

Part 1

Inwardness

Twenty-first century readers are used to the idea that the cultivation and exploration of an inner self is both a predominant literary concern and one of the rewards of literary study. Their central experience of serious literature is usually the novel, which features narrative description of the contents of the minds of characters, or internal monologs in which those minds are revealed, or both. Their predominant experience of drama comes from television and film, which feature revelatory close-ups of expressive faces and occasional voice-overs of thought. As an assumption to bring to Early Modern drama, the idea that inner selves are being explored is both helpful and misleading. It is helpful in that theatre consists of unusually self-revealing action, and Renaissance theatre is no exception to this. But it is somewhat misleading in that Early Modern ideas about what selves consist of differ from twenty-first century ideas, often in significant ways. This part of *Studying Shakespeare's Contemporaries* will discuss personal inwardness as it is presented in the plays of Shakespeare's contemporaries, beginning with techniques for the dramatic representation of inner states and moving on to discuss key features of the inner self. As the preface suggested, Shakespeare excels in evoking human inwardness, so much so that he is sometimes credited with inventing it (see Fineman, Bloom) and with exercising a critical influence on later mapmakers of modern inwardness like Freud. In the following sections, we will discuss a play that influenced Shakespeare in his representation of inwardness, Christopher Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*, and then a play that is influenced in turn by Shakespeare's representation of inward disturbance in *Macbeth* and *Othello*, Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's *The Changeling*.

2 *Inwardness*

1.1 The Inward Self

What makes you think you have an inner life? What makes you believe that other people do? Surely, one major constituent of these linked beliefs is your own capacity to talk to yourself, to maintain a discursive existence when not directly prompted by others, and your experience (which may well be more literary than it is personal) of overhearing other people talking to themselves. Of course, most such discourse is private and never rises to the level of audible speech. Part of its interest, indeed, derives from its variance in tone and intention from public speech. Honesty and candor may keep this variance from reaching the level of complete contradiction; the vice of hypocrisy consists in allowing one's public discourse to overtly contradict one's private internal discourse, and may include taking private pleasure in that contradiction. But even in honest, candid people there is substantial variance between internal and external discourse, and relations with particular others will be as it were measured for intimacy by how great that variance is.

This raises a question. Is there internal discourse that is not, in some way, a response, perhaps even a reply, to an external prompt or gesture? Is internal life private in the sense that it is entirely separate from a social matrix, from the outer world of others speaking and writing and exerting authority that conditions all of the life most adults can remember (given that few can remember anything from before they were speakers and understanders)? Twentieth-century theorists have, on the whole, answered "no" to this question. To cite two famous examples among many that could be offered, Ludwig Wittgenstein denies that there could be such a thing as a private language, and Mikhail Bakhtin claims that every utterance is a reply, part of an always already ongoing dialogic exchange (Wittgenstein, 1974: 94–102, Schalkwyk, 2004: 120, Bakhtin, 1981: 276, Bakhtin, 1986: 121, Clark and Holquist, 1984: 348). Do such claims compromise the idea of inwardness? They certainly cast in question absolute claims about individual autonomy, and they point to the complexity surrounding the ideas of free choice and free will, but they do not in fact do much to undermine the less complex idea that human beings have inner lives that are in large part concealed from those around them, and that those inner lives are objects of the curiosity, and sometimes of the urgent or violent inquiries, of others. These observations, in their generality, do not seem located in any particular historical moment. They seem likely to be true of any culture that shares the moral vocabulary in which lying and hypocrisy are (at least officially) bad and honesty and candor, good. Although strong claims have been made in discussions of Renaissance culture about the emptiness or nullity of the inward self in the Renaissance (see e.g., Belsey, 1985: 48), these claims often seem based on twentieth-century

thinking about the social and linguistic imbeddedness of inward mental life rather than directly on readings of Renaissance texts. As Katharine Eisaman Maus remarks of critics who deny interior life to Renaissance subjects, “such critics characteristically work from philosophical positions that reject as illusory the possibility of a subjectivity prior to or exempt from social determination. That is, they are making a claim not only about English Renaissance subjectivity, but about subjectivity *tout court*” (Maus, 1995: 26). She suggests that hostility to the idea of Renaissance inwardness may derive from “a false sense of what is necessitated by the premises of cultural-materialist and new-historicist criticism” (Maus, 1995: 26, see also 2–3 for a set of quotations of cultural materialist and new-historicist critics on interiority).

New historicism and cultural materialism are the names of related schools of historically oriented literary criticism that arose in the 1980s – the first on the whole in the United States and the second on the whole in Britain – and have deeply influenced the way literature is read in universities since. Both emphasize the ways works of literature are properly to be seen as documents in larger social processes involving conflict and domination. Not only literary works, but human lives, are elements in such processes, obviously, and both movements question the independence of the self at the same time that they dispute the autonomy of the literary work seen as a self-sufficient aesthetic whole. Thus these movements work against a cherished idea about literary reading that used to be central to the declared purposes of literary education – the idea of a modern self becoming “deeper” and “richer” by gaining a satisfactory experience of the rich self-sufficient wholeness of a literary masterpiece. Clearly, the issue of Renaissance inwardness has a number of contentious political dimensions, dimensions that may be an aspect of the difficulty of understanding works from a different historical period, or may be an aspect of the philosophical problem of other minds. These are hard and important issues, and it may be better to approach them more simply by asking yet another question. Do questions about inner selves arise differently in the Renaissance, or at any rate in Renaissance drama, from the way they do now? This is the question this part will attempt to answer, first by looking at the direct ways Renaissance dramatists represent human inwardness, then by moving on to discuss religious dimensions of English Renaissance inwardness, the treatment of psychological obsession in Renaissance drama, and, finally, inner strength and personal honor, inward characteristics that empower or condition the ways characters can act, or can feel obliged to act, on others. As is suggested by its part titles, this book as a whole moves outward from the psyche to the social and political order, so that by its later parts it will be promoting ways of looking at drama which differ from the intentionally individualistic focus of this part.

1.2 The Inward Self in Soliloquy: *The Jew of Malta*

Drama has two powerful techniques for making inward discourse directly available: the soliloquy, where a character speaks his or her thoughts alone on the stage, and the aside, where a character turns away from the action and speaks a thought that is unheard by some or all of the other onstage characters. By discussing soliloquy first in Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta*, this section approaches an inwardness technique in a play that is emphatically *not* prized for its successful evocation of stable, deep selfhood. Moreover, as Jews in sixteenth-century Europe and the Near East were people with limited political rights, tolerated in some Christian and Islamic states and officially expelled from others (from England in 1290, from Spain in 1492), they had fewer communal resources for self-stabilization than citizens or subjects whose religious and ethnic affiliations were those of the dominant culture. The Jews who appear on the Renaissance English stage are usually isolated. As we shall see in later parts, however, English Renaissance drama was profoundly interested in outsiders, and many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Londoners were aliens, criminals, Catholics, or Puritans, and some were Jews, black Africans, transvestites, sodomites, or atheists. Any person in these categories could easily identify him or herself as a persecuted member of a disempowered group, and all except black Africans and Puritans might well be involved in forms of self-concealment that distorted firm, stable identity. Barabas, Marlowe's Maltese Jew, is at any rate no exemplar of consistency; as Emily Bartels points out, he "appears in so many postures that his character seems to consist more of what he is not than of what he is" (Bartels, 1993: 97). Close readings of a series of soliloquies might seem a more natural way to approach a play like *Hamlet*, preoccupied with the inadequacy of outer life to inward experience, than Marlowe's "farce of the ... serious even savage comic humour" (Eliot, 1932: 16), which moves from rapid action at the start to frenzied action at the end. Nonetheless, as we shall see, Barabas's inward life is strongly represented.

Marlowe's *The Jew of Malta* begins with a prologue by "Machiavel" followed by a soliloquy by Barabas. One of the aspects of Machiavelli's 1513 book *The Prince* that made it notorious in sixteenth-century Europe was its recommendation that leaders be able to dissimulate their intentions, to lie, when it is expedient to do so. That is, Machiavelli disputes the idea that lying is in all circumstances bad and that honesty is invariably good. This strategic rationing of one's inward thought for purposes of control and safety was one of many ways in which Marlowe found Machiavelli provocative. As Maus remarks, "Marlowe ... keeps returning to the implications of a personal inwardness withheld or withholdable from others" (Maus, 1995: 210). The Machiavel of Marlowe's prologue expects those

who read him to dissimulate their indebtedness to his advice, “such as love me guard me from their tongues, / ... /Admired I am of those that hate me most” (Prologue 6–9). His comments prepare audiences for two important aspects of *The Jew of Malta*: deceptive self-presentation (set off by private self-revelation), and ambivalence toward a figure who presents a strong but amoral version of the reality of human economic and political life. The first is established early on by soliloquy and aside.

Barabas’s first soliloquy, “*in his countinghouse, with heaps of gold before him,*” as the stage direction has it, seems at the outset impersonal, the talking to himself of a merchant reckoning his accounts: “So that of thus much that return was made; / And of the third part of the Persian ships, / There was the venture summed and satisfied” (1.1.1–3). But the soliloquy soon becomes more expressive, although it remains focused on the wealth in front of him. He reveals impatience at having to account for small sums: “Fie, what a trouble ’tis to count this trash!”, contrasting himself with “The needy groom that never fingered groat” who would wonder at “thus much coin” (1.1.7–14). As he proceeds to an approving account of the hoards of “the wealthy Moor” (1.1.21), he seems enthralled by the way objects of enormous economic value concentrate beauty and power in tangible form:

Bags of fiery opals, sapphires, amethysts,
Jacinths, hard topaz, grass-green emeralds,
Beauteous rubies, sparkling diamonds,
And seld-seen costly stones of so great price
As one of them, indifferently rated
And of a caret of this quantity,
May serve, in peril of calamity,
To ransom great kings from captivity.
(1.1.25–32)

As an exposure of inwardness, this does not seem very inward. It represents Barabas’s participation in the thrill of possessing what others desire, and an awareness that such objects also represent the resources others may desperately need. The neediness of those who do not have his resources – the groatless groom, the captive king – is a major component of the resources themselves, from Barabas’s viewpoint. Although Barabas is talking in part about others, he is also placing himself among them, at the same time registering his own difference as a disenfranchised Jew who has no home ground from which wealth can be directly extracted. The “wealthy Moor” can, in Barabas’s fantasy at least, simply “pick his riches up” from the “Eastern rocks” where precious stones abound, but Barabas’s own more laborious work as a merchant achieves the same kind of concentrated potential by

6 *Inwardness*

separation of wealth from the ordinary people who are enmeshed in a market-world they cannot control:

This is the ware wherein consists my wealth;
And thus, methinks, should men of judgment frame
Their means of traffic from the vulgar trade,
And, as their wealth increaseth, so enclose
Infinite riches in a little room.

(1.1.33–37)

“Judgment,” for Barabas, consists of concentrating the world-spanning reach of human transactions in a private space: the “little room” of his countinghouse, or the privacy of his intentions, unavailable to the “vulgar.” The idea that this is, potentially, a king’s ransom suggests that it represents security and even power as well as accomplishment. Machiavel promises us “the tragedy of a Jew / Who smiles to see how full his bags are crammed” (Prologue 30–31), and Barabas’s soliloquy demonstrates how much more interesting and complex the situation of such a Jew seems from inside his own consciousness than when looked on unsympathetically from the outside. At the same time, Machiavel’s comment warns us that Barabas will not smile for long.

What, then, does this soliloquy accomplish in terms of the representation or evocation of inwardness? It establishes a kind of baseline for Barabas’s later frenzy, in that his complacent account of his own success is shot through with expressions of impatience at the life he has led to achieve “thus much coin,” “wearying his fingers’ ends with telling it” (1.1.16). He clearly prefers to think of his achievement in terms of the solidity and brilliance of hidden gems, “seld-seen costly stones” (1.1.28), rather than as a pile of coins that have passed through many hands and may at any time return to promiscuous negotiation. Moreover, when the soliloquy resumes after an interruption in 1.1, it also sets the terms on which he finds his adversarial relation to the dominant Christians of Malta tolerable:

Who hateth me but for my happiness?
Or who is honored now but for his wealth?
Rather had, I, a Jew, be hated thus
Than pitied in a Christian poverty;
For I can see no fruits in all their faith
But malice, falsehood, and excessive pride,
Which methinks fits not their profession.

(1.1.111–118)

Barabas sees his relation to the Christians as a struggle lightly masked by hypocritical professions of charity on the Christian side and the systematic forgoing of political authority on the side of the Jews:

They say we are a scattered nation;
I cannot tell, but we have scrambled up
More wealth by far than those that brag of faith.

...

I must confess we come not to be kings.
That's not our fault. Alas, our number's few,
And crowns come either by succession
Or urged by force; and nothing violent,
Oft have I heard tell, can be permanent.

(1.1.120–132)

We moderns think of the inner self as prone to ambivalence and contradiction. So far – and in this Marlowe typifies Renaissance norms – Barabas's soliloquy has been marked by a high level of rhetorical consistency and formality; except in its frankness, his speech to himself does not seem that different from a speech he might deliver to an assembly. Nonetheless, as suggested already by our account of Barabas's impatience discussed earlier, the “alas” and the “not our fault” register Barabas's distress at the denial of political power to match the economic accumulation the greatest Jews have achieved. Clearly, it is *faute de mieux*, suppressing his own distress, that Barabas concludes “Give us a peaceful rule; make Christians kings, / That thirst so much for principality” (1.1.133–34). His reference to Abigail, his “one sole daughter, whom I hold as dear / As Agamemnon did his Iphigen; / And all I have is hers” (1.1.136–8), both ominously foreshadows a sacrifice and suggests that Barabas is in his imagination a man who would be king. The punctuated soliloquy of 1.1, then, establishes both Barabas's precarious complacency and his awareness that it is endangered by the collective vulnerability of the Jews. Indeed, the soliloquy locates in Barabas's psyche the social thought-experiment that is at the center of the play: what are the consequences when economic power is concentrated in the hands of the politically powerless?

The first consequence is that when they really need it, the politically powerful will grab the money of the powerless rich. In 1.2 Barabas is, in rapid, plausible succession, summoned to the senate house, told by the Christian governor, Ferneze, that the Turks have demanded payment of 10-years' neglected Maltese tribute, and asked to contribute half his wealth on penalty of forced conversion to Christianity and total dispossession if he refuses. When Barabas declines to be christened and says (in an echo of his opening soliloquy) “Half of my substance is a city's wealth. / Governor, it was not got so easily; / Nor will I part so slightly therewithal” (1.2.86–8), he is held to have “denied the articles” and thus to forfeit all possessions to the state. When his fellow Jews (who have quickly submitted to the expropriation of half their goods, and have so escaped Barabas's total loss) attempt to console him, Barabas rejects their consolations in terms that

8 *Inwardness*

remind us of the foregone aspirations to power in his first soliloquy. Here his lost money becomes a general's defeated army and reminds us of the way he likened himself earlier to Agamemnon (see Shepard, 1998: 119):

You that
Were ne'er possessed of wealth are pleased with want.
But give him liberty at least to mourn
That in a field amidst his enemies
Doth see his soldiers slain, himself disarmed,
And knows no means of his recovery.

(1.2.201–6)

When they leave him alone, he springs up and in a wonderful brief soliloquy reveals his sense that he is harder and more resistant to dissolution than ordinary men:

See the simplicity of these base slaves,
Who, for the villains have no wit themselves,
Think me to be a senseless lump of clay
That will with every water wash to dirt!

(1.2.216–19)

This resistance to the suddenly fluid nature of his experience carries on even after Barabas's daughter Abigail brings the distressing news that Barabas's emergency reserve of gold and jewels ("stones infinite" [1.2.247]) is inaccessible. Barabas's house has been turned into a convent, and Barabas as a male Jew is of course forbidden to enter it. Barabas briefly considers despair and suicide, representing them as an even more radical form of dissolution:

What, will you thus oppose me, luckless stars,
To make me desperate in my poverty,
And, knowing me impatient in distress,
Think me so mad as I will hang myself,
That I may vanish o'er the earth in air
And leave no memory that e'er I was?

(1.2.260–265)

Rather than thus allow himself to dissipate, Barabas embraces uncertainty:

No! I will live, nor loathe I this my life.
And since you leave me in the ocean thus
To sink or swim, and put me to my shifts,
I'll rouse my senses and awake myself.

(1.2.266–9)

Neither a stone to sink nor a clod to wash to dirt, Barabas will be a swimmer and a shape-shifter. Much of the inconsistency and manic variety of the rest

of the play derives from this resolution, as once Barabas leaves the precarious truce with Christian power he articulates in his opening soliloquy, he never achieves a position of stability, and indeed he dies at the end trying to reestablish something approximating the accommodation he started with.

In his first “shift,” he responds to his exile from his own house by asking his daughter Abigail to pretend conversion to Christianity so that she can enter the nunnery and recover Barabas’s rainy-day fund. After some natural hesitation, Abigail, persuaded, turns to the Abbess who is proceeding conveniently across the stage to take up her new residence and begs admission as a novice. While apparently cursing Abigail for her apostasy, Barabas arranges, in a series of hilarious asides, to come early in the morning to the new convent to receive the restolen goods. But when he arrives “with a light” before his house, his confidence in the arrangement appears to have given way to vengeful self-pity. The soliloquy with which Barabas opens the second act differs markedly in tone from his first.

Thus, like the sad presaging raven that tolls
The sick man’s passport in her hollow beak,
And in the shadow of the silent night
Doth shake contagion from her sable wings,
Vexed and tormented runs poor Barabas
With fatal curses towards these Christians.

(2.1.1–6)

As in his earlier soliloquy, this one at first seems to show Barabas’s mental life as quite instrumental, focusing on powerful rhetorical presentation of his activities and intentions. At the same time, it mixes a myth of doom for his enemies with a somewhat comic sense of his own movements: no fatal bird of the air but instead a distracted earthbound creature trying with difficulty to hurry in the dark. Night has brought torment and self-doubt, as is seen in the way the raven’s flight immediately becomes the flight away from him of everything he has counted and counted on:

The incertain pleasures of swift-footed time
Have ta’en their flight and left me in despair;
And of my former riches rests no more
But bare remembrance, like a soldier’s scar,
That has no further comfort for his maim.

(2.1.6–11)

No longer an angry general on the field of his defeat, Barabas is now a poor soldier with only his scars to show for his losses. Lines 9–11 gain some of their poetic power – which derives partly from the sequential off-rhymes “air,” “or,” “er,” “ore,” “are,” “ar,” “ur,” and “er” and the intense alliteration of the initial consonants “m,” “b,” and “r,” and partly also from

the way the pause after “remembrance” breaks the iambic pattern so dominant in Marlowe’s pentameter line – from a subdued pun on “member” in “remembrance”: the mutilated soldier can “remember” what he had, but he cannot regain the member he has lost.

The outdoor public Renaissance theatres – *The Jew of Malta* played mainly at the Rose, Philip Henslowe’s venue, in the 1590s (see Gurr, 1996: 69–77) – tended to feature a curtained recess at back center stage that probably was the site of Barabas’s countinghouse in 1.1, and also had an upper playing space above that recess with a windowlike opening. In this upper stage, while Barabas paces back and forth on the bare main stage carrying his lantern, Abigail appears, unheard by her father and searching for his treasure. Their soliloquies cross each other in one of the more brilliant Marlovian scenes, and one that, as suggested earlier, Shakespeare took note of. Square brackets around stage directions (which are always in italics) indicate that the directions are supplied by a modern editor for the reader’s convenience rather than appearing in the early printed text or texts on which the modern edition is based.

ABIGAIL [*to herself*] Now have I happily espied a time
 To search the plank my father did appoint.
 [*Finding riches*] And here, behold, unseen, where I have found
 The gold, the pearls, and jewels which he hid!
 BARABAS [*to himself*] Now I remember those old women’s words
 Who in my wealth would tell me winter’s tales
 And speak of spirits and ghosts that glide by night
 About the place where treasure hath been hid
 And now methinks that I am one of those.
 For, whilst I live, here lives my soul’s sole hope
 And when I die, here shall my spirit walk.

(2.1.20–30)

Barabas’s words are, as we say, overdetermined – they have more than one appropriate and indeed necessary meaning. His “soul’s sole hope” is his treasure, and the lost house in which he originally amassed it, and the daughter who might be expected to carry his inheritance into the future. Barabas’s memory now associates his treasure with the spiritual traces of others who lost it before he gained it (or hid it before he found it). In his extremity, he also begins populating his inner self with voices from the past, old women who told him stories that undermine the confident account of the meaning and origins of wealth he gave in his first soliloquy. After all, the “spirits and ghosts” haunting hoarded treasure stand for the restless need for vengeance of those from whom it has been taken, and more generally touch on the social resentment of poor Christians for rich Jews that has turned on and victimized Barabas as well as on Barabas’s own anger at dispossession. And as Barabas

thus voices this line of inner thought, he is unheard by one of the objects of that thought who is herself recovering another object of it – the double soliloquy thus has an uncanny connection to the winter's tale of disembodied connection to lost possessions that Barabas remembers. Abigail too feels a mixed sense of elation and loss:

Now that my father's fortune were so good
As but to be about this happy place!
'Tis not so happy; yet when we parted last,
He said he would attend me in the morn.
Then, gentle sleep, where'er his body rests,
Give charge to Morpheus that he may dream
A golden dream, and of the sudden wake,
Come, and receive the treasure I have found.
(2.1.31–38)

Barabas, the unhearing object of Abigail's spoken thought, has meanwhile given up: "As good go on as sit so sadly thus" (2.1.41). Then he suddenly spies his daughter above him: "But stay! What star shines yonder in the east? / The lodestar of my life, if Abigail!" (2.1.42–3). If the title of *The Winter's Tale* is not a sufficient indication that this scene stuck in Shakespeare's memory – *The Jew of Malta* was first performed in 1589 or 1590, just before or simultaneously with Shakespeare's first plays (Hunter, 1997: 554), and Marlowe was the dominant dramatist in London from *Tamburlaine* in 1587 until his death by stabbing in 1593, so his then-less-prominent contemporary Shakespeare surely saw and perhaps read or even acted in his work – the way this moment of recognition of Abigail on the upper stage is recast at a key moment in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* 4 to 6 years later surely clinches it. Romeo dismisses Benvolio with a line that reworks Barabas's comments on scars and maims and then paraphrases Barabas's line as he looks up and sees a candle in the upper playing space: "He jests at scars, that never felt a wound. / [A light appears above, as at Juliet's window.] But soft, what light through yonder window breaks? / It is the east, and Juliet is the sun" (2.2.1–3). I will return to the way the rest of this scene affected Shakespeare in the following. What follows, although no longer in the mode of simultaneous soliloquy, remains remarkable for intensity:

BARABAS [*He calls*] Who's there?
ABIGAIL Who's that?
BARABAS Peace, Abigail. 'Tis I.
ABIGAIL Then, father, here receive thy happiness.
BARABAS Hast thou 't?
ABIGAIL Here. (*Throws down bags.*) Hast thou 't?
There's more, and more, and more.

12 *Inwardness*

BARABAS O my girl
 My gold, my fortune, my felicity
 Strength to my soul, death to mine enemy!
 Welcome, the first beginner of my bliss!
 Oh, Abigail, Abigail, that I had thee here too!
 Then my desires were fully satisfied.
 But I will practice thy enlargement thence.
 Oh, girl, oh, gold, oh, beauty, oh, my bliss!
(Hugs his bags)
(2.1.44–53)

Again, readers of Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, Shakespeare's play about Jews and Christians from around 1596, will notice how closely several key moments in that play are modeled on this scene from Marlowe: Jessica throwing her father Shylock's bags of ducats out of his window to her lover Lorenzo in 2.6, and, more importantly, Solanio's description of Shylock's confused grief and rage after Jessica and Lorenzo have eloped: "My daughter! O, my ducats! O, my daughter! / Fled with a Christian! O, my Christian ducats! / Justice! The law! My ducats, and my daughter!" (2.8.15–18).

The influence of Marlowe on Shakespeare, despite the connection between Barabas's memory and the title of *The Winter's Tale* (1610–11), one of Shakespeare's last plays, is usually held to extend up to midcareer, to *Hamlet* (1599–1601) and basically no further. There are good reasons for this; blustering martial characters whose verse reminds us of Marlowe's heroes, especially of *Tamburlaine*, basically disappear from Shakespeare at the end of the 1590s, and the seventeenth-century Shakespeare seems to have moved beyond imitating Marlowe's style. Nonetheless, the combination of brilliant stage and psychological effects in this scene – most notably the two family members hearing things in the dark, operating on different stage levels as they try to reach each other, the way their interaction, here so collaborative, will shortly after be broken so that they will be mutually destructive, and the way the dark itself is rendered emblematic of oncoming death and destruction by Barabas's initial speech – serves as a model for one of Shakespeare's more remarkable scenes in *Macbeth* (1606). In Act 2 scene 2, Lady Macbeth is waiting by torchlight for Macbeth to return from the upstairs chamber where he has gone to murder Duncan.

LADY MACBETH Hark! Peace!
 It was the owl that shrieked, the fatal bellman
 Which gives the stern'st good-night. He is about it.
 ...
 MACBETH [*within*] Who's there? What, ho!
 LADY MACBETH Alack, I am afraid they have awaked
 And 'tis not done. Th' attempt and not the deed

Confounds us. Hark! I laid their daggers ready
He could not miss 'em. Had he not resembled
My father as he slept, I had done't.
Enter Macbeth, [bearing bloody daggers]
My husband!
MACBETH I have done the deed. Didst thou not hear a noise?
LADY MACBETH I heard the owl scream and the crickets cry.
Did not you speak?
MACBETH When?
LADY MACBETH Now.
MACBETH As I descended?
LADY MACBETH Ay.
MACBETH Hark! Who lies i' the second chamber?
LADY MACBETH Donalbain.

(2.2.2–20)

There is clearly a further development of the uncanny in the scene from *Macbeth*, but it reworks elements of this scene in *The Jew of Malta* that we know from three other Shakespearean plays imprinted itself on Shakespeare's mind. The Marlovian scene shares the sense of family feeling struggling against aggressive violence that we get in Lady Macbeth's comment about Duncan's resemblance to her father: "Had he not resembled / My father as he slept, I had done 't" (2.2.12–13). It is, incidentally, interesting that all the Shakespearean scenes with apparent echoes of Marlowe from *Merchant*, *Romeo*, and *Macbeth* occur early in second acts, as does the source-scene in *The Jew of Malta*.

Barabas's reception of his bags, his recovery of his happiness, is both exultant and sinister – he identifies them as "Strength to my soul, death to mine enemy" (2.2.48), and Abigail sometimes seems central to his felicity, sometimes a secondary adjunct to his vengeance. Of course, from the very earliest literature, personal happiness has been seen in part as the unhappiness it brings to one's enemies. Odysseus, stormbeaten, naked, and salty, clad only with a branch he holds before his private parts, praises marriage to the picnicking princess Nausicaa in book six of *The Odyssey*, as

The blessing of a harmonious life.
For nothing is greater or finer than this,
When a man and woman live together
With one heart and mind, bringing joy
To their friends and grief to their foes.

(Homer 2000, 6:185–89)

But here Barabas's exclamatory rhapsody is chillingly consistent with the way Abigail was invoked at the end of his soliloquy in 1.1., where he

14 *Inwardness*

expressed his willingness to remain under Christian control in Malta in terms of his relatively slender connections to the state:

Give us a peaceful rule; make Christians kings,
That thirst so much for principality.
I have no charge, nor many children,
But one sole daughter, whom I hold as dear
As Agamemnon did his Iphigen;
And all I have is hers.

(1.1.133–8)

Agamemnon, of course, sacrificed Iphigenia for fair winds to blow the becalmed Greek host to Troy. Winds are both of real and metaphoric concern in the play: after celebrating “Infinite riches in a little room” Barabas asks “But now, how stands the wind?” (1.1.36–7). And the Turkish pasha Callapine, asked what brings him to Malta, replies with the frankness that characterizes Turks much more than Christians or Jews in this play: “The wind that bloweth all the world besides: / Desire of gold” (3.5.3–4).

Barabas will use this desire repeatedly to betray his opponents, but he also uses their other desires, including the desire of Ferneze’s son Lodowick for Abigail. Abigail, like many beautiful Jewish daughters in medieval and Renaissance stories about Jews, has fallen in love with a Christian, Mathias. As James Shapiro points out, Jewish women in Renaissance drama and fiction “are always depicted as young and desirable,” unlike Jewish men, and their plot role is frequently that of alliance with male Christians (Shapiro, 1996: 132). When Mathias tells Lodowick about how struck he is with Abigail’s beauty, Lodowick begins to pursue her (nothing so quickly arouses desire for another person than seeing a rival desiring her or him), and Barabas promptly exploits this mimetic rivalry, urging Abigail to pretend love for Lodowick and thus tricking the two young men into killing each other in a duel. But when Abigail learns that her father has sacrificed her beloved in his vengeance against Christians, she converts in earnest with a soliloquy of her own:

Hard-hearted father, unkind Barabas,
Was this the pursuit of thy policy,
To make me show them favor severally,
That by my favor they should both be slain?
Admit thou loved’st not Lodowick for his sire,
Yet Don Mathias ne’er offended thee.
But thou wert set upon extreme revenge.

(3.3.39–47)

How extreme emerges when Barabas reacts to the news that Abigail has now entered the convent as a genuine convert. He enters “*reading a letter*” (3.4.0 s.d.):

What, Abigail become a nun again?
False and unkind! What, hast thou lost thy father,
And, all unknown and unconstrained of me,
Art thou again got to the nunnery?

(3.4.1–4)

Abigail and Barabas call each other “unkind,” and both mean more than the modern sense of “hurtful” or “cruel” by the word: they also mean “unnatural, false to one’s own kind.” But for Abigail, her “kind” does not oblige her to shun Christians – rather Barabas’s family link to her should make him welcome her lover, whatever his religion or race. For Barabas, Abigail, by repudiating her father’s faith and cutting herself off from all communication with him, has turned her back on her own “kind,” her faith, and family. This leads him to yet more “extreme revenge”

Now here she writes, and wills me to repent.
Repentance? *Spurca!* What pretendeth this?
I fear she knows – ’tis so! – of my device
In Don Mathias’ and Lodovico’s deaths.
If so, ’tis time that it be seen into,
For she that varies from me in belief
Gives great presumption that she loves me not,
Or, loving, doth dislike of something done.

(3.4.5–12)

Barabas “sees into” the matter by poisoning the whole convent of nuns, including his daughter. In part, this serves a gangster’s logic of wiping out all who might be able to testify about one’s past crimes. This logic will in fact govern a great deal of the action in the rest of the play, as Barabas energetically but unsuccessfully tries to contain the spread of information by murdering the friar to whom the dying Abigail confessed, the servant who helped him murder the friar, and the pimp and prostitute who seduced the servant, got him to talk, and attempted to blackmail Barabas – a containment strategy that seems to be working until the dying courtesan reveals Barabas’s guilt to the Christian governor Ferneze. But Barabas’s destruction of Abigail also underlines the point this section’s exploration of his interiority as revealed in his soliloquies has made clear: Barabas’s strong selfhood includes a repudiation of any ties that might impede his freedom of action. “*Ego mihimet sum semper proximus*” (1.1.188), “my own affairs are my chief concern,” seems a relatively innocuous although not conspicuously moral principle when Barabas first enunciates it, but it becomes considerably more disturbing as it exfoliates.

One of our fears about the interiorities of others is that they will be filled with desires that make them dangerous to us: desires to dominate us, hurt us, or take what is ours. In Barabas, we get a tour of such an interior space that, in making it credible, also makes it temporarily attractive. The soliloquies of

many villains – including Shakespearean villains like Richard III, Claudius, and Iago – serve a similar dramatic purpose: so, as we shall see later, do those of revengers about whom it is harder to form a terminal moral judgment, like Vindice in *The Revenger's Tragedy* or Bosola in *The Duchess of Malfi*. As a tool for the exploration of inwardness, it is clear, the soliloquy does not always aim at the illustration of a mysterious or unconscious set of motives. Barabas's motives are very present to him and are cogently expressed. At the same time, his soliloquies, as this analysis of them has shown, offer a complex insight into the psyche of an able, ambitious, successful, but categorically reviled and excluded other.

1.3 The Inward Self in Aside: *The Changeling*

What kinds of inner thought do you most routinely conceal or dissimulate? Whatever your response – and who are we to tell you about your own interiority? – it seems not unlikely that sexual impulses, fantasies, or memories feature on your list in a fairly prominent position. Thomas Middleton and William Rowley's *The Changeling* uses “asides” – moments when characters break the flow of conversation in order to express a private commentary on it, audible to the audience but not to the other person in the conversation – in order to expose the decorum of conversation for what it often is, a mask for unavowable intentions, in this play usually sexual or aggressive ones. The play's double plot, half of it concerned with a madhouse where the insane act and speak out their inner lives without decorum, the other half with the breakdown of decorum in the household of an honorable Spanish governor whose fifteen-year-old daughter is about to be married, preoccupies itself with boundary-crossing and the intensities it exposes. The most important and memorable characters, the daughter Beatrice-Joanna, and the governor's ugly servant, De Flores, are both people of strong sexual impulses and few moral scruples who model a kind of extremity that may lie just below the surface of apparently quite civilized people. Thus the play offers a demystifying realism about human motives that is also a scary reflection on the fragility of the social conventions that usually mask them. As William Empson comments, linking the madhouse plot to the main plot by way of the title, “the idea of the changeling ... makes you feel that the shock of seeing into a mad mind is dangerous; it may snatch you to itself. This shock is in all the discoveries of the play” (Empson, 1974: 50). Asides open minds so that we can see into them.

Most asides are brief. A typical example from *The Jew of Malta* – typical also in that it reveals an essential aspect of the speaker's inner being – is just

two words. Barabas is responding to the concern of his fellow Jews at their summons to the senate house:

Why, then, let every man
Provide him, and be there for fashion sake.
If anything shall there concern our state,
Assure yourselves I'll look (*aside*) unto myself.
(1.1.169–172)

In *The Changeling*, by contrast, asides tend to be quite long. This section will first illustrate the way the technique introduces us to a discrepancy between inner thought and public expression, then move on to a close description of a scene in which that discrepancy disappears, with shattering results.

De Flores has just overheard Beatrice, engaged to Alonzo de Piracquo, setting up a meeting with Alsemero, the man she has abruptly fallen in love with. De Flores begins the play sexually obsessed by Beatrice, and she in turn hates him and wishes to avoid his presence without knowing exactly why. Beatrice has just realized that, in refusing to allow Alsemero to attempt to kill Alonzo in a duel, she might call on De Flores for help with this. De Flores, in turn, sees Beatrice's movement toward betrayal of Alonzo as an opportunity for himself. He is reflecting on this in an extended aside as Beatrice, in another extended aside, considers her strategy for dealing with him. De Flores has a disfiguring rash on his face that comes up in their exchange:

BEATRICE [*aside*] Why, put case I loathed him
As much as youth and beauty hates a sepulchre,
Must I needs show it? Cannot I keep that secret,
And serve my turn upon him? --See, he's here.
[*To him*] De Flores!
DE FLORES [*aside*] Ha, I shall run mad with joy!
She called me fairly by my name, De Flores,
And neither "rogue" nor "rascal."
BEATRICE What ha' you done
To your face alate? You've met with some good physician.
You've pruned yourself, methinks; you were not wont
To look so amorously.
DE FLORES [*aside*] Not I;
'Tis the same physnomy, to a hair and pimple,
Which she called scurvy scarce an hour ago.
How is this?
BEATRICE Come hither. Nearer, man.
DE FLORES [*aside*] I'm up to the chin in heaven.
(2.2.66–79)

De Flores, unlike many, entertains no illusions about his own appearance. At the same time, as we know from previous asides, he does not let his ugliness deter him from hoping for sexual satisfaction with Beatrice: "I'll despair the less / Because there's daily precedents of bad faces / Beloved beyond all reason" (2.1.83–85). As he comments in soliloquy at the end of the scene,

Hunger and pleasure, they'll commend sometimes
Slovenly dishes, and feed heartily on 'em –
Nay, which is stranger, refuse daintier for 'em.
Some women are odd feeders.

(2.2.154–57)

Yeats's comment on the mates Helen and Aphrodite chose (and, implicitly, on the men Maud Gonne preferred to Yeats) comes to mind: "It's certain that fine women eat / A crazy salad with their meat" (Yeats, 1921: ll. 30–31).

So far there's a kind of comedy in these asides; they often evoke nervous laughter in performance. But because of these asides, readers and audiences know that Beatrice plays with fire when she tries to flirt with De Flores to get him to do her will. Because of the differences in class and appearance and age between them, she does not recognize in him the sexual attraction to her that she is delighted to arouse in Alsemero. His speeches, rich in sexual double meanings, convey only eagerness for money to her, as her asides (themselves unintentionally sexy) make clear when she delivers her charge to De Flores. De Flores is kneeling before her. Note that De Flores consistently addresses Beatrice as "you," the singular second person pronoun used with social superiors; Beatrice "thous" De Flores. This Renaissance English pronoun, lost in Modern English, is equivalent to "tu" in modern French and "du" in modern German; it has a full range of pronoun forms: "thou" as grammatical subject, "thee" as direct or indirect object, "thy" or "thine" as possessive, and its own set of verb forms as well: "thou art" or "thou hast," for instance, are the "thou" forms of "you are" and "you have" in Renaissance English. The "thou" form is used to address social inferiors, children, and intimates.

DE FLORES If you knew
How sweet it were to me to be employed
In any act of yours, you would say then
I failed and used not reverence enough
When I receive the charge on't.

BEATRICE [*aside*] This is much, methinks;
Belike his wants are greedy, and to such
Gold tastes like angels' food. [*To him*] Rise.

DE FLORES I'll have the work first.

BEATRICE [*aside*] Possible his need
Is strong upon him. [*She gives him money.*] There's to encourage thee:
As thou art forward and thy service dangerous,
Thy reward shall be precious.

DE FLORES That I have thought on.
 I have assured myself of that beforehand,
 And know it will be precious; the thought ravishes.
 BEATRICE Then take him to thy fury.
 DE FLORES I thirst for him.
 BEATRICE Alonzo de Piracquo.
 DE FLORES His end's upon him. He shall be seen no more.
 BEATRICE How lovely now dost thou appear to me!

(2.2.122–138)

When De Flores returns with Piracquo's severed finger as a token of his completion of the task, Beatrice, delighted at the disappearance of Piracquo but disgusted by the finger, tries to get rid of De Flores as quickly as she can: "Look you, sir, here's three thousand golden florins; / I have not meanly thought upon thy merit" (3.4.60–61). But the result is not what she expects:

DE FLORES What, salary? Now you move me.
 BEATRICE How, De Flores?
 ...
 DE FLORES I could ha' hired
 A journeyman in murder at this rate,
 And mine own conscience might have slept at ease,
 And have had the work brought home.

(3.4.62–71)

This is, of course, what Beatrice believes that she has done, but the work is being brought home to her in another sense. Beatrice's asides now make clear her confusion, naivety, and unwillingness to recognize the desire De Flores has been rather clear about all along:

BEATRICE [*aside*] I'm in a labyrinth.
 What will content him? I would fain be rid of him.
 [*To him*] I'll double the sum, sir.
 DE FLORES You take a course
 To double my vexation, that's the good you do.
 BEATRICE [*aside*] Bless me! I am now in worse plight than I was;
 I know not what will please him. [*To him*] For my fear's sake,
 I prithee make away with all speed possible.
 And if thou be'st so modest not to name
 The sum that will content thee, paper blushes not;
 Send thy demand in writing, it shall follow thee.
 But prithee take thy flight.

(3.4.71–80)

Along with her suggestion that De Flores is inhibited by modesty, Beatrice's "bless me!" is, in the circumstances, remarkable. In *Macbeth*, a play that, along with *Othello*, has a clear influence on *The Changeling*, "amen" sticks in Macbeth's throat when he hears Malcolm or Donalbain say

20 *Inwardness*

“God bless us” as he descends from the bedchamber carrying the bloody knives with which he murdered their father Duncan, his guest and king (2.2.30–33). Beatrice, however, has no difficulty asking for blessing in the presence of the severed finger holding the ring she first gave to her guest and fiancé Piracquo. She really believes that the deed belongs to De Flores, her “journeyman in murder,” but he soon disabuses her of the idea: “Why, are not you as guilty, in (I’m sure) / As deep as I? And we should stick together”(3.4.83–84). “Stick together” is a wonderful expression, as it encompasses the shared blood guilt in which they are “deep” and the sexual intimacy De Flores intends and the mutual dependence in evading detection that gives him his primary hold on Beatrice, all in one down-to-earth phrase. As he attempts to kiss her, she urges him to remember his place, as, if he seems overly familiar with her, it will be a suspicious sign:

BEATRICE: Take heed, De Flores, of forgetfulness
’Twill soon betray us.
DE FLORES Take you heed first.
Faith, you’re grown much forgetful; you’re to blame in’t.
BEATRICE [*aside*] He’s bold, and I am blamed for’t!
(3.4.94–97)

The asides are much briefer now, as De Flores grows more direct, and the masks that have been (barely) covering their intentions from each other are being pulled off. De Flores is still using double meanings, but even Beatrice can now only with enormous effort misunderstand them:

DE FLORES I have eased you
Of your trouble; think on’t. I’m in pain,
And must be eased of you; ’tis a charity.
Justice invites your blood to understand me.
(3.4.97–100)

The peculiar combination of moral force and transgressive sexual invitation is brought out by line 100. “Your blood” is both “your sexual being” and “the blood you are soaked in by our crime.” Beatrice has been unjust, not only to Alonzo, whom she has murdered, but also to De Flores, whom she has tried to turn into a tool for the satisfaction of her desires. It is only just, he suggests, that she use him sexually as well as criminally, given that he has desires too. Beatrice, now at last understanding, needs to feel that understanding is impossible:

DE FLORES Justice invites your blood to understand me.
BEATRICE I dare not.
DE FLORES Quickly!

BEATRICE Oh, I never shall!
Speak it yet further off, that I may lose
What has been spoken and no sound remain on't.
I would not hear so much offense again
For such another deed.

(3.4.101–105)

Now De Flores can enjoy an open presentation of his own intentions and feelings, the sort of expression that before has only occurred in asides. This is partly because Beatrice still has not understood the “justice” of his position, but it is also because she has now begun to take his feelings and intentions seriously, although she manifests this by being appalled by them.

DE FLORES Soft, lady, soft.
The last is not yet paid for. Oh, this act
Has put me into spirit! I was as greedy on't
As the parched earth for moisture when the clouds weep.
Did you not mark? I wrought myself into't,
Nay, sued and kneeled for't. Why was all that pains took?

(3.4.105–110)

Not for money, De Flores says, although he of course needs money and intends to have it, but for a sexual reward:

For I place wealth after the heels of pleasure,
And, were I not resolved in my belief
That thy virginity were perfect in thee,
I should but take my recompense with grudging,
As if I had but half my hopes I agreed for.

(3.4.115–119)

We may find De Flores' anticipation of sex with a virginal Beatrice as intensely pleasurable puzzling as a sensual calculation. But we gather that his “pleasure” here includes his mastery over someone who had assumed her own dominance over him. Moreover, in taking Beatrice's maidenhead, De Flores will be triumphing over a set of males who also have also assumed their dominance over him (notably Alsemero, and Beatrice's father Vermandero, but also perhaps the murdered Alonzo) by getting first to a place he was never supposed to get at all. Thus De Flores plans to experience a complex pleasure, partly vengeful and sadistic, but partly (insofar as he intends Beatrice to experience some sort of pleasure too, as he has repeatedly suggested earlier and will again at the end of the scene) the fulfillment of a sense of self-worth with respect to everyone else that De Flores has been manifesting in his asides throughout the play. In confirmation of this view, note the subtle shift in pronouns: for the first time in the play, De Flores here “thous” Beatrice citing his “belief / That *thy* virginity were perfect in thee” (3.4.113).

22 *Inwardness*

Beatrice, horrified, makes explicit two beliefs that have been central to her moral thinking all along: in general, her own privileged insulation from male crudity as a beautiful upper-class daughter of good family, and, in specific, the importance of her avoidance of premarital loss of virginity – a limited notion of the moral, but one that a preoccupation with female chastity perhaps still encourages in fifteen-year-old girls.

BEATRICE Why, 'tis impossible thou canst be so wicked,
Or shelter such a cunning cruelty,
To make his death the murderer of my honor!
Thy language is so bold and vicious,
I cannot see which way I can forgive it
With any modesty.

(3.4.120–125)

De Flores replies with a clear refutation of claims to honor or modesty: “Push, you forget yourself. / A woman dipped in blood, and talk of modesty?” (3.4.125–126). (“Push” is an exclamation of contemptuous dismissal, like “pish” or “pooh.”) That is, Beatrice, not De Flores, is the one who does not know her place. But Beatrice, although becoming more aware of the true moral description De Flores is forcing on her, still reels from the shock of being talked to in this way:

Oh, misery of sin! Would I had been bound
Perpetually unto my living hate
In that Piracquo than to hear these words.
Think but upon the distance that creation
Set 'twixt thy blood and mine, and keep thee there.

(3.4.127–131)

De Flores replies in the most-quoted passage in this much-quoted play:

Look but into your conscience; read me there;
'Tis a true book. You'll find me there your equal.
Push, fly not to your birth, but settle you
In what the act has made you; you're no more now.
You must forget your parentage to me.
You're the deed's creature; by that name
You lost your first condition, and I challenge you,
As peace and innocency has turned you out
And made you one with me.

(3.4.132–140)

“I challenge you” means “I claim you as my own.”

This speech is both a climax in an intense conversation and a philosophical assertion about the conditions of inwardness and self-possession. Basically,

it makes clear to Beatrice that her claims to possess her inward self rest on her avoidance of such acts as murder – as a killer, she has become “the deed’s creature.” Beatrice murdered to preserve herself from a life of “living hate” married to the wrong man; that is, she murdered to keep a kind of harmony between her inward, desiring, choosing self and her outward condition. But by breaking with the social order, she has become a possession of her partner in crime, De Flores, and her claims to be distinct from him by birth, or beauty, or decency fall away. “You’re the deed’s creature” registers a terrible loss in self-possession, and, for Beatrice, the loss is connected with the sexual demand that accompanies it. Of course, for a woman, loss of virginity is as it were the paradigm of such a life-changing “deed”; it opens interior space to another in physical terms, and in the inflexible moral terms of the time, sex without marriage turned a woman from maiden to whore in one bewildering and blood-stained minute, as sex within marriage was necessary to transform a woman from one man’s daughter to another man’s wife. The play is well aware of this both as something that is physically imminent for Beatrice as the consummating moment in the marriage she plans, and as something that is part of De Flores’s plan for her. Alonzo’s cut-off finger is a kind of symbol of it – a would-be bridegroom’s bloody member – as is De Flores’s name with its sense of deflorate. The speech is a reminder of how dependent inward stability is on circumstances that permit more or less leisured reflection. Even the stoic interiority that preserves itself amid torture and degradation depends on the sense of having done right. Beatrice has done wrong, and what should be the prop of her inward moral life, her conscience, in fact undermines it.

Of course it is not only Beatrice’s moral fall that puts her in De Flores’s grasp. He now has a strategic hold on her, and when she responds to his assertion with an instinctive counter that there is still a huge difference between them, he holds out both stick and carrot. In De Flores’s reply to her, “urge” means “provoke” or “dare.”

DE FLORES [P]eace and innocency has turned you out
And made you one with me.

BEATRICE With thee, foul villain?

DE FLORES Yes, my fair murd’ress. Do you urge me?
Though thou writ’st maid, thou whore in thy affection!
’Twas changed from thy first love, and that’s a kind
Of whoredom in thy heart; and he’s changed now,
To bring thy second on, thy Alsemero
Whom (by all sweets that ever darkness tasted),
If I enjoy thee not, thou ne’er enjoy’st.
I’ll blast the hopes and joys of marriage.
I’ll confess all; my life I rate at nothing.

(3.4.139–149)

24 *Inwardness*

Note how he now “thous” Beatrice in forcing her to acknowledge her degradation. He is demonstrating to her (as he did in giving her Alonzo’s finger) that she has already passed over the line between innocence and guilt, and is already a “whore” by any true moral reckoning. His willingness to sacrifice his life to wreck hers astonishes Beatrice, as well it might. De Flores explains that he is enduring the pangs of disprized love and might as well be dead if he cannot have her, and he overbears her attempts to make him a final offer in his eagerness to state his lover’s case, and express the plight he has been concealing from everyone:

BEATRICE De Flores!
DE FLORES I shall rest from all lovers’ plagues then.
I live in pain now; that shooting eye
Will burn my heart to cinders.
BEATRICE Oh, sir, hear me!
DE FLORES She that in life and love refuses me In death and shame my
partner she shall be.

(3.4.150–155)

Of course it is impossible, even in a boundary-breaking conversation like this one, to distinguish posturing from sincere self-expression with certainty. We could not do it with a living human being, and, of course, we cannot do it with a literary character. De Flores certainly works to dominate Beatrice, and it is vital to his intent that she believe him capable of choosing to be executed alongside her rather than allowing her to escape him. Renaissance drama has a number of male characters who kneel before women, present them with swords or daggers, and open their shirts, asking to be slain if they cannot be loved. Two notable examples are Shakespeare’s Richard III and Giovanni in John Ford’s *’Tis Pity She’s a Whore*; in Richard’s case at least we can be quite sure he has no intention of being killed. But De Flores has already taken a huge risk in murdering Alonzo to get into this situation, and he has been revealing a layer of ardent feeling and of passionate moral reflection in these speeches that is certainly a plausible exposure of interiority, even though (unlike asides or soliloquies) the speeches have a persuasive intent and thus a strategic aspect. At any rate, De Flores offers a very powerful expression of commitment in his answer to Beatrice’s last appeal:

BEATRICE Stay, hear me once for all! I make thee master
Of all the wealth I have in gold and jewels;
Let me go poor unto my bed with honor,
And I am rich in all things.
DE FLORES Let this silence thee:
The wealth of all Valencia shall not buy
My pleasure from me.
Can you weep fate from its determined purpose?
So soon may you weep me.

(3.4.156–163)

At this Beatrice gives up. Accepting that she is the deed's creature, she accepts also that De Flores is her fate. Her next speech would, in other circumstances, be an aside: it is the sort of frank self-assessment that is not usually, in this play or in other circumstances, offered to another person, because it gives that person too much power and also offers too dark a view of the other person's actions. The rhymed couplets indicate that we are reaching the end of the scene, and indeed this could be its last speech.

BEATRICE Vengeance begins;
Murder, I see, is followed by more sins.
Was my creation in the womb so curst
It must engender with a viper first?
(3.4.163–166)

But note how De Flores's response to this not-uninsulting reflection shows his self-confident mastery, now that Beatrice is yielding to him. Having been domineering, morally imperious, and threatening, he is now comforting:

Come, rise, and shroud your blushes in my bosom.
Silence is one of pleasure's best receipts.
Thy peace is wrought forever in this yielding.
'Las, how the turtle pants! Thou'lt love anon
What thou so fear'st and faint'st to venture on.
(3.4.167–171)

While we noted earlier that De Flores's "pleasure" has a sadistic aspect, here (as in a number of general comments on sex earlier in the play) he promises to please her; having forced her to accept that she is on his level, he will now endeavor to make her enjoy it.

What, then, has a close reading of this climactic scene shown about inwardness and the aside?

The most important personal conversations people have involve the clarification (or sometimes the dramatic reversal) of other's knowledge of interior mental states. Declarations of love or hatred or indifference, disclosures of hidden truths or secret histories, revelations of vulnerability or resentment or dependence, all involve the opening of barriers that block access to inwardness. Such conversations are dramatic, and of course plays are full of them. Rarely do they achieve the level of intense mutual revelation and forced transformation that this one has. Middleton and Rowley's use of the aside to establish an unusually explicit and visible gulf between outer and inner mental life is a major contributor to the power of this scene.

1.4 A Digression: The Inner Life of Modernized Texts

Part of what we want to know about the inward life of other people is how they got the way they are. Large parts of interiority are personal history – a

set of key experiences. “You can’t understand X without knowing about that father s/he had” makes sense over a wide range of values of X, both fictive and real, from X equals Hamlet to X equals Alfred, Lord Tennyson or Lord Olivier or Jane Fonda; surely you can supply many examples of your own. How do the English Renaissance plays you read get to be the way they are? Being modernized and annotated in the process of being edited is the last step in the process, and it may be helpful to move backward from the text you see to a hypothetical point or period of genesis by focusing for a bit on what editors do and what materials they work on.

We have already mentioned that many stage directions are editorial, meaning that they have been inserted into the text by editors to make things clearer for readers. Most editions have some way of indicating whether a stage direction is editorial or whether it occurs in the early printed text on which the edition is based, known as the “*copy-text*.” In the Norton *English Renaissance Drama*, for instance, editorial stage directions are in square brackets (e.g., “[*aside*]”), while stage directions included in the copy-text are simply in italics if given in full between lines or marginally in the copy-text, or are placed in parentheses (rather than square brackets) if in the middle of a line. Frequently, modern stage directions combine editorial additions with copy-text, as in this example from *The Changeling*’s madhouse subplot: “*Enter Lollio above [unseen by Isabella and Antonio]*” (3.3.177.2). (The final “2” in that citation indicates that this is the second line of stage directions following line 177 of Act 3 scene 3.)

Many a reader’s eye has doubtless glazed over in the course of the previous paragraph, brief as it is. Editors work to make life easier for readers, but for most readers details of editorial practice make life harder. Nietzsche prayed for bowels distant and regular, like millwheels in the night, and readers may have similar feelings about textual editing: a necessary but deeply unglamorous task that should go on reliably and unobtrusively. But for students who want to know a play well, understanding what editors have done to it is part of what is there to know. For general readers and theater-goers the process that lies behind the book they hold, or the script the actors memorized, is well worth knowing about.

Much of what editors do in standard twentieth or twenty-first century versions of Renaissance plays is to modernize spelling and punctuation, and to provide explanatory notes and glosses intended to make unfamiliar terms or phrases intelligible. This is not, of course, quite as innocuous an activity as it sounds. Modernization can render unfamiliar meanings of words invisible and give readers a false sense that they know exactly what a speech means, for example, De Flores’s final line in the first scene of the earliest printed edition of *The Changeling*, “Though I get nothing else, Il’e have my will” (Middleton and Rowley, 1653: B4r; we will explain “B4r” later).

This is modernized in the Norton by the simple expedient of substituting “s” for “f” and spelling “Il’e” as “I’ll” – that is, it hardly needs changing: “Though I get nothing else, I’ll have my will”(1.1.246). But by being rendered entirely familiar, and thus reducing a modern reader’s awareness of historical distance from the words involved, the line may become deceptive. A modern reader needs to know that “will” includes “sexual desire” in Renaissance English as a primary meaning, and that it would be misleading to read this as just “Though I achieve nothing else, I’ll do what I want to do (by continuing to stalk Beatrice),” when it contains a more tangible sexual intention, “Though I achieve nothing else in life, I’ll consummate my sexual desire for Beatrice.” The line thus foreshadows De Flores’s final speech, where he boasts that, although dying, he is satisfied because he has taken Beatrice’s virginity. This problem with modernization is more acute when the Renaissance word sheds part of its Renaissance meaning while being modernized. The word “travaile” in Renaissance English meant both modern “travel” and modern “travail,” that is, “woe” or “suffering.” Most editions of Shakespeare, for instance the Riverside, the Bevington *Complete Works*, the Norton, and William Carroll’s *Arden* 3, using the Folio as a copy-text, render the following line from the Folio *Two Gentlemen of Verona* “In hauing knowne no trauaile in his youth” as “In having known no travel in his youth” (1.3.16), thus eliminating a pun on the two senses of “travaile.” We should stress that this is in no sense a mistake – the context shows that “travel” is clearly the main relevant meaning of the word. But modernization makes invisible a potentially important secondary meaning. Editorial punctuation can also limit meaning for contemporary readers by solidifying a grammatical relation between clauses that is fluid in the early printed text (see Fowler, 1998: 9–10 for examples from Milton’s *Paradise Lost*). And a wrong-headed gloss can mislead readers thoroughly.

Editors do more than this, however. In verse dramas like *The Jew of Malta* or *The Changeling*, where most of the time the characters speak unrhymed iambic pentameter lines, the editor often needs to fiddle with lines that were typeset nonmetrically to make regular lines. Sometimes editors actually add or change words in obviously faulty passages, a process called “emendation.”

What are editors working with as they do this? What is the hidden background of the text you see? In the case of famous Renaissance plays, there is usually an extensive series of previous editions, all of them ultimately based on early printed texts (we have very few plays that have survived as manuscripts, that is, plays in the handwriting of authors or scribes). So a good modern editor will be looking at, or at least constantly referring back to, an early printed text or a facsimile (a photographic or digital copy) of an early printed text. He or she will also look at what previous editors have done.

Because the surviving copies of early printed play-texts adorn the shelves of book collectors or rare-book libraries, editors usually work from facsimiles – a photographic copy of the original. Two new databases, LION (Literature OnLine) and EEBO (Early English Books Online), both produced by Chadwick-Healey and subscribed to by many universities, make early texts a lot more available to beginning students than they used to be. LION provides digitized and thus searchable (although far from error-free) transcripts of early printed texts. EEBO, more relevantly in the immediate situation we are discussing, provides digitized facsimiles of books published in England between 1473 (the date of the first English press-run we have a product of) and 1700. By accessing EEBO, you can put on your screen a copy of the printed page your edition has modernized and transformed for you to read.

This gets you to what editors are working with. But is this “the original”? Obviously in some sense not. For one thing, most early modern printed plays exist in a number of copies, which tend to differ from each other slightly because, in early modern printing-houses, printers made corrections during print runs as they noticed errors. The most scholarly sorts of modern editions work with a collation – a word by word, comma by comma, comparison – of all printed texts, and judge among the small variants. Moreover, many plays exist in different printings, and sometimes these printings are in significant variance from one another. The quarto and folio versions of Shakespeare’s *King Lear* may qualify as two different plays, although it took very energetic scholarly argument to persuade most Shakespeareans that this is so; the 1604 and 1616 quartos of Marlowe’s (and unnamed collaborators’) *Doctor Faustus* certainly do.

More importantly, plays were in most cases performed well before they were printed (the exceptions are so-called closet dramas that may have been written to be read and were never performed for money, like Elizabeth Cary’s *Mariam*). Thus the printed version of a play comes well after it has reached its primary target public, which is a theater audience rather than a set of readers. In deciding what to do with an early printed version of a play, modern editors work with a set of assumptions about how plays got into print that helps them interpret puzzles in the early printed texts. These assumptions rely on several sources of information. There are records involving printing, often derived from the Stationers’ Company, a London guild that regulated printing and selling of books and other print or paper products. There are records involving censorship and court performance (related because the censor was also the Master of the Revels, charged with providing entertainment for Queen Elizabeth, King James, or King Charles). Besides, there are records involving the theater companies themselves, sometimes in law court proceedings or parish registers, sometimes in other materials like the diary of theatrical entrepreneur Philip Henslowe. Finding and interpreting

this information has been a major activity of scholars. Indeed, the field of English studies, as a standard part of university curricula and faculties, was born in large part out of the attempt to understand and edit Shakespeare and Shakespeare's contemporaries.

This effort has yielded a more or less agreed-upon idea of how Renaissance plays got into print. To state a complex and controversial issue very briefly, play-texts were written by the poet or poets ("poet," not "playwright," was the Renaissance term for a dramatic author), often on a commission from a company of players or an entrepreneur, sometimes with an agreed-on outline or plan. When the script was completed, the company or entrepreneur that bought the script seems to have, in most modern senses of the word, owned it. Companies preserved a set of playscripts for the plays they kept in repertory. These scripts were over time annotated and often much modified, serving as a company library that was also a form of intellectual capital (although here we need to be wary of transporting modern notions of intellectual property back to a time before the existence of, for instance, copyright). We used to think that the playing companies thus had a vested interest in *not* publishing play-texts to keep rival companies from performing them, and thus that play-texts got published only when (i) a "pirated" version of the text had been performed or published by another company or a rogue printer, or (ii) when the playing company was in acute financial need. Recent work, however, has suggested that the publication habits of playing companies do not fit this idea well, and that companies published plays to serve a smallish market for readers of printed plays, and not out of some imperative dictated by the large market for performed plays (see Blayney, 1997: 386). Indeed, they seem to have published texts of plays in order to whet public interest in seeing those plays in performance, as a kind of "advertising," as Peter Blayney puts it. Lukas Erne has argued that the published versions of Shakespeare's plays tended to be substantially too long for performance, so that publication marked Shakespeare's aspiration for literary notice, and possibly also for a fuller expression of his literary imagination than stage performance could provide (see Erne, 2003).

Most plays were published in small volumes – "quartos" – that cost about a shilling and could be collected cheaply by play-fanciers. A few poets had large collections of plays published together in a large-volume format, as a "folio" – that is, a book in which the printed sheet of paper was folded in 2; in a quarto it was folded in 4, in an octavo in 8, in a duodecimo in 12. When, as discussed earlier, we cited a line in *The Changeling* as "Middleton and Rowley, 1653: B4r," we were specifying a page by reference to the quarto printing system, in which a given printer's sheet of paper, full size about 18 by 14 inches, will have four pages printed on each side. Each page is about 7 by 9 inches, and one sheet makes eight pages. Each printed sheet will have a capital letter printed at the bottom of the first page on the front side

(and sometimes the same capital with a 2 after on the first page of the back side, that is, the fifth page of the eight on the sheet). These letters order the gatherings of the text, the eight-page units that get sewn together in alphabetical sequence to make the physical book. Thus “B4r” means “the recto of the fourth page in gathering B,” and “recto” means the right or front page, while “verso” means the back page. Thus we have specified the seventh page of the second gathering, or page 15 in the book. Quartos do not usually have page numbers.

Folio publication of plays was unusual. Ben Jonson published a folio of his “Works” in 1616; the famous folio edition of Shakespeare’s plays was published in 1623, 7 years after Shakespeare’s death, by members of his playing company, the King’s Men. A second folio of Shakespeare appeared in 1632, a folio of Marston in 1633, a second folio of Jonson in 1640, and a folio of Beaumont and Fletcher followed in 1647. These were expensive books to make and to buy, and they thus represented a substantial investment on the part of whoever paid to publish them. Quartos were published in small editions of under 1000 and involved a smaller outlay for both publisher and purchaser. The mechanical work was done by a printer, and the individual workman who set the type by hand into the wooden forms that made up a page was a compositor. The edition was usually commissioned by a bookseller; some printers were also booksellers. Compositors worked either directly from a manuscript or from an earlier printed text; for this reason, modern editors of works that were popular enough to be published in multiple editions usually use the earliest in a series of semi-identical editions of a printed text (designated as Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.) unless it looks as though there was some authoritative intervention to correct a printed text between editions.

Actual theatrical manuscripts from the period are rare, but at a time before typewriters, all authors wrote by hand or dictated to someone who wrote by hand. So all the plays we edit went through manuscripts. The manuscripts fall into three general categories. There are authors’ “foul papers,” that is, the manuscript the author or authors composed in their own handwriting, often with corrections, and usually with inconsistency in speech prefixes and a good deal of vagueness about entrances, exits, and who will be present in crowd scenes. There are theatre “playbooks,” which until recently tended to be called by the name nineteenth-century scholars gave them, “prompt-books,” the text held by the “book-holder” or prompter in the theater to make sure that everything went as it should. These texts have more consistent prefixes, stage directions that often anticipate stage action, and exact notations of who goes on stage when and who goes off. And there are scribal “fair copies,” sometimes of foul papers, sometimes of playbooks, commissioned either to give to someone or, more relevantly here, to make a clearer setting-text for the print shop or to avoid having to remove the playbook from the theater’s collection of texts. Theories about what has gone wrong

when an early printed text seems to have something wrong with it often refer back to the setting-text and hypothesize some problem with it: perhaps an author's cancellation mark that was missed by a scribe or by the compositors (producing repetition or something unnecessary), perhaps an author's addition between lines that was not seen.

Take a moment in the key conversation between De Flores and Beatrice in *The Changeling* that we were discussing just before this digression began. Beatrice offers De Flores a large sum of money to go away and let her get on with her life plan, and he rejects her with a show of indignation:

BEATRICE I understand thee not.
DE FLORES I could ha' hired
A journeyman in murder at this rate,
And mine own conscience might have slept at ease,
And have had the work brought home.
(3.4.68–70)

So the passage appears in almost all modern editions. It is one of De Flores's characteristically brilliant and down to earth moral remarks. But if you look at the end of the play, under "Textual Notes," or at the bottom of the page in editions like the Revels Plays that have textual notes in small print there, you will find a notation something like "*slept at ease*: not in Q, editorial addition." The editor in question is Charles Wentworth Dilke (1789–1864), who felt there was something missing in the source text, "Q," an editorial shorthand for the quarto volume published in 1653, well after both Middleton and Rowley were dead. The Q text looks like this:

BEA. I underſtand thee not.
DEF. I could ha' hir'd a journey-man in murder at this rate,
And mine own confcience might have,
And have had the work brought home.
BEA. I'me in a labyrinth;
What will content him ? I would fain be rid of him.
I'le double the fum, fir.
(Middleton and Rowley, 1653: E8r)

Apart from the substitution of the character "f" for "s" in four places, and the abbreviation of speech prefixes, this is not very difficult to read. The second line, however, is hypermetrical (too long); it goes on for 14 syllables and has seven beats. And the third line is too short, only seven or at most eight syllables – eight if "conscience" were pronounced "con-shi-entz." (An iambic pentameter line almost always has 9, 10, or 11 syllables, with five stresses falling more or less on every second syllable. Editors thus try to find ways of producing such lines when they do not appear in the copy-text, for

example, “a JOURneyMAN in MURder AT this RATE.”) To compound the problem posed by metrical irregularity, the third line does not make obvious immediate sense. With all of these issues converging on a particular passage, an editor is entitled to feel that something unusual needs to be done. The metrical issues can be reduced by some relineation. What David Bevington does in the Norton is to treat Beatrice’s previous speech, which stands alone in Q, as a half-line, and have the beginning of De Flores’s next line in Q fill it out to make a complete iambic pentameter line:

BEATRICE I understand thee not.
 DE FLORES I could ha’ hired
 A journeyman in murder at this rate.
 (3.4.69–70)

Note that Bevington modernizes the spelling of “hired” but preserves the Renaissance abbreviation “ha” (meaning “have”) because that affects how the word sounds. Nonetheless, the way Bevington renders the passage as a whole still leaves us with two hypermetrical lines at the end.

DE FLORES And have had the work brought home.
 BEATRICE I’m in a labyrinth.
 What will content him? I would fain be rid of him.
 (3.4.71–2)

Line 71 has 13 syllables and six stresses, line 72 has 12 syllables and either five or six stresses, although both lines can be helped in this regard by elision: pronouncing “And have had” as “And’ve had” and “I would” as “I’d.” Nonetheless, a metrical irregularity remains.

Dilke, emboldened doubtless by the need to adjust meter, and feeling that the problem with both sense and line-length in “And mine own conscience might have” showed that something was missing, added “slept at ease” in his version of *The Changeling* in Volume IV of his 1815 *Old English Plays* (Bawcutt, 1973: 1).

Since editors normally are not in the business of adding their own words to plays, they need a strong reason to make such an addition. Dilke’s emendation is more radical than a comparable standard example, the emendation in Shakespeare’s *Henry V*, where, in Mistress Quickly’s description of Sir John Falstaff’s death in the 1623 Folio, we have the lines: “I knewe there was but one way: for his Nose was as sharpe as a Pen, and a Table of greene fields” (Shakespeare, 1623: 429). No one could figure out what “a Table of greene fields” meant, although editors realized that it might be connected with the mysterious fact that Sir John’s “nose was as sharp as a pen,” as a “table” could mean a book to write in. The 1600 quarto of *Henry V* omits the phrase, possibly implying that the compositor could make no sense of it

(although the passage differs in other ways too, being for one thing set as verse rather than prose):

His nofe was as fharpe as a pen:
For when I faw him fumble with the fheetes,
And talk of Floures, and fmile vpō his fingers ends
I knew there was no way but one.

(Shakespeare, 1600: B4v)

Puzzling over “a Table of greene fields,” Lewis Theobald, an eighteenth-century editor, saw that “a Table” might be a compositor’s error for “a babbled,” where “a” is a contraction of “he,” and that this connects with the “talk of Floures.” This emendation, which, like Dilke’s, shows brilliant poetic sensitivity, has been accepted by virtually all subsequent editions (see McDonald, 2001: 209), although not by the new *RSC Shakespeare*. But as it substitutes words that make beautiful sense for other words that could be confused versions of the substitutes, it is substantially less bold than Dilke’s addition of three words to fill in what he saw as a blank.

The theory behind such an addition is that the compositor, or perhaps the scribe who copied the text sent to the compositor, left out a phrase, either through inattention or because the manuscript from which he was working was difficult to read. This does not seem to have happened often elsewhere in *The Changeling*, although there are other textual puzzles about it. As N. W. Bawcutt remarks in introducing the Scholar Press Facsimile of the 1653 quarto,

A feature of the quarto is that a high proportion of the verse is not set out in its correct lineation. In many cases, however, two separate half-lines or a half-line and a complete line are printed together as a single line, and it looks as although the compositor tried to save paper (or perhaps to avoid too much white space) by compressing the text on to the page.

The manuscript from which the quarto was set must have had a good and legible text, but its precise nature is not easy to determine. The quarto contains none of the features which often point to authorial foul-papers (such as inconsistent or muddled speech-prefixes) or alternatively to prompt-copy (such as anticipatory stage directions). Possibly Moseley had a fresh transcript of the play prepared before he sent it to the printer. (Bawcutt, 1973: 2).

Amidst general uncertainty about the kind of manuscript the quarto was set from, we have this local textual crux. (A “crux” is a point of difficulty; a “textual crux” is usually a particular problem that may require emendation or an elaborate explanation of why not to emend.)

Suppose we wanted to make a case against Dilke’s “slept at ease.” We would start by saying the obvious: “slept at ease” has no positive textual

authority whatsoever, originating as it does in an inspired guess. Could we construct an alternative emendation that would not insert the questionable easy-sleeping conscience, but would fix the meter? Although this has never been done, in fact we could, using the assumptions about dramatic verse and about manuscript-to-print transmission discussed earlier. One of the odd things about the lines “And mine own conscience might have, / And have had the work brought home” is the repetition of “might have / And have had.” Dilke and all who follow him assume that the printer dropped something after “might have.” But there is an alternative possibility. If “mine own conscience might have” itself was a late insertion to the manuscript by the author, it intervenes between two lines that make very good sense without any mention of conscience:

I could ha' hir'd a journey-man in murder at this rate
And have had the work brought home.

The conditional verb “could” governs both “ha' hir'd” and “have had the work brought home.” If, then, we assume that the line about “conscience” is an afterthought on the part of Middleton (the author of this scene, it is generally agreed), the part line “And mine own conscience might have,” has been put between these two lines. But if so, could it not be that the insertion was accompanied by a crossing out or bracketing for deletion of the words “And have had” in the next line – a deletion missed by the compositor? If this were the case, the author would have meant the passage to read as follows:

I could ha' hir'd a journey-man in murder at this rate,
And mine own conscience might have
Had the work brought home.

Relineated, a modern edition of the passage would read as follows:

BEATRICE I understand thee not.
DE FLORES I could ha' hired
A journeyman in murder at this rate
And mine own conscience might have had the work
Brought home.
BEATRICE [*aside*] I'm in a labyrinth. What will
Content him? I would fain be rid of him.

By doing this, we have eliminated two hypermetrical lines that remain in Bevington's edition in the Norton (and in Bawcutt's Revels editions, Richard Dutton's Oxford Standard Authors edition, Bryan Loughrey and Neil Taylor's Penguin edition, Douglas Bruster's Oxford edition, Russell Fraser and Norman Rabkin's Macmillan anthology, Arthur Kinney's

Blackwell anthology, and Simon Barker and Hilary Hinds's Routledge anthology, to cite some other readily available texts), and we have eliminated a phrase that we know to have no demonstrable textual connection to Middleton and Rowley's authorship or to early performance.

Only two recent editions do not follow Dilke, and neither does what we have proposed here. A. H. Gomme preserves the original, giving De Flores the line "And mine own conscience might have, and have had / The work brought home." Joost Daalder's *New Mermaid* has the following:

BEATRICE I understand thee not.
DE FLORES I could ha' hired
A journeyman in murder at this rate,
And mine own conscience might have [had], and have had
The work brought home.
BEATRICE [*Aside*] I'm in a labyrinth;
What will content him? I would fain be rid of him.
(3.4.67–72)

This produces a line that does not make easy sense: "And mine own conscience might have [had], and have had" – moreover, it adds a word of its own, with the footnoted justification "my additional 'had' would help both sense and metre, and could easily have been omitted in transmission by anticipation of the second 'had'" (Middleton and Rowley, 1990: 65). In our view, the theory of error proposed earlier makes more sense than Daalder's, and the result is far more readable and attractive than either Gomme's or Daalder's. In what will surely be the most widely used edition of *The Changeling*, that in the Oxford *Collected Works* of Middleton, published in early 2008, the passage reads as follows:

BEATRICE I understand thee not.
DE FLORES I could ha' hired
A journeyman in murder at this rate,
And mine own conscience might have lain at ease,
And have had the work brought home.
BEATRICE [*aside*] I'm in a labyrinth!
What will content him? I would fain be rid of him.
(3.4.70–74)

Douglas Bruster, textual editor of the play, and perhaps Gary Taylor, a General Editor of the edition, have chosen to modify Dilke's emendation by substituting "lain" for "slept," but their substitution has no more authority than his, and all the arguments for the superiority of "And mine own conscience might have had the work / Brought home" still apply.

Does that mean it should or will be adopted in future editions? By the agreed-on rules of editing, yes; the emendation makes equally good sense

of the text without doing anything but cutting two repetitive words, and it somewhat improves the meter. Our theory of what went wrong to produce the problem seems plausible.

On the other hand, the passage is less arresting without “slept at ease,” which can be understood as De Flores’s satirical version of the way Beatrice seems to think about the operations of conscience – an organ that sleeps until some immediate confrontation arouses it. He is, after all, awakening her conscience throughout the scene; given that intention on his part, Dilke’s words are wonderfully relevant. So one can understand why future editors may not leap to adopt this textual reform.

The point of this excursion is not so much to change future texts of *The Changeling* as to suggest to new readers of English Renaissance drama that textual issues are interesting and important and not particularly difficult to gain access to. We should add that neither in this instance from *The Changeling* nor in the comments on “travel/travaile” in *Two Gentlemen of Verona* earlier do we suggest that modernizing or emending editors have made mistakes. They have made choices, and the choices they have made are subject to second-guessing. An ongoing process of mutual second-guessing is what makes editing fascinating, and it is also what makes “unediting,” to borrow a term from Leah Marcus (Marcus, 1996), equally fascinating: going back to early printed texts partly in order to second-guess modernizing editors by looking for meanings their work has made it difficult to see.

“Unediting” is now possible for almost anyone with access to a networked university library. More and more libraries, including some public ones, have online access to facsimiles of the more than two hundred printed early modern plays, many of them almost entirely unread, and other early printed books. Not much work is required to become familiar with the conventions of Renaissance printing, and in future more and more students will gain that familiarity at the same time that they are studying modernized versions of standard plays and thus getting some familiarity with the literary conventions.

1.5 The Christian/Stoic Soul Under Duress: *The Duchess of Malfi*

One of the major constituents of human interiority in the Renaissance was the soul, seen as closed to other human beings but under the continual scrutiny of all-seeing God. In an era of religious wars and heresy trials, bringing forward the soul’s true nature, under duress if necessary, was both a political objective and a natural aim of drama. Moreover, the heresy trial, as Katharine Eisaman Maus explains, exposed for examination not merely the alleged heretic, threatened with burning at the stake if he or she did not

repent, but also the state religion in whose name this terrible exercise of force was undertaken. If the heretic did not repent and burned instead, the process demonstrated not only the overwhelming physical power of the state church but also the unrelenting spiritual strength of the martyr's faith: "the outcast's degradation and pain transform themselves into signs of the martyr's heavenly prestige" (Maus, 1995: 78). As an early preacher spreading the work of reformation put it in 1527 in London – after an official ban on Lutheranism, and well before Henry's break with Rome,

If I should suffer persecution for preaching of the Gospel of God, yet there is seven thousand more that shall preach...therefore, good people, good people...think not you that if these tyrants and persecutors put a man to death...that he is an heretic therefore, but rather a martyr. (Brigden, 2000: 97)

Although in no sense controversially religious – English drama was forbidden overt commentary on religious matters in any case – John Webster's *The Duchess of Malfi* follows this pattern in its vindication of the interior strength of its heroine. It is one of the great plays of the English Renaissance, and we will consider it again. Here we focus on its treatment of the ways the power of interiority manifests itself in the soul's resistance to duress.

A beautiful, noble young widow, left at her husband's death to rule over Amalfi, the Duchess comes from a family that is hugely influential in the affairs of Italy. Her brother Ferdinand is "the great Calabrian duke" (1.1.86), and her other brother is a Cardinal who has come near to becoming Pope. Her brothers are deeply, in Ferdinand's case almost crazily, committed to keeping her a widow. Late in the play, Ferdinand reveals that they have a financial stake in her widowhood, and they may also have political reasons for their attempts to prevent her from remarrying. Ferdinand also finds the idea of her remarriage, and of any sexual activity on her part, emotionally disturbing. His jealousy of his family's honor verges on sexual obsession with his sister, although Ferdinand's quasi-incestuous preoccupation with the Duchess's physical being may be, as Frank Whigham has it, a "threatened aristocrat[s]... desperate expression of the desire to evade degrading contamination by inferiors" (Whigham, 1996: 191) rather than sexual desire for her. In a process precisely designed to inflame Ferdinand's insecurities, the Duchess has fallen in love with her worthy, manly, honest, affectionate, but somewhat ineffectual steward, Antonio. A steward is an estate manager; given that the Duchess's estate is a small country, Antonio is a kind of secretary of the treasury. In a brilliant scene more relevant to intimacy than to interiority, the Duchess proposes to Antonio and marries him privately and secretly with only her maid as a witness.

Parts of this secret keep for a surprisingly long time. Ferdinand and the Cardinal have left a spy in the Duchess's household, however, the malcontent ex-convict Bosola. Nine months after the marriage, Bosola discerns that the

38 *Inwardness*

Duchess is pregnant, brings her into premature labor (perhaps inadvertently) by feeding her dung-ripened apricots that she greedily consumes (her craving itself being a clue to her pregnancy, as an overpowering desire for pickles or ice cream might be today). He reports back to his employers that the Duchess has given birth to a child, although he does not learn immediately who the father is. Ferdinand reacts hysterically to the letter bearing the news:

FERDINAND Methinks I see her laughing,
 Excellent hyena! Talk to me somewhat, quickly,
 Or my imagination will carry me
 To see her in the shameful act of sin.
 CARDINAL With whom?
 FERDINAND Happily with some strong-thighed bargeman,
 Or one o'th'woodyard, that can quoit the sledge
 Or toss the bar, or else some lovely squire
 That carries coals up to her privy lodgings.
 CARDINAL You fly beyond your reason.
 FERDINAND Go to, mistress!
 'Tis not your whore's milk that shall quench my wildfire,
 But your whore's blood.

(2.5.38–49)

Given this brotherly resolution, it is not surprising that Ferdinand does his best, working through Bosola, to destroy his sister. Moreover, it is her private life, and thus in part her interiority, that he seeks first to know and then to injure. Several strange comments of Ferdinand's make it clear that the Duchess's combination of private selfhood and connection to him is what he finds unbearable. One comes immediately after the outburst above:

CARDINAL Come, put yourself
 In tune.
 FERDINAND So. I will only study to seem
 The thing I am not. I could kill her now,
 In you, or in myself, for I do think
 It is some sin in us heaven doth revenge
 By her.

CARDINAL Are you stark mad?

(2.5.62–67)

That is, for Ferdinand the Duchess's act is partly his own and his brother's. Thus while its sexual pleasure excludes them, its moral and social taint is one they share.

The second comment, equally bizarre in the connection it proposes between the Duchess's affections and her brother's body, comes when the Duchess, mistakenly trusting Bosola after he praises Antonio, has disclosed that Antonio is her husband. The Cardinal moves swiftly to have the couple

banished from Ancona, where they sought refuge in flight from Malfi. Under threat from Ferdinand, Antonio parts from the Duchess, taking their eldest son with him and leaving her with the two younger children. Bosola immediately enters with a troop of horsemen and takes her to a prison under Ferdinand's control. There Ferdinand visits her in pitch darkness – he vowed never to see her again when he discovered she was married – and pretends to give her his hand as a token of reconciliation:

FERDINAND I come to seal my peace with you.
 Here's a hand,
Gives her a dead man's hand.
 To which you vowed much love; the ring upon't
 You gave.
 DUCHESS I affectionately kiss it.
 FERDINAND Pray do, and bury the print of it in your heart.
 I will leave this ring with you for a love token,
 And the hand, as sure as the ring; and do not doubt
 But you shall have the heart too. When you need a friend,
 Send it to him that owed it; you shall see
 Whether he can aid you.
 DUCHESS You are very cold.
 I fear you are not well after your travel. –
 Hah? Lights! Oh, horrible!
 FERDINAND Let her have lights enough.

(4.1.43–53)

The hand, as Katherine Rowe argues, is the pledge of a contractual relation, and as such hand-giving has marked all the major transactions in the play. The giving of a severed dead hand here casts doubt on the validity of all such transactions by undermining the relation between interior will and the bodily agency that performs the willed act (Rowe, 1999: 89–110). What Ferdinand means to do is in one sense clear enough. He pretends to present her with his own hand in order to get her to accept a hand that (he pretends further through the line of sadistic double meanings) is the dead hand of her husband. It is a token of revenge against Antonio that he has, in fact, not succeeded yet in taking, but whose effect on his sister he wishes to experience. But by presenting her with a dead hand as if it were his own, he is symbolizing something else that is related to his earlier outburst to his brother: that in alienating himself from his sister, he has had to mutilate himself. Bosola will himself prove to be a kind of “dead hand” for Ferdinand, used to manipulate and finally to murder the Duchess. Ferdinand then casts Bosola off as a false instrument of Ferdinand's defective will. Before that happens, Bosola reproves his employer for excessive harshness (specifically, for the provision of waxwork bodies of Antonio and her children to follow up on the hand and persuade the Duchess that her family has been killed):

BOSOLA Why do you do this?
 FERDINAND To bring her to despair.
 BOSOLA Faith, end here,
 And go no farther in your cruelty.
 Send her a penitential garment to put on
 Next to her delicate skin, and furnish her
 With beads and prayer books.
 FERDINAND Damn her! That body of hers,
 While that my blood ran pure in't, was more worth
 Than that which thou wouldst comfort, called a soul.
 (4.1.117–125)

In this third outburst, Ferdinand in effect declares that the Duchess's soul, her essential individuality before God, her most privileged interiority, is less important than her physical relation to him. This is an aristocratic assertion (although a sacrilegious one), and it supports Whigham's claim that Ferdinand is above all committed to resisting contamination.

In response to this torment, the Duchess turns to a cultivation of a privileged interiority: that of the stoic whom the tyrant cannot break, or the saint whom the oppressor cannot bring to recantation. Looking at the dead hand and, as the stage direction has it, "*the artificial figures of Antonio and his children, appearing as if they were dead*" (4.1.55.1–3), she comments, "yond's an excellent property / For a tyrant" (4.1.65–66). Specifically recalling classical Roman stoic suicide, she summons one of its female exemplars, "Portia, I'll new-kindle thy coals again, / And revive the rare and almost dead example / Of a loving wife" (4.1.72–74). After Brutus's defeat by Marc Antony and Octavian, Brutus's wife Portia killed herself by putting live coals in her mouth. Brutus killed Julius Caesar because he believed Caesar was becoming a tyrant; thus by invoking Portia while accusing Ferdinand of tyranny, the Duchess reminds Ferdinand through Bosola that tyrants do not thrive and cannot triumph over the truly resolute. But as Bosola promptly points out, stoic suicide was for ancient pagan Romans, not Renaissance Catholic Italians: "Oh, fie! Despair? Remember / You are a Christian" (4.1.74–75). Although near despair, the Duchess does not succumb to it. She says to her maid Cariola in the following scene,

I'll tell thee a miracle:
 I am not mad yet, to my cause of sorrow.
 Th'heaven o'er my head seems made of molten brass,
 The earth of flaming sulfur, yet I am not mad.
 I am acquainted with sad misery
 As the tanned galley-slave is with his oar;
 Necessity makes me suffer constantly,
 And custom makes it easy.

(4.2.23–30)

“Constantly” here means not only “all the time” but also “with constancy,” “exhibiting stoic virtue.”

The Duchess moves, then, in the direction enjoined for Christians preserving an uncompromised interiority under oppression. She accepts the madmen her brother introduces to plague her with the comment to his servant, “Let them loose when you please, / For I am chained to endure all your tyranny” (4.2.59–60). Bosola comes to her in disguise as a bellman and introduces her executioners, with a coffin and the cords that will be used to strangle her, telling her that he carries “a present from your princely brothers” (4.2.161). In her reply, the Duchess continues to speak to her brothers through their agents: “Let me see it. / I have so much obedience in my blood, / I wish it in their veins to do them good” (4.2.163–5). She is both reminding them (especially Ferdinand) that they have not done away with blood connection by torturing her, and pointing out that she has a calm virtuous interior self-possession that she wishes they could share: “Tell my brothers / That I perceive death, now I am well awake, / Best gift is they can give or I can take” (4.2.220–23). And she dies explicitly likening herself to the martyr whose knowledge of interior truth has not been shaken by power imposed on her:

EXECUTIONERS We are ready. . . .
 DUCHESS Pull, and pull strongly, for your able strength
 Must pull down heaven upon me. –
 Yet stay. Heaven gates are not so highly arched
 As princes’ palaces; they that enter there
 Must go upon their knees. [*She kneels.*] Come, violent death
 Serve for mandragora, to make me sleep! –
 Go tell my brothers, when I am laid out,
 They then may feed in quiet. *They strangle her.*

(4.2.224–234)

“Feed” in Renaissance English suggests animality, although less strongly than in Modern English (compare Hamlet’s “What is a man, / If his chief good and market of his time / Be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more” [4.4.34–6]). The Duchess’s comment may be innocuous and self-denying, demonstrating her calm, generous spirit (“when I am dead, they may once again eat their meals in peace,”); it may be insulting (“when I am dead, they may go undisturbed to the trough”); it may be shocking (“when you have prepared my body, my brothers may come feed upon it in stealthy silence”). However one receives it, it is charged with a powerful reproach.

Thus the Duchess’s death demonstrates the martyr’s and stoic’s logic by which a resolute inwardness defies and in the end demonstrates the failure of a tyrant. The Duchess herself is well aware of what she is doing. She says to Bosola of her brothers, “Let them, like tyrants, / Never be remembered but

for the ill they have done!” (4.1.105-106). Bosola, having killed Ferdinand, says as he himself dies to the mortally wounded Cardinal,

I hold my weary soul in my teeth;
'Tis ready to part from me. I do glory
That thou, which stood'st like a huge pyramid
Begun upon a large and ample base,
Shalt end in a little point, a kind of nothing.
(5.5.90–94)

And the Cardinal dies with a request to avoid the kind of memory the Duchess has willed upon him: “And now, I pray, let me / Be laid by and never thought of” (5.5.108–109). But the play makes sure that the “little point” in which the brothers end is our remembrance of their cruelty to their sister and her inward health and strength by contrast to their perversity.

1.6 How to Behave When You Have a Soul Always Already Damned: *Doctor Faustus*

We suggested at the beginning of this part that Renaissance ideas of the situation of the inward self differ in some ways from modern ones. *The Jew of Malta* creates a dangerous Jewish sensibility in violent resentment of Christian hypocrisy; *The Duchess of Malfi* demonstrates the resources of Christian consolation available to the Duchess, a strong-souled character largely immune to self-doubt. The title character of Marlowe's *Doctor Faustus* is both strong-minded and deeply self-doubting. In its presentation of his inward understanding of his spiritual situation, the play requires us to discuss in more detail aspects of Renaissance religious belief and unbelief. These are complex, because the Renaissance was a period of intense religious controversy. The Reformation – the birth of Protestant Christian churches opposing the Catholic Church of Rome, which had been the universal Christian church in Western Europe – was the chief political as well as theological influence on the sixteenth century in England. Henry VIII broke with Rome in the 1530s for dynastic reasons, when he could not get the Pope to agree to his desire for a divorce. In so doing, he established England as the first Protestant nation, although he did not substantially change doctrine aside from installing himself as Supreme Head of the English church. His son Edward VI instituted a Calvinist English church, exiling many committed Catholics and martyring some, after succeeding his father in 1547. Edward's half-sister Mary succeeded him in 1553 and restored Catholicism, burning resistant Protestants at the stake as heretics and earning the name

“Bloody Mary” as a result; Mary’s half-sister Elizabeth succeeded her in 1558 and reestablished a Church of England that attempted by deliberate procedural vagueness about such contested matters as the substance of the wafer and wine at communion service to allow ceremonial participation by as many of her subjects as possible. Although it was sacramentally elastic, however, Elizabethan official religion was theologically Calvinist in that it held strongly to the doctrine that God predestines the elect for salvation and the reprobate for damnation. Here is the first paragraph of Article 17, “Of predestination and election,” from a 1590 edition of the Thirty-Nine Articles that constituted the shared doctrines of the English church:

Predestination to life, is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the worlde were layde) hee hath constantly decreed by his counsell secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation, those whome he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore they which be indued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to Gods purpose by his spirite working in due season: they through grace obey the calling: they be justified freely: they be made formes of God by adoption: they bee made like the image of his onely begotten sonne Jesus Christ: they walke religiously in good workes, and at length by Gods mercy, they attaine to everlasting felicitie. (Church of England, 1590: B1v)

Peter White notes that in the 1580s there were complaints from English Puritans that Article 17 “maketh no mention of reprobation” (White, 1992: 96). Nonetheless, as A. G. Dickens remarks in *The English Reformation*,

article xvii cannot be glossed over by the phrase ‘moderately Calvinistic’... This is not the position of the moderate or ‘sublapsarian’ Calvinists, who at least conceded that the Fall was not predestined and that the election of the redeemed took place only thereafter. Article xvii still appears to contain the most rigorous ‘supralapsarian’ position – that the salvation of some men and (by implication) the damnation of others was from the first built into the very order of the universe. (Dickens, 1964: 251–2)

And White sums up the church position on predestination by commenting that “however reluctant contemporaries were to admit it, the existence of doctrinal Puritanism can hardly be gainsaid” (White, 1992: 97). Dickens goes on to remark that, while the phrasing of article xvii is restrained and “urbane” (in that it omits to mention explicitly the prior ordination of the damnation of the reprobate), “the purely verbal nature of this restraint is stressed rather than concealed by the fact that article 17 hastens on to rather irrelevant considerations on the subject of human despair” (Dickens, 1964: 252). These “considerations” are, as we shall see, highly relevant

to *Doctor Faustus*, however beside the theological point they may seem to Dickens:

As the godly consideration of predestination and our election in Christ, is full of sweete, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feelee in themselves the working of the spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, ... : So, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of Gods predestination, is a most dangerous downefall, whereby the devill doth thrust them either into desperation, and into rechlesnesse of most uncleane living no lesse perilous then desperation. (Church of England, 1590: B1v–B2r)

The Calvinist doctrine of the opening paragraph of article 17 (called “*double predestination*”) had harsh internal consequences for anyone who (i) accepted its truth and (ii) found him or herself to be prone to sin, recklessness, and unclean living. Moreover, a nation whose adults had been forced to change official faiths thrice in twenty years was naturally prone not only to religious schism but also to forms of doubt, and these persisted through Elizabeth’s reign.

David Riggs’s excellent biography of Marlowe focuses on the ways in which Marlowe’s upbringing and education encouraged what would in his time have been called “atheism,” although it differs in many ways from what we might mean by that term. Marlowe, a shoemaker’s son, grew up in the cathedral town of Canterbury, attended the grammar school, and went to Cambridge on a scholarship; he was thus someone who owed his rise to prominence almost entirely to his intellectual abilities, nurtured on a humanist curriculum that emphasized pagan classics alongside Reformation theology. Riggs defines sixteenth-century “atheism” as the product of Calvinist doctrine, of political instability, and of literary and dialectical education:

The Tudor programme of popular religious instruction created the agnostic reaction that it was meant to pre-empt. During the mid-1540s Sir John Cheke coined the word ‘Atheists’ to describe people who do not ‘care whether there be a god or no, or whether ... he will recompense good Men with good things, and bad men with what is evil.’ In 1549 Bishop Latimer notified the young King Edward VI ‘that there be great many in England that say there is no soul, that think it is not eternal ... that think there is neither heaven nor hell.’ ... Archbishop Cranmer drafted the first statute that distinguishes atheism from the older crime of heresy in 1553. (Riggs, 2004: 29)

These “atheists,” according to Riggs, were not in the position of modern atheists or agnostics who manage to live more or less tranquilly in a state of non-relation to religious discourse and to the idea of the divine.

Early modern unbelievers usually did not dispute the existence of God; they denied God's capacity to intervene in their lives via the Son and the Holy Ghost. ... Within the world of post-Reformation Christianity, belief in God was inextricably linked to the fear of God. A deity who could not enforce his commandments – a God without sanctions – might as well not exist. Hence, anyone who rejected the immortality of the soul, the existence of heaven and hell (especially the latter) and the operations of Providence qualified as an atheist. (Riggs, 2004: 29)

Such atheists were often the products of education in divinity, combined with the state's rapid alternation between Protestantism and Catholicism at mid-century. Riggs cites a humanist who commented that "men are nowadays glutted as it were with God's word, and therefore almost ready to vomit [it] up again," some by "turning to curious arts ... some Epicures, some Atheists" (Riggs, 2004: 30). Riggs also cites George Carleton, commenting that in 1572 "the realm is divided into three parties, the Papists, the Atheists and the Protestants" (Riggs, 2004: 30).

Moreover, the literary education sixteenth-century undergraduates received – especially their intensive study of Ovid – introduced them to a powerful counter-Christian understanding of creation: "Ovid's philosopher-hero Pythagoras ... in the last book of the *Metamorphoses* ... introduced Renaissance undergraduates to the ancient (un)belief system of Epicurus and his disciple Lucretius: hell is a fable, and belief in hell a craven superstition ... poets and rulers invented divine retribution to keep men in awe of authority" (Riggs, 2004: 88–89). Riggs sums up the presence of this material in Marlowe's work trenchantly:

Tamburlaine invokes Ovid's creation myth to justify his winner-take-all ideology, and dies alluding to epicurean teachings on death. Small wonder that Marlowe's protagonist was soon dubbed 'that atheist Tamburlaine.' The epicurean Dr Faustus asserts that 'hell's a fable' (II.i.129). The Machiavellian Prologue to Marlowe's *Jew of Malta* boasts that: "I count religion but a childish toy, / And hold there is no sin but ignorance" (14–15). Atheism as such was not the issue in Marlowe's case. Renaissance academics and statesmen inherited the Roman view that philosophers and rulers were entitled to a sphere of private unbelief. Marlowe took the further, more provocative step of circulating epicurean ideas among the general public. (Riggs, 2004: 89)

This view of Marlowe as the rash public representative of a large cohort of educated sixteenth-century skeptics allows us to reframe some basic questions raised by *Doctor Faustus*. In Marlowe's play, derived from a translation of a German account of the life of the historical Johannes Faust, a brilliant scholar is drawn to magic by the barrenness of the alternatives (philosophy, theology, and medicine). After consulting with magicians, he offers his soul

to the devil for 24 years of life and the service of a demon, Mephistopheles. The contract, signed in his blood, is ratified, and the play takes Faustus through a series of rather trivial exercises of the power Mephistopheles has given him to the profound and powerful death scene in which the devils claim him. The play was published in two versions, the so-called A-text in 1604 and the longer B-text in 1616. The A-text was entered in the Stationer's Register in 1601 – that is, the intention to print and sell it was declared by a particular member of that guild, and rights over that play were thereby asserted by that publisher. In 1602, Philip Henslowe paid Samuel Rowley and William Birde four pounds “for ther adicyones in docter fostes” (Foakes, 2002: 206). We think at that point or just before it, Henslowe sent the now-superseded Marlovian A-text (itself a collaboration between Marlowe and someone else) to be printed, and that the longer B-text is a printed version that includes Rowley and Birde's “adicyones” (Marlowe, 1993: 71). Quotations in what follows are from the A-text, now held by most to be preferable as closer to what was performed in Marlowe's lifetime.

A question often encountered in teaching *Faustus* deals with an aspect of the hero's interior mental life. It is this: if Faustus is so smart, why does he often act so stupid? This question might be asked globally of Faustus's initial act of the play: why condemn yourself to eternal torture for temporal rewards, especially when it turns out that there is nothing very substantive that you want to accomplish in this world anyhow beyond impressing people? The question can also be asked (and I think is usually first asked) about particular moments early in the play. Most of the rest of this part will deal with such local moments. Critics have developed some fairly helpful answers to the global question – basically pointing out that almost everybody who lives a secular life at least risks eternal damnation by focusing on the temporal, and that Faustus thus is a super-Everyman, doing in a more egregious and self-conscious way what everyone else does without thinking it through.

Let us then look at some particular moments where Faustus seems stupid, where, as Riggs puts it, most interpreters conclude that he is “a bookish dunce,” (Riggs, 2004: 238). Such moments might include Faustus's response to Mephistopheles's rather magnificent evocation of hell (used later in its essentials by Milton's Satan):

MEPHISTOPHELES: Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed
 In one self place, for where we are is hell,
 And where hell is must we ever be,
 And, to conclude, when all the world dissolves,
 And every creature shall be purified,
 All places shall be hell that is not heaven.

FAUSTUS: Come, I think hell's a fable.

(2.1.122–8)

Faustus's reply is not only stupid in contradicting an eyewitness report from someone who would surely deny hell's reality if he could, it is also graceless, breaking the rhythm of Marlowe's mighty line. Why does Marlowe do it? Could the metrical anomaly be there to draw our attention to something that Faustus is up to?

Similarly, in Faustus's opening soliloquy, he is notoriously partial in his quotation from a Latin Bible that, as Riggs points out, turns out to be, in fact, Marlowe's or Faustus's translation back into Latin from English:

When all is done, divinity is best.
Jerome' Bible, Faustus, view it well.
[He reads.] '*Stipendium peccati mors est*' Ha!
'*Stipendium*,' etc.
'The reward of sin is death.' That's hard.
[He reads.] '*Si pecasse negamus, fallimur,
Et nulla est in nobis veritas.*'
'If we say that we have no sin,
We deceive ourselves, and there's no truth in us.'
Why then belike we must sin,
And so consequently die.
Ay, we must die an everlasting death.
What doctrine call you this? *Che serà, serà?*
'What will be, shall be'? Divinity, adieu!

(1.1.37–50)

Note that once again Faustus's inadequate response breaks the rhythm of the line. Generations of professors have pointed out that Faustus leaves off the redemptive half of each of his scriptural verses. David Bevington's Norton introduction is representative:

Any good Christian in Marlowe's audience would presumably know, however, that Faustus is quoting selectively and unfairly, playing games with the profundities of Christian faith that concede the inevitable sinfulness of humankind only to insist that God's great mercies are open to those who truly repent. From the start, Faustus betrays himself as a fool ... (Bevington *et al.*, 2002: 246).

As Riggs points out, however, Faustus's misleading combination of half a line from Romans with half a line from the first epistle of John in fact distills the essence of Calvinist double-predestination from the point of view of a reprobate: the wages of reprobation is death; and if we deny our reprobation, there's no truth in us. Riggs comments,

The so-called 'devil's syllogism' based on Romans 6:23 and 1 John 1:8 held a special fascination for Marlowe's contemporaries because it so closely resembled the Calvinist dogma adopted in England and Württemberg. Calvin too isolates the first half of Romans 6:23 and insists that 'all sin is mortal'. Article 15 of

the Church of England ended with the first half of 1 John 1:8 followed by a full stop. The Thirty-Nine Articles that constituted the Elizabethan Church nowhere suggest that all who confess their sins will be forgiven; on the contrary, God reserves the gift of grace only for the elect, who feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ...

So, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's Predestination is a most dangerous downfall.

Critics rightly point out that Faustus is hideously mistaken about the Bible; but the Church he is rejecting has taught him to make precisely these mistakes. Marlowe, who had already been taxed with atheism, unveils in *Dr Faustus* the ecclesiastical basis of his own unbelief. (Riggs, 2004: 240)

This suggests that the errors, and perhaps the stupidities, of Doctor Faustus may be part of an ironic strategy on Marlowe's part, and Riggs's way of resolving the problem they raise is to pose Doctor Faustus's own evident fictionality as the governing irony of the play:

Marlowe... used the visual and auditory effects available in the playhouse to instill belief in hell and the devil. He used his poetic gift of irony, indirectness and erudite allusion to notify patient judges that Dr Faustus is a fictional being – a character in a book or an unwitting actor in the theatre of God's judgments. Marlowe's play appealed both to true believers and to freethinking skeptics. (Riggs, 2004: 247)

This is a very fruitful suggestion. But we offer a somewhat different account of the way the play creates a double audience for itself or a double impression in individual readers and viewers.

It is possible to see Faustus as a more intelligible intellectual, rather than entirely as a transparent metafiction. Many of his apparently stupid replies to Mephistopheles are performative speech acts sketching an atheist stance. The key to this way of looking at Faustus, in our view, is a particularly puzzling, initially ludicrous exchange between Faustus and Mephistopheles. Mephistopheles gives his greatest speech, and Faustus gives one of his most bumptious and aesthetically unappreciative replies:

MEPHISTOPHELES: Why, this is hell, nor am I out of it.
 Think'st thou that I, who saw the face of God
 And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,
 Am not tormented with ten thousand hells
 In being deprived of everlasting bliss?
 O Faustus, leave these frivolous demands,
 Which strike a terror to my fainting soul!

FAUSTUS: What, is great Mephistopheles so passionate
For being deprived of the joys of heaven?
Learn thou of Faustus manly fortitude,
And scorn those joys thou never shalt possess.
Go bear these tidings to great Lucifer:
Seeing Faustus hath incurred eternal death
By desp'rate thoughts against Jove's deity,
Say he surrenders up to him his soul ...

(1.3.78–92)

“Learn thou of Faustus manly fortitude.” What does this mean? Surely Faustus is not merely being arrogant and self-aggrandizing here. He is saying to Mephistopheles, “Stop being such a whinging devil and pay attention to how a resolute human being deals with the spiritual situation we share. Act like a Renaissance epicurean atheist (of the kind Riggs has so usefully described) and ‘scorn those joys you never shall possess.’” Why never? To offer a tendentious paraphrase in the Empsonian manner, Faustus says to Mephistopheles, “Because we exemplars of manly fortitude know, as surely as you devils do too, that we are reprobates who have ‘incurred eternal death’ by the very way we think about God. But unlike you, we find something better to do than whine about it: we construct an alternative intellectual framework in which God’s judgments do not matter.”

Given this understanding of Faustus’s attitude – an attitude Faustus here, consciously as it were, strikes at a moment where he must to some degree feel the overwhelming spiritual pathos of Mephistopheles’s grief at being deprived of the divine presence – many of Faustus’s odd remarks become understandable. Comments like “I think hell’s a fable,” spoken to a being who has just come from there, count as speech acts demonstrating the rhetorical possibility of defying God, exemplifications for Mephistopheles of “manly fortitude” vis-a-vis God and God’s system. Remember that Richard Baines and Thomas Kyd – the first in a letter denouncing Marlowe to the Privy Council, the second in testimony under torture ordered by that Council, both accuse Marlowe of leading others to atheism (see Riggs, 2004: 328). In the Faustus–Mephistopheles relation we have a weird paradigm of intimate conversation between two men, both knowing themselves at odds with God, in which the bolder of the two tries to get the other to put a brave face on his irreversible deprivation.

Blaise Pascal, writing half a century after Marlowe’s murder, famously proposed that however improbable the existence of God may be, the rewards of believing in God are so great that they justify belief in an improbability: God is a bet worth taking. This is known as “Pascal’s wager.” Faustus anticipates Pascal, but in reverse, and as Riggs has shown, he is exemplary

in this of the sixteenth-century “atheists.” Faustus, convinced that he is reprobate, undertakes a kind of inverted Pascalian wager in which he balances the hideous near-certainty of eternal torment against the difficulty of sustaining unbelief in a God-saturated world. If only he can *not* accept God’s power, he can perhaps escape damnation, or at any rate lead a decent life while he has it. Faustus certifies that he is damned “by desp’rate thoughts against Jove’s deity” (1.3.91), but as Riggs helps us see, in sixteenth-century England one could easily pass *from* the conviction that one was damned *to* thoughts against God’s deity. And Faustus appeals in a variety of ways to Mephistopheles to recognize in Faustus a superior accommodation to the exiled state: he declares to the newly summoned Mephistopheles, speaking of himself in the third person like a major league baseball player, “This word ‘damnation’ terrifies not him, / For he confounds hell in Elysium. / His ghost be with the old philosophers!” (1.3.60–63).

Moreover, Faustus’s description of himself as damned by desperate thoughts presumably applies to his internal state before he takes up magic seriously at the opening of the play. We can, in fact, see elements of partly suppressed anxiety about Faustus’s relation to God’s judgments and mercy in the apparently cavalier dismissals of nonmagical fields of study in his opening soliloquy. He dismisses medicine because it cannot “make man to live eternally” (1.1.24). He dismisses law after quoting part of a phrase in Latin, “*Exhaereditare filium non potest pater nisi* –”; this means “a father may not disinherit his son unless . . .” Obviously, if Faustus is driven by a sense of being predestined to hell by God, he does not want to hear more about how a father can disinherit his sons. So he condemns law as “servile and illiberal” (1.1.36) – that is, consigning one to slavishness, and ungenerous in its basic terms – and turns to divinity. But, as we saw earlier, as soon as he thinks about theology he decides that he is disinherited: “‘The reward of sin is death.’ That’s hard” (1.1.41). Faustus finally turns to magic as an affirmation of human mental strength, a strength that allows mental life to be a god unto itself: “his dominion that exceeds in this / Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of man. / A sound magician is a mighty god” (1.1.62–64). The opening soliloquy, then, illustrates what Maus means when she asserts that “the nature of theater in Marlowe’s plays is refracted through what I would call a ‘heretical conscience’” (Maus, 1996: 87). “Manly fortitude” of the sort Faustus claims to model for Mephistopheles consists in being a god for oneself.

So far this argument, although it differs from Riggs on what to make of Faustus’s folly, is directly derived from his views about Marlowe and atheism. But what is one to make of the play’s circumstantial refutation of the internalized and rejected Calvinism both Riggs and we see in Faustus?

The play’s basic plot is, after all, inconsistent with double predestination. If Faustus were eternally destined to be damned by a God, however inscrutable that God’s judgments, why should demonic agents strive so energetically to

seduce or daunt him? They need not pretend to be active agents of God's will while awaiting his judgment, they already have it. If Faustus was predestined to damnation since before time began, all they have to do is wait for him. If he is of the elect, nothing they can do could damn him. Obviously *they*, knowing themselves damned without reprieve, do *not* know this about Faustus. Nor do the Good Angel and the Old Man. Is it simply that Marlowe, despite his atheism, reworks a deeply Christian morality plot that originates in Catholic moral thinking, although, as David Bevington demonstrated in *From Mankind to Marlowe*, there is a long series of Protestant (and at least in intention Calvinist) moral drama between Marlowe and his Catholic precursors? Or is Marlowe actually thinking creatively within the ferment of late sixteenth-century Protestant doctrine about the issues of grace and predestination through this juxtaposition?

It is a coincidence, but we think a telling one, that in 1586, when Marlowe was coming down from Cambridge to London, Jacobus Arminius, a young Dutch theologian, returned from Geneva where he had studied with Calvin's chief disciple Theodore Beza to Leyden. In 1588, when Marlowe was, we think, beginning to write *Doctor Faustus*, Arminius undertook a defense of Calvin's doctrine of predestination against a Dutch theologian, a process that led him to his own reinterpretation of Romans, rejection of double predestination, and development of Arminian doctrines of the availability of grace even to the non-elect within a covenant involving election that became a key element in the development of Protestant doctrine. Similar views were developed independently in England in the 1580s and 1590s. Samuel Harsnett, later an archbishop himself, was censured by the Archbishop of Canterbury when he "attacked the harshness of the prevailing predestinarian doctrine in a famous sermon at Paul's Cross in 1584" (Woolrych, 2002: 36). That sermon aimed itself explicitly at the doctrine of double predestination, which Harsnett describes polemically as the belief that

God should design many thousands of souls to Hell before they were, not in eye to their faults, but to his own absolute will and power, and to get him glory in their damnation. This opinion is grown huge and monstrous... and men do shake and tremble at it; yet never a man reaches David's sling to cast it down.
(White, 1992: 99)

Harsnett ends by mapping what he sees as the quicksands of error surrounding the true path of the English church:

To conclude, let us take heed and beware, that we neither (with the Papists) rely upon our free will; nor (with the Pelagian) upon our nature: nor (with the Puritan), *Curse God and die*, laying the burden of our sins on his shoulders, and the guilt of them at the everlasting doors: but let us fall down on our faces, give God the glory, and say, Unto Thee O Lord belong mercy and forgiveness.
(White, 1992: 100, italics Harsnett's).

Marlowe doubtless knew about this sermon, given the controversy that followed it, and his Faustus exemplifies someone who is lost among these alternatives and who chooses, in effect, to make something creative and temporarily powerful out of the “curse God and die” option. Moreover, Marlowe could have heard similar argument at his university. Peter Baro and William Barrett preached and disputed against high Calvinism at Cambridge, and Baro at least did so during Marlowe’s time there, although he was not officially censured by the Archbishop until 1595; he asserts the freedom of the will and God’s interest in the contingency (as opposed to the necessity) of the sinner’s sin and the good person’s virtue in a disputation published in 1588 and delivered before Marlowe went down to London (see Baro, 1588: 515–20). These views that the Protestant way must include a less predetermined situation for sinners – views that well describe everything in *Doctor Faustus* except Doctor Faustus’s own attitudes – got their most memorable summation in English poetry in the words of Milton’s God in *Paradise Lost* (1667), describing a moral universe in which some are elect and some are not, but even those who are not should trust God to take an interest in their spiritual situation:

Some have I chosen of peculiar grace
 Elect above the rest: so is my will.
 The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warned
 Their sinful state, and to appease betimes
 Th’incensed Deity, while offered grace
 Invites, for I will clear their senses dark
 What may suffice, and soften stony hearts
 To pray, repent, and bring obedience due.
 To prayer, repentance, and obedience due
 Although but endeavored with sincere intent
 Mine ear shall not be slow, mine eye not shut.
 (Milton, 1998 3:183–192)

The spiritual power of Marlowe’s play, its exposition of a profound crisis in the inward life of Marlowe and his generation, derives from its portrayal of a Calvinist atheist attempting to be a resolute Epicurean in a world frame that is Christian but not Calvinist. The play shows the brilliant, moving, but ultimately fairly hollow attempt at epicurean fortitude and self-consolation by a man convinced that the alternative is a passive conformist acquiescence in his own predestined damnation. But it sets the character exemplifying this attempt in a richly imagined spiritual universe that rejects predestined reprobation and damnation. Faustus may be a disappointing worldling who does not do much worthwhile with his hard-earned powers. But he is also multivalent figure for those who, raised in the wrong set of beliefs, misunderstand the possibilities of the world in which they cast off those wrong beliefs

and thus lose the chance for the most meaningful kind of life. This kind of life story is not confined to those raised in Calvinist late-sixteenth-century England. People still map the developments in their inward lives according to their relations to the patterns of belief they have inherited. Many still try to get rid of aspects of inherited belief that they find stifling or unbelievable. When they attempt this, they still find that the alternatives they perceive as available are strongly conditioned by the belief systems they used to hold. For this reason, Faustus speaks profoundly for his age, and, by a set of analogies that will continue to hold as long as there are belief systems to cast off, for all time.

1.7 Obsession and Delusion: Comic Inwardness in *Every Man in His Humor*

The inwardness of tragedy is at least potentially our own; the inwardness of comedy is that of other people. Or, from another viewpoint, the interior life of the tragic hero is something we aspire to as well as fear; the interior life of the comic character is something we mock and feel superior to, even as we recognize it. The general idea that in comedy we look at people who are smaller and more limited than ourselves is as old as Aristotle's *Poetics*, but a particular connection between comedy and inwardness was established by George Chapman's highly successful new comedy of 1597, *A Humorous Day's Mirth*, and was extended in Ben Jonson's second surviving play, *Every Man in His Humor*, written and staged the following year. As the titles suggest, this was a comedy connected with the idea of the humors, the bodily fluids alleged in the ancient psychophysiology of Galen to govern each person's nature. We think of "humor" as that kind of activity that promotes laughter, and we think this largely because of the success of Renaissance comedy of humors combined with the failure and disappearance of Galenic humoral physiology. But in the Renaissance understanding of the body, a "humor" was one of four more or less fluid substances: blood, phlegm, choler or yellow bile, and melancholy or black bile. The prevailing relations among these in a particular person's body determined that person's temperament, and the temporary imbalance of one over another explained both moods and diseases (that is, both psychological and physiological states were understood in these terms). As Gail Kern Paster notes, in the English Renaissance "Every subject grew up with a common understanding of his or her body as a semipermeable, irrigated container in which humors moved sluggishly" (Paster, 1993: 8).

While we no longer believe in humoralism, and words like "black bile" and "choler" live on chiefly in footnotes in modern editions of old texts,

the theory remains embedded in lots of living words and expressions. I have already mentioned “humor” and “temperament”; as Paster points out, “in English the symptomatological effects of the humors remain like archaic sediments in the ordinary language of the body: we catch ‘cold,’ are ‘filled with’ our emotions, are ‘sanguine’ or not about the weather (the stock market, the state of Western culture), are said to be in a good or bad humor” (Paster, 1993: 6).

Thus inwardness in Renaissance comedy and tragedy is related to humoralism: the material “inwardness” of characters and persons alike was conceived in terms of these dispositionally consequential balances. An oversupply of black bile made one melancholy – disposed, we would say, to depression, but also toward literature and philosophy; a lot of blood made one sanguine – disposed toward optimism, courage, love, and a life of action rather than contemplation; phlegmatic people are cautious and slow moving and often pale and heavy; choleric people are impetuous and quick to anger.

To make the humoral correspondences yet more suggestive, complex, and untestable, astrology, the theory that the situation of the stars and planets at the moment of one’s birth had a determinative effect on one’s life, was closely linked to the humoral understanding, in that the influence of the planets and stars manifested itself as humoral temperament. A person born when Jupiter was ascendant would tend to be sanguine, for instance, whereas Mars was a choleric influence and Saturn a melancholy one. Moreover, the humors had from classical times been linked to a theory that the four basic elements of the material world are earth (cold and dry), air (hot and wet), fire (hot and dry), and water (cold and wet); these are linked respectively to the humors, the planets, and the twelve houses of the zodiac, and as such live on in the sun-sign columns of daily newspapers.

A comedy of humors, then, has a significant physiology behind it, and lurking behind that a whole cosmology. But it is of course different from a medical or psychological treatise. By highlighting the idea of “humor” in his title and text, and by stressing that his comic characters think of themselves as having and indeed being swayed by “humors,” Jonson emphasizes the way people’s outward lives are often shaped by the desire to exhibit an interesting interior life, to develop a distinctive or fashionable temperament. Jonson does not in fact often suggest that outward behavior is in any way *determined* by an inward economy of sluggish fluids. But by running together a materialistic medical theory of mood and temperament with a satirical fascination with human susceptibility to fashions and to fantasies of self-construction, he explores a fascinating area of social feedback, in which our theories about the physical determination of patterns of social behavior in turn influence that behavior. (One might compare contemporary interest in the question of whether, and if so to what degree, sexual orientation inheres in one’s genetic blueprint – or indeed, more generally,

the contemporary belief in “genetic blueprints” for various temperamental factors. It may be simply true, for instance, that male homosexuality or heterosexuality is strongly shaped by physical differences in sexual response, but belief or disbelief in this theory will obviously influence both one’s own behavior and one’s attitudes toward the behavior of others.) Moreover, in Galenic theory (unlike modern genetics), the way one behaves can change the balance of one’s humors, so the influences run both ways. That is, Galenic humoralism is thoroughly compatible with Aristotelian ideas about habituation: one can form one’s humoral balance in desirable or undesirable ways by adhering to good or bad habits of behavior. At the same time, knowing one’s own temperament will make it far easier to find the patterns of behavior that suit it. While, as Robert Watson puts it, Jonson’s play treats a man in his humor as “in a melodramatic role that aggrandizes his true nature and his true role in the world” making him “monstrous” to others (Watson, 1987: 28), the play is also suffused with the possibility of a harmonious relation between humoral balance, self-understanding, and social role. This harmony, indeed, is what the play aims to encourage in its readers or spectators, although it does this largely by the provision of negative instances. Obvious examples of the ridiculous in the play would be Stephen’s attempt to learn to be melancholy from Matthew and sanguine from Bobadill; but Wellbred and Edward’s interest in the humors of others would count in the harmonious way, as a mode of self-cultivation. They are connoisseurs of folly who take full advantage of opportunities to enrich their internal lives with the spectacle around them. Both the connection to upper-class urban fashions and the multidirectional feedback involved in Jonson’s “humor” is stressed when the educated servant Thomas Cash defines the term for the uneducated but lively minded water-carrier Cob:

COB Nay, I have my rheum, and I can be angry as well as another, sir.

CASH Thy rheum, Cob? Thy humor, thy humor! Thou mistak’st.

COB Humor? Mack, I think it be so, indeed; what is that humor? Some rare thing, I warrant.

CASH Marry, I’ll tell thee, Cob: it is a gentleman-like monster, bred, in the special gallantry of our time, by affectation; and fed by folly.

COB How? Must it be fed?

CASH Oh, aye, humor is nothing if it be not fed. Did’st thou never hear that? It’s a common phrase, ‘Feed my humor.’

(3.4.14–25)

Let us examine the plot of *Every Man in His Humor*. The play was first performed in 1598 in a version set in Florence. Jonson reset the play in contemporary London when he revised it before including it in his folio *Works* of 1616. Thus we have the play in two versions that differ somewhat in emphasis. Students usually read the English or Folio version, which

many critics prefer (Watson, 1987: 235). But commentary refers often to the 1598 version, published as a quarto in 1601, which has Italian character names that often differ from the English ones in the Folio: Lorenzo Senior in the 1601 Quarto becomes Knowell in the Folio, his son Lorenzo Jr. becomes Edward Knowell; Thorello becomes Kitley, Prospero becomes Wellbred, Bobadillo becomes Bobadill, etc. We will reproduce both names the first time we refer to a character, then use the English names; citations refer to an edition of the Folio text with its English names and London settings (Jonson 1969; for a parallel-text edition see Jonson 1971).

The plot, like that of most comedies, is in part one of generational struggle, in which the old try to shape or repress the energies of the young and in the end fail to do so, but it is also (and this is more characteristically Jonsonian) a comedy in which the wiser delight in viewing and in exacerbating the folly of the foolish. Basically, the play is structured around three interlinked actions: (i) Prospero/Wellbred and Lorenzo Jr./Edward Knowell meeting in London in pursuit of entertaining folly (and, as it turns out, a wife for Edward); (ii) Lorenzo Sr./Knowell's pursuit of his son Edward into London in order to investigate and reprove his son's frivolity, assisted and then thwarted by his servant Musco/Brainworm; and (iii) Thorello/Kitley's attempts to get help from Giuliano/Downright to purge his household of Wellbred and Wellbred's associates, and get help from his servant Piso/Thomas Cash to assuage or confirm his jealousy of his new wife, Biancha/Dame Kitley. Entertaining folly turns out to be provided by practically everyone, but the characters singled out from the start as fools are Matheo/Matthew, the plagiarizing poet, Bobadillo/Bobadill the bragging theoretical soldier (discovered by Wellborn before the play begins, and offered to Edward Knowell as a reason to come to the city center), and Stepheno/Stephen, Edward's cousin, the country gull Edward brings along to entertain Wellborn. Cob and Doctor Clement/Justice Clement, at either end of the social spectrum, serve as observers and abettors of this action: collisions between plots occur preeminently at Cob's house (where Knowell goes to catch his son whoring; Kitley goes to catch his wife cuckolding him; and Dame Kitley goes to catch her husband committing adultery) and then at Clement's (where the final judgments on all are delivered).

All of these actions are bound up with the issues about self-conscious temperament we have been discussing under the heading of humors. At the beginning, after he intercepts Wellborn's letter, Knowell deplores the son's "humor" (1.1.16) for poetry and wit, just as he disapproves (more appropriately) of his idiotic nephew Stephen's addiction to new "gentlemanly" fashions, his tendency to spend his "coin on every bauble that you fancy, / Or every foolish brain that humors you" (1.1. 65–66). Even after learning that his father has intercepted and read the letter, Edward accepts the invitation and invites Stephen to accompany him (a third fool to go with the

two Wellbred has promised), saying to himself that Stephen, who has just promised to be even “more proud, and melancholy, and gentleman-like” than he has been, “will do well for a suburb-humor; we may hap have a match with the city, and play him for forty pound” (1.3.110–115). Competition, even competition in serving up the most foolish companion, is at the heart of Jonsonian comedy.

Wellbred brings with him not only his pair of fools, Matthew and Bobadill (a part in which Charles Dickens would star in a famous nineteenth-century production of *Every Man In*), but also a second household with its own characteristic tensions, mostly between the older Kitely, a rich merchant whose humor is jealousy of his new younger wife (Wellbred’s sister), and distrust and dismay at the liveliness Wellbred’s young companions have brought to his staid household. Kitely asks his brother-in-law Downright, a choleric country squire in town for a visit, to chase away Wellbred’s friends, confiding to Downright why he fears to confront Wellbred himself. We quote at some length, because the passage illustrates Jonson’s treatment of “humor” as a concept and as a temperament, and also shows the wonderful vividness of his comic verse:

Nay, more than this, brother, if I should speak,
 He would be ready from his heat of humor
 And overflowing of the vapor in him
 To blow the ears of his familiars
 With the false breath of telling what disgraces
 And low disparagements I had put upon him.
 Whilst they, sir, to relieve him in the fable,
 Make their loose comments upon every word,
 Gesture, or look I use; mock me all over,
 From my flat cap unto my shining shoes;
 And, out of their impetuous rioting fant’sies,
 Beget some slander that shall dwell with me.
 And what would that be, think you? Marry, this.
 They would give out (because my wife is fair,
 Myself but lately married, and my sister
 Here sojourning a virgin in my house)
 That I were jealous! Nay, as sure as death,
 That they would say. And how that I had quarreled
 My brother purposely, thereby to find
 An apt pretext to banish them my house.
 (2.1.93–112)

But of course, Kitely *is* jealous, although his jealousy may be part of a set of distrustful inner tendencies signaled by his offering, then withdrawing his key from his “trusted” servant Cash (2.1.3) and by his already noted suspicions that he is or will be mocked by the young. Their mockery is attributed

to a combination of inner factors, “the heat of humor / And overflowing of the vapor in him” – hot humors worked on the brain by exuding “vapors” or “spirits” (see Paster, 1993: 73) – with external social facts like Kately’s “flat cap,” which signals his status as a non-gentleman, and his “shining shoes,” which may signal his intense desire to be unsustainably clean and respectable. Like the balcony scene in *The Jew of Malta*, Kately’s self-begotten jealousy seems to have made an impression on Jonson’s contemporary Shakespeare, who, according to the Jonson Folio, acted in the 1598 first performances of the play, probably as Lorenzo Sr. Certainly the extended aside in the following text, in which Kately lays out his jealousy of his affectionate and blameless wife and the social and personal insecurities connected with it, seems to have contributed to Shakespeare’s unpacking of the jealous interiority of Othello in 1605 or so; Othello’s name is of course a near anagram of “Thorello” (see Lever, 1971: xxiv–xxvi and McDonald, 1979: 56–7).

Bane to my fortunes! What meant I to marry?
 I, that before was ranked in such content,
 My mind at rest, too, in so soft a peace,
 Being free master of mine own free thoughts –
 And now become a slave? What? Never sigh,
 Be of good cheer, man: for thou art a cuckold –
 ’Tis done, ’tis done! Nay, when such flowing store,
 Plenty itself, falls in my wives lap,
 The *cornu-copiae* will be mine, I know.

(3.6.14–22)

“*Cornu-copiae*,” the mythical “horn of plenty,” here refers to the invisible horns said to adorn the forehead of deceived husbands, called “cuckolds” in a word that derives from the practice of the cuckoo, a bird that lays its eggs in other birds’ nests. There is a characteristically intense condensation of a variety of meanings: Kately provides plenty of money and amusement for his young wife, who will give him horns of plenty in return; Kately’s rich nest houses the interlopers Wellborn and friends who will deposit their eggs; the “flows” of social and sexual life Kately has set in motion by marrying are now overwhelming him and depriving him of the freedom and “free thoughts” he had before marriage; Kately’s social “rank” that used to bring him “such content” now becomes a source of his insecurity and torment. All of this is “humorous” partly because it is all Kately’s self-devised fiction – that is, it has no basis in Dame Kately’s behavior, and derives rather from the massive disruption of Kately’s humoral and social balance that has occurred with marriage. But it is also literary, that is, it is devised partly from Kately’s internalization of dramatic attitudes. When Justice Clement orders all the unbalanced characters to banish their dominant humors rather than

feed them, Kately renounces his jealousy (not entirely convincingly) by suggesting its point of origin:

JUSTICE CLEMENT Come, I conjure all the rest to put off all discontent. You,
Mr. Downright, your anger; you, Master Knowell, your cares; Master
Kately and his wife, their jealousy.
For I must tell you both, while that is fed,
Horns i' the mind are worse than o' the head.
KITELY Sir, thus they go from me – [*He embraces his wife*] Kiss me,
sweetheart.
See, what a drive of horns fly in the air,
Winged with my cleansèd and my credulous breath.
Watch 'em, suspicious eyes, watch where they fall.
See, see! On heads that think th'have none at all!
Oh, what a plenteous world of this will come!
When air rains horns, all may be sure of some.
I ha' learned so much verse out of a jealous man's part in a play.
(5.5.64–78)

The “heads that think th'have none at all” are those of the men in the audience, who are invited by the speech to watch one another with “suspicious eyes.” Kately “cures” himself of jealousy by in effect universalizing it. As Othello says, “‘Tis destiny unshunnable, like death” (3.3.291). Leontes, Shakespeare's jealous protagonist in *The Winter's Tale*, comments to the assembled company – again including the theatre audience –

There have been,
Or I am much deceived, cuckolds ere now;
And many a man there is, even at this present,
Now while I speak this, holds his wife by th' arm,
And little thinks she has been sluiced in 's absence
And his pond fished by his next neighbor, by
Sir Smile, his neighbor.

(1.2.190–196)

“Many thousands on's / Have the disease and feel 't not” (1.2.206–207), Leontes adds.

These are, as Kately puts it, jealous men's parts in a play, and *The Winter's Tale* at this point seeks, as *Every Man In* does, to spread the anxieties of the speaker to its audience, even though *The Winter's Tale* as a whole shows Leontes's jealousy to be perverse. Othello and Leontes echo Kately's role rather than being the roles Kately learned his attitudes and words from, however: Kately's “humor” is evidently derived from the general popularity of comic plots in which an older merchant's wife is seduced by younger gallants. These plots are particularly common (indeed almost mandatory) in

the Italian *commedia dell'arte* evoked in the original Italian setting of *Every Man In*.

Kitely's remark highlights the role of literature, read or viewed, in shaping the humors Jonson holds up for mockery. The irrepressible military boaster Bobadill has, as Jonas Barish points out, become able through "years of poring over books on the duello" to "mesmerize not only Matheo and Stephano but himself into a belief in his own valor" (Watson, 1987: 31). Although Bobadill gets beaten and shown to be a coward, he has bounced back from this by the ending, but the plagiarist Matthew has all his poems – stolen from Marlowe and Daniel and other popular poets – ceremonially burnt by Clement at the end of the play. As Anne Barton points out, in both the quarto and folio texts, "the subject of poetry remains deeply embedded, beyond the reach of revision, within the action of the play. Indeed, to a great extent, it can be seen to govern the real, as opposed to the superficial, plot of the comedy" (Barton, 1984: 54). That real plot, according to Barton, revolves around the kind of "poetry" involved in Brainworm's literary role-playing as he manipulates and exposes other characters, and the question of whether such actions reveal a worthwhile truth and thus exonerate Jonson himself from being the kind of manipulator Brainworm is. Robert Watson, reacting to some extent to Barton, emphasizes Clement's literary role-playing and his final actions, noted earlier, in liberating Kitely, Knowell, and Dame Kitely from the constricting roles they have fallen into: "the play about redeeming life from its bondage to theater and theater from its bondage to convention here weaves the two liberations into a unitary celebration" (Watson, 1987: 45). Both Barton and Watson see the play's Folio prologue as a vital clue to Jonson's intentions, and as in some ways a key to the purpose Jonson follows in much of his drama. Jonson placed *Every Man In* as the first play in the 1616 Folio, giving it the position *The Tempest* enjoys in Shakespeare's 1623 Folio, and of course his prologue stands at the opening of his play:

Though need make many poets, and some such
As art and nature have not bettered much,
Yet ours for want hath not so loved the stage
As he dare serve th'ill customs of the age
Or purchase your delight at such a rate
As, for it, he himself must justly hate.

(Prologue 1–6)

"Ours," our poet, Jonson himself, leaves open the possibility that he turns to the stage out of "need," and acknowledges moreover that many who have written for money have been among the best. (The Jonson of the 1598 production was very needy indeed – bankrupt and recently convicted of felony manslaughter in the death of Gabriel Spencer; the Jonson of the 1616 folio in which this prologue appeared was at the height of an extremely successful career as public playwright, court entertainer, and arbiter of taste, and thus

was far less needy.) But Jonson has not, he claims, been governed by his need to such an extent that he tries above all to please his audience by pandering to its weaknesses. Jonson thus proposes a fascinating relation between stage poets and their medium: one in which a responsible poet, not enslaved by his own need for money, must strive to maintain his self-respect against “th’ill customs of the age” and the tastes of the audience for shameful “delight.” Catering to the audience’s delight, however profitable it might be, would make him hate himself. Ill customs of the age may be literary, or they may be moral: for Jonson it is clear that bad literary taste is not a morally neutral phenomenon. Jonson goes on, however, to describe forms of popular drama that may involve absurdities of representation, but do not in any evident way deprave their audiences:

Or purchase your delight at such a rate
As, for it, he himself must justly hate:
To make a child, now swaddled, to proceed
Man, and then shoot up, in one beard and weed,
Past threescore years; or, with three rusty swords,
And help of some few foot-and-half-foot words,
Fight over York and Lancaster’s long jars,
And in the tiring-house bring wounds to scars.

(Prologue 5–12)

This echoes a famous complaint about the time-crunching plots of romantic dramas in Sir Philip Sidney’s “Defense of Poesy” (1595): “ordinary it is, that two young Princes fall in love, after many traverses she is got with child, delivered of a fair boy: he is lost, groweth a man, falleth in love, and is ready to get another child, and all this in two hours space.” Jonson’s comment on how “three rusty swords” reenact the Wars of the Roses also echoes Sidney’s mockery of the way history is portrayed in such plays: as Sidney puts it, “two armies fly in, represented with four swords and bucklers ...” (Jackson, 1969: 186). Again, though, we may ask, what is there about the provision of romantic drama to eager audiences that might make one hate oneself? Here is where the humoral physiology evoked in Jonson’s title and unmentioned in his Prologue comes in. Bad unrealistic drama feeds absurd humors and thus abets ill customs. A humor is, as Cash puts it, a “monster, bred ... by affectation, and fed by folly” (3.4.21–2). Good realistic drama, on the other hand, can help reattune its audiences to their actual lives:

... deeds and language such as men do use,
And persons such as Comedy would choose
When she would show an image of the times,
And sport with human follies, not with crimes –
Except we make ’em such by living still
Our popular errors, when we know they’re ill.

(Prologue 21–26)

Realistic comic drama, then, is offered as an antidote to habituation in folly, “popular errors,” a habituation that Jonson explains partly physically, partly culturally, as “humorous.” If literature is to be a moral agent, operating to alter the inward selves of his auditors and readers, their interiority needs to be, as Hamlet puts it to Gertrude, “made of penetrable stuff” (3.4.37). Humors, the prime candidates for being that “stuff,” are subject in Jonson’s comedy to a therapy that resembles modern biofeedback: they are excited and exercised in order to be rebalanced and rendered more harmonious. The therapy is administered by laughter, that complex mental–physical activity that, we can all testify, actually does seem to change our inner temper.

I mean such errors as you’ll all confess
By laughing at them – they deserve no less;
Which when you heartily do, there’s hope left, then,
You that have so graced monsters may like men.
(Prologue 27–30)

The last line seems to mean “after showing favor to the monsters of other playwrights, and perhaps to the humoral monsters of my comedy, you’ll be in a position to like me and each other” (Jackson, 1969: 38). Jonson’s prologue emphasizes that laughing “heartily” is a process of making oneself *like* – both in the sense of affection and the sense of resemblance – what is good and attractive in other human beings.

Jonson was keenly aware and in some ways an imitator of the Latin comedies of Plautus and Terence, which were in turn modeled on the Greek “new comedy” of Menander. Northrop Frye summarizes the key characteristics of “new comedy”:

New Comedy unfolds from what may be described as a comic Oedipus situation. Its main theme is the successful effort of a young man to outwit an opponent and possess the girl of his choice. The opponent is usually the father (*senex*) ... The father frequently wants the same girl, and is cheated out of her by the son ... The girl is usually a slave or courtesan, and the plot turns on a *cognitio* or discovery of birth which makes her marriageable. Thus it turns out that she is not under an insuperable taboo after all but is an accessible object of desire, so that the plot follows the regular wish-fulfillment ... New Comedy is certainly concerned with the maneuvering of a young man toward a young woman, and marriage is the tonic chord on which it ends. The normal comic resolution is the surrender of the *senex* to the hero, never the reverse (McDonald, 2004: 93)

Although Frye comments that “the conventions of New Comedy are the conventions of Jonson and Moliere,” in fact Jonson’s comedies are rarely driven by the sexual desire of the young in this clear way, and they do not often end in a marriage, although one is in the offing in *Every Man In*. Katharine

Eisaman Maus links this to Jonson's adoption of a Roman stoic attitude that sees passionate desire as something to be avoided rather than something to be fulfilled (see Maus, 1984: 80–82). This makes the sexual aspects of Jonsonian comedy peculiar among Renaissance plays, as most other Renaissance plays resemble most modern romantic fictions – novels, movies, plays, sex manuals – in regarding desire as something that ought to reach some sort of fulfillment. This also means that Jonsonian “inwardness” is liable to emphasize self-command and the imposition of self on an outer world as more significant than erotic imagination.

1.8 *Epicene*

These considerations bear strongly on Jonson's *Epicene*, old spelling *Epicæne*, also sometimes titled *The Silent Woman*, a comedy that everyone concedes is brilliant and entertaining but that few are sure how to evaluate in terms of the author's sympathies. “Inwardness” is not a word one associates easily with *Epicene*. Even the delusional and uncomfortable inner life of Kitley in *Every Man In* seems deep and cultivated by comparison with that of the characters in *Epicene*, who are conspicuously outward in their orientation, preoccupied with the performances they are giving or arranging for others. Although claims of learning are important status tokens in the play, we never see anyone reading anything, and Sir John Daw is mocked for owning books he never opens:

CLERIMONT They say he is a very good scholar.
 TRUEWIT Aye, and he says it first. A pox on him! A fellow that pretends
 only to learning, buys titles, and nothing else of books in him.
 (1.2.74–77)

Clerimont, Truewit, and Dauphine, the three male friends at the play's center, are distinguished from all others in the play by their successful mastery of leisured urban culture. Young men about town who do not have any particular profession except to be young men about town, they are the models for the rakes and beaux of Restoration Comedy and more recent urbanites such as those in Oscar Wilde's *The Importance of Being Earnest* or the members of the Drones Club in the comic novels of P.G. Wodehouse (see Barton, 1984: 120 and Maus, 2002: 776). They have both class and street smarts, and they stand out as the genuine article amid the rest of the characters who aspire to have these things but do not prove able to cope. Nonetheless, given the morally strenuous nature of Jonson's imagination, *Epicene*'s protagonists do not so much float through intrigue (with unquenchable good cheer like Wodehouse's Bertie Wooster or unflappable nonchalance like Wilde's Algernon Moncrieff), but rather scheme and struggle, dominating the fools

around them but competing with one another. Inward selfhood for them rests on a continually tested and necessarily rather fragile sense of superiority to most of the people they encounter.

There is one way, however, in which *Epicene* stands out as a study of inwardness: in its portrait of the obsessive and solitary Morose. Interiority is, after all, never more strongly and scarily manifested than in madness, where interior mental life carries people entirely out of normal conversational exchanges into a private world. Reclusive privacy and eccentricity, while distinct from madness, are like it in that they represent a high value placed on inner mental life and a resistance to conversation. Morose, the main “humor” character in *Epicene*, exemplifies this choice. The target of most of the plots in the play, Morose is a rich old man whose addiction to silence and his own company sorts oddly with his habitation in the heart of London. He is isolated from others by the strength and idiosyncrasy of his inward life. He claims to have abnormally sensitive ears, but his desire to live surrounded by mutes also derives from frank selfishness: as he comments, he only likes listening to himself – “all discourses but mine own afflict me; they seem harsh, impertinent, and irksome” (2.1.4–5). Given this, it is not surprising that he is a bachelor surrounded by deferential servants. Nonetheless, as the play begins, anger at his nephew Dauphine (who has obtained a knighthood, either by purchase or by the solicitation of noble friends, and thus gained social precedence over the uncle from whom he hopes to inherit) moves Morose to think about marriage. A complex intrigue follows, as Truewit attempts to dissuade Morose from marriage by impersonating a royal messenger and haranguing Morose brilliantly about the horrors of matrimony. This is a scene in which the one-sidedness of Morose’s dialogues with his servants (in which they respond to his monologues with signs or whispers) is completely reversed, as Truewit bears down all Morose’s objections and blows a trumpet to announce his arrival and departure. Truewit leaves behind the impression that he came at Dauphine’s request, but Dauphine, without telling Truewit (although he does include Clerimont in part of the secret), has quietly arranged for Morose’s barber Cutbeard to introduce a candidate wife to Morose: a young woman famous for silence and modesty. Morose interviews her:

Very well done, Cutbeard. Give aside now a little, and leave me to examine her condition and aptitude to my affection. (*He goes about her and views her.*) She is exceeding fair and of a special good favor, a sweet composition or harmony of limbs; her temper of beauty has the true height of my blood. The knave hath exceedingly well fitted me without; I will now try her within. –Come near, fair gentlewoman. Let not my behavior seem rude, though unto you, being rare, it may haply appear strange. (*She curtsies.*) Nay, lady, you may speak though Cutbeard and my man might not, for of all sounds, only the sweet voice of a fair lady has the just length of mine ears. (2.5.14–25)

“Just length of mine ears,” like “true height of my blood,” is a materialistic way of saying “in measurable agreement with my physical needs,” but it also unintentionally implies that Morose has long ears like an ass. Morose continues:

I beseech you say, lady, out of the first fire of meeting eyes, they say, love is stricken: do you feel any such motion suddenly shot into you from any part you see in me? Ha, lady? (*Curtsy.*) (2.5.25–28)

This wonderfully direct and yet presumptuous question – presumptuous as it describes the lover’s hope without any of the fear that would normally go with it – again receives only a sign in reply, and Morose again gives Epicene guarded encouragement to speak:

Alas, lady, these answers by silent curtsies from you are too courtless and simple. I have ever had my breeding in court, and she that shall be my wife must be accomplished with courtly and audacious ornaments. Can you speak, lady? (2.5.28–32)

We do not know whether Morose’s alleged courtliness is a pose he assumes to test whether Epicene will suddenly blossom into “audacious” loquacity, or whether it is part of his self-consequence to imagine himself in these terms (he has, after all, just been afflicted by Truewit posing as a court messenger). In any case, Epicene responds in just the way he would like, by deferring to his authority:

EPICENE (*she speaks softly*) Judge you, forsooth.
 MOROSE What say you, lady? Speak out, I beseech you.
 EPICENE Judge you, forsooth.
 MOROSE O’my judgment, a divine softness! But can you naturally, lady, as I enjoin these by doctrine and industry, refer yourself to the search of my judgment, and – not taking pleasure in your tongue, which is a woman’s chiefest pleasure – think it plausible to answer me by silent gestures so long as my speeches jump right with what you conceive?
 (*Curtsy.*) Excellent! Divine! (2.5.33–42)

Having found, he thinks, a silent woman he can live with, Morose resolves to marry her immediately, gloating at what this will mean for Dauphine. In assuming that Dauphine has acquired his knighthood specifically in order to domineer over his uncle, Morose reveals much of his own motivation for antisocial isolation:

Oh, my felicity! How I shall be revenged on mine insolent kinsman and his plots to fright me from marrying! This night I will get an heir, and thrust him out of my blood like a stranger. He would be knighted, forsooth, and thought by that

means to reign over me; his title must do it. No, kinsman, I will now make you bring me the tenth lord's and the sixteenth lady's letter, kinsman; and it shall do you no good, kinsman. Your knighthood itself shall come on its knees and it shall be rejected; it shall be sued for its fees to execution and not be redeemed; it shall cheat at the twelvepenny ordinary, it knighthood, for its diet all the term-time, and tell tales of it in the vacation to the hostess; or it knighthood shall do worse, take sanctuary in Cole Harbor and fast. (2.5.96–108)

Jonson's unromantic attitude toward sexual feeling is at its clearest here, as Morose, planning his wedding night, thinks of his procreative act as aggression toward another man: he intends to "thrust [Dauphine] out" of his inheritance. Morose is not only fantasizing about revenge in this, he is also pointing to the insecure social position of young men like Dauphine, Truewit, and Clerimont who, without occupations, wait to inherit estates that will underwrite their social positions and habits. Should something go wrong with the inheritance, they will be unsupported urbanites, subject to debt and degradation. Morose, describing the descent of "it knighthood" in sarcastic baby talk, imagines a desperate Dauphine marrying a prostitute (rather than the heiress he presumably is waiting for) so that he will not starve: "the best and last fortune to it knighthood shall be to make Doll Tearsheet or Kate Common a lady, and so it knighthood may eat" (2.5.124–126).

Morose's interiority, then, is unattractive. It is not, however, unimpressive. At the end of the play, in a moment that, as numerous critics point out, turns audience sympathies somewhat toward Morose, he reveals that his isolation is the result of his construal of a paternal admonition. Morose at this point has been beaten down: his new wife has turned out to be garrulous, bossy, and sociable; his quiet house has been invaded by a raucous wedding party led by the Collegiate Ladies bent on inducting Epicene into their society of free conversation and sexual independence, and, in desperation, Morose seeks a divorce. He addresses two characters he believes to be a canon lawyer and a parson (they are in fact the barber Cutbeard and Tom Otter, husband of one of the Collegiate Ladies, in disguise):

Be swift in affording me my peace, if so I shall hope any. I love not your disputations or your court-tumults. ... My father, in my education, was wont to advise me that I should always collect and contain my mind, not suffering it to flow loosely; that I should look to what things were necessary to the carriage of my life and what not, embracing the one and eschewing the other. In short, that I should endear myself to rest and avoid turmoil, which now is grown to be another nature to me, so that I come not to your public pleadings or your places of noise. ... You do not know in what a misery I have been exercised this day, what a torrent of evil! My very house turns round with the tumult! (5.3.43–59)

Having been a blocking figure – that is, the older male relative who seeks to prevent the young hero or heroine from realizing his desires, a standard

figure in classical New Comedy – Morose here becomes something of a locus for sympathy, although his willingness to declare himself impotent, stating publicly, to the assembled company, that he is “utterly unable in nature, by reason of frigidity, to perform the duties or any the least office of a husband” (5.4.43-44), of course opens him to ridicule – he has been forced into a course of rhetorical self-degradation that parallels the economic one he intended for Dauphine. Even after this humiliating declaration – made so that the marriage can be annulled on grounds of nonconsummation – Morose is denied his divorce, because it seems unlikely that Epicene is an intact virgin. Sir John Daw and Sir Amorous La Foole, who have already boasted untruly of having had sexual relations with her, now testify again to this effect, and Epicene manifests shame and misery. Poor Morose is at a stand when Dauphine offers to come to his rescue:

DAUPHINE I have been long your poor despised kinsman ... but now it shall appear if either I love you or your peace, and prefer them to all the world beside ... If I free you of this unhappy match absolutely and instantly after all this trouble, and almost in your despair now –

MOROSE It cannot be.

DAUPHINE Sir, that you be never troubled with a murmur of it more, what shall I hope for, or deserve of you?

[...]

MOROSE ... Make thine own conditions. My whole estate is thine. Manage it; I will become thy ward.

DAUPHINE Nay, sir, I will not be so unreasonable.

(5.4.154–171)

All Dauphine asks is a signed contract to give him, of Morose’s £1,500 a year, “five hundred during life, and assure the rest upon me after” (5.4.175–176). This done and signed, he pulls off Epicene’s wig, and reveals that Morose’s bride is a boy. He then dismisses Morose quite brutally:

Now you may go in and rest, be as private as you will, sir. I’ll not trouble you till you trouble me with your funeral, which I care not how soon it come.
[Exit Morose] (5.4.212–14)

The shock is felt by everyone else on stage as well as everyone in the audience. The Collegiate Ladies have initiated Epicene into their secrets, Sir Amorous La Foole and Sir John Daw have boasted of sexual relations with him, and Truewit and Clerimont have been parties to a plot of Dauphine’s whose most audacious feature they knew nothing of. Truewit acknowledges rather resentfully that Dauphine has triumphed: “you have lurchd your friends of the better half of the garland,” he says, parodying a line from Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus* that Jonson evidently thought ludicrous (“In the brunt of seventeen battles since / He lurchd all swords of the garland”

[2.2.100–101]). “Lurched” means “cheated” or “robbed.” But despite bowing to Dauphine in this way, Truewit also insists on using the revelation to dismiss La Foole and Daw in disgrace and dominate the stage for the final several speeches. While Morose’s humor has been exposed and ridiculed, as have La Foole’s and Daw’s and, to a lesser extent, those of the Collegiate Ladies, Truewit’s own carries on unchecked. It is a humor to dictate to others the meaning and value of their own experiences, and as such it might be thought to be close kin to Jonson’s own dominant disposition as a writer. Although in fact, as Ian Donaldson points out, an eighteenth-century commentator suggested that Jonson both played Morose in *Epicene* and that Morose’s character was “a picture . . . which he drew from himself” (Donaldson, 2011: 261), and this implausible view of the sociable Jonson persisted into the twentieth century.

Most comedies end in marriage. *Epicene* ends in an annulment that reveals that the marriage (in seventeenth-century terms) was always already invalid: there was no real woman involved. In part, this seems related to the harsh representations of the “real” women in *Epicene*: the Collegiate Ladies, who attempt to set up a leisure class pursuit of autonomous satisfaction for women to parallel that undertaken by the young men about town. The play is quite hard on them, and David Riggs speculates that the satire on both real and apparent women is Jonson’s reaction to having had to spend a lot of literary energy flattering the Queen and her ladies in his work for the court (see Riggs, 1989: 152–157). In part, however, the exposure of *Epicene* is also Jonson’s reflection on the conditions of his theater. In the adult companies, young female parts were taken by boys whose voices had not yet broken; in the children’s companies like the one for which *Epicene* was written, all the parts were taken by boys from choir schools. Such works, the product of male authors and male playing companies, will feature male–male competition and male representations of femaleness that may in reality just be maleness in disguise. Certainly Jonson’s exploration of humorous inwardness in *Epicene*, as in *Every Man In His Humor*, focuses on the inwardness of males.

1.9 *Tamburlaine the Great 1 and 2: Interior Strength, External Weakness*

Christopher Marlowe’s *Tamburlaine the Great* was a huge success when it opened in London in 1587. His first publicly performed play, it was quickly followed by a sequel by Marlowe and a string of imitations by other playwrights. From the start, the play seems aware that it offers something new. Marlowe’s prologue to 1 *Tamburlaine* stresses the play’s dramatic and stylistic originality.

From jiggling veins of rhyming mother wits,
 And such conceits as clownage keeps in pay,
 We'll lead you to the stately tent of war,
 Where you shall hear the Scythian Tamburlaine
 Threat'ning the world with high astounding terms
 And scourging kingdoms with his conquering sword.
 View but the picture in this tragic glass,
 And then applaud his fortunes as you please.

(Prologue 1–8)

Marlowe, in part, here alerts us that we are, so to speak, moving from the comedy to the action aisle (his hero was enacted by Edward Alleyn, one of the two most charismatic actors of the late-sixteenth-century stage). But Marlowe also promises a degree of seriousness and largeness in his play and an amplitude of style to match that seriousness. As auditors, we will confront a kind of truth about war and will, at the same time, be astounded by eloquence. A theater of action and rhetoric does not sound like a theater of inwardness.

Nonetheless, part of the amazing and seductive force of these plays comes from their convincing portrait of an exceptional sensibility. I said earlier that we associate inwardness with shy and contemplative people. Another way of saying this would be that inwardness generates itself around sensibilities that hesitate with respect to action; this is a common, although somewhat misleading, way of talking about Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, often seen as the greatest single step forward in the literary representation of inwardness. In *Tamburlaine*, we have the very reverse of this. Tamburlaine acts without inhibition, he never second-guesses himself, and he remakes the political and social institutions of the world in accordance with his will. As the inwardness of most people might be said to coalesce around failure or limitation, Tamburlaine's forms itself around an unbroken series of successes. Thus the play demonstrates how mistaken we are if we think of inwardness as a special property of contemplative people. Men of action have interiority too. But their inward life is in a peculiarly close relation to the outer world and tends to bear real rather than imaginary fruits. Marlowe's Tamburlaine, reproached by the dying Cosroe (whom he has just turned on and defeated in battle, after helping him take the Persian crown from his incompetent brother) explains his temperament:

The thirst of reign and sweetness of a crown,
 That caused the eldest son of heavenly Ops
 To thrust his doting father from his chair
 And place himself in the empyreal heaven,
 Moved me to manage arms against thy state.
 What better precedent than mighty Jove?

(2.7.12–17)

Tamburlaine models himself on a supreme god, Jove, whose dominance derives from a transgressive struggle, in this case against Jove's father Saturn (married to Ops). Tamburlaine from the start links power and self-achievement to both transgression and vulnerability (Jove himself can be thrust aside, as perhaps he has been for most Renaissance Europeans like Marlowe by Christ or for most late medieval Central Asians like Tamburlaine by Mohammed). But Tamburlaine has not only a history of the gods, but also a theory of human psychology, to justify his casting-off of loyalty to Cosroe:

Nature, that framed us of four elements,
 Warring within our breasts for regiment,
 Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds.
 Our souls, whose faculties can comprehend
 The wondrous architecture of the world
 And measure every wand'ring planet's course,
 Still climbing after knowledge infinite,
 And always moving as the restless spheres,
 Will us to wear ourselves and never rest
 Until we reach the ripest fruit of all:
 That perfect bliss and sole felicity,
 The sweet fruition of an earthly crown.

(2.7.18–29)

Thus the natural content of the human mind, the consequence of the humoral system with its conflicting tendencies, is an interiority of boundless aspiration and energy that models itself after the most impressive possible achievements: the self-installation of the gods. But Marlowe (following Ovid, as discussed earlier with respect to *Doctor Faustus*) stresses how the Olympian gods model transgressiveness and will to power rather than transcendence of earthly struggle. Such an inner self may be energized by the dynamic nature of physical and physiological reality, "four elements, / Warring within our breast for regiment" (that is, striving for rule within us), but it finds its full expression in dominating rather than reacting to the outer world. Moreover, the outer world in *Tamburlaine* is relatively plastic or fluid. Persia, Turkey, and Egypt are, for Marlowe's English audiences, regions at the edges of maps (and the "Scythia" where Tamburlaine begins life as a shepherd is vaguer yet). The regimes Tamburlaine takes control of are similarly fragile, although this reflects European political understanding of what would later be called "Oriental despotism" – systems in which total allegiance of subjects to rulers means that no one except the person who bears "an earthly crown" can possess him or herself fully. Thus the world

of the play is one in which there are no settled places, but rather struggling tendencies; a world dominated by upward mobility, in which fixed social structures are fragile. A play written on this principle opens up a startling set of possibilities for its audiences, possibilities underwritten by audience awareness that Marlowe's play is based on the history of a real conqueror, Timur the lame (1336–1405), who rose from Central Asian obscurity to rule a huge empire encompassing Mongolia, northern India, southern Russia, Asia Minor, and the Middle East, with Egypt and Byzantium as tributaries. Marlowe's play thus can present itself, as his prologue suggests, as a piece of sensational realism about politics, showing the influence of Machiavelli.

A Scythian shepherd by birth, Marlowe's hero has, at the beginning of *1 Tamburlaine*, become the leader of a band of thieves, sufficiently annoying to warrant the dispatch of a troop of cavalry to apprehend him. Mycetes, the king of Persia who sends General Theridamas to do this, is so weak and unsuccessful a monarch that his brother Cosroe has conspired with Persian noblemen to usurp his throne. Before Theridamas reaches Tamburlaine, Tamburlaine captures the caravan escorting Princess Zenocrate across Persia to return to her father, the sultan of Egypt. With engaging frankness, Zenocrate pleads with Tamburlaine for her release.

Ah, shepherd, pity my distressed plight,
If, as thou seem'st, thou art so mean a man,
And seek not to enrich thy followers
By lawless rapine from a silly maid.

(1.2.7–10)

Her follower Magnetes takes another tack, seeking to intimate that Tamburlaine and his followers are out of their depth. Magnetes mentions his safe passage from the Persian king: "We have His Highness' letters to command / Aid and assistance if we stand in need" (1.2.19–20). Tamburlaine's reply shows that he accepts neither Zenocrate's estimate of him, nor her estimate of herself, nor is he in the least intimidated by the names of potentates she and Magnetes have dropped.

But now you see these letters and commands
Are countermanded by a greater man,
And through my provinces you must expect
Letters of conduct from my mightiness
If you intend to keep your treasure safe.

Tamburlaine's claims of "mightiness" are part of a strategy to achieve what he asserts, and he cheerfully treats his seizure of Zenocrate and her baggage in these terms:

But since I love to live at liberty,
 As easily may you get the Sultan's crown
 As any prizes out of my precinct,
 For they are friends that help to wean my state
 Till men and kingdoms help to strengthen it,
 And must maintain my life exempt from servitude.
 But tell me, madam, is Your Grace betrothed?

(1.2.21–32)

Zenocrate rewards Tamburlaine's self-confidence with an immediate social promotion: "I am, my lord – for so you do import" (1.2.33). But Tamburlaine, although moved by her word "lord," has no interest in portraying himself as anything other than what he is.

I am a lord, for so my deeds shall prove,
 And yet a shepherd by my parentage.

(1.2.34–5)

Still, Zenocrate's regard for him and her beauty move him to a new imagination of his future and a consequent reshaping of himself:

But, lady, this fair face and heavenly hue
 Must grace his bed that conquers Asia
 And means to be a terror to the world,
 Measuring the limits of his empery
 By east and west, as Phoebus doth his course.
 Lie here, ye weeds that I disdain to wear;
[He takes off his shepherd's garments.]

This complete armor and this curtal ax
 Are adjuncts more befitting Tamburlaine.
[He puts on armor.]

And, madam, whatsoever you esteem
 Of this success and loss unvaluèd,
 Both may invest you empress of the East,
 And these, that seem but silly country swains,
 May have the leading of so great an host
 As with their weight shall make the mountains quake.
 Even as when windy exhalations,
 Fighting for passage, tilt within the earth. (1.2.36–51)

We have quoted at some length here in order to illustrate the way Tamburlaine characteristically works from inside to outside, forcing or persuading what is exterior to conform to his inner sense of self. The costume change that he performs during this speech, in which he takes off a brigand's rags and dons a lordly suit of armor that he has probably just appropriated from Zenocrate's baggage train, happens partly in response to Zenocrate's willingness to believe he is a lord.

Her belief in him and her unsullied status as a sultan's heir make her into an exceptionally important figure in both *Tamburlaine* plays. And Tamburlaine's promise to make her yet greater than she is, while conferring greatness on his followers Techelles and Usumcasane, who "seem but silly country swains" at the moment, are part of a claim that what is inside Tamburlaine is both more formidable and more promising and exciting than what is outside. Tamburlaine's success in sweeping Zenocrate off her feet not only enables his rise, in many ways Zenocrate herself seems to constitute Tamburlaine's good fortune, and Tamburlaine's decline into tyrannical eccentricity followed by illness in 2 *Tamburlaine* begins with her death, followed swiftly by his murder of their eldest son, his declaration of enmity to Mahomet, and his burning of the Koran (Engle, 1993: 201).

Stepping back from this to think about Tamburlaine's peculiar interiority, we might say that *Tamburlaine* illustrates a kind of vulnerability or interior weakness to the institutions and social patterns that bind and limit ordinary people. That is, the play shows its audience what they might do in the world, had they Tamburlaine's inner strength. Tamburlaine's unbroken string of successes, his imposition of his own will on two Persian kings, the emperor and empress of Turkey, the prince of Arabia, and the sultan of Egypt – to consider only 1 *Tamburlaine* – illustrates not just spectacular political and military success, but the fragility of human institutions.

Tamburlaine's impact on his followers includes their belief that he will enhance their lives. This is expressed fairly naively and straightforwardly by Usumcasane and Techelles when they meet Theridamas. They announce that following Tamburlaine will make them kings. Theridamas' impression that Tamburlaine's "looks do menace heaven and dare the gods" (1.2.157) shows the charismatic personal power that Tamburlaine wields as a self-confirming attribute of his being. That is, he is strong, purposeful, and successful, and his strong purposes succeed in part because other people believe this about him. Both Zenocrate and Theridamas, although at times dismayed by Tamburlaine's boldness or cruelty, find enhanced selfhood through associating with him.

Of course, Tamburlaine's opponents find destruction, not self-enhancement, in the same place. Although Marlowe does not emphasize this, it seems clear that Tamburlaine learns about the possibility of successful usurpation from Cosroe, and that he learns how to be a cruel victor from the elaborate threats he hears from the Turkish emperor Bajazeth, who promises before their battle that

By the holy Alcoran, I swear
He shall be made a chaste and lustless eunuch
And in my sarell tend my concubines,
And all his captains that thus stoutly stand
Shall draw the chariot of my emperess.

(3.3.76–80)

Prior to this, Tamburlaine has triumphed over his foes without any particular malice. But after defeating Bajazeth, he starves him in a cage, uses him as a footstool, and offers him broken meats on the point of his sword. In a famous moment in *2 Tamburlaine*, he enters in a chariot pulled by captured kings with bits in their mouths.

So Tamburlaine's cruelty, like his will to rule, is partly learned behavior. Nonetheless, neither Marlowe nor Tamburlaine emphasizes Tamburlaine's receptiveness, because awareness of his receptiveness detracts, or might detract, from the overwhelmingly masterful inner strength that all who encounter Tamburlaine find in him. The inner life of the tyrant, as W. H. Auden points out, tends to be externalized in the forced sensitivity of others to that inner life:

When he laughed, respectable senators burst with laughter,
And when he cried the little children died in the streets.
(Auden 1966 127)

We see this particular aspect of the inner life of the masterful at the death of Zenocrate in *2 Tamburlaine*, when Tamburlaine burns the town near which she died "because this place bereft me of my love" (2.4.138) (Marlowe, 1973: 174).

Tamburlaine is perplexed by only two events in the course of two plays: Zenocrate's death in *2 Tamburlaine*, as we have seen, and her plea for the lives of her countrymen at the siege of Damascus in the first play. In each case, Tamburlaine responds with violent action. Tamburlaine has a three-color rule for cities he besieges: his white tents the first day indicate that if you surrender immediately he will show mercy to everyone; red tents the second show that if you surrender with only a day's delay he will only put combatants to death; black tents the third indicate death to all when he takes the town. Damascus's stubborn governor refuses to capitulate until the black tents are put up, and all Damascenes, including the innocent virgins sent to plead Damascus's case, are put to the sword.

We noted earlier that Tamburlaine models his trajectory, and his sense of how high-pressure interiority necessitates ceaseless struggle, on Jove, seen in Ovidian terms as a god who succeeds to power by violent disloyalty to a father and maintains power by threatening his sons and brothers. The main rival gods to Jove in *1 & 2 Tamburlaine* are, however, not Neptune and Pluto, but Christ and Mahomet. Although Christians and Muslims struggle violently, neither Christianity nor Islam provides the model for unapologetic self-assertion that Marlowe's version of Greek Paganism does. They are religions of transcendence and self-abnegation, and this was we think clear to Marlowe even though in the Renaissance Islam was often seen as a warrior's faith in contrast to Christianity. One of Marlowe's enduring interests

as a dramatist, discussed indirectly earlier with respect to *The Jew of Malta* and *Doctor Faustus*, is the poor fit between human desires for dominance and the model provided by Christ, and the hypocrisy among Christians that results from it. As Una Ellis-Fermor comments, “it was the practice of Christianity he hated, not its original inspiration or the personality of its founder” (Ellis-Fermor, 1927: 143). In *1 & 2 Tamburlaine*, there is some evidence that Tamburlaine sees himself as a champion of Jove’s doctrine of ceaseless struggle, setting himself against monotheistic transcendence. In *2 Tamburlaine*, Tamburlaine reiterates, as he kills his cowardly son Calyphas in front of captured Muslim kings, that his own violent essence is modeled on Jove’s, but he also makes clear that this makes him an unreliable and dangerous follower of Jove:

Here *Jove*, receive his fainting soule againe,
 A Forme not meet to give that subject essence,
 Whose matter is the flesh of *Tamburlain*,
 Wherein an incorporeall spirit mooves,
 Made of the mould whereof thy selfe consists,
 Which makes me valiant, proud, ambitious,
 Ready to levie power against thy throne,
 That I might moove the turning Spheares of heaven,
 For earth and al this aery region
 Cannot contain the state of *Tamburlaine*. [*Stabs Calyphas*]
 (2 *Tamburlaine* 4.1.111–120)

At this point, he vows vengeance on Jove for the cowardly nature of Calyphas in the name of “*Mahomet*, thy mighty friend” (4.1.121) implying both that all these gods are happy associates and that Tamburlaine can play them off against one another. Later in the same scene, Tamburlaine tells the captured Muslims that “I am made Arch-monark of the world, / Crown’d and invested by the hand of *Jove*,” not for bounty or nobility, but to “exercise a greater name, / The Scourge of God and terror of the world” (4.1.150–154). Is Tamburlaine Jove’s scourge or Jove’s rival?

In *1 Tamburlaine*, Marlowe shows his audience the social order giving way to overwhelming strength and self-confidence in a low-born improviser. *2 Tamburlaine* continues a course of conquest that is to some degree reconquest – Bajazeth’s son Callapine escapes Tamburlaine’s control by offering his base-born jailor a kingdom, thus applying lessons learned from Tamburlaine’s seduction of Theridamas in *1 Tamburlaine*, and Tamburlaine reconquers the alliance of monarchs that attempts to reestablish the Turkish Empire. This part of the second play seems rather repetitive, although it demonstrates that one who has established himself by conquest must, as Andrew Marvell puts it, “still keep [his] sword erect” (see Engle, 1993: 205–7) against legitimists – those who defend an old, established social

order against insurgents. But the second play also has a philosophical dimension. In it, Tamburlaine moves on from mere human opponents to take aim at the roots of human self-limitation: time, mortality, and belief in the supremacy of gods who transcend human limits.

Some of his attempts to defeat time are quite normal, although he goes about them in typically radical fashion. Tamburlaine is preoccupied in the second play with passing on his own characteristics to his sons – he worries, for instance, that they physically resemble Zenocrate rather than him, and she reassures him that they have his nature: “My gracious lord, they have their mothers looks, / But when they list, their conquering fathers hart”(1.3.35–36). After Zenocrate’s death, to exemplify battle strength for them, he wounds himself, something that no enemy has ever managed to do, and his two younger sons offer to follow him. Tamburlaine, interestingly, invites his sons to explore the gash he has given himself: “Come boyes and with your fingers search my wound, / And in my blood wash all your hands at once, / While I sit smiling to behold the sight”(3.2.126–128). There may be an echo here of John 20:27, where the risen Jesus invites doubting Thomas (in the words of the Geneva Bible, current in Marlowe’s lifetime) “Put thy finger here, and see mine hands, & put forth thine hand, and put it into my side, and be not faithlesse, but faithfull.” His long speech of military instruction to his sons just before this has included instruction in how to “dryfoot martch through lakes and pooles, / Deep rivers, havens, creekes, and litle seas,” which again reminds one of Jesus’s walking on the waters to the disciples, Peter’s several steps on the surface of the water followed by his collapse through it, and Jesus’s reminder that faith is needed to be his disciple at Matthew 14:25–31. Tamburlaine ends his discussion of how to “make a Fortress in the raging waves” with the comment that “when this is done, then are ye souldiers, / And worthy sonnes of *Tamburlain* the great”(3.2.88–92). Unfortunately Calyphas, the eldest, does not prove worthy. He dislikes the idea of learning war because “we may be slaine or wounded ere we learn”(3.2.94), he does not volunteer to have his arm sliced open after his father has wounded himself, commenting, “Me thinks tis a pitiful sight”(3.2.130), and he will not enter the battle against Callapine’s alliance, refusing his younger brothers’ exhortations on the rational grounds that “my father needs not me, / Nor you in faith”(4.1.15–16) and that if he enters the fray, “I might have harme, which all the good I have / Join’d with my fathers crowne would never cure”(4.1.57–58). After the battle, in which his other sons distinguish themselves, Tamburlaine kills Calyphas in front of the defeated Turks, ignoring appeals for clemency from his other sons and from his generals Theridamas, Techelles, and Usumcasane. As noted earlier, Tamburlaine presents his act as a challenge to the god he serves: “here *Jove*, receive that fainting soule againe, / A Forme not meet to give that subject essence, / Whose matter is the flesh of *Tamburlain*”(4.1.111–113).

The philosophical language of interiority here – Calyphas’s soul is the principle of organization, the “form,” for the physical matter that he derives from his bodily father – mixes with a rather breathtaking reversal of the metaphysics normal at executions, in which the temporal sovereign judges and condemns the body but leaves the judgment of the soul to God (consider the traditional conclusion to a death sentence: “and may God have mercy on your soul”). Karen Cunningham remarks that Marlowe “expose[s] the fraud at the core of public punishments” and “understood the unsettling duplicity of the drama of death” (Cunningham, 1990: 156). Here Tamburlaine, refusing the implicit alliance between judge and God that public trials and executions usually assert, says that he himself judges the soul unworthy, and returns it as defective to the God who provided it. You have, Tamburlaine, in effect, says to Jove, in this case failed to supply a spiritual essence worthy of what the best of us need and exemplify. As Cunningham suggests, Marlowe demonstrates here that our ideas of a god who judges and punishes may derive from the practices of human power rather than the other way around. Tamburlaine makes this visible with his usual effrontery. But the moment is also one in which we recognize that Tamburlaine has crossed another boundary. His care for his sons’ education as conquerors is Tamburlaine’s acknowledgment of his own mortality. He is preparing to pass on his empire, and he seeks to pass it on to sons who are similar to him in martial prowess, although by his existence, nature, and achievements Tamburlaine guarantees that they will not make themselves or be able to take personal credit for their greatness in the way he has (unless they were to rise up against him and overthrow him, which would be the truest form of succession but one he shows no signs of encouraging). Thus he begins their training while Zenocrate lives, and then weeds out the weak son when she has died. (Weak children are in danger when their mother dies; there is a famous example of this in *The Godfather II*.) In injuring his own body and killing part of his family, Tamburlaine breaks the charmed circle that enclosed him and his in *1 Tamburlaine*.

He has also repudiated Jove in the process, rather than simply challenging him. Neither alien human opponents nor pagan gods sufficiently challenge or define him. In *1 Tamburlaine*, Marlowe sets his transgressive hero in loose alliance with the pagan gods in a vaguely Ovidian challenge to Christianity (“A god is not so glorious as a king,” Theridamas remarks at *1 Tamburlaine* 2.5.57); in *2 Tamburlaine* his hero challenges all gods much more directly, as though his entire career has been an attempt to prove that they are either human constructs (and thus fictive) or weak by comparison to human greatness. If human greatness manifests itself by refusing inherited limitations and breaking received boundaries, the repudiation of the gods is one of the highest manifestations of inner strength. Tamburlaine dies in this enterprise. But as he dies, he offers his sons his own spirit in a parody

of the Christian Eucharist that Anthony Dawson calls “a daring move that seems both reverent and blasphemous” (Dawson and Yachnin, 2001: 12). Tamburlaine’s son comments that Tamburlaine’s soul has become part of his sons’ bodies (what he calls, as Dawson points out, their “subjects” [Dawson and Yachnin, 2001: 11]). Tamburlaine replies with a reflection on how his own interior life has proven too great for even his own mighty and imposing body, and must live on, Christ-like, through participation in the bodies of others:

But sons, this subject, not of force enough
To hold the fiery spirit it contains,
Must part, imparting his impressions
By equal portions into both your breasts;
My flesh divided in your precious shapes
Shall still retain my spirit, though I die,
And live in all your seeds immortally.
(II.5.3.164–74, in Marlowe 1997b)

Thus Tamburlaine passes on his powerful interior life to others.

1.10 Disguise and Honor in *The Malcontent*

When Tamburlaine changes his appearance, it is in order to become more fully himself. This is in accord with a hidden moral principle of theater: that by taking on roles we can take steps toward self-realization that we have trouble making as ourselves. But we can also take on roles or disguises in order to deceive others, and this process taps into another kind of basic theatrical energy: the delight audiences take in watching characters make basic identity mistakes and the moral delight they take in watching would-be deceivers deceived. This theatrical process depends on a least common denominator of human inwardness, the fact that other people can conceal their intentions from one another.

John Marston’s *The Malcontent*, written originally (like Jonson’s *Epicene*) for the Children of the Queen’s Revels, a boy company, was published in an augmented version that had been performed by Shakespeare’s adult company, the King’s Men, in 1604. The augmentations were partly by Marston himself and partly by John Webster. In a section on inwardness, what *The Malcontent* most tellingly contributes is a strong presentation of moral disguise, in which an ultimately well-intentioned deceiver is able to express fully both his disgust at and his desire for vengeance on a morally defective society that has mistreated him. The play’s title figure, the malcontent Malevole (a name that means “ill will” or “an ill-wisher,” similar to that of Malvolio,

the anti-festive steward in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*), disguises himself as a cynical critic of court life. The Genoese court he criticizes and inhabits is that from which, as the upright Duke Altofronto, he was banished in a recent usurpation by Duke Pietro, himself about to be usurped by his wife's Machiavellian lover Mendoza. We do not know terribly much about what Altofronto was like before being banished, but the moral tone of his faithful follower, Celso, is very high, and that of his wife Maria is lofty to the point of stiltedness. Held prisoner by the usurper Mendoza, who seeks to marry her in order to legitimize his usurpation, Maria responds to Mendoza's proposal (conveyed by Malevole, whom she like everyone else cannot recognize):

MARIA O my dear'st Altofront, where'er thou breathe,
Let my soul sink into the shades beneath
Before I stain thine honor. This thou hast,
And, long as I can die, I will live chaste.

MALEVOLE 'Gainst him that can enforce, how vain is strife!

MARIA She that can be enforced has ne'er a knife.
She that through force her limbs with lust enrolls
Wants Cleopatra's asps and Portia's coals.
God amend you.

(5.3.24–32)

One can, in our view, safely conclude that not only is Altofronto's noble identity concealed by Malevole's shabby exterior, but also his habitually high-minded moral style is hidden by Malevole's aggressive cynicism. We get a sample of this in the speech Altofronto/Malevole gives to Celso describing his own banishment, a speech that both describes Altofronto as above Machiavellian manipulation and also suggests that Machiavellian prudence and deceptiveness may be necessary for effective rule:

Behold forever-banished Altofront,
This Genoa's last year's duke. O truly noble!
I wanted those old instruments of state,
Dissemblance and suspect. I could not time it, Celso;
My throne stood like a point in midst of a circle,
To all of equal nearness, bore with none;
Reigned all alike, so slept in fearless virtue,
Suspectless, too suspectless; till the crowd
(Still lickerous of untried novelties),
Impatient with severer government,
Made strong with Florence, banished Altofront.

(1.4.7–17)

Malevole, then, both disguises himself as a railing malcontent and expresses a new identity as a reformed idealist who is no longer "too

suspectless,” that is, excessively unsuspicious, but in fact suspects everyone of base motives and is usually right. Inwardness in this play bears the imprint of recent personal history, and *The Malcontent* bears this out by being that rarity: a revenge drama in which no one actually gets killed, but the erring realize their bad ways and request forgiveness.

1.11 Conclusion: A Drama of Interiority?

Our discussion of techniques and issues of interiority in the plays treated in this bears witness to a well-known but easily forgotten paradox about the very idea of inwardness. Interiority only forms itself or matters because of invitations and constraints from what is outside the self. Thus any attempt to define or map interiority turns into a history of what is external but close or significant to the self. Inner resources develop, as for the Duchess of Malfi, when external supports and loved ones are removed. Sardonic consciousness emerges, as for Malevole, when an accustomed social role is stolen. The inner self bursts out in angry or lustful asides in constant counterpoint to the pressure of propriety for De Flores and Beatrice in *The Changeling*; on a larger scale, the interiority Barabas or Tamburlaine emerges in denial of external attempts to define, or limit, or proscribe desire. Jonson’s characters preserve interiority in part out of a sense of superiority to their interlocutors, but their interior life is frequently expressed in discussion or appreciation of humoral theories that Jonson clearly knows to be at least as discursive as they are scientific; the other main zone of interiority in Jonsonian comedy is the arena of secretive plotting, concealed from those outside but directed at defeating or surpassing them. When Morose’s feelings about Dauphine burst out in an extended fantasy about Dauphine’s future disinherited poverty, the fantasy appears to be actuated by resentment of Dauphine’s rank, although Morose’s interiority also has a poignant relation to his own upbringing.

One can see from this summary why the form of interiority exhibited by Shakespeare’s Prince Hamlet – to choose the most spectacular as well as the best-known example of Shakespearean inwardness – derives from the techniques and patterns of interior exploration made available by early modern drama but also does something quite special with them. Hamlet’s inwardness emerges in soliloquies and asides, it derives in part from a collision between skeptical philosophy and Christian moral psychology; it is troubled by the struggle for sexual realism and self-acceptance that is exemplified attractively by the Duchess of Malfi and negatively by De Flores. But Hamlet has that within him that he himself cannot entirely understand, even though he is enormously articulate and insightful about how people’s minds work and

Conclusion: A Drama of Interiority? 81

how the social order constrains them. One of the great pleasures of reading Shakespeare's contemporaries is finding them handling themes or patterns that we think Shakespearean, but handling them differently and with different forms of success. In the next part, we will discuss their representation and contextualization of friendship and love.

