

GLOBALIZATION I

LIQUIDS, FLOWS, AND STRUCTURES

Some of the Basics

From Solids to Liquids (to Gases)

- Solids
- Liquids and Gases

Flows

- Types of Flows

Heavy, Light, Weightless

Heavy Structures that Expedite Flows

Heavy Structures as Barriers to Flows

The Winners and Losers of Global Flows

Thinking about Global Flows and Structures

Chapter Summary

Globalization¹ is increasingly omnipresent. We are living in *a* – or even *the* – “global age” (Albrow 1996; Deflem 2016; Kershaw 2019). Globalization is clearly a very important change; it can even be argued (Bauman 2003) that it is *the most important change in human history*. This is reflected in many domains, but particularly in social relationships and social structures,² especially those that are widely dispersed geographically. “In the era of globalization... shared humanity face[s] *the most fateful* of the many fateful steps” it has made in its long history (Bauman 2003: 156, italics added).

The following is the definition of globalization³ to be used in this book (note that all of the italicized terms will be discussed in this chapter):

Globalization:

Planetary process(es) involving increasing liquidity and growing multidirectional flows as well as the structures they encounter and create.

globalization is a planetary *process* or set of *processes* involving increasing *liquidity* and the growing multidirectional *flows* of people, objects, places and information as well as the *structures* they encounter and create that are *barriers* to, or *expedite*, those flows ...⁴

In contrast to many other definitions of globalization, this one does *not* assume that greater integration is an inevitable component of globalization. That is, globalization can bring with it greater integration (especially when things flow easily), but it can also serve to reduce the level of integration (when structures are erected that successfully block flows). For example, increasingly global flows recently led to the so-called Brexit, where British voters rejected greater integration with the European Union. The global spread of COVID-19 has led to some (perhaps temporary) barriers placed on the movement of people and goods between countries.



SOME OF THE BASICS

In spite of the focus in this book on globalization, there are many scholars who do not accept the idea that we live in a global age (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, this book embraces, and operates from, a “globalist” perspective (Hirst et al. 2015) – globalization *is* a reality. In fact, globalization is of such great importance that the era in which we live should be labeled the “global age.”

Debates about globalization are one of the reasons that there is undoubtedly no topic today more difficult to get one’s head around, let alone to master, than globalization. However, of far greater importance are the sheer magnitude, diversity, and complexity of the process of globalization which involves almost everyone, everything, and every place and each in innumerable ways. (The concept of **globality** refers to the condition [in this case omnipresence] resulting from the process of globalization [Kühnhardt and Mayer 2019].)

For example, this book is being written by two Americans; our editor, managing editor and copy-editor are in England; reviewers are from four continents; the book is typeset in India; the book is printed in the USA and distributed by the publisher throughout much of the world; and you might be reading it today on a plane en route from Vladivostok to Shanghai. Further, if it follows the pattern of many of our other books, it may well be translated into Russian, Chinese, and many other languages. This book is also available for download onto wireless devices of all kinds.

Globality:

Omnipresence of the process of globalization.

This would make the book highly liquid since it would be possible for it to be accessed anywhere in the world at any time.

Before proceeding to the next section, a note is needed on the use of **metaphors** (Brown 1989), which will occupy a prominent place in the ensuing discussion. A metaphor involves the use of one term to better help us understand another term. Thus in the next section, we will use the metaphor of a “solid” to describe epochs before the era of globalization. Similarly, the global world will be described as being “liquid.” The use of such metaphors is designed to give the reader a better and a more vivid sense of the global age and how it differs from prior epochs.

Metaphors:
Use of one term to help us better understand another.



FROM SOLIDS TO LIQUIDS (TO GASES)

SOLIDS

Prior to the current epoch of globalization (and as we will see, to most observers there *was* a previous global epoch [see Chapter 2], if not many previous epochs, of globalization), it could be argued that one of the things that characterized people, things, information, places, and much else was their greater **solidity**. That is, all of them tended to be hard or to harden (metaphorically, figuratively, not literally, of course) over time and therefore, among other things, to remain largely in place. As a result, people either did not go anywhere or they did not venture very far from where they were born and raised; their social relationships were restricted to those who were nearby. Much the same could be said of most objects (tools, food, and so on) which tended to be used where they were produced. The solidity of most material manifestations of information – stone tablets, newspapers, magazines, books, and so on – also made them at least somewhat difficult to move very far. Furthermore, since people didn’t move very far, neither did information. Places were not only quite solid and immovable, but they tended to confront solid natural (mountains, rivers, oceans) and humanly constructed (walls, gates) barriers that made it difficult for people and things to exit or to enter.

Solidity:
People, things, information, and places “harden” over time and therefore have limited mobility.

Above all, solidity describes a world in which barriers exist and are erected to prevent the free movement of all sorts of things. It was the nation-state that was most likely to create these “solid” barriers (for example, walls [e.g. the Great Wall of China; the wall between Israel and the West Bank], border gates, and guards), and the state itself grew increasingly solid as it resisted change. For much of the twentieth century this was epitomized by the Soviet Union and its satellite states which sought to erect any number of barriers in order to keep all sorts of things out *and* in (especially a disaffected population). With the passage of time, the Soviet Union grew increasingly rigid and unable to adapt to changing conditions. The best example of this solidity was the erection (beginning in 1961), and maintenance, of the Berlin Wall in order to keep East Berliners in and Western influences out. There was a more fluid relationship between East and West Berlin prior to the erection of the wall, but that fluidity was seen in the East as being disadvantageous, even dangerous. Once the Wall was erected, relations between West and East Berlin were virtually frozen in place – they solidified – and there was comparatively little movement of anything between them.

The Wall, to say nothing of East Germany and the Soviet Union, are long gone and with them many of the most extreme forms of solidity brought into existence by the Cold War. Nonetheless, solid structures remain – e.g. the nation-state and its border and customs controls – and there are ever-present calls for the creation of new, and new types, of solid structures. Thus, in many parts of Europe there are demands for more barriers to authorized and unauthorized immigration, which was one factor that fueled the vote for Brexit. This has reached an extreme in the US with concern over undocumented Mexican (and other Latin American) immigrants leading to efforts to construct an enormous wall between the two countries. Thus, solidity is far from dead in the contemporary world. It is very often the case that demands for new forms of solidity are the result of increased fluidity. However, a strong case can, and will, be made that it is fluidity that is more characteristic of today's world, especially in terms of globalization.

Of course, people were *never* so solid that they were totally immobile or stuck completely in a given place (a few people were able to escape East Berlin in spite of the Wall and many would still be able to enter the US without documentation even if a fence on the Mexican border were to be completed), and this was especially true of the elite members of any society. Elites were (and are) better able to move about and that ability increased with advances in transportation technology. For the right price, elites may even buy citizenship in some countries (Mavelli 2018). Commodities, especially those created for elites, also could almost always be moved and they, too, grew more moveable as technologies advanced. Information (because it was not solid, although it could be solidified in the form of, for example, a book) could always travel more easily than goods or people (it could be spread by word of mouth over great distances even if the originator of the information could not move very far; it moved even faster as more advanced communication technologies emerged [telegraph, telephone, the Internet, smart phones]). And as other technologies developed (ships, automobiles, airplanes), people, especially those with the resources, were better able to leave places and get to others. They could even literally move places (or at least parts of them) as, for example, when in the early 1800s Lord Elgin dismantled parts of the Parthenon in Greece and transported them to London, where to this day they can be found in the British Museum.

LIQUIDS AND GASES

However, at an increasing rate over the last few centuries, and especially in the last several decades, that which once seemed so solid has tended to “melt” and become increasingly *liquid*. Instead of thinking of people, objects, information, and places as being like solid blocks of ice, they need to be seen as tending, in recent years, to melt and as becoming increasingly liquid. It is, needless to say, far more difficult to move blocks of ice than the water that is produced when those blocks melt. Of course, to extend the metaphor, blocks of ice, even glaciers, continue to exist (although, even these are now literally melting), in the contemporary world that have not melted, at least completely. Solid material realities (people, cargo, books) continue to exist, but because of a wide range of technological developments (in transportation, communication, the Internet, and so on) they can move across the globe far more readily.

Everywhere we turn, more things, including ourselves (as tourists or students studying abroad), are becoming increasingly liquefied. Furthermore, as the process continues, those liquids, as is the case in the natural world (e.g. ice to water to water vapor), tend to turn into *gases* of various types. Gases are lighter than liquids and therefore they move even more easily than liquids. This is most easily seen literally in the case of the global flow of natural gas through lengthy pipelines. More metaphorically, much of the information now available virtually instantly around the world wafts through the air in the form of signals beamed off satellites. Such signals become news bulletins on our smart phones, messages from our global positioning systems letting us know the best route to our destination, or memes shared on social media.

It should be noted, once again, that all of the terms used above – solids, liquids, gases – are metaphors – little of the global world is literally a solid, a liquid, or a gas. They are metaphors designed to communicate a sense of fundamental changes taking place as the process of globalization proceeds.

Karl Marx opened the door to this kind of analysis (and to the use of such metaphors) when he famously argued that because of the nature of capitalism as an economic system “everything solid melts into air.” That is, many of the solid, material realities that preceded capitalism (e.g. the structures of feudalism) were “melted” by it and were transformed into liquids. To continue the imagery farther than Marx took it, they were ultimately transformed into gases that diffused in the atmosphere. However, while Marx was describing a largely destructive process, the point here is that the new liquids and gases that are being created are inherent parts of the new world and are radically transforming it. In the process, they are having *both* constructive and destructive effects (Schumpeter 1976).

Marx’s insight of over a century-and-a-half ago was not only highly prescient, but is far truer today than in Marx’s day. In fact, it is far truer than he could have ever imagined. Furthermore, that melting, much like one of the great problems in the global world today – the melting of the ice on and near the North and South poles as a result of global warming (see Chapter 11) – is not only likely to continue in the coming years, but to increase at an exponential rate. Indeed, the melting of the polar icecaps can be seen as another metaphor for the increasing fluidity associated with globalization, especially its problematic aspects. And, make no mistake, the increasing fluidity associated with globalization presents *both* great opportunities *and* great dangers.

Thus, the perspective on globalization presented here, following the work of Zygmunt Bauman (2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2011, 2012; Bauman and Donskis 2016; Bauman and Leoncini 2018), is that it involves, above all else, increasing **liquidity** (Davis 2016) (and **gaseousness**). Several of Bauman’s ideas on liquidity are highly relevant to the perspective on globalization employed here.

For example, liquid phenomena do not easily, or for long, hold their shape. Thus, the myriad liquid phenomena associated with globalization are hard-pressed to maintain any particular form and, even if they acquire a form, it is likely to change quite quickly.

Liquid phenomena fix neither space nor time. That which is liquid is, by definition, opposed to any kind of fixity, be it spatial or temporal. This means that the spatial and temporal aspects of globalization are in continuous flux. That which is liquid is forever ready to change whatever shape (space) it might take on momentarily. Time (however short) in a liquid world is more important than space. Perhaps the best

Liquidity:

Increasing ease of movement of people, things, information, and places in the global age.

Gaseousness:

Hyper-mobility of people, things, information, and places in the global age.

example of this is global finance where little or nothing (dollars, gold) actually changes its place (at least immediately), but time is of the essence in that the symbolic representations of money move instantaneously and great profits can be made or lost in split-second decisions on financial transactions.

Liquid phenomena not only move easily, but once they are on the move they are difficult to stop. This is exemplified in many areas such as foreign trade, investment, and global financial transactions (Knorr Cetina 2016), the globality of transactions and interactions (e.g. on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Weibo [Axford 2016]) on the Internet, and the difficulty in halting the global flow of drugs, pornography, the activities of organized crime, and undocumented immigrants (Ryoko 2012).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, that which is liquid tends to melt whatever (especially solids) stands in its path. This is clearest in the case of the much discussed death, or at least decline, of the nation-state and its borders in the era of increasing global flows (see Chapter 5). According to Cartier (2001: 269), the “forces of globalization have rendered many political boundaries more porous to flows of people, money, and things.”

It is clear that if one wanted to use a single term to think about globalization today, liquidity would be at or near the top of the list. That is not to say that there are no solid structures in the world – after all, we still live in a modern world, even if it is late modernity, and modernity has long been associated with solidity. And it does not mean that there is not a constant interplay between liquidity and solidity with increases in that which is liquid (e.g. terrorist attacks launched against Israel from the West Bank during the Intifada) leading to counter-reactions involving the erection of new solid forms (e.g. that fence between Israel and the West Bank), but at the moment and for the foreseeable future, the momentum lies with increasing and proliferating global liquidity.



FLOWS

Flows:
Movement of
people, things,
information,
and places
due, in part, to
the increasing
porosity of
global
barriers.

Closely related to the idea of liquidity, and integral to it, is another key concept in thinking about globalization, the idea of **flows** (Appadurai 1996); after all liquids flow easily, far more easily than solids. In fact, it is the concept of flows that is widely used in the literature on globalization⁵ and it is the concept that will inform a good deal of the body of this book.

Because so much of the world has “melted” or is in the process of “melting” and has become liquefied, globalization is increasingly characterized by great *flows* of increasingly liquid phenomena of all types, including people, objects, information, decisions, places, and so on. For example, foods of all sorts increasingly flow around the world, including sushi globalized from its roots in Japan (Edwards 2012), Chilean produce now ubiquitous in the US market (and elsewhere), Senegalese food in Paris (and other parts of the world), and so on. In many cases, the flows have become raging floods that are increasingly less likely to be impeded by, among others, place-based barriers of any kind, including the oceans, mountains, and especially the borders of nation-states.

Looking at a very different kind of flow, many people in many parts of the world believe that they are being swamped by migrants, especially poor undocumented migrants (Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Whether or not these are actually floods, they have come to be seen in that way by many people, often aided by media personalities and politicians in many countries who have established their reputations by portraying them as “illegal” immigrants flooding their country. It is also flows of people that accounted for the spread of COVID-19 from Wuhan, China, to the rest of China and out into the rest of the world (Jia et al. 2020). Given the increasing flows of people within a rapidly developing China and a more interconnected world via air travel, the coronavirus spread around the world before health authorities could adequately contain it.

Undoubtedly because of their immateriality, ideas, images, and information, both legal (blogs) and illegal (e.g. child pornography), flow (virtually) everywhere through interpersonal contact and the media, especially now via the Internet and social media. To take a specific example within the global circulation of ideas, “confidentiality” in the treatment of AIDS patients flowed to India (and elsewhere) because of the efforts of experts and their professional networks. The arrival of this idea in India made it possible to better manage and treat AIDS patients who were more likely to seek out treatment because of assurances of confidentiality. Confidentiality was very important in this context because of the reticence of many Indians to discuss publicly such matters as sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS (Misra 2008).

Decisions of all sorts flow around the world, as well as over time: “The effect of the [economic] decisions flowed, and would continue to flow, through every possible conduit. Some decisions would be reflected in products rolling off assembly lines, others in prices of securities, and still others in personal interactions. Each decision would cascade around the world and then forward through time” (Altman 2007: 255). At the moment, much of the world is experiencing slower growth (World Bank 2019) which continues to be affected by COVID-19. The effect of the pandemic has exacerbated pre-existing trade tensions and tighter financial conditions, further slowing trade and investment in both developed and developing economies.

Even places can be said to be flowing around the world as, for example, immigrants re-create the places from which they came in new locales (e.g. Indian and Pakistani enclaves in London). Furthermore, places (e.g. airports, shopping malls) themselves have become increasingly like flows (for more on this and the transition from “spaces of places” to “spaces of flows,” see Castells 1996).

Even with all of this increasing fluidity, much of what would have been considered the height of global liquidity only a few decades, or even years, ago now seems increasingly sludge-like. This is especially the case when we focus on the impact of the computer, Internet, and social media on the global flow of all sorts of things. Thus, not long ago we might have been amazed by our ability to order a book and have it delivered in 30 minutes or less by drones (Mims 2019). But an even more liquid form of delivery is the ability to download that book in seconds to a tablet or smart phone, and share on social media.

TYPES OF FLOWS

Interconnected flows: Global flows that interconnect at various points and times.

It is worth differentiating among several different types of flows. One is **interconnected flows**. The fact is that global flows do not occur in isolation from one another; many different flows interconnect at various points and times. Take the example of the global sex industry (Farr 2005, 2017). The sex industry requires the intersection of the flow of people who work or are trafficked in the industry (usually women and girls) with the flow of customers (e.g. sex tourists). Other flows that interconnect with the global sex industry involve money and drugs. Then there are the sexually transmitted diseases that are carried by the participants in that industry and from them branch off into many other disease flows throughout the world.

A very different example of interconnected flows is in the global fish industry. That industry is now dominated by the flows of huge industrial ships and the massive amount of frozen fish that they produce and which is distributed throughout the world. In addition, these huge industrial ships are putting many small fishers out of business and some are using their boats for other kinds of flows (e.g. transporting undocumented immigrants from Africa to Europe) (LaFraniere 2008). Over-fishing by industrial ships has emptied the waters of fish and this has served to drive up their price. This has made the industry attractive to criminals and the result is an increase in the global flow of illegal fish (Rosenthal 2008).

Multidirectional flows: All sorts of things flowing in every conceivable direction among many points in the world.

Then there are **multidirectional flows**. Globalization is not a one-way process as concepts like Westernization and Americanization (see Chapter 3) seem to imply (Marling 2006; Singer 2013). While all sorts of things do flow out of the West and the United States to every part of the world, many more flow into the West and the US from everywhere (e.g. Japanese automobiles, Chinese T-shirts, iPhones assembled in China, Russian sex workers, and so on). Furthermore, all sorts of things flow in every conceivable direction among all other points in the world.

Conflicting flows: Planetary processes that conflict with one another (and with much else).

Still another layer of complexity is added when we recognize that planetary processes not only can complement one another (e.g. the meeting of flows of sex tourists and sex workers), but often also conflict with one another (and with much else). In fact, it is usually these **conflicting flows** that attract the greatest attention. This is most obvious in the case of the ongoing “war” on terror between the United States and Islamist militants and jihadists (e.g. al-Qaeda and ISIS). On the one hand, al-Qaeda and other Islamist militants are clearly trying to maintain, or to increase, their global influence and, undoubtedly, to find other ways of engaging in a range of terrorist activities. For its part, the US is involved in a wide variety of global processes designed to counter that threat, stymie al-Qaeda’s ambitions, and ultimately and ideally to contain, if not destroy, it. This encompassed first the US invasions of Iraq⁶ and Afghanistan, and now the ongoing involvement in global flows of military personnel and equipment to other locales (e.g. Pakistan, Syria, and, increasingly, African countries); and counter-terrorism activities (e.g. drone strikes) designed to find and kill its leaders, and ongoing contact with intelligence agencies of other nations in order to share information on Islamist militants, and so on.

Reverse flows: Processes which, while flowing in one direction, act back on their source.

There are also **reverse flows**. In some cases, processes flowing in one direction act back on their source (and much else). This is what Ulrich Beck (1992) has called the *boomerang effect*. In Beck’s work the boomerang effect takes the form of, for example, pollution that is “exported” to other parts of the world but

then returns to affect the point of origin. So, for example, countries may insist that their factories be built with extremely high smokestacks so that the pollution reaches greater heights in the atmosphere and is thereby blown by prevailing winds into other countries and perhaps even around the globe (Ritzer and Stepnisky 2017). While this seems to reduce pollution in the home country, the boomerang effect is manifest when prevailing winds change direction and the pollution is blown back to its source. In addition, nations that are the recipients of another nation's air pollution may find ways of returning the favor by building their own smokestacks even higher than their neighbors.



HEAVY, LIGHT, WEIGHTLESS

There is another set of conceptual distinctions, or metaphors, that are useful in thinking about globalization. In addition to the change from solids to liquids (and then gases), we can also think in terms of change that involves movement from that which is *heavy* to that which is *light* (this is another distinction traceable to the work of Zygmunt Bauman) and most recently to that which is lighter than light, that which approaches being *weightless* (the gases mentioned above).

The original Gutenberg Bible (mid-fifteenth-century Germany) was usually published in two volumes, ran to close to 1,400 pages, and was printed on very heavy paper or vellum. It was in every sense of the term a heavy tome (almost like the one you are now reading – if you are reading it in print), difficult, because of its sheer weight and bulk, to transport. Fast forward to 2021 and a much lighter bound copy of the Bible could easily be purchased from Amazon and transported in hours or days virtually anywhere in the world. That Bible had also become weightless since it could be downloaded using a tablet or smart phone.

More generally, it could be argued that both pre-industrial and industrial societies were quite “heavy,” that is, characterized by that which is difficult to move. This applies both to those who labored in them (e.g. peasants, farmers, factory workers), where they labored (on plots of land, farms, in factories), and what they produced (crops, machines, books, automobiles). Because of their heaviness, workers tended to stay put and what they produced (and what was not consumed locally) could be moved, especially great distances, only with great effort and at great expense. Later advances, especially in technology, made goods, people, and places “lighter,” easier to move. These included advances in both transportation and technology that made all sorts of industrial products smaller, lighter, and easier to transport (compare the pocket-sized smart phone of today to the room-size computer of the mid-twentieth century).

Karin Knorr Cetina (2005: 215) has written about what she calls “complex global microstructures,” or “structures of connectivity and integration that are global in scope but microsociological in character.” She has described financial markets (Knorr Cetina 2012; Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002) in these terms and, more recently, global terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda or ISIS. We will have more to say about these global microstructures (see Chapter 12), but the key point here is that while Knorr Cetina sees these global microstructures as having several characteristics, of primary importance is their “lightness” in comparison to “heavy” bureaucratic systems. Thus, unlike the armed forces of the United States, Islamist militants (e.g. al-Qaeda) are not heavy bureaucratic structures, but rather light “global microstructures.”

It is their lightness that gives them many advantages over the extremely cumbersome US military, and the huge bureaucracy of which it is a part.

It could be argued that we moved from the heavy to the light era in the past century or two. However, by about 1980, we can be said to have moved beyond both of those epochs. We are now in an era that is increasingly defined not just by lightness, but by something approaching weightlessness. That which is weightless, or nearly so, clearly moves far more easily (even globally) than that which is either heavy or light. The big changes here involved the arrival and expansion of cable and satellite television, satellite radio, cell phones, personal computers, tablets, and, most importantly, smart phones and the advent of the Internet (and social media such as Instagram or Twitter). It is with the Internet (and the devices by which we access it) that globalization reaches new heights in terms of the flow of things and of social relationships in large part because it, and much else, have approached weightlessness.

An excellent example of this can be found in the world of music. Vinyl records were quite heavy and the shift to cassettes and later CDs did not make music much lighter. However, the creation of advanced technologies such as smart phones allows us to carry around thousands of once very heavy albums in our pockets, or we can play it from the cloud. We can carry that music with us anywhere in the world and we can exchange music over the Internet with people around the globe.

To take another example, in the past, if we needed to consult with a medical specialist in Switzerland, we would have had to fly there and take our x-rays and MRI images with us, or else had them snail-mailed. Now, both can be digitized and sent via the Internet; x-ray and MRI results have become weightless. Our Swiss physician can view them on their computer screen. We do not even need to go to Switzerland at all (in a sense we have become weightless, as well). We (or our local physician) can confer with our Swiss physician by phone, e-mail, or a video hook-up (e.g. Zoom) via the Internet. It is information, rather than things, that is increasingly important in the contemporary world and the post-industrial economy. Information, especially when it is translated into digital, computerized codes (that's what happens to our x-rays and MRI images), is weightless and can be sent around the globe instantly.

Of course, there are still many heavy things in our increasingly weightless world. Factories, offices, buildings, large and cumbersome machines (including MRI machines), newspapers, hardback books, and even some people (made "heavy" by, for example, minority status, poverty, a lack of education) continue to exist. All, of course, are nevertheless being globalized to some degree in one way or another, but their weightiness makes that process more cumbersome and difficult for them. For example, the global parcel delivery systems (e.g. FedEx, DHL) have become very efficient, but they still need to transport a physical product over great distances. Clearly, that process is still quite weighty, in comparison to, say, the downloading of weightless movies from Netflix (a website that began by allowing members to receive heavier DVDs via snail-mail) or viewing them on-demand. In fact, of course, it is increasingly the case that that which is weightless (e.g. downloadable music, streamable movies, social media) is destroying that which is comparatively heavy (e.g. the CD, the DVD, newspapers).

The ideas of increasing liquidity and weightlessness being employed here do not require that the world be "flat" or be considered as such (see Chapter 4) (Friedman

2007, 2012). Fluids can seep through all sorts of tall and wide structures and, in the case of a flood, those structures can even be washed away (as was the Berlin Wall, for example, and more metaphorically, the Iron Curtain), at least temporarily. Further, that which is weightless can waft over and between the tallest and widest structures. Thus, the world today is increasingly characterized by liquidity and weightlessness, but it is *not* necessarily any flatter than it ever was. Those tall, wide structures continue to be important, especially in impeding (or attempting to), the movement of that which is solid and heavy. It is less clear how successful these structures will be in impeding that which is liquid, light, or weightless.

The most obvious of such structures are the borders (Jones and Johnson 2016; Wastl-Walter 2012) between nation-states and the fact that in recent years we have witnessed the strengthening (heightening, lengthening, etc.) of many of those borders. Similarly, several governments (e.g. China, Russia) have sought to restrict the access of its citizens to at least some aspects of the Internet that those governments feel are dangerous to their continued rule. In the case of China, the electronic barrier that the government has constructed is known as the “Great Firewall.” (A firewall is a barrier on the Internet; the idea of the “Great Firewall” plays off China’s Great Wall.)

The huge “digital divide” in the world today (Cruz-Jesus et al. 2018; Drori 2012), especially between developed and developing countries (or the North and South), is another example of a barrier. Developing countries have fewer computers and the supporting infrastructure (cellular and broadband connections) needed for a computerized world, which creates an enormous barrier relative to wealthier countries. In terms of computerization, the world may be increasingly flat (although certainly not totally flat) among and between developed countries in the North, but it has many hills in the developing countries and huge and seemingly insurmountable mountain ranges continue to separate the North from the South.

The history of the social world and social thought and research leads us to the conclusion that people, as well as their representatives in the areas in which they live, have always sought to erect structural barriers to protect and advance themselves, and to adversely affect others, and it seems highly likely that they will continue to do so. Thus, we may live in a more liquefied, more weightless, world, but we do *not* live in a flat world and are not likely to live in one any time soon, if ever. Even a successful capitalist, George Soros, acknowledges this, using yet another metaphor, in his analysis of **economic globalization** when he argues: “The global capitalist system has produced a very *uneven* playing field” (Soros 2000: xix, italics added).



HEAVY STRUCTURES THAT EXPEDITE FLOWS

The liquefaction of the social world, as well as its increasing weightlessness, is only part of the story of globalization. As pointed out already, another major part is the fact that many heavy, material, objective structures continue to exist and to be created in the globalized world. Some are holdovers from the pre-global world, but others are actually produced, intentionally or unintentionally, by global forces. In studying globalization we must look at *both* all of that which flows (or “wafts”) with increasing ease, as well as all of the structures⁷ that impede or block those flows (see

Economic globalization:
Growing economic linkages at the global level.

below for more on these), as well as that serve to expedite and channel those flows. To put it another way, we must look at *both* that which is light and weightless as well as that which is solid and heavy and that greatly affects their flow in both a positive and a negative sense. This is in line with the view of Inda and Rosaldo (2008: 29):

we will examine the materiality of the global. This refers to the material practices – infrastructure, institutions, regulatory mechanisms, governmental strategies, and so forth – that both produce and preclude movement. The objective here is to suggest that global flows are patently structured and regulated, such that while certain objects and subjects are permitted to travel, others are not. Immobility and exclusion are thus as much a part of globalization as movement.

For example, there are various “routes” or “paths” that can be seen as structures that serve to both expedite flows along their length, as well as to limit flows that occur outside their confines.

- Intercontinental airlines generally fly a limited number of well-defined routes (say between New Delhi and London) rather than flying whatever route the pilots wish and thereby greatly increasing the possibility of mid-air collisions (see Figure 1.1 for some of the major global airline routes).
- Undocumented immigrants from Mexico have, at least until recently, generally followed a relatively small number of well-worn paths into the US. Indeed, they often need to pay smugglers large sums of money and the smugglers generally follow the routes that have worked for them (and others) in the past.
- Goods of all sorts are generally involved in rather well-defined “global value chains” (see Chapter 7 for a discussion of this concept) as they are exported from some countries and imported into others.
- Illegal products – e.g. counterfeit drugs – follow oft-trod paths en route from their point of manufacture (often China), through loosely controlled free-trade zones (e.g. in Dubai), through several intermediate countries, to their ultimate destination, often the US, where they are frequently obtained over the Internet (Maddox et al. 2016).

Then there are an increasing number of formal and informal “bridges” (Anner and Evans 2004) which have been created throughout the globe that expedite the flow of all sorts of things. This idea applies perhaps best to the passage of documented people across borders through the process of migration (Sassen 2007). It is clear that in the not-too-distant past there were many structural barriers to the flow of people. There are even a few places in the world today where this remains true – e.g. between the US and Cuba, or into and out of North Korea. However, with the end of the Cold War, there are now many bridges for people (and products) to cross openly not only between the countries of the old East and West, but also among and between virtually every country and region of the world (see Figure 1.2 for a representation of the international flows of migrants within and between various regions). However, undocumented migrants are likely to need to be more covert in




Figure 1.1 Airline passenger volume. Air travel, the dominant mode of international passenger transportation, was once limited to the wealthy and those traveling for business. With increased competition, lower fares, and a growing global economy, air travel has boomed over the last 40 years. Air traffic is concentrated in the Northern Hemisphere between Europe and North America, with increasing volume to East Asia. Martingrandjean.ch. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0

their movements. All sorts of illegal products are also less likely to move openly across such “bridges” where they would be highly visible to the authorities. Thus, there are also more hidden structures that permit movement of undocumented people and illegal products.

It is also the case that an increasing number of people, perhaps nearly everyone, is involved in, and affected by, global relations and flows and personally participate in global networks (Axford 2012; Singh Grewal 2008) of one kind or another (networks of communication and information technology, interpersonal networks involving individuals and groups, having to alter their lives as result of flows of COVID-19). While global networks span the globe (e.g. cables under the oceans that permit transoceanic communication [Yuan 2006: A1]), or at least much of it, there are other types of networks including transnational (those that pass through the boundaries of nation-states [Portes 2001]), international (those that involve two or more nation-states), national (those that are bounded by the nation-state), and local (those that exist at the sub-national level) (Mann 2007). Networks can expedite the flow of innumerable things, but they are perhaps best-suited to the flow of




Figure 1.2 Global migration flows by region, 2010–2015. Arrows estimate international migration between countries within and between all regions of the world. Source: Azose, Jonathan, and Adrian Raftery 2019. Estimation of Emigration, Return Migration and Transit Migration Between All Pairs of Countries. PNAS 116 (10: 116–122.), doi : <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1722334116>. National Academy of Sciences.

information (Connell and Crawford 2005). People involved in networks can communicate all sorts of information to one another in various ways – phone calls, snail-mail, email, blogs, social networking sites, and so on. These networks have revolutionized and greatly expanded the global flow of information. As with all other structures, such networks can be blocked or monitored in various ways (e.g. the “Great Firewall” or NSF surveillance).

All sorts of networks have been made possible by the Internet. The Internet can be seen as being of enormous importance in allowing information of various sorts to flow in innumerable directions. One important example involves the formation of the networks that became and constitute the movements for global justice and democratization (Vanden et al. 2017; see Chapter 15). It (as well as its various political actions, most notably the anti-WTO [World Trade Organization] protests in Seattle in 1999), like much else in the world today (e.g. the popular uprisings in Turkey and Egypt in 2013), was made possible by the Internet:

By significantly enhancing the speed, flexibility, and global reach of information *flows*, allowing for communication at a distance in real time, digital *networks* provide the technological infrastructure for the emergence of contemporary network-based social forms ... allowing communities to sustain interactions across vast distances... . Using the Internet as technological architecture, such movements operate at local, regional, and global levels... . (Juris 2008: 353–4)

Finally, it is not only individuals who are increasingly involved in networks. An increasing number of social structures (e.g. states, cities, law) and social institutions (the family, religion, sport) are interconnected on a global basis and these, too, enable and enhance global flows. For example, the international banking system has an infrastructure that facilitates the global movement of funds among a network of banks. Included in that infrastructure are IBANs (International Bank Account Numbers), rules, norms, and procedures on how such money transfers are to occur, and a highly sophisticated technical language that allows those in the business to communicate with one another wherever they are in the world. Another example involves global (Sassen 1991, 2013) and world cities (Derudder et al. 2012) (see Chapter 13) that are increasingly interconnected with one another directly rather than through the nation-states in which they happen to exist. The financial markets of the world cities of New York, London, and Tokyo are tightly linked with the result that all sorts of financial products flow among them and at lightning speed. More generally, in this context, we can talk in terms of the “global economy’s connectedness” (Altman 2007). To take another example, the World Health Organization (WHO) includes nearly 200 member states and has coordinated the global response to COVID-19 (see Chapter 15). When the virus was discovered at the end of 2019, the WHO immediately went into action by tracking cases and the spread of the disease, disseminating the most recent medical knowledge, helping to distribute personal protective equipment (PPE) throughout networked countries, recommending health-related policies, and developing the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund for fundraising for the pandemic. Once again, however, barriers are erected to limit such interconnections (e.g. the unwillingness of at least some countries to acknowledge the urgent threat of the disease, and the US’s attempt to withdraw funding to the WHO).



HEAVY STRUCTURES AS BARRIERS TO FLOWS

While there is no question that the world is increasingly characterized by greater liquidity, increased flows, as well as various structures that expedite those flows, we also need to recognize that there are limits and barriers to those flows. The world is not just in process, there are also many material structures (trade agreements, regulatory agencies, borders, customs barriers, standards, and so on) in existence. As Inda and Rosaldo (2008: 31) argue: “Material infrastructures do not only promote mobility... . They also hinder and block it.” Any thoroughgoing account of globalization needs to look at *both* flows and structures and, in terms of the latter, the ways in which they *both* produce and enhance flows as well as alter and even block them. In other words, there is interplay between flows and structures, especially between flows and the structures that are created in an attempt to inhibit or to stop them. As Shamir (2005: 197) puts it, globalization is an epoch of increased openness *and* “simultaneously an era of growing restrictions on movement.” Borders, of course, are major points at which movement is blocked. There are many examples of this including the toughening of border controls in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe), Australia, and the US because of growing hostility to refugees and undocumented immigrants (Hogan and Haltinner 2015).

There are challenges to the idea that all there is to globalization is flows and fluidity (Tsing 2000). In examining global flows (some of which have been anticipated above), we also need to consider those agents who “carve” the channels through which things flow, those who alter those channels over time, national and regional units that create and battle over flows, and coalitions of claimants for control over channels.

A focus on the above kinds of agents and structures, rather than flows, promises a more critical orientation to globalization in terms of the structures themselves, as well as in terms of who creates the structures through which things flow as well as who does and does not control and profit from them (more on this in the next section).

Another important idea is the “frictions,” or the “awkward, unequal, unstable ... interconnection across difference” (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 4). The main idea is that the global flows that create interconnections do *not* move about smoothly; they do not move about without creating friction. Friction gets in the way of the smooth operation of global flows.³ However, friction not only slows flows down, it can also serve to keep them moving and even speed them up. Highways can have this double-edged quality by both limiting where people and vehicles can go while at the same time making movement “easier and more efficient” (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 6). More generally, “global connections [are] made, and muddled, in friction” (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 272). The key point in this context is that flows themselves produce friction that can slow or even stop global flows: “without even trying friction gets in the way of the smooth operation of global power. Difference can disrupt, causing everyday malfunctions as well as unexpected cataclysms. Friction refuses the lie that global power operates as a well-oiled machine. Furthermore, difference sometimes inspires insurrection. Friction can be the fly in the elephant’s nose” (Lowenhaupt Tsing 2005: 6). A prime example of this today is the many frictions being produced in many parts of the world by large numbers of documented and undocumented immigrants, and the backlash against them. For example, refugees from Syria have fled to Europe and other places, and have sometimes been killed by border guards when entering a country without

authorization (Yeginsu and Shoumali 2016). Such frictions led Greece to complete a 6.5 mile fence along its border with Turkey, which was considered the most porous entry point for undocumented immigrants entering Europe (Besant 2012). As has already been mentioned, the most important and most obvious barriers to global flows are those constructed by nation-states. There are borders, gates, guards, passport controls, customs agents, health inspectors, and so on, in most countries in the world. (The great exception is the countries that are part of the European Union [EU] where barriers to movement among and between member countries have been greatly reduced, if not eliminated. The EU is a kind of structure that allows people and products to move much more freely and much more quickly. At the same time, it serves to reduce the need to use hidden channels since there is far less need to conceal what is moving among and between EU countries.) Although many people (undocumented immigrants) and things (contraband goods) do get through those barriers, some of them are successfully blocked or impeded by the barriers. However, it is far more difficult to erect barriers against many newer phenomena, especially the non-material phenomena associated with cell phones and the Internet.

Specific examples of barriers created by the nation-state involve blocking economic transactions that it regards as not in the national interest. For example, in 2006 the US government blocked a deal in which a Dubai company was to purchase an American company involved in the business of running America's ports (*Economist* 2006: March 10). The government felt that such ownership would be a threat to national security since foreign nationals, perhaps enemies, could acquire information that would allow terrorists easy entrée to the ports. In other examples, the US government blocked a Singapore-based firm from acquiring Qualcomm, a manufacturer of computer chips (Kang and Rappeport 2018), and pressured the Chinese company owning TikTok to sell its US assets (Associated Press 2020). Former President Trump, through separate presidential orders, argued that the deals "threaten to impair the national security of the United States." In the case of Qualcomm, the move prevented what would have been the largest technology deal in history, and continued an "America first" policy.

However, many of the barriers created by nation-states that we assume are, or can be, successful do not in fact deal with the flows they are supposed to stem. It remains to be seen whether the new wall between Mexico and the US can reduce the flow of undocumented immigrants to the US. Similarly, it is not clear that the wall between Israel and the West Bank will stop the flow of terrorists into Israel during more intense periods of conflict in the Middle East.

More generally, in a study of the confluence of legal and illegal global imports, Nordstrom found that the global flow of illegal goods is almost impossible to stop. For one thing, the illegal is often shipped with, or is even part of, the legal so that stopping one means stopping the other. For another, the global economy would grind to a halt if there really were serious efforts to, for example, search all cargo entering every country in the world. Even holding "up one line of trucks, one train, one ship" ripples through the global supply chain (Nordstrom 2007: 196). Nordstrom estimates the "most sophisticated ports in the world can inspect a maximum of only 5% of the cargo passing through customs," but even inspecting that much cargo would tax any port and its authorities beyond the limit of its capacities. Global economic gridlock would occur if 5% of cargo was really inspected; a total global economic meltdown would occur if all cargo was inspected.

Nordstrom found that not only do illegal products flow freely across borders, but so do people. She traveled by freighter to and from the US and found that “security does not exist, in fact it cannot exist, in the world today” (Nordstrom 2007: 181). She boarded the freighter and left the US without anyone checking her or stamping her passport and her arrival in Europe was no different: “When I went ashore, I couldn’t even find a person to tell me how to get out of port and into town. No customs, no immigration, no one to even ignore me” (Nordstrom 2007: 187). On both sides of the Atlantic she moved freely among the containers, some of them open, stored onshore.

Corporate organizations, say a multinational corporation like Volkswagen, are devoted to optimizing the flow of their automobiles to all possible markets throughout the world. They also seek to compete with and out-perform other multinational corporations in the automobile business. If they are successful, and Volkswagen has been extremely successful (it has supplanted Toyota as the world’s largest automobile manufacturer), the flow of automobiles from those corporations is greatly reduced, further advantaging the company.

While organizations of many types, including nation-states and corporations serve as structures that can operate against global flows, the fact is that there are signs that many organizations are changing and are themselves becoming more fluid and increasingly open.

One of the roots of this change is open-sourcing and the Internet. The best-known example of open-sourcing is Linux, a free computer-operating system. Anyone in the world with the needed skills can make changes in, and contributions to, it. (The best-known operating systems are produced by Microsoft [now Windows 10]. They cost a great deal and are closed in that only those who work for the company can, at least legally, work on and modify them.) In recent years a traditionally closed organization – IBM – has embraced not only the Linux system, but opened up more and more of its own operations to outside inputs. The Internet has a number of open systems, such as the free online encyclopedia Wikipedia (or wikis more generally). With Wikipedia, (virtually) anyone, anywhere in the world, can contribute to the definition of terms on it. The contrast here is the traditional (and costly) dictionaries (e.g. *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary*) and encyclopedias written by selected experts (*Encyclopedia Britannica*) are closed to contributions from anyone else.

However, in spite of this new openness, most organizations and systems remain closed to various flows. This usually benefits (often economically) those in the system and disadvantages those outside the organization. Even with the new open systems, there are structural realities that help some and hinder others. For example, to contribute to Linux or Wikipedia one must have a computer, computer expertise, and access to the Internet (especially high speed access). These inequalities are explored in the next section.



THE WINNERS AND LOSERS OF GLOBAL FLOWS

It is important to note that while global flows are increasing, they are not ubiquitous. Rather, global structures direct flows towards some groups and away from others, thereby creating winners and losers within globalization. These various structures serve to differentiate and to subordinate on the basis of social class, race, ethnicity,

gender (see Chapters 13 and 14), and region of the world (North–South). In fact, these phenomena tend to be interrelated and often reinforce one another. Thus in the disadvantaged South, one is more likely to find large numbers of poor people in the lower social classes, disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities, and women who are discriminated against on the basis of gender (Bose 2015). As a result, various efforts by the North to subordinate the South serve to further disadvantage people there in all of those categories. Furthermore, these categories overlap – a black female who is a member of the Ibo peoples in Africa is likely to be in a lower social class. (And there is a similar overlap among those who are advantaged – for example, white, upper-class, male Anglo-Saxons in Europe and North America.)

To better understand how advantaged and disadvantaged positions work within globalization, we draw upon another important concept. **Intersectionality** is the idea that members of any given group are affected by their positions within multiple systems of inequality (Chow et al. 2011; Collins and Bilge 2016). This concept was developed, at least initially, to deal with the situation confronting women as an oppressed group with women of color arguing that women's experiences are not all the same; they vary by race, class, etc. (McKinzie and Richards 2019). The concept, therefore, is extended to all social groups. Group members are seen as being enmeshed in a “matrix of oppression” that involves their gender, race, ethnic group, sexual orientation, age, social class, and the part of the globe (North or South) in which they live. All of these variables can be seen as “vectors of oppression” with people simultaneously occupying dominant and oppressed positions.

Intersectionality:

The analysis of multiple systems of oppression to understand how members of any group are affected by their simultaneous positions in dominant and oppressed positions.

The experience of a member of any oppressed group is not simply additive, but the disadvantages change, as do their effects, based on the context and other positions that they occupy (McKinzie and Richards 2019). For example, being a black woman in the UK is different from being a black man in the UK, and the experiences of a black working-class woman differ from those of a black upper-middle class woman. The experiences of those individuals would also differ if they were in Brazil, rather than the UK. With each different combination of identities and experiences, the vectors of oppression change. But virtually all people (including you!) occupy both dominant and oppressed positions, and such knowledge can be used to understand the advantages and disadvantages of majority/minority groups other than your own.

Intersectionality theory also emphasizes the interdependence of multiple forms of oppression. For example, colonialism was built on a system of wealthier nations in the global North dominating those in the global South using racial ideologies to justify the exploitative relationship. Thus, colonialism simultaneously harnessed notions of class power and race to establish a global system of domination. We cannot understand the system of colonialism (see Chapter 3) without conceptualizing both systems of oppression, and how they reinforce one another. Similarly, to adequately critique or alter such systems, both forms of inequality must be addressed.

In terms of shaping global flows, those who occupy dominant positions in these hierarchies tend to erect structures that halt or slow various flows in their favor. These restrictions are designed to work to their advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Good examples involve the operations of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank (see Chapter 6), which, for example, can serve to restrict flows of badly needed funds into Southern nations unless, for example, those nations engage in restructuring and austerity programs that are designed to slow down their economies (at least in the short run). Such austerity and restructuring programs often involve insistence that welfare programs be cut back or eliminated and the result is that the most disadvantaged members of Southern countries – racial and ethnic minorities, women, those in the lower classes – are hurt the most by these programs.

Those in superordinate positions also encourage certain kinds of flows that work to their advantage (and to the disadvantage of dominated groups). For example, the so-called “brain drain” (Dube and Rukema 2013; Fink and Miguelez 2017) (see Chapter 10) is a global phenomenon and it most often takes the form of highly trained people leaving the South and moving to the North. Those in the North actively seek out skilled people in the South and expedite their movement to the North. At the other end of the spectrum, flows of unskilled labor are highly restricted (often limited to poorly paid menial positions sufficient to fill openings in farm or household work).

It is also the case that the prototypical Northern male upper-class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant has, in the contemporary world, acquired a great deal of fluidity and “lightness” in the form of mobility, and thus is able to move about the globe quite readily and easily. In contrast, the Southern female, lower-class, black, Ibo is far less fluid, much “heavier,” and therefore has far less capacity to move about the globe.

While the advantages of those in the North over those in the South remain, elites in the South have been increasingly successful, at least in some instances, at gaining advantages by better controlling flows into and out of that part of the world. For example, Middle Eastern oil used to be largely controlled by Northern corporations (e.g. Shell) which kept the price low and made sure that the more developed North was adequately supplied with comparatively inexpensive oil. This adversely affected oil-producing countries which did not get the price they deserved and furthermore a large proportion of the profits went to the Northern corporations and *not* the Middle Eastern countries from which the oil came. Now, of course, the wealthy in those countries (through OPEC, see Chapter 6) control the flow of oil and are profiting enormously from it. So while they occupy positions of disadvantage (i.e. in the global South), their class positions enable them power and various advantages over others.

In the end, then, globalization involves *flows* – of liquids, gases, and so on – *and* a wide range of **structures** that not only expedite, but also impede, and even halt, those flows in unequal ways.

Structures:
Encompassing
sets of
processes that
may either
impede or
block flows or
serve to
expedite and
channel them.



ON THE INCREASING UBIQUITY OF GLOBAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURES

Globalization (especially global flows and structures) is increasingly ubiquitous (Boli and Petrova 2007). Indeed, our everyday lives have been profoundly affected by this process.

Global flows and structures have become an inescapable part of our *everyday experience*. They are not just flows and structures that are “out there” affecting the world as a whole. It is not just the largest social structures and processes that are affected, but also the most personal and intimate parts of our everyday lives, even our consciousness (Robertson 1992). Furthermore, these flows and structures are not seen by most as being imposed on them against their wills, but rather they are seen as legitimate by most and are even sought out by them. As a result, they are more welcomed than they are seen and treated as unwelcome impositions. Of course, the disadvantaged in the world are the ones who are not likely to welcome global flows and structures. It is the case that one hears increasingly loud voices raised in the North, and especially in the South, against global flows and structures and the problems caused by them. This is true of the poor in the North (and their representatives) and especially of those who live in the global South. Nevertheless, even the protests and opposition in the North and South add to the sense of the ubiquity of global flows and structures and their impact on daily life.

Global flows and structures are increasingly *taken-for-granted* aspects of the social world. That is, they no longer seem to most to be exotic phenomena or even open to question, doubt, or debate. This is quite remarkable since the ideas of global flows and structures, as well as globalization in general, have only been in general usage since about 1990. Global flows and structures no longer affect mainly societal elites; they have descended to the lowest reaches of society. That is not to say that the latter have benefited equally, or even at all, from the global flows and structures; they may even have been adversely affected by them, but they *have* been affected by them.

The above is, in effect, a more micro-perspective on global flows and structures. However, we must not forget the more macro-level aspects of the ubiquity of globalization. There is, for example, the globalization of *social entities*, or social structures, especially cultural and organizational forms including the state and the multinational corporation. Then there is the globalization of civil society (see Chapter 5), and of those social institutions (e.g. Intergovernmental Organizations [IGOs] and International Non-Governmental Organizations [INGOs]) that occupy a position between the state and the market and people in society.



THINKING ABOUT GLOBAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURES

Several concepts are useful for thinking about globalization in general, especially the global flows of focal concern here (Held et al. 1999).

1. How *extensive* are the global flows, relations, networks, interconnections? Obviously, such phenomena have existed for centuries, if not millennia, but what is unique today is how much *more* extensive they have become. They now cover a much greater portion of the globe, involve many more global flows, and will likely grow even more extensive in the future.
2. How *intensive* are the global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? While these phenomena may, in the past, have lacked much intensity

and, as a result, been more epiphenomenal, they are now much more central and important. This is due, at least in part, to the increasingly frenzied activity associated with these flows, as well as to the similarly intense attention to, and concern about, them. For example, many people today are virtually addicted to such things as e-mail to friends throughout the world and to social networking websites that include participants from around the globe.

3. What is the *velocity* of global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? It is not just their extensity and the intensity that matters, but also the speed at which they move. It is clear that globalization brings with it, and is characterized by, increasingly rapid movement of virtually everything. Velocity is closely related to many of the concepts discussed above (and thereby closely related to globalization) including liquidity, gaseousness, lightness, and weightlessness. Increases in any and all of these characteristics tend to lead to movement around the globe at greater and greater speed.
4. What is the *impact propensity* of global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? Again, while these flows may have had little likelihood of having a deep and widespread impact in the past, the increasing propensity to have such effects is characteristic of globalization. Think, for example, of the huge global impact of September 11 because of the fact that it was known about, and even viewed, simultaneously throughout much of the world.

This same set of ideas can – and should – also be used to think about the various structures that have emerged to both expedite and impede globalization:

1. How *extensive* are the structures that expedite and impede globalization? It is clear that the structures designed to expedite globalization (for example, export-processing zones, see Chapter 4) are far more extensive than they once were and it is likely that they will grow even more extensive in the future. Structures designed to impede globalization (e.g. tariffs, customs restrictions, border controls, etc.) are undergoing something of a renaissance today, especially in light of the Great Recession.
2. How *intensive* are the efforts to construct or destroy, expand, or contract structures that expedite and impede globalization? At the moment, for example, efforts to further lower tariff barriers globally seem to have lost intensity, whereas efforts to create new barriers (e.g. physical walls and legal restrictions on immigration) seem to be higher in many countries.
3. What is the *velocity* of the efforts to construct structures that expedite and impede globalization? While the construction of the US–Mexico wall, for example, was halted by the Obama administration, Trump sought to resume building it along the border.
4. What is the *impact propensity* of the efforts to construct structures that expedite and impede globalization? Specifically, what is the impact of such structures on global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? In terms of that wall between the US and Mexico it is clearly hoped, at least by the American government, that undocumented immigration from and through Mexico will be greatly reduced. However, some in the US question its potential impact. The mayor of a border town in Texas said: “You can go over, under and around a fence ... and it [the wall] can’t make an apprehension” (Blumenthal 2000: 12).



CHAPTER SUMMARY

Globalization is a planetary process or set of processes involving increasing liquidity and the growing multidirectional flows of people, objects, places, and information, as well as the structures they encounter and create that are barriers to, or expedite, those flows. The sheer magnitude, diversity, and complexity of the process of globalization today lead to the conceptualization of the current era as the “global age.” Globalization can be analyzed through conceptual metaphors such as solids, liquids, gases, flows, structures, heavy, light, and weightless.

Prior to the “global age,” people, things, information, places, and objects tended to harden over time. Thus their common attribute was “solidity,” the characteristic of being limited to one place. Solidity also refers to the persistence of barriers that prevented free movement of people, information, and objects in that era. Although solidity persists, it is “fluidity” that is more characteristic of the “global age.”

Over the last few decades, that which once seemed solid has tended to “melt” and become increasingly mobile or “liquid.” A range of technological developments in transportation and communication have enabled far greater global movement of what was previously solid. The difficulties posed by the fact that many things and people retain some solidity can now also be dealt with more readily.

As this process of increased mobility continues, liquids tend to turn into gases. This implies additional attributes of being light and a capacity to flow even faster and with greater ease. The flow of information in the global age closely approximates this characteristic of gaseousness. The new liquids and gases that are being created have both constructive as well as destructive effects.

Bauman’s ideas on liquidity inform this book’s orientation to globalization. Liquid phenomena do not easily, or for long, hold their shape. They are not fixed in either space or time. Most importantly, liquids tend to dissolve obstacles in their path.

A closely related concept is the idea of “flows.” Globalization is increasingly characterized by flows of liquid phenomena including people, objects, decisions, information, and places. Many global flows are interconnected – they do not occur in isolation. Others might be multidirectional flows – all sorts of things flow in every conceivable direction among all points in the world. Conflicting flows add another layer of complexity to the analysis of global processes. Finally, reverse flows often have a boomerang effect. That is, they flow back to their source and often have a negative effect on it.

Globalization can also be analyzed through metaphors of heavy, light, and weightless. Historically, there has been movement from that which is heavy to that which is light and most recently to that which approaches weightlessness. Pre-industrial and industrial societies were “heavy,” characterized by that which is difficult to move. Advances in transportation and technology made goods, people, and places lighter. We are currently in an era defined not only by lightness but also increasingly by weightlessness.

This does not imply that the world is flat. Some structures continue to be important in impeding the movement of that which is liquid, light, or weightless. Borders between nation-states and the “digital divide” are important examples of such barriers, which reproduce inequalities.

Other heavy structures expedite flows. “Routes” or “paths” serve to both expedite flows along their length as well as to limit flows that occur outside their

confines. There are also formal or informal bridges that expedite flows. An increasing number of people also participate in global networks, involving networks of communication and information technology, as well as interpersonal networks. Further, an increasing number of social structures (states, cities, law) and social institutions (the family, religion, sport) are interconnected through networks and thus enable global flows. However, organizations such as nation-states and corporations may expedite flows for some while creating barriers for others. For instance, protectionist tariff systems aid the flow of products from a nation-state's own farms and manufacturers, while inhibiting similar flows from foreign competitors.

The idea of flows communicates the sense that virtually everyone benefits from them, but this is not the case. Intersectionality is an important concept that helps us to understand the complexities of inequalities. It refers to the analysis of multiple systems of oppression to understand how members of any group are affected by their simultaneous positions in dominant and oppressed positions.

These structures serve to differentiate and subordinate on the basis of social class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, and region of the world. These phenomena often tend to be interrelated. Those who occupy dominant positions in these hierarchies tend to erect structures in order to impede flows that are not beneficial to them. They also encourage flows that work to their advantage, and the disadvantage of others.

Global flows and structures have now become ubiquitous in everyday experience; they have come to be taken-for-granted. There has also been a generalization of global flows and structures, such that their impact spreads across all levels of society. Four directions of enquiry can be pursued in the analysis of structures and flows – extensiveness, intensiveness, velocity, and impact propensity.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Examine the dual role of structures as barriers to, and facilitators of, global flows. Are subtler structural barriers more effective than material barriers?
2. What is the significance of networks in the current age of globalization? Is it possible for networks to act as deterrents or barriers to flows?
3. Do liquids dissolve structures blocking their path, or do they merely circumnavigate them?
4. Discuss the impact of increased liquidity and gaseousness on hierarchical social structures.
5. How are metaphors useful for understanding global processes?
6. In what ways does the concept of intersectionality help us to understand the winners and losers of globalization?

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NOTES

1 The French call this *mondialization*. See, for example, Ortiz (2006). However, as is clear from his book’s title, Jean-Luc Nancy (2007) distinguishes between mondialization, defined as the open creation of the world, and globalization which is seen as a more closed and integrated process.

2 The term “social” here and elsewhere in his book is used very broadly to encompass social process in various sectors – political, economic, social, etc.

3 It should be noted that while the concept of globalization, if not this particular definition, is now very familiar to all of us, it is actually of very recent vintage. Chanda (2007: 246) reviewed an electronic database that archives 8,000 sources throughout the world (newspapers, magazines, reports). He does not find a reference to globalization until 1979 and then only in an obscure European administrative document. By 1981 there are still only two mentions of the term globalization, but then such references take off

reaching over 57,000 in 2001. Interestingly the number drops off after that, but subsequently rose once again.

- 4 This definition requires several amplifications or clarifications. First, the idea that globalization is planetary is derived from Scholte (2005). Second, while globalization is planetary, little traverses the entire planet. The latter is the outer limit of globalization, but it is rarely approached. Third, the definition as a whole seems to imply a "grand narrative" of increasing globalization, but it is recognized that globalization occurred on a far more limited scale at earlier points in history (see Chapter 2) and that the changes described here are often uneven and that in some cases (e.g. in the case of immigrants, see below) there was greater liquidity, things flowed more easily, in earlier epochs. Fourth, it should be pointed out that *not* all of the phenomena mentioned in this definition are equally liquid or flow to the same degree. Clearly, communication is the most liquid and flows the most easily; places and people are far less liquid and their flow is much more limited. However, places are much more likely now than in the past to flow around the world as represented by the global presence of many fast food restaurants and other chains. In some senses, people (e.g. as immigrants) moved more easily in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century when nation-states had far fewer restrictions on immigration than they do today (but those restrictions have increased greatly recently). However, *overall* people today are more liquid and flow more easily globally as, for example, tourists, business travelers, and the like, and even as immigrants, at least in some senses (e.g. the flow is much more multidirectional than it was in that earlier epoch). It is even more the case that social relationships are more liquid, and flow more easily, than they did in the past. Fifth, Tomlinson (2007: 352) offers a definition of globalization that has much of the flavor of the perspective being offered here: "complex, accelerating, integrating process of global connectivity ... rapidly developing and ever-densening *network of interconnections* and interdependencies that characterize material, social, economic and cultural life in the modern world"; another definition emphasizing flows, interconnectedness, and also barriers can be found in Yergin and Stanislaw (1998: 383).
- 5 In addition to "flow" Chanda (2007) uses terms like "flowing," "water," "ripples," and "waves" in discussing globalization. "Tracking Global Flows" is the title of Inda and Rosaldo's (2008) Introduction to an anthology of work in anthropology on globalization, and flows is the organizing principle of that book. The five substantive sections of that book deal with the flow of capital, people, commodities, the media, and ideologies. Paul Gilroy (1993: 190) often uses images of ships and sea voyages in his discussion of global "flows." See also Ong (2006).
- 6 Although, contrary to US propaganda, al-Qaeda did not have much of a role, if any, in Iraq.
- 7 While this discussion will focus on structures, it is clear that structures are created, run, and staffed by human agents who direct their operations. This is in line with the general tendency in social theory to be concerned with the relationship between structure and agency. See Ritzer and Stepnisky (2017).

