

Part I

The Afterlife of Globalization

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a. Nothing Can Save Us

Nothing can save us. Not the schemes of government planning committees. Not the triumphant spread of liberal democracy to the four corners of the world. Neither sudden scientific breakthroughs, nor technological marvels. Neither quick fixes, nor golden bullets. Not the Right turning to the left, the Left turning right, or everyone coming to their senses and occupying an agreed-upon center. Neither vigilantes, nor vanguards. Not the nation. Not NGOs. Not common sense. Not capitalism. Not the future. And certainly not a smart, articulate, young politician able to fuel the hopes of realists and idealists alike.

If nothing can save us, why even wake up in the morning?

To understand that nothing can save us is far from throwing up our hands and closing up shop. Rather, it's the first step in grasping the real limits of where we are and what is required to overcome these limits. At present, we continue to act within these limits, accepting them as the way things are and the way they have to be. We cede to governments the rationale and logics by which our societies are planned and organized. For all manner of impending crises – the end of fossil fuel,

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the proliferation of disease, the rise in the earth's temperature – we await the abstract entity called “science” (or the market, or God, or compassion) to save us in the nick of time. We imagine politics as an arena in which a happy (however tortured and difficult to get to) middle ground is reached through intelligent debate among competing parties – or at least, enough of a common position that it manages to allow things to limp along for another day. Even if we still meekly cast ballots, democracy has become associated with the bizarre practice of voting for politicians of different parties with the exact same worldview. We prefer to catch our thieves red-handed, content with discovering the pleasures of exceptions rather than having to confront the hard facts of the rule, so that we can continue to invest in the market and believe in the sanctity of our social systems. We imagine that our families and economies break down not because of how they are structured, but because of covetous, greedy, or weak-willed individuals who cause them to go awry. We continue to mime incredulity and shock in the face of crises and scandals, however much such events are dialectically integrated into how things work.

All of these boundary markers, these limits, are at the very heart of our social imaginings – especially when they function unconsciously. But they are at the center of the political in a direct way, too. For all of the celebration of a new global order, we continually fall back on the nation – that old standby of a political form we once thought we had (or were on the verge of having) successfully outgrown, and yet which remains the awkward jigsaw puzzle of geopolitical space in which most of us are content to live. We know that the nation is a fiction that arbitrarily matches space and belonging. And yet, the nation still structures everything – from our most intimate desires to the armies that defend it. Even the most hopeful dreams of a post-national world – whether we imagine it taking the form of rooted locals or as rootless cosmopolitans – are refracted through the lens of the nation. Globalization was supposed to mark the withering away of the nation; instead, in the twenty-first century we witness nations asserting their identities and fighting over the last scraps of the earth's resources. The struggle to address the problem of climate change – a global problem if there ever was one – has been repeatedly sandbagged by national

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interests that were supposed to have been transcended. In what was imagined to be the post-national era, the nation is stronger than ever.

What is true of the nation is doubly true of capitalism. Capitalism is now everywhere, which seems to confirm not only its permanence and effectiveness, but also its legitimacy. Without any competing system against which to now measure it, capitalism is no longer up for debate. This doesn't mean that everyone is satisfied with it, or that we can't analyze its problems and failures, but that its reality as a system has disappeared into the background of everyday life. Problems that one might expect would shake its veneer of permanence merely confirm its necessity and power as a social and political (not just economic) system. *As such, capitalism itself now constitutes a very real limit to thought.* When economic crisis produces unemployment, for instance, the longing is no longer for some new system. Rather, the hope is for capitalism to once again start operating "properly" so that everyone can get back to work – that is, get back to what we have come to take as normal life. Perhaps uniquely, capitalism's greatest quality is that it is a system that allows everything except the rigorous consideration of its own logic. It has become impossible to think beyond, even though we know there was a time before capitalism and that there almost certainly will be a time after it – unless we truly are living at the end of human history.

Crisis, the nation, capitalism: it's all so much *common sense* – that same common sense we said above couldn't save us. What do we mean by invoking common sense, this concept that speaks of received wisdom (of the kind that grates on the nerves of youth) and of a pragmatism that imagines itself to occupy a space outside ideology? The ready-to-hand vocabulary of the way things are and the way they should be that we all carry around with us, the accepted narratives that we reach for to explain the nature of things – that's common sense. A theoretical and practical miscellany comprised of (among other things) inherited beliefs about political structures, ideas about how one should spend one's days, and those things for which one should strive and struggle. More often than not our most intimate and unconscious desires are not at odds with common sense, but in perfect coordination with it. Common sense establishes those decisions and acts which are rational and normal, and those that are not. Not mere belief, not something that

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is an outgrowth of human nature (whatever that is – too often an empty vessel that can be filled with all manner of ideology), it is a product of the social and political systems we inhabit. And, in a reciprocal fashion that should surprise no one, common sense establishes the imaginative limits of these systems, safeguarding their structures in almost territorial fashion in order to perpetuate the sealed logic of common sense and prevent outside ideas from challenging its axioms or principles. Common sense is that paternal voice that stops us in our tracks, reminding us that we've strayed beyond the reasonable and will soon make fools of ourselves if we don't abandon our childish wanderings. It is what we appeal to when we say "It's just human nature" or "It's just how things are," and when we insist that things will always be as they are now (only maybe faster) because they always have been so.

The most stunning contradiction of common sense is not that it doesn't make sense. In fact, common sense *is* perfectly reasonable, rational, and sensible. This is why it is so successful at limiting our imagination. The elegant but brutal contradiction of common sense, rather, is that it does not attend to the *common* at all. It claims a quotidian, empirical, and utilitarian universality, but it delivers benefits for the *few* at the expense of the *many* – even though it is the many who are most comfortable repeating its claims. We want to argue for the other side of common sense. This other side is not the irrational (as one might presume from the standpoint of common sense!), but the rational within a different frame. According to common sense, the political and social configurations within which we currently live are more or less fine. They are adequate to addressing the needs and desires of the common. When and where they are not, all that's needed is some fine-tuning and fixing of broken gears – or at most, when a big and unexpected challenge arises, the addition of some new mechanisms to the old machine. We don't see things this way. The reason we face so many problems and challenges isn't because we haven't been paying sufficient attention to sticky gears and levers already configured in the best possible way; or that so many bad and evil people exploit the machine (if only they would disappear – or be disappeared – then everything would work as it should!). Either way, the whole machine, built piecemeal over centuries, continues to stumble along. But what it

creates and produces – its output, if you will – is fated to be as unjust as it has been in centuries past. And yet common sense tells us that time brings with it continual social improvements: we are better now than we have been in the past, and will be better still tomorrow.

Are solutions to our problems to be found in simple ameliorations of an unjust system? To be clear, we don't think that the system is flawed or broken; it works quite successfully, just as its rules and axioms have ingeniously designed it to. The problem is precisely that it *does* work, it continues to work; all of the corruption scandals and temporary system crashes not only fail to invalidate the system, but help to further prove its stability and integrity. Nothing can save us, but only if we adhere to the system of common sense that has brought us to where we are now.

b. From Globalization to Anti-Americanism

This book began its life as a project examining contemporary expressions of anti-Americanism around the globe. In the summer of 2004, we were teaching a course in São Paulo on the ways in which we understand, theorize, and make culture within the context of globalization. For us, it is important to insist that globalization was not only a vector by which cultural forms and practices were spread around the globe. The most common way of thinking about culture in relation to globalization, even today, is in relation to new hybrid forms of cultural expression that originate out of the mixing and matching of pre-existing local (usually national) forms. Academic and non-academic writing on contemporary culture seemed newly impressed that cultural forms, practices, and expressions come into contact with one another and are reshaped in the process, and that it makes no sense to imagine anything like cultural purity as a result. It does not take much reflection to realize that such cultural sharing is a feature of culture per se: Goethe was already late to the party when he wrote about global literatures in the 1820s.¹ Equally suspect is the initial premise regarding the spatial fixity of cultural forms and practices (again, usually linked to national cultures) which then become uprooted and turned into something else as they travel – a myth of origins if there ever was one. We wanted to

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push our students to think more deeply about the relation between globalization and culture, but in ways that went beyond the standard narratives that more often than not were content to study the globalization of culture or the culture of globalization. In other words, we wanted them to think seriously about the meaning and significance of the two categories conjoined by the preposition “of,” and to question the action of the preposition as well, which in the first instance identifies the result of a process (culture has been globalized) and in the second describes a form of belonging to a moment whose character has been determined in advance.

In the midst of the run-up to the US presidential election later that year, we could not escape the realization that the topic we were teaching felt curiously belated. For us, globalization was never just a way of naming those apparently objective developments which everyone now unthinkingly associates with it – mainly, the ever greater interlocking of national economies with one another through trade and finance – but was a new *narrative* of how the world works that needed itself to be analyzed, assessed, and criticized. Globalization was the name for a novel assertion of economic, cultural, and political power that wanted desperately to hide behind the veil of its claims to have identified, in almost scientific fashion, an actually existing phenomenon. At its core was an extension and expansion of US power – the bringing into being of the “new world order” announced by President George Bush Sr. and most effectively implemented by President Bill Clinton – in order to secure a position of global hegemony which was fast being chewed away by the economic and political rise of countries such as China, India, and Brazil. In São Paolo that summer, it seemed that everyone already knew the lie of globalization, and understood that it was more ideological project than the name for an objective historical process about which, like time itself, one could do nothing. We brought with us complex schemas and offered alternative theorizations to flash the spaces and places where globalization was confusing and complicating things, especially, but not only, with respect to culture. Our Brazilian students and friends had a much simpler way of framing things. Leaving globalization aside, they were offering a challenge to US power and the existing state of the

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world more generally by being anti-American in the most direct way possible.

Indeed, it seemed that if everyone was not already a full-blown anti-Americanist, then they were quickly becoming one. The war against Iraq was in full swing (Saddam Hussein was on trial for war crimes) and George W. Bush was finding it tricky to assemble a coalition of the willing. The hard truth was out; the United States would go it alone if need be. It was tough to argue with a country that not only possessed the largest military in the world, but spent more on defense than half of the rest of the world combined.² Michael Moore's film *Fahrenheit 9/11* had just been released and quickly became the highest grossing documentary film of all time.³ For all of the interest in *Fahrenheit* in the United States, it was the film's enormous audience abroad that was truly significant. In less than a year, the worldwide sympathy for the United States following the events of 9/11 turned into widely held suspicion, driven by the depressing fact that many Americans (including Bush himself) had trouble distinguishing Saddam Hussein from Osama bin Laden. Anti-Americanism was then there for the taking, and irresistible, like so much low-hanging fruit. The brilliance of Bush is that he didn't seem to care. He was a true believer and was quick to remind anyone who would listen that being President is not a popularity contest – even though the US political structure (with its maudlin candidate advertisements and perfectly staged rallies) is organized exactly on the order of a popularity contest. And it was precisely the popularity of Bush *inside* of the United States that enflamed the anti-Americanism abroad. "How could the citizens of the US be ready to elect him President, *again?*," the world seemed to be asking.

While in Brazil we could not escape *Fahrenheit 9/11*: every conversation was invariably punctuated with a comment about it. And every conversation seemed to turn on what the political effects of the film would – and could – be. Could there be a global movement organized around the criticism of the United States? Would it re-energize the dormant energies against the imperious extension of the global power, an energy witnessed in the worldwide protests against the Iraq War in 2003? Might the film change the course of the war? Or

have an impact on the US election? Might an angry yet progressive anti-Americanism actually be more effective at producing global change than so many utopian calls for a new democratic future? Of course, none of this came to pass. Despite catching the mood of the moment and generating an impossible-to-avoid critique of the nature of contemporary politics, Moore's film did not have the force many – including the filmmaker himself – had hoped that it might.⁴ This did not surprise us, nor did the growth of the anti-Americanisms around the globe in the wake of the US military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. But as scholars interested in globalization, we were intrigued by the nature and character of these sentiments and how they related to the discourses and narratives of globalization, which, for the decade preceding them, formed the bedrock of how people imagined the world.

What was clear to us back then was that anti-Americanism was a symptom of something else. Not only was it not about America or even George W. Bush, but it was not similar in form to past anti-Americanisms, such as the ones that emerged at the time of the Mexican–American War (1846–1848) or those that were a consequence of the Vietnam War. In these instances, too, Americans were frighteningly convinced of their own superiority and moral rectitude, and through the deployment of military power produced similar sentiments of fear, disappointment, hatred, and anxiety toward the US government and the ideologies structuring everyday life in the United States, as well as toward US mass culture (captured by the Coca-Cola which Jean-Luc Godard paired with Marx in *Masculin, feminine* [1966]). It doesn't take much to realize that despite a similarity in sentiment, the contexts in which these various anti-Americanisms were expressed were qualitatively different, thus demanding careful attention to their content and the circumstances in which they operated. Some critics were attentive to this difference.⁵ In most studies, however, anti-Americanism was treated as an easily identifiable phenomenon to explain and one equally easy to explain. And so the anthologies, monographs, and op ed pieces began to flow, making connections between current and past expressions of anti-Americanism and (in tune with the need to consider the global frame) paying attention to the distinct forms taken by this latest wave of anti-Americanism in

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various nations. All were invariably structured by a single question: why do they hate us?⁶

This is where globalization returns. Before 9/11 the growing scholarship on globalization *and* the anti-globalization movements tended to de-emphasize the United States as the primary force of geopolitical power. The United States was an important player and recognized as the most powerful single actor in the world; even so, it was treated as something like a category mistake to focus too directly on the United States at the expense of new networks and systems of power and decision making. Supranational institutions (from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to transnational corporations) emerged as the key objects of study and, for social movements, of resistance. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's influential *Empire* (2000), for example, considered any privileging of the United States as missing the crucial point that there are no longer territorial centers of power and fixed boundaries.⁷ It was for this reason that many across the disciplines substituted the adjective "international" for "transnational," a term more suitable to globalization and one which drew attention to the parochialism and paternalism of the nation-state era and the emergence of new non-state actors with considerable power and influence.

Following 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was positioned as once again the most powerful actor in the world. It was the sole superpower. However, it was a superpower in decline. It is this decline that accounted for its actions and its particular impact on the world at the present time. The work of David Harvey, Giovanni Arrighi, and Neil Smith, among others, argued that the shifts in geopolitical power away from the United States were evidenced by the Bush administration's emphasis on political and military solutions to what were fundamentally economic problems of global capitalism.⁸ For these thinkers, a superpower financing its solutions to its political problems through unprecedented deficit spending and diplomatic coercion marks a key shift in the history of the dominant powers. They argued that just as the British moment of hegemony gave way to the US one in the twentieth century, the problems arising from superpower overreach in Afghanistan and Iraq

were signs of the imminent end of the US imperium and the rise of another hegemonic power (likely China). Writers on the right side of the political spectrum (including Niall Ferguson) differed in their analysis of the current US situation only in their view of the overall desirability of the decline of power of the current global hegemon.⁹ However, for these critics, too, when one examines figures such as the US share of global GDP (gross domestic product), one cannot but see a significant shift in power and influence at work.¹⁰

Since the time of the Vietnam War, scholarly work on anti-Americanism produced both within and outside of the United States has usually coincided with moments of especially egregious US military intervention. There is no doubt that the current explosion of books about anti-Americanism (which themselves participate in the constitution of anti-Americanist discourses in intriguing ways) are linked to the perceived failures of the United States to respond “appropriately” to the challenges of the post-Soviet and post-9/11 era. But rather than explaining anti-Americanism merely by identifying its root causes in the belligerence of a hegemonic power – whether one at the peak of its power, or, still powerful, on the decline – an interrogation of this now near-universal political and cultural discourse can allow us to discover unexpected geographies of the current character of global power.

The current work on anti-Americanism usually comes out of an Area Studies framework that tracks the latest eruption of anti-Americanism in a particular nation or region and moves backward in order to analyze its historical roots.¹¹ It goes without saying that there will be deep cultural differences between South Korean or Turkish reactions against American foreign policy and Brazilian or Canadian ones. Research that delineates these differences is necessary. But there is always the risk that such research will function to separate and exceptionalize each culture, thus burying precisely those connections we intend to explore. Instead of moving vertically and placing anti-Americanism in a national context, we will move horizontally and place anti-Americanism in a global context that emphasizes similarities across national situations, rather than the differences between them.

Moreover, since anti-Americanism is not our primary object of study (but a means to study the ways by which dominant discourses of globalization limit the contemporary global imaginary), we intend to study anti-Americanism *analytically* rather than to assess it normatively. In fact, we view this general normative bias in work on anti-Americanism – which either condemns anti-Americanism for its naivety and its counter-productivity¹² or celebrates it for its authenticity and courage¹³ – as the fatal flaw in much of the recent work on anti-Americanism. Even in the best of the recent books on anti-Americanism, the aim of providing an overview of anti-Americanist discourses is, finally, to offer an explanation to a US reading public of the historical origins of anti-Americanism in all manner of military and political misadventures around the globe – that is, to explain it away by explaining it, and so once again taking these discourses as necessarily an expression of something else. We want, however, to assess and understand the character of this truly *global* discourse, taking anti-Americanism seriously as opposed to concluding whether it is right or wrong. We also want to position contemporary anti-Americanism within and in relation to that other discourse that is supposed to explain the world to us today: globalization. We said earlier that we thought that this anti-Americanism was a symptom of something else. It was: a sign of the confusions of globalization – ideology, narrative, post-national discourse and all the rest – as it started to come to an end without an after.

c. From Anti-Americanism Back to Globalization

It is a surprise that discourses of anti-Americanism returned during the second half of the past decade. What's surprising isn't the reasons for such expressions, or their underlying rationale. It is clear that recent anti-American sentiment was motivated by the aggressive actions taken by the US government in the wake of 9/11. The expressions of sympathy and concern for those directly affected by the attack on the Twin Towers, and for the American people more generally, gave way to worry, fear, and anger when it became clear that the response of the

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US government would be to wage war first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The ability of the United States to proceed with these attacks (especially the invasion of Iraq) without the sanction of the international community and without fear of upsetting a fragile geopolitical balance (as would have been the case during the Cold War) made the true nature of contemporary power evident to everyone. The collapse of the Soviet bloc left the United States as the sole superpower in 1989; this much was clear. However, even in the wake of the military actions taken by the United States during the Clinton administration (the Iraqi no-fly zone, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and so on – though notably not Rwanda), the real consequences of this momentous change in power dynamics only became alarmingly evident with the waging of war on a grand scale and the momentous expansion of the state security through the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.¹⁴

So what *does* make today's anti-Americanism surprising? For us the surprise of these most recent anti-Americanisms, expressed by people around the globe, lies less in the "anti" – being against war, against the death of civilians, against the injustices perpetuated via new security measures, and so on – than in the very existence of the "America" to which it is conjoined. For, and at least in a theoretical sense, America was no longer supposed to exist in the new century. Whenever and wherever they are expressed, anti-Americanisms offer a map of global power; they constitute a shorthand of the way things work and how the world is organized. However, as we have said above, historical context is all-important in assessing the how and why of anti-Americanism. The anti-Americanisms of the twenty-first century, like the ones we witnessed in Brazil and heard in the interviews we conducted around the world (discussed in Part III), came in the wake of another shorthand that had come to dominate the public imagination about the nature of contemporary power and the likely direction it would take in the future. This was globalization. One of the key tenets of globalization – something at its very heart as a narrative, assumed as a premise, even if not always directly expressed – was that the nation (if not the state, though perhaps that, too) was coming to an end. The 1980s witnessed a concerted (if belated) critique of the idea of the

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nation in academic circles from scholars in fields as different as literary criticism and political science.¹⁵ The end of the Cold War seemed to provide the historical circumstances in which, at long last, the demarcation of territory into blocks into which we were herded like cattle, consigned by fate to live out one kind of life over another, allowed to move across the borders which confine us (or not), was going to mercifully come to an end. This new era was globalization and whatever we were supposed to find at its end was certainly not the shameless assertion and defense of the Homeland. But this anachronistic defense of the nation is evident not only when America is endorsed as global hegemon, but also when those in other nations criticize America for compromising their own national interests. It is because of this double jeopardy (that potentially ensnares critics from all ideological sides) that all studies of anti-Americanisms today must begin with a rigorous analysis of globalization itself.

Globalization was and remains a messy concept. Though it is now used without comment in journalism and in academic literature – as if to suggest that it is a term that has accrued a fixed definition about which there is general agreement – it is best to think about it as a concept that conjures up a set of associations. The topics, issues, and themes one associates with globalization are not limited to “real” world developments, systems, and processes, but also include desires, hopes, and beliefs. What are some of the things we have come to associate with globalization? The prospective end of the nation-state is a key one. An invention of the eighteenth century which flourished in the nineteenth and wreaked havoc in the twentieth, the new economic, technological, and political circumstances of the twenty-first century exposed the serious cracks (institutional and conceptual) in the foundations on which nations had been built, and suggested that new forms of political organization might yet come into being.

Shifts in economic systems and technological innovation in recent decades meant that processes and forces that shaped life and experience in any given nation now extended beyond its boundaries and were increasingly outside of its control. Every nation needs to participate actively in international trade to supply itself with goods and services not produced within its borders and to generate income by supplying

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others with the same – no mystery there. What the term “globalization” meant to draw attention to was a sea change in this process, a new geopolitical paradigm, which rendered the autonomy and sovereignty of existing nation-states increasingly fragile.

The primary driver of this change was thought to be new technological forms that made the world faster and smaller. Various technologies have been assigned a role in effecting this paradigm shift, including air travel (its expansion and democratization), computer technologies, and new media forms such as the internet and mobile phones. These technologies did not respect national barriers and played a significant role in bringing about changes in economic practices. The list here is familiar to anyone who has followed political and economic developments over the past several decades: just-in-time manufacturing, global production chains, and labor outsourcing on an international scale. New technologies not only provided material support for the new economic system, but played a direct role in the economy itself: production, distribution, marketing, and finance. In sum, globalization captures political, technological, and economic changes that together generate a historical phase-change, especially with respect to the position of the nation in the geopolitical order.

While there were some expressions of worry about the effects of this change in the status and power of nation-states and its impact on national populations, one of the surprising things about globalization is that, on the whole, this development was greeted *positively*. The transformation of the nation pointed to new possibilities for human communities. The nation-state system was nothing to be celebrated and clung to: its record is of unending war, suffering, and exclusions. The disagreements over and anxieties about globalization lay not in the prospective end of the nation, as much as in the precise character of what was going to take the place of the nation-state system. Those nationalists who opposed globalization did so not out of a deep and abiding love of the national political form, but because they feared that some of the programs and policies enabled and supported by specific national communities – universal health care, environmental protections, universal education, and so on – would be imperiled or brought to an end. Even anti-globalization movements quickly offered a

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corrective to the name assigned them by journalists after the protests against the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999. They wanted it known that they weren't against globalization and so in favor of the nation, but rather that they wanted to challenge the political and economic system coming to take the place of the nation-state system (anti-globalization movements are for this reason better described as counter-globalization or alter-globalization – an alternative globalization being at issue, not an end to globalization as such). This was a system of unelected, unrepresentative international organizations and decision-making bodies, largely controlled by rich Western countries, who looked ready to take on the role of de facto government for the entire planet.¹⁶ Globalization was going to happen – it *was* happening – no matter what. It was deemed inevitable. *How* it was going to happen, and what precisely this happening involved, was what was up for scholarly debate and was the subject of political struggle; the reality of this thing called “globalization” itself was not.

Some of the imprecision that has accompanied the concept of globalization has come out of the large number of competing attempts to name the “how” of its happening.¹⁷ The desire to name and define this new thing proved irresistible; attempts to do so extended well beyond economics or politics, and into the realm of culture and identity. This made sense given the significance of culture and identity for the operations of nations. The nation-state produced a national subject; the increasing shakiness of its sovereignty as well as of its physical and cultural borders generated the possibility of hybrid or post-national identities, and on a scale far exceeding earlier experiences of immigration or travel (though these, too, became intriguing subjects of analysis for those who wanted to look at mobility in earlier centuries through the lens of globalization). Analyses of the uncertainty and groundlessness with which contemporary individuals are thought to face life in globalization are built around the assumption of a once stable national subject whose ability to now listen to M.I.A. or reggaeton music, read Orhan Pamuk or Roberto Bolaño, generates new and unexpected individual and communal opportunities. The possibility or impossibility of movements across borders – whether real, imagined, or

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fantasized – names the way in which the globalization is experienced. A great many academic books and articles devoted themselves to offering increasingly complex analyses of these imaginings, each with its own neologisms and conceptual innovations (as, for instance, Roland Robertson’s use of “glocalisation” or the vocabulary of scapes advocated by Arjun Appadurai¹⁸), each trying to get the “new” of globalization and the “how” of its happening just right, so that we could navigate our way through a life rendered suddenly complex.

Against the backdrop of a world rendered global, anti-Americanism can only seem anachronistic: at best, the crude expression of political dissatisfaction; at worst, a category mistake which doesn’t grasp that we are now living in very different times. But it is a mistake to see new anti-Americanisms like the ones we encountered in Brazil in this fashion – as a step back into the comfort of a politics that even at earlier moments was too easy. Anti-Americanism is not a reaction to a world rendered complex by globalization, a throwback to a more transparent view of the way the world is organized. Rather, the sudden reappearance of the nation in anti-American discourse should serve to remind us of a fundamental fact: although globalizing processes and effects exist, *globalization does not exist*.

Of course, many – most! – of the things that have been associated with globalization exist, from cyberspatial communities to transnational trade agreements. But globalization as a system does not exist in the way typically imagined. In fact, globalization as a discourse has come into being and continues to operate today precisely to cover and obscure the system that *does* exist, namely capitalism. There is a conceptual sleight of hand at work whenever globalization is invoked. Like any noun that is meant to name and specify something as complex as a historical period (e.g., modernity) or to capture in a word the character of the *Zeitgeist*, globalization is an assemblage of discrete and distinct actions, processes, effects, and outcomes, bundled together with the aim of producing something legible and intelligible. But in fact this is not what globalization does. Instead of intelligibility, it produces illegibility; it is often represented as a coherent system when it is actually a set of processes and effects across widely different spheres of social life, tossed together for a specific end and effect.

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Within the academic world, this category mistake is not hard to track and explain. Before the mid-1990s, globalization was not commonly mentioned in academic research. Of course the processes and characteristics later assigned to globalization (compression of time and space, new communications, new forms of financial speculation, etc.) were often invoked, but almost always in the name of something else, such as post-industrial capitalism, transnationalism, late capitalism, post-Fordism, information capitalism, post-modernity, flexible accumulation, global capitalism, and so on. The replacement of these names by “globalization” was not only a semantic matter – a linguistic solution to simplify a confusing set of concepts. Rather, at its core the new dominance of globalization was a way to avoid thinking and speaking about capitalism, and, more profoundly, to avoid the larger question of system altogether.

The effects of globalization were so inclusive, so amorphous, malleable, and chaotic that the very thought of locating its logic or tendencies (as would be the case with any other system) became self-defeating. It was at this point that academics from every discipline crashed the party. Scholars in English literature would write about the globalization of Shakespeare (not just the globalization of Shakespeare studies today, but globalization during Shakespeare’s era); anthropologists would track criss-crossed diasporic flows, discovering (eureka!) that we’ve been globalized throughout our history as a species; epidemiologists would study the global spread of disease; and so on, all the way up to the university administrators who were only too happy to rebrand their universities with the word “global,” which soon was a modifier used with any and every noun (global campuses, global undergraduate experience, global curricula, global donors, and so on).

But, and as usual, the historians were the least convinced. When someone would rhapsodize about the newness of globalization – how different everything is and how anyone who does not appreciate these changes are the new flat-earthers – a historian would invariably remind everyone that all of the new characteristics ascribed to globalization have in fact existed for some time. If someone argued that globalization began in the 1970s with the oil crises and the new need for information technologies to make capital more flexible, then a historian would

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show how many of these same links and networks were at work at the beginning of the century.¹⁹ Or if a political scientist argued for the ways in which the autonomy of the national territory was being undermined within globalization, then a historian would correct everyone by showing how Paleolithic trade routes also undermined local autonomy. Such naysayers, however, were not only going after those in the social sciences. If a literary scholar appealed to how the new flexibility of globalization related to the formal inventions of the contemporary novel (as decentered, fragmented, and lacking a stable narrative voice), then a historian of the classics would disabuse everyone by showing how all of those techniques already existed in Homer.

The debate over globalization in the university, therefore, turned into a debate over how to periodize this new thing. When did “it” begin? How does “it” relate to what came before it? And, in response to the orthodox historians, might the same phenomenon function differently at different historical moments? These questions regarding periodization necessarily included the question of how to narrate globalization, how to tell the story of globalization. The point here is that the moment globalization became dominant (usurping capitalism and the problem of system itself) was the moment that all attempts to *explain* it were abandoned. All that was left to do at this point was to *describe* globalization – now both a name for a temporal period and a real, existing, irresistible world-historical force – in all its utopian glory or dystopian menace. The struggle over whether globalization was something qualitatively new or simply business-as-usual – a struggle that invariably took place on the level of description – crowded out from the debate a crucial consideration: when might globalization *end*?

It is impossible to ask this question within the dominant discourse of globalization, precisely because when globalization is understood solely on a descriptive level (for instance, as a stylistic category: it’s faster, it’s more flexible, it’s less centralized) then one cannot imagine a different system coming into being. Globalization is simply the name for the here and now, *and* the future as far as the eye can see. As a temporal category, globalization had a very different quality than other descriptions of periods in human history. Even at its peak, it was never

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imagined that the Cold War would last forever. Something had to give, whether through the victory of one or another of the sides in the war, the occupation of some ideological middle ground, or the destruction of the species through nuclear conflict.

The coming into being of a system whose characteristic elements were such that it could not end was a key to lending globalization its aura of inevitability. This operates especially effectively in the deliberate confusion produced by the term, its seamless combination of empirical elements with ideological ones. Globalization is technological progress. Well, surely computer technologies will only get smaller, faster, and play an ever more ubiquitous role in daily life! Globalization points to production at dispersed sites around the world. Well, of course: could it ever make sense to create something in a single national space again? Why would one ever want to become less productive and efficient? And wasn't this in any case a way to increase GDP for everyone, helping to raise all boats until everyone could experience the same level of economic success? The economic flattening of the world was perhaps the one thing imagined as taking time, as being necessarily slow in a world otherwise characterized by the deranging intensity of speed and scale. Globalization could not come to an end; to suggest it might meant appealing to disaster scenarios, or implying or evoking laughable scenarios of temporal Luddism (appeals to ways of life unmediated by technology, such as organic farming, etc.). The category shift from the structure of capitalism to the effects of globalization, from explanation to description, therefore, snuffed out the possibility of thinking an alternative to globalization. Even if it became increasingly difficult to imagine such scenarios, capitalism was something that could fail or be replaced by some other economic system. But globalization? Social democracies such as Norway and Sweden, or states with economic principles even more distant from capitalism, such as Bolivia, Cuba, or Venezuela, might be seen as standing slightly to the side of capitalism; all, however, participated in globalization. How could it be otherwise? For globalization had no border and no end: it could only get faster, more integrated or divided, more deeply and extensively saturated into the daily life of everyone, everywhere.

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With the financial meltdown at the end of 2008, however, the power of globalization has begun to lose its force. Despite everything, its end *has* unexpectedly come. The anti-Americanism that arose during the Bush years were the first signs of some of the difficulties which globalization was having in capturing the planet's imagination as the new common sense for how things were to operate. The component elements of globalization – say, the impact of technology on lived experience, or the movement of peoples across borders, or the on-the-ground effects of historically high levels of international trade – have not suddenly ground to a halt. But the ideological work performed by globalization cannot help but be shaken, finally and thoroughly exposed by a system crash. Instead of globalization – which remember, was supposed to be the name for the present as such – it has now become possible to talk directly about capitalism, whose force, ferocity, and very existence was obscured and mystified by the narrative of globalization that emerged after the Cold War. The reappearance of capitalism can be witnessed in the numerous references to “the system” that have emerged today in attempts to describe the circumstances we now face. “The system did not work.” “The system is in crisis.” “The system must be substantially reformed.” *Who* is saying such things matters a great deal. For some on the left, the possibility of naming the system – capitalism – directly, outside the obscuring blend of concepts, forces, and processes connected with globalization, marks a moment of genuine political possibility. For those initially involved in articulating the ideology of globalization, the mea culpa that one might expect to find in discussions of the need to reform the system are almost nowhere to be found. And when they are, as in Alan Greenspan's mea culpa in October 2008 (right when the bankruptcies and bailouts began to flow), they effectively ascribe the problems to their own short-sightedness (in typical narcissistic fashion) rather than to the systemic logic itself.

One of the earliest, most pointed, and (it has to be said) most criticized descriptions of globalization is Francis Fukuyama's claim that with the end of the Cold War the world is at “the end of history.” This claim is not really about time or history, though its evocation of a timeless end-of-times captures the atemporality that would become

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essential to the apparent inevitability and unavoidability of globalization. It is, rather, a claim about ideology and change, specifically with respect to political and economic structures. For Fukuyama, with the fall of the Berlin Wall,

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such . . . That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.²⁰

This is not – could not – be a description of an already empirically given possibility; and even if one were to believe in Fukuyama's idea of historical evolution in the strongest sense possible, such a claim would still need to bear the test of time. But in any case, this is neither description nor philosophy, but a call to arms for a political project, one whose aim is to bring about the conditions of the “end of history” announced here. The name for this project was, of course, globalization.

One might expect the system crash through which we are living to have brought an end to such self-confident talk of the “end of history.” And it has. The title of Robert Kagan's book on the end of globalization says it all: *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*.²¹ But the admission that history has come back – not that it was there all along, hidden or obscured, but gone (for the two decades of globalization) and then returned (the present moment) – does not bring with it an admission that anything of great significance has changed with respect to the momentum or movement of history. To be clear: for Fukuyama, the end of history means that humanity has matured to the point where Western liberal democracy is the only game in town; for Kagan, Western liberal democracy is also the only legitimate, mature political form. The difference is that, for Kagan, the movement of history on its own does not confer the legitimacy that comes with political and ideological maturity. If it was once imagined that history had come to an end with the establishment of a “new kind of international order, with nation-states growing together or disappearing, ideological

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conflicts melting away, cultures intermingling, and increasing free commerce and communications,”²² history has now returned in the form of the international competition amongst nation-states. We’ve gone back to the future – back to the end of the Cold War and an older form of geopolitics, if in a new context. The developments of the past 20 years have proven wrong the assumption that economic liberalization leads to political liberalization, as well as the “abiding belief in the inevitability of human progress, the belief that history moves in only one direction.”²³ Even though commerce has been fully globalized, the world is witnessing a revival of competition between democracies and autocracies (Russia, China, Iran), and the creation of “geopolitical fault lines where the ambitions of great powers overlap and conflict.”²⁴ The lesson? “The world’s democracies need to begin thinking about how they can protect their interests and defend their principles in a world in which these are once again powerfully challenged.”²⁵ The principles remain the same, despite everything. What has changed, however, is simply the nature of the political project through which these principles might be actualized.

Easy appeals, by political commentators and authors of books on current affairs, to the forward flow and political and economic efficacy of globalization are disappearing. There is a sense that the world faces all manner of challenges that require both serious reflection and action, and a major change in the way things operate. Even so, as the example of Kagan’s book shows, there is remarkably little difference between the ideas and values – indeed, the very nature of the system – with which we are expected to confront these problems; there is even less sense that these problems might be an outgrowth of the very system that is now imagined as the only path to resolve them. The animating political ideal of globalization was to see electoral democracy and capitalism joined at the hip across the world. There were two principles driving the political project of globalization. First, without naming it directly, globalization was a way of maintaining and managing the dominant position of the United States in the globe. It did so through the ceaseless articulation of the inevitability and desirability of all of the processes and forces associated with globalization – the production and circulation of the values of liberal democratic capitalism not as an

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ideology about which one might have an opinion or with which one might disagree, but as a form of common sense, and further, a common sense not directly connected with the United States. Second, this development was, in any case, historically inevitable; it was where nations and individuals would find themselves at some point; resistance was futile – not just because of the force of existing institutions but due to the movement of time itself.

And *after*-globalization, when history has returned? The global spread of liberal democracy and capitalism are treated surprisingly as no less inevitable. There is now, however, once again the necessity of a struggle to bring this state of affairs into existence; this is a struggle that involves the nation-state. The reappearance of the nation in politics might suggest that there is an entirely new actor, suddenly awoken from its slumbers, on the global political scene. In truth, globalization always involved the nation-state, especially the United States. (We can also think of China, a country whose successful integration into the global economy required a strong nation-state, or equally the involvement of the governments of Russia, Brazil, India . . . in fact, every nation's state involvement in making globalization happen.) Globalization was a form through which the United States articulated the rationality of the values and ideas – their common sense – claimed on behalf of capitalism and democracy. After globalization, the *form* by which this common sense is articulated has had to change: with the system crash of 2008, the absolute givenness of globalization, its fixity and finality, has come to an end. One form it has taken is the admission of a post-American moment – a concession to the anti-Americanism of the past several years – though one which, as we shall see, is intended to maintain the hegemonic position of the United States as much as globalization. The *content* of this common sense has changed far less. Under the guise of another paradigm shift (first globalization, then its end) requiring concerted analysis, the common sense animating the discourse of globalization is trotted out, if in a new guise.

Almost everything we have written thus far about globalization and its aftermath suggests that it was little more than an ideological screen, a false promise – at best, a social-scientific category that turned out (in the

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end) to have less explanatory value than hoped for; at worst, a form through which consent was generated for liberal democratic capitalism in a fashion that proved difficult to question or resist. However, this would be to mischaracterize the ways in which globalization was understood and experienced. Globalization was a particularly effective figure/concept in extending US hegemony in the wake of the Cold War, a moment in which there might well have been wariness and resistance to the ideas and ideals of the world's lone superpower on the part of other nations. It is important to remember that globalization was also a moment of possibility and promise. The end of nation-states and the promise of cosmopolitanism; the opening up of borders and opportunities for travel; new forms of communication and human interrelation; a planet-wide rise in living standards; innovative technologies and the novel experiences that accompanied their use – these were developments connected with globalization that stretched the horizons of the social, cultural, and political experience. This is not to suggest that these possibilities were wholly realized, without their dark side, or even wholly new: the exclusions and violence of nation-states did not disappear, borders and mobility remained limited and confined to a small minority, new forms of communication and technology brought with them expanded forms of surveillance, labor exploitation, and so on; and for every new burgher added in China and India, a new disenfranchised slum dweller was added to the world as well. Nonetheless, one cannot discount the way in which the “one world” narrative of globalization generated energies for an economics and politics other than the status quo of capitalism and liberal democracy that we now witness. With the end of globalization comes the collapse not just of an ideological project, but hopes to enact a very different kind of politics on a global scale.

With the financial crisis of 2008, globalization comes to an end. Good riddance, one might say. For at that very same moment, for many the deferred promises of globalization are liberated. The election of Barack Obama in the wake of the financial meltdown resolves in an instant the seething anti-Americanism expressed around the world during George W. Bush's second term in office. It points to new political horizons and suggests that the political struggle announced by

Kagan will take a different form than he might have expected. Or so it might seem.

d. “I face the World as it is”: On Obama

Thinking about anti-Americanism brought us back to globalization, but to a globalization operating on a different terrain than before: weakened in its self-certainties and the strengths of its fictions. Anti-Americanism, too, seemed to have been wiped out in an instant with the victory of Barack Obama. Even for those suspicious of claims about abrupt shifts in geopolitics due to singular events, his victory seemed to herald something new on the political and social horizon.

Obama’s campaign was never just a national political event, just as his victory over John McCain was not just a national victory. There has never been a moment in modern history when non-citizens were so interested and instrumental in a national electoral race. Everyone the world over knew that what happened in the US election would profoundly affect their everyday lives – perhaps even more profoundly than their own local and national elections. In fact, the largest crowd of Obama’s campaign came not in Chicago or California, but in Germany, as over 200 000 people crammed around Berlin’s Victory Column to hear Obama on July 24, 2008. Obama began his speech, “A World That Stands as One,” by making it clear that he spoke not as a presidential candidate, but as a citizen of the United States and as a citizen of the world.²⁶

Part of the attraction to Obama was his background and his unlikely ascension to the top of the US political structure. But, and especially for those outside of the United States, most impressive was his intelligence and respect for fair and critical scrutiny of history and cultural difference in particular. Of course, Obama’s appeal was in response to the growing antipathy toward George W. Bush, the leader who ridiculed intellectuals as quickly as he dismissed analytic work. Bush’s favor for a folksy gut feeling and his explicit reliance on religious conviction to guide political decision making might work fine in the United States, but rarely for those abroad on the receiving end of its

reductions and cartoon-like representations. Whereas a common-sense-driven anti-intellectualism is highly effective in almost any national context, it does not travel well, because common sense necessarily rejects analysis as it strategically mobilizes the national mythology. The most important expression of Obama's intelligence as it operated abroad (as against Bush's anti-intelligence), however, occurred not in relation to a particular policy or electoral promise, but over his parsing of a single sentence: "the war on terror."

Obama, like a good English professor, asked how there could be a war on a noun. There could be a war on a certain country that encourages terrorist acts (like Afghanistan) or even on a certain terrorist (like Osama bin Laden – in fact, Bill Clinton fired over 70 Tomahawk missiles at bin Laden in 1998), but terror is not an enemy in its own right. Unlike Bill Clinton's parsing of another sentence ("I did not have sexual relations with that woman" that was about evasion and the gratuitous use of his intellect to obscure and defend himself against an act that was as clear as day), Obama conducted his parsing in an attempt to return to what was at stake following 9/11. Indeed, if Clinton would have used his legal, rhetorical, and philosophical acumen to argue for why it wasn't the worst crime in the world to have an affair with Monica Lewinski (and that the obsession with the affair is a symptom of a US culture not only saturated by a sensationalized media but also by hypocritical moral positions), one wonders if the anti-intellectualism (and perhaps even the anti-Americanism) that proliferated during the Bush era would have been so strong. At any rate, more than any of his positions on defense policy or geopolitics, Obama's close reading of Bush and Cheney's "war on terror" was what most impressed those looking at the presidential race from abroad.

This desire for Obama to return care and consideration to decision making went a long way. So far, in fact, that many held their tongues when Obama brought into his administration Clinton-era favorites, such as Lawrence Summers as his leading economic advisor (not to mention Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State), and retained key Bush appointee Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. Even the aftermath of the financial crisis (and the support for financial bailouts) that dominated Obama's first year in office did not significantly undercut his

popularity at home or abroad. It took over a year, with the combination of the return of Wall Street – Goldman Sachs registering record profits and administering huge bonuses in spite of receiving funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) – and his decision to crank up military operations in Afghanistan, to kill the Obama fantasy.

A fantasy functions by turning Loss into a lost object – so that something that is structurally significant and informing but does not exist in any concrete way (such as the absent presence of Loss) is given positive form. In this sense Loss represents something that is impossible to possess (like having the super-rich without a poor majority within capitalism), while the lost object represents that thing that, or person who, can miraculously resolve this irresolvable contradiction. Indeed, the fantasy of Obama was the fantasy that a national leader could act in a way that exceeded the particular interests of his or her own country. This is the fantasy that was most spectacularly exploded in Oslo on December 10, 2009, when Obama accepted the Nobel Peace Prize.²⁷

Only nine days earlier, Obama spoke to the US military academy at West Point to announce his new policy in Afghanistan.²⁸ Calling for a surge of over 30 000 new troops to be deployed in Afghanistan (for an additional cost of over \$30 billion in 2010 alone), Obama refocused the United State's military priorities. Iraq would be wound down (a jab at Bush's failed policy and confusion of priorities), while the war in Afghanistan would be intensified. This decision, which came after months of consideration and debate (with the top US military commanders [Generals McKiernan and Patraeus] in favor, but the US ambassador to Afghanistan, retired Army General Karl Eikenberry, along with Colin Powell and Vice President Biden, resistant), would have to be engaged head on in his Nobel speech. Now Obama had two circles to square: first, how to respect the spirit of the Peace Prize, while having just committed to a major new military offensive (one under dispute even within his own administration); and second, how to accept this prize that represented global hopes and aspirations for the United States on the part of so many of the world's citizens, while not compromising his responsibility to US interests.

Acknowledging the Swedish royalty and then the Nobel committee before making a direct reference to the citizens of America (highly aware of how things would play back home), Obama mentioned Afghanistan almost immediately. He knew that Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King (the two other Nobel Peace Prize winners whom he recognized most frequently in the speech) would disagree with his decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. “But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation,” Obama argued in opposition to Gandhi and King, “I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people.” It is the sentence-starting “But” that is most striking. If Obama was not a head of state, he seemed to suggest, then he would be guided by the examples set by Gandhi and King. In other words, Gandhi and King were global leaders (and/or local leaders), while Obama is a national one – and these two different types of leadership cannot be reconciled.

The irreconcilability of national and global leaders is most profoundly expressed in relation to the environment. In his 37-minute Nobel speech, Obama mentioned climate change only once, and, even in this single utterance, environmental concerns were inextricably linked to military interests. Obama stated, “For this reason, it is not merely scientists and environmental activists who call for swift and forceful action – it’s military leaders in my own country and others who understand our common security hangs in the balance.” The conflation of environmental concerns with military ones is particularly significant given that at the very same time that Obama was speaking in Oslo, the most important summit on climate change (United Nations Climate Change Conference, or COP 15, with 192 nations gathered together, along with NGOs, civil society, and demonstrators from around the world, to seek a new treaty, agreement, or even consensus for how to manage global warming) had begun in Copenhagen, at which Obama was scheduled to give a major address.

The talks in Copenhagen were in free fall from the beginning. Targets, enforcement, and transparency were the buzzwords, with the different players unable to agree on benchmarks and how enforcement and transparency might even be possible on a global scale. For example,

the United States hesitated on targets. Washington announced that it would cut greenhouse gas emissions 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020; this, however, only amounted to a 4 percent decrease based on the 1990 benchmark used by most other nations. China cited sovereignty concerns as it hesitated on enforcement, while India and Brazil questioned why they should be held to the same targets as those of the United States and the European Union given the uneven history of global industrial development; the Group of 77 (an organization of 130 developing countries) argued that cuts in CO₂ emissions should not come at the expense of their development; and the African Union (a 50-member bloc of mostly poor nations) demanded much sharper cuts in emissions, as did small island states (a 39-member group, notably represented by the charismatic Prime Minister of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed), without which their very nations will become uninhabitable due to sea-level rise. And then there was the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, asking for financial compensation for any decrease in oil prices resulting from the climate negotiations), rainforest coalitions, former Soviet republics, and the suspiciously quiet “yes” countries, such as Canada and Japan.

By the time Obama arrived on the penultimate day, all of the weaker players had been sidelined. The struggle was between the United States and China, with Brazil, India, and South Africa along for the ride. In fact, what became known as the Copenhagen Accord was reached between these five nations (more a commitment to take climate change seriously than anything concrete), and begrudgingly supported by the other member nations who feared not being able to access funds from richer nations to help adapt to climate change. In the mainstream US media, Obama was represented as holding firm against China and coming off as the key figure to save the talks. But for the great majority of participating nations and the various leaders of NGOs and activists looking on, Obama was a terrible disappointment and the event as a whole little more than a sham.

Many of the international hopes and desires that had previously been invested in Obama were quickly drying up – but something seemed different. Instead of blaming the power play on a short-sighted and

merciless leader – the way George W. Bush would have been excoriated, for example – many started to blame the larger system of decision making. The process itself was called into question – the process of how national leaders engage supranational problems. The executive director of Greenpeace UK stated that “The City of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight . . . It is now evident that beating global warming will require a radically different model of politics than the one on display here in Copenhagen.” Even centrists began to describe the summit as an “abject failure,” calling the whole diplomatic structure a farce and singling out Obama’s bullying as the factor most responsible for forcing the rest of the member nations to sign a “death warrant.”

What became clear in Copenhagen, and what was already on display in Obama’s Nobel speech in Oslo, is that there could not be a serious commitment to manage climate change while the United States continued to wage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The over \$3 trillion price tag for the US wars conservatively calculated by Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes cannot be squared with what is required on the climate front.²⁹ For all of Obama’s erudite allusions to political theory in order to argue for the legitimacy of waging a “just war,” it is the economic argument that falls flat. On the streets of Copenhagen and across the world the central contradiction could finally be spoken: in order to finance the wars, the United States would need to keep producing wealth (driven by the limitless expansion and consumption of commodities, especially military weaponry) at a rate that will destroy the species and perhaps even the planet. Obama was backed into a corner, which is why in his Nobel speech he resorted to the final fantasy: “For make no mistake,” Obama intoned, sounding more Bush and bin Laden than King or Gandhi, “Evil does exist in the world.” *Plus ça change . . .*

e. *Of and After: Two Narratives of the Global*

What we plan to do in this book is to make sense of what we have here termed “common sense.” The common sense we will explore and

examine is that which has been developed and articulated with particular force from the end of the Cold War to the end of globalization – from the enthusiasms of Fukuyama to the disappointments of Obama. We are as interested in the common sense *of* globalization as we are in the shape common sense is taking *after* it. Of course, the axioms, tropes, and figures that comprise common sense have not been invented *ex nihilo* over the past 20 years: they draw on a whole array of beliefs, practices, and relations that have been developed over the past century, and even longer. The widely held belief, for instance, that history is constituted through measurable progress has roots that extend back into the Enlightenment; the belief that this progress is best evidenced by a specific kind of technological development (e.g., the miniaturization of computer technologies) and the social effects to which it is related (e.g., bringing people together through the collapse of space) has a more recent origin. We want to argue that there is today a shared global common sense that constitutes the frame within which we operate; this frame produces a critical limit to our capacity to address problems new and old, from our impact on the environment to the effects and outcomes of our economic systems. It is a limit that may well not itself be all that new, but it is one whose consequences grow more serious by the day.

Why not use a different term? Why common sense? Why not ideology? Or hegemony? In the way we are using it, common sense is certainly related to these. Though hegemony is a concept to which critics don't appeal as much as they once did, having moved on to other, more stylish concepts in the marketplace of ideas, it remains important for grasping how contemporary societies operate. Hegemony names the way in which consent is produced, managed, and reproduced. The consent named here is the consent to be ruled, to participate in an unjust system, and to engage in a mode of life that for the vast majority is far less than it could be – an empirical point and not mere utopian imagining. Hegemony identifies the way in which virtually every aspect of social life is structured to legitimate a social system that benefits certain social interests over others. The components of hegemony include everything, from the social and political “givens” one learns during one's education to everyday norms of

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behavior; from the character and nature of social relations to the legitimating structure of political systems; from the constituent elements of the family to the expected narrative trajectory of an individual life. Hegemony is not the lie of the system – a trick, knowingly pulled by those whose wealth allows them to miraculously exceed the epistemological limits of the social and so orchestrate things from the outside (the crude way of understanding ideology). It is the truth of the system, what, in a very fundamental way, the system “is.”

Common sense is related to hegemony: it points to the same deep social assumptions that structure privilege and generate disadvantage. While evoking hegemony, we see it as doing a different kind of work. The ready-to-hand intelligibility of common sense – the distracted *content* of the social which passes for *form* or *system* – is at the heart of the operations of hegemony; it is where power takes on the innocence of tradition or the apparent scientific certainty that lurks in socio-biology: “it has always been thus.” Moving from the depths of hegemony to its surface, common sense appears as a figure when the operations of hegemony are most in doubt, at their shakiest, anxious about their capacity to enact their marvelous capacity to reproduce the present into the future with that fragment of difference needed to offset the fatal rigidity of social stasis. The common sense we are examining is something given, a set of assumptions, facts, and presumed logics. In the circumstances we are exploring, common sense betrays its origins as a social invention because it needs to be insisted on, repeated, pronounced (with varying degrees of confidence and commitment) as a solution to impending crises. It doesn’t get to do what it likes to do best: lie dormant, a bear in its winter cave, and just as dangerous when disturbed.

As we have already suggested, in the period from the end of the Cold War (that dreamy period of ossified common sense!) to the end of globalization there are two contexts in which common sense is forced to *argue for its legitimacy by means of the legitimacy of its own arguments*. The first arises out of the expansion of a hegemony (that of the United States) from nation to planet, a process full of danger given the wildly different contexts, histories, and temporalities it would of necessity

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encounter. This expansion necessitates, too, its exposure to the surface in its native context, as not just a distinct mode of being (that difference we still naively like to term “cultural”), but as a form of social and political consent that it is attempting to reproduce elsewhere. The challenge to common sense in this first instance is to create a vocabulary that could be in principle put into effect everywhere. The one-world ethos of globalization, a system constituted as both atemporal (once begun, it could never end) and inevitable (here, there, and everywhere) offered the perfect solution. There is, of course, a necessary feeling of inevitability to any form of hegemony. In the case of globalization, this was not the inevitability that suffuses common sense by means of tradition, but rather, through History understood in the strongest sense possible – that universal History in which all of humanity is thought to be moving toward a common end. Fukuyama’s intuition that globalization constituted the end of history was on the mark, but only insofar as it was through a strong appeal to this view of History that a global common sense could be produced with a relatively small degree of conflict or resistance to it.

The second context in which common sense is exposed to the air emerges out of the fear of limits. Common sense routinely fails to operate. When it becomes possible to speak of the “failure of the system” or assert that everything has to be changed because “the system no longer works,” this is another way of saying: we don’t believe in common sense. But this does not produce an end of common sense, only its rebound: for it is precisely common sense that is then invoked and celebrated in order to condemn the very common sense that caused the system to fail in the first place. Once again, common sense is mobilized to defend its suitability for everyone, while simultaneously retreating to the comfort of the national space in which it was most at home. In each case – globalization and its aftermath – common sense presumes to speak on behalf of the common, to render the sensibility of the common legible to it. It is at the moment when the legitimacy of common sense is being asserted ever more vociferously that it is possible to draw into question its claims and operations, and to probe deeply into the world that it has produced and proposes to continue to produce.

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Our examination of today's common sense takes place at two sites. First, we look in depth at the arguments put forward about the shape and character of the present in a number of texts written both during globalization and in its aftermaths, that is, when globalization is asserted as all powerful, and then when its guiding ideas are asserted even more strongly to address the crisis of its end. We look to what we take to be especially significant sites at which the common sense we are pointing to is engendered and regenerated, produced and reproduced. Our focus is, first, on those whom Richard Florida has named the "thought leadership of modern society: nonfiction writers, editors, cultural figures, think-tank researchers, analysts and other opinion-makers."³⁰ The reason for looking at the ways in which common sense appears in the work of some of today's global "thought leaders" is not to overstate the influence of these particular authors. By choosing authors with distinct perspectives, who operate within different fields of knowledge (international relations, sociology, economics, social activism, entertainment), we want to capture the various modalities of common sense in order to produce a map of its worldviews, and to understand its limits. In understanding the operation of hegemony, it is essential to remember that though it works to benefit elites, it is not directly and knowingly produced by them, but rather produces them, too. The work that we will look at is significant not because it contains the beliefs of some of today's most popular thinkers and those on behalf of whom they speak. Rather, they are works in which the author presumes to speak on behalf of the common (sometimes a national common, at other times a global one), first through an explication of the constitutive elements and driving imperatives of existing social and political systems, and second by offering guidance about and advice on what comes next. Each of the authors we look at attempts to explicate a sociohistorical paradigm shift that demands of us a different mode of being; the limits imposed by common sense appear in the way that this shift is characterized, the form taken by their assessments and arguments, and the nature of the difference for which they argue.

In Part II, we examine the constitution of the common sense of globalization by examining texts by Richard Florida, Thomas Friedman, Paul Krugman, and Naomi Klein as well as looking at the

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rendering of globalization into film, through an assessment of a single film (*Michael Clayton*) starring the actor George Clooney. The texts that we assess include some of the foundational arguments for how we should understand the new geopolitical system – globalization (Friedman) and its aftermath; descriptions of the new character of work and cities (Florida) as well as the economics of the global era (Florida, Krugman, and Klein); critical assessments of the politics and culture of globalization (Clooney, Klein); and a ferocious re-narration of globalization intended to make us see it with new eyes (Klein). Our aim in taking up these texts is not to take them to task for getting things wrong, nor to pick winners and losers amongst them whose views and insights we can thus either jettison or champion. To repeat: the aim is to generate a map of what we have termed common sense and its operations, especially with respect to how it understands the future. Something is missing in the work of each and every one of these authors; something is missing, too, even if they are taken together in the hope that the gaps and flaws of one might be filled out by the smarts and insights of the others.

Florida, Friedman, Krugman, Klein: it might seem as if we are paying particular attention to journalism as a form in which knowledge of the world is rendered (if we add Clooney to the mix, one could say that it is the media more generally that concerns us). There are reasons for this. This book is not primarily intended as an investigation of the limits of journalism in comparison to other ways we narrate the world to ourselves. Nonetheless, journalism plays an undeniable role in constituting our sense of which events are important to the common, as well as how we are supposed to understand the larger significance of these events. Indeed, the latter function of journalism is already contained in the blunt act of reportage. The events that demand the attention of journalists do not, as is still commonly assumed, constitute a pre-existing reality which is then reported on. Rather, these events are picked out of the ebb and flow of social life by means of the logic contained within journalism regarding the significance of this or that event. Journalism thus has an effect at an almost ontological level, offering up to view some component elements of reality, and, by not taking up other elements or aspects of our reality, ensuring that they

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don't exist. In the end, what we are typically presented with in newspaper or on the television news is the world in the form of a "variety show. . . a litany of events with no beginning and no real end, thrown together only because they happened on the same day."³¹ But this does not mean that a larger logic does not work to hold all of these events in place. Even in the obituaries one can find evidence of the organizing common sense of the day. In his analysis of the obituaries in the *New York Times*, Franco Moretti discovers what constitutes the story of an individual life in today's world. It is a narrative that takes a specific form: a slow, steady forward march, with individual lives each contributing in small ways to an already determined historical direction – from rags to riches, a celebration (by virtue of being in the *Times*) of success in the world. This is an example of the larger logic by and through which the world is given: "no changes of direction, but myriad regular steps along a well-worn path . . . a quantitative and orderly march: without confusion, and certainly without catastrophes."³²

The texts we are examining are not by reporters, but by commentators who frequently offer insights on the op-ed pages. Though the op-ed pages began as the space of opinion in a medium otherwise comprised of fact (the very admission of perspective and partiality in one part of the newspaper functioning to render the rest impartial through the logic of difference), it has come to serve a different purpose. Since the news focuses on "breaking" events and tries to capture audience interest by focusing on new stories and situations, journalism can lend itself to a form of cultural amnesia. Events seem to have no antecedents or consequences, no links to larger and more persistent histories and structures. Things happen, and seem to happen out of the blue: journalism operates in perpetual crisis mode, swinging its attention from one thing to another. There is nothing more disturbing than watching old TV news footage, filled with fearless "expert" predictions and projections of the dire consequences that might unfold from breaking stories that we now either cannot remember or cannot imagine as ever having been of much importance.

Though imperfectly, the op-ed pages try to offer perspectives that put events in relation to other events, as well as in relation to broader cultural narratives that can be called up in short form to stand in for

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organizing principles and forces behind these events, and which also point to their larger significance. Such renderings of system effects are nevertheless still lost in the short spaces and ephemeral nature of the daily news. And so we get the book-length works that we are probing here – works that are explicit in their desire to paint the big picture of both how the world works and how it *should* work. This makes such texts ideal sites to capture the dominant ethos and epistemology of globalization. Since each of these texts is also didactic – intended to fill in gaps in understanding and offer lessons as to what individuals and nations should believe and how they should behave – we get an unfolding of the common sense about the deepest elements of our reality: its epistemology, ontology, ethics, politics and view about the present and the future. Our analysis would be missing something essential if we did not also include some consideration of the manner in which popular cinema plays a role in this same kind of analysis and didacticism, which is why we end Part II by looking at a film about the present that embodies the limits and fantasies in the common sense we live.

Our claim is that the production of the common sense we find expressed in the texts we examine in Part II forms an essential element of the political project of globalization, and, indeed, is at the basis of emerging narratives of what comes after. Globalization was the process by which the same common sense – the same touchstones, the same general assumptions, the same beliefs in the character of geopolitics – was reproduced *everywhere*. This can be most clearly seen in the global belief in the necessity of capitalist economic systems: with few exceptions, we are all capitalists now. But it extends beyond economics, into all of the registers in which hegemony is expressed. *Of* and *after*.

Globalization is finished, but lives on, even if it is now possible to (for instance) focus on the role of US power within the world, or to fearlessly name capitalism as a system (that is, as a choice) rather than as fate. This is, at least, our contention. To establish this claim and to render clear the depth of its significance, we felt that it was important to go beyond the analysis of symptomatic expressions of common sense such as those found in these texts. In our choice of writers who might be seen as occupying the center or center-left of the political spectrum,

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our aim was to offer a less partisan and more complex examination of common sense than would be the case if we had singled out conservatives writing in favor of great-power politics and against any substantive change in the world. The authors we chose to focus on view the future as full of problems and in need of change; they do not cling to the way things are, but understand themselves as progressives who are offering ideas that will enable us to address the challenges we collectively face in a manner that will produce a better future. Even though this creates a more compelling site at which to probe the common sense of the global present and its aftermath, it does not fill in the whole picture that we want to paint.

The third part of this book stretches beyond the theoretical positions we develop in Part I and the textual narratives we examine in Part II. Is there a common sense about the present and the future that is now shared globally? If so, what are its claims and assumptions? Its political and cultural implications? In order to address these questions, we conducted a series of interviews with university students over three years (2006–2009). We carried out these interviews at sites around the world in an effort to grasp the similarities and differences in varied local and national contexts. Using the same set of questions in each case, we asked students (ages 18–30) enrolled in a range of undergraduate and graduate programs to tell us about social and political problems faced by their country and the world, the role of education in the world, their sense of the meaning of politics, capitalism, and democracy, their sense of the United States as a global actor, the role of global popular culture and their own culture, and their sense of what promises or threats the future held. For the students we spoke to, the Cold War was at best a dim memory. These students were truly the product of the era of globalization and its common sense – the first global generation, who viewed the world not just from the perspective of their own nations, but with a feeling for the fact that culture and politics operate at a global level, with serious implications for how they live and act locally and globally.

The interviews took place in many nations not usually included in wide studies of anti-Americanism and globalization, and certainly not typically placed in the same study together, in an effort to capture as

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best as possible the kinds of social framings that we were interested in understanding better. We spoke with students in the new capitalist democracies of Central Europe (Croatia and Hungary), in old European powers (Germany and Russia), and in nations that, each in its own complex way, have a relationship to the United States that is both friendly and filled with tension (Taiwan and Colombia). In the end, we spoke with 60 students in total, in interviews lasting approximately one hour each. Our intention was not simply to confirm the operations of a global common sense by looking for any and every trace of it in the perspectives and beliefs of these students. Nor were we looking for some simple antithesis of the positions and ideologies in the texts examined in Part II. Rather, we wanted to understand the points at which the ideas of this global generation and those of the thinkers in Part II converge and diverge, to see what preoccupations and expectations were present and absent in the outlook of each. We did not take the views of the students as a single bloc and oppose them to those who we took to be writing globalization into existence. As the third part will make clear, we were careful to be attentive to national and historical differences.

We were nevertheless struck strongly by how similar the views of the students were on almost every topic we spoke to them about. Without anticipating too much, what was surprising to us was their almost uniformly insightful and nuanced understanding of the nature of global power. But this was an insight that offered no sense of an ability to act to change the nature of a system which they saw as troubled, unjust, and out of balance. Perhaps the biggest gap between the common sense shared by the students and that articulated by the writers in Part II is a sense of a capacity for action in the world. The writing of the “thought leaders” is meant to generate change, even if they view the present as more or less fine as it is; the students, on the other hand, see a troubled world in need of fundamental change, but the very scale and scope of what would be required to set things aright means that all that they expect is a continuation of the status quo. After all, even if globalization (as ideology) might be seen as teetering, globalization (as the name for a period) has no end. And if there is no end, why should one imagine the future being any different than the present?

We'll leave the significance of this interpretive gap between thinkers and students for later in the book. This book draws attention to what current narratives of globalization and its aftermath offer us, and what they fail to. Our analysis is organized around a view of limits, gaps, and failures in these narratives. The writers we examine and the students we interview also point to limits and gaps, and the need to imagine new futures and to break with old habits of thinking and doing. It is critical for the analysis that follows that we establish clearly that our sense of how to understand what it means to speak of limits – to say, with Jimmy in Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weil's *The Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny*, “something's missing” – is very different than that found in these two groups, and importantly so. The intervention that we wish to make in understanding globalization and its aftermath is captured in the seven theses that follow. Taken together, these point to a different way of imagining a gap in or limit to a system, a theoretical point we articulate in the final section of this first part.

f. Seven Theses after Globalization

Whether one wants to change it or leave it the same, writing about the present and its problems always seems to come equipped with solutions. The structure of a typical book marked “current affairs” on the back cover is: (1) introduce a major change/development/discovery that necessitates the writing of the book (if possible, described through a neologism or catchphrase that might find its way on to the lips of writers for *Foreign Policy* or into the papers of students sitting in seminar rooms in the John F. Kennedy School of Government); (2) describe the theme of the book in some detail, making recourse to the assumptions and theories of common sense to push the narrative along; and (3) conclude with a discussion of what needs to be done to address the change/development/discovery in an appropriate fashion, that is, typically in a manner beneficial to the national community to which the author belongs (e.g., if [nation y] doesn't do [x], it will fall behind the rest of the world, especially competitors [a, b, and c]). The discovery in (1) is implicitly taken to affect the entire world; the

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solution in (3) is meant only for individual nations, or perhaps for a small group of friends. In every case, there is something that can be done to either take advantage of (1) or to mitigate its effects – that is, to save us.

The better way to think about the world? Think: nothing can save us.

Thesis 1: Education will not save us

Learning and knowledge are imagined to necessarily solve problems. The troubles of the world are explained as the result of ignorance or inadequate understanding. How to resolve these problems? Through education. Education is thought to be the process by which a void of knowledge is filled, only to be followed by new voids that will be filled, and so on, ad infinitum. But education's blind spot is not ignorance; rather it is what goes missing precisely when ignorance is overcome.

Even when education reflects upon its own limits, it fails to reflect upon how it participates in reproducing the very logic that structures these limits. Thus, dominant educational forms invariably understand themselves to be disinterested and neutral. In this role as disinterested interpreter, education is not addressed to a demand for knowledge, but rather to a demand to rationalize the nastiest excesses – from colonialism to environmental destruction to all of the “just wars” underwritten by academic expertise. With the best of intentions, education finds ever-ingenuous ways to justify these excesses, to justify injustice (always in the name of knowledge, in the name of neutrality). For every time education questions crime and corruption, it just as surely provides their most perfect rationales. Genocide, war, and the disregard for our fellow human beings are as much a product of education as ignorance. Producing justifications for violence in the name of education constitutes citizens who are internally split and perilously self-alienated. The dissimulated truth of education is power; and power dissimulated is more neurotic and dangerous than power acknowledged.

Knowing and *doing* are not one. To know about a problem, to understand why and how it works, does not necessarily produce an active response. Knowing and *change* are not one. To know about a

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problem, to understand why and how it works, does not necessarily produce an alteration of present circumstances – and many times this desire and accumulation of knowledge functions to reinforce and harden the very problem under examination. The limits of knowing can only be overcome by acting. Likewise, the limits of acting can only be overcome by knowing. But even this axiom does not go far enough. For the very recognition of this problem of praxis is still shaped by the dominant forms of education.

Standard university education only produces rigor within the confines of the academic disciplines. The university usually produces either a disciplined rigor (the very straight and solid scholarship within the disciplines); an unrigorous discipline (a weak scholarship that coasts on an already established disciplinary tradition); or an unrigorous undiscipline (the worst kind of academic amateurism that often hides behind the moniker “interdisciplinary”). And these three types of knowledge production are driven by the growth of the corporate form of the university (everything valued by quantitative results – “excellence” equaling the number of articles published, students placed, dollars raised) as well as the ideology of neutrality. The gap that separates knowing and doing, doing and changing, theory and practice, criticism and excellence, interest and disinterest, however, can only be engaged by a rigor that resists an education system dominated by the academic disciplines. We call this an *undisciplined rigor*, a mode of thought that necessarily challenges education. Education will not save us.

Thesis 2: Morality will not save us

The most common way of naming the causes of the errors and problems of the world is through moral categories. Right or wrong, good or evil: if something has come undone or gone badly astray, or, on the contrary, if things have worked out or some uncommon valor has been displayed, these are the concepts we trot out (as Obama said: “Evil does exist in the world”). Whether we use “wrong” or “evil” in a given situation depends on the degree of the misdeed or perhaps the rhetorical force with which we want to insist on morality. When

Google claims it will “do no evil,” we know it does not mean to hold off inquisitions or to keep demons at bay, but that despite its financial power it will act as a good corporate citizen.

While virtue or vice might be a common evaluative taxonomy, it should never be the place where one begins – or ends. Moral categories are intelligible only in relation to a pre-established code of conduct. To speak of “good” or “evil” is to affirm the existence and legitimacy of this code. What it cannot do is pass judgment on the system itself, nor engender an analysis of its axioms and formulae. Google can avoid doing evil *as* a corporate citizen. Whether the system that allows an abstract entity like a corporation to be a citizen is productive or destructive vis-à-vis the social whole is entirely left out of its calculations. One can do nothing but good, and still be bad.

But isn't it nevertheless meaningful to point to the egregious and immoral behavior of specific individuals? To say: everything would be fine, if only for the corporate thieves, the bad apples, the tax cheats? Such name calling points to a longing for justice, even as it indefinitely defers the possibility of justice. These isolated moral failings of the system confirm its force all the more strongly: when we call some individuals “evil” it must mean the system itself is “good.” A better solution is not to imagine the system itself as always already evil, but to push beyond such moralizing to an analysis of its operations. Morality will not save us. It wasn't hypocrisy that transformed religious good into the evil of the Crusades, but a satisfaction with a system of naming that affirms rather than questions.

Consider a thought experiment. What if every person in the world, every day and in every way, acted according to the dictates of morality? We would have the good teacher, the good doctor, the good lawyer, the good policeman, the good politician. Would the result of all this goodness be a “good” system, one free of poverty, injustice, and pollution? Remember: “good” is not the same as “equal.” If the presumption is that the good politician would be one who upholds the existing laws to the best of their ability, then the answer is “no.” If one imagines that the good politician would change these laws in order to produce equality, then the real issue isn't morality at all.

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Thesis 3: The nation will not save us

Contrary to what one might expect at a time when economic and financial borders have disappeared, nations and nationalisms are being taken out of the closet, dusted off, and once again worn about proudly and without embarrassment – despite being somewhat tattered and badly out of fashion. The twenty-first century was supposed to be an era when borders were lowered and the lines demarcating nations were erased, both on our maps and in our imaginations. And yet here nations are, proud as can be, standing at the ready to defend the values of Enlightenment civilization against the Islamic hordes or to insist that immigrants absorb their ideas and ideals. “Every nation is one people,” Johann Gottfried von Herder wrote, “having its own national form, as well as its own language.”³³ Evidently some nonsense manages not only to stand the test of time, but to become even more popular as the years pass by.

We are first born as human beings before we become subjects of nations, even if we tend to learn this the other way around. As human beings, we are one; as national subjects, we are necessarily separate, divided, and at each other’s throats. It is hardly a surprise, then, that nations cannot, separately or together, deal with problems that are of importance to the human instead of to their citizens. Despite all of the knowledge generated as to “what is to be done” with respect to the environment, scientific fact that even national leaders take as true, there is little or no substantive action on a threat to our collective futures. The political form of the nation blocks the way forward on a path that we all know we have to take.

Some radicals might disagree with this. Many see political possibilities in the policies and plans of their own individual nations. Isn’t it worth using the frame of the nation to create and defend policies – for instance, universal health care – given that such plans are in jeopardy in many parts of the world? Maybe. But this can’t be the final step. “Universal” doesn’t mean one nation – it means everyone. Health care in one nation is just as limited and just as much of a problem as “socialism in one country.” Such schemes will not save us.

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Let us be blunt. *We* don't need the nation – capital does. Without such political divisions, *especially* at a moment when economic transactions are borderless, there would be no differential zones of labor, no spaces to realize profit through the dumping of overproduction, no way to patrol surly populations who might want to resist capitalism, no release valve for speculative excess. The basic functions of nations make them perfect objects around which to organize the globe politically. The establishment of zones of inclusion and exclusion, control over the legal status of citizen-subjects, practices of demographic accounting and management, and the mobilization of bodies for use in territorial expansion and war – what could be better for capital? And what has been more disastrous for humanity as a whole?

Theodor Adorno writes: “The formation of national collectivities . . . common in the detestable jargon of war that speaks of the Russian, the American, surely also of the German, obeys a reifying consciousness that is no longer really capable of experience. It confines itself within precisely those stereotypes that thinking should dissolve.”³⁴ We say: exactly! In episodes of the *Star Trek* TV series, each time the *Enterprise* encounters a new world it finds on it a single planet-wide community of beings. How disappointed such aliens must be to meet up with humans, who have carried their national differences with them even into the future, even into the final frontier.

Thesis 4: The future will not save us

The future is colonized by the present. The very name and fantasy of the future is contained by the imaginative limits of the present. We pretend that we do not know what the future will bring and this somehow brings us relief, but this, too, is a way of containing the future. The most radical position to take in relation to the future is to not expect that it will come. And, yet, we continue to believe that the future has always come – that every past has been solved by the future. But we only think this as a way to justify our present, to make the present rational.

The present won't save us either. Without the future, the present is only something to be managed, to be sustained, to be tinkered with

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around its edges. To what else could the defeatist name “sustainable development” possibly refer? To live in a present that is not disturbed and troubled by a different future (even the radically different future of no future) is to submit to the limits of the present. We require not a different present and future, therefore, but a different way of understanding and living these temporal categories we call the present and the future.

The paradigmatic condition that flashes this different mode of being is that of the medical patient who has received a terminal diagnosis of a life-threatening disease only to live through medical advances that then turn the terminal illness into a chronic one. Now the disease remains life threatening, still incurable, however much the illness is managed and controlled into the future, perhaps indefinitely – a sort of sustainable development of the dying. One has been killed, but has yet to die and is now afforded a meantime that functions like a hole in time, an escape route to somewhere else and a trap door to where we began.

This way in which the formerly terminal live on as the “already dead” provides a model for social and ecological challenges. Think about some of the ecological forecasts that predict an already-too-late scenario of our environmental future, or any other it-is-only-a-matter-of-time situations in which the end is foretold, however long it might take to reach. Perhaps it is death itself that has always represented such a limit, a limit that turns the tables on us and returns to time its ultimate freedom.

The most radical field within medicine is palliative care, precisely because it has revalued the temporal field. The dying were generally given the lowest priority as death was understood as a medical defeat or statistical embarrassment. Why spend resources on someone who only has weeks to live? Why value something that will not give us enough return on our investment? Because the moment we stop deferring the future or hoping for another one is the moment something shifts in the present. But, and again, this shift is not a present or future with alternative content, but an alternative presentness and futurity to the reality of both the present and future.

This palliative model does not only relate to the dying patient. History, too, is dying. And so is the species. And the planet. What

would a palliative ward for these soon-to-be deaths look like? Like the dying patient, what if we understood the planet, the species, and history as needing a different type of care, a different way of relating to the present and to the future that was not shaped by instrumentality or the miraculous? How to care for something, for someone, knowing that it or they will end soon? What does it mean to act in the face of this end?

True, this relationship to the end might open up new ways of deferring or avoiding it. But we cannot know this in advance. Such a strategy would compromise the alternative attitude to the end that is required to transform it. Unless we think it differently, the future will not save us.

Thesis 5: History will not save us

Human nature does not exist. “Since time immemorial” is the most insidious excuse for human violence and “always” always betrays a fantasy for simplicity. When we appeal to a flattened past to justify the present we are invariably confusing two different modes. For example, “war has always existed and will continue to exist.” “Poverty has always existed and will always exist.” “Peace has always followed war and will always follow war.” These three trivially true statements are profoundly false. Of course, we can point to wars since the beginning of humankind, but the context of war, the logic of war (the very category of war) is something qualitatively different at different moments in history. Yes, there is something called poverty that fills the historical record, but how poverty is constructed and structured as well as what it means and feels like to be poor in the feudal period is incomparable to what that condition and experience is at the contemporary moment. Fixing these categories and pretending that they persist from one historical moment to the next always functions to repress or explain away our deepest fears – not to mention the possibilities of alternative ways of living and organizing ourselves.

History does not contain the hidden secret that we missed the first time around. Yes, secrets are hidden in history, but once they are uncovered they lose their autonomy and thus their significance – they

are immediately recuperated and plotted on a straight line to the present. History is important in order to remind us that the very category of history means something different to us today than it did in the past.

The appeal to past evil (personified by Hitler) is always a mistake. If there is evil, then it is always singular. It can never be defined by a set of criteria or repeated, only and always produced anew, making it incommensurable with what evil was before. And before that. To appeal to evil, therefore, invariably functions to falsely straighten and stretch history. Linear history manages evil by representing it as an unfortunate, however temporary slip, on the forward march of history. But not content with that, appeals to linear history go to the end: to justify evil. By appealing to the “eternal” and “continual” presence of evil, linear history assures the presence of evil in the present; in the process, it thus assures the lack of awareness about the historically contingent production of value.

The supposed transhistorical value of evil shapes and is shaped by the supposed transhistorical value of wealth. It should come as no surprise that the wealthy must obscure the historical origins of their wealth. But there is a catch. If immense wealth is not explained historically then it appears fraudulent, but when it is explained historically it comes dangerously close to revealing itself as theft. The arts collective REPOhistory investigates and recontextualizes historical representation through site-specific public art works in New York City. They might produce a sign of a corporate building (seamlessly fitted into the décor of the city) explaining how the building was acquired and any shady and aggressive practices that led to its founding. REPOhistory’s guerrilla interventions want to draw attention to the forgotten or suppressed narratives of wealth, while “revealing the spatial relationships inherent in power, usage and memory.” The appeal to space is important: by re-mapping history at the same time that it re-narrates it, REPOhistory temporarily resolves the inescapable problem of doing history: how to narrate both its continuities and discontinuities.³⁵

History exists. And we have access to the historical archive to prove it. But the continuous history of history does not exist without so many breaks and ruptures, which in turn separate us from the past so absolutely that we can only face it (and remember it) the way

we do a dream. And we have access to the historical archive to prove that as well.

Thesis 6: Capitalism will not save us

Capitalism is a system of human design and invention. It did not fall like manna from heaven, offered up by the gods to help us traverse the desert of the social. It is not akin to other systems that form a part of the natural order of things, such as the Krebs cycle (the process by which cells use oxygen in respiration) or the cardio-pulmonary (circulatory) system. Like any human social system, it is of necessity fallible, full of holes and problems that do not allow it to work according to the schemas worked out by economists. The *Homo economicus* that are meant to inhabit the ecosystem of capitalism are supposed to make rational decisions all the time. Even economists recognize that these rare beasts are guided more by what John Maynard Keynes called “animal spirits,” and less by that (no-less-invented) capacity named “reason.”³⁶ One might then expect a little humility from a system whose champions expect it to carry us forward into the future.

Let’s hold in abeyance for a moment the question of whether the thing we call capitalism properly constitutes a system, even if this is how we are apt to talk about it. If capitalism is necessarily incomplete, if it doesn’t constitute the best of all possible worlds, why the need to insist that it does? Capitalism has played a significant role in technological development. Economies have grown around the world over the past century, and even more so over the past two decades, improving living standards for people almost everywhere. Capitalism generates a cornucopia of new products. All well and good.

But does it come as a surprise to anyone that everything about our economic system isn’t all that great? The freedom that is often associated with capitalism is experienced by the vast majority of the world’s population as servitude: the repetitive boredom of a workaday world that one has no hope of escaping. From shockingly unequal levels of wealth distribution (the top 10 percent in the United States receiving 50 percent of its income share in 2006)³⁷ to deep financial insecurity for most of us, there are problems aplenty with the regular,

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systemic operations of capitalism. The operations of financial capitalism benefit only the very rich; it's hard to defend the social good of the abstract production of money by money. Capitalism develops wealth, sure. But where does this wealth originate? Is it like a magician pulling a rabbit from a hat – presto! Absolutely: for as with magic, there is no real magic there, only a sleight of hand that distracts us from seeing that the work of many is for the benefit of the few.

Capitalism has flaws, some very deep ones. It is foolish to imagine that this system, a creature of a specific historical moment, can overcome every limit in a way that benefits the common. It is no one's panacea. Why, then, does one find it defended so strongly? Like a bit of scripture one cannot argue against for fear of blasphemy?

Those who want to insist on the irrefutable necessity of capitalism are repeating (without knowing it) Gottfried Leibniz's argument about the nature of the world. God created the world; if this world of ours is the world that God chose to stick with (after trying out other combinations, one must suppose), it must be the best of all possible worlds. Sure, there is evil and suffering, but this is part of the optimum mix to make the whole what it is, or to make it possible at all. Evil is necessary and can't be done away with; suffering is productive because it incites humans to action. Sounds a lot like the kind of argument that the rich make on behalf of the necessity of the fears and terrors produced by capitalism: it gets the lazy poor to the workhouse. Voltaire's *Candide* famously ridiculed this view of the world. Dr Pangloss's misplaced and irrational optimism in the fundamental good of the way things are seems to be repeated by the many who want to insist that there is nothing but capitalism. It exists – it thus must be part of God's plan! Like *Candide*, the rest of us know better.

Thesis 7: Common sense will not save us

This is the easiest point to grasp, and yet the hardest one to explain so that it is grasped correctly. Common sense will not save us. We face too many challenges, threats, and problems to rely on old ways of

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doing things. Who could disagree? Writers of every political stripe who wish to direct their energies toward these problems exhort us to “think outside the box,” or demand that we come up with alternative ways of seeing things. In other words, like the famous ad says, almost everyone is imploring everyone else to “think different.”

Common sense is a matter of form more than content. Common sense is universal, in the sense that it is a feature of every human society. Within a certain context, common sense takes a specific content. The content of our common sense – a common sense now rendered global – includes the six theses listed above. These theses do not exhaust our common sense – hardly! What they do identify are the social axioms that we imagine will save us from ourselves. In other words, these are the elements of common sense that we typically draw upon to save us from the problems produced by our common sense.

Ah, what philosophical puzzle building! A necessary system of ideas that folds inescapably in on itself! It is perfectly fair to ask: what is it that allows us to see common sense as other than what it is? Is not our own critical perspective just more common sense?

Common sense is what everybody knows. It is all manner of assumed knowledge, from the banal to the erudite. It presumes to already offer the answers to all questions, even if some work needs to be done to recombine some of its tenets or to extend some of its insights a little further. Such new insights are a form of “thinking outside the box” that congratulates itself for its innovation and radicality, but in fact stays within the range of what is deemed sensible. To give an example: the need for more energy and the problems of global warming might lead to the invention of various forms of green energy. However, a hard look at the question of “need” in this case – a need fueled by a system for which a decrease in economic growth is simply not an option – remains an unthinkable limit. Common sense always impedes the imagination of limits. The imperative to “think outside the box” serves mainly to reaffirm the legitimacy and value of the box.

When we say that common sense is what everybody knows we do not mean to invoke ideology in the usual sense of this term. It isn’t that we are blocked from seeing the “bad” aspects of the systems, prohibited

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(for some reason, by someone) from understanding how things work. Indeed,

Everybody knows that the dice are loaded
Everybody rolls with their fingers crossed
Everybody knows that the war is over
Everybody knows that the good guys lost
Everybody knows the fight was fixed
The poor stay poor, the rich get rich
That's how it goes
Everybody knows³⁸

What is missing is not knowledge, but a figuration of its systematicity.

Let us be clear. Common sense is not properly understood as an error in our way of seeing things, if by “error” we mean that there is a solution to common sense that takes the shape either of some position completely outside and beyond it (the epistemic fantasy par excellence), or that its “mistakes” can somehow be corrected – for instance, by rendering the lyricism of poetry into the certainty of mathematics, as in Yevgeny Zamyatin’s *We*.³⁹ We make no affirmation of something beyond common sense. But this is not the same as to say we are fated to what already is. The six previous theses are rendered in the negative. The aim of these negations is neither to pass judgment on nor to eliminate the propositions they disclose in a direct and simple way. Rather, what they do is render the limits of thought more transparent to itself than it might otherwise be. It is only at this point that critique can begin – again, to be clear, not from outside of common sense, but from a position *within it* that recognizes that neither its positive content nor its guiding imperatives and axioms exhaust the whole field of thought. *The limits we are pointing to are limits produced by common sense, which common sense insists can only be addressed by those processes which generated the limits.* One need not play fancy games of ontology or epistemology to recognize a space in which critique can originate.

When we say that common sense cannot save us, we are in fact making a positive claim. What we need is critique that addresses itself to analyzing and changing society as a whole. The theoretical insights of

common sense aim at explanation and understanding, but never at change at the level of the whole. This, however, is the challenge that is necessary for thought to undertake today.

g. Something's Missing

So, all of these somethings (education, morality, nation, future, history, capitalism, common sense) will not save us. Nothing will save us. What is this *nothing* that will save us? Indeed, this “nothing” can be understood as “something” (and not merely due to the trick of grammar that makes nothing a noun). But first things first: nothing is the very thing that structures these somethings. There is always something missing in these somethings – which is nothing. This nothing is the thing without which something would not exist. Constellations are the nothing that holds the stars together. The space in between the branches is the nothing that holds the tree together. Capitalism is the nothing that holds capital together.

Capitalism is nothing. It's nowhere to be found. One cannot hold it and measure it and prove it. But the stuff of capitalism is everywhere and readily accessible to study. All of the commodities, the bank notes, the heavy lifting, the extreme consumer desire, the prized philanthropic acts, the neuroses (from hypersensitivity to disassociation), the carbon emissions, the floods and fires and other socially generated “natural disasters,” the digital ones and zeroes that instantaneously transmit our communications, entertainment, and money around the world, are not capitalism – they are the effects of capitalism. Capitalism is nothing.

The first meaning of “something's missing,” therefore, is that *this nothing that is capitalism and that is something, is missing*. Since nothing's missing even though it exists, nothing becomes a matter of belief. We must believe that nothing exists even though we have no positive evidence to prove it. It is for this reason that capitalism is a matter of belief. And today, more and more people are beginning to believe again. Born again. Not necessarily as Leftists or Rightists, but as

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believers in the system called capitalism – or, more to the point, in the existence of the very category of “system.”

This belief in system today returns only after globalization discourse no longer conceals capitalism. During the heyday of globalization, no one believed in the system of capitalism – not only was it nowhere to be found, but it was constantly being concealed. It was out of sight, out of sense, out of our capacity to believe in it. It existed not as system, but as everything – and everything without nothing only exists as fantasy. Now the relations that exist between things, between nations, between past and present, rich and poor, ally and enemy (and a relation is the perfect figure for nothing!) are in the process of being deconcealed. What comes after globalization? The deconcealment of the absent relations that make up, and are made by, our lives – the deconcealment of nothing.

These nothing spaces that come between everything have been the most crucial markets for capital. Our urban spaces are saturated with advertisements, not just on billboards but on our bodies and in our dreams. Every crack is filled with slogans, every piece of available space is occupied like enemy territory. Likewise, time is also saturated, every second filled with jingles and naked bodies, and more slogans – even slogans imploring us to stop looking at slogans. Go to a sporting event and try to focus on the event. There is not a moment that is not occupied – there is no in-between time, no time-outs, not a single instant that is not controlled in advance. Any counter-insurgency of time is immediately snuffed out. Any counter-effect is stillborn without the time to grow and live. Even the future is filled. What is personal and national debt but an occupation of future time?

This is also to say that nothing might not change, but our relationship to nothing can. The way we understand, represent, believe, and experience it changes from one historical moment to the next. In fact, we might even narrate a modern history of our relationship to nothing. As industrial capitalism heated up in the nineteenth century, *nothing* was more readily experienced. Being displaced from the country to the city, to shift one’s dependence from the land to factory wages, made it easier to represent and believe in the relations that structured everyday life. The relations of imperialism, with its

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unambiguous and rigid organization of metropolis and colony, colonizer and colonized, were impossible to miss. And following the 1920s and 1930s, the stark realities of what was on the other side of capitalism (from bread lines to fascist rallies, all the way to the concentration camps) put the relations (the nothing) of the system on display again. The same goes for the Cold War: everything was organized and understood in terms of bipolarity, different systems organized by the space (the space of ideology, the space of production, the space of cultural value) that separated them.

But with the oil crises of the 1970s, the integrity of the two systems of the Cold War began to come apart, and the globalization of one of the systems (capitalism) usurped the other system. By the time the Berlin Wall fell, the usurpation was complete and the space that existed between the two systems disappeared. But when there is only one predominant system, everything changes. In particular, the experience, understanding, and representation of the system itself. This is the moment of full-blown globalization. The system of capitalism went missing as the blowhards for everything (from all sides of the political spectrum) became louder. Something went missing. And that something was the system of nothing, or nothing as system. With the mortgage crisis cum worldwide financial meltdown in 2008, we are beginning to miss something again. *The system has returned and, therefore, something's missing.*

One way to imagine this return of something's missing is as the return of the imagination of something's missing. To believe in system again is to believe in other systems, not only failed or defeated systems of the past, but in future systems. We are not interested in offering up a specific blueprint of a future system. Rather we want to argue for the necessity of imagining alternative systems. All types of systems: absurd ones and dangerous ones and impossible ones and unthinkable ones. To propose and take seriously other systems is not only about inspiring analyses of these alternatives. It also exercises our powers to imagine system as such. Science fiction dystopias, for example, represent miserable societies and disastrous systems, but the very act of imagining such a dystopia is a utopian act – an act that believes in the integrity of a system and how such systems come into being and go out of being.

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The “end of history” comes to an end when we can start to imagine the beginning and end of systems.

After Globalization, therefore, makes three key claims: (1) following the global economic crisis of 2008, the belief in, and consciousness of, what presently structures the world (the nothing that is capitalism) has returned; (2) this return of belief enables and inspires the desire for another nothing – another system into which capitalism can mutate; and (3) this desire for another nothing, for something else, shakes up what is possible. “Something’s missing” is both the *nothing* to which we are alive again and the radical future that we *miss* despite being unable to expressly prescribe, imagine, or desire it. “Something’s missing” opens up to what comes *after globalization* – an opening that promises a little more peace and a little more equality than the bag of goods we are once again being sold.

Notes

1. For examples of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s comments on world literature (*Weltliteratur*) see “Some Passages Pertaining to the Concept of World Literature,” in *Comparative Literature: The Early Years: An Anthology of Essays*, ed. H-J. Schulz and P. Rhein (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), 1–11.
2. For most recent figures on comparative levels of military expenditure around the world, see figures compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which are available on its website: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/> (accessed October 15, 2010). In 2009, US military spending measured as a percentage of global spending was 43 percent.
3. The figure usually cited for box office receipts for *Fahrenheit 9/11* is US\$119.2 million. See note in Michael Cieply, “Muscular ‘Expendables’ Enlivens Battle for Studio,” *New York Times*, August 16, 2010. Available at: <http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/muscular-expendables-enlivens-battle-for-studio/> (accessed October 15, 2010).
4. Moore told the media on several occasions that he hoped that the film would influence the outcome of the 2004 US presidential election.

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See, for instance, Martin Kasindorf and Judy Keen's interview with Moore, "Fahrenheit 9/11: Will It Change Any Voter's Mind?" *USA Today*, June 24, 2004. Available at: www.usatoday.com/news/politic-selections/nation/president/2004-06-24-fahrenheit-cover_x.htm (accessed October 15, 2010).

5. See for example Brendon O'Connor and Martin Griffiths, eds, *The Rise of Anti-Americanism* (New York: Routledge, 2005), and Brendon O'Connor, ed., *Anti-Americanism* (Oxford: Greenwood, 2007), a four-volume set collecting academic writing as well as original source material on anti-Americanism. Other examples of such texts are discussed in Part III.
6. In the wake of 9/11, an enormous number of books have been written assessing the status of US power – its decline, continuation, or rise, or its legitimacy or illegitimacy – with respect to competitor regions or nations. In English alone, a full list would run in the hundreds – enough to create a new genre of books that cut across political science, international relations, advice manuals for foreign policy makers, and pop-psychology at a national level. This includes titles such as: Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Atlantic Books, 2004); Richard Crockatt, *After 9/11: Cultural Dimensions of American Global Power* (New York: Routledge, 2007); Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008); Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds, *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002); Ivo Daalder and James D. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003); Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, *The Next American Century: How the U.S. Can Thrive as Other Powers Rise* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert Harvey, *Global Disorder: America and the Threat of World Conflict* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003); Michael Hirsh, *At War with Ourselves: Why America Is Squandering Its Chance to Build a Better World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Michael H. Hunt, *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

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- University Press, 2002); Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, *America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked* (New York: Times Books, 2006); Charles Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Knopf, 2002); Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, *Ethical Realism: A Vision for America's Role in the World* (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Kishore Mahbubani, *Beyond the Age of Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Robert W. Merry, *Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005); Cullen Murphy, *Are We Rome?: The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007); Ralph Peters, *New Glory: Expanding America's Global Supremacy* (New York: Penguin, 2005); Jeremy Rifkin, *The European Dream: How Europe's Vision of the Future Is Quietly Eclipsing the American Dream* (New York: Penguin, 2004); Dennis Ross, *Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in the World* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 2007); Rockwell A. Schnabel and Francis X. Rocca, *The Next Superpower?: The Rise of Europe and Its Challenge to the United States* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007); Nancy Soderberg, *The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005); and Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (New York: Norton, 2005).
7. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
 8. See Giovanni Arrighi, "Hegemony Unravelling," *New Left Review* 32 (2005): 23–80 and *New Left Review* 33 (2005): 83–116; David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Neil Smith, *The Endgame of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
 9. See Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons of Global Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2003) and *Colossus: The Price of America's Empire* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
 10. The US share of global GDP declined to 27.7 percent in 2006 from 30.8 percent in 2000. See www.data360.org for figures (accessed October 15, 2010).
 11. In addition to those texts listed in note 6 above, see Dan Diner and Sander L. Gilman, *America in the Eyes of the Germans: An Essay on*

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- Anti-Americanism*, trans. Allison Brown (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1996); J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home? Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996); Denis Lacorne, Jacques Rupnik, and Marie-France Toine, eds, *The Rise and Fall of Anti-Americanism: A Century of French Perception* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); and “What We Think of America,” special edition of *Granta* 77 (Spring 2002), which includes articles by Ariel Dorfman, Michael Ignatieff, Ivan Klíma, Doris Lessing, Orhan Pamuk, Harold Pinter, J.M. Coetzee, and others.
12. See Russell A. Berman, *Anti-Americanism in Europe: A Cultural Problem* (New York: Hoover Institution Press, 2004); and Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (New York: Penguin, 2004).
 13. For example, see Christopher Connery, “On the Continuing Necessity of Anti-Americanism,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 2.3 (2001): 399–405; and Andrew Ross and Kristin Ross, *Anti-Americanism* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).
 14. The 2011 Budget Request for the US Office of Homeland Security is \$54.7 billion. To track the growth in expenditures, see the documents collected on Whitehouse’s Office of Management and Budget website: www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals/ (accessed October 27, 2010).
 15. For example, such influential texts as Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1983; rev. edn, 1991); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
 16. Daniele Archibugi has made an argument for a “cosmopolitical democracy” that would maintain the existing system of states while creating a new global democratic structure in which the planet’s populace could cast ballots and elect those who control the supranational functions currently carried out by organizations such as the World Bank or the World Trade Organization. See Archibugi, “Cosmopolitical Democracy,” in Archibugi, ed., *Debating Cosmopolitics* (New York: Verso, 2003), 1–15.

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17. For an overview of theories of globalization, see Imre Szeman, "Globalization," *Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies*, ed. John Hawley (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 209–217; and "Globalization," *The Johns Hopkins Guide to Literary Theory and Criticism*, ed. Michael Groden, Martin Kreiswirth, and Imre Szeman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 458–465.
18. Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992); and Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions in Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
19. Amongst the most powerful of these deflationary accounts of the claims of globalization – especially with respect to the idea of a global economy – is Paul Hirst and Graeme Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).
20. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 4.
21. Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Knopf, 2008).
22. Kagan, *Return of History*, 3.
23. *Ibid.*, 5.
24. *Ibid.*, 12.
25. *Ibid.*, 97.
26. Text and video of Obama's Berlin speech can be found on-line at <http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/berlinvideo/> (accessed October 28, 2010).
27. Barack Obama, "The Nobel Peace Prize 2009 – Presentation Speech." Nobelprize.org. 13 Sep 2010. Available at: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/presentation-speech.html (accessed October 28, 2010).
28. The full transcript of Obama's speech at the West Point Military Academy on December 1, 2009, can be found at: www.stripes.com/news/transcript-of-president-obama-s-speech-at-west-point-1.96961 (accessed October 28, 2010).
29. Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Blimes, "The Three Trillion Dollar War," *London Times*, February 23, 2008. Available at: www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article3419840.ece
30. Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 69.

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31. Pierre Bourdieu, *On Television* (New York: New Press, 1999), 6.
32. Franco Moretti, "New York Times Obituaries," *New Left Review* 2 (2000): 105.
33. J.H. von Herder, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, trans. T. Churchill (London, 1800), 166.
34. Theodor Adorno, "On the Question: 'What is German?,'" *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, trans. H.W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press), 205.
35. For information on its activities, see www.repohistory.org (accessed October 28, 2010).
36. See two recent additions to an ever-expanding field of books: George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, *Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); and Justin Fox, *The Myth of The Rational Market* (New York: Collins Business, 2009).
37. See Emmanul Saez, "Striking It Richer: Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States." Available at: <http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2006prel.pdf> (accessed October 28, 2010). Saez has written a number of influential papers on this topic with Thomas Piketty.
38. Leonard Cohen, "Everybody Knows," *I'm Your Man*. Columbia, 1988.
39. Yevgeny Zamyatin, *We*, trans. Natasha Randall (New York: Modern Library, 2006). The reference is to the activities of R-13, a poet in One State, and his method of approaching his craft.

