

The Temptation of Fascism and the Will to Survive (1939–51)

If we view Francoism as a single period, we see that the year 1959 was crucial, not just economically as a result of the change that occurred at that moment, but also politically because that year saw a blurring of any identification with the fascist model and the dictatorship became more bureaucratic in style. It was no mere chance that the emphasis on politics in the period immediately following 1939 coincided with an economic situation that had become disastrous through mismanagement by those in power.

Dividing the Franco years into 5-year periods also makes sense. If 1959 is taken to be a pivotal year, the two decades preceding it can be seen as leading up to it while the following 15 years show the consequences of the change that occurred in that year. The first decade of the Franco regime was characterized by internal unity. During the early years of the dictatorship every effort was made to align the victorious Spain that had won the war with the powers that had been its allies during the conflict. That effort provides the key to the entire period and explains why Spain was later ostracized.

What happened in effect was that there was an attempt to rebuild Spain according to a model that was the complete antithesis of what had gone before. The attempt to establish fascism within the country was closely linked to an expansionist policy outside, in the same way as survival, thanks to cosmetic changes from 1945 onwards, focused Spain's foreign policy entirely on the need simply to survive. As for political opposition to the regime, during World War II and afterwards it kept going by remaining focused on how the Civil War had ended. One can even go so far as to say that Spanish culture of the period was deeply marked by the immediate impact of the recent conflict.

If it makes sense to view the period as a single chronological unit, it also makes just as much sense to divide it up. The World War II years were not only marked by Spain's foreign policy but were also the first moments in the new regime's political journey. Furthermore, it was the period in which Franco served his apprenticeship and learned his political skills. In the period that followed, one might say that this apprenticeship was completed, and what became central to life in Spain was its ability to resist outside pressure.

A Failed Attempt to Make Spain Fascist

In the months following the Civil War Spain seemed to move towards an alignment with the Axis, more in terms of political institutions than foreign policy. Concerning the latter, the fact that Spain joined the anti-Komintern pact and left the League of Nations (*Sociedad de Naciones*) was proof of its ideological tendencies.

Visits by Spanish leaders to Germany and Italy confirm that this desire for alignment existed, especially the talks that took place in Rome in May 1939 between the fascist leaders and Serrano Suñer. This rising star in Franco's government enjoyed a close relationship with Ciano and even with Mussolini, and it was this that earned him a reputation as the representative of fascist politics in Spain. Nor was Serrano's reputation derived solely from the regime's international alignment; it came also from its internal politics. Mussolini, by advising Franco not to proclaim Spain a monarchy and by emphasizing the need to "talk to the people," was in effect suggesting that the regime become more fascist. Ciano's visit to Spain in July confirmed this sense of there being an alignment with Italy. Discussions in the Spanish Council of Ministers – Franco's cabinet – now revealed clear tension between those who were ready to follow the rising star, Serrano, and those who were not.

Although crisis had been brewing for some time, it finally erupted in August; by then Franco had already done away with the monarchist Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez. The change in government signaled victory for Serrano, who from that moment until 1942 was the key figure in Spanish politics. A cultured and intelligent lawyer, Serrano was superior to the rest of the regime's emerging political class, though he by no means lacked faults, being megalomaniac, ambitious, tending to foster a personality cult, intemperate, and secretive. As well as keeping his government portfolio, Serrano also

managed to take on the presidency of the party's Political Junta; from then on he was addressed as "Minister President" by a press that he himself controlled. It is even perfectly possible that the young generals serving in various ministries for the Armed Services at that time (Juan Yagüe, Agustín Muñoz Grandes, and José Enrique Varela) were there not only because Franco trusted them more than those who had brought him to power but because from Serrano's point of view they were more susceptible to his own influence. There were in the new government personalities from the traditional Catholic right, but only as technical advisers or because they were close to Serrano (José Ibáñez Martín and José Larraz); the monarchist presence was much less evident – a clear sign that Franco saw it as potentially dangerous. The Carlist presence (Esteban Bilbao) was manageable.

The all-powerful Franco–Serrano duo was strengthened by a number of measures. Shortly before the governmental crisis, General Queipo de Llano was sent to Italy; in practice, he was exiled. At the same time, legislation was passed on the position of the Chief of State who, from then onwards, "on a permanent basis," would be able to exercise the functions of government without need of prior consultation with the cabinet. In fact, thanks to measures such as these, Franco acquired more absolute power than even Stalin – who had, at least in theory, to obey a Constitution – or Hitler, who was answerable to a parliament. The ratification of the party statutes, praised by Mussolini, took on characteristics that made them virtually identical to those of the fascists. Not only were the National Council and its Political Junta endowed with decisive political importance but also provision was made for controlling trade unions and armed militias. The economic plan approved in October 1939 was notable for its tendency towards autarchy.

If there was indeed a will to make Spain more fascist, one must ask why fascism never came anywhere near gaining control there. The reply to this question may be found in what actually happened in a situation in which internal politics were closely bound up with the international situation. In brief, it would only have been possible for the regime to become fascist if Franco's Spain had decided to join in World War II on the side of the Axis. In 1939 and 1940 any attempt to increase fascist influence would have been in its earliest stages and was unlikely to mature, and if the intention had been clear it nonetheless had fundamental weaknesses from the start.

The role of the army in the Spain that emerged victorious from the Civil War was of supreme importance and there was never the slightest

doubt that it would have to be a major player were conflict to arise, in contrast to what happened in, say, Romania. One must bear in mind that in 1939, 80 percent of posts in the Administration were reserved for ex-combatants (and not, for example, for party militants) and that at least 25 percent of all political posts were given to men with an Army background. We have already noted that during the Civil War the military dominated the Administration in the rearguard and that in the wake of the conflict they took on the task of repression. Even in the Party's National Council, if 24 percent of its members were party veterans, about another 20 percent were from the Armed Services. As late as 1951, 27 percent of mayors and local councilors were Civil War ex-combatants. Any victory of the Party over the army could only have been possible if the Party had managed to establish for itself a more influential role in Spanish society.

The early years of the post-Civil War period illustrate clearly just how limited any growth in fascist influence actually was. The Party published figures which seemed to show its strength: in 1939 it had 650,000 members, and in 1945 1,000,000, in addition to 2,000 government employees and another 10,000 in the union organization, and it was no doubt monopolized by the most orthodox Falangists. The role of Carlism decreased: the position it occupied allowed it to retain some influence but it was marginalized and limited in the impact it might have. As regards the Party, the Carlist attitude can be summed up in what an ex-minister, the Conde de Rodezno, told Franco: it would not have been openly hostile but it certainly lacked solidarity. It was only in Navarre that Carlism had any real influence. Membership of the Party varied according to regions. In Catalonia it was tiny before the outbreak of the Civil War; it could only draw members from the anti-Catalanist right and a few local notables. In the Basque Country the Party managed to gain the support of traditionalists at a municipal level and of those linked to Falange in positions of power in the provinces. Over a large part of the Iberian Peninsula traditional elites were of the right. It is possible to discern a limited achievement of the aim of "nationalizing the masses" in the incorporation into the Party of former left-wing militants: A study of the Aljarafe district in the province of Seville shows that 15 percent of Party members came from left-wing militias and expressed radical opinions with uncompromising directness. This explains why it embarked on a mission of social action which went so far as to include speaking out strongly against monopolies. At the same time, the fact that it was a leading force in society meant that

it could also play a policing role. Whatever the situation, its powers of coercion and its propaganda against its opponents had a far greater impact than any willingness to sign up to its ideas. Despite censorship, only sections of the press and the media could ever be considered tools of “fascist expansion” at the time. By around 1940 it was obvious that the result of the Party’s attempt to influence society would remain ambiguous: in practice it fostered fear and passive acceptance rather than whole-hearted commitment.

Nor did the institutions that governed the Party work well. The National Council remained a divided body that in fact did very little, so much so that there is not much to be gained by discussing it further. More or less the same could be said of the Political Junta. The Institute of Political Studies (*Instituto de Estudios Políticos*), which was supposedly the intellectual breeding-ground of fascism, never matched up to its reputation. It might initially have been thought that in organizations aimed at young people there might have been a will to see fascism spread. However, the revolutionary Spanish Students’ Union (*Sindicato Español Universitario* or SEU) finally lost its battle for life in 1941 with the disappearance in Russia of its principal radical leader, Enrique Sotomayor. Although the SEU had more than 50,000 members, there were always obvious gaps in its coverage of Spanish territory, the most obvious being in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In 1943, compulsory membership became the rule for all students. The Youth Front (*Frente de Juventudes*) created in December 1940 never had more than 13 percent of young people on its lists, and the percentage of women was even lower. Unlike what had been on offer in Germany, training was traditional, being run by soldiers and primary school teachers who had left their 20s far behind them, so without ever entirely losing its Falangist character, the Youth Front drifted towards educational and sporting activities. A parallel voluntary organization, Franco’s Falange Youth Groups (*Falanges Juveniles de Franco*) – whose identification with the leader is itself significant – barely attracted 18 percent of young men and 8 percent of women. Last of all, the section of the Party aimed at women favored the domestic ideal of the model housewife that typified the traditional Spanish right. The *Sección Femenina* of Falange offered the mother as its role model rather than the young revolutionary. Its leader, Pilar Primo de Rivera, left no one in any doubt that “the real duty of women to their Fatherland is to bring up families on firm foundations of austerity and cheerfulness where all that is traditional can flourish.” Nothing was so worthy of praise as a woman’s “submissiveness”

to men. Numbers of members never even reached a third of those in equivalent organizations in Italy; women barely took part in mass processions and could rarely be photographed doing gymnastics.

The Party quickly lost the political battle in two areas. In the summer of 1940 militias were set up but not much was achieved beyond laying down very elementary guidelines for mobilization. The military makes militias superfluous and in Franco's Spain the initial victory that had laid the foundations for the regime belonged unequivocally to the Army. Falangist union organizations did not play a major role in the national economy either. According to the Law on the Bases of Union Organization (*Ley de Bases de Organización Sindical*) of December 1940, although unions claimed to represent "the entire people organized as a working militia" the law did not include chambers of commerce or members of the professional classes. There is nothing of greater significance in the blocking of the revolutionary aims of the Falangist union organization than the fact that it was an army general, Andrés Saliquet, who denounced the man in charge of it, Merino, as a former Freemason. In Mussolini's Italy, the Party controlled and put blocks on union activity; in Spain, the force that exercised the greatest power – the Army – closed the door on Merino by denouncing him.

Mention of the Party takes us on into World War II. For Franco's Spain the invasion of Poland was not welcome news but it responded by aligning itself with its Civil War allies. For the first months of World War II Franco's Spain was closely aligned with fascist Italy but was in no state to think of taking part in the conflict, not even to the limited extent that the Duce considered his own country able to participate. In the event, in April 1940, when Mussolini decided to enter the war, he told Franco first, and when in May it became clear that France had been defeated, the Falangist press began to demand the return of Gibraltar. The spectacular defeat of France – Spain's traditional enemy in Morocco – immediately meant that Spain was tempted to join in the war in an attempt to gain some benefit in a radically new European order. Two days after Mussolini joined the war, Franco and Serrano modified Spain's position and put it on a footing of "non-belligerence," which in Italy's case had meant "pre-belligerence." The fact that over those same days Italian warplanes were allowed to overfly Spanish territory to bomb the British made participation seem more likely.

For Spain actually to take part in World War II it would have needed its economic situation to be better than it was and for there to be a greater

degree of internal cohesion. By December 1939 there was already discontent among the highest-ranking military officers directed at Franco and strong reservations concerning Serrano who, in the eyes of many, had too much power concentrated in his person, gave too much support to a Falange that was too revolutionary, was dominant, megalomaniac, and even seemed not to get on well with those who had helped to bring him to power. In January 1940, General Muñoz Grandes was replaced as Minister Secretary General of the *Movimiento* after only a few months in the position. It is worth underlining the fact that a regime that prided itself on following the model of fascist Italy should have appointed a soldier as leader of the Party when it was in fact a soldier who would replace Mussolini in 1943.

The Temptation to Intervene and Internal Conflict (1940–2)

It has been written that a triumphant Germany immediately put pressure on Spain to join in World War II and that this pressure was insistent and lasting even if it never succeeded in breaking down Franco's resistance. What actually happened, however, was that after Germany's victory in France, the Spanish leadership identified totally with the Axis and this situation lasted, with different nuances and some hesitations, until well on into 1944. German pressure to induce Spain to intervene in the war, though strong for several months, did not last very long. The initiative concerning Spain's possible entry into the conflict was taken not by Germany but by the leaders of Franco's Spain. In mid June 1940, the *caudillo* sent General Jorge Vigón to hold talks with Hitler and express Spain's willingness to become a participant in the conflict. On this occasion Spain for the first time made substantial territorial demands. These consisted – and remained so for some months – of the extension of its possessions in the Sahara and Guinea and, above all, of the occupation of the whole of Morocco and the part of Algeria that had been colonized by Spaniards. There was not a single section of the Franco regime that was not in favor of these imperialist ambitions. If for Falange Spain's imperial destiny seemed likely to be fulfilled by this process, for Africanists who had fought in North Africa long-cherished ambitions would be realized. The Falangists, nonetheless, were the most ambitious (and least realistic) and at times demanded Spanish expansion into the south of France and Portugal too.

There was never the slightest chance that the Franco regime's aims would ever be achieved because the position of Hitler's Germany on the issue was a far cry from what was widely desired in Madrid. The Führer was never a strong advocate of a historical justice that would allow Spain to fulfill its aspirations; for Hitler Spain was a not very important country that he expected to follow his lead of its own free will and be ready to furnish him with raw materials and strategic advantages in return for almost nothing. In Hitler's view, not even the Mediterranean was of any importance. Once France was defeated, he hesitated briefly over where Germany should next expand, finally deciding on eastern Europe with the result that Spain was no longer of any interest to him.

Having outlined the German position, we can now return to the events that were now unfolding. In July 1940, the Spanish Foreign Minister Juan Luis Beigbeder suggested occupying part of French Morocco on the pretext of controlling disturbances there. The operation never took place, probably because the French kept up a high level of military presence in the area and because Germany was never likely to authorize it. There was, however, an attempt to replicate this kind of spectacular decision in the style of Mussolini which, although it was somewhat of a caricature, did not, unlike the Italian model, end in a fiasco. At the very moment when German troops were entering Paris, Spanish troops occupied Tangiers, announcing the move as irreversible. The French representative was expelled from the city and a German consulate was set up there, whose actual aim was espionage. In practice it would be as late as 1944, when the war seemed to be turning decisively in favor of the Allies, that Spain would come round to considering the zone it controlled as international once more.

Shortly afterwards in 1940 Spain made concessions of considerable strategic advantage to the Germans: by July there was a German military mission in Spain preparing for an eventual retaking of Gibraltar, besides which, throughout 1940 and 1941, thanks to what was called Operation Moor, a total of 18 German submarines were re-provisioning in Spain. This allowed them to extend their radius of action considerably – so much so that they could reach as far as northern Brazil. The Germans also benefited from the information provided by the Spanish secret services, and even such people as Serrano handed over to Nazi diplomats dispatches from neutral ambassadors and anyone whose information might be interesting to them, such as, for example, the Duke of Alba, Spain's representative in London.

The German presence on the French–Spanish border signaled imminent danger for what was to become the United Kingdom’s main base on the Old Continent: Portugal. The Portuguese might well have feared that Germany would attack through Spain with Spanish help and it was in these circumstances that negotiations took place, beginning at the end of June 1940 and ending a month later. The treaty was seen by the Spanish as a way of drawing Portugal away from the British cause and into its own camp. The British were not at all worried that their ally should sign up to such an agreement because it did not alter Britain’s own policy towards Spain, outlined before Germany had ever become a threat. In Britain’s view, a friendly Spain was desirable but a neutral Spain was essential. This was why it sent as its ambassador to Madrid an important Conservative, Sir Samuel Hoare. The ambassador, as eagerly as the Foreign Office, favored maintaining a stance that would incline Spain towards neutrality by exerting pressure on provisioning. The tactic used was typical of British Imperialism: to neutralize a dangerous area with the minimum of military effort and at only a limited economic cost. However, the policy went hand in hand with errors in execution and excessive fatuousness on the part of Hoare. On more than one occasion Churchill considered that invading part if not all of Spain’s territory might prove to be a necessity given the possibility of Franco inclining towards the Axis and endangering the UK’s strategic position.

Hoare tried to make his influence felt in military circles and used money to buy the support of monarchist generals. Yet his most effective policy consisted of a series of agreements from the final months of 1940 onwards that allowed Spain to be provided with enough oil and essential supplies to survive but not, on the other hand, to join in the war. However, despite all this, the possibility that Germany might invade Spain with the help of part if not all of those in power meant that plans were drawn up to block the way to Gibraltar and allow a takeover of the Canary Islands. A large amount of Britain’s limited combat resources were kept on alert for many months in case of such an eventuality.

An important aspect of Britain’s policy was the need to persuade the Americans to come into line with the British position. However, the United States tended to be even more anti-Francoist than Britain, perhaps as a result of the way that the two countries had chosen to distance themselves from each other after the Civil War. When an agreement with the United States to supply oil was finally reached at the start of 1942, only 60 percent of Spain’s previous consumption of petroleum products was conceded.

If British policy was decided on and put into action swiftly in that crucial summer of 1940, remaining unchanged until the end of the war, German policy was formulated later and therefore was more subject to change. In fact, it was only in 1945 that Hitler realized that he should already have persuaded Spain to join in the conflict by the summer of 1940; that would have allowed him to take Gibraltar which in turn would have allowed him to gain a stranglehold on the UK's main communications route to its Empire. He had not done so because he believed that with his air force he could force Churchill to submit. In any case, Hitler did not want the French colonial empire to fall into British hands. All these factors meant that he could not satisfy Franco's excessive territorial demands, which were the essential condition for Spain's entry into the war.

Over the summer of 1940 and on into September the Spanish repeatedly presented their demands to Hitler but in the course of a visit in September Serrano, who was soon to take on the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, discovered to his great surprise that the rebuilding of Europe was not going to take the shape that Spain's notion of historical justice required but instead one that entirely suited Hitler's own personal interests. Not only were Serrano's requests barely granted a hearing but, moreover, he was faced with a German demand for one of the Canary Islands and another naval base in either Agadir or Mogador. He, as much as Franco, was strongly in favor of taking Spain into the war; as Franco wrote, "we shall benefit from being in the war but not by acting in haste." His idea was to gain substantial territorial advantages with the least possible intervention, but Hitler thought that Franco's Spain was a weak country lacking in resources which was asking too much and arrogantly attempting to mount an operation against Gibraltar for which it lacked the necessary means. This last factor was decisive: taking everything into account, the Führer himself explained to those working with him that by trying to reconcile the conflicting interests of Spain, Italy, and France, he was trying to bring off a "monumental deception."

This meant that Spanish desires never stood a chance of being met given Hitler's own agenda, while there was a distinct possibility that Franco might give way under the stubborn, calculated pressure exerted by the master of Europe. Nonetheless, accounts of their meeting at Hendaye in October 1940 have suggested that Franco managed to avoid committing himself while Hitler was in despair at his own failure to make him do so. What really happened was that Hitler, who had always despised the Spanish leaders, managed on that occasion to get them to sign a protocol

that committed Spain to entering the conflict but on no precise date, which meant that the situation remained open. Franco himself had gone to the meeting with a memorandum in which he explained that he could not enter the war “just because he wanted to,” reminding Germany that Italy had become a burden to its ally. The critical moment in Germany’s pressurizing of Spain occurred in the last weeks of 1940. Hitler, whose main focus of concern was Central and Eastern Europe, had no strategy in mind for the Mediterranean except for a few brief weeks, and by January 1941 he considered the option of taking Gibraltar closed. In any case, his troops in the Balkans were having to cover for Italian defeats and when the invasion of Russia took place it became impossible to undertake sizeable operations at both extremes of Europe.

In February 1941, on one of only two journeys that Franco ever made outside Spain, accompanied by Serrano he met for talks with the Duce in Bordighera. He explained to the fascist leader that he not only wanted to enter the war but that he was afraid he might do so “too late.” Mussolini, who must at that time have assumed that the war had already been won by Hitler, did not credit Spanish intervention with much importance: “How can a country which has not got bread to last the week go to war?” he asked one of his associates. It must be said that he himself had not won any great victories and Spain might become a competitor in the sharing of power around the Mediterranean. What happened after that was a repeat of what had gone before: Italy wanted Spain to join in the war but only when Italy said so and only when it best suited Italian interests.

From the start of 1941 on, Germany’s military strategic planning on Spain was purely defensive: it anticipated only the creation of a protective front in the north which would move back gradually in the event of British troops taking the Iberian Peninsula. Spain no longer served Axis interests beyond its function as a defensive wall. That year Germany imported seven times as much military material from Spain and in 1943 Spain’s trade with the Reich accounted for 25 percent of the country’s total and was above the level of trade with Allied countries. This did not, however, mean that Spanish supplies were essential to the Reich except in certain strategic materials and at the end of the war. Germany gained significant trade concessions from Spain, yet at the same time instructions to the German ambassador in Madrid were to keep out of internal politics which, throughout 1941, were particularly uneasy.

A decisive factor in Spain’s non-intervention in World War II was the lack of unity among the leaders of the regime which witnessed bitter

confrontation between the military and Falange exacerbated by Serrano's determination to hold on to his own personal power. In June 1940 Franco had dismissed Yagüe, who had been accused of disloyalty, possibly by Serrano himself. More decisive still was the formation of a military party opposed to what Franco represented. Some generals favored intervention in the war but all of them were far more aware than the Falangists were of the dangers for Spain of insufficient preparedness. "With what?" asked one general when the possibility of Spain joining in the war was being discussed in his presence. The military feared that the exalted national sentiment stirred up by the Party might lead to an engagement in the conflict that would be suicidal; their high-ranking officers had advocated caution in any statements coming from those with political responsibility, and caution was not the style favored either by Falange or by Serrano. Yet there was also a question of the distribution of power. The military believed that they had won the Civil War and considered that it was they who had put Franco in the position he now enjoyed. In their view Falange was demagogic and ineffectual and Serrano was abusing the excessive power to which he clung.

In May 1941 a crisis-point was reached like no other in the entire history of Francoism. What made it different was how long it lasted and the fact that Franco, having tried to resolve it in one way, found himself forced to back down. At the start of May Falange, controlled by Serrano, declared itself no longer subject to censorship; at the same time, two members with the evocative surname Primo de Rivera – Pilar and Miguel – resigned from their posts in the organization. On May 5, it was announced that Galarza, who until then had been undersecretary to the Presidency, was moving over to be Minister of the Interior: a post that had in fact been vacant but in effect had been controlled by Serrano through the undersecretary since he himself had taken on the portfolio for Foreign Affairs. At the same time Carrero Blanco, who was destined to play such an important role later in internal politics, took over the post of Undersecretary to the Presidency.

However, Falange had the strength to retaliate. The Falangist newspaper *Arriba* launched a personal attack on the new Minister of the Interior and there followed a whole battery of resignations. Some, like Larraz, acted out of a conviction that the regime was handling the economy very badly, but those who resigned were above all leaders within Falange and Serrano himself was among them. He wrote to the Chief of State, addressing him as "Dear General," and assured him in a menacing tone that "the

case as far as we are concerned now offers no dignified solution.” Franco was forced to make changes: on May 16, no fewer than four highly significant Falangists were appointed to ministerial posts: Arrese as Minister-Secretary of the *Movimiento*; Miguel Primo de Rivera as Agriculture Minister and Girón as Labor Minister; another Falangist, Joaquín Benjumea, became Finance Minister, taking over from Larraz. If we add to their number Serrano and Demetrio Carceller, we have to conclude that never before or subsequently did Falange play such a decisive role in government. Yet Franco managed to keep Galarza on as Minister of the Interior and Galarza, from that position of power, began to appoint provincial governors and leaders of the Party. At his side, Carrero started to make moves prejudicial to Falangist interests; what he saw as necessary was not a party in chaos confronting the military but rather a “select minority” with administrative skills. Finally, the star of the only person capable of leading Falange to a monopoly of power – Serrano Suñer – began its decline. From that moment on he controlled neither the Ministry of the Interior nor the press; he had also lost his monopoly in relations between Falange and Franco. In the future this role would be played by Arrese, who was more submissive and less intelligent but also less ambitious, and who would end up supplanting entirely the brother-in-law to the dictator.

It is significant that this crisis coincided almost exactly with the signing of an agreement between the Vatican and Spain which resolved the greatest problem that existed between the two powers: the appointment of bishops in Spain. The Spanish Church felt it had cause for grave concern in the final months of 1939. Its bishops feared at that stage that an attempt might be made to gag the Church. Pontifical documents were subjected to censorship, as actually happened when they spoke out against Nazi racism. The decisive issue was that of the appointment of bishops, as Franco’s Spain wanted the right to nominate candidates. Disagreement was so profound that the appointment process ground to a halt and by the end of 1940 some 20 dioceses were vacant. Agreement was finally reached in the days following the governmental crisis, probably because Serrano felt he needed a diplomatic success. As a result, bishops were appointed according to a system whereby the Vatican was presented with a previously agreed list of candidates. Obviously, at the same time, the image of relations between Spain and the Vatican presented to the public was idyllic. The Saint Barbara festival was like a royal coronation and Franco was accompanied throughout those years and the period that followed by a relic of Saint Teresa’s hand, captured from the enemy in Malaga in the Civil War.

In June 1941 the German offensive against Russia united the Francoist leadership for a time, all agreeing that, as Serrano put it, “Russia was guilty” of causing Spain’s ills in the 1930s. Yet there was disagreement even on the subject of the Spanish Volunteer Division (*División Española de Voluntarios*) sent to Russia: not least concerning its name, since in Falangist circles it was called simply the Blue Division (*División Azul*). There also appear to have been differences of opinion on who should command it since some thought that it was a matter of political responsibility while others considered the operation strictly military. As happened on so many occasions, Franco opted for what seemed like a solution to suit both sides, which was to hand over command to a Falangist soldier, Muñoz Grandes. The Spanish Division numbered 18,000 men and saw action in the Leningrad sector. Muñoz Grandes met twice with Hitler in 1942 and expressed quite openly his own unequivocal support of the Axis. As time passed and Franco decided that Muñoz Grandes’s position as commander of the Division had become problematic, he got rid of him by the simple device of making him a lieutenant general: a rank that meant he could no longer stay in Russia. German victories at the start of the conflict had made an early Soviet collapse seem likely. In July 1941 Franco had stated that the war “had been approached wrongly and that the Allies had lost it.” Not even the entry of the United States into the war at the end of 1941 after the attack on Pearl Harbor induced the Spanish leadership to be more prudent in their pronouncements.

Over this time, confrontation between Falange and the Army was becoming more frequent. Spain’s entire political life was taken up with a succession of confrontations between soldiers and Falangists that became increasingly violent. As Serrano’s role had become less important, internal strife had built up such a store of acute tension that finally violence erupted. On August 16, 1942, a group of radical Falangists threw bombs at the close of a religious service in Begoña at which the Army Minister, the traditionalist Varela, had been present. The immediate result was a political crisis whose gravity can be measured by how long it lasted and how many people were dismissed from their posts. General Varela resigned, blaming Falange for what had happened. The crisis would have ended there had Franco, urged on by Carrero, not thought it necessary to compensate for Varela’s resignation by distancing himself from Serrano. There was at this point no response from Falangists in support of Serrano to make Franco change his mind. On September 13, Varela was replaced by Carlos Asensio and Serrano Suñer by General Jordana, a former vice-president during the

Civil War. There was no indication that the crisis signaled a step towards a change in foreign policy; rather it appeared to be the result of internal factors. Foreign ambassadors judged quite correctly that what had happened showed that the only effective force within the Spanish regime was the Army; they were right, but only in part, because the ultimate winner was in fact Franco himself. No other political crisis would last as long as those that faced him in 1941 and 1942. The Falangists themselves, and more especially their Secretary General Arrese, submitted to the authority of the dictator despite the fact that a Falangist was executed. In the difficult times that lay ahead, Falangists and the *caudillo* would form a tight-knit group bound together by mutual interest.

During the period in which Serrano Suñer enjoyed political hegemony, attempts were made to endow relations with the Spanish-American world with special significance through cultural contacts. In defiance of democratic ideals Falange, working through diplomatic channels, launched a virulent campaign against the United States. The creation of the Council of the Hispanic World (*Consejo de la Hispanidad*) in November 1940, when the possibility of Spain joining in World War II had not been definitively dismissed, provided an administrative structure. The impact of this policy on Spanish interests was catastrophic: apart from the fact that there were no actual advantages gained, throughout the years following its implementation it was a heavy burden on the Franco regime.

— Stumbling Progress towards Neutrality (1942–5) —

The change in direction in politics within Spain allowed the move towards neutrality that Jordana might have been working towards to benefit from the new turn the war was taking. The new Foreign Minister repeatedly assured the Axis that Spanish foreign policy was not going to change under any circumstances; nonetheless, at the first meeting of the government a resolution was approved that meant that the term “non-belligerence” disappeared.

The Allies had now gained the initiative in the war and were in action in a part of the world that directly affected Spain. Landings in North Africa were accompanied by British guarantees to Franco that the operation was not directed against him. After the British landings in December 1942 Jordana went to Portugal: a move indicative of the stance he wished to adopt from that moment on. The Salazar regime had remained neutral

towards both sides in the conflict and could provide a useful means by which Franco's Spain could indicate a Spanish will to make overtures towards the Allies. Evidence of the ambiguity of the situation is seen in the fact that Carrero seemed still to think a German victory possible. Only after the Normandy landings did he suggest that Britain and Germany might broker a peace that would prevent the Russian advance.

Just as during the most fascist phase of the Franco regime's development relations with the Church had been plagued with difficulties, so now there were abundant signs of Spain's will to be on good terms with the Vatican. Franco went so far as to write a letter to the pope accusing the Americans of making concessions to Russia that would represent a serious threat to Catholicism. The pontiff replied in discreet terms that promised nothing. The Spanish position remained uncertain. The most clearly neutral position was that of Jordana and a section of Spain's diplomatic service which included, for example, the Duke of Alba.

One might well ask how the Spanish position was viewed by the warring parties. Germany had always taken a dual political approach where Spain was concerned and now this became especially relevant for a period of a few months. The very large German embassy staff (some 500 people of whom perhaps a third were spies) had been told repeatedly not to involve themselves in Spanish political affairs. On the other hand, the Nazi Party representative kept in close contact with radical Falangist groups. At the end of 1942 and start of 1943, the Germans also made contact with a number of high-ranking military officers, but what Hitler really wanted was for Spain, in the event of an Allied attack, to defend itself. In accordance with this stance, the Germans ended up agreeing to the Spanish proposal that Germany supply Spain with arms. The agreement they reached meant that half Spain's imports from Germany would be in the form of materials of war, principally artillery for coastal defense, while exports would take the form mainly of wolframite: a mineral of enormous strategic importance. As on other occasions, the position Italy adopted was substantially different from that of Germany. For Mussolini, the fact that the war was now centered around the Mediterranean was no longer a matter of choice based on Italy's own interests but rather of survival. He therefore suggested that Hitler attack the Allies through Spain.

Franco's policy in 1943 was still to foster a sense of being apart from the conflict while those who favored a more neutral political stance were having some successes without ever actually winning the debate. There

was a significant move towards neutrality in April 1943 when, on the occasion of the commemoration of Columbus's landing in Barcelona on his return from America, Jordana spoke clearly of his desire for peace, no doubt largely as a result of his Catholic affiliation. It took time before Franco gradually began to adopt the language initially used by his Foreign Minister. Nonetheless, the Spanish position did shift millimeter by millimeter as the course of military operations changed. The fall of Tunis in May 1943 led Carrero to suggest that Germany should react quickly or try to make peace.

The collapse of Mussolini's regime was, however, to have an even greater impact since it had been a role model that Franco's Spain had imitated. It was information from Spanish military sources that convinced the Italians that the Allied landings would happen in Corsica or Greece rather than Sicily. When they happened in Sicily, Italy collapsed almost immediately, ruining any chance the fascist regime might have had of survival. Mussolini's removal from power had immediate repercussions in Spain, represented in Rome at the time by a Falangist of some importance: Raimundo Fernández Cuesta. Falange thought that something similar might happen in Spain. Once again this caused divisions at the heart of the regime's governing class. While Jordana tried to freeze Spanish diplomatic relations in Italy, Falange helped Mussolini's supporters in Spain. Of Europe's neutral countries, only Portugal and Switzerland maintained relations with the Saló Republic. Mussolini, some of whose closest collaborators ended up in Spain, was also on the point of fleeing there at the last moment. As is well known, he opted instead for Switzerland, was arrested on the way there, and summarily executed.

Yet Mussolini's fall had in effect happened much earlier, in July 1943 when, for the first time, he mobilized the members of Italy's political class who favored the restoration of the monarchy. This subsequently became an element of decisive importance in Spanish internal politics. The best evidence of the anxiety that Franco might well have felt when faced with this alternative is his affirmation, in front of an audience of Falangists, that "the liberal capitalist system," which he always linked to monarchist circles, "has gone for ever," at the same time announcing his firm decision that those who were not entirely loyal to him should "leave the ship."

To understand the monarchist position we must go back in time to the start of 1942. The previous year in Rome Alfonso XIII had died after acknowledging Don Juan as his heir and abdicating in his favor. The man who now took upon himself the future succession of the dynasty was

someone who had identified himself with the extreme right and had not hesitated in trying to take up arms against the Republic in the middle of the Civil War. However, his cause soon came to represent something quite different because a certain sector of the political class was seeking a more viable political formula for Spain in view of a possible victory of the democratic powers. Already by March 1942 a monarchist committee had formed that was in contact with sections of the military that tended to express strong criticism of General Franco. Franco felt obliged to keep up some contact with Don Juan and in May wrote him a letter in which he lectured him on the characteristics required of any monarchy that might be restored in Spain; it must be “revolutionary” and by no means the “decadent” monarchy that in his view had ascended the throne in the eighteenth century.

In June, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez and Eugenio Vegas Latapié had to go into hiding: the former into exile in Portugal and the latter in Switzerland. Don Juan de Borbón responded to Franco’s letter at the end of 1942 by appointing as one of his advisers José María Gil Robles, a prominent leader of the most powerful right-wing faction during the Second Republic. As time passed, Don Juan’s insistence that Franco accept the monarchist option became more pressing. In March 1943 the *Cortes* was set up. Franco had ensured that members of the nobility and the Armed Services sat alongside the Falangist leadership, thus indicating that he himself intended to stay in power. Don Juan then wrote to Franco outlining the “extremely grave risks” that would have to be faced if the monarchy were not restored, but the dictator merely pointed out that in actual fact those who supported the monarchy were an unreliable minority.

As has already been suggested, the moment when monarchist pressure on Franco became more insistent was in the summer of 1943. In June Franco might well have felt that his ranks were thinning when some 30 members of the *Cortes* approached him requesting the reinstitution of a traditional Catholic monarchy. The regime’s reply was cautious. Carrero alerted the military to the existence of a Masonic plot to undermine the regime. In September 1943 Franco received via the Ministry for the Army a document signed by all lieutenant generals asking whether the time might not have come to make way for a new regime; in its original version the text was even more explicit since it suggested a return to monarchy and a dismantling of the totalitarian system. Not only those who had signed it but probably all Spain’s high-ranking officers were in agreement with the proposed changes. Franco, on the other hand, was planning to

stay in power and he had before him, in what had happened in Italy, the stark example of what not to do. He insisted that he had never received the document and refused to allow all the lieutenant generals to come and see him together, which might have resulted in a repetition of the last great Fascist Council meeting in which the Duce was done away with. What he did instead was receive the generals one by one and defuse in private conversations what might otherwise have become a dangerous force in opposition. In this way Franco freed himself from the possible threat of military opposition at the very moment when Allied pressure was becoming stronger.

Franco had no reason to hope that the Allies would treat him well after he had shown a decided inclination towards the Axis up to that time. The British, however, were too busy mopping up in Italy in 1943 to spend any time on Spain. At this point the position of British diplomatic representatives in Spain did undergo a marked change. The British ambassador, Hoare, soon realized that nothing was going to change Spanish politics; nonetheless, he did not recommend strong action against Franco. Jordana managed to have the Blue Division recalled; in total, over time, some 47,000 Spanish soldiers went to Russia, almost half of whom were wounded. What the British ambassador found hardest to take was the calm air of self-sufficiency that Franco displayed each time he received the diplomat and delivered one of his endless monologues. In circumstances such as these it is not surprising that Hoare's defense of a policy of non-aggression towards Spain lasted to the end of World War II.

For their part, the Americans had at this time another ambassador, the historian Peter Hayes, who was a Catholic and Roosevelt's personal representative but was not always in line with those in power in the State Department, who were more strongly anti-Francoist. Hayes tells in his memoirs how in Franco's office he came across photos of Hitler and Mussolini but soon reached the conclusion that the Spanish regime had little to do with fascism. Initially he tried to intervene in Spanish politics, for example asking Spain not to attack Russia, but in the postwar period he became an enthusiastic defender of the Franco regime. Nonetheless, neither Hoare nor Hayes can be held responsible for the Allies' harshest decision on Franco's Spain; that was taken by the US Department of State.

What happened can be explained by the position adopted by the Spanish up to that point and by Spain's slowness and insincerity in its move towards neutrality, but there was also a chance factor that led to the decision being taken. In November 1943 what came to be known as

the “Laurel Affair” happened. Spain sent a telegram to the pro-Japanese government in the Philippines mentioning its “indestructible and proven relationship” with that country. The text did not, in fact, constitute recognition of the government but Washington was indignant about it.

The result was that in January 1944 all oil exports to Spain were suspended. The situation became extremely tense for the regime because at that time an Allied victory seemed highly likely after the Normandy landings. Finally, following very difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached in May by means of an exchange of notes between the Spanish Administration and the Allies. Franco’s Spain confirmed the withdrawal of the Blue Division, promised to close the German consulate in Tangiers, and expressed willingness to resolve by arbitration the legal situation of Italian ships in Spanish harbors (which finally happened in line with American demands). It is probable that the question of greatest interest to the Allies concerning Spain was that of the Spanish export of wolframite to Germany. This mineral was of prime importance in the production of weapons of war (in warheads and armor-plating, for example) and Hitler had lost all other possible sources of supply apart from Spain. The agreement consisted of limiting supply to just a few tens of tons, the Allies buying up and using the rest. In this instance, as in so many others, Jordana’s favorable attitude to neutrality met with disapproval from an Administration in which the Axis still had many supporters. No lesser figure than the Industry Minister, the Falangist Carceller, appears to have been one of them.

From that time on, Spain’s foreign policy of neutrality was based on close identification with the pope and Catholicism, apart from one pronouncement on World War II that outlined three different theaters of war. As regards neutrality, efforts were made at the start of 1943 to draw together those neutral countries that shared Spain’s religious position, but all attempts failed. As Franco himself explained, he was neutral as far as the war between Britain and Germany was concerned but he supported Germany in her war against the Soviet Union, as well as those countries that were fighting Japan. In fact these opinions were intended principally as camouflage to hide his former alignment with the Axis, but they also testify to the regime’s interests and the mistakes it made. They show, for example, that Franco never took seriously the Allied demand for the unconditional surrender of the enemy, and they highlight his fear of a communist threat and his radical disagreement with those Americans who seemed to think that the communist regime might change.

At this point, however, a major about-turn had occurred in another aspect of Spain's foreign policy: in relation to Latin America. There was no more pro-Axis political propaganda and no Spanish interference in internal politics; indeed, Spain now accepted American influence in the area. At the same time ambassadors and organizations linked to Falange disappeared, though they had never been as important as the United States had thought. Spanish propaganda became purely cultural and had different objectives. The attempt to link Spain with a group of nations which had not been involved in the conflict underlined once and for all its own neutrality.

Its neutrality was evident in another area too. The Franco regime did not adopt a notably anti-Jewish stance; there was no racially based anti-Semitism, partly for the simple reason that numbers of members of this ethnic minority were small, though anti-Jewish discourses were at times used by leaders of the regime. Francoist anti-Semitism was a product of Catholic traditionalism and was compatible with both appreciation and the study of Spain's Sephardic heritage. There was, however, no policy of offering protection to Jews despite the fact that some were Sephardi and could therefore claim Spanish origins. There was a stage early on in which some 30,000 Jews passed through Spain but the regime had no policy aimed at saving them. Even towards the end of the war the regime did not offer them protection, although by then it was obvious that they were facing extermination. About 8,000 Jews were saved thanks to intervention by Spanish authorities, but these were instances in which Spanish diplomats took the initiative and acted on their own behalf, not on specific instructions from the government. In Greece and Hungary significant numbers of Jews were saved, and not only Sephardis; one Spanish ambassador, Ángel Sanz Briz, features in the Holocaust Museum in Jerusalem as one of those who defended the persecuted people.

All these factors are significant because they show that the Spanish authorities wanted to avoid any cause for confrontation with Nazi Germany but they also wanted to conform to conditions laid down by the Americans. At the same time, Franco's Spain tried hurriedly in the early stages of the war to give the impression that it was adhering strictly to a position of neutrality that had been far from clear up to that point. However, its true position was made evident to Allied ambassadors when Lequerica was made Foreign Minister. An intelligent man and skeptical to the point of cynicism, the new minister represented his country in its dealings with the Pétain regime and as a person he had always shown a clear preference for

the Axis. As minister he never missed an opportunity to try to gloss over his pro-German past and to align himself almost to the point of adulation with the United States, which now seemed likely to be the undisputed winner in World War II.

When in the spring of 1944 Churchill stated in the House of Commons that he thought it was a mistake to insult Franco unnecessarily since he had done the Allies a favor by not entering the war, the regime thought this signaled a British attempt at rapprochement. That was not the case, however: Churchill responded in a tone that left no room for doubt on his strong disagreement with the political system in Spain. As for the United States, Lequerica directed all his diplomatic efforts at that country without any success. As time passed, Spain made concessions in relation to American warplanes and its neutrality turned into more positive support of those who were now quite clearly going to win the war. In April 1945 it broke off diplomatic relations with Japan; even so, the American president wrote to his ambassador that he did not want any involvement with Spanish politics, not believing that a regime that had been set up with the support of the fascist powers would be acceptable in the newly organized postwar world. Even those who were on the brink of defeat distanced themselves from Franco: after September 1944 the German ambassador was withdrawn from Madrid and when, months later, Hitler heard that Franco considered that he had not really been an ally of Germany, he spoke bluntly of Franco's "cheek."

What lay in wait for Franco was not just isolation from the outside world but also problems within Spain. As 1943 went by, several attempts were made to make him move ahead with the restoration of the monarchy on his own initiative. His refusal to do so had profoundly perplexed Don Juan's supporters who did not know whether or not to go for open confrontation with the regime. In the early months of 1944 a split did occur, mainly due to the attitude adopted by Franco himself. In January he wrote to Don Juan arguing at length that his own position was entirely legitimate, even claiming that it was providential. He also warned Don Juan that the exercise of power was "not a matter for bargaining." The dynastic heir retorted that Franco was overconfident about his regime and its likely duration. This so infuriated the *caudillo* that he wrote back stating that he would ask God to shed His light in Don Juan's mind and forgive him for the error of his ways. This exchange of letters, in which Franco always addressed Don Juan in a respectful tone rather like that of a schoolmaster with a not very intelligent child, left an open wound in the

relationship between the two men that would never heal. Franco always considered the dynastic heir his closest rival, which explains the acerbic comments that he extended to encompass most of Don Juan's followers and advisers. At around the same time, several members of the monarchist cause were sanctioned. With the end of the war in sight, in March 1945 Don Juan, in the so-called Lausanne Manifesto, presented the monarchy that he personified as the means of bringing about a transition towards a regime with a constitution, respect for human rights, and certain regional freedoms. From that moment on, the monarchy remained on the horizon as a possible formula for political reconciliation and for a transition without trauma from dictatorship to something resembling political regimes elsewhere in postwar Europe. This option met with a total lack of any attempt at understanding on the part of those who had fought on both sides in the Civil War, whose memories of the conflict were still too acutely painful. Any gesture Don Juan might make could immediately be interpreted by either side (or both) as a betrayal, and the result was predictable. Even so, when World War II ended it not only seemed that the Franco regime was facing enormous difficulties but that its very survival was impossible.

We would do well at this point to draw up a final balance for the period 1939–45. As regards World War II it should be said from the start that it is difficult to offer a precise definition of the position taken by Franco's Spain, and not only because Franco himself did not want it clarified since Spain, having little actual power, could not change the final outcome of the war and so had to adapt to circumstances. If we were to try to define its position, we would have to start with Francoist Spain's links with the Axis. They explain why neutrality turned into non-belligerence when there was hope that some benefit could be gained with minimal involvement. After 1940 Spain again rejected the possibility of joining in the conflict to avoid coming up against the same demands. It is clear that the priority of the Spanish regime was clearly not so much victory for the Axis as its own survival.

Franco always maintained that his "capability and prudence" were what prevented Spain entering the war, but although he always thought carefully about what he considered to be national interests (which were synonymous in his mind with his own), he did not lack capability, though he was by no means prudent on every occasion. If he was often wrong about the direction the war was taking, at the same time he did not just give in to what others wanted and he always knew how to cover up unashamedly

for past mistakes. But his politics were never the politics of neutrality. He gave help to the Axis that not only exceeded by far any help offered by truly neutral countries such as Switzerland, or those that adopted a stance favorable to Germany such as Sweden or Turkey, but was even greater than the help given by Finland which fought against the Soviet Union from the summer of 1941 on. A correct assessment of the Spanish position in relation to the war reveals that there were at least three occasions – in the summer of 1940, the following year, and in the autumn of 1942 – when Spain could have entered the war; that it did not do so was little short of a miracle.

The main reason why Spain did not join in was in all probability nothing to do with Franco or the regime's diplomacy. Conditions within the country at the time – it was poor and weak and its ruling class was in disarray – were a prime factor, but there were others too. Germany was only interested in Spanish involvement for a short time. Italy did not want a competitor when it came to the dividing of the spoils but it did want an ally at a time when its own strategies had not paid off. Britain, despite its naïveté at times on Spanish policy, is evidence of the value of intelligent diplomats capable of making the most of their resources in difficult circumstances. The United States could on occasion be thuggish, but never so much as to commit a gratuitous act of aggression against a Spain that it did not like.

It seems obvious that, unlike what had happened in 1914–18, Spain did not reap the benefits of true neutrality. Other countries had to stretch the definition of what was neutral (for example, allowing German troops to pass through them as Switzerland did), but none of them defined themselves as non-belligerent when what they were was pre-belligerent. The consequences would be felt later. When with constant ambiguity and repeated delays Spain gradually moved towards a firmer neutrality, no one could believe that this new stance was genuine. It is a curious paradox of the end of the World War II that the fate of Franco's Spain might well have been worse had Hitler won the war. He had never liked the Spanish leaders and, unlike those who did win, he had no qualms about interfering in the politics of other countries. And one can cite another paradox: the permanent hostility of Franco's Spain towards Soviet Russia throughout all these years proved more useful to him in the postwar period than friendship with Portugal, and at least as useful as his relations with the Vatican.

There is one more aspect to consider where it is important to examine the balance in relation to Spain's stance during World War II. We know

that this was a very difficult time for Franco and not just because events in the rest of the world were putting pressure on him. In terms of Spanish politics too, these were the most complex years that he had to face, but they were also the years in which he served his final apprenticeship. What is surprising is not so much what he did in World War II as how capable he proved himself to be in the postwar period in Spain, despite the fact that this stage was only reached after a period of persistent crisis and bitter confrontation among those working alongside him, such as during the crisis of 1939–45. In this final year, he managed to combine his capacity for arbitration between the different tendencies within his regime with the ability to understand intuitively how foreign policy was going to change, or to stir up memories of the Civil War in a way that would permit him to survive after a very complex period of isolation.

Cosmetic Change: Regime Politics between 1945 and 1951

In 1945 Franco's dictatorship was threatened at one and the same time by uncertainty inside the country on the direction it should take, by the possibility of internal opposition, and inevitably, by isolation from the outside world. All three factors were so closely linked that one cannot talk about one of them without also referring more or less directly to the others.

Franco discovered early on that it was important to give an appearance of institutional change and he found that the way to do this was by gaining approval for a number of constitutional measures that would in no way interfere with his own political power. This explains the 1942 Law of the *Cortes*: a procedure aimed at placing greater emphasis within the regime on the traditionalist element, as was obvious in the historic titles given to the assembly itself and to the parliamentary deputies or "*procuradores*." It would come to be seen as typical of the Franco regime's hesitancy over institutionalization that this move was a direct result of advice from Mussolini to Serrano and Franco, and that in the end it would give satisfaction to a particular section of Falange. There was a similar occurrence in 1943 when a bill on fundamental legislation was drawn up but at the time did not see the light of day.

The defeat of the Axis made it obvious that what Lequerica had told Franco in 1945 had been wise: Arrese (and Falange with him) "should be removed from the limelight" – that is to say, as far as the outside world

was concerned they should be as unobtrusive as possible. Franco, conscious of the wisdom of this advice, was not slow to act. From 1944 on there was evidence of him wanting to offer a more democratic image, for example when the first union elections were held in 1945 with a promise of municipal elections later on. After the summer of 1945 he understood what was happening on the international stage and responded effectively. As ever, his best weapon was his sense of timing which allowed him to prolong his stay in power while he made changes that were apparent rather than real. He actually told General Varela that he believed he was acting “with great tact but without haste,” a phrase that says much about his political style as a whole. When Serrano Suñer proposed setting up a transitional cabinet to oversee the move towards a form of government acceptable to the rest of Europe, with some intellectuals included, Franco simply wrote “ha ha ha” alongside the proposal. His canniness – so like that of Sancho Panza – would stand him in very good stead.

He himself took the initiative in July 1945 when he brought forward new constitutional legislation and made changes in the government whose aim was crystal clear: to bring him into line with the political situation in Europe. Before doing so, however, he covered his own back with generals whose loyalty he knew he could count on at the time. Franco’s most important decision from a tactical viewpoint was to adopt a Catholic stance in his politics. This was a clever move as one of the parties that was doing much to stabilize democracy in Europe at the time was the Christian Democrats. In Spain Franco did not go that far but he did call on support from Catholic associations that had remained in the background during the early days of the regime. There was one common element that united the official Catholic world and the Franco regime: their shared experience of a Civil War in which one in five parliamentary representatives of the Catholic Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas* or CEDA) had perished at the hands of the enemy. National Catholicism was not a doctrine practiced by only one section of the Spanish right but rather a common sentiment that united them all by linking together religion, nationalism, and the political regime. Nonetheless, the Catholic establishment did not exercise actual power until 1945, despite its clear support for the regime from the start. The Spanish Catholic Church expressed a clear desire for institutionalization and openness that went beyond a personal dictatorship.

Those Catholics prepared to collaborate who came to power in July 1945 had a program that coincided with the Church’s overall wish that the

dictatorship be institutionalized but should not be fascist. The person who best represented the will to collaborate was Alberto Martín Artajo, who moved from the position of President of Catholic Action to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the summer of 1945 the regime's options seemed extremely limited, and, taking up a position in direct opposition to it, key figures in CEDA such as José María Gil Robles and Manuel Giménez Fernández condemned the degree of collaboration with the government that was beginning to occur. It would not be fair to say that this was pure opportunism on their part, though it did become so in the end. Martín Artajo wanted – at least in theory – a return to monarchy, a declaration of political rights, and the necessary legislation to ensure that those rights were respected. In addition, according to his plans, citizens' views would be consulted. Furthermore, legislation governing the press would be modified and Falange would disappear, while the social services it had created would come under state control.

All in all it was a program that would allow for greater openness that was to an extent liberalizing but made no move towards democratization, offering only faint hope of some modest step towards closer relations with Europe. Franco never hid the fact that his own plans were altogether different. It was time once again to consider Spain as a kingdom, he affirmed, but Don Juan was no more than a “pretender” to the throne; it was up to Franco to decide who his successor should be. He was also quite blunt in the judgment he passed on the institution of monarchy. It could not, he said, be based on nothing more than the matter of who the offspring of “the last man to sleep with Queen Isabel (meaning Isabel II)” happened to be; rather they should wait and see whether or not “what emerged from the Queen's womb” was suitable, and the task of deciding that fell to him. He also made it quite clear to those who asked for some institutional structures to reflect political pluralism, that there would never be political parties. Of the press during the Civil War he stated that “I knew nothing of the matter and could not take charge of it during the war.”

Political change did not result in the disappearance of Falangist ministers, who kept hold of the portfolios for Labor (Girón) and Justice (Fernández Cuesta). It did, however, signal the end of the office of General Secretary of the *Movimiento*. This was in fact an attempt to hide what was really going on in Spain from anyone outside as the organization itself remained in existence in the hands of a lower-ranking civil servant. This means that Girón was quite right when he said: “The men of Falange were going to do Spain a painful service by vanishing discreetly from the public

stage.” The raised-arm salute disappeared. Coinciding with the change of government, three important alterations became law. The Primary Education Law (*Ley de Enseñanza Primaria*) ensured that at this early level education was entirely Catholic. The Spaniards’ Charter of Rights (*Fuero de los Españoles*) turned out to be a typical list of rights that were never made law. The passing of a Local Government Law (*Ley de Régimen Local*) implied that in local town halls a wider range of interests would be represented but this hope too was doomed to frustration. There was no change made on state control of the media which now came through the Ministry of Education. If censors had once been Falangists, now the job was done by members of the Catholic establishment.

In October 1945 the Referendum Law was approved, indicating a will to put before the people a major decision (that everyone suspected would be about the monarchy), though this did not mean that consultation would take place immediately. In that same month an amnesty was declared but a Law on Public Meetings, Associations, and Personal Guarantees (*Ley de Reunión, Asociación y Garantías Personales*) was immediately put on hold. There seems to have been a moment when a proposition was put forward to do away with the National Council, which was too strongly reminiscent of fascist organizations, but Franco was clearly reluctant to do without Falange. The proposal on the transformation of the *Cortes* never went further than effecting a slight variation in the rules governing it.

All in all, although there was much talk about “organic democracy,” the reality on the ground in Spain was different from the Catholic corporatism of the 1930s. The regime was still a dictatorship which had changed its language but not the reality, which meant that all power was still concentrated in the person of Franco. Rather than being defined according to the principles of organic democracy, Francoism could be summed up in three words that appeared in one of the reports from Carrero to Franco written in those days as guidelines on how to resist pressure from outside Spain: “order, unity, and endurance” – with special emphasis on the last of the three. In the eyes of the man who now provided Franco with his greatest inspiration, what drove dissidents and democratic powers to try to change Spanish institutions was “sheer silliness” in the case of the first group, and a desire to rob Spain of its national independence in the case of the second.

Franco, who never harbored the slightest doubt about remaining in power but was not always able to keep up his appearance of confidence, clung on with grim determination. He turned against the monarchists and

repeatedly voiced his anti-Masonic obsession. What seemed to him the greatest cause for concern was the possibility that the monarchy might manage to attract a large number of supporters from among those who had till then stood firm at his side. That was why, at the start of 1946, when Don Juan arrived in Estoril, he reacted decisively and violently. Statements on how “the regime must defend itself [against the defenders of the monarchy] and sink its teeth into their very soul” and “crush them like worms” show a level of excitement that was unusual in one so cold. This sense of anger is also evident in the anti-Masonic articles that he wrote in the press.

Yet Franco was always perfectly clear in his own mind as to what to do about the monarchist option. In the spring of 1947 he raised the matter in a Law of Succession on which a referendum was held in July and approval won by the inevitable overwhelming number of votes in favor. The law did not at any point address the issue of keeping the traditional dynastic line. It went no further than to make a general statement to the effect that Spain was a kingdom and to outline a very elementary mechanism for change in the event of the Chief of State passing away (a Regency Council (*Consejo de Regencia*) made up of high-ranking members of the political, military, and religious authorities). It was still Franco’s prerogative to decide who would succeed to the throne but how this would happen was left vague. The only immediate practical consequence of the Law of Succession was that he was now able to bestow titles of nobility, which he did, giving dukedoms to the heirs of Primo de Rivera, Calvo Sotelo, and Mola, and other titles to the soldiers who had been in command under him during the Civil War. At the same time, over the course of 1948 and 1949, some of the monarchists who had fought with him in the war were sanctioned or dismissed from the Armed Services.

At the same time as the referendum, company juries (*jurados de empresa*) were set up as a complementary social strategy similar to the ballot in that they offered an appearance of democracy and were equally devoid of any real political effectiveness because of the delay in sorting out the regulations governing them. Rigid control of the press remained in place right up to that time; throughout the 1940s any criticism of the government of any sort was suppressed. The team responsible for the media, drawn from Catholic circles, was disbanded by political maneuvering before their program – modest though it was in scope – had had a chance to be implemented. In many areas – for example in relation to culture or to tolerance towards other religious groups – these Catholics had often been more closed-minded than even Falange.

At the end of this period Franco had every reason to feel extremely satisfied. In 1949 he was described by the major newspaper of the regime, *Arriba*, as “the man sent from God who always appears at the critical moment and defeats the enemy.” That same year he visited Portugal and was awarded a doctorate at the University of Coimbra in the second and last journey outside Spain that he ever made in all his long time in power (and as on the previous occasion, he went once again to a dictatorship). In 1954 the *Cortes* would approve the renaming of his grandchildren to allow them to keep the surname of their grandfather the dictator. But there can have been no greater sign of his self-satisfaction than his governmental reshuffle. In 1951, with the storm effectively behind him, Franco gave himself the private satisfaction of not showing his true face. The Catholics retained their quota of places in the sharing-out of power and even increased it thanks to Ruiz Giménez being made Minister of Education, but Falange now made a comeback as the post of Secretary General of the *Movimiento* was resurrected and put once again in the hands of Fernández Cuesta. In addition, two men who had played key roles during World War II (and not exactly to the Allied advantage), General Muñoz Grandes and Arias Salgado in charge of the Blue Division and controlling the press respectively, were given a military portfolio and that of the Ministry of Tourism and Information. Carrero Blanco, Franco’s principal adviser since World War II, who was critical of Falange’s excessive power, was given a ministerial post.

Everything we have seen so far in this epigraph shows how measures implemented after 1945 brought minimal change, at least as regards Franco’s personal power. However, if we compare the years immediately after the Civil War with the period after the end of World War II, there were evident changes in the mood of the country, and these become clear when we consider two questions: Catholicism and attitudes to particular cultures.

The desire to bring about a “neo-traditionalist reconquest” of Spanish society led on to the idea that the Catholic faith and the Spanish fatherland were consubstantial, to a messianic interpretation of past history, and to an authoritarian vision of a harmonious future for society. What made Falangists different from clericalists, and the years up to 1945 different from those that followed, was a difference in emphasis. Falangists accepted without question that the regime and the Party were both Catholic but they were not prepared to accept that the Catholic religion was autonomous and independent of politic control. They therefore pursued a political strategy aimed at achieving an “absolute monopoly” of power by

preventing the formation of Catholic organizations. The more clericalist sector, on the other hand, saw Catholicism as a means of integration but at the same time claimed autonomy for itself.

Nonetheless, the fact that they agreed on certain fundamental principles means that it is almost impossible nowadays to understand the controversies that divided the two groups throughout the 1940s. The clericalists complained that the Civil War was not being viewed as a “Crusade”: an essentially religious conflict. They also rejected the attempts that were being made to “nationalize” the intellectuals of the “98 Generation” or the liberals. The radical Falangists would have used the term “national revolution” to describe the regime. More than the traditionalists, they favored a secular culture with which they could identify and which they could imbue with Spanish nationalist sentiment.

What was most characteristic of the period after 1945 was not the disappearance of a National Catholic mentality so much as the greater degree of autonomy that was allowed to the Catholic Church in matters of social action. The regime accepted that the various movements within *Acción Católica* had their own areas of specialization. In 1947, following an example that had already been set in the 1930s, a group of organizations emerged which were essentially apostolic in aim but could be seen as competing with organizations linked to the Party. Among these were the Workers’ Catholic Action Guild (*Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica*), Catholic Labor Youth (*Juventud Obrera Católica*), and Catholic Student Youth (*Juventud de Estudiantes Católicos*): HOAC, JOC, and JEC, respectively. As time passed, these would all come into serious conflict with the Party.

The example of Catalonia, which is by far the best known, shows very clearly the Franco regime’s desire to implement a policy of homogenization that would lead to the disappearance of regional cultures, which would be replaced by the culture of Castile. The expression “cultural genocide” seems appropriate to describe what happened in those years. The Catalan language could only be spoken in the privacy of the home, while the renaming of streets seemed designed either to be offensive or as a gratuitous display of force. Not only was the use of Catalan prohibited in public life but an official propaganda campaign was mounted to promote the use of Castilian (“Speak the Language of the Empire,” was the advice given by solemn posters all over Barcelona). A number of city monuments that might have been associated with Catalanism were removed and there was no more Catalan press, not even of a religious nature. From the summer of 1939 on, it was decided that as many obstacles as possible would be put

in the way of publishing in Catalan. The only publications allowed were folkloric or religious pamphlets, the Bible, and classical Greek texts such as Plutarch – provided the introduction and notes were in Castilian.

In 1946 the situation changed slightly. There was a discernible “spring-time” in the world of publishing which allowed almost all Catalan poetry to be published, though the work of Joan Maragall, for example, could be published in Castilian but not in Catalan; the translation of recent authors into Catalan was forbidden. Preaching in Catalan was tolerated in rural areas but not until the 1950s in urban areas. Some grotesque cases occurred, such as that of writers such as Shakespeare having to be published in clandestine editions. Not surprisingly, the Catalans themselves wondered whether their culture would be able to survive. Even so, this period was in actual fact better than what could be termed the “blue era” when the Falange’s influence was strongest.

Opposition from Survivors: The Spanish Left from 1939 to 1951

In 1969 the former mayor of the little village of Mijas in the province of Malaga reappeared in public after an amnesty had been declared on crimes committed during the Civil War. He had spent 30 years of his life hiding in his home from 1934 to 1964, waiting for the chance to reappear. His experience, though remarkable, was only one of many similar stories that could be told by Spaniards on the side that lost the Civil War. In fact, until they could be reasonably certain of the outcome of World War II, no real attempt was made by the vanquished to regain power in Spain; once they did so, however, the international situation meant that the attempts of the opposition met with failure. It did, however, survive and enjoyed a moment of hope which was destined to die in the 1950s.

Probably the clearest example of dissent within a party was that of the socialists. The situation created during the Civil War continued or even intensified up to 1945, and only the hope of an Allied victory kept alive any desire to re-form the party. The one who did best out of this situation was Indalecio Prieto, who saw the ranks of his followers swelled by former supporters of Francisco Largo Caballero and Julián Besteiro, while Juan Negrín’s influence waned noticeably. Negrín’s influence had never been particularly strong in Spanish socialism, though he had been a powerful figure in the state apparatus of the Republic; now the frequent shifts in

position of the Spanish Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Español* or PCE) weakened his position. Prieto began very early on to argue in favor of a plebiscite: an option he had favored at the end of the Civil War. His tactic never won unconditional support within the party but he did gain a majority.

Within Spain, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (*Partido Socialista Obrero Español* or PSOE) survived, though its position was very precarious. In Asturias guerrilla groups continued fighting until 1948, and from 1944 on a national executive existed inside the country. This executive, like the PSOE which had formed after emigration to France, adopted a strongly anti-communist stance. In France the principal organizer of the Socialist Party was Rodolfo Llopis, but Prieto, who combined greater prestige with tactical capabilities, provided the real thrust behind the PSOE in exile in France, and in 1946 the organization had 8,000 members. Taken as a whole, therefore, the Socialists were in a position to put forward a strategy based on external pressure on Spain and aimed at achieving a transition towards democracy. Even as they declared that they were Republicans, the Socialists were still open to change.

This attitude clashed with the opinion of those who wanted to restore the institutions of the Republic. The so-called Spanish Junta for Liberation (*Junta Española de Liberación*), founded in 1943, was the brainchild of Catalan Republicans with support from Socialists, though its most significant figure was Diego Martínez Barrio. The Junta came into being in opposition not only to the monarchist alternative but also to communist attempts to set up larger organizations. Inside Spain, what was known as the National Alliance of Democratic Forces (*Alianza Nacional de Fuerzas Democráticas* or ANFD), which came into being around the same time, insisted more strongly on the need for free elections in the present than on re-founding the institutions that had existed in 1931; closer to the monarchists, the ANFD also showed itself to be unequivocally anti-communist.

There had, then, emerged a possible source of confrontation between the ANFD and the Republicans in exile. It was as late as 1945 that the Republican *Cortes* was finally set up and functioning in Mexico. Martínez Barrio was elected President of the Republic and Negrín offered him his resignation. Not that this reunited the Republican camp. Prieto wanted Negrín as President of the Government and when a cabinet was formed under José Giral he refused to join it. It is therefore fair to say that the Republic was reborn with serious problems of disunity. At the start of November Giral completed his task of forming a government but Prieto,

being more closely in touch with international relations at the time, was not slow to voice very different opinions from those of the official Republican government. Giral renounced violence but this was not enough to gain clear support from the western nations who, by asking in March 1946 for a transitional government to be set up, showed that they did not see the Republic as synonymous with democracy.

The Spanish Communist Party, whose political influence had increased over the course of the Civil War, found itself at the end of the conflict being accused by the rest of the Spanish left of harboring hegemonic ambitions. Confrontation was particularly bitter between the socialists and the communists and left the latter isolated. During the period that followed there was a first change in direction for the party when José Díaz committed suicide in 1942 and the leadership passed to Dolores Ibárruri: *La Pasionaria*. The bulk of the communist leadership was in South America and from there, via Portugal, they managed to reestablish some degree of organization within Spain. In 1941–2 Spanish communists suggested adopting a tactic of “National Union” against Franco, hoping thereby to group together very different factions, including some from the Spanish right, united by principles that were exclusively patriotic and anti-fascist. In reality, however, the communists attracted almost no support. They were, after all, as divided as any other group by internal disputes about the International and their diagnosis of what was going on in Spain. The defeat of an attempted guerrilla invasion via the Pyrenees allowed Santiago Carrillo to take over as communist leader in France. His position as leader there did not, however, mean a change in tactics, for the guerrilla war continued.

Compared with anarchism, Spanish communism had not been very strong in the 1930s but this situation changed in the first half of the 1940s. The reason was that the anarchists now faced the ultimate dilemma of whether or not to take part in politics. Now, with disputes intensifying within its ranks due to the split between anarchists inside Spain and those in exile, the possibility of moving towards syndicalism presented itself, or even of engaging in party politics alongside Republican groups or without them. But quite apart from these dilemmas, more than any other left-wing group the National Confederation of Labor (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* or CNT) received offers of support from members of the official Francoist union. As with the socialists and communists, by 1944 the anarchists had a clandestine organization that was active nationwide, though it appears that they bore the brunt of Francoist repression.

The reason was that they tried to function as a union among the masses that could easily be infiltrated by the police. At the end of 1945 the new national executive of the CNT was imprisoned; of the first 14 such executives, 10 were dismantled by the police. In contrast to those who were in favor of joining the political process, the most extreme members who rejected any form of government advocated guerrilla war and acts of terrorism, though they were unlikely to achieve anything by these means. In the early post-Civil War years, the CNT lost 80 percent of its membership and by the start of the 1960s its leaders were longstanding militants who had fought in the Civil War, there being no one of a younger generation to take their place.

As regards nationalist movements, one can detect in all of them, as a general trait, an initial tendency towards radicalization during the World War II years. It is significant that in 1944 the linking up of the nationalist groups from around Spain's periphery led to the re-forming of "Galeuzca," the group whose three syllables, taken from the names of the three historic regions, had united the most radical nationalist youth in the 1920s. However, after 1946 this group disappeared from the scene.

Up to the start of 1946 one might say that in fact the opposition in exile or of the left merely managed to survive. Then, with the defeat of the Axis, its members believed they could see light at the end of a very long tunnel. For Spaniards on the right, however, the Republic not only meant a return to the situation before the Civil War but also a reversal of the outcome of that war. From that time on, it seemed far more likely that it would be the monarchist option that would take Franco's place than the republican option.

Giral's government, from its moment of inception, had had problems that only increased in 1946 because it failed utterly to convince the democratic nations that Franco might come to pose a serious threat to world peace. Objectively speaking, Giral was quite wrong in making this assertion and the United Nations' recommendation that the only action needed was to withdraw ambassadors from Spain might have been seen as a defeat by the socialists who were being increasingly spurred on by Indalecio Prieto to seek possible ways ahead. This explains why a government was formed with Llopis as president at the start of 1947. From the very beginning the main representative of Spanish socialism in France faced a difficult balancing act. He belonged to a party which favored the democratic nations and therefore seemed able to offer some form of guarantee; yet it also had to try to unite all the opposition parties in exile and for that reason Llopis

included a member of the Spanish Communist Party in his cabinet. In the summer of 1947 Prieto's position, which was always open to change, became the most powerful element in the PSOE, which meant that it was now impossible to hold the government together. The exclusively Republican government that then formed with Albornoz as president came to be seen as a kind of representative of Republican legitimacy and this enabled it to last a long time, though it was still incapable of providing any real alternative to the Franco regime.

From 1947 on, the PSOE in exile was still the most powerful party under Prieto's leadership. His attitude had proved to be the most clear-sighted on the left, but if his strategy was to succeed he had to find some way of working with the monarchists. His approaches to them over the course of 1948 proved fruitless, however. In 1948, at talks held in France they had failed to forge any solid hope of replacing Franco. Until 1951 the PSOE continued to argue at its conferences for the need to work with the monarchists but there was little it could do when faced with the democratic powers' increasing reluctance even to consider the problem of Spain. If for the socialist leaders outside Spain these were years of bitter disappointment, inside the country, after a brief period of hope, Spaniards experienced in their own flesh the full weight of repression. Between 1944 and 1947 there was some degree of organization inside Spain but it soon disappeared. At the end of the 1940s socialism was active only in areas where in the past it had been firmly rooted (Madrid, the Basque Country, and Asturias) and there it lacked coordination. By 1949 three national committees that had served one after another and some 1,300 militants were in Spanish jails.

As was the case in all communist parties in Western Europe at the time, the PCE obeyed directives from Moscow without question, to such an extent that Santiago Carrillo used the phrase "pole star" when talking of the Soviet Union, Jorge Semprún said that if the Soviet Union did not exist life would not be worth living, and Rafael Alberti described Stalin as "father, comrade, and master." As in other European communist parties, the Stalinist personality cult had its national equivalent: in Spain's case, Dolores Ibárruri. The particular stance of the PCE within the Spanish opposition was that it strongly supported the use of guerrilla warfare, though it by no means had a monopoly there. The fact that the PCE abandoned the option of guerrilla tactics in 1948 has been attributed to a decision by Stalin but it is more likely that circumstances outside Spain led to the change. Stalin only made a very general statement about the

need to use armed combat in conjunction with legal processes. It is not true to say that this about-turn resulted in the PCE leading the strikes that happened in those years, which were in fact spontaneous.

At least as much as, or even more than, its support for guerrilla warfare, what characterized the PCE at the time was its isolation; it was so inward-looking as to adopt the defensive position typical of the Stalinist period which required constant purges driven by a fear of infiltration. In 1947 the PCE abandoned the Republican government at the same time as its marginalization was becoming obvious in other countries such as Belgium, France, and Italy. In 1948 it ceased to exist, as did the autonomous governments of Catalonia and the Basque Country. In 1950 it was declared illegal in France. Meanwhile, ideological purges were taking place which can be seen as clear evidence of heterodoxy in other countries. The party's self-destructiveness was evident in the fact that of the 17 PCE parliamentary deputies from the Republicans' last *Cortes*, four had died by this time but ten had left the party.

Although it drew its main support from the communists, the guerrilla war started up spontaneously in areas where there was a solid leftist tradition or where the geography was complex. With scant organization and few resources, the resistance fighters were simple "escapees" or people who had "taken to the hills," often after having broken out of prison. The communists used them to set up networks engaged in armed action which could count on limited supplies but never posed any serious threat to the regime. It was not, therefore, the most "serious" opposition group and it was not the reason why Spain did not enter World War II. Nor did it organize proper military action. As Carrero wrote to Franco in one of his reports, it was more a case of "banditry" aimed at creating an atmosphere of insecurity than an offensive reaction capable, for example, of cutting communications.

There was significant guerrilla activity between 1946 and 1948 but it decreased to a bare minimum after 1952, although there would still be occasional executions of resistance fighters in the mid 1950s. The most active group, which functioned on the eastern side of the country between Teruel, Cuenca, Castellón, and Valencia, depended on resources brought through from France. Unlike similar guerrilla warfare in other countries, the Spanish resistance did not have steady support from the local population, though they did have a network of some tens of thousands working with them or liaising; nor could they count on cross-border support and so they had to keep going by making small raids in isolated places.

Their action consisted mainly of assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage, or raids, and at most they occupied a small settlement for a short time. The guerrilla fighters did not work as large units but as small bands of men who remained hidden during the day and attacked at night. That is why it is impossible to give a detailed account of guerrilla operations. Some 2,200 guerrillas died in combat, while the Civil Guard, which was mainly in charge of fighting them, lost 250 men, and the losses to all the security forces combined can be put at about 300. Although there might have been as many as 7,000 guerrillas in total, there were never more than 2,000 to 2,500 in action at any one time in groups of no more than 300 people. On both sides the struggle was notable for its savagery: the guerrilla fighters executed real or supposed supporters of the regime, while the regime's counter-insurgency tactics included torture and application of the "law on attempts to escape." Carrero Blanco himself suggested using "a thrashing" as the most usual method for dealing with opposition terrorism.

It would be wrong to suggest that there was a fundamental difference between the guerrilla war and workers' protests in factories as if their strategies were incompatible: in fact, the first strikes in Franco's Spain occurred at the height of the guerrilla war. In May 1947 in the Basque Country the General Union of Workers (*Unión General de Trabajadores* or UGT) and the National Confederation of Labor (*Confederación Nacional del Trabajo* or CNT) joined in the strikes but so did the Basque Nationalist Union and the respective political groups which supported these movements. Asturias was the region that until the 1960s led in terms of workers' protests in Spain. From the start of the new regime a steady increase in the extraction of coal was recorded: in 1952 the numbers of miners employed topped 90,000, whereas in 1935 there had been only 44,000. After the Civil War there was also a marked militarization of working life which meant, for example, arrest for not turning up to work. Even though in the Spain of the time miners' salaries were above average, in practice until very late on they barely served to cover basic food needs. If all these factors are taken into account, along with the lack of modernization, the high accident rate in Spain is easily explained. Between 1941 and 1959 more than 1,500 miners died in Asturias and about 750 in León and Palencia as a result of accidents at work. Despite these statistics, in Asturias, the Basque Country, and Barcelona instances of protest were spontaneous, isolated, and unconnected, which can be explained by a general sense of defeat, fear, and repression.

In a context such as this, what happened in the Catalan capital at the start of the 1950s is of particular interest as it was something entirely new. The Barcelona Tram Strike of 1951 was not started by any clandestine organization; it happened as a result of a protest not about a political issue but about the price of public transport, which had been raised by 40 percent, far more than in Madrid. It meant that almost all trams stopped running for several days and had the added success of splitting those in power in the Catalan capital (Falange clashed with a governor whom they considered lukewarm). The wave of strikes spread from Barcelona to the Basque Country. There, in contrast, together with groups made up entirely of workers, members of Catholic organizations joined in too. All these factors, which go some way towards explaining the ministerial crisis that followed in April 1951, lead us on to consider a social protest that was to have a promising future, but only with the passage of time.

The Monarchist Alternative

As we have already seen, the most active person on the Spanish left at this time, Prieto, knew only too well that replacing the Franco regime would depend on reaching an agreement with the monarchists. Although with some variations, the democratic forces also agreed on a transition towards democracy on the condition that the restoration of the monarchy would bring about reconciliation. We must therefore consider the monarchist alternative which now meant a clear break with the regime, however much the regime might try to bring about change by a peaceful process of transition. One could say that if ever there was a time when the Franco regime might have been replaced it was in 1946 and it would have been Don Juan who ruled as king in place of the dictator.

Over the course of 1945 Don Juan's and Franco's emissaries traveled to and fro between Switzerland and Spain but the chances of them reaching an agreement were scant because they differed on important issues. The dictator did not think for one moment that he should give up power; rather he clung to it with even greater determination. He had potent weapons to draw on: he could mobilize the younger elements in the Armed Services, and from the outset he thwarted any attempt to restore the monarchy by constantly suggesting new candidates. He used every argument possible to stay in power, including the need to hand out firm justice to those who had lost the war, but his most powerful weapon was his sense of timing and how slow he was to take action.

Don Juan's arrival in Portugal caused great commotion in Spain. An impressive committee of dignitaries, including 20 ex-ministers as well as aristocrats, members of the Armed Services, and Spain's five most important bankers, wrote Don Juan a letter which showed that support for Franco was less than one might have thought. However, most of the signatories were doing no more than putting their names to a formula that the international situation at the time seemed to demand, and they were unlikely to pursue it to its logical conclusion. This was how things stood when, a few days after Don Juan's arrival in Estoril, Franco broke off existing relations with him. It is obvious in what Carrero wrote to the dictator at the time that both men felt indignant about "the small smart salon set" whose common characteristics were "snobbery, frivolity, and stupidity."

At that time the monarchists had to play a "double game" which, as Gil Robles suggested, was so plagued by difficulties that in the end they simply could not win. It was, on the one hand, a matter of undermining the Spanish people's support for the regime by drawing into the monarchist camp sections of society that had been on Franco's side in the Civil War and, at the same time, reaching an agreement with the non-communist left. Although Don Juan de Borbón hesitated on more than one occasion and made many tactical mistakes, it was the monarchists' heterogeneity, their lack of unity, and their uncertainty as to the exact method they would use to remove Franco from power, as well as the state of post-Civil War Spain, that are the main factors that explain their failure. Certainly, if Franco was never deposed it was because it is very difficult, when a dictator has been brought to power by a civil war, to remove him without another civil war.

"Double politics" came into being in the early months of 1946. In February the so-called "Estoril Principles" ("*Bases de Estoril*") were signed with the result that a section of the Carlist movement joined Don Juan's cause, signing up to a program which mentioned "healthy representative institutions." At the same time contact was made with the moderate left inside Spain. It is probable, however, that the monarchists moved far too cautiously at this time, because in the months that followed Franco seized the initiative, never to lose it again. One must remember, too, that the socialists only adopted a more open stance later on.

Francoism benefited from a curious reaction that was evident in Spanish public opinion. The stance adopted by the democratic forces who condemned the regime was not widely understood and, as a result, the regime found it easy to stir up a mood of resistance like that when ancient Numantia defied the Romans. Carrero and Franco both realized this almost immediately and it was fundamental in shaping their decisions. It

was in this atmosphere that Don Juan was contacted about the Law of Succession on which he had not yet had a chance to express an opinion. His conversation with Carrero, who was sent by Franco to report back on Don Juan's response, could not have been more significant. Don Juan complained that the text implied that the ruler was to be chosen; Franco's adviser retorted that in a civil war one could not bestride two trenches. "You will not succeed," replied Don Juan, warning of the difficulties they would face in terms of public opinion outside Spain. He was wrong about this. Declarations that he made shortly afterwards unfortunately clashed with monarchist public opinion in Spain. They made it seem as though it had been the monarchy that had won the Civil War and had restored civil liberties. Don Juan also stated that he was allowing contact between his followers and those who had fought on the opposite side during the Civil War: a fact that was confirmed when Gil Robles met Prieto in London in October 1947. The two leaders agreed on the reestablishment of civil liberties, on an amnesty, and on Spain's reintegration into Europe – that is to say, on the basic essentials. Both men were at the time open to possible change; they had had the support of the main political groups in the 1930s but there was no great difference between the final positions they now adopted. When news of this appeared in the Spanish press, accompanied by the usual propaganda, the conservative masses in the country adopted an attitude totally closed to any possibility of change. The unlikelihood of an immediate restoration of the monarchy at this point, the question of the education of Don Juan Carlos, the eldest royal child, and the divisions among the monarchists meant that from 1948 onwards Don Juan tried a series of different tactics. These included the meeting held on Franco's yacht the *Azor* off the Basque coast in August 1948. As with all other meetings between Franco and Don Juan, what was most important here was not its content so much as the fact that they met at all. "Whose gun is going to backfire on him?" Don Juan asked, referring to Franco and himself. "God will decide," he concluded. In the medium term the answer was undoubtedly Franco's but it changes totally if we consider the longer term. One must remember that Don Juan Carlos, merely by returning to Spain, could have been considered to have been confirmed as Franco's successor.

At the very same time as these talks were going on between Franco and Don Juan, monarchist and socialist representatives were meeting for discussions in San Juan de Luz, only a few kilometers away, and realizing that they agreed with each other on the outcome of the transition. Yet

from the end of 1948 on, hopes of a return to monarchy gradually faded, while at the same time there was a slow shift among monarchists towards cooperation with the regime. Pressure from democratic forces had dwindled to nothing and there was puzzlement among the monarchist rank and file. By 1951 any possibility of agreement between monarchists and socialists had vanished totally.

At the end of 1951 Franco's new government had been named and a monarchist spokesman did not hesitate to label it the "most totalitarian" to date. In November 1948 Don Juan Carlos had been sent to Spain; at the same time Don Juan replaced the most anti-Francoist of the advisers who had been with him so far with others more closely in touch with government circles. The prince's education became a political issue once again when, after he had completed his Baccalaureate, the decision had to be made as to whether he should continue his studies in Spain or go abroad. Those working closely with Franco had their way, which meant that Franco himself could oversee the training of the one who would in time become King of Spain. Nonetheless, between father and son there was always a kind of "family pact" aimed at achieving an identical outcome, though that was not at all evident at the time, as became obvious after 1975: that is to say, 30 years after the Monarchist option first came to seem a real alternative.

Franco in Isolation

The previous pages have allowed us to appreciate to just how great an extent outside pressures on Spain affected internal politics. The only reason for Spain's isolation was the continuance of a political regime that had not evolved to any degree since its beginnings in 1939. If Spain had done away with Franco and had evolved as Turkey had done, its collaboration with the Axis might have been forgotten. Something similar could have happened had it made a more radical about-turn as Brazil did, though Getulio Vargas did have to hand over power; or alternatively if Spain had opted in the past for a genuine neutrality like that of Salazar in Portugal, who also decided in 1945 to adopt a tentatively conciliatory political stance. However, nothing like this happened in Franco's Spain.

Despite triumphalist declarations by the regime's spokesmen, there were clear signs of diplomatic difficulties before the end of World War II. In the summer of 1945 an international conference was held in San

Francisco, out of which the United Nations Organization would emerge. The Mexican delegate proposed that nations whose regimes had been set up with the help of the fascist powers should not be granted membership. The “big four” meeting in Potsdam not long afterwards approved a resolution which stated that no request from Spain would be considered. Also, over the course of 1945 Spain’s modest attempt at imperialist expansion ended pitifully: it was not allowed to take part in the international conference that was to decide on the future administration of Tangiers.

Within the regime Franco himself always had a major role in determining the direction that foreign policy would take, but this was even more the case at a time when he himself was having to play a hard game to stay in power. Franco showed no sign of personal greatness or statesman-like vision, but he did demonstrate that he was capable of astute analysis of the international situation when he judged that collaboration between the democratic countries and the Soviet Union could not last. If his foreign policy was successful it was because it was simple: he merely applied Carrero’s maxim of “order, unity, and endurance” that governed his actions inside Spain to events on the world stage. Foreign policy consisted, then, of affirming repeatedly that Spain was a nation with an open and evolving constitution, capable of coming into line with the rest of Europe but with peculiarities that precluded political parties. The Civil War was seen as one episode in an ongoing struggle against communism and the regime was considered to have stayed neutral throughout World War II.

Many Spanish diplomats at the time knew full well that only the disappearance of the most notoriously dictatorial aspects of the regime would allow outside pressure on Spain to be eased. Lequerica – effectively Franco’s representative in the United States – used a different type of argument based on material interests and on the political games played in American internal politics. In his view it was essential “to help businesses,” which meant having the Republican Party in power: a group that was “not fanatically passionate but strong at administration and economics.” That was the period of the reconstruction of a Europe that had been devastated by war, and Spain had resources that they might need.

It was above all in the early months of 1946 that Spanish diplomatic relations reached a particularly low point. Panama asked the United Nations member-countries to make their contacts with Spain conform to what had been decided at the San Francisco and Potsdam conferences.

France, still driven by memories of the Spanish Civil War, closed Spain's borders. One might have thought that the regime's days were numbered, which would explain both the monarchists' excitement and Franco's defensive attitude. However, the first references to the "iron curtain" date from this time. In March 1946, to avoid aligning themselves with the Soviet Union, the western Allies (France, Britain, and the United States) published a declaration which expressed both their desire for changes in Spain's political situation and that there should not be another civil war. In effect they were now giving the impression that they would have accepted a formula that allowed a modest pace of evolution. "The most we can hope for," wrote one British diplomat, "is modification of the present regime and the suppression of its most undesirable elements."

That position was taken much further by the United Nations. In April of that same year Poland, a country in which Soviet influence was now decisive, stated that the existence of a regime such as Franco's posed a threat to world peace. However, in Ocaña where, according to the Polish delegate, atomic bombs were being made, all that was actually being produced was bricks. What the communist countries would have liked was for the United Nations to break all economic links with Franco's Spain. After a lengthy attempt to formulate a resolution, in December 1946 Spain was expelled from all international organizations and a recommendation was made that all diplomats in Madrid be called back to their own countries.

We already know that when these measures were made public in Spain the reaction was like that in ancient Numantia. They did of course give the clearest possible indication of just how isolated the Franco regime was at that time: in the United Nations voting there had only been six votes opposing the proposal, all from Latin American countries, against 34 votes in favor and 12 abstentions. Yet the UN measures made little impact in practical terms since Franco's Spain was already virtually isolated. Only three European ambassadors (including the British ambassador) and two Latin Americans were withdrawn from Madrid, while the Portuguese, the Swiss (interpreting their position as neutral), the Vatican nuncio, and the Irish representative, because he was from a country with a strong Catholic tradition, stayed on.

It was obvious what Franco had to do if he was to escape from the isolation imposed on him. He could hope that the Vatican and Catholic lobbies in all countries might join together to defend him. He also managed to persuade Portugal to act as intermediary between Spain and the

democratic nations: between 1945 and 1957 Franco and Salazar met for talks five times. However, the regime actually broke out of its isolation first and foremost by exploiting divisions between the countries that had won World War II, attitudes to Spain in Latin American countries, and, to a lesser extent, in Arab countries too.

Although the main split between the countries that had won the war was between the Soviet Union and the others, there were some gray areas that need explaining in relation to the Spanish question. It suited the Soviet Union to have an area of ongoing instability in Southern Europe. In that sense the Soviets preferred Franco to a stable democratic monarchy. At the start of 1947 they made indirect contact with Franco to ensure that he would not align Spain with the western nations. It was the split between the Soviet Union and the democratic countries that was Franco's salvation – far more so than his own foreign policy. France saw that, as had happened in the Civil War, Spain's problematic state was becoming a cause for political debate within the country, but material considerations came to the fore: a trading agreement was signed in mid 1948. France would rather have kept its relations with Spain exclusively limited to trade, but Franco would agree only to full relations. The British position was the most coherent and consistent of any of the western nations: it involved trying to encourage the different elements of the Spanish opposition to engage in some form of cooperation presided over by the monarchy. The process leading up to this situation was also to be gradual: as Bevin said, it should be the result of a daily exercising of pressure and not of a total split. As early as March 1947 the British signed a trade agreement with Spain but, disappointed to find the opposition too divided, they finally came to the conclusion that there was no longer any point in applying more "pin-pricks" to Franco.

American policy was the most erratic of all the great powers. It was the United States that, in 1946, published the most hard-hitting document against Franco's claim to have been neutral while at the same time being reticent about a possible transition towards a monarchy. In the end, however, military interests won over all others. From 1947 onwards, all American strategic planning was based on the notion that if the Soviets launched an offensive against Europe, within 50 or 60 days they would reach the Pyrenees. Spain would be useful as a bastion of resistance and a base for a counter-offensive; in conditions such as these, Spain was as important on the southern flank of Europe as Britain was in the north. In October 1947, the State Department Office of Political Planning came to

the conclusion that the Franco regime could not be removed except by force and recommended that pressure on it be eased.

At the same time, Lequerica's maneuvering in the American press and politics had a degree of success. From 1949 onwards the American House of Representatives began to approve aid to Spain – aid that was vetoed by President Truman. The first time aid was given definitive approval was as late as 1951. Apart from military reasoning, the Americans' change of heart owed much to the formation of an influential nucleus of Catholic senators and congressmen who were anti-communist, interested in exporting cotton, and who encouraged the arms industry or opposed Truman. The result of all these factors was a marked change in the American position: in 1945 public opinion had been largely hostile to Franco but in 1951 almost half of those polled were in favor of Spain joining NATO. Even so, one would have to say that what actually happened was that there was a shift from considering an alliance with Spain "extremely unpopular" to seeing it as "just not very popular."

Having explained the position of each of the western nations, it is also useful to look at the "substitution strategies" to which Franco resorted in order to alleviate his isolation. Foremost among them was his attitude towards the Latin American countries, and the tactic that the regime used to win support in that part of the world was its culture; as a result, funding increased substantially (by 40 percent). The Council of the Hispanic World (*Consejo de la Hispanidad*) was renamed the Institute of Hispanic Culture (*Instituto de Cultura Hispánica*). Spain's culture was presented in Latin America as offering a very particular, traditional, and Catholic alternative capable of challenging other, more materialistic options. In this way the Spanish regime could count on being favored by a section of Latin American opinion, even if at the same time it alienated more left-wing countries (such as Mexico, Chile, Costa Rica, and Colombia).

"We have hauled our body halfway out of the pit now and we shall never forget who it was who held out their hand to help us up when we were down in the depths," said Areilza in 1949, referring to Argentina in a speech which he made as Franco's representative. Indeed, Argentina's role in enabling Spain to emerge from isolation was so decisive that one could even suggest that "saving the dictatorship" depended on it. In the 1940s Argentina was the world's major exporter of wheat and beef but did not have a merchant fleet capable of transporting its products. In political terms Perón's government favored a populist "third way" with a "Latin identity" aimed at providing an alternative to American dominance

in the new continent. At the time when Spain's isolation was at its worst the interests of the two countries coincided, which might give the impression – quite wrongly – that their politics also coincided. In fact Perón wanted to hold on to the support of the extreme right in his country while at the same time fostering a sense of national identity in opposition to American pressure; but his regime's popularism was markedly different from the National Catholic tone of Franco's Spain. Eva Perón had no hesitation in telling a Spanish minister that his country was overrun by those who "paraded around in cassocks sucking on communion wafers."

Cooperation between the two leaders, being a direct result of circumstances, was short-lived and caused trouble for Perón. For Franco, however, it proved decisive. At the very same moment when the UN was recommending the withdrawal of all ambassadors from Spain, Argentina was hastening to send its own to Madrid. In October 1946 a trade agreement was signed. In 1947 Eva Perón came to Spain on a visit that lasted 15 days and provided plenty of opportunities for displays of popularist demagoguery. The following year saw the signing of what was known as the Franco-Perón Protocol aimed at fostering trade relations between the two countries. In this way Argentina made a crucial contribution to ensuring that Spain's supply lines did not collapse, although it received very little in return. In 1948 Spain imported almost 400,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of maize – quantities which, in terms of price, were not a tenth of what Spain exported to Argentina. However, Cádiz did not become a free port facilitating the distribution of Argentine goods throughout Europe, investment in Spain did not increase, and Spain did not export industrial products to Argentina. In 1950 the balance of payments was already in Spain's favor and in 1954 rumors were rife of a possible breakdown in relations.

Spanish–Argentine relations – effectively an alliance between two pariahs – were characterized by misunderstandings. Argentina was a naturally rich country whose leaders were excessively overoptimistic about the future but it could not help Spain to gain any real benefits because the two economies were not complementary. There was also a divergence in foreign policy, for Perón had anticipated World War II and had adopted a neutral stance, while Franco wanted involvement in the western world. Each hoped to benefit from the other but it was Franco who gained real advantages. Meanwhile, the climate in the New World was changing. The clearest proof can be seen in the way the Latin American countries voted on the UN recommendation approved in December 1946. Whereas in 1946 some six countries had voted against the motion, in 1947, 1949, and

1950 respectively, the votes were eight, 12, and 16 against. The change in attitude towards Franco's Spain in Latin America can therefore be seen as widespread, early, and decisive, independently of Argentina.

Along with the support Spain received from Latin America, support from Arab countries must be taken into account. Even more so than with the former, Spain's policy in relation to the latter was the result of a process of substitution. It was a matter of managing through contact with the Arab nations to bring about some improvement in international relations as a whole. The Arabs did not have democratic institutions and usually abstained from voting in the UN; they also tended to reject any third-party interference in their own affairs, fearing communist intervention above all. This explains why Spanish diplomacy and propaganda had notable success. The problem facing Franco was that at any given moment the Arabs might demand independence for Morocco. Even so, in 1950 King Abd-Allah of Jordan visited Spain as the first Head of State to do so in this period. Then, in 1952, Martín Artajo traveled to various Arab countries with Franco's daughter and General Ben Mizzian, who was of Moroccan nationality but was an officer in the Spanish Army.

The successes achieved by Franco's Spain in its relations with Arab nations were due in part to the fact that they were more interested in the Palestine question than in Morocco. If Spain opposed the creation of the State of Israel and supported the Vatican proposal that the Holy Places should be under international control, the main reason for doing so was Israel's attitude. When independence was declared the news was not even announced to Spain: a country which the Israeli ambassador to the UN considered an "active sympathizer and ally" of the Nazis. In effect Israel gained the support of liberals and socialists. Not even firm reminders of the help afforded to escaping Jews during World War II, nor the degree of religious freedom allowed in Spain after 1945, impressed Israeli politicians one iota.

Having highlighted the support that Franco's Spain could call on, we can now describe how the country began to emerge from isolation. In 1947 Franco's Spain was expelled from the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. On the other hand, in the UN it received 16 votes in its favor in comparison to six the previous year. The western powers now decided that the withdrawal of ambassadors had, paradoxically, had the effect of increasing support for Franco and therefore that it was time to adopt a different stance. The "slow relaxing" of pressure on Francoist Spain recommended by planners in the State Department was helped by

events on the international stage. In the summer of 1947, responding to Soviet pressure, Hungary had become a communist dictatorship and in February 1948 the same happened in Czechoslovakia. In the summer of 1948 the Soviets began the blockade of Berlin. By that time the chairman of the American Committee of the Armed Forces had visited Spain. In January 1950 the American Secretary of State did not agree to America approving a UN resolution allowing relations with Spain to be resumed. However, finally, in November 1950, the United Nations approved by 38 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions (which included France and Britain), a resolution which passed no judgment on the regime and gave approval for the resumption of diplomatic relations. In fact, by this time Spain already had representatives from 24 countries in Madrid. At the end of 1950 Spain took its first step towards membership of international organizations when it was admitted to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

At a glance it might seem that the attitude of the western nations had changed substantially, especially in the case of America. All the democracies thought from 1945 onwards that it would have been better had Franco handed over power but at no point were they prepared for military intervention, partly because it was not common practice and partly because Franco's Spain posed them no real threat. In response to what the Polish delegate had stated at the UN, a British diplomat said of Spain that "it is only a danger and a disgrace to itself." The western powers also discovered that the Spanish opposition was weak and divided and therefore Spain ended up being what might be termed "tolerantly ostracized." Truman stated that the withdrawal of ambassadors was "the wrong means to achieve the right ends," and Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, described what had been his own attitude up to then as "neither effective nor intelligent behavior." This position did not imply any recognition of the benefits of the regime but only that it was immovable. The cold war increased tolerance towards the Franco regime but it was still ostracized and the clearest proof of that is that Spain was not allowed to benefit from the Marshall Plan or to join NATO.

The "Dark Night": Autarchy and Rationing in the 1940s

As we already know, the level of destruction inflicted within Spain was nowhere near the level outside in Europe after World War II. In Spain a

tenth of all cattle were lost during the Civil War but in Greece half perished in World War II; three-quarters of the Spanish merchant fleet survived while only a quarter of the French and Greek fleets were saved. In these two countries the drop in electricity production was 50 percent greater in France and 300 percent greater in Greece and the destruction of homes was twice and five times as bad, respectively. What made Spain different was how slowly reconstruction got under way – a fact that must to a great extent be blamed on the regime's economic policy which ensured that 1945 made no significant impact on the situation inside the country. Both before and after that date the political strategy favored autarchy and state intervention with a seasoning of revolutionary rhetoric which on several occasions conflicted with the measures put forward by Finance Ministers but satisfied the regime's Falangist members. During World War II Spain had an economic policy of strict rationing with no chance of cross-border trade against a background of stagnation. Once the war ended, the economic policy pursued previously could no longer be justified in any terms. Had Spain had more links with European foreign policy doubtless a profound transformation would have been possible, like that experienced by the rest of Europe from 1947 on. It has been estimated that without the Civil War Spain's economic growth could have increased by a third, and that with the Civil War – but with the Marshall Plan as well – growth could still have increased by a quarter.

What was most important in terms of foreign trade during the World War II years was Spain's relations with Italy and Germany. As time passed, involvement with these two countries became increasingly prejudicial to Spain at a time when the country was paying off a part of the debt incurred during the Civil War. Germany and Italy headed the list of countries buying Spanish products in 1941, and that did not alter until 1943. It was only in 1944 that a real change occurred in the theater of war that was clearly in the Allies' favor. It is true to say, therefore, that political factors made Spain dependent on the Axis, and that this dependency became particularly significant because Spanish trade had fallen to almost half its previous level as a result of the conflict. Estimates suggest that 12 percent of the value of its imports was transferred to Germany and 3 percent to Italy as a result of the debts incurred during the Civil War. Another aspect of the question relates to military expenditure by the Spanish state over this period, either to improve defenses or in preparation for joining in the world conflict. According to official figures, the budget for expenditure on such materials was always above 50 percent

during the war and reached a maximum of 63 percent in 1943. This data all reveals the extent to which, if Spain had adopted a truly neutral position, it would have been of real benefit at the time. Improvements could have been made to industrial productivity by greater openness to trade with the Allies but in 1945 Spanish industrial productivity was 10 percent below what it had been in 1935 and the annual growth rate had not yet reached 1 percent.

The opportunity lost over these years can best be appreciated if one compares Spain with other neutral European nations. All of them improved more than Spain, which was the country with the lowest level of industrial expansion. Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey faced difficulties that were, objectively speaking, much greater in terms of their geography and trade than any facing Spain, yet Spain made difficulties for itself by its bad relations with the Allies and by spurning foreign investment. On the one hand, public resources were used to build up industries that produced war materials, which swallowed up imports, energy, and money; on the other, no dams were built which could have eased the energy deficit and in effect the expansion of industries that could have exported their products was cut.

Autarchy and interventionism had been strong tendencies in the Spanish economy since the start of the century but now, being rooted in nationalist ideas, they became more pronounced than ever before. At the same time intervention proved to be extremely ineffectual. In Franco's startlingly simplistic opinion, "Spain is a privileged country which should be entirely self-sufficient"; as the peseta rose and fell in the only place where it was in free circulation (Tangiers), Franco imagined Jewish conspiracies at work. Self-sufficiency came to symbolize a revolt against the evils of degenerate economic liberalism. The hard-line nationalists of the time contended that prices of products and matters relating to productivity could be fixed by decree without any reference to the market; even the Labor Charter (*Fuero del Trabajo*) stated that "prices of major agricultural products will be subject to discipline and reevaluation." Any non-conformist behavior was viewed as a crime against the "Fatherland," with its corresponding guilty parties who had to be punished. Nor was the verb "punished" used purely theoretically, for we know only too well that in many militarized industries such as coal-mining, offenses led to arrests. The extreme simplicity of these ideas means that it is possible to say that Spain's political *caudillo* behaved like a quartermaster in matters relating to the economy.

A fundamental characteristic of economic interventionism at this time is that it was not at all original. At most what happened was that there was

evidence of an effort to imitate the economic policies of fascist countries by setting up bodies to allow the state to act directly in Spain's economic affairs, such as the National Institute for Industry (*Instituto Nacional de Industria*) and the National Resettlement Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Colonización*). There are many examples of such imitation in Spanish legislation; so, for instance, the Spanish Foreign Currency Institute (*Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera*) was renamed the Institute for Currencies and Exchange (*Instituto de Cambio y Divisas*), borrowing the title used in Italian law. Yet more probable still is the notion that all such changes owed more to the need to apply a coat of modern varnish to an old-fashioned "barrack-style autarchy" that could be traced back to Spanish military projects at the time of World War I. Another characteristic of Spain's economic policy was the extreme, almost militaristic zeal with which it was applied. Thirdly, state intervention created a "legal barrier to entry" which served principally to favor monopolistic practices and also, therefore, behavior that would prove economically damaging, and one final characteristic of the Spanish economy at the time was the multiplicity of administrative organizations, which added to the general chaos and privileged those who supported the regime.

Never before had it been more obvious that autarchy made very little sense in Spain. Not only were there not enough rubber, cotton, fertilizers, and oil but not enough wheat either: a product in which Spain should have been self-sufficient a lot earlier. It is typical of a state that is so powerfully interventionist to have no real and effective plan for its own reconstruction. Dating back to the Civil War there was a National Service with responsibility for devastated areas which in due course (in 1940) became a Directorate General (*Dirección General*). There was also an Institute for Credit (*Instituto de Crédito*) whose function was exactly what its title suggests, and action was taken to ensure that specific places that had suffered particularly badly from the effects of war, such as Brunete and Belchite, were "adopted" according to a special scheme. However, these were isolated instances where action was actually taken and not a real overall plan.

Whatever area one considers it is clear that interventionism failed, being least relevant where it should have been most effective. The Ministry of Agriculture was still in Falange's hands but the program that it implemented was in fact a copy of the one that the traditional right had outlined under the Second Republic. Apart from returning land to those who had had it taken away from them during the Agrarian Reform, an attempt was made to increase productivity by various schemes aimed at

repopulation that did not affect the question of land ownership. This led to the creation of the National Resettlement Institute (*Instituto Nacional de Colonización*) in October 1939. During the earliest period of the Franco regime the Institute concentrated almost exclusively on buying up land but did not really carry through its aims of repopulation. Estimates suggest that the yearly rate of resettlement for the period 1939–51 was only about 1,500 workers a year, which is a low figure when compared with attempts made by the Republic during its much briefer existence marked by failure. Only 23,000 families were settled on 10,000 hectares of land. In fact, the largest repopulation took place in the period immediately following (1956–60), when levels reached 2,000 per year thanks to the Badajoz Plan. Yet the efforts of the Institute affected only some 48,000 settlers and 6,000 agricultural workers up to 1975; of those, some 10,000 were resettled in Badajoz.

Despite this neglect of the countryside in the years following 1939, Spanish society did become more “rural”: from a level of 45 percent of all workers being in agriculture the figure rose to 50 percent, breaking with a centuries-old trend. There is a very simple reason for this: the difficulty of getting hold of supplies meant that the population moved to where the foodstuffs were. Nonetheless, there are authors who point out that a higher percentage of big landowners cultivated their own land than had been the case under the Republic when most of these properties were farmed by tenant farmers. The deficiencies in agricultural productivity in the immediate postwar period have been blamed on what was termed the “persistent drought” but there was another reason as well. Although there were indeed some terrible years in terms of the lack of rain (1941 and especially 1945 when the wheat harvest was only 53 percent of the average harvest before the Civil War), a much more decisive factor was the lack of investment given that the state concentrated its efforts almost exclusively on autarchic industrialization.

No sector was as extensively regulated and no sector witnessed such total failure due to the regime’s interventionism as that of commerce inside Spain. Immediately after the war a system of ration cards came into use: started as a “provisional” measure it was to remain in place for no fewer than 12 years. In fact rigid controls on agricultural productivity meant in effect that agricultural workers had to hand over a fixed quota of what they harvested for a ridiculous price. Shortages in supply in the first instance awakened a desire for yet more government intervention but, as well as not solving anything, this led to black marketeering known as

“estraperlo.” It would be hard to exaggerate the size of the black market; it has even been suggested that black market trading in wheat exceeded official trading and that in the case of olive oil figures were close. Interventionism was as ineffectual as the measure which “absolutely” forbade queuing. The black market became such a normal part of life that Ridruejo could conclude that “everybody has a finger in the pie.”

In discussing problems of supply we have indirectly touched on Spain’s industrial policy. The nationalistic obsession of its politicians at the time with Spain’s greatness was more easily satisfied by huge factories than by more modest projects that were economically viable. Its grandiose industrial policy was the pride and joy of the regime, which tried by these means to achieve national greatness and prove the superiority of this political strategy over any other except increasing Spain’s military capability. Measures concerning industry were implemented early on after being approved in 1939–40. However, the achievement the regime was most proud of was the founding of the National Institute for Industry which dates from 1941. Its founding statutes stated that its main aim would be to “foster the creation and revival of our industries, especially those whose principal purpose is to solve problems arising from the defense needs of this land or concerned with the development of our economic autarchy.” This measure was to an extent an imitation of Italian legislation, though the politician responsible was not a fascist but Suances, a naval man and a personal friend of Franco’s who had been Industry Minister in 1938–9 and in charge of devising these legal measures. In 1945 Suances once again took on a ministerial post with responsibility for Industry, a job that he managed to make compatible with being the President of the INI.

The fact that those principally responsible for Spain’s economic policies were from the Armed Services is significant. It was been written of Suances that he “treated private capital as a schoolmaster treated pupils to whom he was giving lessons in patriotism”; he was “a paternalistic but severe schoolmaster” who threw himself into the task of making the most of Spain’s “neglected resources” as though his sole aim was to create industries without any regard for cost. In a country where hunger was rife, clothing scarce, and shelter often lacking, Suances decided to invest huge sums of money to ensure that oil from the bitumous slate of Puertollano should still be available for the foreseeable future (it was in fact only obtainable in the 1950s and at uneconomical prices). Born in El Ferrol, Suances had spent a number of years working in naval shipbuilding and under the Republic he had had experience in a private company that had

ended in failure, intensifying his suspicion of private initiatives. He equipped the INI with its own financial resources in the form of bonds (*obligaciones*) at savings banks (*cajas de ahorros*) guaranteed by the state. His main objective was the “vital nerve-centers of production” to such an extent that he effectively took on a “director’s role” in the Spanish economy. Management was centralized and vertical. His efforts were mainly directed at producing energy and they were profoundly unsuccessful on oil production, though there were better results on electricity thanks to the use of low quality coal in the thermo-electric industry (ENDESA and ENHER)¹ and to the fresh drive in the exploitation of available hydroelectric resources. A third aspect of the INI was that it functioned as a “hospital for sick companies” by means of an actual “socialización” of losses. Within 10 years the INI had also become the only company producing vehicles, it had a major share in fertilizers and aluminum, and it played a very important role in oil-refining and artificial fibers. In other words, the public company had taken over from the private or foreign company in Spain.

As economic activities of dubious worth increased in number, the economic policy of the newly formed state did not pay enough attention to private industry which, against a background of interventionism at home and uncertainty in foreign trade, was forced to resort to extraordinary procedures. A mayor of Sabadell acknowledged in his memoirs that at that time two-thirds of the wool used in the Catalan textile mills did not come from official suppliers. Major businessmen were at times obliged to adopt the paternalistic tone that was imposed on them by the state but at the same time they also had virtually limitless powers within their companies as “bosses” answerable only to the state. Nor should one forget that there were serious deficiencies in Spain’s energy supplies. In 1940 the country had consumed a million tons of oil but because of its pro-Axis stance it had restrictions imposed on its oil supplies by the Allies, so much so that it did not reach that level of consumption again until 1946. Once World War II was over, the difficulties that Spain was encountering in obtaining the currency to buy oil were starkly obvious and electricity supplies were found to be seriously inadequate. In years such as 1945 and 1949, electricity supplies were on occasion some 30 percent below demand.

All of these factors contributed to the poor performance of Spain’s index of industrial productivity in comparison with other countries. Available data reveals that the country’s backwardness dated from this time. Growth was only 0.6 percent during the period 1935–50, while in the rest of Europe it was 2.7 percent. Only in 1950 did levels of industrial

production once again equal the levels in 1930. Spain fell behind Italy and did not even begin to close the gap until 1963, and in 1975 the difference was as it had been in 1947. Between 1946 and 1950 Greece and Yugoslavia doubled their industrial production while Spain's rose by 1.1 percent. In 1950 the income per capita was 40 percent lower than in Italy, when in 1930 it had been only 10 percent lower. All of these factors must be taken into account when we encounter statements saying that the Franco regime was the driving force behind Spain's economic development.

A key factor in the economic policy of the time was public finance. Historians seem to agree on the effectiveness of the action taken by the Finance Minister Larraz who had been responsible for monetary reunification after the war. Other aspects of his time in office seem less positive. As regards taxation, the period was characterized by the shaky structure of direct personal taxation which was virtually nonexistent, and by widespread tax-avoidance, although there was marked success in indirect personal taxation and taxes levied on exceptional profits (*beneficios extraordinarios*). Even so, estimates on tax fraud suggest that only a third of what should have been collected actually reached the public coffers. Whereas taxes in Europe at that time were far higher, in Spain the tax problem prevented an interventionist state doing its job properly (in Britain tax was at 33 percent of the national income, in Italy 21 percent, and in Spain only 14 percent).

Also, maintaining the situation in banking virtually unchanged in effect created a *numerus clausus* preventing development, and this was reinforced by the Law on the Regulation of Banking (*Ley de Ordeación Bancaria*) of 1946. Not surprisingly, in some operations banks obtained profits of 700 percent. In years that were not very good in economic terms, annual dividends of 12 or 13 percent on bank bonds were not uncommon. In addition, banks concentrated their growing power in industry. At the same time, banking legislation had a clearly inflationary effect. Debt became common throughout the system and it was automatically dealt with by the Bank of Spain (*Banco de España*). Yet this was not the only mechanism that drove inflation. Being unable to generate revenue by means of taxation, the state resorted to circulating debt. It is remarkable that as interventionist a state as Spain should have forgotten how vital it is to control debt. Circulation of debt by the state was as frequent as it was abundant: it can be shown that the national debt tripled over those 10 years. As for foreign investment, suffice it to say that Riotinto was viewed as an "economic Gibraltar" and everything that could be done to ensure

that the mines ended up as capital in Spanish hands was done. Finally, in 1954, seven Spanish banks bought up two-thirds of the capital while the rest remained in British hands.

We once again find ourselves face to face with the state's interventionist policy as soon as we turn our attention to foreign trade, which was dominated by bilateralism, the awarding of licenses, and numerous exchange rates. The peseta kept the same exchange rate until 1948, which was entirely consistent with Franco's nationalist ideology since he viewed a strong currency as the best sign of economic power. After that there was a shift to a system of "multiple exchange rates" which came into force in an impenetrable jungle of highly elaborate regulations. Since foreign trade was also subject to a system of licensing, the demand to participate soon became overwhelming. In this as in so many other areas there were many instances of favoritism that were both irrational and corrupt. Certain surnames from the ruling classes, including many from a Falangist background, soon appeared on the list of those with large fortunes. It was only in mid 1950 that a free currency market was established – a date when, in any case, the chances of obtaining foreign finance were still small for political reasons. The problem was made worse by the fact that the Spanish state nationalized the greater part of all foreign capital in Spain (German companies set up during the Civil War, Barcelona Traction, Telefónica in 1945 . . .).

As the moment comes to try to evaluate Spain's economic development at this time, it is worth calling to mind the opinion of the Hispanist Gerald Brenan: "The impression Spain gives at present is of a country for whom the road which leads to the basic conditions of what is human and tolerable is closed." This may seem an exaggeration and it contrasts strongly with what actually happened subsequently in Spain's economic development, but it does reflect the situation as it was at the time Brenan was writing. In 1945 the per capita income was close on a third of what it had been in 1935 and it only recovered completely in 1951; however, it was not until 1954 – that is to say, when the regime had been in existence for 18 years – that prewar macroeconomic levels were reached once again. In order to reveal the extent to which the 1940s were a time of sacrifice for Spaniards it has been possible to ascertain that the actual salaries of specialized workers fell by half. At the end of the decade Spain had fallen behind the most advanced countries in Latin America such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Instead of experiencing a process of reconstruction, political factors condemned Spaniards to a stagnation without

parallel out of which there grew, as an inheritance for the future, a public sector whose value was questionable.

This examination of Spain's economic policy should conclude with reference to the government's social policy. Unlike what had happened in other countries with basically similar regimes, such as Peronism, Spain's social policy was not in the hands of unions but of the Labor Ministry. The Single Union Law (*Ley de Unidad Sindical*) and the Law on the Bases of Union Organization (*Ley de Bases de Organización Sindical*) of 1940 followed criteria that were clearly fascist. The union was conceived of as single, compulsory, and "ordered hierarchically under state direction," which meant that "since all democratic illusions have now been defeated, it brings together those who are choosing to take part and serve by their leadership." These unions were permeated by an ideology that used revolutionary language that in practice said very little. In this way negotiation was avoided, life inside companies was run like a barracks, and employers had exceptional disciplinary powers. Until late 1944 no election of representatives took place within companies and in October 1947 company juries were set up. However, at this point the owners managed to prevent their actual introduction into the workplace by suggesting that it was a "dangerous innovation" and in effect the measure only came into force after 1953 and then only in larger companies.

Since trade unionism had been emptied of all content, revolutionary rhetoric found an outlet in another sector of the Administration. The specific measures that were the outcome of these policies in the early years of the Franco regime meant expansion of the social welfare system inherited from the Republic and before. The next few years saw the first family allowance, the setting up of conciliation boards at work in 1938, old age pensions in 1939, a policy of Protection of the Family (1945), sickness benefit (1942), and the Law of Labor Contracts (*Ley de Contrato de Trabajo*) in 1944. There was also pay for public holidays and bonuses. Technical universities became the new starting-point for professional training. Of all these new provisions, the one that made the greatest impact on Spanish society was without doubt medical provision for children. Infant mortality fell by half in the period 1935–55 and deaths in childbirth to a quarter or even a fifth of previous levels. Other aspects of the regime's social policies were put into practice much more slowly or remained in the limbo of rhetorical declarations, such as those aimed at protection of the family. One must take into account the fact that salary rises were automatically made non-effective by inflation, and that however much social

legislation intended to bring in new measures, levels of consumption clearly showed a downward trend once again.

Culture: Penance and Survival

The situation of Spanish culture in 1936 has been described as a true “age of silver.” The trauma of war meant that a section of Spain’s creative writers and artists went into exile and also that a very particular interpretation was put on the country’s past, as much by those who left Spain as by the ones who remained there. In neither case was there was a total break with the past, though some attempts were made to do just that.

The experience of exile made a powerful impact on many Spanish intellectuals. Prominent figures who went into exile included the musicians Manuel de Falla and Pablo Casals; philosophers such as José Gaos and Gabriel Ferrater; specialists in the social sciences such as Manuel García Pelayo and Francisco Ayala; men of letters such as José F. Montesinos and Guillermo de Torre; educationalists such as José Castillejo and Alberto Jiménez Fraud; playwrights such as Alejandro Casona and actresses such as Margarita Xirgu; the historians Rafael Altamira, Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, and Américo Castro; the novelists Max Aub, Arturo Barea, and Ramón Sender. Yet more important by far than drawing up a list of exiles is to determine the ways in which they might have been influenced by the extraordinary circumstances of their exile. Many saw their academic work disrupted and all of them experienced exile as an acutely painful mutilation. Yet as well as their pain we must consider other more fruitful consequences of exile. Many of them discovered the global nature of Spanish culture and felt that, rather than being driven from their own country, they had discovered another land, unlike numerous Central Europeans who had fled from Nazism.

This is why reflection on Spain and its past has been as insistent as it has been passionate. That has often been the case with all kinds of thinkers but is especially true of historians. In Américo Castro’s opinion, Spain’s past had been profoundly marked by its three religions – Christian, Muslim, and Jewish – and by a deep-rooted intolerance towards any dissenting minority. Nor, in his view, had this been totally negative since the anguish of the Jewish *conversos* had provided the inspiration for a large part of Spain’s cultural creativity. In his famous debate with Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, what seems to have been most important was not the degree to

which either of them might have been right or wrong but the fact that they were both so powerfully drawn to the study of Spain's past. Sánchez Albornoz, a positivist historian whose work had little in common with Spain's tradition of essay-writing, attacked Castro's thesis, rejecting what Castro claimed to have been the arabization of Spain and instead taking his own search for Spanishness further back in time as far as the Iberians. Essentially both historians felt strongly attracted by the notion of Spain's uniqueness and their results coincided. This type of preoccupation is also evident in novels written by exiles after the Civil War in which war itself also played a major role in the work of many writers. That is the case with Barea's *La forja de un rebelde* (*The forging of a rebel*), or Manuel Andújar's *Vísperas* (*The evening before*), and also with works by Aub, Sender, Ayala, and a great many others in which the theme of the Civil War mingles with memories of childhood, the problems of exile, and the difficulty of returning to Spain, or the threat of the dictatorship.

It has often been argued that given the caliber of those who left Spain, who were not only brilliant in terms of thought and narrative but also in disciplines such as poetry or the natural sciences, what was left behind in Spain was a barren desert with nothing but official art and official literature of more than dubious quality. However, to suggest that this was the case is to oversimplify and to ignore history. The exiling of intellectuals did not encompass even a fraction of Spain's cultural creativity; furthermore, it is far from certain that there ever was an official culture as such, quite apart from the fact that among the ranks of the victors too there was evidence of quite considerable brilliance.

Those who stayed in Spain had not all supported the winning side or even changed sides (though some had). As the Catalan journalist "Gaziel" wrote, clearly an effort was made by those in power to breathe life into "the relics of a past that has been obliterated in the rest of the world," and they had the "sickeningly submissive" approval of the Spanish bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, if Spain's liberal tradition could not survive as such, at least there still existed a "noble line of integrity." There were also those who, like Julián Marías, chose "to live with the scant liberty that exists at present but in all circumstances to be free." When writing, he adds, one had at times not to say everything that one was thinking but one could at least say some of it. It goes without saying that this was far from easy. We need only remember that many of the most important novels of the decade were censored. Cela's *La familia de Pascual Duarte* (*The family of Pascual Duarte*) was censored first of all and then he was thrown out of

the Press Association (*Asociación de la Prensa*) on account of *La Colmena* (*The Beehive*). In the immediate postwar years Baroja's complete works were banned, more than 10 percent of all plays were subjected to censorship along with novels by well-known Falangists, while for years it was forbidden even to mention Spain's most successful playwright, Jacinto Benavente. Nonetheless, as Marías has said, "there was a considerable degree of personal and social freedom" because the regime was never entirely totalitarian and because it was not overly concerned with cultural issues. This explains, for example, how José Ortega y Gasset was able to return to Spain and try to reestablish a link with the liberal heritage of the past, as no lesser a person than Gregorio Marañón had done before him. In the aftermath of World War II, Spain's weighty legacy of tragic experience seemed to come through more clearly in Marañón's work because, in the biographies that he wrote, the theme of exile or the thirst for political power appeared more often than they did in the works of the more shy and reserved Ortega. It is highly likely that both men believed that Francoism might possibly move in a more liberal direction but in this respect they both soon had cause to give up hope. In Ortega's opinion, Madrid had reverted to being like any "unchanging small town in La Mancha," just as it always had been. As for Baroja and Azorín, they seemed to prefer someone who would "tame" revolutionary passions to the passions themselves.

There was little evidence in Franco's Spain of the real heirs to the liberal tradition, although 1947 did see an Institute for the Study of the Humanities (*Instituto de Humanidades*) founded, inspired by Ortega; it was also possible to begin publishing *Insula*, a literary review which put the literary world inside Spain in contact with those in exile. The problem is that this world was denied the opportunity to exercise any real influence and in consequence many prewar cultural institutions were left in a situation that was, to say the least, precarious. Marías wrote of the two great patriarchs of Spanish thought of the earlier period that "Unamuno was not seen in a very good light [but] it was not as bad as for Ortega [since] after all [the former] was dead and had been a less rigorous thinker." Nonetheless, in Franco's Spain as it was in its early stages, apart from those already mentioned and many others who were less important there was, for example, Ramón Menéndez Pidal who ended his literary career with a period of sparkling polemical syntheses. In other words, it was not the case that the literary masters gave in. However limited their chances of action were, liberal intellectuals with their slow silent labors

made their contribution to Spain's transformation. The writer Carlos Barral could state that in the postwar years "the country set about doing penance [but] a transformation which years later seemed unimaginable happened at breakneck speed."

Rather than propounding only one kind of cultural orthodoxy the Franco regime had many kinds that overlapped to a greater or lesser extent and were neither clearly differentiated nor long-lasting. The mission to rebuild Spain's capacity for scientific research was entrusted to the National Scientific Research Council (*Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* or CSIC), part of whose directorship was of the traditionalist clericalist right and not at all in tune with Falange. In universities there was a sort of division of labor between the Party and Church groups when it came to formulating the 1943 Universities Act (*Ley Universitaria*). The result was a text which in essence did not in any way break with the university tradition of the nineteenth century: the lowest-level teaching posts were given to Catholic integrists. Continuity within Spain's universities was evident in their centralization and the continuation of the system of selection based on competitive examinations (*oposiciones*). Within 12 years three quarters of university chairs had new occupants. The only decisive change was the exponential rise in control in the sense that the vice-chancellor, who was appointed by the government, was seen as both a "head of the university and a government delegate." Power was shared between the most strongly clericalist sector and Falange in the sense that Falange controlled the Spanish University Students' Union (*Sindicato Español Universitario* or SEU) and the residential university colleges (*colegios mayores*) in order to maximize its impact on the young. As for academic staff, one would have to point out that the clericalists were the strongest element. Nor should one forget the drastic financial cuts that plagued the universities which, in the postwar period, had only 365 teaching staff in contrast to 553 under the Republic. Many of the students and academics who studied and taught there during those years have left in their memoirs a very negative testimony to their experiences. Carlos Castilla del Pino affirms that after the war in every academic subject there was someone whose aim was to start at the level that had previously been attained and to "to drag it down further than could ever have been imagined in the mid twentieth century." In many areas this may well have been the case but generalization can also distort the picture. In other areas political commitment was abandoned and essays and articles led on to serious academic study as a refuge from surrounding circumstances.

Falange and others associated with it took charge of what might be termed “high culture.” The Party operated on two levels: one of lower quality production more directly controlled by more immediate political interests responsible for publications such as *El Español* or *La Estafeta Literaria*, and the other represented by the review *El Escorial*. The latter aimed to provide “propaganda in the grand style” but quality soon took precedence over the desire to persuade. It was hoped that in this way the roots of liberalism would be taken over and absorbed but it also ensured their survival. On another front, children’s magazines published by Falange gave a first opportunity to write to authors who in time would become serious critics of the Franco regime. There is no doubt at all that there was more intelligence, sensitivity, and generosity of spirit in Falange circles than in other groups dominated by Church interests. Among such Falangists it was even possible at times to find an appreciation of new developments in the sciences that until then had never caught anyone’s interest in Spain. The *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (Political Science Review), aimed in theory at setting out the regime’s doctrinal position, in fact served to introduce sociology into Spain. Whatever the means might have been, by the middle of the 1950s there were no more than mere traces of fascism or any kind of cultural orthodoxy left.

In addition to this plurality of orthodox positions we should add to the general panorama of the moment a comment on the relative autonomy enjoyed within each of these areas and the drift among former hardliners towards greater apathy. There was of course an entire literature which chose to explore themes related to aspects of the whole experience of the Civil War but it belonged to the traditional right (Ricardo León, Concha Espina . . .) and it did not last long. In the last analysis it is only of limited interest and does not of course invalidate their writing that Cela was a censor and Gonzalo Torrente Ballester wrote a book which spoke highly of the single party system, any more than Luis Rosales’s or Luis Felipe Vivanco’s fascination with epic or religious poetry should be paid undue attention. The most honest and obvious explanation for facts such as these will always be preferable to an attempt to claim that these writers were early dissidents when in fact such dissidence either did not exist or else came very much later. Another fact worth mentioning is that with one or two exceptions the novelists and intellectuals most closely associated with the regime in the area of ideology were more belligerent in their attitudes before it came to power than while it remained there. The case of Rafael Sánchez Mazas best typifies this as he soon devoted himself to an

evocative style of writing, as is clear from *La vida nueva de Pedrito de Andía* (*The New Life of Pedrito de Andía*).

In exile as much as within the country, Spain's essential nature became not just a dominant theme but an obsession for essayists. This is evident in Menéndez Pidal's last works, especially *Los españoles en su historia* (*Spaniards through their history*) in which, like so many pro-Castilian historians of liberal background, he traces the origins of the nation back to a very distant past and condemns Spain's plurality as decadence. The fiercest argument of the period was the one that arose between different orthodox viewpoints at the end of the 1940s. The ensuing debate set Pedro Laín Entralgo, the most outstanding figure among the Falangist intellectuals, against the monarchist Catholic extremist position represented by the CSIC journal *Arbor*, founded in 1944, for which the author of *España sin problema* (*Spain without problems*), Rafael Calvo Serer, used to write. The Falangist position aimed to move closer to the intellectual attitudes of the liberal left in order to integrate them into its own way of thinking. Those opposing it, however, had since 1939 denied that there was anything essentially problematic about Spain because Menéndez Pidal "presented us with a Spain without problems." Laín's judgment was so very different that his starting-point was an alternative vision entirely unlike that of Menéndez Pidal and it was presented as being more liberal than the opposition's own view. All in all, this debate is evidence of the crucial importance of reflection on Spain's essential nature in the cultural world of the postwar period and throughout the Peninsula. It also allows us to trace the slow progress that was being made towards the recovery of liberal principles. For the Falangists it was the desire to draw in intellectuals in exile that in the long run led to them becoming more like them. The other faction was anti-totalitarian and monarchist and this last factor meant that it evolved too, at least in the case of Calvo Serer.

If we move on from these semi-political debates to the life of Spain's literary world we shall find a marked change in attitude from the Republican years. Prior to its politicization in the 1930s, the "1927 Generation" had been known for its experiments in form and its brilliant use of metaphor. The "1936 Generation" replaced these techniques with dense sentimental rhetoric and a preoccupation with human destiny. Germán Gullón sums it up more or less exactly: as a generation it would have been "moderate, tolerant, understanding, and an enemy of conventionally determined posturing and flag waving," reluctant to contribute to splitting Spain in two precisely because it had already witnessed that spectacle and had suffered

in its own flesh because of it. As one can see, all this has very little to do with the mockery (*fumistería*) of official art (Josep Pla). For many of these writers both in exile and in Spain a supremely important influence was that of Ortega y Gasset.

Much of what has been said so far is even more relevant to any discussion of poetry at the time. Apart from its initial interest in religious or imperialistic poetry when it was founded, the journal *Garcilaso* represented a search for a lyricism that would be “neoclassical (in form), intimate, and nationalistic.” Yet not even the supreme mentor of this group, José García Nieto, always adhered to these principles; perhaps more significant still was the return to a classical notion of discipline (the “scandal of rigid discipline”). In Rosales, as in Vivanco and Leopoldo María Panero, we find that political commitment and a commitment to this classical ideal were soon left far behind. At the same time, Damaso Alonso’s 1944 work *Hijos de la ira* (*Sons of Wrath*) signaled the “rehumanizing of poetry” by presenting Madrid, in an agonizing way that has parallels with what was going on at this same time in *tremendista*² narratives (Cela), as “a city of more than a million corpses.” The review *Espadaña* also marked a return to reality which contrasted with the process of “embalming” undertaken by those who had tried to link the world of poetry with the classical world. Even before the 1950s Gabriel Celaya had chosen to write politically committed poetry in opposition to the regime.

To an extent, in narrative too a backward step was taken towards classicism – to the tradition represented by Galdós and Baroja. The latter became the great master of the newly emerging generations, as Camilo José Cela – the most brilliant author of all those who had emerged in the 1940s – would recall. Cela’s *La familia de Pascual Duarte* (*Pascual Duarte’s family*, 1942) was the novel whose appalling version of reality, taken from the work of the painter José Gutiérrez Solana and the “Spanish Black Legend,” brought the pain of the postwar period into a literature that seemed not to have experienced it until now. In fact *tremendismo* was born of this experience and became a dominant fashion. Less agonizing and more humbly imitative of Spain’s “harsh, heartfelt, and painful day-to-day reality,” as is stated in the prologue, was Cela’s *La colmena* (*The Beehive*), written in 1946 but only allowed to be published in 1951 and then only abroad. Carmen Laforet’s *Nada* (*Nothing*), published in 1945, explores beneath a prosaic story the general degeneration in collective morale in postwar Spain. At around this time the career of another writer began to make slow but sure upward progress: that of Miguel Delibes.

The theater, given its particular nature, would have had difficulty had it allowed discordant elements to have a voice. It has therefore been written that the 1940s were characterized by “humorous theater” that had “some novelty and was somewhat disconcerting and offered veiled social criticism of Spain’s banal daily existence.” The perennial bourgeois theater saw Benavente triumph in 1945 when he was once again allowed to put on a new play. Real novelty, though not immediately obvious, came in the form of plays in which humor and tenderness mingled, such as works by Miguel Mihura, author of *Ni pobre ni rico, sino todo lo contrario* (*Neither rich nor poor but quite the contrary*) of 1943 and *Tres sombreros de copa* (*Three bowler hats*), premiered in 1952. It was only in 1949 that *Historia de una escalera* (*Story of a staircase*) was first performed, introducing the short-lived but morally questioning theater of Antonio Buero Vallejo. For the time being, the vanguard was limited exclusively to writers in exile where in 1944 Rafael Alberti premiered *El adefesio* (*Looking a sight*).

There was never really one official orthodox position on architecture and the plastic arts either. Although the architecture of the time followed fascist models, in the postwar period there was virtually no possibility of rebuilding, and monuments commemorating the conflict used almost exclusively the form of the cross. There was practically no censorship in the plastic arts. In architecture – the art form most likely to have an immediate political impact – there is evidence of changing tastes and undefined intent in some of the greatest monuments of the time. This may well be the case with the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen), begun in 1940 and very much the inspiration of Franco himself who even made some sketches for it. Initially there may have been an intention to imitate the architecture of Nazi Germany about which an exhibition was held in Madrid, and it was with these aesthetic notions in mind that designs were put forward for the Air Ministry building in Madrid. However, these plans went nowhere, partly due to the weakness of Spain’s economy at the time and partly too because of changes within the regime. In this last respect, it is significant that the Air Ministry already mentioned was finally built according to architectural styles from Spain’s own national heritage. Sánchez Mazas wrote that “El Escorial offers us the best lessons for the Falanges of the future” and indeed the Ministry owes much to the architectural principles of El Escorial. A style of monumental architecture that drew on national traditions is also to be found in other important examples of the architecture of the time, such as the Technical University (*Universidad Laboral*) in

Gijón designed by Luis Moya Blanco. National tradition was also evident in music, for example in the case of Joaquín Rodrigo's *Concierto de Aranjuez*. After 1951 it is clearly inappropriate to talk of official architecture in relation to the Franco regime.

As regards painting and sculpture, the most that one can say is that there was official art in areas such as illustration (Carlos Sáenz de Tejada) or murals (José Aguiar) but it did not last for long. Official tastes tended towards classicism and they were the dominant influence on sculpture (Enrique Pérez Comendador, Enric Monjo, José Clará . . .) for obvious reasons. However, rather than a return to classicism, what in fact happened was that some aspects of the avant-garde of a previous period continued to exist but in a very limited market. One must also take into account the impact on new generations of outstanding figures from an early era of Spanish painting: as was the case with Daniel Vázquez Díaz in Madrid or Joaquín Sunyer and Pere Pruna in Barcelona. A further important factor to bear in mind was that painters such as Solana, who had until this time been demonized, became acceptable because they had so much in common with the literary phenomenon of the time known as *tremendismo*. Perhaps the strongest evidence of this link connecting the present with the past is to be found in the so-called *Academia Breve de Crítica de Arte* (Brief Academy of Art Criticism) and what was known as the "Vallecas School." The former, inspired by Eugenio D'Ors, existed from 1942 onwards and merits attention for its attentiveness to the most recent changes in painting and sculpture. D'Ors's efforts were devoted to raising the level of information on, and quality of, material on contemporary art in the capital. The Vallecas School did not represent a particular discipline or trend; rather, it was a group of young painters drawn to Benjamín Palencia: a figure who provided a link back to the vanguard of the 1930s. Many painters were interested in landscapes and still life, and in very uncertain circumstances they managed to keep up an admirable level of activity which only received public recognition in the 1960s. After 1948 the earliest attempts at abstract art began to appear, at first closely associated with surrealism and influenced by Klee and Miró, or with primitivism (the "Altamira School"). The first biennial Festival of Latin American Art, where the artistic merit of a young painter such as Palencia was acknowledged, marked the start of a new era. Conceived as a vehicle for political propaganda about Latin America, its importance lay in the fact that from that time on, the official Spanish art world came to accept the most varied artistic options.

Brief reference must be made to popular culture – to entertainment and leisure, for it is here that we can best observe the spirit of the age. In the history of Spanish cinema those were the years in which the popularity of the medium spread. The number of cinemas began to multiply and did not stop until the late 1960s. In 1952 the British historian Gerald Brenan stated that such a passion for the cinema was not to be found in any other country: an opinion confirmed by the fact that the number of establishments per thousand inhabitants equaled that of the United States. In those years too, an industrial style of production came into being. In 1941 the dubbing of films became standard: a nationalist measure initially, though it then became a lasting habit. In that same year, quotas were set for the showing of Spanish films and a system introduced which meant that anyone who produced Spanish films could also import foreign ones. Furthermore, the cinema was declared an industry of national interest and so received official funding.

During this period Spain produced an average of 37 films a year. In official circles the cinema was considered to have a vital function as a “formidable weapon for disseminating ideas,” though this did not mean that pure entertainment was abandoned since the most popular genre at the time was comedy. However, films on historical themes (Juan Orduña) were thought to have greater significance. They were considered especially important in “shaping of the spirit of the nation” and common themes included heroic biographies, the formation of the Spanish state, and the colonial enterprise in America.

In song too, and in other forms of entertainment associated with it, there were notable changes in the 1940s. As well as a campaign to impose a certain morality in variety performances, the world of popular music saw a last revival of Spain’s own style of operetta, the *zarzuela grande*, whose main exponents were Federico Moreno Torroba and Pablo Sorozábal. Its final crisis came as a result of a creative recession and a loss of prestige among the general public brought about by elitist criticism. In contrast, a genre that did flourish was a kind of folkloric spectacle introduced by Antonio Quintero, Rafael de León, and Manuel López-Quiroga which was almost entirely Andalusian. The success of this kind of production displaced for a time the music-hall songs of the past, the Argentinian tango, and Mexican ballads (*corridos*) which had given the musical entertainment of a previous era a cosmopolitan dimension.

Having made its appearance in the 1920s, radio became a social phenomenon in the 1930s. After the Francoist victory a new legal ruling came

into force that was intended to last. Alongside the most widely broadcast private radio station *Unión Radio*, now rebaptized with the new name *Sociedad Española de Radiodifusión*, a state radio station came into being, *Radio Nacional*, and also one representing the Party. However, information – what was known as a “*parte*” or bulletin: a term with a military ring to it – was strictly the monopoly of *Radio Nacional* and at the same time a system of strict censorship was introduced. This did not, in fact, mean that radio broadcasting was in any way limited; in those years there were a million receivers: a figure three times the size of the figure at the start of the 1930s. Alongside political information, what is most remarkable about radio broadcasting in the postwar period is the sheer quantity of religious programming. Despite all difficulties, by the middle of the 1940s it was obvious that private radio had survived and indeed a new form of entertainment appeared: serials. The retransmission of popular music would have an immense impact both on the broadcasting companies (in commercial terms) and as a means of laying the foundations of a form of popular leisure entertainment.

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Notes

- 1 The National Electric Company PLC (*Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, sociedad anónima*) and the Ribagorzana National Hydroelectric Company (*Empresa Nacional Hidroeléctrica del Ribagorzana*).
- 2 *Tremendismo* was a movement that depicted the harshness of life in graphic detail.