s. In 2009, Chrysler

was partly purchased by Fiat, which now has three of the nine directors on the board. As the *national* production and accumulation of profits shrink due to *transnational* ownership and production, the new class formation erodes the national corporate community's competitive position within the world system. Chrysler's capitalist shareholders become transnational – its owners and directors become part of a transnational capitalist formation seeking profits (to be shared transnationally) from production in multiple countries.

In very clear terms, director interlocks between transnational corporations reveal TNCC formation assembled in networks of cross-border connections. Transnational interlocks of directors of corporate boards establish class connections across national borders. Transnational interlocking assures shared capitalist class planning and decision-making across nation-states.

All TNCs have interlocking directorships and interlocking structures of governance (see [muckety.com](http://muckety.com) and [ketupa.net](http://ketupa.net)). It is now regular corporate practice to maintain directorate interlocks across borders, clearly indicating a broadening of transnational class formation. For instance, China-based Lenovo, which bought IBM's PC business in 2005 and is now the world's largest PC firm, has nine members from six nations on its board of directors, as it moves into Brazil, India, and Russia (Kirkland & Orr, 2013). It is obvious that “globalizing firms are increasingly dominant” in national networks and a vibrant transnational capitalist class is “increasingly integrated” within nations and globally leaving national capitalists at a disadvantage in national markets overwhelmed by TNC production and distribution (Klassen & Carroll, 2011, p. 399).

While viewers and readers of popular media in Central Europe and across the globe share entertaining populist fare (from game shows and reality TV to sports and melodrama), sharing what amounts to a highly materialistic localized version of more polished European and US originals, transnational owners share a more cosmopolitan ethos emerging from their integrated business operations. Transnational capitalists travel in exclusive elite social circles nurturing a global business culture. “Global elites in each country increasingly tend to share similar lifestyles, including patterns of higher education (e.g., attendance at world-class business schools) and consumption of luxury goods and services” (Robinson, 2004, p. 31). Nationality does not interfere with the shared “cultural capital,” which reinforces class identity, formation, and behavior (Bourdieu, 1987). TNCC members, whatever their national identity, exist in the same social class and political milieu.

### Central European Media

The Central European Media Enterprises group (CME) produces programming and owns the largest broadcast stations across Central Europe, including in Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania. CME was founded in 1994 by Robert Lauder, director of cosmetic giant Estée Lauder. Time Warner owns 49.9% of CME. The company's board includes Caryn Becker, CEO of CLEAR wireless; Herbert Granath, an ABC vice-president, director of Crown Media, and partner in Eurosport TV; Alfred Langer, CFO of Celanese chemical company; Fred Langhammer, director of insurance giant AIG, Disney, and Japanese bank Shinsei. CME is majority owner of 1 + 1, a Ukrainian station, partners with Alexander Rodnyansky, CEO of Russian TV network CTC. These interlocks link CME to Axel Springer, Viacom, News Corp, AOL, Omnicom, Verizon, ATT, La Opinion, Bertelsmann, and Reliance Media in India. CME directors sit on transnational planning boards, including the Trilateral Commission, the IMF, and the Council on Foreign Relations, as well as Blackstone Group and Sunoco Carlyle (with over 1,500 joint ventures in 75 countries). Who owns CME? Names of directors can be found at [muckety.com](http://muckety.com), but corporate shareholders and directors cross borders and industries, making CME a transnational exemplar. Axel Springer, a German-led transnational publisher, has similar joint venture relations throughout the region. In short, local media in Central Europe are already part of the transnational entertainment network.

The circles that capitalist elites move in are defined by interests and activities, not geography. Private equity manager Glenn Hutchins says, "You see the same people, you eat in the same restaurants, you stay in the same hotels. But most important, we are engaged as global citizens in cross-cutting commercial, political, and social matters of common concern" to transnational capital (Freeland, 2011). Complementing their interlocking corporate board meetings, elites gather in transnational policy groups and networks. In 2006, 45.5% of transnational capitalists sat together in elite class organizations (Carroll et al., 2010), including the Trilateral Commission, the World Economic Forum, and the World Business Council for Sustainable

Development. Such policy-planning groups further cement the organizational and cultural cohesion for the formation of collective transnational capitalist interests and action.

The next chapter opens with a brief overview of transnational capitalist policy planning and then turns to a larger discussion on transnational class leadership.

## References

- Adejunmobi, M. (2011). Nollywood, globalization, and regional media corporations in Africa. *Popular Communication*, 9(2), 67–78.
- Artz, L. (2003). Globalization, media hegemony, and social class. In L. Artz & Y. Kamalipour (Eds.), *The globalization of corporate media hegemony* (pp. 3–33). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Artz, L. (2006). On the material and the dialectic: Toward a class analysis of communication. In L. Artz, S. Macek, & D. Cloud (Eds.), *Marxism and communication studies: The point is to change it* (pp. 5–52). New York: Peter Lang.
- Athique, A. (2008). The global dynamics of Indian media piracy: Export markets, playback media and the informal economy. *Media, Culture and Society*, 30(5), 699–717.
- Banister, J. (2005, July). Manufacturing employment in China. *Monthly Labor Review*, p. 11.
- Bourdieu, P. (1987). What makes a social class? On the theoretical and practical existence of groups. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*, 32, 1–117.
- Bourdieu, P. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago.
- Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2012). International labor comparisons. Retrieved from <http://www.bls.gov/fls/>
- Carroll, W. K., Carson, C., Fennema, M., Heemskerk, E., & Sapinski, J. P. (2010). *The making of a transnational capitalist class: Corporate power in the twenty-first century*. London: Zed Books.
- Chance, G. (2013, January 22). Global governance in a changing world. *China Daily*. [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-01/22/content\\_16151239.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-01/22/content_16151239.htm)
- Chossudovsky, M. (1997). *The globalization of poverty: Impacts of IMF and World Bank reform*. London: Zed Books.
- Coghlan, A., & MacKenzie, D. (2011, October 24). Revealed – the capitalist network that runs the world. *New Scientist*, 2835. Retrieved from <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354.500-revealed--the-capitalistnetwork-that-runs-the-world.html>
- Davis, D. W., & Yeh, E. Y. (2008). *East Asian screen industries*. London: BFI.

- Dicken, P. (2003). *Global shift: Reshaping the global economic map*. 4th edn. New York: Guilford.
- Domhoff, G. W. (2006). *Who rules America? Power, politics and social change*. 5th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Forbes. (2014). The world's billionaires. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/billionaires/list/>
- Freeland, C. (2011, January/February). The rise of the new global elite. *Atlantic Magazine*. Retrieved from <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-rise-of-the-new-global-elite/308343/>
- Fröbel, F., Heinrichs, J., & Kreye, O. (2004). *The new international division of labour*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Fuchs, C. (2013). Why and how to read Marx's "Capital"? Reflections on Johan Fornäs' book "Capitalism. A companion to Marx's economy critique. *Triple C: Communication, Capitalism, & Critique*, 11(2), 294–309.
- Galbraith, P. W., & Karlin, J. G. (2012). Introduction: The mirror of idols and celebrity. In P. W. Galbraith & J. G. Karling (Eds.), *Idols and celebrity in Japanese media culture* (pp. 1–32). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Golding, P., & Murdock, G. (1991). Culture, communications, and political economy. In J. Curran & M. Gurevitch, (Eds.), *Mass media and society* (pp. 15–32). London: Edward Arnold.
- Hart, P. (2012, November 28). Reporting on sweatshops when your boss is in the sweatshop business. FAIR Blog. Retrieved April 8, 2013, from <http://www.fair.org/blog/2012/11/28/reporting-on-sweatshops-when-your-boss-is-in-the-sweatshop-business/>
- Havens, T. (2006). *Global television marketplace*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. (2007). *Dialectic of enlightenment (cultural memory in the present)*. Trans. E. Jephcott. (Originally published 1944). Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Indian farmers, Coca-Cola vie for scarce water supply. (2008, November 17). PBS Newshour. Retrieved April 8, 2013, from [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec08/waterwars\\_11-17.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec08/waterwars_11-17.html)
- International Labour Organization. (2013). *Global wage report 2012/2013: Wages and equitable growth*. Geneva: International Labour Office. Retrieved from [http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-wage-report/2012/WCMS\\_194843/lang--de/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/global/research/global-reports/global-wage-report/2012/WCMS_194843/lang--de/index.htm)
- Iwabuchi, K. (2002). *Recentering globalization: Popular culture and Japanese transnationalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Jalée, P. (1977). *How capitalism works*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Kalb, D. (2011). Introduction. Headlines of nation, subtexts of class. In D. Kalb & G. Halmai (Eds.), *Headlines of nation, subtexts of class: Working-class populism and the return of the repressed in neoliberal Europe* (pp. 1–36). New York: Berghahn Books.

- Kalb, D., & Halmai, G. (Eds.). (2011). *Headlines of nation, subtexts of class: Working-class populism and the return of the repressed in neoliberal Europe*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Keane, M. (2006). Once were peripheral: Creating media capacity in East Asia. *Media, Culture & Society*, 28(6), 835–855.
- Kikeri, S., & Perault, M. (2010, May). Privatization trends. *Viewpoint*, 322, 1–4. Retrieved from [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/322Kikeri\\_Perault.pdf?resourceurlname=322Kikeri\\_Perault.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/322Kikeri_Perault.pdf?resourceurlname=322Kikeri_Perault.pdf)
- Kirby, P. (2004). Globalization, the Celtic Tiger and social outcomes: Is Ireland a model or a mirage? *Globalizations*, 1(2), 205–222.
- Kirkland, R., & Orr, G. (2013, June). Thriving in a “PC-plus” world: An interview with Lenovo CEO Yang Yuanqing. *McKinsey Quarterly*. Retrieved from [http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high\\_tech\\_telecoms\\_internet/thriving\\_in\\_a\\_pc-plus\\_world](http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/thriving_in_a_pc-plus_world)
- Klassen, J., & Carroll, W. K. (2011). Transnational class formation? Globalization and the Canadian corporate network. *Journal of World Systems Research*, 17(2), 379–402.
- Kraul, C. (2006, September 16). Ugly never looked so good. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved from <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/16/business/fi-betty16>
- Larkin, B. (2008). *Signal and noise: Media, infrastructure, and urban culture in Nigeria*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Marshall, A. G. (2012). No conspiracy theory – A small group of companies have enormous power over the world. *Alternet*. Retrieved from <http://www.alternet.org/world/no-conspiracy-theory-small-group-companies-have-enormous-power-over-world>
- Marston, S. A., Woodward, K., & Jones, J.P. III. (2007). Flattening ontologies of globalization: The Nollywood case. *Globalizations*, 4(1), 45–63.
- Marx, K. (1973). *Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy*. Trans. M. Nicholaus. New York: Penguin.
- McCabe, J. (2013). Introduction: “Oh, Betty, you really are beautiful.” In J. McCabe & K. Akass (Eds), *TV’s Betty goes global: From telenovela to international brand* (pp. 1–25). New York: I.B. Taurus.
- Miller, J. (2012). Global Nollywood: The Nigerian movie industry and alternative global networks in production and distribution. *Global Media and Communication*, 8(2), 117–133.
- Miller, T., Govil, N., McMurria, J., Wang, T., & Maxwell, R. (2008). *Global Hollywood* 2. 2nd edn. London: British Film Institute.
- Nohara, Y., & Sharp, A. (2013, July 26). Japan’s elders turn to shoplifting. *Chicago Tribune*, p. A19.
- Nwachukwa, M., & Njoku, B. (2010, May 9). Africa Magic provides platform for the African story – Segun Fayose. *Vanguard*. Retrieved from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/05/africa-magic-provides-platform-for-the-african-story-segun-fayose/>

- O'Regan, T. (1991). From piracy to sovereignty: International video cassette recorder trends. *Continuum*, 4(2). Retrieved from <http://www.mcc.murdoch.edu.au/ReadingRoom/4.2/oregan.html>
- Ogeret, K. S. (2009). Films out of Africa. *Journal of African Media Studies*, 1(3), 505–509.
- Oxfam. (2013, January 13). Annual income of richest 100 people enough to end poverty four times over. *Oxfam International*. Retrieved from <http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2013-01-19/annual-income-richest-100-people-enough-end-global-poverty-four-times>
- Qiang, L. (2013). Beyond Foxconn: Deplorable working conditions characterize Apple's entire supply line. *China Labor Watch*. Retrieved from <http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/report/62>
- Phillips, P., & Soeiro, K. (2012, August). The global 1%: Exposing the transnational ruling class. *Censored Notebook: Investigative Research*. Retrieved January 15, 2013, from <http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/the-global-1-exposing-thetransnational-ruling-class/>
- Rantanen, T. (2005). *The media and globalization*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ritzer, G. (2009). *Globalization: A basic text*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Robinson, W. I. (2004). *A theory of global capitalism: Production, class, and state in a transnational world*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Robinson, W. I., & Harris, J. (2000). Towards a global ruling class? Globalization and the transnational capitalist class. *Science & Society*, 64(1), 11–54.
- Rothkopf, D. (2008). *Superclass: The global power elite and the world they are making*. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux.
- Sadik, N. (1991). Population growth and the food crisis. *Food, Nutrition and Agriculture*. Retrieved September 30, 2014, from <http://www.fao.org/docrep/u3550t/u3550t02.htm>
- Schiller, H. (1976). *Communication and cultural domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press.
- Samuels, A. (2013, April 8). Monitoring every move. *Chicago Tribune*, p. 3B.
- Sklair, L. (2001). *The transnational capitalist class*. New York: Wiley.
- Srebreny, A. (2009) Maps and mandalas, division and multiplication: Media and global divides. *Nordicom Review*, 30, 39–56.
- Steger, M. B. (2005). *Globalism: Market ideology meets terrorism*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Sun, F. S. (Producer). (2001). *Mickey Mouse monopoly: Disney, childhood & corporate power* (Motion picture). United States: ArtMedia Production.
- Szalvai, E. (2012). Power and culture in media internationalization: The unusual case of a minority media conglomerate. *Revista de Negocios Internacionales*, 4(1), 28–56.
- UNCTAD. (2008). *Development and globalization: Facts and figures 2008*. Geneva: United Nations.

- UNCTAD. (2011). The world's top 100 non-financial TNCs, ranked by foreign assets, 2010. Bern, Switzerland: United Nations. Retrieved from [http://unctad.org/Sections/dite\\_dir/docs/WIR11\\_web%20tab%2029.pdf](http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_dir/docs/WIR11_web%20tab%2029.pdf)
- UNCTAD. (2012). *World investment report: Towards a new generation of investment policies*. Bern, Switzerland: United Nations. Retrieved March 21, 2013, from <http://www.unctad-docs.org/files/UNCTAD-WIR2012-Full-en.pdf>
- van der Pijl, K. (1998a). *Transnational classes and international relations*. New York: Routledge.
- van Tulder, R., & van der Zwart, A. (2005). *International business-society management: Leading corporate responsibility and globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Walters, S. (2012, February 4). Apple still shamed by China's iPod sweatshops six years after Mail on Sunday exposé. *Mail Online*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2096551/Apple-shamed-Chinas-iPod-sweatshops-SIX-YEARS-expos.html>
- Wright, E. O. (1985). *Classes*. London: Verso.
- Yen, H. (2013, July 28). 80 percent of US adults face near-poverty, unemployment: Survey. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/28/poverty-unemployment-rates\\_n\\_3666594.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/28/poverty-unemployment-rates_n_3666594.html)

## Further Reading

- Robinson, W. I. (2004). *A theory of global capitalism: Production, class, and state in a transnational world*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Sklair, L. (2001). *The transnational capitalist class*. New York: Wiley.