

WHEWELL'S COURT LECTURES, CAMBRIDGE 1938–1941

Thinking is being alive. Living is exchanging thoughts.
Yorick Smythies

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The notes Smythies made during the lectures of this chapter, the *Lectures on Knowledge*, are contained in two small spiral-bound notebooks. The first notebook begins with Smythies' version of 'Are There an Infinite Number of Shades of Colour?' (cf. Chapter 2), followed by this chapter's Lectures 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10. Smythies inserted the lectures from the other notebook as Lectures 2, 7, and 11; Taylor's notes as Lecture 1 and the first half of Lecture 10. The latter he went on to cross out, for unknown reasons. We use 'N' for these original notes and 'MS' for Smythies' rewritten and expanded version of the original notes. The immediate notes are written with a rather soft pencil, typical of Smythies' early lecture notes. The expanded version of Lectures 1 to 11 is written with a broad-nibbed fountain pen into the same kind of middle-sized notebook he used during the lectures. This was probably done in 1938, when Smythies had Taylor's notes available. We do not know whether his insertion of Taylor's notes and the other three lectures in their respective places was led by chronological considerations, but nor do we know enough to interfere with this arrangement. Lecture 10, as it appears in MS, may be a compilation. The section before the words 'My Notes' has no parallel in Rhees's unpublished version of the lecture, while everything from 'My Notes' to the end of Lecture 10 does.¹

The *Lectures on Knowledge* differ from other notes by Smythies in that most of the meetings – six out of 11 – are dated. Unfortunately, no year is indicated, and half of the day numbers are difficult to read. Moreover, those that are relatively unambiguous do not correspond to the pattern that we were anticipating, being: 20 May (Friday), 27 May (Friday), 4 June (Saturday), 15 June (Wednesday). We expected lectures on Mondays and discussions on Fridays, as Wittgenstein had announced to Moore in a letter of April 1938: 'I'll have the first meeting on Monday (25th) at 5 p.m. ... We shall meet in Taylor's rooms in

1 Cf. Subsidiary Written Source [4].

Trinity'. On 26 April, Wittgenstein writes: 'I find that I shall have to be in Paris on Thursday (day after tomorrow) so my Friday discussion is off ... I shall lecture on Monday next' (CL: 296 f.).

Since this is puzzling, it is mandatory to consider the available evidence for dating in detail. Smythies' dates, including those with ambiguous day numbers, refer to Full Easter Term. Actually, the last two lectures appear to have taken place after the end of the official lecturing period on 10 June (cf. Cam. Univ. Cal. 1937–38: xviii). The immediate lecture notes of Lecture 11 are dated to 15 June. Lectures 5, 7, and 9 are known in a version by Rush Rhees, two of which are dated by Smythies to 20 May and 10 (?) June.² Rhees and Theodore Redpath think they remember that Wittgenstein taught a course in Lent Term, and Rhees dates the *Lectures on Knowledge* partly to Lent Term 1938 (cf. CE: 407, Redpath 1990: 46). This, however, is either false or needs qualification (cf. Introduction 2). According to manuscript volume 120, Wittgenstein was still in Vienna on 6 January. He travelled to Cambridge only after that. On 8 February, he notes his arrival in Dublin, where he spends five weeks in the middle of the term. His return to Cambridge on 18 March seems to be prompted exclusively by the *Anschluss*, the annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany (cf. vW 120: 57v, 128v). Thus, Wittgenstein could not have taught a regular course in Lent Term 1938, and since he was not well during the last couple of months of the same year, he did not lecture in Michaelmas Term 1938 either (cf. Klagge 2003: 349).

Our dating of the *Knowledge Lectures* to Easter Term 1938 is consistent with the cast of people who Smythies reports as intervening in discussion – Casimir Lewy, Theodore Redpath, Rush Rhees, Alister Watson, and John Wisdom – all of whom are likely to have been at Wittgenstein's lectures in 1938 (cf. Klagge 2003: 348 f.). Taylor's presence is evidenced by the fact that Smythies employed his notes for Lectures 1 and 10. The joint presence of Lewy and Taylor is particularly significant, since Lewy attended Wittgenstein's lectures from 1938 until Easter Term 1945, and Taylor probably only in 1938 (cf. Redpath 1990: 46, Klagge 2003: 348).

Consistent with our dating, most *Nachlass* parallels are to be found in the Manuscript Volume 119 (24 September to 19 November 1937) and in Notebook 159 (spring to summer 1938), as Rhees already observed (cf. CE: 406–411, 418–426). Notebook 159 begins by alternating between the topics of the *Lectures on Knowledge* and the *Lectures on Gödel* (cf. Introduction 2). Since these remarks are partly in English, Wittgenstein may have used this notebook for his own preparation. Significant parallels are also to be found in Notebook 158, begun on 24 February 1938. It has a passage, partly written in English, that parallels the beginning of Lecture 2. The passage consists of a distinctive juxtaposition of remarks about philosophical puzzles in general and what he calls

² Rhees' version was published, without any exact dating, in *Philosophia* 6, 1976, 430–433, 438–440, 442–445; reprinted as CE: 407–411, 419–421, 423–426.

'the dream puzzle': whether a dream occurs while we are asleep or is just remembered as occurring while we are asleep (cf. vW 158: 37r–41r).³ At one point in the notebook, he quotes an apparently typical phrase of one of his pupils: 'Watson: "The key question is ..."' (vW 158: 39v). A few pages later, he draws the same figure of a cube that he uses in *Knowledge* Lecture 3 (cf. vW 158: 43v). The notebook says nothing about the philosophical meaning of the figure, while this comes out very clearly in the lecture.

³ See also the passage towards the end of Smythies' Preparatory Notes (Chapter 10), where it is called 'a most important fact about dreams' that they occur while we are asleep.

Lectures on Knowledge

⟨Easter Term 1938⟩

Lecture 1

Taylor's notes.

If someone says 'I have pain' and someone else says of him, 'he has pain', does 'I have pain' mean the same as 'he has pain'? How can they mean the same, since the ways of verifying them are different? You could say: 'Our scheme of paradigms is too simple.'

Is 'It's going to rain' *about* the present or the future? You can say both (to a large extent what you say depends on your mood). Whether a proposition is 'about' something or not is generally a complicated matter. You're putting (the question) into too straight a jacket.

There is a temptation to say that the two sentences *refer to the same fact*. The temptation is due to the use of a certain picture. You think of 'the same fact' as like 'the same person.'

Is 'He has pain' about his behaviour?⁴ Cf. 'I seem to have a rush', 'He seems to have a rush.'

For such phrases as 'I'm in pain', 'I see red', 'I have such and such a wish', I'll use the word 'utterance'. Like a moan, etc., as opposed to a description.

There is a complicated relation between 'He's in pain' and the behaviour. They don't mean the same. Though 'He moans' may mean (under special circumstances, e.g. when he is in bed dying, very, very ill) 'He is in pain.' (The two may come to exactly the same thing.)

The connection between 'I'm in pain' and 'He's in pain' is that his saying the former is a criterion for 'He's in pain.' Is there a verification in the case of an utterance? (Cf. Lecture 2.)


⁴ In MS, followed by: Akin in the third person.

How did you learn the use of the word ‘pain’? You were crying and someone told you you were in pain, etc.⁵ Cf. ‘I dreamt so and so.’ How do we learn the use of this? Has anyone ever shown us what a dream is like? What red is like? We woke up and told a story in the past tense. Then we were told, ‘you dreamt it.’ So we learned.⁶

Experiment (alarm clock etc.) to show that a long dream only takes two seconds. Does the experiment show this? Someone might say: ‘Perhaps you didn’t dream it, but only remembered dreaming it.’ Is the child correct in using the present or the past tense about its dream? Is something *now* happening, or *did* something happen? Correlated phenomena. (Events in the brain, moaning in sleep, etc.) You can use the present or past tense, as you like. (The choice is a linguistic one.)⁷

We’re inclined to say: ‘Something corresponds to the utterance.’ A case of shifting the responsibility. To say ‘something corresponds’ is just another way of saying, ‘What he says is true.’ Cf. saying, “A statement is true” means “Reality is in agreement”.’ What’s done? A grammatical recommendation is made.

Lecture 2



The fly catcher.⁸ The fly gets in but can’t get out. The stronger the wish to get out, the harder it is for it to get out. (It is fascinated by one way of trying to get out.) If we put the fly in glasses of shapes and shades different to this one, where it was easier for it to get out, where it was less fascinated by the light, etc., and we trained it to fly out of these, it might fly out of this one also.

Similarly, when we spoke about the dream puzzle, we shifted to a less puzzling problem. We produce a similar puzzle in another case where the puzzle is less alive.

5 Cf. *PI* §244.

6 Cf. *GWL*: 30f., 180, 252.

7 Cf. *Smythies’ Preparatory Notes*, near the end, *vW* 158: 37v–38r (March 1938), *vW* 128: 22 (1944), *vW* 130: 251 (1 August 1946), *PPF* §52f. = *PI II*: 184a–c.

8 Cf. *Wittgenstein’s Reply*, *vW* 149: 67 = *NFL*: 258 (1935/36), *vW* 118: 44r (1 September 1937), 71r–v (8 September 1937), *vW* 117: 60f., 92 (1937, later than 11 September), *RFM*: 56, I, §44, *PI* §309.

Is it an idle question about the dream, whether a dream is a waking experience or a disturbance of one's sleep?⁹ Ask where this sentence is at home.

Two sentences from quite different contexts fight when they are brought together in a certain way.

You'd find this sort of question (about the dream) asked at the beginning of a scientific book.

Distinguish the *point* of a game from something just given in the rules. The shape (of the board, say) may have something to do with the point. I abolish something in the game, i.e. I say it's not to the point. But you say it is to the point. Nothing deep seems to me to be bound up in this difference of opinion.¹⁰

The law of causality is referred to at the beginning of scientific books, and then never mentioned again.¹¹ Ought we to leave out the bow to the law of causality? I say: 'Do away with it! But what today you give up, you wouldn't have given up a hundred years ago, e.g. someone says the discussion about transubstantiation was futile. Was it? It depends on what the person you talk about it to, does: Luther would not have turned a hair at the talk about verification.

It is in a sense a personal question, whether the discussion rests on a misunderstanding. Does putting 'yours sincerely' at the end of letters rest on a misunderstanding?

What I do is, in a sense, influence your style. (What I do is alter your style.)¹² I point out that the mouldings *had* a point which they no longer have.

The more progressive people say one thing (about dreams); the others deny it. Freud says he isn't going to discuss the question. But he talks as a man talks who has in his hand the picture of something happening while the man's asleep.

If you look closely at one aspect (the man asleep or the recollection), the other blurs. Cf. looking now at an object in the foreground, the background blurred; now at an object in the background, the foreground blurred.¹³

A dream in a silent picture used to be a man asleep and a blue haze. What the cinema says is conclusive.¹⁴

It was found that the exact wording of the dream sentence was important.¹⁵ So we were more inclined to speak of the phenomenon of recollection.

9 Cf. you can imagine a kind of dream-germ having been there and it expanding when you recollect the dream. (vW 158: 38r–v; cf. 37r–41r, March 1938).

10 Cf. vW 147: 13r–14v (1934), vW 149: 16 (1934/35) = NFL: 233f., RFM: 109, PI §564.

11 Cf. vW 108: 198f. (29 June 1930), vW 134: 3 (1 March 1947).

12 Cf. LC: 28, *Lectures on Aesthetics, III*, §37–41 (1938).

13 Cf. vW 121: 12r (13 May 1938).

14 Cf. vW 114: 6r–v (27–30 May 1932), PR §217, BT: 466.

15 Cf. Freud, S. A. V: 512–515 = G. W. II/III: 517–520.

The foreground begins to interest you, whereas it didn't previously. In a law court, the exact words you use don't matter. But in describing a dream they are all important.¹⁶

The question might be brought up whether 'He has pain' and 'I have pain' mean the same or not where it was not known who was meant by 'he'. [E.g., someone says 'I have pain'. I say to someone else 'He has pain', where I might be referring to one of several people. He asks me: 'Were you both meaning the same?'] This would be the 'home' of the question in ordinary life.

[The behaviourist wished scientifically minded people to stop using 'I'm in pain', and instead use remarks about behaviour, etc. This was not a scientific discussion, but the preliminary to one. To say 'I ought to say something about my behaviour instead of "I am in pain"' gives a shock. In a way, the substitution doesn't in the case of 'He's in pain'.

Let's try to reach to depths of the utterance puzzle.]

You are both inclined and disinclined to say: 'To an utterance there corresponds something' and 'To an utterance there corresponds nothing'. The question might be put: 'Is pain something or is pain nothing?'¹⁷

'Surely, if I say "I have pain", something corresponds to it [my words]. If I say, 'What?', you say, 'A certain feeling'. 'A certain feeling' is used in a queer way, not [as it is usually used] as a preliminary to a specification. You might get to 'a certain something'.

How do you recognize it [the experience] to be the one so and so [as the one called so and so]? How do you know that what you call 'pain' [now] is the same as what you called 'pain' yesterday? You remember. How do you remember?

You said, 'I have pain.' I asked you for a reason, you said: 'I remember that the experience I have now is the same as what I had before.' But you now stand on no firmer ground. Cf. looking at two identical copies of the *Evening Standard* to be quite sure of the news.¹⁸ How do you know your memory image is right? Or, how do you know it is a memory image? 'Are you sure this is what you called "pain" yesterday?' is an absurd question. What is it like to remember calling this colour 'black' yesterday? In what way could I call this [your remembering calling it black yesterday] a justification for your calling this 'black' [today]? If I buy him a top-hat, he remembered calling (this) 'black' yesterday, this won't act as evidence against him.

My remembering 'God save the King' may consist just in my whistling it.

16 *Up to this point the text of this course is taken from MS. For the rest, the basic source is N.*






17 Cf. vW 121: 7v, 10v–11r (10–13 May 1938), PI §304.

18 This sentence is taken from MS. In N: Cf. Evening Standards. Cf. vW 120: 75r–75v (19 February 1938), vW 116: 250 (1938 or later), PI §265.

Suppose I spoke a language unintelligibly, now called a colour 'black', then 'green', then 'yellow', but I always say: 'What did I call it yesterday? Oh yes, "black".' This won't help.

'Why do you call him "Watson"?' – 'Because I remember calling him "Watson" before.' Does this act as a justification? How do I know which leads you right – the inclination to call it 'black' or the memory? If I say the first, am I likely not to say the second? You have no reason for calling it 'black'. There is no justification. [You didn't in any way deduce that it was black.]

You would not trust your memory (which may be just calling it black) more than your inclination to call it black. You could call the latter also a memory phenomenon. How does it help to appeal from one to the other?

Suppose [that in order] to remember the colour of , I have to draw it:  [a patch of shape  of the same colour] and then an image of  from painters' samples comes. Is this  evidence for calling the patch 'black'? It would be absurd to call it this. [You could say better: 'I'm sure this is black because it *is* black.']¹⁹

We are inclined to talk of a memory image as a sample which we can see, but which others can't see. Cf. the picture of steam comes from a picture of a pot in a movie picture. We might say: the steam must have been somewhere. This is similar to a memory image coming and our saying, 'It must have been somewhere,' 'came from somewhere.'²⁰

Why shouldn't I say: 'This [calling him so and so] *is* the phenomenon of recognizing that I call him so and so'? Do I recognize him first?

'Are you sure this is black?' It is not a case where you would say you were sure, or that you knew. The question of being certain or not does not arise.

Lecture 3

18²¹ May 1938

'The two colours are the same' may mean all kinds of different things, e.g. we can compare them to see if there is a transition, or put them side by side, etc. Similarly, if we say, 'Impressions A and B are the same.' 'Impression A and what I saw yesterday are the same' is different from 'Impressions A and B are the same,' [in the former there is] no putting side by side. Very different also [is] 'A's pain is the same as B's.' There are entirely different methods of comparing (different methods of verification).

¹⁹ In MS, 'blue' instead of 'black'. Cf. vW 150: 18, 31 (1935/36), NFL: 250f.

²⁰ Cf. PI §297.



²¹ The reading of the second number is conjectural.

Don't look for the same meaning of 'same'. We have different methods of verification. But it might be said: 'If we could do what we can't do, wouldn't we find out that they were the same?' We don't look at the actual language-game. We look at the words [spellbound], and supplement them by an *imaginary* language-game, a mirage of a language [towards which we rush].²²

'Do I have one impression of a chair, which persists, or are there millions of atoms of impressions, different but alike?' This is an example of supplementing a language-game by an imaginary one. We see in a cinema one picture standing still and we ask: 'Is this one picture or lots?' meaning 'Is there one picture in the projector or lots?' There is in this case [in the case of the impression] no lantern, etc. But we supplement what we see with something else. You can get yourself saying: 'It's always another impression.'²³ [You're not just now puzzled by this. It's not loaded with passion. So it serves our purpose.]

'Is the utterance of pain justified when you have pain?' You are inclined on the one hand to say, 'Obviously it is', on the other hand to say: 'How do you know it is the same thing as you called 'pain' yesterday?'; etc. Suppose I said: 'You always need a new intuition to tell you what pain is.' This is intuitionism; the same as intuitionism in mathematics.

Russell might say: 'If I have pain, I am directly aware that the sensation is the same as I had yesterday', or 'that this is black'. I would ask: 'Do you mean that you are directly aware that the word "same" fits the situation?', or: 'I know exactly what this colour is. But I don't know its name'. Someone might reply: 'No, it's not the word. It's the meaning.' I say:²⁴ 'If it's not a question of the word, we'll have an instance. Then what you are immediately aware of is that these instances fit.'

'We have  as a paradigm of sameness, and we are immediately aware that the paradigm fits .²⁵ Would it fit if one was black and one yellow? Then, you have to have a paradigm of the way it fits. [Is a new intuition needed to see whether the paradigm fits in the right way?]

Cf. 2 4 6 8 10 ... You need a new intuition to go on. Saying that you have a new intuition doesn't help you in the slightest. You could just as well say [you make] a new decision, although in fact you don't make a decision. You just go on.

I am directly aware that they are the same? If you don't mean you are directly aware that the word fits, you mean that [you are directly aware that] the paradigm fits.

²² The expression mirage of a language also occurs in *vW* 158: 36v–37r (March 1938).

²³ Cf. *MWL*: 102, PR §54.

²⁴ In *N*: W. says

²⁵ No quotation marks in *N*, only in *MS*.

Suppose someone said: ‘Are you justified in applying the word “pain”?’ If you mean: ‘Is there a step between?’, then we may or may not be justified. There being no reason for doing it doesn’t mean you are wrong (or unjustified).²⁶ You might say, there is no right or wrong about it. Cf. ‘How can the earth rest on nothing?’ [Cf. ‘The house rests on the earth, but what does the earth rest on?’]

→ ← ‘Do (these) arrows point the same way?’ [You can make a man say that both point in the same direction, or away from one another.]²⁷

How do you distinguish between shamming being in pain (seeing black) and not shamming? Why is one doubtful how to answer these questions?

How do you distinguish between having pain and not having pain?

You look.


How do you have a mirage of a language-game? Obviously, you don’t look.

Another answer is: ‘You just say so or you just yell.’ I might say: ‘There is no way of distinguishing.’ [Is this a case of distinguishing at all?] ‘How do you verify the fact that you have pain?’ What strikes you first is that this question is rubbish.

[It is important, when answering questions of this kind; in these discussions, etc., to say whatever comes into your head. Cf. psychoanalysis.]

Saying, ‘There is no reason,’ brings up the picture of shamming every time. (Cf. earth again.) [Notice the similarity with the case of the earth ‘resting on nothing.’ We say, ‘Surely the earth *must* be held up.]



‘You can’t look at it as a plane figure.’ The appearance changes. Put in lines  and you can look at it as a plane figure.²⁸ This is similar to what we do in philosophy.

[Compare a description of how you learn to say ‘pain,’ with a description of how you learn to say ‘pencil.’] ‘When you have the same feeling again you say it is pain.’ Cf. ‘When you see the same thing again you call it a pencil.’ The latter is an experiential statement. How do you know the former? ‘When you pinch him again, he has pain.’ This is all right.

²⁶ Cf. vW 124: 132 (15 March 1944), PI §289.

²⁷ Cf. vW 115: 254f. = PB: 212f. (1936, August or later), BB: 140.

²⁸ For similar figures, see, for example, vW 158: 43v (later than 15 March 1938, when W. drafted a letter to Gilbert Pattison; cf. 28v–32v and vW 120: 172r) and vW 121: 23r–v (16 May 1938). Both figures are in MS, but only the second one is in N.

[Why is it unsatisfactory to say: ‘When he has the same feeling again, he calls it “pain”?’] First, it makes you think he says: ‘Ah, here is the same feeling again. So it is pain.’

This is unsatisfactory because

‘to notice it is the same is to notice it is pain’ (Rhees).

‘It is still in terms of a psychological impression.’ (Watson) It is now in terms of ‘same’ instead of ‘pain’. How does he recognize ‘same’? ‘When you have the same feeling again you say it is pain’ does tell us something, i.e. that he does not use a system that calls pain ‘x’ on Monday, ‘y’ on Tuesday, etc., i.e. it tells us something about the use of the word ‘pain’. (You try to impose the use of ‘book’ onto the use of ‘toothache’).²⁹

[How do you know it’s a picture of Mr Wisdom that ‘comes into your head’? It won’t help to say what the method of projection employed (about the picture) is. There is the same trouble with this.] What made the picture a picture of Wisdom was what you did with it, i.e. what made it so was saying ‘Wisdom’. Not similarity, or the way it was projected. It is helpful to ask: ‘What makes a portrait of Mr Smith a portrait of Mr Smith?’ Not similarity.

Lecture 4

Saying that thoughts are intangible [and trying to observe a thought and see what happens] and looking round quickly (in the case of someone not knowing English properly) when someone says, ‘Time passes’, are two very similar actions.³⁰

A philosophical question [such as ‘What is the nature of thought?’] is not about language – the whole point of it is that it is not – though talk about language can eliminate it.

What happens when one is puzzled about thought is that one tries to observe a thought, to say: ‘What is it like?’

If someone asked, ‘What happens when I eat?’, we knew exactly what kind of answer is required. [We describe movements, hand to mouth, bite, etc.] But [if someone asks] ‘What happens when I think?’, we don’t know. To the former we give a description as an answer. [Cf. what happens when you write a letter? What happens when you buy something? You may say: ‘All that happens is that the grocer does so and so, you give him a piece of copper, etc.’]

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²⁹ *In N*, ‘book’ and ‘toothache’ are switched.

³⁰ Cf. *vW 115: 172 = PB: 156 (1936, August or later)*, *vW 159: 3r (1938)*.

'What happens really when you checkmate?'³¹ It is no use saying '*this* happens.' We could have used coins, etc.

It often seems that I am³² saying: 'You are trying to think the unthinkable, think what is logically impossible.' Cf. the example of a man who tries to catch his thumb. It might be said he was trying to do what was impossible. You might say to him: 'Certainly you can do this if you want to. There is nothing wrong with it. [You can go on with it if you have the time.]' His action has a similarity with trying to catch something. [He may even say he's trying to catch his thumb.] I want to interpret a philosophical puzzle simply as a futile movement.

(My mind is bigger than my head and somehow spherical.) Cf. what happens in the protoplasm of a cell? [You think of a gaseous mechanism.]³³ A word 'coming into the mind' suggests a mechanism, which can't be found, and so suggests gaseousness. Cf. Haeckel, 'God is a gaseous mammal.'³⁴

If you wished to see what a thought was by introspecting, you would not get an answer as to whether it was gaseous or not, because you could look at it as something gaseous.

People say: 'Thinking is a process in the mind.' This suggests a picture. If you ask, 'Is it right or wrong?', I say, 'So far, it is neither right nor wrong.' Why does this satisfy us at all? It sounds like other explanations: 'Digestion is a process in the stomach', etc., where something more can be done with the statement. You can open the stomach, observe, etc.

You are supplementing it [the actual language-game played with 'thought'] with an imaginary language, which looks similar to other languages (in connection with 'stomach').

We ask 'Why?' and not to be given an answer is disagreeable, and to be given an answer is agreeable. We want to rest it [what we say] on something.

Cf. 'Why does the sun arise?' – 'Because it always has risen.' – 'Why should that make it probable it will rise again?' It is very disagreeable not to answer the question 'Why do you say you're in pain?' (or 'They are the same'). You want it to rest on something.

When Russell said: 'The ultimate furniture of the world is images and sensations', he had the idea of putting together *matter*, not individual material objects.³⁵ What is Russell doing? I could say he is writing what he is writing,

31 *The figure is redrawn after MS. The illustration in N has no crosses.*

32 *In N: W. is*

33 *In N, followed by: Similar pictures.*

34 *Cf. Haeckel 1928: 308.*

35 *Cf. Russell 1919: 182.*

doing what he is doing. [You could shout, 'Stop!'] Similarly, I could say: 'I am doing what I am doing,' making such and such movements.

'How can a person ask such a question, if it is nonsensical?' The answer is that it is not nonsensical at all. How is it that I say³⁶ on the one hand, that it is nonsensical, on the other that it is loaded with sense? The answer is: 'It is a real question.' The images, movements, feelings, are taken from somewhere else – where it [the question] has got a good use.

[Cf. a madman may ask, where there is no game or chessboard, but only squares: 'Shall I move the piece here or there?' The same may go on in his mind as goes on in mine when I ask, while playing chess, 'Shall I move the piece here or there?' He asks it with the same worry and feeling as I do.]³⁷

The question 'What goes on when a man thinks?' is a similar question, loaded with puzzlement. The question is a perfectly good question, and the feelings are perfectly appropriate feelings, *for another occasion*.

(*Watson*: Isn't the business [in philosophy] of having fluids, shadows, substances, etc., very similar to having a mythology?)

Wittgenstein: Exactly the same.)

[It's '*matter*' not '*chair*' that puzzles us. We compare '*matter*' to '*chair*'. It's not that we don't know where the word applies. It is that the word is unfamiliar. The word '*matter*' is in the same position as the word '*mind*'.]

When adjectives, verbs or substantives are used in the ordinary way,³⁸ we are never puzzled; but when they are used in a different way, we are puzzled. (We constantly look to add usage. Y. S.)

Having asked, 'Isn't the difference that we don't know where to apply the question?', Wittgenstein says: 'No.'

[In the case of material things, we mix up the game played with sense-data. In the case of the mind, we mix up the game played with material things.]

(The questions can arise: 'Here are the views of a chair, where is the chair? Here's the chair, where are the views?') [Are they in another world?]

36 *In N*: W. says

37 *In N, instead*: Cf. in chess, I ask with great feeling: 'Shall I move the queen here or there?' A madman asks: 'Shall I move this piece here or there?' The same goes on; where there is no game or chessboard, but only squares. He asks it with the same worry and feeling, etc. The same may go on in his mind.

38 *In N, over the line*: (to refer to adjectives, verbs and substantives)

Lecture 5

20³⁹ May (1938)

[Russell says:] ‘If one makes an utterance, one is immediately aware of the cause of the utterance.’⁴⁰ It seems at first sight a very cheap explanation: ‘The word “cause” fits.’ This is not a matter for you to decide, because the word ‘cause’ is public property.⁴¹ You are inclined to say: ‘It fits subjectively’ or ‘It fits my idea.’ Is the word ‘fit’ also privately used?

[Instead of] ‘I’m sure that a man came into the room,’ I might say: ‘I’m sure it seemed to me that a man came into the room,’ or I could draw a picture of the impression and say, ‘I’m sure of this.’ But are you sure that the picture fits? If I give the mode of projection of the picture, this is just an idle wheel. It won’t help. You may say there is nothing [wrong?]⁴² in the expression ‘to be immediately aware of,’ because it marks the end of a chain. But the expression does lead to puzzlements. Suppose I said: ‘The table lies on the floor, the floor rests on the earth, and the earth rests on itself.’⁴³ This easily leads to puzzlement. I would prefer to say⁴⁴ ‘rests on nothing’ gives a feeling of insecurity; ‘rest on itself’ of security. ‘A priori’ is not a word, but a gesture. Similarly: ‘Certain propositions are firm in themselves.’⁴⁵ [If I say ‘I just do it,’ this conveys the impression of arbitrariness.]

‘We don’t arrive at the idea of causality by observing simultaneity, but by perceiving directly in certain cases that a certain thing is the cause.’

I start. Someone says, ‘Why do you start?’ I say, ‘Because of that flash.’ Do I perceive simultaneity (succession)? I call ‘cause’ that at which I look or at which I start away. To talk of ‘being immediately aware’ gives a misleading impression. Is Russell also aware of being immediately aware? Otherwise, why the ceremony of classifying impressions?⁴⁶

[Russell says he must classify it as a cat, before he actually says the word ‘cat.’]



39 Conjectural reading of the second numeral. The date appears only in N.

40 Cf. Russell 1935: 136–138.

41 Cf. vW 159: 11r (1938).

42 Not in N; crossed out in MS: [wrong?]

43 Cf. vW 119: 127r–v (16 November 1937), vW 159: 9v–10v, 12r–v (1938).


44 In N: W. would prefer to say

45 In N, on a new line, followed by: To say, ‘I am immediately aware of it.’

46 Cf. Russell 1935: 137.


[Perhaps he draws a line from one picture to another in the mind.] Ceremony of drawing a line. [If so, must we also classify the second picture?] As it doesn't matter what he has on top of what, who says that the table he has in mind has to be used in the same way?

Private and public games of chess. If Russell says he classifies it, we don't know what he does – in fact it doesn't matter what he does. A man has a private table for the use of the word 'cat', etc., words and pictures opposite to them.⁴⁷



If I know nothing about the table, I don't know how it is a table. All that matters is the result – whether what he calls 'cat' is what we call 'cat'.

Suppose a string was attached to me and I felt a pull. I might say: 'Go along the string [round the corner] to find the cause of the tug.' [The person who pulled the string is the cause of the tug.] 'Cause' is often used in connection with following one particular kind of mechanism.



We follow the mechanism to find the cause. Hence the idea of a causal nexus. It is often said, 'Cause is a connection.' But what is a connection? A string. A cogwheel. Tracing a cause often means tracing a mechanism.⁴⁸

Another thing we take as a prototype of cause is impact. If a thing has been explained by impact, then it has been explained. [In mechanics, explanation by impact is the final explanation. This, as opposed to finding out by repeated experiments that something is the cause.] In a simpler language-game, finding the cause might be finding what strikes.

It would be misleading to say here,⁴⁹ 'I am immediately aware of the cause' – we point to the cause (it is this here).

47 Following N. In MS, there are two tables; one with horizontal arrows. Cf. CE: 409.

48 Cf. vW 119: 123 (15 October 1937), 124–126, 129f. (16 October 1937), LC: 13–17.

49 In N, an arrow is drawn, going from the figure, above, to this sentence.

[Why do we call all these things 'cause' then? Because their use is similar in many respects. We predict by means of them.]

No one, in English, says he wills to do something. He lifts his arm. It is said, 'I am immediately aware of the cause of lifting my arm – the act of willing it.' One reason why one uses 'cause' here is that one can, in a very large number of cases, predict the movements of the body, e.g. that before three seconds I will put my hand here.

The case of two seeds of tulips and rose. [It is repellent to say: 'There is no difference between them. But this will produce a tulip because it comes from one, and that will produce a rose because it comes from the other.' You feel inclined to say, if no difference can be found, that there must be a distinctive disturbance in the surrounding ether.] 'A cause can't operate over a gap in time.' This picture [of a cause operating over a gap] is intolerable. But we can imagine ourselves settling down on it. [The idea of] action at a distance shocked [scientists]. This idea of action at a distance⁵⁰ revolutionized science. To say that the seeds are the same would be a revolution; similarly with indeterminism. We would play a different game, and [we would] no longer be inclined to say: 'There must be a difference.' There is an ideal – a direction in which investigations are pushed.⁵¹

Russell is thinking on the one hand of the feeling of conviction – which is as strong when I say, 'I'm sure I see a chair' as when I say 'I see red' – on the other hand of the game played. [The difference in certainty which there is between seeing black and seeing a chair is not one of feeling. The difference is in the *uses* of the two, in the different games played with 'I see a chair' and 'I see black!']

Suppose I played draughts with chessmen. While I made a move, my state of mind might be exactly the same as in a game of chess.

To refer to a gesture (instead of a state of mind) is like talking of the position of a pointer on a clock, instead of the time. [I often go from a statement about a state of mind to a statement about a gesture, etc.] If I talk of the state of mind a man is in when he says so and so, I must give a criterion for that. (Talk about 'a certain state of mind!') [Two senses of 'a certain state of mind': (1) as a preliminary to a specification; (2) not as a preliminary to a specification. In (1) it's the gesture that counts; in (2) it's what he says.] We want to talk of a state of mind [at the moment you say what you do say], which is, as it were, a picture of the whole game.

The idea that meaning is a state of mind at the time, or something happening at the time, rather than the use, which is spread out over time.

⁵⁰ *In MS, added over the line:* of indeterminism

⁵¹ *Cf. Necessary Propositions, 'All There': Logical Necessity, vW 119: 21–26 = CE: 372–376 (26 September 1937), 410f., GWL: 90f., 220, RPP I §903, Z §608, Rhees 2002: 17.*

Understanding, when I give Lewy orders for the grocer, is playing the game. How can I in an act of understanding grasp the whole use [e.g. of 'sphere', 'cube', etc.]?⁵² The idea that as knowing must correspond to the whole game – to a large set of criteria – I must have them all in mind at once, play the whole game each moment.

[Mustn't I have checked off all possible criteria, if I really *know* he's in the chair?]

What is the difference [in your state of mind] between expecting a man to tea at 4.30, 5.00, and 5.30? [How do you know it's one and not the other?] It can't be only your saying different words. [So it must be something corresponding to the words.

No, it isn't *only* your saying different words.]

Lecture 6

27 May 1938

'A physical fact is not the kind of thing that can be known.'⁵³ [There is a] picture of the structure of a physical fact not fitting the structure of knowing. [Cf. asking: what is the logical structure of the facts of the world?]

Compare: 'Hydrogen can't combine with Oxygen, because of valencies, O = -H, because of structure.'⁵⁴ Similarly, knowing and physical fact can't combine. [Cf. 'A cube can't lie in a plane. It doesn't fit!'] We may talk of the idea of logical fitting, as opposed to the idea of physical fitting, e.g. '2 + 2 fit 4'.

Our senses oscillate between grammatical rules and statements of fact.

We chose the foot because it corresponds to facts. On the other hand, the foot is now the unit of length. [It seems as though] possibility and impossibility are brought *into* language. [It seems as though 2 and 3 were too big for 4, and red and green too much for one place.] It is as though conflicts were going on in language itself, corresponding to physical conflicts. You feel that knowing doesn't fit physical facts, but would fit something else.

We have in law courts constantly to separate knowledge from surmise. ['I saw Mr Smith ...' – 'So you only *saw* a shadow?'] It comes down to that all he knows is evidence of his senses, so that it seems that all he has is sense-data. [But: 'So all you know is that you saw a red patch? Are you sure you remember this?' – There *is* this game, and it is an important one.]

52 Cf. LFM: 24, 26, GWL: 182, PG: 243, PI §138.

53 MS attributes this statement to Russell. No such attribution in N and CE: 423.

54 Cf. vW 159: 20r-v (1938).

You could say: 'Haven't you even forgotten the use of the word "red", so that everything you say is of no use?'

The next step is: 'Even if you know that a man is sitting in this chair, you know it in a different sense.' Cf. do you doubt in a different way that Lewy is sitting in this chair and that you are seeing brown? Most people wouldn't question these things at all. We do play a different game with '[I see a] brown patch' and with 'I know there is a man in this chair.'

You say that knowing is a mental process and that therefore when you know the one thing you obviously do something different to when you know the other.

'What happens when a man knows so and so?' Is there a difference between 'I know so and so' and 'It happens that I know so and so'? This ['It happens'] adds nothing to the verb.

If you ask, 'What happens when a man eats?', you can either give a definition or a description of what eating consists of. On the other hand, 'know' is not used to describe a happening. Cf. 'What happens when A checkmates B?'

We could mean two things:

Aren't there characteristic events happening at the time when we say a man knows? 'I say such and such words, make such and such a face. But this can't be all. What happens which is relevant is that he says certain things. These things aren't meant by the word 'know', etc. But this doesn't mean anything more happens.

Often nothing happens, e.g. I know there's not an abyss on the other side of the door. I just walk out.

The verb 'I know' is not explained by giving any event. Russell talked of knowing as a relation between subject and fact.⁵⁵ Here, as often, an expression of language stops us from looking at the facts. The expression ['I know this'] suggests a prejudice: 'I – know – this.' Everything else seems irrelevant. [We immediately compare 'I know this' with 'I do this.' The linguistic analogy occupies our whole attention.]

['Is a feeling of conviction necessarily present when you know something?' – *When* does the feeling of conviction take place?] ('Suppose you have a feeling of conviction between two acts of thinking, which belongs to which?' [The question] sounds and is absurd.)

[Do all the things you know go on all the time inside you?] Don't the acts of knowing the multiplication table, Shakespeare, etc., etc., all going on at once, interfere [with one another]? [Distinguish between dispositional and non-dispositional knowledge.]

⁵⁵ Cf. Russell 1984 [1913]: 105, 114f.

[If I threw you into the depth of the morass (of the puzzle about knowing) and then hauled you out, you would have an *experience*.] Obviously you have an experience when you make a gesture. The gesture fixes the feeling.

‘We could use the word “know” so that we wouldn’t say we knew unless we had a feeling of conviction within two minutes [of the act of thinking].’ (Having a feeling of conviction. Pulling out a watch.) But this hasn’t any resemblance to our use of the word ‘know’.

What applies to knowing applies also to understanding. Example: 2, 12, 19, ..., etc. ‘Oh, now I know!’ What happens when he understands? He suddenly says it, laughs, etc. When you then say what happens isn’t all understanding it seems. [But is this all understanding consists in?] How did you learn ‘know’, ‘Now I understand’? At a certain point you give a signal or simply do something. You could use an expression like ‘Oh Heavens!’ Then there would be no verb about it at all.

Cf. ‘What happens when one remembers? In case of memory, the characteristic feature is the memory image.’ [You’re tempted to reduce everything to the case in which you have an image.] How do you know it is one [a memory image]? etc.


The existence of a feeling of conviction is not though at all irrelevant.

‘He left her after a year, which showed he didn’t really love her. It couldn’t have been the real feeling.’ It becomes doubtful then whether it is [true] by definition or by experience.

[There are sorts of feelings characteristic of memory which at times accompany memory, e.g. a far off tone of voice or a feeling of pastness (‘far far away’).]

You think you must probe to find out what happens.

Children are taught words like ‘surprise’, ‘recognition’, etc., with very exaggerated gestures [and overemphasized tones of voice].

It might be said, ‘When most people speak, they don’t mean anything. They just say things automatically.’ [I say, ‘I’m sure there’s a sofa in the room.’ Are you *really* sure? You hardly thought at all. How can you be sure?] I might *really* be sure a sofa was in the room. ‘I – sure – sofa in room.’ Compared with this, the ordinary use of language appears mechanical. We’re inclined to say ‘I  sofa’ (often found in a lecture on epistemology). [You see this sort of diagram on the blackboard after a lecture in epistemology.] Being sure is a queer activity: rays going from me to the fact. I can’t help thinking this picture is taken from light rays – eyes, rays, etc. By ‘being sure’ we mean no process which looks like this.

Can one deny in the same sense that there is a sofa in the room, that $2 + 3 = 5$,⁵⁶ and that I have a headache, in the same sense of 'deny'? Can one use the word 'not' [in each case]? – Yes. Can one have the same feelings of denial? – Yes. Do we play the same game with 'denial' [in each case]; have the same grounds for denial, etc.? – No, obviously not.

Similarly: with knowing that $2 + 3 = 5$; that there is a brown patch; that there is a sofa. Are $\sim\sim$ (neg) and $\sim\sim$ (pos) different kinds of negation? [Cf. 'If $\sim\sim p = p$ in one case and $\sim\sim p = \sim p$ in another, must the ' \sim ' be different in the two cases?'] Cf. 'If two chemicals give something different, they must have been different things.' Similarly: 'The two negations must have been two different things [if they gave something different].' Cf. 'The real king in chess can only move in *one* way.'

I once had the idea that a word had, as it were, a body connected with it.⁵⁷ Suppose I had shapes made with glass: a cube with a red base, but the cube itself invisible; a pyramid with a red base, but an invisible pyramid, etc. Meaning was something invisible behind the word which made it impossible to put it together [with other words] in a certain way – it, as it were, embodied the rules.

You have to see that the verb does not refer primarily to what happens at the time, but to what happens before and after. Very often words like 'hope' and 'mean' are used to describe mental processes. 'When you said you were delighted, did you really mean it?' These words often do refer to what happens at the time.

Cf. a feeling of wanting an apple and I say, 'I want an apple.' But the feeling could just as well have been a feeling of wanting a pear. But what is the feeling? A feeling of hunger.

Lecture 7

One wouldn't be tempted to say, 'You can't know there is a chair there' unless you were sometimes tempted to say this in ordinary life, e.g. you describe a conjuring trick. A man might say: 'All you know is that you had this kind of image' ['All you saw was so and so, so you couldn't have known it']. You would like to give the man a film [of what you saw. 'That's what I saw, now *you* interpret it'].

'Obviously, whatever you know, you know only through your senses. Everything else is conjecture.' The 'evidence of the senses' is first the eye, then

⁵⁶ In *N*, here and in the next paragraph: $2 + 2 = 5$

⁵⁷ Cf. 'meaning-bodies' in *PG*: 54, I, §16.

the ear, then – nothing. [You might say:] ‘The eye gives us pictures.’ The first thing we might say is that the eye doesn’t give us pictures. ‘The pictures don’t last.’⁵⁸ [When we talk about sense-data we have resource to pictures.]

We compare what actually happens with the idea that the first thing we got hold of is like painted pictures.

Supposing instead of using language to describe on the one hand sense-data, on the other physical objects, [we have two boxes. One is full of pictures.]⁵⁹ When we want to show someone something, we look up the right picture [and say:] ‘This is what I see.’ The other box contains models. I can either describe what I see by pictures or by models. If I want to show you what I see out there, I do it either by pictures or by models.

Could you say that if I use models I am being rash? [‘If you use a model you’re a bit rash. You aren’t so rash if you use a picture.’] ‘Surely the primary game is to show you just pictures; the secondary [game is showing] models.’ [Our saying in some cases:] ‘Is this a puppet or a painted man or not? Perhaps he will turn round’ inclines us to call it primary.

It would be easier to show a model. Why shouldn’t this (the model game) be the only game I had learnt? You might say: ‘Doubt can’t adhere to pictures, but can adhere to models.’

[The idea that there is something you see indubitably is connected with realism in painting.] When we think of pictures we always think of pictures in the style of picture postcards not in the style of Picasso. Although Picasso tried to draw exactly what he saw. No one would admit that what Picasso draws are data [of sense. Convention in painting. The child must learn *not* to do certain things.]

What happens is similar to what happens when we talk of an infinite approach to accuracy. (‘Coming to tea at five.’)

We try to get more and more indubitable facts [to make what we say] more and more certain. It is possible in great many cases to say: ‘But this is still conjecture. All the evidence was only so and so.’ We take this procedure as a model.

If we imagine experience gives us pictures, it does not give us sentences which express pictures, or pictures which express the picture. Doubt, which still inheres, could be in the end whether I use ‘blue’ in the right way. In a great many cases, it is more certain that I see a blue patch than that I see a blue waistcoat.

⁵⁸ Quotation marks have been added in MS.

⁵⁹ In *N*, instead: we have a box full of pictures.

The idea is that the senses give evidence, but the senses give nothing at all. Senses say nothing. ‘The senses give evidence, not in a spoken language, but in a picture language. We can give, first, the picture language, then the ordinary language, and this is the more primitive. ‘The senses give evidence in a picture language, and we translate it into spoken language.’⁶⁰ [As though pictures were imprinted on the mind from without. The sense evidence is compared to a sort of cinema reel you refer to.]

If you say, ‘I see it’, I say that this is of no use (as you can’t translate it into ordinary language), since we don’t know what method of translation you use.

A savage might say: ‘What I saw was this $\cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot \cdot$ ’ and then count dots. The picture is in what is drawn, and it is a metaphor to say that the senses provide us with pictures. We form a crude theory – or crude picture of what happens when we see, etc.

Then there is an idea that though no doubt is possible as to what the senses tell us, there is always doubt as to interpretation. It would only be a matter of being conscientious to doubt everything. Cf. looking up words in a dictionary [when translating]. ‘If I was very conscientious, I would look up *every* word.’⁶¹

The whole game we play depends just as much on not doubting every physical fact as on not doubting whether we are using ‘green’, ‘red’, etc., correctly. We might think that although doubts as to whether we use words correctly would make the game impossible, doubt as to physical facts would only make the game more difficult [but more accurate]. Suppose instead of saying, ‘There is a sofa in this room’, I look around [carefully]. But why should I ever be convinced? Why should I even conjecture? Isn’t it rash even to conjecture? I don’t scrutinize evidence closely to reach conclusion. [It is not a case of scrutinizing evidence closely to reach a conclusion.] I can’t get at any evidence at all.

Suppose we made experiments which gave us certain data, which gave us a curve.




Suppose I asked: ‘Isn’t it always rash to draw a curve? [Perhaps there are only the dots]’. In a particular case, it is not more rash to draw a curve than to make a dot here. You could say (i), perhaps there are only data, nothing else at all, or (ii) more cases wouldn’t give a curve. It is as if there was an ideal of

60 Quotation marks have been added in MS.

61 Quotation marks have been added in MS.

cautiousness. Whereas what we do is doubt the dictionaries. It looked at first as though there was one correct way to play the game. This is quite wrong – it is only the right game in a very limited field.

To say ‘It is rash to draw a curve’ would come to ‘You must not draw a curve.’ If there is evidence at all, there is evidence now. A different kind of doubt adheres to curves and to points in that given the points you can draw this curve:



To say that to the curve a different kind of doubt adheres would be like saying that to the sentence ‘I see a red patch’ a different kind of doubt adheres. This is wrong if it refers to the state of mind of the person. What is correct is that we play a different game with one to the other.⁶²

If I am doubtful about whether this is blue, I [don’t] ask ‘Is this called “blue”?’ but ‘Is this vest blue?’, etc.

At the bottom is that we want to reduce the game played with models to that played with pictures. But it can’t actually be reduced. None of us could describe what we see, or paint it.


Suppose Russell asked, ‘What does “I met Jones in the street” mean?’ and I showed a coloured film and said, ‘It means this.’ [‘This can’t be, because this other picture is also my meeting Jones in the street.’] This explanation could be supplemented in a thousand ways. We don’t learn words just by being shown the picture; the picture alone could give me thousands of games. No ostensive explanation could give me anything like a full explanation of the use of a word. [*Redpath*: ‘I held up a piece of chalk as an explanation of “chalk”.’ But what about chalk in a quarry pit?]⁶³ Russell and others simplify our language. They construct a game which is not the game played. ‘Each sentence has its sense evidence attached.’ (Watson) I want to say what tempts one to make such simplifications.

We have a tendency to say that everything must be well grounded; we imagine one unshakeable foundation on which all our knowledge rests – i.e. our sense evidence. It seems that the game with models is not well grounded.⁶⁴

62 *In N*: What is correct is that we play a diff game with one to other; all with one doubt to other.

63 *In N*, *instead*: (*Redpath*. chalk & chalk quarry, etc.)

64 *The figure below is drawn by the editors according to the instruction rendered in facsimile.*



I can say, 'This is a sofa,' thinking of the painted image. If Moore says, 'This is a sofa,' we can interpret 'this' as the picture before me which corresponds to a sofa.

We say, 'This is a chair' in many different ways:

- 1) pointing to a picture [of a chair] (often used);
- 2) pointing to a sugar-box, 'This is what I use as a chair' (often used);
- 3) pointing in mist;
- 4) pointing to what looks like a chair, i.e. it is not a sham;
- 5) pointing to a reflection;
- 6) [pointing to] where the chair is collapsible (often used); etc.

Does 'This is a human hand' [as Moore uses it] mean, 'I have a real hand' or 'This is called a hand' (this is what everyone knows), but this is a definition, or, 'It is a sofa (hand) which gives me the impression I have, i.e. it is not a hallucination?'⁶⁵

Would pointing to a picture on a screen and saying, 'This is a book' do, for what Moore means? Cf. 'This is a knight,' pointing to a painting. The words 'This is a sofa' don't refer to any sense impression. 'To what sense impression do they refer?' (Again, a mirage of a language.) The words are not used in such a way that 'this' refers to one sense impression (unless you can say to *what* sense impression they refer).

[It is like a case of talking to oneself.] What does talking to myself consist in? You say these words to yourself. (Like giving myself a present, and giving myself a letter of thanks, with the one hand and with the other. I can do this.)⁶⁶

Are you pointing to the subject or predicate or both [i.e. when you say in this particular way 'This is a sofa']? Do you know what you are pointing to, the

65 Cf. Moore 1928, Section IV.

66 Cf. Similarity Lecture 10, vW 119: 103r (13 November 1937), PI §268.

sense impression or the sofa? You use an instrument of language (pointing) (without making use of it, Y. S.). The idea is that 'this' refers to an impression, behind which is the sofa (like [in the case of the] screen), or 'the cause of' or 'corresponding to' [which is the sofa]. I say⁶⁷ you mustn't point to the sense-impression and the sofa at the same time.

'To this sense impression corresponds a sofa.' You might say, 'To *this* (pointing) sense impression corresponds a sofa' (as apart from *this* sense impression). This comes roughly to saying, 'Here is a sofa.' Suppose there was here a sofa, here paper giving exactly the same sense impression as the sofa. Isn't it a contradiction to say, 'This is a sofa' and 'This (pointing to the same thing) is not a sofa'?

Cf. $(\exists x).\phi x$. 'There is an x such that x is a man.' What is x which is a man? What is the thing of which we say it is a man? We say, 'There are men who wear ...' and 'There is a man, etc.', but not 'There is a thing which is an animal, etc.'

I don't deny there is a subject of which we assert that it is a circle. But it isn't at all clear what is the subject.

['This is a circle.'] 'This' could be the centre, so that the sentence meant 'Round this point a circle is drawn.' 'What would it be like if this was not a circle?' This is all right. Or 'this' could be bits of chalk, a bit of string which now is a circle, now an ellipse.

'This is a human hand.' Can it be something else after half an hour? What is 'this', which alters [or not]? Do I mean *this* (material) or picture in front of me is a human hand (later it will be a bit of paper)?

There is a superstition: 'How on earth do you know what you mean by the noises you make? How does Moore know he is pointing to a sense impression? How does he know he isn't pointing to a sofa and saying it is a sofa?' If I say, 'By 'this' I mean this outline', then it is all right.

When I point to a sense impression, that I am doing this is characterized by the use I make of my sentence. I draw a picture, etc.

If I say, 'By this I mean my sense impression', my sentence comes to no more than 'What I see is a sofa.' If you were talking to yourself, why did you point at all? 'The other day I saw something in the distance and it looked like *this*', pointing to a sofa. Here we are pointing to a sense impression. We say this because of the use we make of the sentence.

67 In N: W. says

Lecture 8

4 June 1938

When in philosophy one says, 'One can't know such and such' or 'One can only know ...', one is advocating a use of the word 'know' contrary to the usual one. One of the most characteristic features of the word 'know' is that we nearly always apply it in cases where it is sensible to say we were wrong. 'Couldn't the philosophers be right in what they were saying?' I don't know what this would mean, as they are merely advocating a different use.

The question is: why do they advocate a different use? 'I know so and so went into his room' could be said in most (formal) law cases. 'Was he drunk?', 'Was the light good?', 'Has he ever had hallucinations?', etc. 'No'. But he could always be wrong. Supposing that all the normal conditions held. If a certain concatenation of circumstances arises, the word 'know' is used in such a way that he would say, 'I didn't know: I only thought I knew.' The man used the word correctly, i.e. we who taught him how to use the word couldn't possibly have taught him not to use it in this case. So he played the game correctly when he said he knew it.

Everyone draws an analogy between 'I know' and 'I believe' [or 'I feel sure']. But it makes no sense to say, 'I only thought I believed' – whereas 'I only thought I knew' has good sense.

We use 'I know' on the one hand analogously to 'I feel sure', on the other so that it has to be withdrawn. We treat the word 'know' more or less as we treat the word 'have' or 'possess'. 'I had a pair of shoes, but now I haven't', etc. [You don't say 'I had a pair of shoes, but there wasn't a pair.']⁶⁸ This is one reason why we are inclined to say we only know things about sense-data.

To say 'I saw a chair, but there wasn't one really' is all right, though queer. But to say 'I had the impression of a red patch, but there wasn't one there' makes no sense at all. ('I have such and such a sense impression' is used similarly to 'I have such and such a pair of shoes.')

There is a reason for using a construction (1) analogously to 'to have' and (2) analogously to 'to believe'.

A blame attaches to saying 'I know' when it's wrong. There is an inclination to say that if a man says, 'I know', and then he's wrong, he's to blame. [We may feel that a person who says, 'I know *p*', when $\sim p$, isn't playing the game.] A meteorologist who says it will rain, when it doesn't, we don't blame. We hardly even say he's mistaken. We expect things like this. An astronomer who predicts an eclipse, but a star interferes, is like a man losing a game of chess. No blame

68 Cf. Knowing is here like having; having in yourself. (*vW* 159: 30v)

attaches. On the other hand, if in a psychological experiment the patient doesn't tell the truth, he is to blame.

We use the word 'know' so that if a man says, 'I know', he mustn't be wrong, or only in very rare cases. Its usage is like 'believe' in that there can be no doubt as to whether you know or not, as there can't be whether you believe or not. [One is inclined to say: 'Surely there can be no doubt whether we know or not' in the same sense as 'There can be no doubt whether we believe or not.']

For all practical purposes it would be enough to have only the expression 'I'm sure.' The word 'know' fastens a sentence, like putting a peg into a wall [which is not going to be removed and saying: 'This is going to stand'], 'This is not going to be withdrawn.'

Do we have any right to fasten once and for all any sentences besides those about sense-data, etc.? 'Have we a right?' is queer, because who is going to allow us or not allow us?

If you doubt certain things, such as (the existence of) Trinity College, or Trinity Street, you say, 'If I doubt this, I doubt everything. If this isn't true, I'm crazy.' If we saw no Trinity College, we would say we were having a hallucination, etc. On these grounds we could fix certain sentences treating of physical objects by saying: 'If you ask me to doubt this I can't say anything.' I can just as well doubt the uses of the words 'red' and 'blue' and 'green' [in which case I can't say anything].⁶⁹

As it is, the use of the word ['know'] isn't limited to these cases. In cases such as Trinity College, if I were asked, 'What would you do if evidence was produced?', etc., I couldn't say what I would do.

One could put the position of those who say, 'You can't know ...' by: 'To know is to have, and one can only have sense-data.' (One wouldn't say, 'to know is to perceive'; as Lewy suggested.)⁷⁰ The thing is: to eliminate the case of saying, 'I didn't know, I only thought I did', which we would do if we restricted the use [of 'know'] to knowing sense impressions. The idea is that if a man is really conscientious, this can't happen [he wouldn't say 'know' when he might say afterwards 'I only thought I knew']. The analogy is the case of 'I believe' where you can't say, 'I thought I believed.'

There is no need to preface 'I have pain' with 'know' because there is no need to fix that.

Suppose you say, 'I knew he went into the room', you might produce as a justification a coloured film; though this would be a very queer (unusual) case.

⁶⁹ Cf. *Puzzle of Trinity College*.

⁷⁰ *Parentetical sentence crossed out in N*.

Or would your justification be that you have seen the man before from all angles, etc.?

[WITTGENSTEIN:] Do you know you are using the word 'pain' rightly?

RHEES: I don't care.


WITTGENSTEIN: That is, you know what you know. You have what you have.

I recommend, if you want to get out of a ditch, [it is important] to get in and out and in and out over and over again.

'You can't be in the same state of mind about a man going into the room as you can be about⁷¹ seeing such and such a patch.'

'You can't have a carbuncle in the sense you have pain.' The notion of 'having' which fits pain doesn't fit a physical object, the boil.⁷² 'Fitting' is like that of a sphere into a cylinder, and not a cube into a cylinder.

Two different uses of 'fitting': (1) as I use it in geometry; (2) as I use it to describe a physical fact, e.g. (1) 'A circle will fit into a square if its radius is half the size of the square.



(2) 'This peg fits into this hole.'

When you talk of 'fitting' in connection with pain, you don't want it to be an experiential statement. [But you imagine some sort of *sham* trial. As it were, you try if you can have a boil as you have a pain and find you can't.] You would say, "'Having" in "having pain" is used in a different sense to "having" in "having a boil".'




$$s = f(r).$$

71 Following MS. In N: about a man

72 In N, followed by: this states same case.

You could have an experiential statement and the experiential statement might contradict the geometrical one. We would say that the disk must have contracted.⁷³ 'A circle can never fit an angle in the same sense that a semi-circle does.'



Suppose in (i) I say, 'The angle has a circle' and in (ii) 'The angle has a semi-circle.'

'A square could never have a circle in the same sense it could have a square.' Not satisfactory examples. (Wittgenstein)⁷⁴

'A wire-ring can never hold a cylinder in the same sense a wire-ring can hold a disc.' I⁷⁵ could say this is a grammatical statement. You could have used different words.

'A cylinder can never fit a ring⁷⁶ in the same sense (way) it can fit a hollow cylinder.'

Rhees: There seems to be a difference in situation.

It seems that the meaning of 'fitting' [in the one case] doesn't fit [the meaning of 'fit' in] the other case. We are using 'fitting' in different ways. But does this mean there are two different states of mind?

'If a man uses 'fitting'⁷⁷ as a relation between a cylinder and a ring on the one hand, and between a cylinder and a cylinder on the other hand, he must have used the word in two different ways.' He says nothing more by the last sentence than he has said already. It seems that the whole use is collected in meaning.

[You ask:] 'In what ways?' He could have pointed to two different pictures and said: 'In the one case I meant that, in the other *that*.' Here he would be defining what he meant by 'two different cases of usage.'

Rhees wishes to imagine a state of mind, which is meaning, which fits pain but doesn't fit the boil.

73 In N, followed by: $\forall S$ In MS, instead of the first two sentences: 'Where $s = f(r)$, the circle fits a triangle.' This may be an experiential statement and be false. The experiential statement might contradict the geometrical one.


74 Only in N, added over the line and connected with an arrow: not satisfactory examples. W.

75 In N: W.

76 Following MS, in N: loop

77 In N, followed by: in two different cases

Suppose I show what I mean by 'fitting' by giving examples of boxes, cylinders, etc., fitting into one another:



fitting (1)

ring
cylinder

fitting (2)

then another series of cases by drawing cylinders and rings, etc. [I say:] 'He uses the word in two different ways – namely this and that.' We call it two different ways because we have assumed two sets of explanations. If you ask, 'Are these really two different ways?', this is an absurd question. You can call them different or the same.



Which case of fitting does this fit? You could say both.

It isn't so clear that 'having a boil' fits 'having pennies', etc. Why shouldn't I say it fits both?

If you say you can't have pain in the same sense as you can have a boil, you are tempted to say that your statement is both experiential and grammatical. When Rhees talks of a state of mind, he seems to wish to use it experientially.

If I use 'fitting' in [senses] (1) and (2), there needn't be a different state of mind present. [If you take the experiential statement, then you may be wrong.]

It is as though you included in the notion of fitting 'having a body and a ring,' and then as though you did not include it.

Supposing we have two senses of the word 'fitting,' 'fitting₁' and 'fitting₂.' [Suppose I said:] 'A cylinder can't fit a ring in the same sense that it can fit a cylinder.' What did this mean? I didn't use an index. If I said, 'A cylinder can't fit₂ a ring in the same sense it can fit₂ a cylinder,' this would be nonsense. I wrote two indices and not two words because this could mislead. If they are different words, the sentence can't be said at all. If I use it without indices, the sentence is all right.


Similarly, if I introduce 'have₁' and 'have₂,' I can't say 'A man can't have a pain in the same sense as he can have a boil.'

The sentence brings before the mind an experiment, which of course is a delusion. There is no case of a something which fits the boil and a something which fits the pain. If there were, it could be doubted whether there was something which fitted both the boil and the pain.


Lecture 9

10⁷⁸ June 1938

⁷⁹'I thought I knew' ought to make one feel awkward, as 'I thought I believed' does [because of this curious grammar of 'know']. It seems as though the ideal case of knowing is knowing a sense-datum. [How can knowing fit the one case when it fits the other? Cf. again: 'Can one have a boil in the sense in which one has toothache?'] How can knowing fit a physical fact if it fits the fact that you have a certain impression?⁸⁰



'A three-pronged fork can never fit a four-pronged fork in the same sense as it can fit a three-pronged fork.' It is a case of the structure of what you know. The structure of knowing can't fit a physical fact in the same way as it fits a sense-datum.



[These] two figures will be illustrations of what I call 'join' in the one case and in the other. [You look at the figures to learn what I mean when I use these terms.]


To say of two 4-pronged forks that they are joined in the sense of join₂ – I just don't know what this is like; although if I can give a rule, then I do know what it's like.

[If you ask: 'Can two 4-pronged forks be joined in way 2?' – what shall we say?] I may not use 'join₂' for two 4-pronged forks at all, but I may, e.g.


⁷⁸ The day number may read 15 or 18, instead. Full Term officially ended on 10 June, cf. Introduction 1.

⁷⁹ In MS, preceded by: It is queer to say: 'I thought I knew it.' 'Know' is so similar in many ways to 'think' and 'believe'; which are used differently. On the other hand, it is used similarly to 'see'. You can't say, 'I saw the red chair, but there wasn't one'. This is partly inconsistent with Lectures 10 and 11, PI §138b, OC §12 and §21.

⁸⁰ Rhees' figure on the right is different (cf. CE: 423). In Smythies' MS, under the figure on the right, written in Rhees' hand: (?Lewy)




This is not how we make illustrations. [It's odd to describe this as join_2 . It's an impractical picture. It is most important that there is a convention here.

Cf. the importance of  not being a picture of Watson.

One may be tempted to say:] 'Surely this is not a mere matter of words. It is in the *nature* of 3- and 4-pronged forks that they can't be joined [in this way].'

Suppose there are in a drawer two forks, and I ask, 'Are they joined in the first way?', and the answer is 'They can't by their nature be joined in this way.' This may be a bit of information, not about the paradigms, but about the two forks, i.e. that they have a different number of prongs [i.e. an empirical statement which tells us about the forks].

[But what when you say of the two forks in open view:] (1) 'These two forks can't be joined in this way –'



If Rhees can't see the forks, this might mean: 'The forks have a different number of prongs.' [It is important to ask:] Does 'these' mean 'the forks that are in this place'?


Suppose that when I try to join them a new prong grows and I ask: 'Is it still this fork or not?' So (1) means that when two forks are brought together, a new [fourth] prong doesn't appear. It is not clear what criterion for identity is being used for forks [what is being done with (1)].

We wish to talk not about an external relation, but about an internal relation. 'It is in the nature of' and 'It is because of an internal relation' are used in the same way.

'These two forks have different natures,' meaning they have a different number of prongs. But you can't refer to a paradigm of having different natures.



This is what we call 'having different natures.' It is as though you were saying, 'It is hopeless to try to join these.' A sham experiment. One thinks it is a case of [their] not being able to be joined. 'In what way can't they be joined?' – 'In *this* way.'



These are predicates. But what is it you say this about? It may be about forks. ‘They can’t be joined; they look like this.’ This makes sense. But ‘These look like this’ doesn’t.

In philosophy language idles, and that it idles is shown by the fact that no one asks how it is used.⁸¹

[We are inclined to think that everything about join_1 and join_2 is given in the examples. In most cases,] illustrations are used in very limited ways. The use of them is fixed. [But not here.]

[So, what are you saying when you say that the two senses of knowing are different?] ‘Knowing that I have pain is not the same as knowing there is a sofa in the room. The two can’t be compared.’

Cf. Rhees saying that it’s not merely a matter of words, but of [the difference between] states of mind [with ‘It’s not merely a matter of words, but of the difference of nature between two forks]. Here also you might say it’s not merely a matter of words, but of forks.

[All the uses of ‘I know I’m in pain’ are *uneigentlich*, odd. You could substitute something else in each case.]

The philosophical idea is that the reason I don’t say ‘I know I have tooth-ache’ is because it would be a truism. In the very rare cases where the sentence is used, it is used utterly differently from normal (a Pickwickian sense?). What we nearly always wish to do is to project all uses of a word into a picture. This word means that – thinking of a picture. The picture is generally that of a state of mind.

Lecture 10

(Notes of Taylor)⁸²

Rhees: ‘I was inclined to say that the *only* difference between knowing and believing can’t be just that we use the words differently.’

We don’t ordinarily ask, ‘What is the difference between an elephant and a match?’, but we do ask (say): ‘What is the difference between a zebra and a horse?’

81 Cf. *vW 159: 31v (1938), BT: 258r, PI §38.*

82 *In N, the lecture begins on the next recto page after the end of the last lecture with what in MS is described as My notes. Following MS, we begin with Taylor’s notes; crossed out in MS.*

If you ask, ‘What is the difference between an elephant and a match (zebra)?’, I might say: ‘*This* is an elephant and *that’s* a zebra (match)’ or I might say: ‘“Match” is used in *this* way, “elephant” in *that* way.’ If you ask, ‘What is the difference between a zebra and a horse?’, I could say: ‘The one is striped and the other is not.’ This would be a different kind of explanation.

When you ask, ‘What’s the difference?’, you refer to some *particular* kind of difference usually. ‘Two different states of mind’ sounds like two similar things (descriptions) differing in some respects.

If you *call* both knowing and believing states of mind, then you can say that they are *different* states of mind; and what you mean is that you *call* them each the same thing, and they are used differently. But you torture yourself by trying to *introspect* the difference. You can’t find the difference this way. You don’t mean by saying that they are two different states of mind that you *can* introspect the difference.

(You use ‘know’ to pin something down.) What would be the point of pinning down ‘I have toothache’?

‘If now we *really* introspected, we would find the difference between the two.’ He says: ‘In the case of pain, you *can* actually introspect.’ Cf. saying that every judgement must be *about* something.

It’s a case of wishing to project all the uses of a word into a picture, of wishing to find everything given all at once in the picture. ‘These words mean *this*’ – thinking of the picture. The picture is that of a state of mind.

You *seem* to be able to introspect differences. Spread out what you *do* introspect: all sorts of things, the different sounds of the words etc., etc. All sorts of special associations in the cases of particular persons (e.g. ‘knowing’ is always for me something brown).


‘Certain’ suggests uncertainty in the way ‘know’ doesn’t. You are taught to be extremely careful in using the word ‘know’.

‘Even though the state of mind *is* the same in the two cases₁ (in a particular case), the two sorts of knowing still don’t fit.’ This is not experimental, but logical fitting. It’s in the nature of these things that they don’t fit.

I define fitting as:



and then I make the statement of



that ‘This fits this.’

What would be queer about this? It would be less queer if the things were wide apart. You would answer to 'This fits this': 'I don't know about this yet. I'm not clear about what you're doing.'

Do you mean: 'This fits this *now*'? Hold up two pieces of chalk and say: 'This chalk fits this chalk exactly.' This could mean that the chalk hasn't changed between saying the two things. Someone once said that the law of identity is really an experimental fact, only we don't usually make the experiment.

So 'This fits this' means or may mean all sorts of things. What was it worth to say: 'Knowing fits this case but not this case'? Cf. 'This fits this'

How do you know it fits? What paradigm are you referring to?

(My notes.) We don't concern ourselves about the language-game played with 'fitting', but we do concern ourselves with a picture.

If we were asked, 'What would it be like for knowing not to fit a physical fact', we would not know what to say. You could also put it: 'How do you take knowing and what you know, apart?'

What you put together is the grammar of 'to know' and the grammar of 'to have such and such an impression.'

Just as you can't know what didn't happen, so you can't have what's not there. This makes you put together knowing and sense-data. 'To know' does not fit sense-data, because of 'I thought I knew, but I didn't'.

There are two sorts of questions which are always confusing [being confused] in philosophy. With 'fitting': (1) 'Does this fit that?', (2) 'Are we to say that this fits that?' Similarly, 'being simple', 'being complex'.⁸³ As always, the question takes its meaning from what is done with it.



Suppose we asked whether $\sqrt{\quad}$ was simple or complex. What would we have to reply? What sort of investigation is this to be? [You have to ask which paradigm for 'simple' and 'complex' you have in mind.]

'Is this simple or complex?' could be 'Is this composed of two bits or only one?', etc. It could be geometrical, e.g. a prime number may be called a 'simple number'. Is 31 simple? The question could be: is it one of our simple signs? [a, b, c, etc.]

Or, take the case of a colour: is it simple or complex? Here one could get fearfully puzzled. There may be a simple answer, e.g. if simple colours are red, blue and green, and all others mixtures of these.

We can stare at it as if trying to get its essence.

83 Cf. *vW 152: 96 (1936, first half)*, *vW 133: 16v–17r, 19r–21r (2–3 November 1946)*, *BT: 455f*, *PI §47f*.

Then there is the question: 'Are we to call this complex or simple?' Suppose I learn the use of these words from  or  [and then ask: 'Well then, what about this colour? Would you call it simple or complex?']


We might be inclined to use the one word rather than another. [Most people to *this* question would not in fact say, 'I don't know what you mean', but would think and then give a certain answer.] The analogy is that you either are or are not inclined to call it 'simple' or 'complex'.

Cf. 'Which of the composers are you inclined to call ['the soup' and which] 'the joint'?' [You may answer either (a) 'Don't talk such rubbish', or (b) 'Such and such a composer'.]

One reason we are inclined to contemplate this kind of thing ['Do they fit?', 'Is it complex?', etc.] is that there really is such a game. The game of: 'What would you call this, simple or complex?' It is akin to the game: 'What colours do the vowels have?'⁸⁴ In the same way we can say: 'Do these colours fit or don't they?' ['Colours fitting' may be 'colours are the same' or 'colours harmonize.']

[Return to: 'Does knowledge fit physical objects?'] It comes to: 'Are you inclined to call it 'fitting' or not (in the case of knowing 'fitting' physical facts)?'

By leading you one way [by calling your attention to certain examples] you can be inclined to call it 'simple' (or 'fitting'), by leading you another [way you can be inclined to call it] 'complex'. [Though it is one thing to find out *what* you are inclined to call the colour, another thing to say *why* you're inclined to call it this.]

[Cf.]  [Does the straight line cut the circle at two points or not?] You can be made inclined to say that they cut, and to say that they do not. Are these two kinds of questions?

[(Taylor's notes.) I wanted to consider cases of propositions being *about* one thing or another. Are propositions really about sense-data? Are propositions about the future about the future or the present?]⁸⁵

'What is this proposition about?', e.g. if I don't understand a word. What is he talking about? 'Jack is a fool', 'Whom are you talking about?' [There is a clear answer in this case.]

To say, 'What is the proposition 'The moon goes [around] the sun' about?' – this is a grammatical question [in the literal sense].⁸⁶ [You could say 'about the moon', 'about heavenly bodies', 'about astronomy'.


⁸⁴ Cf. *Similarity Lecture 10, Description Lecture 7*, vW 115: 240f., 243 = PB: 203f., 210f., vW 150: 27 (1934/35), BB: 136, PPF §274–278 = PI II: 216c – g.

⁸⁵ In MS, designated as T's notes and crossed out.

⁸⁶ The rest of what is printed here as the end of Lecture 10 is not in N.

These are straightforward cases. But the philosophical questions are not straightforward.

Compare again: 'Is it simple or is it complex?'



You could say: 'In one sense complex, in another simple.'⁸⁷

Wisdom: The supporters of rival answers arrange temptations for you and they call this 'giving reasons' for their views.

Every such expression as 'fitting', 'simple', 'cutting', 'about' has certain simple primitive associations, e.g. 'cutting' has \ominus and not $\overline{\bigcirc}$.

The related phrases, pictures, gestures, in each case are all very complex.

Cf. 'Which colour is more pure?' You answer at once. The association of 'not dirty' – dirt generally grey.

What is 'Wisdom sitting on the sofa' about?

About a physical object.

About atoms.

About sense-data.

The idea of an ultimate analysis is present here, as though there were a peculiar ultimate way of finding out what a proposition is really about.

Is 'This is a beautiful book' about the book or about my impression?]

Lecture 11

15 June 1938

Language is an innumerably complicated thing. It is one thing to master the technique of using words [- we all do this -] and quite a different thing to give an account of it. [There is the tendency to describe it in terms of oversimplified pictures, in terms of too few paradigms.] We are always being misled by a lot of

⁸⁷ The figure is not in MS, but only in TS. It also appears in Rhees' unpublished version of Lecture 10. Cf. *Subsidiary Written Source* [4].

different analogies. What we are doing here is to point out such analogies [and how they are misleading].

We discussed the idea that ‘(knowing the word) “King”’ was a description of a state of mind.⁸⁸ [We discussed the analogy between knowing and a state of mind; the idea that ‘knowing’ is a description of a state of mind. We said that it was terribly misleading to call knowing and believing states of mind.]

If ‘believing that Smith is happily married’ is a state of mind, how is the state of mind distributed over the whole saying of the sentence [‘Smith – is – happily – married’]? If you looked at states of mind when saying the sentence, you might discover all kinds of different things, e.g. an air of assurance [spread over the whole of the tone in which the sentence is said].

A savage who hears English spoken, understands primitive sentences, and then tries to understand less primitive sentences and makes a primitive interpretation of them. Our difficulties are like this, e.g. if he hears that a man ‘has pain,’ he looks around for it; or hears a man ‘has a mind’ and thinks of it as being in his head.

To say ‘Belief is a state of mind’ is a primitive explanation of belief. The idea that belief is a tonus, or that belief is a state of mind accompanying the words – this would still be far too primitive.

‘He is sure,’ we don’t get this chiefly from the way he says it, but from his behaviour before and after. If I said, ‘Are you now in a state of mind? In what state of mind are you?’, you wouldn’t know what on earth to say. [But if you say, ‘He believes Smith has gone down,’ this doesn’t necessarily say he has *any* state of mind.] It is not different from saying that love or hatred is a state of mind. [Certainly there is in these cases an association with a definite sort of state of mind or feeling.] As much as hatred is connected with showing the teeth or tone [saying things in a certain tone of voice], so much is the way a thing is said connected with belief, or a state of mind connected with belief. [Often the feeling plays a role, often it doesn’t. There may or may not be a *feeling* of conviction, just as there may or may not be a *gesture* of conviction.]

[Cf. looking at] adjectives as denoting ingredients of a substance. This is a primitive interpretation. [We have the model of ‘alcoholic,’ ‘oily,’ etc.] We have in mind a picture of: ‘It consists of this and this and this and this.’

Plato: ‘How beautiful must beauty be, if in a thing beauty is merely an ingredient.’

Under the heading ‘states of mind’ in a book, I would not treat belief; I would treat sadness, joy. It is extremely misleading [to call belief a ‘state of mind’]. I say

⁸⁸ There is no record of the discussion referred to.

it must be misleading, because it misleads. [What's the ditch it leads to? It leads to puzzlement among other things.]

Is it misleading to call $\sqrt{-1}$ a number? On the whole, it doesn't mislead now.⁸⁹

There are characteristic gestures of belief, doubt, etc., therefore, you may say there is a characteristic state of mind, because feeling myself shrugging my shoulders is a state of mind.

The next step in the confusion comes in through the word 'description'. [Is 'I know ...' the description of a state of mind or the expression of one?] Is 'I wonder' the description or the expression of a state of mind?

Howling would be called an utterance and not a description. [Under certain circumstances, you'd call 'I'm in pain' an utterance, under others a description.] If I say, 'Before, I had a dull pain, now I have a sharp one', this would generally be called a description.

Suppose I say: 'I feel sure he went into the room', and it is shown that he didn't, was I right or wrong? Under different circumstances, one would actually treat the proposition in different ways. Suppose we were making psychological experiments, and the idea was to discover when a man is sure that a man is going into a room, under what circumstances. 'Do you feel sure he put a card into his pocket?' You discover [that when you feel sure], sometimes a card was put, sometimes not. But in a court of law, the fact that you were wrong would be stressed.

'There is a simple way of always being right: always saying "I think ...".' But there is now no longer any question of right or wrong.

Cf. we play a game of chess by always saying, 'Suppose I moved from here to there. We would never lose. But winning or losing would no longer take place.

Suppose every now and then I made a move tentatively and then said, 'What would you do?', and he did something and I lost a king. We would be inclined to say: 'I hadn't lost.' But suppose we always said this when moving, e.g. it might be thought politer to do this, what would we then say? Would there be no winning or losing? ['What would you do if I did so and so?' Making a move might then be the criterion for winning.] Whether a person wins or loses is shown by different things, i.e. applauding, winning money, etc.; although we ordinarily distinguish between taking a piece and making a move tentatively.

What is the criterion for 'I think' being merely a description of my state of mind? I could preface every sentence with these words – but every sentence would not become a description of my state of mind. [Whether 'I think ...' is a description of my state of mind or not, depends on the context in which it is used.]

⁸⁹ *In N followed by:* ¶ It misleads to puzzlement. It leads to all sorts of things, but puzzlement is one.

In a psychological experiment you treat what a man says differently to the way you treat it on other occasions. I would not say you were unreliable, or treat what you say as wrong information. [If I said, when watching a conjuring trick, 'I think he pulled a chicken out of the hat,' you could say, 'You're wrong,' but what you said would not be treated as a wrong piece of information. Whereas if you said, 'I think he's gone down,' and this was wrong, it would be treated as a piece of wrong information.]

There is a case where, on account of introspection, one says, 'I'm inclined to believe so and so.' This is quite compatible with 'I know so and so is not the case.' There appears an analogy with an ordinary description. One looks, and describes what one sees. It ['I think Wisdom is in this room'] is a description of a state of mind if one calls this, i.e. saying words or shrugging one's shoulders, a state of mind.

'I think' has a substantive and a verb and sounds like a description [like 'eat' or 'walk']. Cf. 'I greet you,' 'I thank you.' Are these descriptions of what you are doing? No. They appear so. But saying them is thanking or greeting. This business of 'I thank you' is most important. It throws great light on utterances.

Suppose I say that a sofa exists, but brown subsists.

There is one thing: pointing out complications in the use of individual words. This can help to clear up a puzzle. It can also help to substitute two words for one word [e.g. 'fit,' 'fat'. We do this as a temporary sort of measure, which may do good for a time, but we don't go on with it – not necessarily at least.]⁹⁰ It hardly ever helps to use new words – it might do good if the word was used for a time. In certain rare instances, it might help if it [a new word] was always used.

It can appear that you are constantly discovering new entities, e.g. discovering a sense-datum. In a way this is natural. Talking about sense-data is accompanied by a peculiar way of looking at things, e.g. standing still, I stare in a way I have never stared before; in a sense this is discovering something new, or discovering visual space.⁹¹

A new name may be of use but not in philosophy. In philosophy it is extraordinarily confusing. In philosophy we want to see the structure of use. It [giving a new name] blurs the structure of use. We never do give new names. One thing replaces this [the giving of a new name], i.e. the usage of slang. [Ask yourself] 'What am I inclined to call this?', i.e. to find the just word which suggests a new usage. Everyone wants to make a new discovery, hence the desire to give new names.

⁹⁰ *Added in MS, but then crossed out.*

⁹¹ *Cf. vW 120: 46r–v, 49v–50r (9 and 12 December 1937), vW 116: 221, 225 (1938 or later), PI §401.*

[There have been cases, though, when giving a new name was important.] An occasion when giving a new name was terrific and useful and was a solution:

is
=
ε

though an English word would have done [equally well].

The centipede and the toad: 'What do you do when you change from leg 52 to 78?' Then the centipede was not able to walk. This is what happens to us [when we look at 'know', 'believe', 'think', etc.]. It seems to indicate a state of mind; then it does not.

In the case of 'I believe', 'I think', 'I feel certain', one is inclined to say: 'One can't be wrong.' This is equivalent to saying that 'I believe', etc., are used as utterances. [Sometimes they are. But] 'I know' is not used this way. 'I thought I knew, but I didn't'

'I know' you are comparing with 'I believe', and 'I believe' with 'I am sad', 'I feel certain.' [You get to the idea that 'I know' refers to a state of mind in a complicated way by comparing 'I know' with 'I believe', and 'I believe' with 'I am sad', 'I feel certain.']

The word 'state of mind' is used in different ways: (1) as a conscious state, a tonus, (2) as a state of behaviour. He knows this, the ABC, the multiplication table. In the one case the state of mind lasts as long as he says it [the words], in the other it lasts all his life.

Once you have the inclination to say that 'I know' describes a state of mind, you have the tendency to wipe out 'I thought I knew', and [have] the idea that to say the latter is wrong. Then you can only know when you can't be wrong, i.e. you can only know your impressions.

[*Rhees*: You've left out the case of knowing a mathematical proposition.]

'You can't be wrong', said in a case of a mathematical calculation means nothing more than that it was not an experiment, but a calculation. At the end of a proof you may say: 'So I know such and such.' This is the case *Rhees* is thinking of. We nail it down.


We nail it down, so it can't be removed. What if everyone had made a blunder and 25×25 didn't equal 625? We wouldn't say we were wrong. We wouldn't know what to say. We would say we were crazy.

'I know so and so went into the room.' There are very rare cases where we would admit we were wrong. Cf. 'I know Trinity College is over there.' This is not like the case: 'I know the accused went into the room.'

This happens in nearly all simple sums. But not in sums half a mile long. [What happens with $25 \times 25 = 625$ happens with nearly all simple sums.]⁹²

This we nail down as we nail down ‘There is a university in Cambridge.’

[Back to: ‘You can’t know the sense-datum in the same way as you know the physical object.’]⁹³



The triangular prism [the physical object] can’t fit ‘knowing’ as [the triangle] the sense-datum does. The state of mind would be roughly three antennae. These fit a triangle, and in a sense, though not the same sense, fit a triangular prism.

Fitting₁ = fitting a triangle.

Fitting₂ = fitting a prism.

[The prism and the antennae don’t fit₁. The triangle and the antennae don’t fit₂.]⁹⁴ Is this a correct picture?

One may say that all the sentences of our language describe ‘fits’; but [that] there is a further ‘fit’ which the sentences have to fit [satisfy] before they can describe a ‘fit’ correctly. Logical possibility and logical impossibility [experiential and logical fitting].

Does a triangular so and so which he has cut out of wood fit a solid angle? But the idea of a triangle fits₁ the idea of a solid angle. Ideas seem to fit or not to fit. When we said that the state of mind can’t be the same in one case as in the other, we said that one state of mind can’t (logically) fit the other (case). [When we said that the state of mind can’t fit the other case, it was a logical fit we had in mind.]


If we say that a triangular prism doesn’t fit the antennae in the same way as a triangle fits the antennae, this comes to: ‘If I say that the triangle fits the antennae in sense₁,⁹⁵ then I am wrong.’

92 Replaces N: (25 etc.)

93 MS adds (me) and (knowing) to the figure; in N, instead of (physical object): corr. to P. O.

94 Replaces N: fitting 1, prism and antennae don’t fit.

95 In MS: If I say that the prism fits them in the same way as the triangle fits them, then I say something wrong.




Is this right or wrong?

Watson: They want to say it is nonsense.

Rhees: One wouldn't know whether it was right or wrong.

Wittgenstein: Exactly.

As soon as it is written down you compare it with the other proposition.




'I don't know what to do with (II).' Couldn't you give it some kind of sense after all? Yes. You could give it a grammatical sense. '~(I)' means 'cross it out'. 'It is not correct to say this.'

It suggests we can try to see if it fits logically or not [as though we had tried something with (I) and failed]. But to say it doesn't fit is simply to make an agreement not to use the sentence. It is simply about language. Though it suggests we can try to think and fail (cf. the book I wrote years ago).

In the end, valencies are grammatical valencies.

'You can put words together if the valencies fit.' The valencies are the valencies of words. I could express logical possibility in the way I now express chemical possibility.⁹⁶ The valencies are part of the symbolism.⁹⁷



The word has the valency, not the triangle.

"Green is red" makes no sense because we have not given anything the name "green". It is not because the notions of green and red can't be brought together. 'Cut is beautiful' lacks meaning because we haven't given the word 'cut' a meaning.

⁹⁶ Cf. *PG*: 128, *LFM*: 146, *PI* §521.

⁹⁷ Only the figure of H_2O is in *N*; the rest of the figure is added in *MS*.