CHAPTER 1

Classifying and Excluding Migrants

Race, residence and origin were the three criteria defined by the colonial administration of the Nigerian and South African governments that were used to create systems of exclusion and inclusion in the urban areas of the two countries. The first criterion related to the administrative racial classifications then in force: blacks, whites, coloureds and Indians in South Africa; Europeans and natives in Nigeria.[1] The second criterion separated certain groups in South Africa described as 'urbans' or permanent residents, who were granted the right to live in the city, from the vast majority of rural Africans classified as 'migrants' or 'temporary sojourners', who were deprived of such residential rights. The third criterion dissociated groups in Nigeria, who were said to be 'of native origin', from groups known as 'non-natives' or 'foreign natives'. A considerable amount of research has been devoted to the definition and evolution of these classifications as well as the social reality they helped to produce, but these three aspects are usually treated separately in the literature.

The first criterion was linked to the question of racial classification, theoretically modelled on the differences between citizens and subjects, but in fact difficult to dissociate from socioeconomic and cultural criteria, a reality attested by the obsession with how to classify 'borderline' racial groups such as mixed-race both in colonial Africa (mixed blood) and in South Africa (coloured) (Martin 1998; Saada 2007). On the scale of the city, this criterion was also associated with the racialisation of urban areas, i.e. segregated residential policies based on belonging to one of the official racial classifications, an issue that has long been at the heart of research in urban history. Studies of colonial city planning and segregation schemes designed to keep native populations at a distance from white European populations have played a pioneering role in developing the concept of a segregated city (Home 1997; Nightingale 2012). The concept evolved in two different and unexpected directions during the

1990s: the first, centred on South Africa, stresses the need to transcend the racialisation of urban areas, and the second, centred on cities in the rest of Africa, insists on the concept's continued relevance, despite criticism about this dualistic interpretation (Bigon 2016; Fourchard 2011a). We would like to go back and examine the reasons for these divergent historiographical shifts, which were surprising to say the least, given that the exacerbated racial division of urban space imposed in the 1950s was still a very tangible reality in South Africa in the 1990s.

The second criterion – residence – referred to the roles assigned to Africans in urban areas by labour policies, above all the distinction between the so-called temporary or 'floating' populations (circulating between the city and the countryside) and the so-called 'stabilised' populations (i.e. a working class with its own system of wages, promotions and status, which developed family life by bringing workers' wives to the city and putting them in charge of the children's education) (Cooper 1995). In Nigeria, stabilisation policies were introduced at a late stage after the Second World War, as in the rest of British and French colonial Africa. These policies were limited by the centrality and size of the non-wage sector as well as urban traditions that predated colonisation and the fact that wage earners set up family networks extending far beyond the nuclear families fantasised by the colonial administration (Lindsay 2003). In South Africa, the labour market and the divisions between migrants and families in townships were structured over the long term by the coexistence of policies granting different rights to workers depending on whether they resided in urban or rural areas. Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Natrass have emphasised the extent to which the current social inequalities in South Africa are the legacy of this long-standing differentiated management of the population (Seekings and Natrass 2006). Such policies radically transformed urban environments but also directly shaped the South African bureaucratic apparatus, and aggravated the precariousness of the country's most vulnerable groups, the migrants from the Bantustans whose rights to residence in the city and thus access to employment were always under threat – a process that was challenged during the demonstrations and riots that took place in Sharpeville and Langa in March 1960.

The third aspect of classification – origin – is related to autochthony, i.e. the claim to have been the first to arrive in a locality (Bayart et al. 2001). Autochthony is inherent in the formation of the colonial and post-colonial state, which in seeking to govern through determining the location of African residents redefined the classifications of 'subject' and 'citizen' as well as the boundaries between those who 'were there before' and those who came afterwards (Bayart et al. 2001; Geschiere 2009). Research on autochthony in Africa has concentrated above all on rural property conflicts (Dorman et al. 2007; Kuba and Lentz 2006; Lund 1998), war situations and projects to

achieve political hegemony (Banégas 2006; Gary-Tounkara 2008; Marshall-Fratanti 2006). Far less attention has been given to the urban dimensions of these phenomena, with a few notable exceptions, including in Nigeria, a particularity that deserves a closer look (Albert 1996; Akinyele 2009; Anthony 2002; Cohen 1969; Fourchard 2009; Higazi 2007; Madueke 2019; Mustapha and Ehrhardt 2018).[2] 'Indigeneity' is the standard term employed by actors and researchers to describe autochthony in this country. During the 1970s, the terms 'indigenes' and 'non-indigenes' probably replaced the words 'natives' and 'non-natives' used during the colonial period (see Chapter 6). At the time, colonial management of population flows was less concerned about dissociating temporary migrants from permanent urbans than about preserving the authority of 'traditional chiefs' by removing their responsibility over migrants coming from other regions of the federation. The colonial administration had decided to grant some of these migrants a particular place of residence (reserved neighbourhoods) as well as institutions and rights that differed from those of the local population, thereby creating a lasting distinction between populations of native origin and those said to be non-native. This single device was at the core of the process of differentiating the two categories and the particular historical forms indigeneity took in Nigeria. In the highly competitive political context of decolonisation, the rivalries between these groups turned into conflicts, like the one observed in the Kano riots in May 1953.

The politics of exclusion and belonging based on race, residence and origin are often treated separately on a national, regional or imperial scale. They are harder to dissociate on the scale of the city seen as a totality to be governed by an administration despite the presence of multiple competing authorities in such areas. The excessive focus on the racial dimension sometimes drove other social realities out of the spotlight, though they were in fact part and parcel of the same colonial project. The laws passed in the early twentieth century to organise racial segregation in urban areas (the decree of 1917 in Nigeria and the law of 1923 in South Africa), also governed residence and guaranteed rights of 'natives' and 'non-natives' in Nigeria as well as those of 'urbans' and 'migrants' in South Africa. The racial question was inextricably linked to urban and rural residential policies, which played a central role in South Africa's mining and industrial economy,[3] while the question of native or non-native origin was essential to the smooth functioning of indirect rule in Nigeria. It was also inseparable from the emergence of categories endowed with specific rights ('urbans' in South Africa and 'natives' in Nigeria). Those categories laid the legal foundation for the exclusion from the city of all those supposedly outside their definition ('migrants' in South Africa, 'non-natives' in Nigeria). On the urban scale, this resulted in assigning distinct areas to groups (usually specific locations, townships or hostels), granting them

specific rights in terms of housing and work, placing them under a distinct authority, in some cases guaranteeing privileges or exemptions and facilitating access to services such as education, health care and leisure activities.

To understand more fully how these different policies of exclusion and belonging interacted in the two countries, I will examine how the policies came into being, tracing the initial voluntary participation of those concerned to their violent opposition to such policies, in particular by looking in some details at two local events that drew international attention: the Sharpeville massacres in 1960, viewed by some as proof that half a century of non-violent opposition had failed and that South African liberalism had been defeated by radical movements (Rich 1986); and the Kano riots in 1953, often described as the first communal riot in Nigeria. More specifically, in line with Michel Dobry, I want to look closely at what actually took place in these moments of crisis (Dobry 1986). The aim is to articulate different historical durations in the analysis: how the manufacture of differences between groups were co-produced by the bureaucracy and local populations in the medium term; the shorter-term history of the three places (Kano, Sharpeville and Langa), which must be re-examined in detail precisely because of the local nature of the massacres; and finally, the very short duration of the event itself, how it unfolded and the actors it mobilised (versus those who stayed on the sidelines).[4] Taking these different historical periods and scales into account will bring out more clearly the meaning of the events especially in relation to the contested politics of categorisation and exclusion of migrants from the city.

Race and Urban Space

Although the story of racial segregation in South Africa and Nigeria is well known, it is important to remember that the measures implemented in these countries were incomplete. They were also on opposite trajectories by the 1940s, when race was becoming a marginal issue in Nigeria, but turning into a constant obsession of the South African government. This approach is especially necessary in light of recent historiographical interpretations regarding the role of race in shaping colonial cities.

At the end of the nineteenth century, urban development in both contexts was shaped by a powerful medical or sanitary discourse. A stronger correlation had been demonstrated between mosquito-borne tropical fevers and native districts, and it became urgent to remove their populations and keep them away from European neighbourhoods. Several historians have shown that fevers and epidemics often triggered interventions by government or municipal authorities, who deliberately used the argument of sanitary conditions to justify wider social and spatial separation between Europeans and

Africans (Bigon 2016; Goerg 1997; Ngalamulume 2004; Swanson 1977). The biomedical reconfiguration of urban space also reinforced differences among African residents themselves, even though, outside of epidemic episodes, such reconfiguration was more often a goal than a reality (Echenberg 2002). Measures excluding the entire African population from reserved areas were always partial, while many Africans managed to circumvent colonial rules (Bissell 2011).

In Nigeria, there was no legal foundation for residential segregation prior to the creation of European reservations in 1915 and the adoption of the law on townships in 1917 prohibiting Europeans from living outside their assigned districts and non-Europeans, except for domestic servants, from living in the European district (Olukoju 2003). The law replaced the term 'cantonment', designating areas allocated to quartering troops, by the term 'township', which in this country came to mean an enclave outside the jurisdiction of native authorities, intended to accommodate Europeans or so-called 'non-native Africans'. In practice, however, the clear-cut delimitation of a district exclusively for European use proved difficult to achieve and was not even desired by the various sections of the European community. In the early 1920s, the 1917 law was modified to make it applicable to the particular features of each city: strict residential segregation was no doubt possible in the new townships that had no long-standing European commercial interests (like those in Kano or Enugu). The law was considerably relaxed in older cities such as Lagos, where it simply recommended that a European zone be established where officials should reside, and other Europeans were welcome – but not required – to live (Olukoju 2004). The aim was to reconcile the interests of medical health officers with those of European traders and missionaries who refused to transfer their properties to European districts. This explains why the historic section of Lagos Island, in which European and African tradesmen had been living and working since the nineteenth century, remained a mixed district. In 1928, Ikoyi, a residential neighbourhood in Lagos, was nevertheless planned exclusively for British civil servants. In the end, for a variety of reasons – medical progress in fighting yellow fever and malaria, the desire of the Colonial Office to abandon the principle of racial segregation in the mid-1930s, and the struggle engaged by nationalist leaders against any form of racial discrimination – most European districts in Nigeria like Ikoyi were turned into government residential areas (GRA) in 1940, where social status took precedence over racial origin after World War II (Olukoju 2004). In terms of city planning, the initiation of urban development projects involving racial segregation lasted only three decades in Nigeria.

In South Africa, the racialisation of urban space dates further back – the first location reserved for Africans is said to have been mapped out in Grahamstown during the 1840s and in Port Elizabeth in the mid-1850s

(Baines 1989). The policy was adopted more widely in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries where bubonic plagues have exercised a powerful influence on the development of urban segregation: areas were reserved for Indians in Durban and Johannesburg and for Africans in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth in 1901 and in Johannesburg the following years (Baines 1989; Parnell 2003; Swanson 1977) and was officially kept in place until the 1980s. The meanings given to the words 'location' and 'township' differed noticeably from those in Nigeria: in South Africa, they designated an area reserved for non-white people, separated from the rest of the city and usually situated on the outskirts. The first legislation regulating the residence of Africans in urban areas (Native [Urban Areas] Act of 1923) aimed to harmonise disparate local laws. It empowered municipalities to set up segregated locations outside the white city and elect advisory boards to introduce a budget and regulate the flow of migrants. The act was intended as a first step towards solving the problems of overpopulation, epidemics and criminality found in poor areas and sought to improve the living conditions of the African population through housing programmes provided by municipal governments, employers or Africans themselves. During the interwar period, the cities that were not reluctant or opposed to the idea were nevertheless unable to manage population flows and segregate population groups completely.

When the National Party came to power in 1948, it had already adopted 'apartheid' as its slogan (meaning 'separate development of the races' in Afrikaans), but it had yet to come up with a plan for its implementation (Posel 1991). Preserving white supremacy entailed a commitment to racial purity, the refusal to grant political and social rights to the African majority, and quartering people according to their racial classification. Racial planning became more systematic, relying on a new legal arsenal that imposed race-based residence, denied the possibility of ownership to the African population (Group Areas Act of 1950) and racially segregated access to public facilities, services and offices, from maternity hospitals to cemeteries, as well as cinemas, beaches, public parks, transport, places of worship and playing fields (Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953). Although there were some areas still free from state control in the 1950s, the strict segmentation of urban space was a fundamental feature of apartheid. Today, the correlation between space and race remains the most obvious legacy of urban administrators in the apartheid era (Evans 1997, p. 121) as shown by ongoing efforts at racial integration, which was still restricted to the African 'middle classes' in the 2000s and the powerful heritage of racially divided urban space (Lemon 1991; Seekings 2000, p. 834; Tolimson et al. 2003).

It is perhaps because racial segregation was taken to such an extreme in South Africa that an approach emphasising the excessive racialisation of

urban history came under fierce attack as soon as apartheid ended. In the mid-1990s, Jennifer Robinson and Paul Maylam criticised South African historiography for being obsessed with the racial question and suggests instead to analyse townships as units of state power (Robinson 1996) or to explore the relationship between the central state and local authorities in developing urban policies (Maylam 1995). Deborah Posel (1997) and Maylam rejected the teleological, monolithic and functionalist analysis of state control for creating the misleading impression of all-powerful state bodies. In the same issue, Susan Parnell and Alan Mabin criticised historians for exaggeratedly racialising their research topic instead of looking at how municipalities and city planning had been gradually introduced under the influence of the transnational movements in architecture and urban development, thereby ruling out comparative approaches between South Africa and the rest of the world (Parnell and Mabin 1995, pp. 39–61). In other words, for a number of South African scholars, apartheid was not only about state racism or the product of a single 'grand plan' created by the state in response to the pressure of capital accumulation (Posel 1991) but also about the significance of African townships as a key institution of segregation and resistance (Bickford-Smith 2008; Bonner and Nieftagodien 2008; Maylam 1995), as a strategy between spatial arrangements and political power (Robinson 1991) and at the centre of conflicts and compromises between the government and capitalist interests (Posel 1991). More recently, Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall came to a similar conclusion: most historical studies of Johannesburg have been concerned with spatial dislocation, racial polarisation, evictions and the marginality of townships, and consequently neglected the social interconnections between the city, the townships and other areas (squatters' camps, the countryside, homelands) and underestimated the practices and imaginaries of townships and the role of townships in producing multiple urban identities (Nuttall and Mbembe 2009, pp. 356–357). Instead of being open-minded towards worldwide literature on the metropolitan experience, the history of Johannesburg was caught between two different teleological narratives: the rise of apartheid and the rise of the nation-state (Mbembe and Nuttall 2005, p. 198).

Just when a racialised reading of the apartheid city seems less central to South African urban studies, it is becoming prevalent in certain analyses of colonial and post-colonial cities. The notion of 'post-colonial' cities implies it is necessary to understand the colonial legacy they may share to include Africa's cities in a global framework suggested by the promoters of urban comparison (Robinson 2011; Simone 2010). The expression nevertheless conveys something more essential than a given historical moment, whether it expresses a reality radically different from the colonial city or on the contrary,

a legacy that the post-colonial city cannot seem to eradicate. But in these new analyses, the 'colonial city' is not considered a total social object, as Georges Balandier (1985 [1955]) proposed; instead the focus of attention has been on urban planning, control technologies, the civilising mission and the separation between colonisers and the colonised and discussion of African social practices refer to a colonial perception of disorder and a resistance to colonial order (Celik 1997; Home 1997; Nightingale 2012). In his book on Kinshasa, Filip de Boeck suggests that colonialism produced a dual city (a native city versus a Western city) that dreamed of fashioning nuclear families of working class Africans, well dressed, well groomed, well fed and sexually domesticated (De Boeck and Plissart 2004, pp. 20–40), though he fails to mention the inadequacy of colonial policies to make this possible. He notes that it took 'the development of new peripheral areas, long after independence, to move away from the mimetic reproduction of the alienating model of colonial modernity imposed by the colonial state and Mobutu' (De Boeck and Plissart 2004, pp. 20–40). Resistance to the colonial order was perceptible in the youth movements of the 1950s that combined music, theatre and cinema to challenge these forms of imprisonment. In short, Belgian colonialism is said to have produced a segregation of lifestyles while violently penetrating the private, everyday lives of workers, a reality that the youth of Kinshasa more or less successfully resisted. On this account, the all-encompassing nature of the colonial project was limited only by the ability of the colonised to resist that same project.

Colonial societies cannot be understood merely as antagonism between Europeans and natives (Cooper 1994; Eckert 2006, p. 213). The notion of the dual or racialised city overlooks the ability of local societies to circumvent, ignore or even conceive of such divisions differently and overestimates the ability of administrations to implement a consistent, steady policy (Fourchard 2011a). It underestimates the internal cleavages especially between first comers and newcomers (Geschiere 2009; Locatelli and Nugent 2009; Monson 2015; Nieftagodien 2011) or the capacity of insiders and outsiders to develop a common sense of belonging to a town (Fabian 2019; Glassman 1995; Ranger 2010) the will of neglected communities to build an everyday alternative political order (Stacey 2019) or the wish of clandestine builders to blur distinction between the European city and the African 'suburbs' that had long shaped Lourenço Marques, today's Maputo (Morton 2019, p. 116). It also miscalculates the capacity of workers to escape forced or waged labour (Eckert 2019; Fall and Roberts 2019) and to enjoy new forms of urban leisure despite colonial restrictions (Fair 2018; Gondola 1997; Martin 2002). In the end, the point is not so much to de-racialise at any cost the urban history of Africa – and of South Africa in

particular – but rather to step back and explore the new social configurations that have emerged from the colonial context and from apartheid. This, as I now consider, while the Sharpeville massacre is conventionally viewed in South African historiography as an especially significant manifestation of 'African resistance' to apartheid, it can also be reinterpreted as the product of policies to differentiate and exclude migrants from urbans and as a partial mobilisation against those policies.

Differentiating Urbans from Migrants in South Africa

On 21 March 1960, in front of the police station in the Sharpeville township (in the province of Transvaal, 70 km south of Johannesburg), the police fired on a crowd of demonstrators, mostly women, campaigning in favour of the abolition of pass* laws, i.e. the rules concerning an identity document required to legally reside and work in the city: 69 people were killed and 300 wounded. The demonstration was organised by the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a political party set up in 1959 following a split within the African National Congress (ANC). On the same day, in Cape Town, a crowd of between 6,000 and 15,000 people, all men this time, who had rallied in response to a call from the PAC in the township of Langa. The police gave the crowd three minutes to disperse before attacking, killing three individuals and wounding at least 46 others. That evening, the PAC activists set fire to the township's main administrative buildings, notably the entry and exit checkpoints for migrant workers. The army had to intervene to restore a fragile calm in the days that followed.

What made the Sharpeville massacre such a pivotal event in South African history was not the intensity of the violence – it was not the first time the South African police had opened fire on a peaceful crowd – but rather the political reaction it aroused within the country and around the world (Lodge 2011, p. 26). In South African historiography the Sharpeville massacre is analysed in nationalist terms and as the struggle against apartheid. According to Philip Frankel, Sharpeville marked an emotional high point in the anti-apartheid struggle and a decisive step on the long road from authoritarianism to democracy (Frankel 2001). Most approaches classify the events of Sharpeville under the heading of resistance to apartheid, which runs the risk of underestimating the weight of political divisions among the various anti-apartheid movements or ignoring conflicts between social groups that both contributed to the fragmentary character of the struggle (Frankel 2001; Legassick 2002). Three complementary approaches can be used to reveal this fragmentary character.

1. Gramsci argues that the state imposes its rule less by shaping people's consciousness than by the way it invites them to raise questions and debate certain topics. The events in Sharpeville and Langa unfolded in the context of specific measures taken by the South African government, namely, the policies that differentiated temporary migrants from urban dwellers. In the townships of Sharpeville and Langa, the radical disruption of lifestyles in the 1950s associated with a hardening of segregation into apartheid was predominantly conditioned by narrowing access to the city for male and female migrants. Once a central issue in the historiography of South Africa, this has been overlooked in recent analyses regarding Sharpeville. It is therefore necessary to re-examine this history.

2. In keeping with the ideas of Gramsci, who held that popular consciousness is not simply dominated by the thinking of the ruling class, but rather made up of fragments of thought from different periods and diverse horizons: the dominated can absorb many ideas from the ruling class, while at the same time judging their everyday experience as contradicting that domination (Choplin and Ciovalella 2016; Glassman 1995; Gramsci 1991). Taken together, those experiences enable us to understand more fully the actors' demands and grievances and highlight the constellation of contradictory interests involved, from the standpoint of both the decision-makers (ministries, companies, municipalities) as well as the mobilised actors (migrants, women, young students and delinquents, families). It is important to highlight these contradictions.

3. Adopting a detailed approach is the only way to deal adequately with this kind of history. Indeed, the demonstrations belong to a history peculiar to these two townships. Apart from Langa and Sharpeville, there was very little support in the country for the PAC's national mobilisation campaign against the pass that occasioned the violent incidents we will explore here. Thus, local contexts substantially determined the mobilisations. This means it is necessary to re-examine this highly local history in detail as well as in a wider context.

Stabilisation Policies and Urban Residential Rights

At various historical junctures, South African governments faced a choice between refusing Africans any legal status in the city and hence reinforcing their exclusion or building infrastructures likely to socialise them and acculturate them to the European vision of urban society (Cooper 1995, p. 515). In reality, these tendencies coexisted, and the focus was instead on the respective percentages of permanent residents and migrants that could be accommodated in urban areas. Employers wanted not so much to choose between a

migrant workforce and a permanent workforce as to have access to both types of workers and balance their needs by playing one group off against the other or against the white working class (Cooper 1995, p. 264). Dual labour policies dissociating the two groups were adopted to meet these different requirements: one category of workers described as 'urbans' were to be stabilised by conceding them a few rights, whereas the population of temporary migrants were destined to return to the reserves.* This approach was less the product of a coherent policy than the fruit of compromise, negotiations and permanent conflicts within the government and power struggles between the bureaucracy, companies and white farmers in rural areas faced with a constant need for manpower until the late 1960s (Posel 1991).

Urban segregation in South Africa was grounded in the law of 1923. This law has often been presented as the legal basis for a system imposing temporary city residence on African population (seen as temporary sojourners) and encouraging the formation of a rural workforce sent back to the reserves once their labour contract was completed, in keeping with a model inspired by workforce management at the Kimberley and Johannesburg mines since the end of the nineteenth century. However, the law sought to widen the separation between temporary migrants and urbans, as Doug Hindson has shown (Hindson 1987). On the one hand, it recommended establishing a national system for inspecting work documents (passes) to control the flow of migrants more effectively. Municipalities were given the power to designate 'proclaimed areas' – most of the time there were locations and townships – where they could control population flows and repatriate anyone considered undesirable. On the other hand, it wanted to promote the stabilisation of certain categories of workers by granting pass exemptions to voters, property owners and professionals including businessmen, craftsmen, Africans with some education and employees. Women whose husbands were urban residents did not need a pass, a concession made to political organisations that had been hostile to such measures since the end of the nineteenth century (Hindson 1987, p. 36). In so doing, the law created a distinction between the urbans a category now defined legally who benefitted administratively from exemptions, and the other categories of the African population. While protecting the first group, they consolidated at the same time the power of local authorities to expel new categories of undesirables such as 'unemployed' people, i.e. those who failed to find work within two weeks after their arrival in the city, as well as single women and 'those who were idle, depraved or troublemakers' (Hindson 1987, pp. 39–41). The law conferred the right to punish job seekers in the so-called proclaimed areas, reflecting a new national preoccupation with sending the 'surplus' of African people back to the reserves, and systematising the use of passes to exclude the migrant population from access to the urban labour market (Hindson 1987, pp. 41–42).

While the law of 1923 intended to widen the separation between Europeans and Africans and dissociate migrants more completely from urbans, its application was hampered by a host of diverse concerns that made it impossible for municipalities to block the influx of rural populations seeking work in the areas under their authority.[5] Urban management of labour migration was problematic due to the many ambiguous and conflicting interests at stake between white employers and the central state, between the central administration and local authorities, and even within the Ministry of Native Affairs where the staff itself was divided on which policy should be adopted (Evans 1997). The mobility of the population was in the hands of hundreds of municipalities that jealously preserved their autonomy. In many cases, urban authorities decided not to establish proclaimed areas because it would mean paying for the cost of additional personnel to control population flows and they left the population living at the margins of the townships. They also lacked the resources to carry out ongoing territorial surveillance to deliver work permits to migrants, making it difficult to expel 'unemployed' workers when their 14 days of authorised residence expired. They refused to follow the injunctions of the Ministry of Native Affairs, while requesting additional financing for housing programmes. Lastly, until 1937 (when they were required by law to publish biannual municipal censuses), they had no reliable estimates of the urban population due to the existence of numerous squatter* areas and an unknown number of tenants and subtenants living in the townships (Evans 1997, pp. 45–49). In short, the knowledge acquired by the South African state concerning African urban populations was extremely fragmentary, whereas the dilution of responsibility between the central administration and the municipalities encouraged squatting in outlying areas and overcrowding in townships, which ultimately led to a major housing crisis at the end of the Second World War.[6]

By 1948, the preservation of white supremacy found itself threatened by an urban population responsive to the slogans of the ANC. The new forms of mobilisation adopted by the ANC since 1947 (demonstrations, boycotts and strikes) were a source of concern for the newly elected National Party. 'Tightening state power over the townships became a priority for the National Party and provided the incentive for building the apartheid system' writes Deborah Posel (Posel 1991, p. 270). Although, as Posel points out, the relatively weak majority of the National Party during this decade forced the government to make compromises, at the same time, the 1950s marked a significant break from the previous management of population flows in the city. In the late 1950s, Hendrik Vervoerd, Minister of Native Affairs from 1950 to 1958, then Prime Minister from 1958 to 1966, endeavoured to turn a divided Native Affairs Department (NAD), marginal in the state apparatus

and focused on rural populations, into a key player within the South African bureaucracy, with added human and financial resources and a mission to make urban affairs a priority. He introduced new methods for controlling urban and migrant populations, reduced the autonomy of local authorities despite opposition, and significantly increased state information on the population, particularly through the reference book,* which gradually replaced the pass starting in the mid-1950s (Evans 1997, pp. 90–108). In 1959, the reference book became instrumental in implementing the prime minister's vision of 'grand apartheid', i.e. the systematic deportation of 'surplus people' to ten Bantustans. The Bantustans were 'reserves' set up on 13% of national territory that served, under the guise of self-government, as the main areas of South African rural ghettoisation (Breckenridge 2005, pp. 102–104; Giliomee 2003, p. 534). In apartheid South Africa, controlled urbanisation went hand in hand with bureaucratic expansion.

The aim was to freeze urbanisation by gaining greater control over migrants' access to the urban labour market. To meet the rising demand of white employers for manpower to fuel post-war economic growth, Verwoerd wanted to put the urban population to work by enacting the *Urban Labour Preference Policy* (ULPP), which gave urbans priority over migrants for jobs. The policy was a response to mounting concern on the part of the authorities, who saw the connection between the high level of unemployment among young urbans in Johannesburg and Pretoria, the expansion of *tsotsis* (the predominant types of delinquents and criminals in townships), and political unrest in the townships (Evans 1997, pp. 84–90). These policy orientations were enshrined in the law of 1952 to 'stabilise a section of the African urban proletariat', introducing strict differentiation between the category of migrants required to register in labour offices and find work in an urban area within 72 hours and those who were granted urban residential rights, a special provision of the law known as 'Section 10'. The latter included 'those who were born in the city and have lived there permanently; those who have been working for an employer in an urban area for at least 10 years; those who have been legally residing in the urban area for a period of at least 15 years; the wife, unmarried daughter or minor son of the previously defined native' (Hindson 1987, pp. 68–69).

For the first time in South African history, the law of 1952 officially recognised the urban residential rights (instead of mere exemptions) of a category of Africans. While exemptions had formerly been granted on the strength of property, the right to vote, occupational qualifications and services to the state, the residential rights of urbans were henceforth based solely on birth, years of residence or years of employment in the city (Hindson 1987, p. 62). This recognition of rights was premised on the exclusion

of all other categories of people from urban areas, especially temporary migrants who were sent back to reserves – henceforth called 'Bantustans' – if they failed to find work. Section 10 laid down the conditions for preferential allocation of jobs, housing and services to holders of residential rights, thereby protecting urbans from the competition of rural workers (Hindson 1987, p. 63). Bureaucratic control intensified significantly: the number of offences related to the absence of valid passes rose from 232,000 per year in 1951 to 414,000 per year in 1959 (Feinstein 2005, p. 155). The situation of migrant workers grew increasingly precarious, even though they continued to be preferred by employers.[7] Illegal migrants had to accept whatever job they were offered by the labour office, unlike urbans who could seek out employment of their own choosing. White employers were not averse to hiring them, but promptly took advantage of their irregular status to pay them less and send back to the reserves those who complained about their working conditions (Pogrund 1990, p. 70). Migrant or 'isolated' women were the other main targets of this new policy. Although in 1952, Verwoerd had to defuse political mobilisation against his plan to extend the pass system to women, the National Party's sizeable re-election victory in 1953 enabled him to 'recommend' that African women be issued a pass in 1954, and make them compulsory in 1960. Eventually, the main difference between the law of 1952 and the law of 1923 lay in the fact that the new law was implemented by the NAD. The NAD had considerably consolidated its power at the expense of the municipalities: it could count on census-taking to provide broader information on urban populations and its jurisdiction could now include an area inside the city limits.[8] The NAD has especially the responsibility to enforce a nationwide registration of all Africans, their names, locale, tax status, fingerprints and their officially prescribed rights to live and work in the towns and cities into a reference book referred to as *Dompas* by Africans or the stupid pass (Breckenridge 2014, p. 138). It was against this backdrop that pass laws were enforced in a particularly brutal manner in the townships of Sharpeville and Langa.

Reinterpreting the Riots in Sharpeville and Langa

Tom Lodge has written the main work on Sharpeville, in which he painstakingly reconstructs the events of this iconic protest. The author pays special attention to the sociology of the PAC leadership and describes the considerable deterioration in the living and working conditions of the Sharpeville residents and Langa migrants. Using sources obtained from PAC activists, Lodge demonstrates that, by recruiting evicted residents and unemployed school-age youths in Sharpeville, the PAC branch in the area was extremely

effective in mobilising the local population against the pass policy (Lodge 2011, pp. 79–93), due especially to its task force that urged or even required many residents to join the demonstration. Nevertheless, the analysis leaves unanswered questions about whether or not several key actors participated in the events of both Sharpeville and Langa and the ambivalent effects of the apartheid regime's labour policies on political mobilisation. While the introduction of a compulsory pass for women met with considerable opposition elsewhere, Lodge claims that was not the case in Sharpeville; instead, the women lined up *en masse* to register at the labour office, in particular because the local branch of the ANC had not denounced the new policy (Lodge 2011, p. 82). But then how are we to interpret the main conclusion of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission published in 1998, which supported the testimonials of Sharpeville survivors who stated that most of the participants were unarmed, apolitical women opposed to the pass? (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report 1998, p. 537). Furthermore, why did the young urban 'thugs' known locally as *tsotsis,* who, according to Tom Lodge and the Wessels Commission that conducted the inquiry in the months after the protests, surround the PAC headquarters in Sharpeville demanding the abolition of passes, a demand that did not concern them since, as urbans, they were not legally required to have one?[9] Why did the unmarried migrants in hostels fail to join in the demonstration when they were the first to be concerned by pass inspections, and why, on the contrary, did they mobilise in such large numbers in Langa? While PAC militants obviously played a role in mobilising the people in both townships, it seems necessary to insist on a broader aspect that Lodge overlooked: the sudden application in these two townships of a system that abruptly excluded numerous categories of urban residential rights.

In 1960, the people living in Sharpeville township had been evicted from a slum area called Topville, located in the middle of the region's steel mills of Vereeniging (Chaskalon 1986). In the 1950s, the African population of Vereeniging was housed in the two starkly contrasting townships of Sharpeville and Topville. Sharpeville was a new, tightly and model-controlled township while living conditions in Topville, especially housing were precarious (around 10,000 people housed in shacks) due to a considerable population growth and the reticence of the municipal council to build houses (Chaskalon 1986, p. 9). The African population preferred Topville, however, the rent was not excessive, the steel factories were close to their dwellings, and, above all, the municipal control was limited: there were numerous *shebeens* (illegal taverns serving alcoholic drinks) and police raids failed to eliminate them, thereby allowing many women to earn a living. Until the end of the 1950s, the pressure concerning passes was mild: it was possible to

obtain a pass or a residence permit by bribing a member of the Advisory Board.[10] Since 1941, the township of Sharpeville had been slated to replace the shack areas of Topville. Ten years later, Sharpeville was hailed as the best-managed township in the Union and on its way to becoming the prototype of neighbourhoods intended for stabilised urban families. It was endowed with all the modern amenities: six schools, a library, a childcare facility, five football pitches, five tennis courts, electricity in certain neighbourhoods, a stadium, Standard Bank offices and one or two bedroom family homes (Chaskalon 1986, p. 12). These facilities were financed by the rapid growth in sales at the beer hall and the municipal brewery, which had become the third largest in the country by the end of the 1950s. There was little political consciousness in Sharpeville township; the ANC defiance campaign in 1950 had never caught on there, and until 1958, there was no apparent sign of discontent. Nevertheless, there were clear-cut social divisions.

Sharpeville is a good example of the contradictions in apartheid stabilisa-tion policies and the refusal of white employers to comply with governmental directives. Bureaucratic foot-dragging and lack of financing forced the NAD to halt relocation from Topville to Sharpeville in 1951. The NAD refused to enlarge the compounds for workers at the Union Steel Corporation (USCO), the main employer in the area, because they were situated in a white residen-tial area. Their reluctance was also motivated by the official policy of giving job priority to township residents in Sharpeville. Out of a total male work-force of 20 000 living in Vereeniging in 1953 around 11 000 were migrants from Basutoland and the Orange Free state reserves (Chaskalon 1986, p. 7). The employers preferred to continue hiring migrant workers, who were cheaper and more cooperative than the township's school-age youths who showed little inclination for unskilled labour (Chaskalon 1986, pp. 7–9). Furthermore, the municipality played an ambivalent role: on the one hand, it refused to obey the Native Affairs department's orders to send migrants to work on farms to encourage those with rights to remain in the city to take up local urban employment;[11] on the other hand, it failed to convince employers to hire unemployed youth from the township. The number of these youth was very high; they formed groups who spent much of their time mocking migrants who gathered at the municipal beer hall to drink together, engaging in a type of sociability opposed to the consumption habits of the *shebeens,* with which the beer halls were trying to compete (La Hausse 1988). The growing social division between migrants and urban youths was compounded by more violent types of opposition starting in the mid-1950s. The neigh-bouring town of Evaton was in the grip of factional struggles between a gang known as the Russians, groups of Basotho gangsters who organised after the Second World War to provide paid protection to Basotho migrants working

in the region's mines and industries (Kynoch 2005). Following struggles between these two factions in 1956, the police, normally tolerant towards an organisation that had proved useful in combating the ANC or the *tsotsis*, ordered both factions to leave Evaton (Kynoch 2005, pp. 112–114). They found a haven in Sharpeville and Topville, generating renewed violence in 1957 and trouble for the municipality (Chaskalon 1986, p. 20).

In 1958, the fragile equilibrium of the area was disrupted by four new measures. First, the municipality was finally granted an authorisation to remove the 10,000 inhabitants of Topville to Sharpeville, which was accomplished within a year, even though the programme for new housing construction was not yet completed. As a result, much of the evicted population was either assigned to more precarious and costly accommodations or families were crowded together two to a house. About 5,000 Topville residents preferred to move to Lesotho or the nearby town of Evaton until housing conditions improved in Sharpeville (Chaskalson 1986, p. 27). Second, since 1955, the ministry had curtailed the residential rights of migrants from the British protectorate of Basutoland, despite protests from their employers (Chaskalson 1986, p. 21).[12] Consequently, thousands of Basotho who had fled Sharpeville lost the right to return and settle there, and were henceforth separated from their families that had decided to stay in Sharpeville. Third, the construction of the police station in 1958 freed the municipal police from previous constraints and it stepped up its raids in the new township. According to Chaskalson, the chief victims of the increased identity checks were 'the illegal relatives of residents with urban rights' (Chaskalson 1986, p. 22), in other words, the migrant workers mentioned earlier as well as women. When passes became compulsory for women in the neighbourhood in 1958, the women went in large numbers to obtain them. The women's compliance with the measure seems to have stemmed less from the lack of reaction on the part of the local ANC, as Tom Lodge suggests (Lodge 2011, p. 82), than from an urgent need to avoid expulsion to reserves or to Basutoland. The growing frequency of police raids was indeed aimed at actively opposing female proprietors of the *shebeens* competing in Sharpeville as elsewhere with municipal beer halls. The beer halls were the principal source of financing for low-cost family housing construction in the municipality, which had seen its revenues drastically reduced since 1959 following population decline. Fourth, and lastly, the municipality decided to combat the *tsotsis* more vigorously by prohibiting young people from frequenting beer halls and empowering the Advisory Board[13] members to create a group of vigilantes (see Chapter 3) authorised to administer corporal punishment to township youth (Lodge 2011, p. 82). The new population management system already mentioned, which the administration called the 'reference book', strongly identified in the

minds of local residents with the pass system, had been in use for several years to clamp down on young people over the age of 16: even very minor offences provided legal grounds for expulsion to the agricultural labour camps that had sprung up since 1955 (see Chapter 2). This administrative practice was backed by the vigilante group, who saw it as a practical way of putting supposedly unruly youths to work (see Chapter 3).

In short, the authoritarian eviction from Topville to Sharpeville and the internal contradictions of apartheid policies had disrupted the neighbourhood's political economy to the detriment of three main groups: women with residential rights but whose incomes dropped even as rental costs rose significantly; school-age urban youths, described by the Wetchel Commission as *tsotsis*, who were in reality denied access to skilled occupations (reserved for whites only) and jobs in industry (reserved for migrants by local employers), and who were being deported on a vast scale to the countryside at the end of the 1950s; and finally, the women and men whose spouses had been refused the right to return to Sharpeville after 1959 because they were from the British protectorate of Basutoland. These were the three principal groups that mobilised against the abolition of passes following the PAC campaign. Not much is known about the unmarried migrants housed in Sharpeville's new hostels, but they did not join the demonstration, unlike the migrants in the Western Cape Province who were the primary target of apartheid stabilisation policies.

In 1955, the municipality of Cape Town signed on to the new preferential labour policy in its local variant, the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, which prohibited hiring Africans as long as there were coloureds seeking jobs in the province. The policy was adopted in response to the demands of coloured voters in municipal elections, who generally supported the measure for fear Africans would compete with them for jobs and housing (Lee 2009, p. 20). At the same time, the municipality and the NAD set about eliminating the 58 squatter areas located on the outskirts of the city, which had exploded during the war – in 1946, the Vindermere squatter area alone may have had as many as 15,000 inhabitants of various origins (Field 2001). In 1954, when the area was rezoned by the NAD to become part of the municipality, the squatters' dwellings were demolished, illegal African population were sent to reserves, and legal Africans, coloureds and white populations were gradually rehoused in the townships and various suburbs. In 1956, the African families that worked legally in town or enjoyed urban residential rights were sent to an emergency camp equipped with only water supply and latrines, where they had to build their own houses; later on the camp became the township of Nyanga West, a typical example of how apartheid stabilisation policy was enacted.[14] The NAD also decided that Langa, the first Cape Town township to have a 'married quarter', would become an area

for temporary migrants, particularly 'bachelors', the term used in customary law to designate single men.[15] Finally, in 1956, 9,000 'bachelors' formerly scattered among the various squatter areas on the peninsula, were identified, classified and quartered in 849 'barracks' (worker hostels) that each accommodated 16 men.[16] By 1960, Langa and its extension to Nyanga East had a population of 19,000 men, 18,000 of whom were single[17]. Unlike Sharpeville, where women and school-age youth were most affected by forced removal, in Cape Town the most radical disruption of lifestyles and working conditions took place among these hostels for migrants. From the relative freedom of the squatter areas, where, despite the surrounding poverty, a family atmosphere had developed and a local social life was organised around *shebeens* (Windermere had 900 *shebeens* before the eviction) (Field 2001, p. 33; Lee 2009, p. 26), the migrant workers found themselves in an atmosphere of exclusively male hostels, where they were overcrowded and controlled by a growing number of civil servants and police officers.[18] They also came under tighter surveillance: in Langa, the number of offences resulting from failure to produce a passbook rose from 15 in 1946 to more than 1,500 in 1954 (Muthien 1994, p. 81). Migrants and more general people without the rights conferred by Section 10 were especially targeted: if they loitered in the streets and refused jobs in town, they were turned over to the police, who sent them to farms in the region. The situation had also become critical for African women in Cape Town: since 1954 they were required to have a work permit or risk expulsion (Muthien 1994, p. 69). By 1959, the local Bureau of Native Affairs had already distributed 12,000 reference books, a record number for South Africa (Lee 2009, p. 20; Muthien 1994, p. 70). A delegation of African women complained to the manager of native affairs that Cape Town was the only city in South Africa that systematically applied the Section 10 clauses of the 1952 law to women as a whole, whereas in Kimberley, Section 10 was applied only to 'undesirable' women, i.e. those who owned *shebeens* or who had left their husbands (Lee 2009, p. 20).

Thus, in contrast with Sharpeville, in Langa those who mobilised against the pass laws were neither school-age youths nor very limited number of women, but rather migrant male workers, who had seen their living and working conditions deteriorate in just a few years and their female partners deported to Eastern Cape. In March 1960, Sobukwe, the national leader of the PAC, acknowledged that out of a total of 20,000 party members, 8,000 came from Cape Town, well ahead of Johannesburg (1,000) and Eastern Cape (1,000) (Pogrund 1990, pp. 89, 106, 112, 120–121). Of the 32 party leaders and managers in the province, 10 came from the migrant district of Langa (Lodge 2011, p. 125). In contrast, neither the coloured neighbourhoods were concerned by these new rules nor even the families in Nyanga or those Tom

Lodge calls the 'middle classes' of the townships, joined in solidarity with the Langa migrants during the days of protest (Lodge 2011, p. 125).

The events in Langa, like those in Sharpeville, were not based on class or nationalism; they were partial mobilisations that revealed how fragmented the subaltern groups actually were. They were a protest against the sudden application of a system, which had fundamentally upended the already pre-carious daily lives of certain groups that had been spared to some extent until then. Lodge's analysis grasp these events in terms of anti-apartheid resistance, which it was of course, but omits to mention the fragmentary character of the struggle that explains his interpretation of the weak response of women to the pass system and the absence of solidarity on the part of the 'middle classes' with 'the people and their struggle'. In so doing, he misses the point: aside from the cases of Langa and Sharpeville, the vast majority of people did not even attempt to resist bureaucratic constraints in the late 1950s. Most migrants and women had no other choice but to comply, including by bribing local civil servants, whereas the so-called middle classes, who for the most part enjoyed residential rights like the migrants with labour contracts in Sharpeville, were not necessarily ready to mobilise in support of the abolition of passes, a system that gave these groups relative advantages in the labour market and in access to housing.

Finally, Tom Lodge claims that the leadership of the demonstration in Langa was made up of 'semi-urbanised' workers (Lodge 2011, p. 126), a term borrowed from a 1963 monograph on Langa by Monica Wilson and Archie Mafeje (Wilson and Mafeje 1963). The two anthropologists, who conducted surveys in South Africa and Southern Africa, were influenced by the Rhodes Livingstone Institute (RLI), founded in 1937 in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and the Manchester School of Anthropology, which saw cities as prime laboratories for social change, modernisation and proletarisation (Ferguson 1999, p. 25). They were trying to understand what they called the forms of 'urban adaptation' manifested by migrants and they sympathised with the demands of African urban residents for access to decent housing, paid labour, schooling and health care, against the wishes of white settlers hostile to any permanent African settlement (Ferguson 1999, pp. 26–37). Their studies were underpinned by modernisation theories and a meta-narrative of the transition as a way for rural dwellers to become modern urban members of industrialised society (Cooper 1983, p. 12; Ferguson 1999, p. 33). But they also demonstrated, that labour and controlled urbanisation policies had far-reaching social effects. Wilson and Mafeje or Mayer in Port Elizabeth discovered that the internal classification criteria adopted in the early 1960s in the township were based on the distinction between the urbanised population on the one hand, and migrant, semi-urbanised workers

on the other – a stereotypical distinction used by city residents to describe badly dressed 'country bumpkins' eager to be urbanised (Cooper 1983, pp. 13–31; Mayer 1961). Thus, they were able to show how the actors had re-appropriated the bureaucratic apparatus: urban residential rights were used to guarantee the urbanised population a way of life and social distinction, which they continually invoked to distinguish themselves from those opposed to their lifestyle or who were denied it. Around the same time in South Western Nigeria, anthropologist Abner Cohen, who belonged to the same group of RSI anthropologists as Mayer or Wilson discovered in his empirical study of Ibadan the cultural and political effects of assigning a specific group to reside in a particular urban district reserved exclusively for that group (Cohen 1969). He was the first to expose several decades of colonial management designed to dissociate natives from non-natives, which was essential to Nigeria's social differentiation policies.

Differentiating Natives from Non-Natives in Nigeria

In the early twentieth century, neither the Colonial Office in London nor the local administration in Nigeria was particularly concerned about who had temporary or permanent residential rights in urban areas. Following the conquest of Nigeria, their top priority was to determine what should be done with migrants who did not come under the jurisdiction of native authorities, who were the cornerstone of the architecture of the indirect rule the British sought to establish at the time. The local administration decided to grant certain migrants a separate place of residence (reserved sections of the city called Sabon Gari or Sabo) with specific institutions and rights that differed from those of the local population, thereby creating a lasting distinction based on people's native or non-native origin. Let us go back and take a brief look at these policies using the examples of Kano and Ibadan, before returning to examine the Kano riots in greater detail. Just as the events in Sharpeville help us to understand the substantial divisions created by differentiated management of migrants and urbans, the Kano massacres can also be interpreted as the result – by no means unavoidable – of policies that distinguished between natives and non-natives.

The Kano riots, which lasted from 16 to 19 May 1953, took place in the context of a struggle among Nigeria's leading political parties at the time of decolonisation. The nationalist parties of the south – the Action Group (AG) and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) – wanted to move the date of the country's independence forward. On 31 March 1953, one of the leaders of the AG proposed to set 1956 as the deadline,

but Ahmadu Bello, leader of the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), the main party of the north, was opposed to the idea, arguing that his region was not ready. The NPC delegation was consequently harassed at the end of the National Assembly session in Lagos. Two months later, the NCNC and the AG organised a meeting in Kano on 16 May 1953 to campaign for independence, which the north opposed. In turn, NPC activists attacked the meeting, setting off four days of violence during which the residents of the Sabon Gari clashed with the other inhabitants of the city. Contrary to Sharpeville, not a single soldier or police officer fired on the rioters (Northern Region of Nigeria 1953, pp. 37–38). The civilian population was entirely responsible for the particularly heavy toll of violence – 36 killed, 336 wounded – and the torching of numerous properties.

Today there are two main interpretations that account for the first large-scale urban riots in colonial Nigeria. The commission of inquiry set up after the riots concluded that 'tribal oppositions' linked to constant criticism of the traditional authorities and political leaders of the north had ignited public opinion in Kano (Northern Region of Nigeria 1953, pp. 39–40). Similarly, the high number of deaths among the Ibgo population from the south-east led John Paden to view the events as the manifestation of relatively spontaneous violence, fuelled by years of economic rivalry between the Hausa and Igbo people, an interpretation supported by many historians and political scientists (Albert 1994, pp. 111–138; Osaghae 1993; Paden 1973). Douglas Anthony, author of the most thorough research to date on the anti-Igbo pogroms in 1966 prior to the Biafran war (1967–1970), offered a different interpretation: he suggested that in 1953 as well as in 1966, the rioting had undoubtedly been instrumentalised for political ends on the first day, but afterwards it took on a life of its own (Anthony 2002, pp. 34–36). Though agreeing on the whole with Anthony's interpretation, I would argue that the Kano riots stemmed neither from nationalist demands nor from ethnic or class-based conflict, but first and foremost from differentiated management of native and non-native populations. When this policy was called into question during the 1940s, it sparked growing hostility between the two groups. It is necessary to trace this antagonism back to its roots, partly forgotten in Nigerian historiography, and re-examine the dynamics of the riots insofar as they revealed the grievances accumulated on both sides and the manifestations of a social order in dispute.

The Birth of Territorial Enclaves: Non-Native Neighbourhoods

In Nigeria, as in most of pre-colonial Africa, there were identifiable differences between host populations and foreign populations. In most West African

cities, trading and religious communities (Hausa and Dioula) dispersed across the region had long been living under the control of local authorities: the Hausa were permitted to engage in their activities by authorities, who in turn derived substantial advantages in terms of enrichment, prestige and advice (Schack and Skinner 1978, p. 5). Those relationships were profoundly altered by colonialism, reifying the boundaries separating hosts from foreigners (Lentz 2006, pp. 1–34).

The presence of Christians who had migrated from the south to the north of Nigeria soon became problematic for the colonial authorities. On the one hand, the colonial power was hard-pressed to set limits on its policy of freedom of movement at a time when skilled employees from the south were becoming indispensable to both the administration and Western trading companies (Albert 1996, p. 93). On the other hand, the administration feared unrestricted migration of Christians from the South, who were unlikely to become fully integrated due to their unwillingness to submit to the emir of Kano, the leading native authority of the city and the province. This fear was perhaps exaggerated. Nigeria's northern city-states welcomed and integrated West African and North African immigrant tradesmen, a tradition no doubt strengthened by the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate in the early nineteenth century.[19] A new section called Fagge, nicknamed the *garin barki* ('visitors' city' in the Hausa language) was created at the city entrance for Kanuri, Touareg and Peul tradesmen, but, according to Paul Lovejoy, this arrangement was above all intended for the type of professions exercised by these tradesmen, whereas wholesale livestock traders had to be located on the outskirts of the city (Barth 1857, p. 463; Lovejoy 1980, p. 53). Indeed, during the same period, tradesmen from the south (Oyo, Ogbomoso and Ilorin) were allocated land and the right to build within the city walls, leading these families to adopt the language, eating habits and religious practices of their hosts (Olaniyi 2005a, pp. 88–92).

In 1909, the new colonial administrator, the 'Resident' of Kano district, Charles Temple, who was proficient in indirect rule, asked all the Nigerians from the south and other West Africans who had formerly been scattered throughout the city to relocate to the military quarters set up in 1904. In 1911, the area acquired its definitive name: Sabon Gari ('new city' in the Hausa language), which was located one kilometre outside the Kano city wall. The main reason for establishing the Sabon Gari was to create a neighbourhood for 'native foreigners' who were not under the jurisdiction of the native authorities. The Sabon Gari thus became an administrative enclave run by a British station magistrate answering directly to the Resident, unlike the rest of the city, which remained under the authority of the Emir (Fika 1978,

p. 211). Lebanese and European companies and traders from the south were barred from settling inside the walls of Kano. In 1913, the Emir expelled all non-Muslim tradesmen from the old city and prohibited the sale of land and houses in that section to outsiders (Cristelow 2005, pp. 256–262; Ubah 1985, p. 93). Yoruba Muslims were allowed to live in the old city provided they complied with Muslim practices (no alcohol, veiled women) (Barkindo 1983, p. 14; Olaniyi 2013, pp. 67–89).

During the 1910s, a similar process was under way in other Nigerian cities: neighbourhoods were reserved for Nigerians from the south in the old cities of Gusau and Zaria and in the new towns of Kaduna and Jos in Northern Nigeria, and neighbourhoods were reserved in Lagos, Ibadan and Bamenda, where Hausa tradesmen were required to live after the eastern part of Cameroon was attached to Nigeria in 1918 (Awason 2003, p. 292; Home 1997, p. 130; Paden 1973, pp. 113–114; Plotnicov 1967, p. 41;). The administration of a specific quarter reserved to northern Muslim immigrants in the city of Kumasi (Gold Coast) 'was also modelled after that of the Hausa emirates in Northern Nigeria' (Bigon 2016, p. 212). All these initiatives were linked to a broader policy pursued by Lord Lugard, the Governor General of Nigeria from 1914 to 1919, who recommended that the townships be reserved for native foreigners, whereas local natives, even those employed as simple labourers by European employers, were to remain under the control of the native authorities (Kirk Greene 1968, p. 163). The law of 1917 harmonised these local arrangements by defining the township as an enclave outside the jurisdiction of native authorities, which 'consequently relieved these authorities from the difficult task of controlling native foreigners, government employees and Europeans' (Home 1997, p. 128). The law recommended establishing enclaves for Nigerians from the south who were living in the north to be called 'Sabon Gari', and enclaves for the populations from the north living in cities of the south that would take the name 'Sabo', a diminutive of Sabon Gari (Oyesiku 1998, p. 41).

Residential segregation along with parallel institutions to govern these differentiated populations continued to be the dominant model in the south until the 1940s and lasted until independence in the north. In Ibadan, as Abner Cohen demonstrated, the interests of the colonial administration coincided with those of the chief of the Hausa community in Ibadan (the Sarkin Hausa). Indeed, this chief possessed sufficiently broad powers over the administration, justice and the police[20] to group all of the city's Hausa tradesmen together, and thereby keep control over the regional market of cola and livestock in a context of growing competition with local populations. Sabo maintained its ethnic exclusivity throughout the colonial period,[21] even though it could no longer accommodate all the residents of the north after

the 1940s.[22] The Sabo chief nevertheless remained under the authority of the native chief of the city named Olubadan, who answered directly to the Resident (Cohen 1969, p. 162).

In the cities of the north, on the other hand, the Sabon Gari were administrative enclaves controlled by district British administrators until 1940, when they were replaced by the authority of the emirs, setting off fierce protests from the inhabitants (see below). In Kano, starting in 1932, the administrator was assisted by an advisory board comprising a president and two representatives of the Sabon Gari communities who helped him collect taxes and oversee relations between the Sabon Gari, the emir of Kano's advisory board and the colonial authorities.[23] The district had its own court of justice; the only police force that could intervene was the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), contrary to Kano, which was under the supervision of Native Authority Police. Alcohol and beer could be sold in the Sabon Gari communities (whereas it was strictly forbidden in the city), women were allowed to live alone, and schools could be set up by missionaries or financed by local associations (whereas the administration was hostile to the introduction of Western education in Northern Nigeria until 1945) (Olukoju 1991, p. 363; Tibenderana 1983). The implementation of these policies does not seem to have caused any major conflicts until regionalism developed after the Second World War.

Regionalism and Decolonisation

The regionalisation process in the 1940s and 1950s involved transferring the functions of the colonial administration to the three main regions of Nigeria (east, west and north). It was accompanied by a new policy of regional self-identification, which Eghosa Osaghae called 'regionalism': 'a system in which citizens who are not natives of a given region are discriminated against and excluded from access to public goods. In other words, the government of the region gives access to public goods only to citizens who are natives of that region' (Osaghae 1998, p. 7). The northern region championed regionalism (Osaghae 1998, p. 9): in 1952, in an effort to close the gap in school and university training following indirect rule, Ahmadu Bello, leader of the northern region, launched a plan to train, employ and promote the people of the north (now described as Northerners) in the civil service, a process called Northernisation, which became the priority of his government during the 1950s and 1960s (Paden 1986, pp. 252–257). At the same time, Ahmadu Bello sought to limit the access to civil service jobs, land and public procurement contracts to people of the south (henceforth called Southerners) (Anthony 2002, p. 44; Paden 1973, p. 319; Paden 1986, p. 256). Tellingly,

the terms 'Southerners' and 'Northerners' tended to replace the terms natives and non-natives, and became their equivalents in the jargon of administrators and politicians.

At the end of the 1940s, the formation of regional political parties (the NPC, the dominant party in the north, the AG, the dominant party in the south-west, and the NCNC, the dominant party in the south-east) was indeed the springboard for manufacturing the regional antagonisms familiar to historians of Nigeria. First of all, the opposition between the north and south: the parties of the south were in favour of independence, whereas the leaders in the north were against it, fearing that the lack of qualified administrative personnel from the north would lead to domination of the state and the regions by the elites of the South. Second, the conflict amongst the so-called majority ethnic groups (Yoruba, Hausa and Ibgo) championed by these parties for control over national and regional leadership. Third, the increasing divisions between the majority groups and minorities in the same regions, which then formed opposition groups and allied themselves with the dominant party in the rival regions. It should be noted that the term 'ethnic minority' did not enter the vocabulary of the political elites until the regionalism process was under way (Osaghae 1991, p. 238). Regional political oppositions were exacerbated in Kano, where the NPC was dominant in the old city, whereas a minority radical party (the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU)), still allied to the NCNC, dominated not only in the Sabon Gari, but also in numerous other neighbourhoods of the city, which wanted to end the all-powerful hold of the emir and his administration. In the case of Kano, the regional antagonisms were amplified by a conflict linked to the management of local affairs in the Sabon Gari starting in 1940.

Cooperation between the Sabon Gari representative and the native authorities deteriorated sharply in 1940 when, due to wartime restrictions, the colonial administration decided to put the Sabon Gari enclave back under the authority of the emir.[24] According to John Paden, this retreat created more tension between the local and 'foreign' populations (Paden 1973, p. 335). The civic and ethnic associations, created during the war to promote and defend the special interests of the residents, forcefully objected to the measure. They demanded a local democracy (i.e. a town council with elected representatives to replace the emir's appointees) and the elimination of separate institutions for managing Kano affairs (i.e. the abolition of the township council for Europeans and the Advisory Board for Africans), and denounced the emir's new interventionism in their local affairs.[25] A township representative summed up these fears in 1941:

> The District Officer of Kano division said that we, Southerners, are only here in Kano *don albarkarchin Sarki* ('on the goodwill of the Emir').

Hausa men live in Egbaland in peace why shouldn't we live here? If we are law abiding, why should we be here 'on the goodwill of the Emir' and not of right as Nigerians? We object to the idea of permission. We are here as Nigerians – of right anywhere in Nigeria.[26]

The dispute focused primarily on the rights of Sabon Gari inhabitants to residence and 'ownership'. The issue of housing was becoming a concern: the district population had tripled between 1939 and 1954 from 8,000 to 21,000 inhabitants, whereas it was designed to accommodate about 10,000 This rapid growth was mainly due to the increase in the Igbo population, which made up two-thirds of the inhabitants in the mid-1950s (Paden 1973, p. 258). Starting in the 1930s, medical surveys noted the squalor in the district, which favoured the business of slumlords reported by the doctors: 'The plot holders act as they will, building dark, poorly ventilated rooms to let, and the tenants pay considerable sums for plots where 35–40 people are crammed together, not counting children'.[27] All the surveys taken during this period end with the same recommendations: to reduce the land-to-building ratio for construction, prohibit the accumulation of plots and their sale without notifying the administration and improve existing housing to prevent epidemics.[28] Although the district's unsanitary conditions were a long-standing concern, the new regulations on neighbourhood buildings did not come into force until 1940, when the Sabon Gari were transferred to the native authorities, who were given significant policing powers.

The initial preoccupation with sanitation was soon eclipsed by a far more vital issue: the very terms governing the settlement of Southerners in the northern region. The transfer of power to the native authorities had especially increased the control over Sabon Gari residents, particularly by the Native Authorities Police (known as the NA police or 'Yan Gadi' in Hausa) that had replaced the NPF in 1940 (Chiranchi 2001). That same year, the Sabon Gari was divided into sections, each one under the authority of a chief who had a map of the various buildings,[29] along with detailed information on their occupants, the identity of the leaseholder, his business activities, and the rent he charged his tenants. Every week a member of the NA police visited the section chief to register the arrival of new immigrants and verify any violations of local regulations. This was a major change. As Bola Ige points out, whereas residence certificates were formerly delivered by colonial administrators, that role was now assigned to local native civil servants (Ige 1995, p. 99). A group called the Sabon Gari Plot Holders Association was organised to protest against this supervision and the new forms of perceived discrimination:[30] plot holders could no longer sell their homes to the highest bidder or to a person of their choice without first informing the native authorities, who could prohibit the sale and propose a different buyer; they could no longer

mortgage their homes to take out loans, nor own more than one plot per family; women, whether married or not, could no longer hold leases; leases were renewed at the discretion of the local authorities, no matter how much the plot had been developed.[31] These rules applied only to residents of the Sabon Gari and not to residents of the European neighbourhood. In 1949, the association demanded 'an end to these kinds of discrimination before they are turned into a riotous demand by agitators'.[32]

The Kano Riots

The residents of Sabon Gari thus found themselves in a subaltern position on two fronts: in relation to the colonial administration that employed them and in relation to the native administration that henceforth determined how they were to live in their neighbourhood. They considered themselves victims of twofold discrimination: the first was colonial in nature, imposed by the British administration, which continued to refuse the residents the same political and social rights as those of Europeans (hence the demand for a unified town council); the second was a new and far more pervasive form of discrimination, emanating from the native administration, which sought to limit the rights previously granted to residents during the colonial period. For the protagonists of the Sabon Gari, the riots were the manifestation of built-up resentment towards the new native administration, a revolt against the new political configuration. To the residents of the old city, the attacks on the minority population in the Sabon Gari were an extreme sign of an increasingly discriminatory ideology directed against Southerners and promoted by the native authorities and NPC leaders and militants. In this context, the actors in both camps used violence, rumour and looting to disrupt a social order they perceived as unfavourable to them.

The newspaper *West African Pilot*, founded in 1937 by Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the NCNC, compiled the commission of inquiry's conclusions based on interviews conducted three months later in Kano, reporting that youths described as hooligans were the first to attack the residents of the Sabon Gari on the evening of the 26 May 1953 meeting campaigning for independence organised by the AG and the NCNC, and again the following day in the hope that 'the disruption would bring more opportunities for looting'. In the 1940s and 1950s, it was common practice for political parties to recruit thugs (called 'area boys' or '*jaguda* boys' in the South, and '*yandaba*' in the north) to serve as enforcers (Anifowose 1982, pp. 230–234; Rotimi 2001, p. 140; Ya'u 2000). In the case of Kano, there is no direct proof of such practices, but there is incriminating evidence. The delegates of the AG and the NCNC political parties were planning to organise a meeting on

17 May in the neighbouring town of Kaduna. On 15 May, the delegation leaders received telegrams warning of possible attacks against the delegates, a sign that premeditation cannot be ruled out.[33] The speech delivered the night before the riot by Inuwa Wada, secretary of the Kano branch of the NPC, calling for violence to avenge the affronts committed against the NPC in Lagos two months earlier, also reveals how the NPC stoked existing tensions by using thugs:

> Having abused us in the South these very Southerners have decided to come over to the North to abuse us, but we are determined to retaliate the treatment given us in the South. We have therefore organised about 1,000 men ready in the City to meet force with force.[34]

The partisan political dimension should not be minimised. On the contrary, it was a key factor both in the old city and in the Sabon Gari when ethnic associations became AG and NCNC recruiting grounds at the end of the 1940s.[35] In all likelihood, the violence was less spontaneous than the initial research suggests, and local political leaders, particularly those of the NPC, no doubt played a decisive role in triggering the riots.

The political violence developed in a context of steadily mounting mutual opposition and distrust between the Sabon Gari and native populations, with rumours helping to escalate the tension and violence. Prior to the riot, talk of organised armed groups ready to take over adjacent neighbourhood circulated on both sides, prompting the communities to try and arm themselves. The day before the outbreak on 19 May, the inhabitants of the Sabon Gari bought locally made firearms (referred as *dane* guns*)* 'knowing that something was going to happen'.[36] They were used not only to defend their neighbourhoods, but also to attack the inhabitants of other areas in the city. At the end of the first day, new rumours led to a spate of renewed violence:

> During the night, stories were circulating in the City and in Fagge, some true, most either false or exaggerated, of retaliatory acts by Southerners in the Sabon Gari, some of which were alleged to have concerned Hausa women… It was not merely a matter of revenge for alleged acts against their fellow countrymen. It was becoming even more a demand for 'preventive war'.[37]

The relationship between the population and law enforcement authorities was another critical component in the production of violence, inseparable from the economic aspect of looting. The entire NA police of Kano (350 men), two NPF anti-riot units (100 men), and a brigade of British

gendarmes (130 men) were mobilised to quell the riots (Northern Region of Nigeria 1953, pp. 12, 12–19, 25–26). The NA police were deployed in the Sabon Gari, but in the early morning, the residents attacked the police officers, who were suspected of allowing looting to take place.[38] There is some basis for these allegations. During the four days of rioting, the NA police arrested 120 people only, 62 of whom received sentences of one to four months in prison (Olaniyi 2005b). In contrast, when one small NPF unit (53 men) regained control over security in the Sabon Gari between 24 May and 30 September, 3,232 individuals were convicted and sentenced, and the equivalent of 21,258 pounds in stolen goods were recovered (Olaniyi 2005b). For the NPC militants, looting the goods of Sabon Gari residents and setting fire to their homes merely carried to extremes the discourse of the NPC government and the agents of the native authorities who regularly reminded them of the precarious nature of the Southerners' 'occupation' and rights in the north (Ige 1995, p. 100). For the Sabon Gari residents, on the other hand, targeting the members of the NA police gave them a chance to take their anger out on those they held responsible for the discrimination they suffered and intimidate those perceived as intelligence agents who could inform people outside about the goods waiting to be looted in the neighbourhood.

At first, no institution was able to control the rumours or check the ensuing cycles of violence, and ultimately, none of them had enough legitimacy to impose a ceasefire on the belligerents. The native authorities were the only institution common to the opposing parties, but for years they had been deaf to the numerous demands of Sabon Gari leaders and they were seen not only as illegitimate but indeed as supporters in the hands of the NPC. The failure of the indirect rule to create a space for mediation made way for the central role played by rumour in aggravating tensions and the cycle of violence. Probably the only organisation that transcended the territorial divisions was the NEPU party, which might explain why its supporters, whether Hausa or not, either helped the Southerners to escape from their assailants or refused to take part in the riots and looting (Sklar [1963] 2004, p. 131; Olaniyi 2003, p. 229). In the end, segregated space, the introduction of separate institutions under indirect rule and the reifying of social and cultural differences between 'migrants' or residents of the Sabon Gari and residents of the old city clearly fuelled the violence of the massacres.

Conclusion

To accommodate migrants needed for the colonial economy without calling into question racial hierarchies in South Africa and the native authorities in Nigeria, bureaucrats invented *apparatuses* of exclusion aimed at not granting

migrants the same rights nor the same urban space as to the other urban dwellers. Despite the differences of labour policies between Nigeria and South Africa, the classification of migrants as a specific bureaucratic category and their compulsory residence in specific enclaves share four common features that draw the contours of what might be referred to as urban colonialism. If colonialism is the domination of colonised majority by a European minority depriving the former of their fundamental rights, urban colonialism is one of its specific forms that grants different rights (especially in terms of housing and labour) to different colonised categories living or residing in towns and cities.

Firstly, the colonial urban governmentality was limited and did not serve the well-being of the population but provided a legal and informational basis for the discrimination of migrants and their distinctions from the rest of the urban African population. If all the African population was discriminated by colonial and apartheid policies, the migrants were even more affected in their daily lives. During the 1950s, the bureaucracies of the two countries had individualised information through instruments such as reference books, labour bureaux and municipal censuses in South Africa, and surveys on sanitary conditions of neighbourhoods, lists of plot holders and owners, zoning maps and residence certificates in Nigerian Sabon Gari. While the information was incomplete – in Nigeria it pertained to only a few parts of urban space, and in South Africa, keeping files on the population proved to be a failure and a chaotic process for Breckenridge (2014, p. 137, 161) – it nevertheless appeared to be a tool of individual control and individual discrimination against certain categories of the population, which, like those in Kano and Sharpeville, tried to oppose it but very often had no choice but to adjust to it.

Secondly, this form of colonialism found its origin in the urban fabric as cities became laboratories for testing and implementing public policies that were highly exclusive towards migrants. These massacres reveal the particular stories of the townships of Sharpeville, Langa and Kano, where the processes of differentiation between urbans and migrants, natives and non-natives, had been especially exacerbated in the course of the previous decade. They reveal a struggle of subaltern groups (women migrants and tsotis in Sharpeville, migrants in Langa, non-natives, migrants, residents and political activists in Sabon Gari in Kano), opposed to new government measures (mandatory passes in South Africa, new supervision by the Northern Native Authorities in Nigeria and their regionalist policy). These events had the consequential effects of strengthening exclusion at the national level. Sharpeville was followed by the ban on anti-apartheid organisations (ANC, PAC after the South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1950), which went underground and abandoned non-violence.[39] South Africa entered its more repressive period in

history. Control over migrants was strongly consolidated from the 1960s to the end of apartheid: the members of the government in favour of opening up urban residential rights were marginalised within the government, the number of people punished for failing to present a pass rose from 414,000 in 1959 to 694,000 in 1967, and the distinctions between migrants and urbans (urbanised, semi-urbanised, migrants) grew sharper in the following decades (Feinstein 2005, p. 155; Posel 1991, pp. 240–241). After Sharpeville, South Africa and the pass system in particular became metonymic for white supremacy everywhere (Breckenridge 2014, 139). The pass laws were officially abandoned in 1986 but regulations for the millions of migrants staying in hostels remained the same: the hostels were reserved for males with *bona fide* employment who were legally allowed to be in urban areas until the end of apartheid (Ramphele 1993). In Nigeria, the Kano massacres led the Colonial Office to convene a conference in London with the representatives of Nigeria's main parties, who negotiated a federal constitution giving greater leeway to the leaders of the various regions to de-escalate existing tensions (Lynn 2006, pp. 245–261). Nigeria became a federal country at this very moment. The strengthening of the executive powers of the regions gave, however, the leaders an opportunity to intensify their regionalist tendency to discriminate against Nigerian migrants from other regions in granting access to public goods, to state employment, to university and to political positions, an issue that has resurfaced again and again ever since (see Chapter 6).

Thirdly, the different rights provided to different categories have been appropriated by the populations and in the case of Nigeria by new state institutions at independence. Within a few decades, the terms natives, non-natives, migrants and urban became part of everyday life. Initially devised to govern populations they became ordinary categories commonly used to designate oneself and others. This appropriation of invented colonial categories had enduring legacy in both countries. In Nigeria, the terms native and non-native were replaced in the 1970s and 1980s by the designations 'indigene' and 'non-indigene' which became common categories used by the administration, the politicians and ordinary people in a new urban politics of exclusion (Chapter 6). In South Africa, the distinction between migrants and urban dwellers having township rights has enduring effects even after the end of apartheid. During the 2008 violence, old residents in the Alexandra township of Johannesburg insisted on their historical rights to housing obtained during apartheid and criticised newly arrived migrants, both nationals and internationals for not wanting to 'join the queue' on the waiting list for future housing (Nieftagodien 2011). In the squatter area of Atteridgeville on the outskirts of Pretoria, the leaders of the squatters'

movement who had been struggling since the mid-1980s to benefit from decent housing sent a clear message to newcomers amid the 2008 violence: everyone but especially newcomers (i.e. migrants) had to abide by the 'policy of patience' and the waiting list (Monson 2015). In the lower middle-class neighbourhood of Luloyloville in Cape Town, a number of owners looked down at neighbouring hostels and squatter camps and also considered they have historical rights of decent houses (Buire 2019, pp. 252–255). In other words, the right attached to house and labour invented by the apartheid government to township dwellers is still very much part of the township residents imagination today.

Fourthly, assigning distinct areas to groups, granting them specific rights in terms of housing and work, placing them under a distinct authority, provides an important basis for triggering collective violence. This is probably one of the most important legacies of urban colonialism. Indeed, the new social and spatial realities inherited from decades of differentiated population management were at the heart of local clashes and wider national conflicts. The 1966 anti-Igbo pogroms in the northern region that led to the civil war (1967–1970) were similar but on a larger scale than the events in Kano in 1953 and primarily affected Sabon Gari residents in northern cities, whereas the Southerners integrated in local Islamic communities were often spared (Anthony 2002). Many more localised conflicts since the colonial period (in Warri (Delta State) since the 1950s, in the cities of Jos and Yelwa (Plateau State) since 2001, in Ile-Ife (Osun State) throughout the twentieth century, in Zangon Kataf (Kaduna State) in 1992, and in the metropolis of Kano (Kano State) in 1953, 1966, 1991, and 1996) have rightly been qualified as indigene-settler conflicts (Adebanwi 2009; Ekeh 2007; Higazi 2007; Madueke 2018; Ukiwo 2006). Beyond their particular local histories, these conflicts are all controversies over how to determine who is a genuine *indigene* (or in colonial parlance a native) of the city (HRW 2006, pp. 43–44 and 54–58). Some of these conflicts are a direct legacy of this colonial policy of belonging, others are a re-enactment under new political and economic conditions of the opposition between natives (indigenes) and non-natives (non-indigenes) (see Chapter 6). In South Africa, the recurrent clashes between Marashea (gangs protecting migrants) and *tsotsis* from the 1950s to the 1970s demonstrate that these divisions were profoundly linked to residence (urban vs. rural) and age group (adults vs. youths) (Kynoch 2005). The anti-delinquency committees set up before and after the riots in Sharpeville and Langa attest to both an effort to combat the supposed unruliness of young people and migrants and a developing sense of respectability and civic pride among organisations of parents and elders in the townships (see Chapter 3).

In the end, 'detribalised', 'delinquent' and 'unruly' youths, who, according to the Sharpeville and Kano commissions of inquiry, were quick to convert to political causes, were seen as a major threat to the stability and political order in South Africa and Nigeria. Due to the absence of alternative sources, it is difficult to assess the involvement of young people in these particular events in greater depth. Even so, this reading undoubtedly conveys a deeper political concern shared by administrations, governments and many local organisations. This image of urban youth as marginalised and ready to take part in violence was in turn the product of a very particular history in which we can see how that image might have been – and was in fact – constructed as a danger by a group of actors bent on reforming their behaviour.

Notes

1. South Africa became a dominion of the British Empire in 1910, comprising the former British colony of Natal and Cape colony and the former Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange. The country was endowed with a government and a Parliament elected by the white minority. Its 6 million inhabitants were classified by 'race': blacks (67%), whites (21%), coloured (9%) and Indians (2.5%). Nigeria was a colony of the British Empire, set up in 1914 following the merger of the Northern Nigerian Protectorate, the Southern Nigerian Protectorate and the colony of Lagos. At the time, it had 16 million inhabitants, including 3,000 Europeans residents.

2. See also the resurgence of autochthonous claims in Douala, Cameroon, in Geschiere (2009).

3. The discovery of significant deposits of diamond in Kimberley (1867) and gold in Johannesburg (1886) gave rise to a mining and industrial economy requiring a large workforce from the entire country as well as several colonies in Southern Africa (Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, etc.), India, China and Europe.

4. Labour policies have been analysed in numerous historical works in South Africa that have been briefly summarised here, whereas the policies regarding the differentiation between natives and non-natives in Nigeria are much less familiar, and based on documents found at the national archives in Ibadan and Kaduna. The story of Sharpeville is primarily taken from an unpublished monograph by Matthew Chaskalon entitled *The Road to Sharpeville*, African studies seminar paper, University of Wits, African Studies Institute, 1986. The story of Langa relies on the existing literature, supplemented by the archives of

the Advisory Board of the townships of Langa and Nyanga West obtained at the Cape Town archives. The story of the Sabon Gari* in Kano is written thanks to reports available at the National archives at Kaduna. The reports drawn up by the commission of inquiry in Sharpeville in March 1960 and the commission of inquiry in Kano in May 1953, as well as those written after the riot by the journalists in the *West African Pilot* give additional information. Nevertheless, this documentation is insufficient to reconstruct the events with exactitude.

5. The African urban population rose from 600,000 inhabitants in 1904 to 1.7 million in 1936, thus exceeding the number of whites residing in the city (1.3 million).

6. There was a shortage of 154,185 houses for families and a shortage of housing for 106,877 workers in 1947 (Hindson 1987, p. 56).

7. Family housing in the compounds* of mining companies was limited to 3% of the workforce during the 1950s (Crush et al. 1991, p. 13).

8. There is disagreement among the specialists on this point. Contrary to Ivan Evans, Keith Breckenridge maintains that the new centralised system was just as inefficient as the previous decentralised one. The introduction of the reference book created a bureaucratic nightmare for the Ministry of Native Affairs, and the plan to ensure that all South Africans had an identity document with fingerprints had to be scuttled, leading to trafficking in reference books. Breckenridge's article stops at the year 1960, however, and does not talk about the conditions under which the reference book was implemented after that date (Breckenridge, 2005, pp. 102–104). It should be noted that bureaucratic control intensified significantly during the 1950s: the number of offences related to the absence of valid passes rose from 232,000 per year in 1951 to 414,000 per year in 1959 (Feinstein 2005, p. 155).

9. P.J. Wessels, *Report of the commission appointed to investigate and report on the occurrences in the district of Vereeniging (namely, at Sharpeville location and Evaton) and Vanderbijlpark, province of the Transvaal on 21 March 1960*, 23 September 1960, Supreme Court, Pietermarizburg.

10. Hundreds of residents were thus without a pass when they were evicted in 1958 (Chaskalon 1986, pp. 8–11).

11. To avoid alienating local employers, the municipality refused to introduce police escorts to force migrant 'unemployed to find work at farms in the region.

12. In 1955, an amendment to the Urban Areas Act changed the status of migrants from the British protectorate of Basutoland. Henceforth, they were authorised to remain in an urban area only if they had been

legally present on 6 May 1955. They were allowed to change jobs within the urban area, but lost that right if they left the zone for any reason other than holiday leave.

13. Advisory board is a body of co-opted or elected African members who advised the municipal superintendents or managers in their day-to-day administration of African townships and locations. They served as a link between urban Africans and local authorities and they provided a means of social control (Baines 1994, 81). Most of the time managers developed a highly personalised nature in the administration of townships and consequently played an important role in shaping the form of cities and city politics (Musemwa 1996; Robinson 1991; Sapire 1994).

14. In 1960, family housing in the township could accommodate 2,789 men, 3,009 women and 4,313 children.

15. This decision was reported in a number of newspapers: 'New threat to Langa', *New Age*, 9 December 1954; 'Verwoerd denies Langa threat. Statement on Obstacles to city's plans', *Cape Times*, 29 April 1954; City Native Debated. Backing for state in Council, *Cape Times*, 28 January 1955.

16. CTA, 2/OBS 3/1 680, progress report on action taken by the council for the provision of Native housing for the period May to October 1956.

17. CTA, AWC, 3/1, City of Cape Town, town clerk department, native authorities branch. Memorandum in the urban area of the city of Cape Town, undated, about 1960.

18. The number of civil servants rose from 221 in 1947 to 343 in 1958. Yvonne Muthien, *State and Resistance in South Africa, 1939–1965*, Aldershot, Avebury Publisher, 1994, p. 81.

19. In Katsina, Hausa and non-Hausa tradesmen lived in the same neighbourhood; in Kano, North African tradesmen mixed with the local population in the Dalla district (Lovejoy 1980, p. 52).

20. He ruled on civil law cases (marriage, divorce, estate, child custody), and had the power to arrest suspects and transfer them to the police; he also performed the functions of an administrator (ensuring the upkeep of mosques and cemeteries, helping the needy, supervising short-time hotels).

21. In 1916, there were 400 Hausa in the district; by 1963, there were 4,184. During the 1940s and 1950s, when the Yoruba were authorised to own property in the district, only the Hausa were authorised to hire out rooms.

22. National Archives Ibadan, NAI, Oyo Prof 1, 592, Letter from the Divisional Office Land Section, Ibadan, to the Secretary Western Provinces, Ibadan, 12 December 1950.

23. National Archives Kaduna, NAK, Kano Prof, 6115, Organisation of Sabon Gari Administration by Wesport, 1938.

24. The city was divided into three sections: the GRA reserved for Europeans, the pre-colonial city under the exclusive authority of the emir, and finally 'Wage', which included the colonial housing developments reserved for Africans that were non-natives of the city (Fagge, Sabon Gari, Tudun Wada and Gwarwarga, inhabited by migrants from the North) under the authority of the emir, who in turn was counselled by Advisory Boards made up of representatives from the various districts appointed by the emir.

25. NAK, Kano Prof 6115, Representatives of tribal and federated unions of the Sabon Gari to the Senior Resident, Kano Province, 1 November 1944.

26. NAK, Kano Prof 6115, Prcis of talks at a meeting between representatives of the Sabon Gari community and the Resident, 16 November 1941.

27. NAK, Kano Prof, 6122, Medical Officer of Health to Local Authority, Kano, 16 March 1942.

28. NAK, Kano Prof 6122, Medical Officer of Health to the Resident Kano Province, 25 February 1939.

29. At the end of the 1930s, a building plan for each plot was produced by the mapping section of the Native Authorities. NAK, Kano Prof, 6122, Resident Kano Province to the Secretary Northern Provinces, Kano Township Overcrowding in Sabon Gari, 29 March 1939.

30. NAK, Kano Prof 6122; Petition by Kano Sabon Gari Plot Holders Association, 31 March 1945 to the Secretary Northern Province Kaduna.

31. NAK, Kano Prof, 6122, Kano Sabongari Plot Holders Association to the Resident Kano Province, 15 August 1949.

32. NAK, Kano Prof, 6122, Kano Sabongari Plot Holders Association to the Resident Kano Province, 15 August 1949.

33. 'Kano Riots. 'The Wide Scene', *West African Pilot*, August 17, 1953.

34. 'Kano Riots. 'The Wide Scene', *West African Pilot*, August 17, 1953.

35. Thus, the Yoruba Central Welfare Association (Egbe Omo Oduduwa) set up in Kano in 1942 preceded the branch founded by Awolowo in London in 1945 and in Lagos or Ile-Ife between 1945 and 1948, even

before the creation of the Action Group in 1949. The Igbo Community Association, which was a member of the Plot Holders' Association, became a recruiting ground for the NCNC in Kano in 1949.

36. 'Kano Riots. General Conclusions'. *West African Pilot*, August 19, 1953.

37. 'Kano Riots. General Conclusions'. *West African Pilot*, August 19, 1953.

38. 'Kano Riots. General Conclusions'. *West African Pilot*, August 19, 1953.

39. On the respective roles played by the Sharpeville events, the international context (support from the USSR and China) and the internal evolution of the leadership of SACP, the ANC and Mandela in the transition to armed action, see Stephen Ellis (2011).