


Chapter 1

Governments, Mayors and Policies

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Source: Eduardo Marques

The Politics of Incremental Progressivism: Governments, Governances and Urban Policy Changes in São Paulo, First Edition. Edited by Eduardo Cesar Leão Marques.

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This chapter situates the reader concerning local institutions in Brazil and the governments of São Paulo. We begin with a comparative discussion of the country's local political institutions and how the literature has framed the role of mayors and local governments. The second section presents the electoral results for the executive in São Paulo since the return to democracy. The third section briefly describes the main characteristics of the São Paulo municipal governments during the period, discussing the political context of each administration, but also exploring transversally the different policies that we will investigate in the rest of the book. Complementing the analysis of local governments developed in this chapter, the next chapter focuses on the local council and its relationship with the executive and policy production.

Brazilian Institutions and Municipalities in International Perspective

What do we mean when we talk about local institutions? As has been widely discussed, albeit by a literature focused on Western countries, local government structures vary substantially according to factors such as separation of powers, form of access to posts (by election or appointment), concentration of executive power, partisan, non-partisan or management emphasis of the executive power in question, as well as the political resources granted to each institution. Local institutions vary more than nation-state government formats, including variations within the same country, as found in different German regions until recently (Wollman 2004) or between townships, municipalities, counties, school districts and special districts in the United States (Berman 1991; Pelissero 2003; Svava 2003).

Regarding the choice of the local executive, they may be elected directly in separate elections by the council, as in Southern Germany (Wollman 2004), France (John and Cole 1999), Brazil and most of Latin America. They may also be appointed by the elected councilors of the winning party or parties, as is the case in England, Spain, Portugal (John and Cole 1999) and Canada (Graham 2017). Additionally, local governments may lack a concentrated elected leadership altogether, as in the 55% of US municipalities governed by managers hired by councils, including large cities such as Phoenix, San Antonio and Las Vegas.¹ Executive power may be concentrated in one single individual, as in France and (again) Brazil, or it may be exercised collectively by an executive council chosen by council members, as in Northern Germany until recently and Norway (Goldsmith and Larsen 2004). Councilors can be elected to represent single-member districts or large multi-member districts. Additionally, they may be partisan, as in Brazil, Scandinavia (Goldsmith and Larsen 2004), France (John and Cole 2000) and New York City, or

non-partisan, as in many other US cities, such as Los Angeles and Chicago (Svara 2002). Considering this variability, authors like Mouritzen and Svara (2002) and Heinelt and Hlepas (2006) have produced classifications of local governments that depart from formal institutions. However, although these classifications help us understand and organize all these differences, how cities are governed depends on several other characteristics and processes not accounted for by static institutional typologies (Sellers and Kwak 2010).

Besides separation of powers and electoral rules, several other institutions constrain local autonomy and the local capacity to deliver policies. Among these is the vertical integration with other levels of power inside the country, like federalism in Brazil (Arretche 2012), but also internationally as with the European Union (Boraz and John 2004; Judd 2000). Moreover, the availability of fiscal resources defines the existence of any real capacity to exercise municipal autonomy (Judd 2000; Pressman 1975; Sellers and Kwak 2010).

In Brazil, all local governments follow the single institutional format of the municipality (*município*), covering the entire territory of the country, with congruent boundaries that may include urban and rural areas, according to local definitions. Municipalities enjoy a considerable amount of power. The 1988 Constitution recognizes them as independent entities in a three-layer federalist system with responsibilities and policy-making capacities within federalist policy systems (though less present in urban policies). Additionally, however, they have access to financial resources from automatic fiscal transfers proportional to their population, as well as from resources earmarked for specific policies and from their direct authority to locally tax urban properties and the service economy (Arretche 2012).

When compared with other countries and cities, therefore, municipal administrations and their mayors control a substantial amount of power in Brazil. Mayors and councilors are directly elected for a four-year term (with no recall) in partisan elections. One consecutive mayoral re-election is allowed (since 1996), while councilors may run for unlimited re-election. Local elections are held separately between federal and state executive and legislative elections (held together), functioning as mid-term elections for the main parties involved in national politics. Voting is mandatory, although punishments for abstention are low. The partisan nature of elections and their mid-term position has integrated local elections into national political cycles, giving a national political status to mayors of large and important cities like São Paulo.

Finally, in terms of policies, as already indicated in the introduction, Brazil's municipal governments have several exclusive responsibilities. These include especially policies that produce and manage the city such as intra-municipal transportation, traffic control, road construction and maintenance, waste management, land use control and building regulations, urban planning, street ordinances (and enforcement), slum upgrading and basic

sanitation, either directly or under concession or permission. Municipalities also participate in several other policies through policy-specific federalist systems, such as primary healthcare provision, early-years education, and basic social assistance programs. More complex, health and social assistance provisions, as well as high school education, are dealt with by states and the federal government within systems that combine centralization and decentralization of different tasks (Arretche 2012). Judicial actors also play essential roles in this matter (Bucci and Duarte 2017), including in urban policies (Coslovsky 2016).

However, these local institutions and policies do not govern themselves automatically. They are occupied by mayors or other local political leaders, bringing leadership to the center of our discussion. How much should we consider the particular importance of the mayors and their personal characteristics? Classics such as Pressman (1975), Wolfinger (1972), Talbot (1969) and Hentoff (1969) already discussed this element at length, suggesting that decisions and strategies, but also styles of mayoral leadership, make a difference in governing. We already know that the ability to formulate bold and directive city projects, as well as coordinate and mobilize support, is central (John and Cole 1999; Stone 1993), although it seems equally important to specify support from whom. In Stone (1993) and the urban regime literature, it is implicit that political support means support from local economic elites (and especially developers). However, other forms of governance may also mobilize support from non-elite social groups and actors, leading to different political situations and resources for local executives (Pierre 2011). In any case, political leaders must also mobilize politics on the ground, at a more disaggregated level in the neighborhoods, in order to maintain political support and generate legitimacy (Hentoff 1969; Talbot 1969), as discussed in the next chapter.

In any case, emphasizing the relevance of individual styles should not be understood as a plea for voluntarism, since institutions and political contexts frame and constrain mayors, but also because different political situations may demand radically diverse styles and political action. As we shall see in the next chapter, several very different personal styles led to similar results in terms of the mayor's capacity to implement an agenda. As in the case of formal institutions, therefore, just understanding the different mayoral styles does not explain how cities are governed.

One way to bridge the gap between leadership and institutional and political structures is to explore the idea of durable shifts of governing authority (Orren and Skowronek 2004). Governing authority, in this case, does not refer only to the stable occupation of governmental command positions by individuals or parties, but also to the web of relations that produce legitimacy

and to the ability to frame the interpretations about their own power and policy agendas. This idea can help us understand the existence of relatively long periods of political control (of governing posts and agendas) in cities, such as in urban regimes (Stone 1993), or urban political coalitions (Mollenkopf 1993). Over time, however, political conditions and support for leadership (and its agenda) may change, leading to the weakening or reconfiguration of the governing authority (Lucas 2017). Flanagan (2004) suggests that we can classify mayors according to their position vis-à-vis the current authority (for or against) and the latter's resilience (resilient or vulnerable). The combination of these two binary strategies leads to four leadership modalities: rebuilding (opposed to vulnerable authorities), articulating (in favor of resilient authorities), disjunctive (in favor of vulnerable authorities), and pre-emptive (opposed to resilient authorities). We shall return to these concepts while discussing governments later in this chapter.

Finally, mayors also belong to political groups and parties and are in continuous interaction with many other actors with their interests and ideas (Le Galès 2011; Rhodes 2007). As we shall see in the following chapters, it is clear that the policy preferences associated with political parties influence what kind of policies each administration produces and delivers, confirming several studies (Einstein and Glick 2018; Hajnal and Trounstein 2017; John and Cole 1999; Marques 2003). However, governing large metropolises is becoming more and more associated with the governance of the interactions between various State and non-State actors (Le Galès 2011), connected by formal, informal, legal, and illegal relations (Marques 2013) within increasingly heterogeneous institutional formats (Judd and Smith 2007; Pierre 1998). The understanding of urban policy production depends on comprehending the intricate patterns of interactions between actors present in each policy sector and the city.

The two last sections of this chapter deal with the government of the city of São Paulo, first presenting the electoral results that empowered mayors in the period and subsequently briefly discussing the most central policies and events of each administration.

Electoral Results and the Mayors of São Paulo

According to the predominant interpretations of politics in large cities of the Global South, elections are marked by low political competition, considering the monopolies created by clientelism and pork-barrel politics, or by high volatility, considering electoral rules in the region, which result in a fragmented party system with low party identification (Ames 2002). Contrary to

these accounts, the city of São Paulo houses quite stable electoral behavior, relatively low volatility and identifiable spatial voting patterns, although with intense political competition for all types of posts (Limongi and Mesquita 2011). The population of São Paulo generally has a mostly center-right profile, although voters tending to the left and right are also present. Some authors suggested a systematic growth of the right at the beginning of re-democratization (Pierucci and Lima 1993), but, as we shall see shortly, the right-wing vote tended to stay where it had been and has been captured by the center-right since the 2000s. Electoral victories in São Paulo since the return to democracy involved the mobilization of these three major political and ideological blocks – left, right, and center – with oscillations in their levels due to political conjunctures and electoral dynamics. Table 1.1 below shows the percentages of votes in the first and second rounds of the municipal executive elections since 1985.

The table shows several patterns. The most general relates to the political polarization in the first rounds, with the constant presence of PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores (left-wing) among the two candidates with most votes in almost all the first rounds and all the second-round disputes. The exception was the first election, won in one single round by PTB – Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, with PMDB (with a candidate who would later fund PSDB – Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira) in second place and PT already in third place with around 20% of the votes. PT's primary opponents were the PDS – Partido Democrático Social/PPB – Partido Progressista Brasileiro (both right-wing) between 1988 and 2000, and the PSDB (center-right) associated with DEM – Democratas (right-wing) between 2004 and 2016. In the first rounds, which more accurately express voter preferences, PT oscillated between 25 and 38% of the votes, except for the first election (when Luiza Erundina had 20% in the third position) and the 2016 election (when Fernando Haddad had just 17% of the votes). The candidates opposing PT had between 25 and 53% of the votes in the first rounds, except for Paulo Maluf in 2000 (with only 18%).

PT won three elections (one in a single round) while the PSDB/DEM also won three and the PDS/PPB won two plus one of the PTB. These three blocks correspond to the left, center-right, and right, respectively, each winning three elections. Except for 2012, the top-ranked contender in the first round confirmed the lead in the second round. In four elections – 1992, 1996, 2004, and 2016 – there was an immediate polarization, with the top two most voted candidates obtaining more than 70% of the votes in the first round. In all these cases, PT lost, suggesting that this party becomes competitive only when an evident (and early) coalition does not form against its candidate. In effect, PT's three victories correspond to the lower proportions

TABLE 1.1 Electoral results of the leading candidates for mayor of São Paulo.²

Year	Election	Candidates	Parties	% of valid votes
1985	Single round	Jânio Quadros	PTB	37.53%
		Fernando Henrique Cardoso	PMDB	34.16%
1988	Single round	Luiza Erundina	PT	29.84%
		Paulo Maluf	PDS	24.45%
1992	1st round	Paulo Maluf	PDS	48.85%
		Eduardo Suplicy	PT	30.68%
	2nd round	Paulo Maluf	PDS	58.08%
		Eduardo Suplicy	PT	41.92%
1996	1st round	Celso Pitta	PPB	48.24%
		Luiza Erundina	PT	24.50%
	2nd round	Celso Pitta	PPB	62.28%
		Luiza Erundina	PT	37.72%
2000	1st round	Marta Suplicy	PT	38.01%
		Paulo Maluf	PPB	17.35%
	2nd round	Marta Suplicy	PT	58.51%
		Paulo Maluf	PPB	41.49%
2004	1st round	José Serra	PSDB	43.56%
		Marta Suplicy	PT	35.82%
	2nd round	José Serra	PSDB	54.86%
		Marta Suplicy	PT	45.14%
2008	1st round	Gilberto Kassab	DEM	33.61%
		Marta Suplicy	PT	32.79%
	2nd round	Gilberto Kassab	DEM	60.72%
		Marta Suplicy	PT	39.28%
2012	1st round	José Serra	PSDB	30.75%
		Fernando Haddad	PT	28.98%
	2nd round	José Serra	PSDB	44.43%
		Fernando Haddad	PT	55.56%
2016	1st round	João Dória	PSDB	53.29%
		Fernando Haddad	PT	16.70%

Source: authors' elaboration based on TSE data.

of votes concentrated among the two winners of the first round (55% in 1988, 53% in 2000 and 59% in 2012). As we shall see later, PT's victories were associated with specific effects – the army occupation of a steel mill factory that led to the death of one striking worker (and the absence of the two-rounds rule) in 1988 (Couto 1994); the numerous Pitta government scandals, shortly before the 2000 election (Chaia et al. 2002); and the height of the Lula government's prestige in 2012.

Therefore, we can summarize the local political scenario as a relatively stable opposition between PT, which mobilizes about one-third of the electorate, and the force that polarizes against it with another third of the electorate. At the beginning of the period, right-wing parties (PTB/PDS/PPB) were the ones polarized against PT, although in the 1985 election they beat the PMDB – Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro. However, this polarization changed for the center-right (PSDB/DEM) against PT from 2004 onwards. The election for mayor depended on the mobilization of a third of the electorate not represented by either pole. This electorate seems to be ideologically closer to the right than the left since PT lost four of the second-round contests and won just two.

The electoral results also show a robust geographical stability that points to the presence of evident social cleavages in voting behavior, with clear PT predominance in the urban peripheries, which are mostly poor, and the opposite pole dominant in central areas and the first ring around them, inhabited by the elites and the middle classes (Figueiredo et al. 2002). The use of statistical inference for small areas by educational levels confirms this interpretation (Limongi and Mesquita 2011), indicating a higher penetration of PT among the poor with little schooling, while more professional groups have tended to vote for the PDS/PPB and the PSDB/DEM since 2004.

Municipal Administrations

After observing the electoral results and the main electoral cleavages in the city, we can turn to a brief description of the general profiles of the municipal administrations, political contexts and policies since the return to democracy.³

Brazil's transition from authoritarian rule was slow and intensely negotiated, with the first direct elections for state governors in 1982, for state capital mayors in 1985, the election of the first civilian president, albeit indirect, in 1985, the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1988, and finally the first direct election for president in 1989. A key event on this trajectory was the 1988 Constitution, establishing the democratic features of the institutions responsible for municipal government. We concentrate our analysis, therefore,

on urban policies after 1988, although considering the legacies of the military period and the two previous mayoral terms of the 1980s, already during the democratic transition but still under different rules.

Until 1985, state governors appointed mayors of state capitals. Governors, in turn, were elected indirectly by state assemblies, whose members were directly elected. The first direct elections for state governor happened in 1982. In the case of São Paulo, Franco Montoro of the PMDB (originating from the opposition party during the military regime, the MDB) won the election. After some months of intraparty conflict, he appointed his transportation secretary Mário Covas in May 1983 as mayor of the state capital until December 1985.⁴ This appointment represented a victory of the governor's group against his deputy governor, Orestes Quércia, who wanted the confirmation of the local council's president, who had been holding the position provisionally.

Jânio Quadros

In 1985 the first direct elections were held for state capital mayors. The PMDB considered inevitable the election of its candidate, Fernando Henrique Cardoso since the latter senator had been leading the polls from the start. This would have been a logical result since the opposition party, the MDB, had grown substantially under military rule since the mid-1970s and the party had won the state government in 1982. Nevertheless, to the surprise of many (Lamounier 1985), former mayor Jânio Quadro⁵ of PTB was elected with 39.3% of valid votes, against 35.5% for Cardoso and 20.7% for PT's federal deputy Eduardo Suplicy. Jânio Quadros would govern for a term of three years between 1986 and 1988. His administration left few landmarks, except for starting a major road construction program that would influence the city's policies (and weaken its finances) over the subsequent administrations, including many roads, tunnels and bridges (Marques 2003).

Luiza Erundina

The 1988 election would involve another surprise, with several notable national events in the background. The election involved no fewer than 15 candidates, several of them from the right, including two candidates directly linked to the incumbent mayor (his press secretary and planning secretary/son-in-law). However, Paulo Maluf of the PDS emerged as the leading right-wing candidate, ahead in the polls for most of the time.⁶ Two candidates represented the center: João Leiva of the PMDB (linked to the former deputy governor and now governor Orestes Quércia) and José Serra of the PSDB. The latter party had been created a few months earlier – in June 1988 – from

a split of the two internal party factions that had competed within the PMDB since the late 1970s.

The winner, however, was Luiza Erundina of PT⁷ with 29.8% against 24.5% for Paulo Maluf and 14.2% for João Leiva. Luiza Erundina had been the deputy mayor's candidate in the previous election on Eduardo Suplicy's ticket. The election was marked in particular by the killing of three workers (and another nine seriously injured) by the army on putting down a strike at a federally-owned steel mill company, just five days before the elections. The winning coalition had strong leftist tones (PT, Pcdob, and PCB) and the elected mayor had a Trotskyist background and intense connections with social movements, especially in housing. On the other hand, the local political environment was still profoundly conservative.

Luiza Erundina took office amid a deep fiscal crisis, with unprecedented budget deficits, suppliers refusing to provide services, degraded public facilities, and deflated bus fares due to inflation, among other problems. The campaign agenda was softened, and previously radical militants who were now occupying government positions claimed they needed to manage and operate the municipal administration and prioritize various kinds of demands. Despite this slight drift toward the center – and numerous conflicts with the council – her government introduced many progressive ideas and innovative policies.

This government corresponds to what Flanagan (2004), following Orren and Skowronek (2004), describes as pre-emptive politics, with the executive waging war to achieve modest results opposed by a resilient governing authority. Effectively, Luiza Erundina lived in constant conflict with the city council, where she held the largest block of seats, but which was still clearly a minority (33% or 17 councilors from a total of 55). Nevertheless, she exerted a strong and far from conciliatory style of leadership and decided not to build a majority coalition on the council, as we shall discuss in the next chapter. The government judged that the local political and economic elites could not be mobilized in favor of its redistributive agenda, in a situation similar to what Pierre (2011) calls welfare governance. They chose, therefore, to alienate elite actors and to mobilize the support of social movements, which could exert pressure on the council and alter public opinion. The strategy backfired, and the movements increasingly pressured the government itself for results, while the council boycotted the implementation of many policies (Couto 1994). Consequently, the council rejected most of her important proposals, including the new master plan and a zero-bus fare policy to be financed by a strongly progressive land tax reform (also rejected). The mayor even came under massive opposition from within her own party, in part because she belonged to a small internal faction, but mainly because she refused to compromise with interest groups other than social movements (Couto 1994).

Nevertheless, notwithstanding these defeats for the council and a difficult fiscal situation, Erundina's administration introduced several redistributive policy innovations that would remain on the agenda for decades. Many of them will reappear in the discussions of specific policy sectors in the next chapters, such as regularization of irregular developments, slum upgrading projects and integrated environmental protection programs (Marques and Pulhez, Chapter 8), active instruments for land use control and private development regulation (Hoyler, Chapter 9), priority for public transportation and public spaces (Requena, Chapter 4), waste recycling (Ralize, Chapter 7), new regulations and changes to the payments of bus contractors, as well as the optimization of bus routes (Campos, Chapter 5), regulation of visual pollution by outdoor advertisements and billboards, and early the inclusion of several participatory institutions.

Paulo Maluf

The 1992 election was the first with two rounds and repeated the same main political competitors of the previous election – PT and the PDS. At the end of the first round, the results showed an early polarization between Paulo Maluf (with the PTB and PL in his coalition) with 37.3%, and the PT candidate, Senator Eduardo Suplicy (associated with the PSB, Pcdob, and PCB) with 23.4%. Aluísio Nunes of the PMDB recorded just under 10% and Fabio Feldman of the PSDB 4.5% of valid votes. Paulo Maluf was victorious in the second round with 58.1% against 41.9% for Eduardo Suplicy.

Regardless of the many differences between the political projects of the leading contenders, for the first time, the right-wing candidacy incorporated themes such as slum upgrading and social assistance policies, albeit through flimsy and poorly designed initiatives. One such example was a project to produce new vertical housing in favelas, presented as slum upgrading. This was an answer to the redistribution initiatives launched by the previous administration, creating a kind of turnstile effect for easy redistribution policies that can readily be understood via median voter theories. On the other hand, previous initiatives that would have led to harder urban redistribution – such as the community-driven self-help housing construction, proper in situ slum upgrading, and above all effective planning and land use control – were paralyzed. In health, the administration created its own health system, which left São Paulo as the only municipality outside the national health system until 2002.

However, despite the formal presence of some redistributive policies, the government's emphasis fell largely on road construction, resuming the major works initiated under the Quadros administration and suspended during the

Luiza Erundina government. These works were located mainly in the richer southwest region of the city, including several tunnels and bridges built by Brazil's largest construction firms and benefiting its two main constituencies – the upper-middle classes and the construction lobby (Marques 2003). The municipality lacked the funds to implement these works, but an accounting gimmick solved this by issuing a large volume of irregular debt bonds. The administration ended up US\$ 1 billion overdrawn and the former mayor sued in Brazilian and foreign courts in the following decades. Paulo Maluf remained free for years as a result of political immunity (he was later elected federal deputy) and endless judicial appeals. In 2018 his term as a federal deputy was revoked, and he went to jail but was ultimately allowed to move to house arrest due to advanced age.⁸ His administration was also closely tied up with real estate interests, reflected by the appointment of developers themselves to key housing and planning positions (Marques and Pulhez, Chapter 8).

After the brief interval of Luiza Erundina's experience, therefore, the Maluf administration represented the return – and peak – of the mainstream policies and politics that had constructed São Paulo since the military period, but now with evident tones of fiscal irresponsibility. These centered on symbols of modernization and development expressed in the military slogan of “São Paulo, the locomotive of Brazil.” In more concrete terms, this meant prioritizing car travel, large road infrastructure programs, the closure of public spaces, a lack of planning, meager and peripheral housing policies, and passive and selective land use control, resulting in highly regressive policies that reproduced much more than reduced urban inequalities. As with Jânio Quadros, Maluf's mayorship reinforced an already strong and still resilient governing authority, but the next administration would be left to cope with the decline of this project and agenda.

Celso Pitta

Although the Maluf administration represented a disaster in financial, administrative, and urban terms, this reality was not immediately explicit to voters. Consequently, Maluf was able to build and reinforce a reputation as a strong leader who had constructed and achieved many things, encapsulated in his electoral campaign slogan – “it was Maluf who did it.”⁹ Since mayoral re-election only started in 1997, Paulo Maluf himself could not run in 1996. He, therefore, backed the candidature of his finance secretary Celso Pitta.¹⁰ Celso Pitta won the first round by 44.9% against 22.8% for former mayor Erundina (PT), 15.6% for José Serra (PSDB) and 7.0% for Francisco Rossi (PDT). The election was not decided in the first round by less than 2%, but in the second round, Pitta achieved a solid victory of 62.3% against 37.7% for the PT candidate.

The administration was victim to many scandals and a severe financial crisis caused by the already mentioned extraordinary expenses of the previous government. Even essential services such as waste collection were severely cut and discontinued at certain times. The mayor's political support declined among voters, service providers and building companies, the main supporters of his coalition in business circles. Among his few well-evaluated policies were inherited programs, such as a water resource recuperation project and irregular settlement regularization, both created by the Erundina government, funded by the World Bank and virtually suspended during the Maluf administration. The administration also started a mobility project that could have had a redistributive impact by connecting the populated and segregated Eastern zone to the center, but the alternative chosen presented very high costs and was never completed. This is a fascinating example since the government opted to construct a new highline infrastructure on which a rapid bus transit system would operate, instead of merely constructing corridors or dedicated bus lanes in the existing avenues (Almeida 2019). By trying to transform a problematic redistribution policy into an easy one (while also generating high-value contracts for builders), the government made the policy unfeasible.

The many scandals included those relating to debt bonds (*precatórios*), the local health system, waste management, the purchase of school meals and a significant tax collection mafia. The last scandal, especially, dragged on for months generating considerable public exposure. The mayor was arrested twice, once for not paying alimony to his ex-wife, but also for money laundering and corruption (denounced by his former wife). By the end of the administration, 74% of the population rejected his government.

Independently of the mayor's complete lack of leadership skills, this administration cannot be understood dissociated from the previous Maluf government or the broader context of Brazilian democracy during the 1990s. In this sense, the Pitta administration represented an effort to conserve a weak and declining governing authority that faced rapidly eroding public support and promoted an outmoded agenda based on an increasingly discredited 1970s understanding of development.

Marta Suplicy

The 2000 election took place under the strong rejection of the municipal executive and was won by Marta Suplicy of PT.¹¹ The first round was highly fragmented between 16 candidates, including former mayor Paulo Maluf, former president Collor (whose candidacy was later canceled by the courts), former mayor Luiza Erundina (for the PSB in coalition with the PMDB), Senator Romeu

Tuma (PFL) and state deputy governor Geraldo Alckmin of the PSDB. Marta won the first round by 38.1% against 17.4% for Maluf, 17.3% for Alckmin, 11.5% for Tuma, and about 10% for Erundina. Maluf went into the second round on a difference of just 0.1% over Alckmin, already signaling the dislocation of the right by the center-right as PT's rival pole. The second round was won by Marta Suplicy (58.5%) against Paulo Maluf (41.5%). As we shall see in the next chapter, although electing just 16 councilors from PT, the administration decided to avoid Erundina-style isolation and build a coalition on the council that guaranteed a comfortable 62% majority and the approval of its legislative agenda.

The administration improved local finances through fiscal responsibility policies, especially crucial given the downfall of previous governments. The government also implemented many redistributive policies in areas such as planning with a new master plan, land use law and redistributive urban taxation (Minarelli 2019), education with the construction of large day-care centers and schools in peripheries with innovative design and activities (Spira 2017), new priorities for traffic control (Requena, Chapter 4), transportation with bus corridors and a restructured bus system tied to a smart card (Campos, Chapter 5), social rent, central region housing, slum upgrading and irregular settlement regularization (Marques and Pulhez, Chapter 8), an innovative assistance program for homeless people (Bichir et al. 2017) and a better-regulated concession for waste collection (Ralize, Chapter 7), as well as the city's first experience in participatory budgeting (Hernández-Medina 2010).

On the other hand, the administration continued to pursue large urban renewal projects through the institution of Urban Operations, including the creation of compelling new instruments (Sarue and Pagin, Chapter 10). These Operations boosted the development industry, but also allowed some recuperation of municipal land value through public works. The opposition widely criticized the government for proposing rises in property taxes, introducing new taxes on housing waste collection and street lighting that received intense opposition (Ralize, Chapter 7), as well as making only timid advances in healthcare as São Paulo became integrated into the national health system for the first time. Simultaneously, though, voices from the left complained about the efforts to comply with development interests and the administration's large-scale investments in wealthier areas of the city (Fix 2009).

The Suplicy administration thus revived Luiza Erundina's efforts to develop redistributive policies, both easy redistribution ones – targeted to expand services and infrastructure for the poor – and hard redistribution – associated with planning, land use and changing the distributive logic of the budget. The strategy chosen by the mayor involved constructing a

strong support coalition in the council and incorporating elite interests, leading to the approval of both easy and hard redistributive policies, but also making the implementation of the latter much more difficult. This government managed to deliver many vital policies but failed to produce a definite shift in governing authority.

José Serra and Gilberto Kassab

By 2004, Marta Suplicy had stable levels of popularity¹² but lost the election to former minister José Serra of the PSDB.¹³ The first round again presented an early polarization with 43.6% for José Serra and 35.8% for Marta Suplicy, followed by Paulo Maluf with 11.9%, and former mayor Luiza Erundina (PSB), Francisco Rossi (PHS) and Paulinho da Força (PDT) with shallow levels of support. José Serra won the second round with 54.9% against 45.1% for Marta Suplicy. This election marks the end of the right/left polarization (PDS-PPB-PP versus PT) and the beginning of the center-right/left polarization (PSDB-DEM-PSD versus PT) in São Paulo's local politics.

Serra would remain São Paulo mayor for one only year and three months, resigning to run for São Paulo state governor in 2006. Consequently, the summary of his government is presented with that of his deputy mayor, who completed his term and was re-elected in the following election. His short administration was marked primarily by concerns over financial equilibrium, although the new taxes created during the previous administration were abolished. Other significant actions included the integration of the bus smart card system with the subway (although with additional charges), a cultural festival, free prescription drugs in the health system and a controversial urban renewal project in the central area. The latter project remained a matter of public discussion (and the courts) for years and, despite several changes, never came into being. Also, in the central areas, the previous administration's social rent program was suspended and replaced by a partnership with the state-level housing company (Marques and Pulhez, Chapter 8).

Serra's successor was his deputy mayor, Gilberto Kassab (DEM),¹⁴ who finished his term and was re-elected in 2008. This election had 11 candidates, with Gilberto Kassab obtaining 33.6% versus 32.8% for Marta Suplicy (PT), 22.5% for Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) and 5.9% for Paulo Maluf (PP). The center and the right votes combined in the second round, leading Kassab to gain 60.7% versus 39.3% for Marta Suplicy.

Among the government's central policies were the introduction of a mandatory vehicle pollution inspection (latter suspended by the courts) and two policies that would stay and positively impact the city's landscape: the creation of the first bicycle lanes (Lemos and Wicher Neto 2014) and regulation against visual pollution from advertisements. This idea had been on the

agenda since the Erundina administration but never implemented. The large school construction program in the peripheries started by the previous government was continued, albeit with changes that substantially reduced the policy's innovations (Spira 2017).

Controversial decisions included bus fare increases above inflation and changes to how to calculate property tax – redistributive but subsequently suspended – as well as repressive operations in a central region used by crack users. This latter policy, along with restrictions on the number of beds in shelters and meals for the homeless and new efforts to implement a central area renewal project, led to the mayor being accused of pursuing social hygiene practices.¹⁵ In both governments (Serra and Kassab), developers returned to key government positions in housing and planning (Marques and Pulhez, Chapter 8) and under Gilberto Kassab, an attempt was made to revise the master plan in highly regressive ways, targeted to benefit developers. Policies for the center of São Paulo, a major region for redevelopment, mobilized many public debates, with the government advocating policies that could “revitalize” central areas by gentrifying them.

To summarize, these mayors were elected with center-right agendas centered on fiscal austerity, but that also included distributive policies in Lowi's sense (1972), such as reducing air and visual pollution, as well as some easy redistribution programs, including infrastructure expansion to peripheries. In terms of land policies and development regulation, as well as initiatives for the central areas, however, these governments were very conservative. As we shall see in the next chapter, these positions were closely aligned with most of the council, meaning that managing the coalition was very easy.

Fernando Haddad

The 2012 election had 12 candidates and ultimately once again opposed PT and the PSDB. It was the first election from which Paulo Maluf was absent, replaced from the right by Celso Russomano of the PRB, who had gradually occupied the political vacuum left by Maluf's decline.¹⁶ José Serra of the PSDB won the first round with 30.8%, but closely followed by Haddad (PT) with 29.0% and Russomano (PP) with 21.6%¹⁷ with 55.6% against 44.4% for José Serra.

The Haddad administration marked, therefore, a new return of PT to São Paulo city hall. The government continued previous policies, but also actively innovated with a combined emphasis on: (i) public transportation with a new traffic paradigm (Requena, Chapter 4), dedicated bus lanes and corridors (Almeida 2019) and a reorganization of the bus system (Campos, Chapter 5) and a substantial expansion of bicycle lanes; (ii) Planning and

land regulation – a new master plan, zoning law and regional plans, a new secretary and procedures for development approval; and (iii) incentives for use of public space with the pedestrianization of principal streets on weekends, parklet construction and speed limit reduction, in addition to pilot traffic calming projects (Ang et al. 2020). The government also created innovative programs in new areas such as sexuality and gender, and a completely new strategy for dealing with crack addicts in the city center (Bichir et al. 2017).

Among the government's failures was a large development project near the two large rivers that cross the city that never left the blueprint phase (Silva 2016). The 2015 economic crisis and the parallel decline of the Dilma Rousseff presidency (also from PT but was never aligned with the mayor)¹⁸ frustrated expectations of federal investments, especially in infrastructure and equipment (large schools, crèches and hospitals) and through the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* (My House My Life, see Chapter 8) federal housing program. Although the government had the support of eight parties and could count on 62% of the votes in the council, several policies were approved but faced later problems in the courts, such as a concession for the modernization of street lightening (Zago 2019), a public bidding process for new bus providers, as well as measures for progressive and redistributive land taxation.

The Haddad administration again resumed the redistributive agenda but trying to avoid both Luiza Erundina's isolation and Marta Suplicy's proximity to elite interests. This balance seems to have worked better, and even the large renewal projects launched by this government were much less regressive (Sarue and Pagin, Chapter 10). The new emphasis on mobility was also hugely important in terms of urban redistribution since the poorer people were most likely to use public transportation and live further out due to residential segregation patterns. We shall see in the next chapter that one major problem was to overlook the role of councilors and their party machinery in the territorial political mobilization of the city, leading to increasing isolation.

Although the administration's policies were supported by most of the population and by experts, therefore, the mayor himself was somewhat poorly rated. The 2016 election again involved 11 candidates, including two former mayors (both originally from PT) – Luiza Erundina of PSOL and Marta Suplicy of the PMDB – as well as Celso Russomanno (PRB) and João Dória Jr. (PSDB), in addition to Fernando Haddad. The election took place during a deep economic crisis and parallel to PT's major national crisis that led to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and the imprisonment for the corruption of dozens of politicians from various parties. Candidates recognized as politicians, in particular from PT, foundered throughout the country, resulting in the most significant defeat in the party's history.¹⁹ In this context,

the 2016 election was the first in São Paulo to be decided in the first round with João Dória of the PSDB²⁰ obtaining 53.3% versus just 16.7% for Haddad, 13.4% for Russomanno 10.1% for Marta and only 3.1% for Erundina. After just one year and three months in office, Dória repeated José Serra's gesture in 2005, withdrawing his candidature for state governor (and win) in the 2018 election.

Notes

1. www.nlc.org/forms-of-municipal-government.
2. The list of parties cited, especially in this chapters and the next, includes: DEM – Democratas; MDB/PMDB – Movimento Democrático Brasileiro. For a period Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro; PCdoB – Partido Comunista do Brasil; PDS – Partido Democrático Social; PDT – Partido Democrático Trabalhista; PFL – Partido da Frente Liberal; PHS – Partido Humanista da Solidariedade; PP – Partido Progressista, later PPB – Partido Progressista Brasileiro, later Progressistas; PPS – Partido Popular Socialista, later Cidadania; PR – Partido da República; PRB – Partido Republicano Brasileiro; PRB – Partido Republicano Brasileiro, later Republicanos; PSB – Partido Socialista Brasileiro; PSC – Partido Social Cristão; PSD – Partido Social Democrático; PSDB – Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira; PSOL – Partido Socialismo e liberdade; PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores; PTB – Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro; PV – Partido Verde.
3. We tried to avoid tiring readers with excessive detail in this chapter, and reduced them to a minimum omitting names of people, place and programs, except the ones discussed in the rest of the book.
4. Covas was an engineer who graduated from the University of São Paulo in 1955 (curiously much like Reynaldo de Barros, the PDS candidate who stood against Montoro and Paulo Maluf, confirming the elite nature of local politics). He was a federal deputy who had lost political rights under AI5 in 1968 (the most authoritarian institution of the military regime) and later became PMDB president in 1979. He was Franco Montoro's preferred candidate for deputy governor in 1982 but was defeated inside the party by the political group led by the former mayor of Campinas, Orestes Quéricia, based in São Paulo's interior. After his period as São Paulo mayor, Covas was defeated as a presidential candidate in 1989 and as governor of São Paulo in 1990 but was elected

senator in 1986 and governor in 1994 and 1998. He died in 1998.

The biographical information on mayors comes from various websites with data on the occupation of positions at the three levels of government, electoral results and personal biographies.

5. Quadros had been a councilor (1948/1953), state deputy for Sao Paulo (1951/1953), mayor of the capital (1953/1955), governor of São Paulo (1955/1959) and federal deputy for Paraná (1959/1961). He entered history, however, as the national president who resigned in 1961 after just seven months in office during a troubled process that would lead to the 1964 military coup (FGV 2001). He died in 1992.
6. Maluf is an engineer from the University of São Paulo (1954) from a family of businessmen of Lebanese origin. He had been very close to the military governments since the 1964 coup when he became deputy president of the Commercial Association of São Paulo. The military later appointed him as president of the federal bank Caixa Econômica Federal (1967/1969), mayor of São Paulo (1969/1971), state secretary of transportation (1971/1975), and governor of São Paulo (1979/1982). He served as federal deputy (1983/1986), was the regime's defeated candidate in the indirect presidential election of 1985 and was again defeated for the position of state governor in 1986 and 1990. In 1992 he was directly elected to an executive office for the first (and last) time, later being elected as a federal deputy in 2006, 2010, and 2014, and unsuccessfully ran for mayor in 2000, 2004, and 2008 and state governor in 1998 and 2002. Until 1992 he was in the PDS, but in 1993 he articulated the merger of the PDS and PDC, forming the PPR. In 1995 he articulated the fusion of the PPR with the PP, forming the PPB, the party for which his successor Celso Pitta was elected. In 2003, the party was renamed the PP.
7. Erundina is a social worker from the municipality of São Paulo closely connected to housing movements (there is even a favela named after her). She was a councilor between 1983 and 1986, and state deputy between 1986 and 1989. She became a candidate in 1988 by winning party primaries against Plínio de Arruda Sampaio, more moderate and preferred by the party elites. After leaving office, she was elected as federal deputy numerous times (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2018) and ran unsuccessfully for mayor on several other occasions (1996, 2000, 2004, and 2016). She also held a ministerial position under Itamar Franco's presidency and left PT to join the PSB, returning on more than one occasion, before joining PSOL.

8. <https://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,veja-os-processos-judiciais-que-envolvem-o-deputado-paulo-maluf,1093390>.
<http://g1.globo.com/bom-dia-brasil/noticia/2016/03/justica-francesa-condena-paulo-maluf-por-lavagem-de-dinheiro.html>; <http://portal.stf.jus.br/noticias/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=365279&ori=1>.
<https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2018/08/22/camara-dos-deputados-cassa-mandato-de-paulo-maluf.ghtml>.
9. www.youtube.com/watch?v=erEbxyP2ofA.
10. Pitta was an economist who served as Maluf's finance secretary and before that had been the chief financial officer of the Maluf family's processed wood company, the Eucatex group. He was the second Afro-Brazilian mayor of São Paulo and the first to be elected (the first was the jurist Paulo Lauro in 1947, appointed by governor Ademar de Barros for two years in office). Pitta died in 2009.
11. Marta Suplicy is a psychologist from a wealthy and traditional family who became publicly known for fronting a progressive television show in the 1980s about women and sexual behavior. She was married to Eduardo Suplicy and was elected federal deputy for the first time in 1994. In 1998, she ran for governor for PT but received 0.45% fewer votes than Mário Covas of the PSDB, who advanced to the second round against Paulo Maluf (and won). In 2006, she lost PT's nomination for governor and was later defeated in mayoral elections in 2008 and 2016, the last time for the PMDB. She was elected senator for PT in 2010. She also occupied the Ministries of Culture and Tourism in 2007 and 2014 under presidents Lula and Dilma Rousseff, respectively. In 2015, she migrated to the PMDB.
12. <http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaopublica/2005/01/1223736-marta-suplicy-encerra-mandato-com-49-de-aprovacao.shtml>.
13. José Serra is an economist who graduated from the University of Chile when he was in exile, later obtaining a PhD in Economics from Cornell University. Before entering São Paulo city hall, he was State Secretary of Planning (1983/1984), federal deputy (1986 and 1990), senator (1994 and 2002) and Minister of Economic Planning (1995) and Health (1998). He also ran unsuccessfully for mayor in 1989 and 1996 and president in 2002. After leaving city hall, he was elected governor in 2006, ran unsuccessfully again for the presidency in 2010, was elected senator again in 2014, and was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2016 under Temer. He belonged to the MDB and was one of the founders of the PSDB.

14. Kassab is an engineer and an economist trained at USP, but his political background was linked to the São Paulo Commercial Association and Real Estate Brokers and Developers Unions in the 1980s. He was Planning Secretary under Pitta (1997) when he was responsible for political articulation with the Council and was elected federal deputy in 1998 and 2002 (PFL). He occupied the Ministries of Cities and Science and Technology during the Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer presidencies. He has been a member of the PL, PFL, DEM, and PSD.
15. www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff0212200712.htm and www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/cotidian/ff2601200713.htm.
16. Paulo Maluf defeated Russomano in the PP primaries for the mayoralty in the previous election. He is a television presenter who was elected four times as a federal deputy (1994 for the PSDB, 1998 and 2002 for the PPB, and 2006 for the PP) and had run for mayor of Santo André (also in the metropolitan region of São Paulo) in 2000. He was elected federal deputy again in 2014 by the PRB and once again lost the election for São Paulo mayor in 2016.
17. Fernando Haddad won the second round. Haddad is a lawyer by training with graduate degrees in Economics and Philosophy (all from USP) and a professor at the Department of Political Science of the same university. He was the deputy secretary of finance during the Suplicy administration and the deputy Minister and later Minister of Education during the Lula presidency. His first electoral contest was for São Paulo mayor in 2012. Subsequently, he was defeated in the 2016 mayoral election and the presidential race of 2018.
18. <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/vivi-na-pele-o-que-aprendi-nos-livros>.
19. oglobo.globo.com/brasil/declinio-do-pt-partido-perde-poder-em-374-cidades-20222813.
20. João Dória is a publicist, television presenter and author of self-help books. He had been municipal secretary of Tourism during the Covas administration in the 1980s and president of the national tourism agency (Embratur) under the Sarney presidency in 1986. He has never run for an elected office and won the PSDB primaries against local traditional names thanks to the support of state governor Geraldo Alckmin (and maybe illegal practices: <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/materia/guerra-do-cashmere>).

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