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The Place of the Emotions among the Passions

1. Passions, affections, and appetites

*Emotions and what
we care about*

Emotions and moods are the pulse of the human spirit. They are both determinants and expressions of our temperament and character. They are tokens of our modes of engagement with the world and with our fellow human beings. Our frame of mind is moulded by our moods, which wash our experience with their pink, grey, or black colours. Our emotions reflect what we care about and what we are averse to, what is important to us and what does not matter to us. A life bereft of emotion would not be worth living, for it would be a life without love or affection, lacking joy and delight, wanting enthusiasm and excitement. It would be driven by arbitrary wants, inclinations, and natural appetites. It would be a life in which we encountered the works of nature and of man without awe or wonder, without curiosity or admiration. There can be no happiness without such emotions. It would also be a life without pity and compassion, grief and sorrow – a life immune to empathy and to human fraternity, and to recognition of the human condition.

There can be no creature with sensibility, desire, and a modicum of cognitive powers, *a fortiori*, no creature with powers of intellect and will, that is immune to emotions. For emotions are corollaries of vulnerability (fear and anxiety, hope and relief), of success and failure

in the pursuit of goals (triumph and delight, frustration and disappointment), and of conflict (rage, anger, hostility). There could hardly be creatures that reproduce sexually and whose young require prolonged care that do not feel maternal and filial bonding and affection. Nor could there be social creatures with knowledge of good and evil that were not susceptible to such emotions as shame, guilt, and remorse.

We share both appetites and emotions with beasts.

Animal emotions But the emotions that can intelligibly be ascribed to beasts, both in their nature and in their objects, are limited by the expressive constraints of the animal's physiognomy and physique, and by lack of a language. Without either a tensed language or a language with means of temporal reference, there can be no current emotions conceptually and cognitively linked to the past (such as present remorse for a past misdeed) or to a specific time in the future (current fear of tomorrow's danger). Without a vocabulary of emotions and the apparatus of pronouns, there can be no consciousness of one's emotions, that is, realizing what emotions beset one – that one is irritated, is becoming increasingly excited, is ashamed. And, without that, the possibility of self-conscious assessment and control of one's emotions is beyond one's reach. There could be no second-order emotions, such as anger at one's humiliation, shame for one's fear, or embarrassment for one's ill-judged curiosity. Nor could there be any emotions of self-assessment, such as pride in one's achievements, guilt for one's sins, remorse for the wrongs one has done to others. In the domain of the emotions, as with all the faculties of man, mastery of a rich language distances the horizon of what is humanly possible far beyond anything that lies within the reach of other animals. It opens the doors of felicity – and of suffering unknown to other animals.

Emotions are *feelings*. The things we call feelings constitute *Feelings* a curious melange of categorially disparate phenomena.¹

Feelings include *physical sensations* – feeling pain, itches, and tickles as well as sensations of overall bodily condition, such as feeling well or ill, and *somatic sensations*, such as the feeling of a distended belly, of creaking joints, and of shortness of breath. The concept of feeling subsumes *tactile perception*, such as feeling the roughness of a surface, the warmth of a fire, the shape of an object. *Hedonic feelings* are feelings of pleasure and displeasure. There are *cognitive feelings*, namely feeling – that is, opining, having a hunch or intuition – *that*

¹ It should be noted that not all languages share such a ramifying and heterogeneous notion of feelings.

things are thus-and-so. There are *deontic feelings*, as when one feels that one *must* act thus-and-so. None of these will be discussed here.² What concerns us are the feelings associated with what were traditionally conceived to be *the passions of the soul* – a category that includes the emotions and much else besides.

This term of art has been used to signify all that *Passions of the soul* can be contrasted with the ‘actions of the soul’.³ In early modern philosophy, it was understood to encompass all receptive, rather than active, psychological attributes. These were held to include the powers of perception, taken to be no more than forms of sensible receptivity. This both distorts many of the concepts of perception and the two-way powers exercised in voluntary perceptual activities (intentionally feeling shapes, textures, warmth and cold, as well as listening to and listening for, scrutinizing, observing, watching, examining, looking for, etc.)⁴ and imposes too crude a dichotomy upon the psychological attributes of living creatures. It is more fruitful and illuminating to employ the word ‘passions’ as a quasi-technical term to subsume the *appetites* (hunger, thirst, lust, and addictions); *felt desires*, such as urges, cravings, and impulses; some *obsessions* (obsessive emotions and compulsive obsessions); and the *affections* (agitations, moods, and emotions) of a living being.⁵ These are indeed passions rather than actions: we cannot voluntarily, intentionally, or deliberately feel hungry or thirsty, feel an urge or an impulse, be compulsively obsessed with something; nor can we recklessly, negligently, or inadvertently feel excited or amazed (agitations), cheerful or depressed (moods), angry or frightened (emotions). At the same time, it is true that we can sometimes suppress our passions or bring them under control by an effort of will and self-restraint.

² Feeling in general and tactile perception in particular were examined in *The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature* (Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2013), pp. 278–85; doxastic feelings were surveyed in the same book, pp. 114–19.

³ The Greeks had no word equivalent to ‘emotion’. The term they used was ‘*pathos*’, meaning ‘that which happens to a person or thing’. Its extension was far wider than that of ‘emotion’.

⁴ For discussion of perception, see *The Intellectual Powers*, pp. 286–315.

⁵ There are many other different uses of ‘passion’ in modern English, ranging in meaning from physical suffering (‘the passion of Christ’) to an overpowering emotion (‘passionate grief’) or outburst of such emotion (‘passionate weeping’), and from a fit of rage (‘to fly into a passion’) or an amorous impulse (‘a passionate desire to kiss her’) to an enthusiasm for something (‘a passion for chess’) or a zeal in pursuit of a goal (‘a passionate quest’). Someone of a passionate nature is excitable, temperamental, or emotional. A passionate lover is amorous, ardent, and hot-blooded.

We can moderate or even eradicate them through the exercise of reason. Sometimes we can enhance them or even engender them *indirectly* by voluntary thought or action. We can also cultivate, refine, and educate our sentiments and emotions. We shall discuss the relationship between the emotions and the will in chapters 2 and 3. Note that, while sensibility, intellect, and will are faculties of human beings, there is no faculty of the passions. That is no coincidence, since ‘faculty’ derives from the Latin *facultas*, meaning a power to do, which does not subsume susceptibilities, liabilities, passivities, or passions.

The first task that must be undertaken in clarifying the concept of emotion is to locate it among the concepts of the passions thus construed, and to describe the differences between emotions and other passions. This will give us a distinct but not yet a clear idea of what an emotion is. We must describe the conceptual boundaries that distinguish the emotions from other affections, such as agitations and moods; from felt desires, such as urges and cravings; from obsessions and appetites; and also from *attitudes* (see fig. 1.1). Attitudes may be of different kinds. First, *subjective axiological judgements* of liking or disliking, approval or disapproval, being pleased or displeased. Secondly, *sentiments*, which are emotionally tinged beliefs or opinions. One may agree with the sentiments of another about the merits




Figure 1.1 The passions of the soul and their relation to other feelings

of an object, plan, or policy but not about the truth of a mathematical theorem or law of nature. Thirdly, *emotional attitudes*, such as feelings of admiration or contempt, which differ both from mere affective judgements and from sentiments.

The term ‘appetite’ (from the Latin *appetitus*) has different uses. Most generally, it is used to signify a desire to attain an object or to fulfil a purpose. Somewhat more restricted is its use to indicate an inclination, preference, liking to do, or fancy for, something. By extension, we may speak of having *no appetite* to pursue a given course of action, meaning an aversion to doing something or a reluctance to act – finding a course of action distasteful or perhaps even fearful. Much more narrowly, ‘appetite’ signifies hunger or desire for food, as when we speak of having a good or poor appetite, of ‘working up an appetite before lunch’ (meaning engendering hunger by vigorous exercise), and of ‘loss of appetite’ (signifying a disinclination to eat). Anything that ‘whets one’s appetite’ stimulates one’s desire for food – and by extension therefrom also signifies anything that makes one eager to enjoy something. However, here the expression will be used in a quasi-technical sense (sanctioned by usage) that is wider than mere hunger and narrower than a desire to attain a goal. Appetites – thus conceived – are common to both man and beast.

Natural and acquired appetites *Natural appetites* are hunger, thirst, and – with qualifications – lust. *Acquired appetites* are material addictions – to alcohol and other depressants (opium, morphine), as well as to tobacco, caffeine, cocaine, and other stimulants.⁶ Appetites are blends of sensations and felt desires (such as inclinations, urges, or cravings). The sensations characteristic of natural appetites have specific locations. The sensation that is partly constitutive of hunger is located in the midriff – one could not have a feeling of hunger in one’s throat any more than one could have feelings of thirst in one’s midriff. Constitutive feelings of hunger must be distinguished from mere accompanying sensations, such as a headache and dizziness that may occur as a consequence of lack of food. The sensation characteristic of thirst is a feeling of a dry throat. Sensations characteristic of appetitive lust are of

⁶ Material addictions are to be contrasted with non-material addictions, such as an addiction to gambling. Non-material addictions are not appetites. The cravings of a drug addict will persist despite incarceration or hospitalisation. Not so the irresistible desire to gamble.

genital arousal. In general, the sensations associated with the appetites are *forms of unease* that dispose one to take action to satisfy the appetite and thereby to ameliorate the feeling of unease. (In the case of natural human appetites, the expectation of satisfaction of the appetite may be pleasurable. In this respect, they resemble human material addictions.) The intensification of appetitive sensations over time renders the appetite progressively more and more urgent and the craving more and more pronounced. Loss of appetites is associated with illness and old age.

The appetitive desire that is blended with sensation *Objects of appetites* is specified or characterized by an infinitive grammatical object. To be hungry, thirsty, or lustful entails that one wants *to eat*, *to drink*, or to *attain sexual release*. To be hungry is to crave *food*, to be thirsty is to crave *drink*, and to be lustful is to crave *copulation* or *sexual release*. These are the *formal* objects of the appetites. The formal object of V-ing is specified by a description which *must* apply if one V-s at all.⁷ The connection between V-ing and its formal object is logical, not empirical. Trivially, one can produce the formal object of V-ing by modalizing the verb 'to V': only what is edible can safely be eaten, only what is perceptible can be perceived, and only what is imaginable can be imagined. Less trivially, only what is dirty can be cleaned, only what is damaged can be repaired, only what is liquid can be drunk.

What distinguishes desires characteristic of appetites from other kinds of desire or wanting is not merely the fact that they are blended with sensation, but also that they are *fully specified* by their formal object. One might say that they have no non-formal, 'material', object. Or one might say that there is no distinction between their formal and their material object. The child who announces that he is not hungry for the main course but only for the pudding is inadvertently making a grammatical joke. The adult, who announces that he is thirsty for a gin and tonic but not for a cup of tea is intentionally making one. Lust, however, straddles the divide between appetites and desires. For, unlike hunger and thirst, lust *may* have a specific object (a man may lust after a specific woman, as David lusted after Bathsheba, and a woman after a specific man, as Potiphar's wife lusted after Joseph).

⁷ For discussion of this valuable medieval distinction, see A. J. P. Kenny, *Action, Emotion and the Will* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1963), pp. 189 ff. Note that the formal object of an action, desire, or emotion is not the same as an internal accusative (e.g. to dream a dream, to think a thought).

Here animal lust is transmuted into sexual desire directed at a particular *person* (see chapter 10).

The intensity and urgency of an appetite are typically proportional to the intensity of the sensations. Satisfying an appetite leads to its temporary satiation and so too to the disappearance of the sensation. Of course, the glutton may still want food but no longer because he is hungry, just as the drunkard may want a scotch but not to quench his thirst. Appetites are neither constant (as love may be) nor singular (as a desire such as wanting to see Naples before one dies perforce is). Rather, they are *recurrent* in the following sense: despite their satisfaction on a given occasion, they will, other things being equal, recur naturally some time later, when one becomes thirsty again, feels hungry or lustful again. Appetites are caused by physiological conditions that are typically concomitants of bodily needs (or, in the case of lust, by hormonally determined drives) consequent upon deprivation of food, drink, copulation, or sexual release. Nevertheless, the felt need for food, drink, or copulation is not the same as wanting it.⁸ Non-natural appetites are similarly caused by physiological changes consequent upon habitual consumption of the addictive substance. When the agent successfully takes action to satisfy his appetite, the desire is sated and the sensation of hunger, thirst, or lust, or the craving for the addictive substance, ceases for a time, only to recur if deprivation is prolonged.

The teleology and evolutionary warrant of the natural appetites is obvious. Hunger and thirst have the patent purpose of driving the animal to eat and drink for its own preservation. Without animal lust for copulation the species could not survive. Human beings may be moved to eat, drink, and copulate from appetite alone – from hunger, thirst, and lust. But they may also be moved by regular habit, on the one hand, and by acquired tastes and preferences, on the other. In this way the appetites are transformed into ordinary desires with specific objects. Refinement of the natural appetites is characteristic of civilized societies, hence the cultivation of cuisine and culinary taste, of connoisseurship regarding artificial beverages, and of the transmutation of lust into sexual desire and erotic love, on the one hand, and into the erotic refinements of love-making, on the other.

The criteria for being hungry, thirsty, or lustful, *Criteria for an appetite* or for craving alcohol or an addictive drug do

⁸ For detailed examination of needs and their relationship to wants, see *Human Nature: the Categorical Framework* (Blackwell, Oxford, 2007), pp. 130–7.

not lie in expressive behaviour, bodily mien, or facial expression. One does not jump with hunger, as one may jump for joy; cringe with thirst, as one may cringe in terror; or smile with lust, as one may smile with tender love. The criteria for having an appetite are the appropriate conative behaviour of *trying to get*. The criteria for being possessed by an appetite – being in a frenzy of hunger, thirst, or lust – are constituted by single-minded conative behaviour to attain the object of one's appetite, and distinctively greedy behaviour in satiating one's appetite, as when one ravenously falls upon food, slakes one's thirst without pause for breath, or sates one's lust 'like an animal', as soldiers are prone to do in the sack of a city when on a rampage of rape. Satisfaction of an urgent appetite, unlike fulfilment of ordinary wants, is manifest by feelings and behavioural expressions of *relief*.

Being possessed by an appetite has an obvious kinship with *Obsessions* *obsessions*. However, obsessions do not display the pattern of occurrence, satiation, and recurrence characteristic of the appetites. They are not bound up with bodily located sensations after the manner of the appetites. They have a non-formal, material, object in addition to a formal one. Obsessions may be *non-emotional* or *emotional*.

Obsessive collecting of Rembrandt prints, ancient Greek coins, or seashells is non-emotional. Similarly, an interest in philosophy, poetry, or genetics may become, and then be, obsessive. Though not emotional obsessions, they are likely to be emotion-involving, as is manifest in the excitement of the collector's pursuit, the joys of displaying one's collection, the delight in sharing one's enthusiasm for a subject with others. The distinctive features of non-emotional obsessions are the single-mindedness of the obsessive pursuit, the intensity and extent of the preoccupation in thought and imagination, the strength of the desire to pursue the interest, and the lengths to which one will go to engage in the obsessive activity or to attain the goal of the obsession.

Obsessive hatred, jealousy, or guilt are emotional obsessions. An emotion becomes obsessive when the agent is *invaded* by recurrent thoughts, mental images, recollections, and fantasies concerning the object of his emotion. The obsessive emotion occupies one's mind, driving out one's customary concerns and projects. This is manifest, for example, by Othello's crying out in his agony of obsessive jealousy:

O, now for ever
Farewell the tranquil mind! farewell content!
Farewell the plumed troops, and the big wars
That makes ambition virtue! O, farewell!

(III. 3)

Obsessions may be directed at a person (an obsessive preoccupation with an acquaintance, with a celebrity, or with a past historical figure), a class of persons (the Nazis' obsessive anti-Semitism), a topic (an obsession with ancient history, the philosophy of Kant, or the novels of Jane Austen or with the study of barnacles (Darwin) or fleas (Miriam Rothschild)), a pursuit (collecting stamps or memorabilia, balletomania, footballomania), or an activity (gambling, playing chess or golf, running, or mountain climbing). Obsessions may be harmless and even laudable, or irrational and deleterious (sometimes involving ingrained prejudices and stereotyped thought, understanding, and interpretation that guide and pervert one's life). As obsessions become increasingly compulsive, they verge on the pathological. Carried to extremes, they involve obsessive-compulsive and ritualized behaviour, on the one hand, and pathological monomania, on the other. By and large, pathological obsessions are defects of intellect and will.

Appetites and cravings Appetites have a kinship to cravings. A recurrent craving for a specific food or drink is akin to an appetite, save for the fact that it has a specific object. Like hunger and thirst, such intense desires invade one, plague one, intrude upon one – driving all else from one's mind the more urgent they become. One is beset by longing for the object of the craving. Pregnant women are given to cravings. But, of course, one may crave for something non-recurrently, in which case one's craving is no more than an intensely felt desire.

One might wonder why the felt desire to sleep is not conceived to be an appetite. After all, it is marked by sensations of lassitude and weariness (which are sensations of overall bodily condition⁹), blended with an intense desire to rest, close one's eyes, and fall asleep. Like appetites, the desire to sleep forces itself upon one. Like appetites, the constitutive desire (to sleep) is sated by its satisfaction, and the characteristic feeling (of weariness) evaporates. Like appetites, the desire to sleep is recurrent. For all that, it is not an appetite for two reasons. First, little if any conative behaviour of *trying to get* is involved (other than lying down or demanding quiet). Secondly, the desire to sleep involves no impulse *to act* but rather a desire *to cease* acting and to rest.

Urges Similarly the felt desire to void one's bladder or bowels, despite its pattern of onset, satisfaction, relief, and recurrence, is not an appetite but an urge. Urges are inhibited felt desires. An inhibited appetite, when it becomes intense, *is* experienced as an urge

⁹ See *The Intellectual Powers*, pp. 262–5.




Figure 1.2 *Conceptual links of appetite*

to drink or eat, or as an urge to copulate or find sexual release. But there are numerous non-appetitive urges too. Some may be completely inhibited by self-control (the urge to strike another who has insulted one) or may be inhibited for a while (the urge to void one's bladder) or only for a few moments, as when one feels and finally succumbs to an urge to yawn. Sometimes they cannot be inhibited for more than a few moments despite one's best efforts, as when one tries in vain to hold back a sneeze. For a schematic representation of the conceptual links of appetite, see figure 1.2.

Attitudes, as noted earlier, may be *sentiments* – emotion-ally tinged beliefs, *subjective axiological judgements* – such as liking or disliking, approving or disapproving, or may be *emotional attitudes*, such as respect or contempt. Like other passions, attitudes are felt. Unlike sensations, they are neither somatically located feelings nor feelings of overall bodily condition. Unlike tactile perceptions, they are neither the upshot of the exercise of a cognitive faculty nor the result of cognitive receptivity. They have a kinship with cogitative feelings (hunches, opinions, intuitions) inasmuch as they are kinds of judgement. Emotional attitudes are estimative judgements infused with emotion, as sentiments are beliefs tinged with emotion. Emotional attitudes include respect, admiration, and reverence for another, as well as disdain, contempt, and hostility. Their objects may be individual human beings or classes of individuals, living things, the natural world, the artefacts of man, institutions, or doctrines. Emotional attitudes lay a claim to objectivity in so far as their grounds are alleged attributes of their object that are conceived to warrant the attitude. They persist or endure for a time, but, lacking what Wittgenstein called *genuine duration* (as opposed to mere duration),

they are not mental states or states of mind. In so far as dispositions, pronenesses, and tendencies are defined by reference to what they are dispositions, pronenesses, and tendencies *to do*, emotional attitudes are clearly not dispositions. They are logically linked with reasons for feeling respect or contempt, admiration or disdain, rather than with categories of acts or actions that manifest a disposition. Those reasons may also provide reasons for behaviour motivated by the emotional attitude. One's contempt for someone may lead one to vote against that person, if he is running for an office for which one is an elector, but not voting for him is not contemptuous behaviour. One's respect for another may underlie one's trust in him, but trusting another is not the actualization of a disposition to respect.

Affections, like sensations, felt desires (urges, cravings, *Affections* and impulses), and appetites, are *felt*. One feels love or hate (emotions), startled or astonished (agitations), cheerful or depressed (moods). Unlike localized physical sensations (pains, tickles, itches) and somatic sensations (of heartbeat, distended belly, tense muscles), affections do not have a bodily location and do not, *save per accidens*, inform one of the state of one's body (or what has impacted on it), even though they are sometimes linked with sensations. One does not feel pride in one's chest, although one's chest may 'swell with pride' and one may be 'bursting with pride'. One does not feel fear in one's mouth, even though one's mouth may feel dry with fear. If characteristic sensations are integrated with affections, then, unlike physical and somatic sensations, they do not, *save per accidens*, inform one of the state of one's body. One's blush of shame does not inform one of the state of one's facial arteries, although it may inform one that one is more ashamed than one thought. One's tears of grief do not inform one of the state of one's lachrymal glands, although they may inform one that one loved the deceased more than one thought. Unlike feelings that are perceptions (tactile feelings), the affections do not inform one about the world around one. They are not sources of knowledge of our environment but presuppose, or incorporate, knowledge or belief concerning the world. They are forms of response to what we perceive, know, or believe about the world around us and about ourselves. As in the earlier examples, they can be sources of knowledge about ourselves. The form of knowledge, in such cases, is realization.

The term 'affection' is here used as a term of art. Like 'passions', it has both a wide technical use and a variety of common or garden uses. Widely used, it coincides with the traditional wide use of 'passion' to signify the varieties of ways in which a human being (or beast) may be

psychologically affected. In its common uses, it signifies a favourable or kindly disposition towards a person or thing, hence fondness, tenderness, and warmth of attachment. It will be used here in a narrow technical sense to signify a subcategory of the passions.

The feelings that are affections can be divided into *agitations*, *moods*, and *emotions*. The boundary lines between these are not sharp. Unlike perceptions, they often occur in blends: astonishment and joy, surprise and anger, and excitement and hope are common blends of agitation and emotion. Grief-laden depression, guilt-ridden gloom, and morose jealousy are blends of mood and emotion. Fear and anger, joy and love, hatred and rage, and shame and guilt are common blends of paired emotions. Moreover, a mood may transmute into an emotion, as when a vague anxiety is transformed into a determinate fear; an emotion into a mood, as when grief grows into depression; one emotion into another, as when affection grows into love; and an emotion into a persistent emotional attitude, for example anger with another into hostility, and disappointment in another's lack of good faith into distrust. Nevertheless, the distinctions are useful, even though they often have to be qualified by 'may be' and 'for the most part'.

2. Agitations and moods

Agitations Agitations are short-term affective disturbances, typically caused by change, often by something unexpected. They include such affective responses as feeling thrilled, shocked, convulsed, amazed, surprised, startled, horrified, revolted, disgusted, or delighted. These too, like appetites, are commonly, but injudiciously, assimilated to emotions. Agitations are immediate consequences of what we perceive, come to know, or realize (or think we do). Because they are disturbances – often unanticipated disruptions that intrude upon us – they do not involve motives for action, as many emotions do, but rather temporarily *inhibit* motivated action. One may behave in certain ways *because* one feels startled, thrilled, or shocked. But one does not act *out of* thrill, shock, or being startled as one acts out of love, compassion, or gratitude. One may be *motivated* by love or jealousy, by compassion or envy, but one cannot be motivated by horror, amazement, or delight. This requires a brief explanatory digression.

Motivating and
adverbial emotions

Emotions are not themselves motives – motives are not felt, do not overcome one at a given time or place, and are not pleasant or unpleasant, as many emotions are. Nevertheless, some emotions involve motives for acting, for example gratitude, jealousy, hatred, fear, and love. They involve motives in so far as the reason for the emotion and the reason for action it furnishes fit a general pattern of backward- and forward-looking reasons constitutive of a motive.¹⁰ The backward-looking reason for gratitude is a benefit conferred upon one, which provides a forward-looking reason for thanking the benefactor in order that he may recognize one's gratitude – so 'acting out of gratitude' describes a motivated act. So too in cases of acting out of remorse (commission of an offence, wishing one had not committed it, acting to make good the evil done) or acting out of fear (something threatening and a good reason for avoiding or removing it). Similar patterns are displayed by jealousy, envy, and pity. However, emotions such as hope, despair, sadness, grief, shyness, and embarrassment do not provide motives, even though one may do something *with* hope, *in* despair, *out of* embarrassment – for in these cases there is no determinate pattern of backward- and forward-looking reasons. Rather, these emotions are manifest in the *manner* of acting – and might be deemed *adverbial emotions*.

Criteria for
agitations

Agitations are made manifest by distinctive *modes of reaction*: one cries out *in* horror or amazement, recoils *with* revulsion or *in* disgust, is convulsed *with* laughter or paralysed *with* shock. They have characteristic forms of behavioural manifestation. These may be facial expressions, such as the wide-eyed look of alarm, amazement, surprise, wonder, the grimace of revulsion or disgust. They may be gestures – the open arms of delight, withdrawn arms of alarm, the open hands of surprise or amazement. They may be vocal exclamations, such as cries of delight and glee, and shrieks of excitement and thrill. They encompass more global behaviour, such as shrinking with revulsion or in disgust, jumping when startled, or prancing with delight. These various forms of affective reaction, in an appropriate context, constitute criteria for

¹⁰ For discussion of motives, see *Human Nature*, pp. 162–3, 218–19; Kenny, *Action, Emotion and the Will*, ch. 4; and A. R. White, *The Philosophy of Mind* (Random House, New York, 1967), pp. 135–42, 163–4.

ascribing the agitation to a person. Of course, what in one context is a shriek of excitement or thrill (children on a helter-skelter) may in another context be a shriek of alarm or fright. What corresponds among the emotions to agitations will be denominated ‘emotional perturbations’. Emotional perturbations are manifest in the clenched fists and frown of anger, the cries of joy, or the trembling of fear. We shall discuss emotional behaviour in chapter 2.

Agitations may transmute into long-standing *emotional attitudes* and *sentiments*, for example, of finding something revolting or offensive, having previously been revolted or offended by it. One may have been awe-struck by something sublime in nature, and this immediate response may give rise to the sentiment that it is awe-inspiring. One’s palpable shock at encountering exceedingly shabby behaviour may yield to the sentiment that what shocked one is contemptible. Similarly, delight at good news commonly modulates into a mood of cheerfulness or into a feeling of gratitude. These are no longer agitations or disturbances.

Yet another form of affection that differs from emotion is *Moods* a *mood*. Feeling cheerful, jovial, or euphoric; feeling happy, contented, or tranquil; feeling bored, irritable, morose, melancholic, or depressed are moods. They contrast with agitations in various ways. They do not *need* any determinate object.¹¹ One can feel happy or cheerful without being happy or cheerful *about* anything, but one cannot feel surprised or alarmed without being surprised at something or alarmed by something. One may feel depressed or bored without being depressed or bored by anything in particular, but one cannot feel amazed without being amazed by anything. It is important not to confuse the cause of a mood with an object of the mood. What puts one into a good or bad mood *need not* be an object of the mood. The good news that one does not have cancer may make one cheerful. One is *relieved* not to have cancer, but one is not cheerful *about* not having cancer. Nor is one cheerful (as opposed to relieved) *that* one has not got cancer – one is just very cheerful. Persistent pain often makes one irritable, but the pain is the cause, not *the object* of erupting irritation. A relaxed afternoon in the sunshine by the sea may put one into a tranquil mood, but one is not tranquil *about* the sun and the sea. It is sometimes suggested that, while to be depressed or cheerful is not to be depressed or cheerful about anything in particular, one is depressed or cheerful about everything.

¹¹ We shall refine the notion of the object of an emotion in chapter 2.

But this is to confuse the view of the world characteristic of the mood (rosy or black, joyful or gloomy) with a putative generality of objects of a mood.

A mood is a *state of mind* or *frame of mind*.¹² One may be in a state of melancholia – possessed by undirected angst or persistent depression, or in a jovial or relaxed frame of mind. Moods are associated with having a certain view of the world: a rosy, resigned, or grey outlook, or a dark and embittered one. Anxiety and worry (*Sorge*) descend upon one, enfolding one in dank mist. But joy is a suffusion of one's whole being, as memorably expressed in Coleridge's lines:

Joy is the sweet voice, Joy the luminous cloud –
 We in ourselves rejoice!
 And thence flows all that charms or ear or sight,
 All melodies the echoes of that voice,
 All colours a suffusion from that light.¹³

Moods *colour* one's thoughts and *pervade* one's reflections. Joyous moods limn our thoughts with the rainbow; dark moods make one prey to black thoughts and blacker feelings. Moods (like emotions) are exhibited in the *manner* in which one does what one does when in a given mood, for example, cheerfully, sadly, grumpily, miserably. They are evident in one's demeanour, facial expression, and tone of voice, as well as in one's manifest (and avowed) inclinations and disinclinations to act.

Of course, moods *may* have an object (signified by a 'nominalization-accusative' (see pp. 42–3)). One may feel depressed *that* war has broken out or depressed *at the prospect* of a war, that is, depressed that war is going to break out. One may be positively euphoric *at one's stunning success* – and one's euphoria may last for days. One's euphoria is a mood, but it does not lack an object – one is happy *that one has succeeded*. A mood that has an object may pervade one's mind no

¹² We have defined mental states by reference to the idea of *genuine duration*, i.e. they obtain only during one's waking life, and cease with sleep or loss of consciousness, they admit of degrees of intensity, they may wax and wane, they are interruptible by distraction of attention, they can be resumed after interruption, and so on. (For elaboration, see *The Intellectual Powers*, pp. 164–8, pp. 227–30.) States of mind may be distinguished from mental states by their approximation to frames of mind. The latter not only have 'genuine duration' (and not merely duration), but they are also cogitatively invasive and colour one's outlook.

¹³ Coleridge, 'Dejection: an Ode', stanza 5.

less than an objectless mood. Directed anxiety about one's kidnapped child (e.g. Mrs Trevelyan in Trollope's *He Knew He Was Right*) – designated by an 'object-accusative' – may take over one's inner life (one's thoughts and one's imagination, one's zest for life, and one's interests) no less than objectless angst.

*Mood with object
compared with
emotion with object*

What then differentiates a mood with an object from an emotion with an object? Romeo's passionate love pervades his thoughts and occupies his imagination, but it does not gild the world as he views it *with love*. Obsessive emotions, such as Othello's jealousy, approximate moods in their invasiveness. But they still differ from moods in so far as they do not determine a frame of mind or outlook upon the world. Othello's agony does not suffuse everything he views *with jealousy*. What they commonly do is engender an all-pervasive mood, such as good cheer and a general feeling of benevolence (Pierre Bezukhov, on realizing that he is in love with Natasha) or profound depression (the upshot of Othello's jealousy and Macbeth's guilt).

*Moods as occurrent
or dispositional states*

The relation of mood to temporality differs from that of agitations and emotions. One may be surprised or amazed for a second or two, revolted or disgusted for a minute. One may feel a pang of jealousy or envy, a sudden flash of anger or annoyance, a momentary thrill of fear or wave of despair.¹⁴ But one cannot feel cheerful or bored for a moment, jovial or melancholic for a minute, let alone feel a sudden flash of tranquillity. Moods must last for a while. We distinguish between occurrent moods, which are *states of mind* with genuine duration, and moods that are longer-term *dispositional states*.¹⁵ One may feel depressed for an afternoon, but one may suffer from a depression that lasts for months. A piece of good news may

¹⁴ But there are exceptions. Love is an emotion, but one cannot feel a flash of love or love someone *for* a moment, although one may fall in love *in* a moment. For love is a persistent emotion, not a momentary or passing episodic mental state (see chapter 10).

¹⁵ The term 'dispositional state' may seem an oxymoron. How can something be both a state (an actuality) and a disposition (a potentiality)? Well, that is the concept we have. We speak of being *in* a depression or *in* low spirits for weeks, or of being *in* a cheerful mood for some days. Dispositional states are not *mental* states since they lack genuine duration. They are standing and persistent pronenesses to be in a given mental state during hours of wakefulness. The dispositional state of being in a prolonged depression is to be distinguished from the general disposition to depression.

make one feel cheerful for the whole afternoon, or one's good mood may last a few days. As a dispositional state, a mood is a disposition to feel, say, joyful, depressed, or cheerful during one's waking hours, and a proneness to respond in, say, a joyful, depressed, or cheerful manner to the people and events one encounters. Because moods guide one's thought down characteristic tracks, they are manifest in the tenor of one's expressed thoughts and judgements. Because they colour one's thought, they also affect one's inclinations and disinclinations to act and one's acceptance of something as a good reason for acting. Those who feel cheerful or joyful are prone to engage in social activities; those who feel melancholic and depressed are more likely to eschew company, picnics, parties, and so forth.

It is unsurprising that names of moods may also serve as names of temperament, as when one is said to have a cheerful or melancholic temperament. A cheerful person is *normally* in a cheerful mood, just as a melancholic person is *normally* gloomy. It is striking that a *moody person* is one who is prone to be in a melancholic mood, to be irritable or glum, but not one who is disposed to be in a cheerful or jovial mood. Character traits are different from this: an irascible person is not someone who is normally irate, a timorous person is not someone normally frightened, and a compassionate person is not one normally engulfed by waves of compassion. Names of temperament, when they are also names of moods, signify tendencies or pronenesses. Names of traits of character, when they are also emotion names, more commonly signify liabilities and susceptibilities.

Moods have reasons that are also causes, reasons that are not (Humean) causes, as well as overt causes that are not reasons. As noted, good news may put one into a good mood, just as bad news may engender a melancholic or depressed mood. 'What makes you so cheerful?', 'Why are you in the dumps today?', or 'What has made you so miserable?' are questions we commonly ask our friends and family. They typically respond by saying: 'I'm feeling so cheerful because we won', or 'I'm in the dumps because my girlfriend has jilted me', or 'I'm feeling miserable because I failed'. Such answers specify the cause of one's mood in a perfectly decent, common or garden sense of 'caused' or 'made happen'. It is an explanatory relation. An antecedent event is identified as the cause of one's lapsing into the mood one is in, although there need be nothing nomological about this sequence. However, in these cases the answer to the question of what *made* one

feel as one feels specifies something that is also (one thinks) a *warrant* or *justification* for feeling thus-and-so. One's answer normally makes it *rationally intelligible* why one is in the mood one is in. Failing a major examination or being jilted by one's girlfriend is a *good reason* for feeling low. Here one mentions a factor that is both a cause (inasmuch as it *made* one feel thus-and-so) and one's reason for feeling so-and-so. It is one's reason not for acting or for thinking, but for feeling as one does. That what makes one feel thus-and-so or puts one into such-and-such a mood is *one's reason* is further evident from the fact that one's mood will normally evaporate as soon as one hears or discovers that what made one feel melancholic or depressed is no longer so, or, indeed, was never in fact so at all. In the latter kinds of case, one will have recourse to the explanatory pattern: 'I was depressed because *I thought that ...*'.

In other kinds of case, one's reason for being in a given mood is not an *antecedent cause* of one's mood. For one's reason for being in a buoyant mood may be a future event. Jack's reason for feeling so cheerful may be Jill's prospective arrival, but *that Jill is going to arrive tomorrow* is not the (Humean) cause of Jack's now feeling buoyant. Nevertheless, it would be perfectly correct to say that what is making Jack feel so cheerful is that Jill is going to arrive tomorrow. This reflects the pliability of our notion of making things happen and the multifaceted character of our concept of a cause.¹⁶

There are causes of moods that are independent of any reasons for feeling as one feels. A persistent pain or a woman's menstrual period commonly engender an irritable mood. One is not irritated *at* the nagging pain but prone to become irritated at some nuisance that intrudes upon one. One may, but need not, be aware that one's mood is caused by one's condition. In the right circumstances and in the right company, alcohol is apt to make one feel jocose (and in the wrong company or in solitude, morose). Such causes of moods are not one's reasons or justifications, although they may well be cited to excuse or explain one's irritable or jocular mood (fig. 1.3).

¹⁶ For detailed examination of the multifocal character of the concept of causation, see *Human Nature*, ch. 3. To be sure, a causal theorist may argue that although one's reason – namely *that Jill is going to arrive* – is no cause, it is one's mental state of believing that she is going to arrive that is the mental cause of one's feeling. But believing is not a mental state (see *The Intellectual Powers*, pp. 227–32). Moreover, it is not *the believing* but *what is believed* that makes Jack cheerful. For a general discussion of reasons and causes, see *Human Nature*, pp. 226–30.




Figure 1.3 *Conceptual links of moods*

Of course, all moods are dependent on a neurological substrate without which one would not be in the mood one is in. Low levels of serotonin in the brain, which can be caused by dietary deficiency, are prone to cause depression. But equally, encountering something that is a good reason for feeling sad and depressed, such as bereavement, is prone to cause a fall in serotonin levels. It would be an egregious error to suppose that a reductive physiological explanation of mood could replace explanations in terms of reasons and justifications.

One normally has non-evidential knowledge of what put one into such-and-such a mood or what made one feel so cheerful, joyful, or depressed. In such cases, the cause of one's mood is also one's reason for being in the mood. However, one's knowledge is not infallible – one may be wrong about the reason one is moody. It may not be the unwelcome letter one received this morning that made one so depressed, but rather the harsh words one's wife or husband said yesterday evening or their failure to congratulate one for some noteworthy achievement, which upset one. The letter may occasion irritation, but the root cause of one's irritability is yesterday's distress and resultant low spirits. This is something others may notice and they may then correct one.

Not only may one err in identifying what put one into such-and-such a mood, but one may not even be aware of what brought it about. Others may notice that one has been cheerful or depressed ever since one heard that things are thus-and-so, even though one did not oneself

Epistemology of moods

Moods and the will

realize this. Nevertheless, one may acknowledge the reason when it is pointed out to one. In other kinds of case, one may be in a given mood ‘for no reason at all’ – one may just feel low and depressed, or wake up feeling cheerful and eager to face another day. It does not, of course, follow that one’s mood has no cause. It may well have a physiological cause.

The connection between moods and the will is importantly different from that between emotions and the will. For emotions are bound up with reasons for action, with specific patterns of intentional action, and with motives. By contrast, moods merely incline or disincline one to actions of certain kinds. Hence the idiom ‘I’m not in the mood for ...’ and ‘I feel like ...’. That one is feeling cheerful or depressed does not give one a reason for doing anything in particular, although it makes one more likely to accept or not to accept certain facts as reasons for one to do certain things or to adopt or reject certain goals (to go out as opposed to staying home, to invite guests for the evening, or to accept an invitation, and so on).

A mood may modulate into an emotion, as when objectless angst (a mood) crystallizes into determinate fear (an emotion). Conversely, an emotion may fade into a mood, as when a fit of anger (an emotion) leaves one depressed or irritable (moods).

3. Emotions

Different classifications of emotions

Emotions are neither appetites nor agitations or moods, although the boundaries separating these three categories are blurred. Paradigmatic emotions are fear, anger, gratitude, resentment, hatred, indignation, envy, jealousy, pity, compassion, grief, hope, excitement, pride, shame, humiliation, regret, remorse, and guilt. Love, as we shall see in chapter 10, is, in one sense, paradigmatic and, in another sense, atypical. Emotions can be variously classified. We may distinguish reflexive emotions, such as self-love, self-hatred, self-pity, and self-respect, from emotions that are not thus reflexive (including love, hatred, pity, and respect). We may differentiate emotions of self-assessment, such as pride, shame, guilt, and humiliation, from emotions that do not involve self-assessment. We may classify emotions as negative or positive, according as to whether one would (normally) prefer to feel such emotions (delighted, excited, overjoyed, contented, amused, affection), or prefer not to be subjected to them (feeling bored, envious, jealous,

frightened, sorrow, embarrassed, humiliated). We may distinguish between emotions that we share with animals (anger, fear, expectation, affection, loneliness) and emotions that are unique to humanity (pride, shame, remorse, guilt, humiliation, nostalgia). We shall have occasion, later in this book, to examine some of these distinctions.

As its etymology suggests, the idea of an emotion is linked with that of *being moved* by something. In its earliest occurrences in English in the sixteenth century the word signified political agitation, civil unrest, and commotion, a usage derived from the French *émouvoir* (to stir up). By the end of the sixteenth century, ‘emotion’ signified a movement of peoples, a disturbance of society, or a perturbation of the body. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, it was only in the early seventeenth century that it came to signify an agitation of the mind, an excited mental state, or passion. The etymological association between the idea of emotion and that of motion (and impact) is embedded in our descriptions of the causes of some of our emotional responses. A scene may be ‘touching’, a story ‘moving’, a song ‘stirring’, and a tragedy ‘shattering’. We are *moved by* or *stirred by* emotion, both in being *perturbed* by what causes us to feel what we feel (a pitiful scene, a noise in the night, an offence) and in being *moved to* act by our feelings (of compassion, fear, anger). This is the *picture* we use, the form in which we present our emotions to ourselves.

Just as we associate thinking with the head (we close our eyes and clutch our head when we think hard), so too we associate emotions with the heart (many emotional episodes are accompanied by a violent felt increase in our heartbeat, and we are prone to touch our chest when declaring our passion). This association is built into numerous cardiac idioms: we may be broken-hearted with unrequited or disprized love. We may be warm-hearted if we are naturally sympathetic to other people, or cold-hearted if we are indifferent to their sorrows, travails, and entreaties. We are light-hearted when cheerful, and have a heavy heart when we are the bearers or recipients of bad news. Our heart may overflow with tenderness and melt with love. Sincere emotions are said to be heartfelt, and to reveal one’s emotional responses too readily is to wear one’s heart on one’s sleeve. Nevertheless, despite the fact that one may love a person *with* all one’s heart, the heart is not an organ of emotion in the sense in which we see *with* our eyes, walk *with* our legs, and manipulate things *with* our hands. We use our eyes in order to see, but there is nothing we can do with our heart in order

to love. To give one's heart to someone is not to do anything with one's heart but to bestow one's love upon another. To love someone with all one's heart is to love them without qualification or restraint. Similarly, the heart is not the locus of emotions, for, although one may indeed love someone with all one's heart, one does not feel love, let alone have a feeling of love, in one's heart, as one may feel a pain in one's chest.

Emotions and what we care about What, if anything, characterizes the emotions? Why do we collect this underdetermined range of feelings under their rubric? They are, to be sure, affections – ways in which we are affected by what we perceive, know, or believe about things and what we perceive, know, or believe about ourselves. Like other affections, episodic emotions are non-voluntary *responses* to people, animals, and things that we encounter and to how we take things to be. They manifest our *sensitivity* or *insensitivity*, our *judgements* and *evaluations* concerning the people we encounter and the situations with which we are confronted, and our *responsiveness* in expressive behaviour. Unlike agitations, which are mere spontaneous reactions, *emotions exhibit what we care about*. Hence, unlike agitations, they are intimately linked, especially in the form of enduring or persistent emotions, with intentional action and motivation to attain, conserve, and protect what we care about, and to respond to or avoid what we are averse to and what is detrimental to what we care about. And that is also why they are loosely linked in manifold ways with the pleasant and unpleasant, with the distressing and the hurtful.¹⁷

It is pleasing to see what we care about well protected, and distressing to see it harmed. What we care about is internally related to what is important to us. It is natural to take joy in the flourishing of what we care about, and painful to see something important to us destroyed. Some emotions, such as affection, contentment, enthusiasm, amusement, relief, and satisfaction, are in themselves pleasant to experience. Others, such as jealousy, envy, anxiety, fear, terror, shame, embarrassment, and humiliation, are intrinsically unpleasant or worse. Yet others, such

¹⁷ In the history of the analysis of the emotions, it was Plato who inspired this link between emotions, the pleasurable and the painful (see *Philebus*, 47^e). Aristotle inherited the idea (with the qualification 'for the most part' or 'in general' (*Eudemian Ethics*, 1220^b12)). It was duly transmitted to Aquinas and to the early moderns. But they did not explain the association of pleasure and pain with the emotions by reference to the notion of *what we care about*.

as the epistemic emotions of wonder and curiosity, need have no direct link with such reflexive hedonic/anti-hedonic features.

As already observed, many emotion names are often also names of motives. We do things *out of* love or hatred, jealousy or envy, compassion or gratitude – these emotions providing us with *motives* for acting, that is, systematic *patterns* of backward- and forward-looking reasons. In displaying our emotional responses to people, things, and events around us, we reveal ourselves and our nature. We show what kind of person we are, for we show what we care about, how much we care about those things, what reasons move us, and what reasons move us to action. So it is unsurprising that some names of emotions also signify traits of character and personality. One may be a loving, affectionate, compassionate, or jealous person in so far as one has such feelings and is commonly moved by such motives. But one may be an irascible, shy, timid, and anxious person even though *these* emotion names do not signify motives but feelings linked to appropriate pronenesses, liabilities, or susceptibilities. Other emotion names, such as ‘guilt’, ‘embarrassment’, ‘awe’, ‘dread’, and ‘ecstasy’ do not signify character traits at all.

To care about something is to value it or to condemn, censure, or be otherwise averse to it in one axiological dimension or other. Not to care about something is to be indifferent to it. Animals who lack the capacity to care are animals without emotions. Human beings who are generally deficient in their emotional responses are deemed to be unfeeling, unemotional, passionless. They are held to be cold, impassive, detached, aloof, or stony. This is a fault of character, for it betokens not caring about what one *should* care about. To be emotional, however, is to be sentimental,¹⁸ excitable, and temperamental. These traits too are considered to be character failings. They display caring to excess, or caring about the wrong kinds of thing, manifesting excessive emotion, or being affectedly effusive or maudlin. One may fail to control one’s emotions in contexts where self-control is called for. We are sometimes overcome by emotion or are in the grip of passion, when we should be restrained. Where the heart overrides the head and feelings override the intellect, ill-considered judgement more often than not ensues. We shall discuss this further in the chapters that follow.

¹⁸ To be sentimental, in contemporary usage, is, on the one hand, associated with sentimentality. In this sense it means being extravagantly, self-indulgently, effusively, or insincerely emotional. At the same time, it is associated with sentiment, in one of the senses of the word; thus used, it signifies being tenderly nostalgic.

Susceptibility to emotion is, in general, a corollary of vulnerabilities, liabilities, and pronenesses – of the innate desire for self-preservation and the innate tendency to sympathize with others, on the one hand, and of the pursuit of goals that may or may not be achieved, on the other. For these are primitive roots of care and concern. All moderately developed animals care for their own physical safety. However, mere avoidance behaviour and threatening displays, as exhibited by fish and reptiles, for example, are insufficient for ascription of emotion in anything but the thinnest of senses. There are adequate grounds for ascribing emotions to a creature only to the extent to which its behavioural repertoire incorporates expressive behaviour, facial and vocal expressions of emotion appropriate to occasions that warrant an emotional response. The snarl of a dog exposing its fangs, coupled with stiffened tail and ears drawn back, is, in appropriate contexts of challenge, indicative of anger and aggression. Its wagging tail and desire to lick the hands or face of its master when being patted manifest affection. The closed eyes and purring of a cat signify contentment; the arched back, erect hair, laid-back ears, spitting, and hissing signify threat or fear.¹⁹ Most carnivores display anger (or fear) when prevented from eating their prey. Territorial animals fight with ferocious rage to protect their domain. Most animals take care of, and manifestly care for, their young during the period of their dependency, will fight to death in order to protect them, and exhibit distress (primitive grief) at the death of their young. Animals that jointly rear their young bond. These responses to the circumstances of life are the primary animal roots of caring and, by the same token, of the most primitive emotions. Social animals have, to a greater or lesser degree, capacities for group bonding, and hence for primitive forms of affection that reaches beyond their mate or offspring. They stand in hierarchical social relationships and protect their status within their social group. Relatively few kinds of animals, apart from humans, have an innate capacity for the form of caring that is constituted by *sympathy*. This, as Adam Smith and David Hume saw clearly, is one root of morality.

Emotions differ from appetites. First, many emotions, such as affection, gratitude, hope, pride, and regret, have no distinctive link with sensations at all. Some emotional occurrences, such as flashes of anger or

¹⁹ For what is still a classic description of animal emotion, see C. Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (John Murray, London, 1872).

thrills of fear, are indeed associated with distinctive sensations, but the connection with sensations differs from that between appetites and sensations. One does not feel fear in one's stomach in the sense in which one feels thirst in one's throat, even though one may feel butterflies in one's stomach. One does not have a feeling of anger in one's temples, heaving chest, or tight stomach muscles, as one has a feeling of hunger in one's belly. So emotions do not have a somatic location in the manner in which appetites do. One's fear, jealousy, or longing, no less than one's hunger, may be dreadful – but not because of the feeling in one's chest or stomach. *Those* feelings are not what is dreadful.

Secondly, emotions have formal objects that restrict the range of intelligible non-formal, material, objects of the emotion. Anything that can be feared, anything for which one can feel remorse, anything that one can envy, is a potential material object of the emotion. The formal object of an emotion is the characteristic that *must apply* or must *be thought (or known) to apply* to anything towards which one feels a given emotion. The formal object of an emotion restricts the range of its possible material objects. Or, to put the same point in the formal mode, the formal object limits what expressions may intelligibly occur as the direct objects of the emotion verb. So, for example, one fears what one thinks to be frightening, harmful, or dangerous – one cannot intelligibly (non-pathologically) fear flowers, grass, or leaves. What one feels remorseful about is a misdemeanour one has, or thinks one has, committed. One cannot feel remorse for what another has done or for something one is about to do. What one envies is something one believes to be a good that is another's. One cannot feel envious of another's misfortunes or of one's own good fortune. Unlike appetites, which have *only* formal objects, emotions can have an indefinite array of objects characterized by and subsumed under the formal object definitive of the emotion.

Thirdly, the intensity of emotions is not proportional to the intensity of whatever sensations may accompany their episodic manifestation. How much one fears heights may be evident not in the intensity of the perturbations one may feel when on a high building, but rather in the lengths one goes to avoid being on it. How proud one is of one's children's achievements on prize-giving day cannot be measured by reference to any sensations (no matter how thrilled one is).

Fourthly, emotions do not display the pattern of occurrence, satiation, relief, and recurrence characteristic of the appetites.

Fifthly, emotions have a cognitive dimension that is absent from the appetites. The hungry animal wants food, the thirsty animal wants drink, the animal in rut or in heat wants to copulate, but no particular knowledge or belief is essentially associated with these appetites. By contrast, the frightened animal is afraid of something it *perceives* or *thinks* to be dangerous; a mother is proud of her offspring, *believing* them to be meritorious; the repentant sinner is remorseful, *knowing* or *believing* himself to have sinned. This cognitive dimension of the emotions will be examined later.

Sixthly, and coordinate with the cognitive dimension of emotions, is the rational dimension. For emotions are rightly evaluated in terms of their rationality or reasonableness. One may have good or poor reasons for feeling angry with someone, for feeling regret, remorse, or guilt. The reasons are related to the subsumability of the material object of the emotion under the formal object that is constitutive of the emotion, as well as to the specific circumstances of the case. It is these that make certain emotions warranted or unjustified, reasonable or irrational. The rationality of emotions will be explored in chapter 3.

Finally, many emotions are exhibited by characteristic facial expression and manifest in typical tones of voice – as in the case of love and affection, fear, anger, or hatred. The appetites are not (see table 1.1).

	<i>Emotion</i>	<i>Appetite</i>
Locus	×	✓
Non-formal object	✓	×
Intensity proportional to sensation	×	✓
Pattern of recurrence	×	✓
Can occur in blends	✓	×
Cognitive dimension	✓	×
Characteristic facial and tonal expression	✓	×

Table 1.1 *A comparison between emotions and appetites (give or take borderline cases)*

Temporary and enduring emotions

Just as we distinguished between moods that occur on a given occasion (feeling cheerful this afternoon) and moods that are longer lasting dispositional states (as when one suffers from a depression), so too we must distinguish between *temporary emotions* and *persistent* or *enduring emotions* (see fig. 1.4). I shall use the term ‘temporary emotion’ to signify an emotional response on a given occasion to some actual or imagined person, object, event, state of affairs, or putative information that has come to one’s attention, either by perception (or misperception) or by hearsay that informs (or misinforms) one, or that one imagines. We can distinguish two kinds of temporary emotions by reference to their duration. A temporary emotion may be *momentary* or *acute* like a flash of anger, a pang of envy, a flush of pride, or a sudden thrill of fear that immediately dissipates. Alternatively, a temporary emotion may *last for a while*. One may feel furious with another for some actual or imaginary slight and remain angry and ill-tempered for the rest of the afternoon. One may feel frightened or terrified by a present danger and cower in terror until it passes an hour or more later. One may feel proud of one’s spouse throughout the whole celebratory dinner in his or her honour. I shall refer to such temporary but continuous emotions as *episodic*. These are restricted to emotions that are felt while awake and conscious but that cease on loss of consciousness. One feels no anger, fear, or pride while one is asleep). *Temporary emotions* (momentary and episodic alike) are to be distinguished from *enduring* or *persistent emotions*. The latter persist through periods of sleep – one does not cease to love one’s beloved when one sleeps any more than one ceases to know or believe what one knows or believes




Figure 1.4 Forms of emotion distinguished by temporality

when one falls asleep). Enduring emotions may last for long periods of time, indeed, sometimes for a lifetime. A characteristic feature of enduring emotions, such as love, is that they develop over time (see chapter 10). The passion of youth develops, in a happy marriage, into the love of old age. Grief, initially unbearably intense, will gradually evolve into abiding sadness and a sense of loss that may, with time, modulate into sorrowful nostalgia. The trajectory of jealousy is commonly from doubts, suspicions, and anxieties over supposed infidelity, to anger and resentment at confirmed or supposedly confirmed infidelity, culminating *in extremis* in hatred (see chapters 7 and 8).

Among *episodic emotions* we must distinguish two kinds: *episodic emotions that constitute mental states*, as when one is in a state of anxiety over one's missing child all day, or excited all afternoon in anticipation of a party that evening, or bored all through a lecture. These are emotions with *genuine duration*. They obtain only when one is conscious; they commence, last for a while, and then terminate; they have degrees of intensity, and may wax or wane; they can be interrupted by diversion of attention and later resumed; they do not persist through sleep or loss of consciousness. These may be contrasted with *episodic emotions that are not mental states*, since they cannot, in the same sense, be interrupted by distraction of attention and later resumed. One may feel proud of one's child throughout a ceremony in his honour, but one cannot be said to be in a state of feeling proud, and one's feeling of pride cannot be said to be interrupted by distraction of attention. Similarly, one may envy another for some honour he receives at a ceremony one is attending, but one's feelings of envy cannot be said to be interrupted and later resumed in the way in which one's fear, boredom, or anxiety may be. Nor would one answer the question 'What kind of mental state is he in?' by saying 'He is envious/in a state of envy'.

Many temporary emotions, especially momentary ones, are bound up with *emotional perturbations*. Emotional perturbations are disturbances akin to agitations – they are manifest in the trembling of fear, the throbbing temples of rage, the tears and heartache of overwhelming grief, the blushes of embarrassment. Some may indeed be tempestuous: one may be seized by wave of anger, swept away by a flood of anguish, or gripped by a storm of sexual passion. Others, such as a flash of envy, a twinge of jealousy, a pang of resentment, are not. To be sure, there is no hard and fast dividing line between momentary and episodic emotions.

Many episodic emotions involve (or need involve) no perturbations, for example, pride, contentment, curiosity, interest, wonder, trust, gratitude, and loneliness. Others may indeed involve perturbations in certain types of case but not in others. Becoming indignant or angry with someone who has insulted one typically involves perturbations, but becoming angry at what is said in an article in a newspaper or at a prime-ministerial announcement on the radio need not. Here the anger may be manifest in what one says (“That’s outrageous”) and does (writes a critical letter to *The Times*; resigns one’s party membership) rather than in flushing red with anger, raising one’s voice, shaking one’s fist, and so forth.

It is primarily, but not only, temporary emotions that give rise to the stark, but often misleading, contrast between reason and the emotions (which will be discussed in chapter 3). Episodic emotions in particular (but also persistent ones) are associated with being emotional rather than rational, with an excess of sensibility and a deficiency of sense, with reckless, passionate reaction as opposed to thoughtful and measured response. In this respect, momentary emotions – *fits* of rage, *waves* of remorse or pity, *flashes* of jealousy – resemble agitations. Beset with such feelings, one may act or react spontaneously – without thinking – angrily, jealously, fearfully. By contrast, many episodic as well as persistent emotions, such as hatred, jealousy, sexual passion, and being in love, often *warp one’s reason* and *distort one’s judgement*.

Persistent emotions *Persistent* emotions lack ‘genuine duration’. They do not lapse with loss of consciousness. So they are neither *mental states* nor *states of mind*. One may love or hate a person, an activity, a cause, or a place for the whole of one’s life. One may be proud of the achievements of one’s youth or of one’s children for the rest of one’s days. One may be envious or jealous of a person (one’s sibling, for example) for years (see fig. 1.4). One may fear for one’s endangered family and friends for as long as the danger persists. One may be ashamed or guilty of one’s misconduct for decades, and one’s regret for one’s follies may never cease. Although persistent emotions may *arise* out of emotional episodes, as when one’s persistent fear of heights may originate in a particular episode of terror on a cliff face, they are not themselves such episodes. Can they, like persistent moods, be said to be *dispositional states*? It is tempting to think so. One might suppose that one’s pride in one’s children is a tendency *to feel proud* of them from occasion to occasion, that one’s lasting remorse for some past misdeed is a proneness *to feel remorse*

from time to time, and that one's persistent jealousy of one's spouse's flirtatious relationship with another is a disposition *to feel jealous*. This is at best misleading, at worst quite mistaken.

It is misleading in so far as it suggests a sharp and perspicuous distinction between *being* angry, hopeful, frightened, or jealous, on the one hand, and *feeling* angry, hopeful, frightened, or jealous, on the other. But it is unclear whether there is any systematic difference between feeling angry and being angry, between feeling jealous and being jealous, or between feeling frightened and being frightened. Heathcliff's hatred lasted a very long time – does that imply that he hated Edgar and Isabella Linton as well as Hindley and Hareton Earnshaw for a long period, but felt hatred only from time to time? Othello and Swann were in the grip of persistent jealousy – does that mean that they were jealous for a prolonged period, but felt jealous only when awake and thinking of the woman they loved? There is a temptation to think so, but it should be resisted. We may say indifferently, 'A feels very angry with B' or 'A is very angry with B', 'A feels frightened of B' or 'A is frightened of B', and 'A feels pity for B' or 'A pities B'. Perhaps the phrases 'feels frightened/angry/pity' more readily invite the question 'What makes one feel ...?', whereas the phrases 'is frightened/is angry/pities' invite the question 'Why is/does he ...?' or 'What reason does he have for ...?'

The relation between a persistent emotion lacking genuine duration and a temporary emotion (no matter whether momentary or episodic) is not that between a disposition or tendency and its actualization. As we have noted, human dispositions (with the exception of dispositions of health) are unlike inanimate dispositions.²⁰ Rather, they are traits of character or temperament. But being angry with, afraid of, or pitying someone, unlike being irascible, timorous, or compassionate, are not character traits – indeed, they may sometimes be 'out of character'. Are persistent, enduring, emotions then pronenesses or tendencies? Pronenesses and tendencies are specified by reference to what they are pronenesses or tendencies to *do*. To be sure, feeling an emotion is not a *doing*. But there seems no reason why one should not extend the idea of proneness and tendency to *feelings*. Is Othello's jealousy not a proneness to feel jealous? Is Jean Valjean's remorse not a tendency to suffer feelings of remorse? Is Achilles' anger with Agamemnon not a proneness to episodic fits of anger with him?

²⁰ See *Human Nature*, ch. 4, sections 7–9.

Is Pierre's love for Natasha not a tendency to experience floods of tenderness towards her with appropriate frequency? It should be obvious that something is awry.

We are misled by the form of words '*feeling* [an emotion]', a form that inclines us to ascribe a false quasi-substantiality to what is felt when we feel an emotion. It invites the thought that to feel an emotion is to stand in a relation to a something; or, as has sometimes been supposed, that we know what emotion we feel because we perceive it (feel it) in inner sense. To avoid this grammatical undertow, we should keep in mind the adverbial forms of emotion words, for example, to do something *angrily*, *fearfully*, *enviously*, or *affectionately*, as well as the verbal forms *to rage*, *to fear*, *to envy*, and so on. Moreover, we should reflect on what someone who is jealous, frightened, angry, remorseful, grateful, and so on is prone to *do*, and not rest satisfied with the glib tautology that he is prone to *feel* jealous, remorse, fear, angry, gratitude. For that merely provides us with a lame excuse for avoiding the question of what feeling angry, jealous, afraid, grateful, and so on can amount to from case to case.

What is necessary is to shift focus from *momentary Emotional histories* *emotions*, which may incorporate pangs, twinges, flashes, or explosions of emotion, on the one hand, and *episodic emotions*, on the other, to *emotional histories*, in which *enduring emotions* find their place. Such histories are narratives involving manifold forms of human reaction and response, thought and intention, action and interaction.²¹ We must focus upon the complex ways in which an emotion may come alive and be manifest in what one says and does. Moreover, we must not forget the manifold ways in which the emotions are active in one's inner life, torturing or tormenting one, keeping one awake at night, racking one with obsessive fantasies, delighting one in one's daydreams, and informing one's dreams. To be enraged or furious, or to have a fit of anger, are emotional episodes. Rage and fury are not persistent emotions, but anger may be. To be angry with someone for a prolonged period is not a proneness to occasional outbursts of anger with that person, but rather a lasting resentment, a persistent lack of amiability, the severance of social relations, coldness and distance on occasions of meeting, and so forth. It is to think and speak of the

²¹ See R. Harré, 'Emotions', in R. Harré and F. M. Moghaddam, *Psychology for the Third Millennium* (SAGE, London, 2012), and P. Goldie, *The Emotions* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000).

object of one's anger with disdain, to be prone to dwell upon the reason for one's anger with resentment and hurt, to rehearse imaginary dialogues in one's mind, and so forth. That is what it is to feel angry with someone over a period of time – it is not merely, or not even necessarily, to succumb to episodic outbursts of anger. Love that persists over a lifetime may grow out of falling in love at first sight, out of the emotional perturbations characteristic of erotic love and the ensuing emotional states distinctive of passionate wooing. But the constant love of a happy marriage (e.g. Pierre and Natasha) is not merely a tendency to be swept by feelings of loving tenderness or erotic passion, but rather a persistent concern for whom one loves, a standing motive for action beneficial or pleasing to the beloved, a desire for and delight in shared experience, and a persistent colouring of thought, imagination, and fantasy. What does Othello's jealousy amount to? He is racked with doubts and suspicions, tormented by distrust, writhes in self-inflicted torments. He stoops to spying, plotting, and conniving; seeks vengeance for imaginary wrongs; spends sleepless nights mocked by the 'green-eyed monster' of jealousy. The things a jealous person does out of jealousy and the behaviour that discloses persistent jealousy cannot be reduced to a determinate act-category that specifies a tendency or proneness. However, to characterize jealousy as a 'multitrack disposition' is equally misconceived.²² For that merely masks the fact that the relation between an emotion and its ramified expression in judgement, imagination, behavioural expression, and motivated action or omission is *not* akin to the relation between a disposition (proneness or tendency) and its actualization. The hatred that Edmond Dantès bears his treacherous erstwhile friends is manifest far less in emotional perturbations and outbursts of episodic emotion than in the iron determination of his will for revenge, in the cast of his thought and fantasy, and in his motives and reasons for action over many years. The envy that moves Cousine Bette need not sweep over her every morning, but it informs her life in a multitude of ways, invades her imagination and fantasy, occupies her thoughts day and night, and motivates her plans and projects. We need to shift our focus from tendencies and pronenesses to the agent's acknowledged *reasons* for his persistent emotions and

²² The idea of multitrack dispositions was introduced by Ryle in *Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson, London, 1949), pp. 44–5. For refutation of the view that belief is a multitrack disposition, see *The Intellectual Powers*, pp. 221–6.

to their constituting pertinent considerations in his imaginings and practical reasonings.

It should already be evident that the boundary between temporary and enduring emotions, on the one hand, and *emotional attitudes*, on the other, is blurred.

Momentary emotions often generate emotional attitudes – as one’s brief flash of anger is transformed into dislike, disdain, and hostility. Similarly, episodic emotions often mutate into emotional attitudes. When someone misbehaves shamefully in one’s presence for a prolonged time (he may be drunk, or have failed to control his temper, or be unctuous towards his superiors), one may react with rising feelings of contempt. One’s feeling of contempt may be exhibited in one’s facial expression when addressing the person who has behaved contemptibly – one looks down one’s nose, curls one’s lip, raises one’s eyebrow. One’s contempt may be long-lasting, but that does not imply that one will have recurrent feelings of contempt (facial expression and all). Rather, one’s *attitude* towards the person will be contemptuous. One *judges* him to be contemptible. One will hold him in disdain, sever social relations with him, no longer speak well of him.

It is evident that emotions exhibit both *compositional complexity* and *contextual or narrative complexity*. Compositional complexity is patent in the manner in which emotions may involve cognitive and cogitative strands (perception, knowledge, belief, judgement, imagination, evaluation, and thought); sensations and perturbations; forms of facial, tonal, and behavioural manifestation; or emotionally charged utterances that express one’s feelings; reasons and motives for action; and intentionality and causality. The contextual complexity is manifest in the manner in which emotions, in all their temporal diversity, are woven into the tapestry of life. An emotional episode is rendered intelligible not only by reference to the context and occasion in which it arises, but also by reference to a past history – to previous relationships and commitments, to past deeds and encounters, and to antecedent emotional states. The loss of temper over a triviality may be made comprehensible by reference to long-standing, but suppressed, jealousy. One’s *Schadenfreude* (delight at the misfortune of another) may be explained by one’s antecedent malicious envy (one’s resentment at the good fortune of another) or by reference to one’s standing resentment at an insult. The intensity of one’s grief may be explained by reference to the passion with

which one loved. The general point is finely depicted in Edward Greenwood's poem 'The Story':

I glimpsed as I passed an open door
 The sight of someone else's grief,
 A visitor bent with flowers in her hands,
 Whispering words to bring relief

To one who, stooped in the doorway there,
 Was a picture of distress,
 For, as she took them, she'd tears in her eyes
 From some cause I could only guess.

I couldn't eavesdrop on words exchanged,
 For they shared a sorrow not mine,
 Round which a boundary was drawn
 That stopped me crossing its line.

But I hovered on its threshold when
 I saw them both mourning there,
 Though both of them were unknown to me,
 There was something I could share.

They made me meditate on grief,
 And I thought as I passed slowly on
 Of the one who had come to commiserate,
 And the one whose tears shone.

A glance takes the part of a sorrowing heart,
 Not with what's behind the pain,
 For that you'd need to be in at the start
 And see the whole story plain.

For the most part, understanding the emotions, as opposed to explaining their cortical and physiological roots, is idiographic rather than nomothetic, and historical rather than static. We shall explore this thought in chapters 2 and 3.