

Past and Present

In its description of the four major routes from France to Santiago de Compostela, the French author of the twelfth-century Pilgrim's Guide contained in the so-called *Liber Sancti Jacobi* proceeded on the *Guide Michelin* basis that a country is what it eats and drinks. Accordingly, travellers through Navarre were warned against quenching their thirst from its rivers. Rivers in Navarre were poisonous. Further west the water was safer. There, though, fish and meat were both best avoided. Bread was another matter. Estella, for example, had excellent bread, wine, meat and fish. (But since Estella was more French than Spanish, that was not to be wondered at.)

The inhabitants of the regions through which travellers were condemned to pass were also evaluated. With their alarming grunts that passed for language, those of the bosky Basque country (apples and milk tolerable; high mountains; fine views of France from the top) were barbarians. The Navarrese were worse. Like the Basques, the Navarrese would kill a Frenchman for a penny. Like the Scots (to whom they were thought to be related), they went naked below the knees. A bestial people, they lived and ate like pigs, scooping up food from the common trough. Being more prone to bestiality than to theft, when they secured their mules they padlocked their haunches together rather than attaching their legs to a gatepost. Their very name betrayed the malignity of their origins (*Navarrus: non verus: not straight; in a word, brigands*). Once out of Navarre, matters improved, but only somewhat. For the Castilians were prone to viciousness, and even in Galicia (the region of this troglodytic peninsula which most nearly approximated to polite, that was to say to French, society), even there, the inhabitants were liable to fly off the handle.¹

¹ *Liber S. Jacobi*, 502–23. On the evidential value of the *Liber* and the circumstances of its composition: Hohler, 'A Note on Jacobus'; Díaz y Díaz, 58–60, 67–9.

Most of which had been said before:

Northern Iberia, in addition to its ruggedness, not only is extremely cold, but lies next to the ocean, and thus has acquired its characteristic of inhospitality and aversion to intercourse with other countries; consequently, it is an exceedingly wretched place to live in.²

Observed from without, Spain was therefore an easy enough country to characterize. If Gervase of Tilbury, writing in the early years of the thirteenth century, was to be believed, what distinguished Spaniards was the tightness of their trousers (not a good sign in a land opposed to restrictions to procreation).³ And fifty years later or thereabouts, another Englishman, the monastic chronicler Matthew Paris, voiced the opinion (which he attributed to King Henry III) that, in addition to being the scum of mankind, Spaniards were deformed in appearance, despicable as to social graces, and detestable in their moral behaviour.⁴

From the opposite point of view the wider world was characterizable too. Indeed, to the high-ranking Castilian civil servant, Diego García, the opportunity proved irresistible. In 1217 he delivered himself of a virtuoso performance on the subject. It was not people's moral behaviour that interested the chancellor of the king of Castile. In the case of the Scots, it was not even their dress. Rather than short-skirted, for Diego García Scots were, by definition, studious, just as Poles were serene, Normans amiable, Englishmen smart, Sicilians grave, Ethiopians pious, Hungarians bandits, and Irish dealers in tall stories. And so on, and so on, some of which may have borne a passing resemblance to early thirteenth-century reality, just as the author's estimation of the inhabitants of the peninsula itself may have done, of Galicians as chatty, Leonese as eloquent, rural *campesinos* as great trenchermen, Castilians as warriors, *serranos* as hard, Aragonese as constant, and Catalans as cheerful.⁵

All of which is illuminating, so far as it goes (particularly the ethnic emphasis to which we will return at the end of Chapter 8). But it does not go far enough. It does not take into account Spain's image of itself at the time of its 'loss' to the Muslim, as recorded in Alfonso X's national history in the 1270s, as a place enclosed with its inhabitants wrestling Miltonically

² *The Geography of Strabo*, 3.1.2, Loeb transl., II. 3.

³ *Otia imperialia*, 299. The loose dress of Muslims was recommended by Ramon Lull on grounds of both comfort and hygiene: Hillgarth, *Spanish Kingdoms*, 168.

⁴ *Chronica Majora*, V, 450.

⁵ *Planeta*, 178.

to redeem themselves from the original sin of its last Visigothic king.⁶ Nor, instructive though they are, do the Pilgrim's Guide and *Planeta* provide a substitute for the chronicle of the age which students of the history of twelfth-century León and Castile so singularly lack. For the period between 1147, when the chronicler of Alfonso VII laid down his pen, and the date in the 1220s when the author of the so-called 'Anonymous Latin Chronicle' seems to have begun work, we possess no account at all of contemporary events in the central peninsular kingdoms. Nor evidently did the thirteenth-century historians. When they reached this stage of their story they turned to epic material. Bitty and episodic annals apart, our knowledge of these years has to be pieced together from surviving documentary material, which, in a land whose central records were lost in the fourteenth century, means only that fraction of the documentation that students have had the energy to seek out in the archives of beneficiaries. Only for the 1280s and 1290s – and even then only patchily – do we possess for the kingdom of Castile fiscal records of the quantity and calibre that historians of medieval England and France take for granted.

The causes of this long spell of historiographical amnesia in the west of the peninsula, contrasting as it does so strikingly with the activity of the first half of the twelfth century, remain to be identified.⁷ In Catalonia it was a different story. There, not only has the region's ample documentation been preserved in a central repository, but also, at the beginning of our period, in about 1162, monks of the monastery of Ripoll compiled the primitive version of the *Gesta comitum Barcinonensium* ('Deeds of the Counts of Barcelona'), that 'spinal column of Catalan historiography' which traced the county's independence to Count Wifred the Hairy's prowess in protecting it from the Saracen thralldom which the Carolingian ruler had proved incapable of doing. The confection of the *Gesta* was timely for more than one reason. Count Wifred (so called, the Chronicle reports, because he was 'hairy in places where hair doesn't usually grow') had died in about 897. Catalan independence was therefore a good half-century more advanced than the Castilian variety, wrested by the counts of Castile from the kings of León. Moreover, since Wifred's descendant, Count Ramon Berenguer IV of Barcelona, had inherited his mother's rights to the county of Provence, the interest in the Midi that the king of France was beginning to exhibit in 1154 may have seemed unhealthy. When he and Louis VII had met in that year, in the course of the Capetian's high-profile pilgrimage to Santiago, the count would have been aware of

⁶ PCG, c. 558 (p. 311a₃₈): '... cerrada toda en derredor: dell un cabo de los montes Pirineos que llegan fasta la mar, de la otra parte del mar Oceano, de la otra del mar Tirineo'.

⁷ Reilly, 252; Linehan, *History*, 246–7.

the other's earlier scheme to invade the peninsula. On that occasion, having made such a poor job of harrying Islam in the East during the Second Crusade, he had contemplated trying again in the West, all without so much as the by-your-leave of Spain's Christian rulers. With the 'Song of Roland' twelfth-century Europe's collective refrain, this was all too typical.⁸

To Spaniards the French were intolerable. By the account of some of them, rather than suffering defeat at Roncesvalles, Charlemagne had reconquered Spain from the Moors 'as far as Córdoba', whereupon the locals had then lost it again.⁹ One of the recurrent themes of this book will be the strength of the Spanish response that such vaingloriousness elicited. As our story begins, the figure of Bernardo de Carpio, the fictitious nephew of Alfonso II of Oviedo, was beginning to develop. This was the man who saw Charlemagne off when, in the words of the so-called *Historia Silense* (probably written between 1108 and 1119), 'as is the way with the French, corrupted by gold and without a bead of sweat on him raised in saving Holy Church from the barbarians, Charlemagne went home'.¹⁰

To return to Catalonia. Historiography provided Catalonia with some compensation for the comparative disadvantage associated with its remoteness from the pilgrim road, for the lack of those hooligans and subversives from northern Europe who in certain circumstances might become the heroes of Christendom's southern frontier. It provided its count with the sort of ideological underpinning that the king of Castile would be seen to be seeking in the 1180s.

In the absence of such evidence as that with which their colleagues to the north are so generously provided – the writings of Walter Map and Robert of Torigni, the Pipe Rolls – historians of twelfth-century Spain have become accustomed to concentrating their attention instead on such issues as the direction in which rivers run, the topography of mountains and plains, and the shock to the system of butter-tolerant northerners at the heights of the Despeñaperros pass as they encountered the blinding light of al-Andalus and entered an olive-based economy. The contrasts were extreme; the mountainous region between Toledo and Ávila was appropriately described by the papal chancery in 1216 as 'alpine'.¹¹ In this connexion the reach-me-down

⁸ Coll i Alentorn, 187–91; *Gesta comitum Barcinonensium*, 5; Bisson, 'Essor de la Catalogne', 459–62; *Gesta comitum Barcinonensium*, 4; Miret i Sans; Linehan, *History*, 276–7.

⁹ Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne*, 273. As late as the 1270s the (French) Master-General of the Dominicans, Humbert de Romans, was repeating the *canard*: *Opusculum tripartitum*, 193, 206.

¹⁰ Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne*, 258–316.

¹¹ AC Toledo, I.4.N.1.12 (Mansilla, *Honorio III*, no. 19). Similarly in 1188: Rassow, 6.

categories of modern French historical scholarship have proved useful and the experience of those Frenchmen who came to Castile in 1212 to fight for the Cross can be prayed in aid: the former for insights which have helped to liberate the subject somewhat from the costive limitations of documentary minutiae; the latter for the warriors' disappointment on being denied the booty they sought, which, combined with their capitulation to heat and diarrhoea, caused them to return home even before battle had been joined.¹²

Armies also marched on their stomachs. The author of the Pilgrim Guide had a point: if bread mattered, so did gastric fluxes. Whatever other perils it may have had in store for twelfth-century pilgrims, at least the journey westward towards Santiago was through terrain recognizable as familiar, adorned with such features as trees and grass, sheep and rivers. The rivers may have been poisonous, but at least they were wet. By contrast, such foreigners as crossed the Tagus in the years after 1212 found themselves in a desert. In those same years Castilian historians were engaged in putting the peninsular past in order and perfecting an account of it that has remained in place ever since. In the very structuring of their presentation of the period with which this volume will be concerned, Castile's thirteenth-century historians betrayed their conviction that within the Spanish peninsula Castile alone enjoyed political legitimacy. By the archiepiscopal author of the first general history of Spain since the beginning of history itself and the compilers of the earliest exercise in royal historiography alike, the kings of Navarre, Aragón and Portugal were treated as interlopers, faring even worse than the rulers of al-Andalus. Whereas both in Archbishop Rodrigo of Toledo's *De rebus Hispanie* and Alfonso X's *Estoria de España* the history of the Muslim south was integrated with that of the Castilian north, the rulers of the other Christian kingdoms were treated as peripheral figures and accorded only walk-on parts. It was only when, and only in so far as, particulars of their past were required in order to make sense of the story of the modern descendants of the paladins of Spain's Gothic period, when they made either love or war with them for example, that their very existence was so much as acknowledged.¹³

It is a version of that hierarchical arrangement that will be adopted in this attempt to convey to an English-speaking readership some sense of this multi-dimensional complex. The alternative would have been two or three (or twenty or thirty) self-standing chapters to be fitted together by the reader as best he or she might. It will be for others to judge whether

¹² Vicens Vives, *Manual*, 143–53; Barrios García, *Estructuras agrarias*, 81–109; below, 54.

¹³ Fernández-Ordóñez, *Las Estorias de Alfonso el Sabio*, 23–4.

for that readership a Crown of Aragon-centred or an al-Andalus-centred, or even a Navarre-centred, approach to the history of a century and a half, during which in territorial terms the kingdoms of León and Castile, first independently and then combined, loomed largest on the peninsular scene, might have made better (as opposed to more politically correct) sense. However, there could be no justification for anything more than a version of such an arrangement. For reasons to be explained, strict adherence to it as an organizational principle would be perverse and anachronistic. In the course of the 1180s, as Catalan scribes were being instructed to refrain from dating documents by the French regnal year, the king of Castile had abandoned his Gothic credentials, by the 1230s the Castilian chronicler (and chancellor) had written the Goths out of the story, and in the 1280s the official history followed suit, drawing a line at the year 711 and crediting the recovery of the peninsula from Islam not to the descendants of that discredited clique but to subsequent generations of its indigenous inhabitants.¹⁴

According to the fourteenth-century statutes of the Spanish College at Bologna, the term ‘Spain’ was to be understood ‘in the large sense of the word’, as meaning ‘all the kingdoms beyond the Pyrenees’. But that was not an agreed definition. Provençal troubadours tended to distinguish ‘Espanha’ from Aragón and to reserve the term ‘espanhol’ for the inhabitants of the kingdoms of Castile and León. In the *Liber provincialis* of the Roman Church the dioceses of Calahorra and Pamplona were identified as being ‘on the way into Spain and Castile’, in 1258 a visiting Norwegian delegation treated ‘Castile’ and ‘Spain’ as interchangeable terms, and in 1282 a German political theorist remarked that, although Spain had many kings, only one of its kingdoms was actually called ‘the kingdom of the Spaniards’.¹⁵

That is why there is no better justification for combining the thirteenth-century histories of Aragón and Castile than for combining those of Aragón and France. Despite occasional posturing by both parties, the diplomatic record provides nothing adequate. In Martínez Ferrando’s catalogue of more than two thousand documents in the Aragonese registers relating to the kingdom of Valencia, only one entry concerns Alfonso X of Castile.¹⁶

The refusal of the custodians of medieval Spain’s historiographical tradition to admit the existence of the kingdoms which had sprung up since 711

¹⁴ Below, 38, 233–4; Catalán, *De Alfonso X al Conde de Barcelos*, 153; Martin, ‘Contribution de Jean d’Osma’.

¹⁵ Martí, 132; Alvar, *La poesía trovadoresca*, 292–301; Cambridge, St John’s College, MS. G.9. fo. 6ra; Guzmán y Gallo, 49–51; Alexander of Roes, *Memoriale*, 115 (‘tamen unum dicitur regnum Hispanorum’).

¹⁶ Madrid, 1934 (noted Burns, ‘Warrior neighbors’, 151).

has vitiated all subsequent attempts to tell the story that follows. Now more than ever of course, and of course rightly, that view of the past is rejected. Yet its influence lingers on, further complicating the task every modern historian of the period confronts as he or she embarks upon the history of a land in which a malign fate ensured that from time to time all its rulers simultaneously bore the same name. In the bemused words of one recent observer of the Iberian scene, ‘the mid-1150s saw three kingdoms established in Christian Spain, with an Alfonso growing old in Castile, an Alfonso in the prime of his life in Portugal, and a small Alfonso growing up to be heir of Aragon, all dedicated to spread moderate confusion among the Muslims of their own day, and extreme confusion among historians until the end of the world.’¹⁷

After the Emperor

In fact, when our story begins in the mid-1150s Christian Spain was home to not three but five kingdoms. In 1134 an illegitimate member of the Navarrese royal house had resuscitated the kingdom of Navarre by having himself acclaimed king at Pamplona. García Ramírez IV, ‘the Emperor’s dear son-in-law’, had been conspicuous at the siege of Almería in 1147, the last significant feat of Christian arms for which ‘the Emperor’ himself, as he was forever known after his ‘imperial coronation’ of 1135, Alfonso VII of Castile-León, had been principally responsible.¹⁸ Although over the next century and a half Castile and Aragón would both strive to expunge it, when the emperor died in 1157 the kingdom of Navarre persisted in remaining on the peninsular map, resistant to each of its intermittently powerful neighbours and backing on to the southern extremities of the recently established Angevin Empire.

This made four, and the division of Castile-León on Alfonso VII’s death in 1157 made five. Eighty years on, after the two kingdoms had been reunited, an anonymous chronicler (in all likelihood Juan de Soria, royal chancellor and bishop) ascribed the ‘unhappy’ division of the kingdoms to the ‘sins of men’. But this was wisdom after the event. It was not the view of either of the chronicler’s episcopal contemporaries, Lucas of Tuy and Rodrigo of Toledo, for both of whom the division of the kingdom was simply in accordance with customary practice. In 1157 division of the ‘empire’ into

¹⁷ Brooke, 319.

¹⁸ Reilly, 184; ‘Prefatio de Almaria’, ed. Gil, lines 286–8 (trans. Barton and Fletcher, 260). For the imperial coronation: Linehan, *History*, 235–7.

its constituent kingdoms had been allowed for in political calculation for almost a decade. In 1148 Alfonso VII addressed both his sons as kings, before the end of his reign the Infantes Sancho and Fernando, the future rulers of Castile and León, were both issuing royal charters in their own names, according to the troubadour Peire d'Alvernha, some of those who bewailed the emperor's death were only simulating grief. By the 1280s when the Alfonsine History was being improved, subversive sentiments such as these had been suppressed. But although that History's imaginative compilers conjured up an affecting account of the deathbed scene, replete with tales of the great and the good swooning at the prospect of the emperor's demise, and with Archbishop Jean de Castellmorum of Toledo, described as the king's inseparable companion 'both on the frontier and at home', very much to the fore, not even then was it suggested that there had been anything unnatural about León and Castile going their separate ways in 1157.¹⁹

Whether the division was also for the best would be for later generations to debate and determine, according to the then prevailing wisdom. To *Spanish* nationalists down the ages, for example, the separation of Castile and León between 1157 and 1230 has appeared a catastrophe because for them the principal item on the cosmic agenda has always been the annihilation of Spanish Islam. Equally imbued as they were with the confessional programme embodied in historiography ever since the ninth-century *Chronicle of Alfonso III*, to nationalist writers of the ages of Fernando III and General Franco alike, any deviation from the road to peninsular unification was by definition an 'absurd' step in the wrong direction.²⁰ To Castilian and Leonese nationalists of the present generation, the generation of the *autonomías*, by contrast, the question is rather whether the line that Alfonso VII drew between the two kingdoms before his death in August 1157 was drawn in the right place.

That was the question that exercised Alfonso's two sons, Sancho III of Castile and Fernando II of León, when they met at Sahagún in May 1158. According to the 'Castilian' Rodrigo of Toledo, Fernando at once offered to do homage for his kingdom, only to be rebuffed by Sancho on the grounds that it would be unbecoming for any son of so great a father to do homage to anyone. This was symptomatic of the hypersensitive obsession with hierarchy that was to characterize the dealings of all Spain's kings, their heirs and their heirs' siblings throughout this period and beyond. It was also a put-down. So too was the archbishop's report that the king of León

¹⁹ *Crón. latina*, c. 7; Lacarra, 'Lento predominio'; Escalona, 531; González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 664–5; Reilly, 229; Alvar, *Poesía trovadoresca*, 39–40; *CM*, IV, 77; *DrH*, VII, 11; *PCG*, 662ab.

²⁰ Thus González Jiménez, 'Fernando III legislador', 114.

arrived at Sahagún smelling of the farmyard, causing his elder brother to insist on his taking a bath before they sat down to dinner together. What D. Rodrigo's authority was for this story we do not know. But, unless it was his own invention, it reflected Castilian disdain of uncouth provincials such as is recited to this day by smart *madrileños*. Fernando may not have forgotten the slight when in August 1158 his fastidious brother died, leaving him master of the field. According to the Leonese Lucas of Tuy, Fernando II was all things to all men, energetic, very pious, a king everyone preferred to love than to fear, and (if that has a sinister ring to it) at least not notorious as his son Alfonso IX would be for his treatment of those who crossed him. Even so, the possibility has to be allowed for that, like his son after him, he harboured memories of the insult and that it remained with him and influenced his actions in the years to come.²¹

The agenda that Sancho and the deodorized Fernando settled down to at Sahagún in May 1158 (which Rodrigo of Toledo, incidentally, fails to mention) concerned the institutionalization of the division of their father's empire. But for one particular, the treaty of Sahagún might have exercised an influence equivalent to that of the treaty of Tudején of January 1151. Then Alfonso VII and Ramón Berenguer IV had combined to partition the kingdom of Navarre and agreed their respective zones of future reconquering activity in the south and south-east. Having sworn eternal collaboration against all-comers (other than their uncle Ramón Berenguer) and eternal enmity against the king of Portugal, at Sahagún the brothers planned the partition of the 'land of the Saracens' in the south and south-west. Portugal was to be expunged and Seville shared between them. Fernando was to have the territory towards the Atlantic as far as Lisbon; Sancho everything as far as Granada.²² In 1158, therefore, it was already the consensus that Seville was the terrestrial meridian of Christian ambition.

The treaty of Sahagún completed the pragmatic division of the peninsula that had been initiated at Tudején. At Nájima three months earlier Sancho had surrendered the kingdom of Zaragoza to Ramón Berenguer and his successors in return for homage and Aragonese recognition of Castile's primacy of honour. The new king of Castile was perhaps contemplating a crown-wearing in the style of his father's of 1135, with the Aragonese ruler of Zaragoza in an appropriately servile ceremonial role.²³ Now, in the same rationalizing spirit, he sought to bring order to the Tierra de Campos, the untidiest stretch of the border between Castile and León. With

²¹ *DrH*, VII, 13 (cf. González, *Fernando II*, 30–1); *CM*, IV, 79; below, 39–40.

²² Miquel Rosell, nos. 29, 44; González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 775–6; Reilly, 219.

²³ Miquel Rosell, no. 36.

its pre-existing mosaic of jurisdictions and loyalties, this region was to remain a trouble spot until the end of the century and beyond. In 1158 Fernando had recently evicted the Catalan counts, Ponce de Minerva and Ponce de Cabrera, and Osorio Martínez, from areas he deemed to be part of his kingdom. By the treaty of Sahagún Sancho acknowledged his brother's claim in return for the latter's undertaking to allow the Castilians to retain their holdings within the disputed area as 'temporary fees', and in May 1158 there was no reason why this arrangement should not have held.

There was even some prospect of making headway in the 'land of the Saracens' itself. As Juan de Soria remarked in the next century, Alfonso VII had been 'fortunate in taking places, less so in keeping them.'²⁴ Easy come, easy go. Similar things would be said after Seville was reconquered a century later. The chronicle of Alfonso's own reign reveals why this was so. His reign had been marked by a series of spectacular sorties south and sieges successfully completed. But he was overstretched, his lines of communication were over-extended. Places quickly taken were as soon lost. Almería, whose capture in 1147 had been the toast of Europe, was recovered by the Almohads in the month of the Emperor's death.

Hence the significance of the only other event of Sancho III's reign mentioned by the chroniclers. The emperor had entrusted the Templars with custody of Calatrava, the fortress at the gateway to Andalusia that he had conquered in 1147. But ten years later, with an Almohad counter-attack believed to be imminent and the Templars unable to provide for its defence, the place was returned to Sancho III. Whereupon Raimundo, the Cistercian abbot of the Navarrese monastery of Fitero, brought a party of volunteers there from Toledo to oppose the enemy and, when the enemy did not materialize, constituted them as a religious confraternity which in 1164 was affiliated to the Cistercian order and provided with a version of the Cistercian rule dedicating them to warfare both defensive and offensive. Thus was founded the Order of Calatrava, the first of the Spanish Military Orders, to be followed in 1170 by Fernando II of León's establishment of the Order of Santiago, an order dedicated to the same purpose but differing from the other to the extent that its knights were lay-brothers and therefore allowed to marry. The two rules were approved by Pope Alexander III in 1164 and 1175 respectively. Whereas in Aragón the Templars and Hospitallers remained dominant, the kingdoms of Castile and León were now provided with indigenous military orders charged, in the words of the pope's commission to the Order of Santiago, with the task of 'fighting always against the enemies of Christ's cross for the defence of Christendom'. Here were

²⁴ *Crón. latina*, c. 5.

professional warriors destined to supplement if not supersede the make-shift urban militias whose seasonal forays south of the Tagus had advanced the Christian reconquest since 1085.²⁵

Many tasks lay ahead when (the particular that relegated the treaty of Sahagún to the footnotes of history) in August 1158 Sancho III died after a reign of a year and twelve days – on this occasion, according to Lucas of Tuy, ‘not because of the people’s sins’ – and the chief of these was the survival of Sancho’s three-year-old heir, Alfonso VIII. The 1150s saw new kings established in England, Germany and Sicily. In 1158 Louis VII of France was Christendom’s senior monarch and Alfonso VIII its tyro. Indeed, for foreign chroniclers he would always be Alfonso the Small. According to Alberic of Trois Fontaines writing in the 1230s he was ‘le Petit’ because he had been small at the time of his accession and the name stuck, even in his glory days – though Alberic could not refrain from adding that all Alfonso’s Spanish predecessors had been called small in order ‘to distinguish them from the great king Charles.’²⁶ Like Estella, Alberic was French.

In 1158, however, Alfonso was indeed not only small, he was also hemmed in at home by experienced operators from the previous generation: by Afonso Henriques of Portugal and Fernando II of León to the west, and to the north and east by Sanç VI of Navarre and Ramón Berenguer IV, count of Barcelona, prince of Aragón and the ‘bond of their friendship’, as his nephews Sancho and Fernando had described him at Sahagún.²⁷

Despite his Provençal preoccupations, Ramón Berenguer’s mastery of affairs made him the peninsula’s most effective ruler. The *Usatici* of Barcelona (Catalan *Usatges*), the regalian code issued by him and purporting to epitomize customary practices dating from the time of Ramón Berenguer I, not only vested ultimate judicial authority in the count-prince but also stated his right to the service of all men within his jurisdiction whenever necessity demanded. These claims were matched by his survey (1151–2) of peasant tenures and obligations in the county of Barcelona and the regions surrounding it, ‘virtually a “Domesday” for Catalonia.’²⁸ True, he did not exercise such authority in Aragón, where he ruled by right of his wife Peronella, the heiress to the kingdom to whom he had been betrothed in 1137 when she was an infant. But that was not a source of weakness.

²⁵ Forey, 23–32; Powers, *Society*, 112–35.

²⁶ CM, IV, 78; Alberic, *Chronica*, 895; likewise, Ralph of Coggeshall, 14; Matthew Paris, *Chron. Majora*, II, 41.

²⁷ González, *Alfonso VIII*, no. 40.

²⁸ *Usatges de Barcelona*, c. 64; Soldevila, *Hist. de Catalunya*, 170–97; Bisson, *Fiscal Accounts*, I, 25; II, 3–29.

As the thirteenth-century chronicler Desclot imagined him saying as he accepted Peronella but refused the royal title: ‘I am one of the greatest counts on earth and if haply I were to be called king, then I would not be amongst the greatest but rather the least of them.’²⁹

When in the following century Alfonso X sought to impose a code alike in inspiration to the *Usatici* (albeit on a much larger scale) the attempt cost him his throne. As elsewhere in twelfth-century Europe, small was relatively effective. What the varying fortunes of the rulers of the ‘Angevin Empire’ and the self-contained Capetian kingdom demonstrated, the varying fortunes of the king-emperor of Castile and the count-prince of Catalonia amply confirmed.

Unlike the places reconquered by Alfonso VII, those reconquered by Ramón Berenguer IV remained reconquered. Moreover, the security of his successors was assured. Although at Tudején he had promised eventually to do homage to Alfonso VII for the kingdom of Valencia and the greater part of that of Murcia, by 1151 the basis of the claim to peninsular hegemony which justified the demand for such an undertaking – the claim founded on the alleged descent of the rulers of León from the kings of Visigothic Spain – had long been unsustainable. Only in the very different circumstances obtaining between 1580 and 1640 was peninsular unity in that rarefied sense achieved. Twelfth-century reality comprised a plurality of Christian kingdoms. And in Castile an alternative myth capable of accounting for it was in gestation. Already a substitute genealogy was being formulated, a genealogy which traced the ancestry of the king of Castile not to his Leonese forebears but to Nuño Rasura, the champion of tenth-century Castilian independence from León.³⁰ Such had been the real significance of the treaty of Tudején.

In January 1151 the principle of peninsular partition had been conceded, the principle that legitimized not only Portugal and Navarre but also the lordship of Albarracín, situated between Castile and Aragón. Calling himself ‘the vassal of Holy Mary’, and of no other, Pedro Ruiz de Azagra ruled over a vast area which drove a territorial wedge through the south-east right down to the Valencian coast. When the rulers of Castile and Aragón were at war, as they so frequently were, each strove for his alliance, and when they were not, he astutely allied himself with the Christian king of Navarre and the Muslim ibn Mardanīsh (King Lob, ‘the Wolf-king’), the peninsula’s most consistently anti-Almohad warrior throughout the 1160s, until such time as normal bad relations were resumed between his neighbours. With its

²⁹ *Llibre del rei*, c. 3 (Critchlow, I, 18).

³⁰ Catalán & de Andrés, I, liii–lv.

episcopal see attached to Castilian Toledo (and, as will be seen, constituting something of an ecclesiastical Trojan horse), the lord of Albarracín was an anomaly. But he was no less significant a political force, and the marriage in the 1260s of his descendant, Teresa Álvarez, to a scion of the Lara clan suggests that towards the end of our period the notion of peninsular formation, the corollary of that of peninsular partition, was still in its infancy. In the 1290s there was little reason for regarding the pendulum principality of Albarracín as a more transient feature of peninsular geopolitics than the kingdom of Portugal or (certainly) that of Navarre.³¹

The history of the nascent Crown of Aragón further demonstrates how far from 1492 we are in the year of Tudején. In a charter granted in August 1151 Ramon Berenguer IV described himself as ‘count of Barcelona, prince of Aragón and Tarragona, marquess of Tortosa and Lleida’. And even this description begged a question, indeed the largest question of all, for it was only in his capacity as count of Barcelona that Ramon Berenguer was the Fourth. As king of Aragón, he was Ramón Berenguer the First. And despite Maravall’s description of the kings of medieval Spain as rulers ‘not of a kingdom but of a space’, and in this case while functioning as king though entitled count, the distinction was one almost always scrupulously observed by Aragonese and Catalans alike. Thus, in 1157 a diploma of the previous century describing Ramon Berenguer I as ‘count and king of Barcelona’ was rejected as apocryphal on the grounds that Barcelona was ‘not a royal place’.³² For the next century and a half the divisive forces within the Corona de Aragón were more formidable than those at work between Castile and León either before or after 1230. With Jaime (Jaume) I dividing his realms between his sons and Pedro III (Pere II of Catalonia) accustomed to match a Catalan with an Aragonese on important diplomatic missions, not until 1319 was it decreed that ‘whoever may be king of Aragón shall also be king of Valencia and count of Barcelona’, with his year equally divided between his three realms.³³

Of the other three lordships laid claim to by Ramón Berenguer in 1151, Tortosa and Lleida (1148, 1149) were both recent conquests from Islam, ‘and came to define New Catalonia and its boundary with Aragon, while securing a vast frontier for Catalonian expansion’.³⁴ But not for the land-locked Aragonese whose exclusion from the consolations of crusading paralleled

³¹ Zurita, II. 29, 32, 41; Ayala Martínez, *Directrices*, 219–22, 325; Doubleday, 76–7; below, 215–16.

³² Altisent, *Diplomatari de Poblet*, I, nos. 140–1; Maravall, *Concepto*, 359, 373–4.

³³ Hillgarth, ‘Problem’, 3.

³⁴ Bisson, *Crown of Aragon*, 33.

the interruption of the regime of annual *razzias* into Castilian Extremadura recorded by the *Chronicle of Alfonso VII*. Although the inspiration of the *reconquista*, the secular determination to reverse a process of territorial trespass, both preceded and outlasted the religious motivation of the papal Crusade movement, by 1150 the one had come to encompass and exploit the other, with Spain happy to be regarded by Rome as a second crusading front dedicated to ‘the defence of Christianity and the repression of Saracen malice’. Another generation would elapse before peninsular ideology returned the compliment. Meanwhile, as the bargains struck between the Jerusalem-bound northerners and the ruler of Portugal at the siege of Lisbon in 1147 demonstrated, crusade-mindedness did not exclude business-mindedness.³⁵ There was land for the taking, land meant wealth, and the possession of wealth provided this opportunity-society with its contours and its postulates. The *Poem of Almería*, recording events of the same year on the other side of the peninsula, told the same story. The reward of the Spaniards who came to the siege was ‘all the gold that the Moors possess . . . a share of the silver, a share of the gold’. Contrary to the interpretation sometimes given to this passage of the *Poem*, it was these men’s crimes that their bishops forgave, not their sins.³⁶ The generous terms of surrender enjoyed by Tortosa’s defeated inhabitants – including guaranteed commercial status – a procedure hallowed by custom and justified by necessity – the granting of a third of the place to the Genoese who had been active at the siege (as they and the Pisans had been at the siege of Almería), and the Mediterranean dimension that that participation implied, combined to stoke the fires of frustration lit by exclusion from the spoils of conquest.³⁷

For the ancient settlement of Tarragona, hitherto the limit of Catalan expansion down the Mediterranean coast, the year 1151 was made memorable by an attempt to evict the Norman Robert Burdet to whom in 1128 Archbishop Olleguer had ‘given’ the then abandoned ‘capital of the churches of all of nearer Spain’. According to the chronicler Orderic Vitalis, in 1141 Burdet was seeking to have his principality declared independent of all secular authority and subject only to the papacy, just as the county of Portugal was in the process of doing. But twenty-three years later, when Burdet had served his purpose in the dialectic of peninsular reconquest and resettlement, the count-prince combined with Olleguer’s successor, Bernat Torts,

³⁵ Erdmann, 55 (Council of Valladolid, Jan. 1155). Cf. Fletcher, ‘Reconquest and crusade’, 42–3; González Jiménez, ‘¿Re-conquista?’, 167–73; Linehan, *History*, 245–6, 264.

³⁶ ‘Prefácio de Almaria’, lines 38–63 (cf. Fletcher and Barton, 251, for this as ‘a clear indication of the crusading nature of the Almería campaign’).

³⁷ Zurita, II. 15; Bisson, *Crown of Aragon*, 27, 32.

to dispose of him (and his formidable wife), though by the time that had been achieved, mid-April 1171, the archbishop had been murdered in his cathedral, and his killer, Burdet's son, had defected to the Moorish king of Mallorca.³⁸ Students of the period over time have remarked on the apparent parallel with the case of Thomas Becket, just four months earlier.³⁹ 'It was for the same reason', observed Zurita. Sadly, though, the parallel did not prove exact. In 1194 Catalonia went one better and Archbishop Bernat's successor but one met a similar end.⁴⁰

While all this was coming to a head, in 1154 Pope Anastasius IV re-established the ancient ecclesiastical province of Tarraconensis, thereby providing the count of Barcelona with a coherent ecclesiastical definition of the assemblage of territories over which he held sway – as the churches of Toledo, Compostela and Braga were for the kingdoms of Castile, León and Portugal respectively – and giving the whole complex a local habitation and a name by detaching the region south of the Pyrenees from the Narbonensis and endowing the church of Tarragona with a province of eleven sees. 'Thus the Papacy contributed in the most pronounced manner yet to the formation of the Corona de Aragón,'⁴¹ and by including the church of Pamplona, capital of Navarre, in the restored province facilitated the process of absorbing the neighbouring kingdom.

But Ramon Berenguer was not confined to the peninsular theatre of operations. His father had also been count of Provence by right of his wife Dolça, and in the same year, 1154, the magnates and free men of Béarn elected him as their lord and as tutor to the under-age Gaston V. This was one of many engagements in Languedoc and Provence, an area in which earlier counts of Barcelona had been active for as long as that county had existed. Ramon Berenguer and his successors would retain an interest in that region, the Midi and points east, as well as incurring the wrath of successive counts of Toulouse throughout the following century. Although lack of space precludes investigation of the history of the area and its dynastic ramifications, one consequence of the continuing connexion with Provence must be mentioned, namely the access it provided to the burgeoning school

³⁸ Villanueva, XIX, 212–14, 280–83; Defourneaux, *Les Français en Espagne*, 224–30; Fried, 99–101 (sceptical).

³⁹ Zurita, II. 31.

⁴⁰ The victim was Archbishop Berenguer de Vilademuls and the perpetrator his niece's husband, Guillem Ramon I de Montcada. Though this incident had no connexion with the foregoing, being more of a family affair, it had the consequence of keeping successive archbishops of Tarragona on the qui vive: Villanueva, XIX, 163–71, 304–8; Shideler, *Montcadas*, 124–7.

⁴¹ Kehr, *Papsturkunden*, no. 65; idem, *Papsttum*, 50.

of Roman Law at Montpellier, and beyond that with Italy. Both in Catalonia and further west, civilian jurists had been influencing the language of government since the 1120s, with the formula ‘What pleases the most excellent majesty of the lord emperor’ being employed by the draftsmen of the Treaty of Tudején in 1151 and ‘What pleases the prince has the force of law’ occurring in the *Usatici* thereafter. Thirty years on, civilian arguments would be employed against the men of Vic’s attempt to challenge the temporal lordship of their bishop. It was with Vic that the family of Pere de Cardona – teacher at Montpellier, chancellor to the king of Castile, archbishop of Toledo, and cardinal – was associated.⁴²

Although the implications for government of Roman law notions were not unidirectional, in combination with the exertions of the bureaucrats responsible for laying the fiscal foundations of government they could be made to serve the dynasty’s purposes. So too could the manipulation both of custom – as practised by the codifiers of the *Usatici* in persuading the political heavyweights of the 1150s that their predecessors had accepted the compilation almost a century before, making it appear ‘less a legal text than a work of comital propaganda’ – and of the dynasty’s own past, in which the monks of Ripoll were currently creatively engaged, and in whose house Ramon Berenguer IV was buried in 1162. In 1131 Berenguer Ramon I de Montcada had reportedly told the count-king’s father that ‘for all I hold from you I would not thank you with a single fart’. It was a measure of the transformation in the relationship between the count-kings and their principal barons that by the mid-1220s the great-great-grandson of the one (Guillem de Montcada III) conceded to the great-grandson of the other (Jaime I) that ‘your line has made ours what it is’ – or so the latter claimed.⁴³

A crucial part in that process was played by Guillem Ramon II, the Great Seneschal. Already a considerable force in the land during the lifetime of Ramon Berenguer IV, when the count encouraged his wife, the Montcada heiress, to separate from him the Seneschal had retaliated by cutting off Barcelona’s water-supply. During the minority of Alfonso II (Alfonso I of Catalonia), who succeeded his father at the age of five or thereabouts, he achieved a role in public affairs secure enough for his family to survive the consequences of the actions of his tumultuous and then murderous

⁴² Reilly, 48–9; Bisson, *Crown of Aragon*, 33ff; Linehan, *History*, 270–1, 305–8; Miquel Rosell, *Liber Feudorum Maior*, no. 29; *Usatges de Barcelona*, c. 65; Kagay, 19–21; Freedman, *Diocese of Vic*, 84–7; idem, ‘Another look’, 180.

⁴³ Below, 38; Gouron, 277–9; Bensch, 80–2; Bonnassie, 711–28; Kagay, 51–7; Kosto, 278–9; Shideler, *Montcadas*, 38 n. 128, 155–6; *Book of Deeds*, c. 33.

descendants. Alfonso II's early years are shrouded in mystery, with his Aragonese mother calling him by the Aragonese name Alfonso and his Catalan father referring to him in his will as another Catalan 'Ramon', and, as Reilly has suggested, much of the relevant documentation is either suspect or spurious.⁴⁴

Had Castile itself not been in disarray in 1162, no doubt it would have seized the initiative not taken in 1137 when it failed to wed the infanta Peronella to the future Sancho III. As it was, at Agreda in the September of that year Fernando II of León, attended by the archbishop of Toledo and sundry other Castilian prelates, and calling himself 'king of the Spains' and 'king of the Spaniards' (*Ispaniarum rex; rex Hispanorum*), occupied the void by having the boy-king betrothed to his sister, Sancha of Castile, and declaring himself 'tutor' of the lad's 'body and honour' as well as defender of his interests against all-comers, 'particularly the king of Navarre'.⁴⁵ But that said, and despite the diplomatic pleasantries exchanged at Agreda by the child and the effective ruler of both León and Castile, it is reasonable to suppose that all manner of opposing forces were raging, Aragonese against the Catalans, Catalans against the Aragonese, and both against the Leonese. Since it was part of the king of León's strategy to trump a matrimonial proposal involving the ruler of Aragón and the Infanta Mafalda of Portugal, entered into when the happy couple were months rather than years old (and itself a response to the Castilian–Leonese intention declared at Sahagún to ostracize Portugal's ruler Afonso Henriques),⁴⁶ all five of the peninsular kingdoms may be said to have been striving for advantage, or at least involved, in the aftermath of the death of Ramón Berenguer IV. In short, it was a proper family funeral.

In the event, in his will the dead count was found to have declared Henry II of England the boy's guardian – or at least that was what his will was made to say. This was doubtless designed to keep papal influence at bay and forestall the raising of awkward questions regarding the monastic vows and episcopal status of Alfonso's maternal grandfather. Later the count of Provence (yet another Ramon Berenguer) became involved. He and Henry were both more or less distant threats; 'a smokescreen,' Ubieto calls the former of them. Until 1174 when Alfonso came of age and married Sancha of Castile, the real ruler of Aragón–Catalonia was the Great Seneschal. Acting in concert with his co-regent and fellow Catalan, Guillem de Torroja, bishop of Barcelona, Guillem Ramon demonstrated all the dedication that in the

⁴⁴ Reilly, 226.

⁴⁵ Villanueva, XVII, 326–8.

⁴⁶ Ubieto Arteta, 'Un frustrado matrimonio'.

next century the Lara clan was to display on behalf of the Castilian Infantes de la Cerda.⁴⁷

We shall leave the young king of Aragón here, but not before remarking that, although his alliance with Sancha of Castile hardly confirms the trend, in matrimonial terms Spain was looking outwards. Sancha, for example, was the daughter of Alfonso VII's second wife Rica, daughter of the Piast prince Wladyslaw of Poland. And for some that remained an achievement. For one or other of them the marriage, in the same year as the Alfonso–Sancha alliance, of Dolça, the king of Aragón's sister, to the future Sancho I of Portugal, may have turned out to be something to be thankful for. For centuries Spanish kings had married within the peninsula, and for reasons of policy *pro pace* marriages with neighbouring and closely related ladies would continue to be arranged. But as the twelfth century advanced a change of attitude becomes apparent. Already in 1145–6 Afonso Henriques of Portugal had looked to Savoy for a consort. Part of the reason for this new departure was an enhanced awareness of the possible consequences of marrying within the forbidden degrees and of breaching the canonical rules that made valid marriages a virtual impossibility for prince and peasant alike. A 'sin very great before the Lord' was how the Chronicler of Alfonso VII described the process of extracting Ramiro the Monk from the cloister in 1135 and having him couple with Agnes of Poitou for dynastic purposes, rather than out of any stirring of the flesh.⁴⁸ Stricter observance of the rules, something which for the Castilian chronicler Juan de Soria in the 1230s amounted almost to an obsession, came to be seen to serve dynasties well, but only by marrying outside the clan. And in both fiction and fact marriage outside the clan meant marriage outside the peninsula. While in the story of the origins of Catalan independence the woman whom Wifred the Hairy seduces and then marries is a daughter of the count of Flanders, real-life kings of Aragón begin to seek matrimonial alliances in Byzantium and Jerusalem and other peninsular royal houses.⁴⁹

Many of these developments, material as well as spiritual, were associated with the Cistercian Order. In addition to providing the Order of Calatrava with personnel, the White Monks played a crucial role in the process of peninsular colonization. By infilling the hinterland in Galicia they made themselves 'a social force of the first order'. In Catalonia likewise their strategies of piety materially assisted the settlement of the area behind

⁴⁷ Idem, *Hist. de Aragón*, 196; Soldevila, *Hist. de Catalunya*, 199, 201 n. 10; Villanueva, XVII, 190–7; Shideler, *Montcadas*, 87–113; below, 175ff.

⁴⁸ *CAI*, I, 62.

⁴⁹ Vajay, 737, 740–1; Linehan, *History*, 252, 254; *Gesta comitum Barcinonensium*, 4–5; Aurell, 427–66.

the front line. While Robert Burdet and his like were being eradicated from Tarragona, monastic Frenchmen were making an indispensable contribution on the frontier of New Catalonia. Under the aegis of Ramon Berenguer IV Poblet was established in 1153 with thirteen monks from Fontfroide near Narbonne. Three years earlier Santes Creus, mausoleum of the Montcada family, had been founded.⁵⁰ Alfonso's choice of burial place, not with his father at Ripoll, the spiritual centre of Old Catalonia for two centuries or more, but at Poblet, registered the shift. In 1176 he indicated the possibility of further displacement – to Poblet's dependency of 'Cepolla' (now Puig de Santa Maria) in the kingdom of Valencia, 'should I be able to capture Valencia'.⁵¹ In 1213 his son, Pedro II, would be laid to rest at Sigena, his Castilian mother's establishment and the third burial place in as many generations of a dynasty whose unfinished territorial agenda denied it the luxury of a permanent ceremonial capital.

It was the function of the land-hungry grandees of Aragón and Old Catalonia to urge the priority of that agenda and to hanker after the good old reconquering days of Alfonso the Battler. The impostor claiming to be that very king who appeared on the scene more than thirty years after his death at the battle of Fraga may be regarded as the incarnation of such sentiments. The late 1170s seem to have been rather a good time for pretenders: a pseudo-Sancho III of Castile is recorded, and also remembered as meeting a sticky end. For the Aragonese recidivists, Alfonso's involvement in Provence and the conflict with the counts of Toulouse unleashed after the death of his cousin the count in 1166 offered little prospect of enrichment through booty or a safety valve for the dispersal of the forces accumulating in peninsular society. The destructive effects of such pressure were everywhere apparent. The troubadour Bertran de Born dismissed Alfonso as of poor stock, mud from a muddy spring, while in the vitriolic verses of Giraut del Luc he was a 'false king' who, as well as disposing of the impostor, was credited *inter alia* with impregnating three nuns of Vallbona during the hours of compline and nones. (The epithet 'the Chaste' which came to be attached to him arose from a fourteenth-century chronicler's 'piquant' confusion with the ninth-century king of Oviedo of the same name and number.)⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid., 261; Santacana Tort, 301–70; Altisent, *Hist. de Poblet*, 25–34, 51–99; Udina Martorell, *El 'Llibre Blanch' de Santes Creus*, no. 49 (Dec. 1150); Carreras i Casanovas, I, 15–251; McCrank, items V–VIII.

⁵¹ Altisent, *Diplomatari de Poblet*, no. 549; Guichard, 398. The claim that because his father's choice had been made *in extremis* Ripoll deserved compensation, though accepted by Alfonso's son after his death (Pujol y Tubau, 88), must therefore be rejected.

⁵² Defourneaux, 'Louis VII', 658–9; Ubieto Arteta, 'Aparición', 36–7; *Crónica latina*, c. 4; Riquer, *Trovadores*, 711 ('vengutz de paubra generacion'); idem, 'El trovador Giraut del Luc', 214; Ventura, *Alfons 'el Cast'*, 145–6, 150.

On another level, the monastic community of Sant Cugat del Vallès suffered persistent persecution at the hands of Guillem II de Montcada, son of the Great Seneschal, with his myrmidons threatening amputation of limbs and eye-gouging, smashing the place up, and demanding hospitality for as many as seventy of them – though it should be remembered that this account gives the monks' side of the story and that bishops if not monks were perfectly capable of replying in kind, amputation and the gouging of Christian eyes by Saracen hands being included in the repertoire of sanctions used by the bishop of Vic for the discouragement of sacrilege and the enforcement of law and order in his episcopal city. Even the king acknowledged that.⁵³

One of the Sant Cugat incidents concerned a fish. The fish in question had been intended by the bailiff of Sant Cugat as a Christmas gift for the abbot and monks but had been seized by one of the ruffians. In the resulting mayhem widespread damage was done and seven hams stolen.⁵⁴ Another fishy story, from the other side of the peninsula, concerned an altercation that occurred in the city of Zamora in the first year of the reign of Alfonso VIII. A fisherman, whose name history does not record, was on the point of selling to a shoemaker of his acquaintance a trout just taken from the Duero when he was put upon by a servant of the *regidor* who claimed the treat for his master. As is the way on such occasions, voices were raised and, as was to be expected in a Leonese city in which there was not much else going on, a crowd gathered, and sides were taken. One thing led to another. The *regidor's* man summoned reinforcements, and took them to the church of Santa María to consider his next move. The shoemaker's friends set light to the church. That is the first point of the story: the wholesale carnage. Amongst the many casualties was the eldest son of Count Ponce de Cabrera, a Catalan who had made a career for himself in León after coming there in 1127 in the entourage of Berenguela of Barcelona, the bride of Alfonso VII.

That the story had lost nothing in the telling by the time it took the form in which it has survived, the aftermath confirms. The arsonists, so the story goes, decamped in the direction of the Portuguese frontier, halting *en route* only in order to communicate with Fernando II and demand that he dismiss the count. Otherwise they would cross into Portugal. The king dismissed the count. That is the second point. The human presence,

⁵³ Benito i Monclús, 879, 883; Bisson, *Tormented Voices*; Shideler, 'Les tactiques politiques', 338. In 1222 Jaime I would recognize that except with the bishop's permission he 'neither could nor should' establish exchange facilities at Vic: *Docs.JI*, no. 35.

⁵⁴ Benito i Monclús, 881.

such as it was, had to be maintained. In the late 1150s respect for the remnants of the Catalan *grandees* brought in in the previous generation took second place to the continuing need to conserve human stock at a lower level. As between the claims of such horizontal alliances and those of the lowlier sort, the lowlier sort would always prevail, because it was they who would be needed when the time came for vertical activity, when the time came to take the battle to the enemy, and because meanwhile they had the task of keeping the enemy out.⁵⁵

Of course, keeping the enemy out had been the Christian rulers' priority ever since it had ceased to be their policy to keep the enemy *in*, in order to milk it dry. The balance had shifted in 1085 when Alfonso VI had occupied or (as he thought of it) *reoccupied* Toledo and the Christian north's informal empire over the petty kingdoms of al-Andalus had been brought to an end. After 1150 the demographic imperative remained the priority.

While most if not all of the towns established along the pilgrim road to Compostela were mercantile in character, those beyond the Duero ('Extremadura') and further south beyond the mountain range of the *cordillera central* ('Transierra') were principally military. Toledo on the Tagus marked the southernmost extent of an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, from Lisbon to Tortosa, an area dominated by fighting families organized by national groupings occupying strategically situated walled cities to each of which was attached an area of open land running down to the Tagus. The example of Ávila, with its massive fortified cathedral, or Zamora where churches provided sections of the city wall itself, demonstrated the ability of these groupings to retain their own identity while collaborating in the common task. The Arab geographer al-Idrīsī describes the city of Segovia as a cluster of small villages. Around such places live-stock was kept, to be moved inside at the approach of the enemy. At such times the countryside was evacuated, obliging the raiders from the south either to remain for only a single day or to bring all necessary provisions with them. The effective limit of the Christian reconquest at any time was determined by the furthest point south at which sheep might safely graze. The clearest indication of the confidence of the abbot of Fitero and his friends when they assumed responsibility for Calatrava in 1158 was that they took twenty thousand sheep with them. There could be no question of agriculture: standing crops were a standing invitation to enemy arsonists. Animals can

⁵⁵ Fernández-Xesta y Vázquez, 261–83; Barton, 'Two Catalan magnates', 256–7; idem, *Aristocracy*, 284–5.

be moved, vines not. Eternal vigilance was the rule. When fire broke out at Plasencia the citizens' first duty was to secure the city walls.⁵⁶

Those who undertook the task of manning Christendom's southern frontier might be prompted to do so by spiritual inducements such as those offered by the archbishop of Toledo, Jean de Castellmorum, to the saviours of Calatrava in 1157. But it is evident from accounts of the sieges of Lisbon and Almería ten years earlier that spiritual inducements alone were not sufficient to satisfy the appetites of that 'unstable fringe of society', as it has been described, made up of younger sons whom society north of the Pyrenees could no longer accommodate.⁵⁷ When, around 1200, the vernacular name of the eventual beneficiaries of the process emerged, that name was *ricos homes*.

Whether they originated in high society, such as the princes of Burgundy who created the kingdom of Portugal, or belonged to its lower reaches, these *ricos homes* were as exclusive as they were acquisitive. A point particularly insisted upon in the revealing little chronicle written up in the mid-1250s concerning the exploits of a group of them based at Ávila was that they were warriors who had no truck with lesser breeds. This was understandable inasmuch as many of them were the descendants of lesser breeds themselves, of the likes of the lawless desperadoes who had been encouraged to come from afar by terms such as those of the *fuero* which Alfonso VI had granted to Sepúlveda in 1076, a code subsequently adopted as far as afield as Morella in Aragón (1233) and Segura de León to the south of Badajoz (1274). Sepúlveda provided immunity for all-comers. Once across the Duero, even murderers were guaranteed refuge: 'if any man of Sepúlveda kill another of Castile and flee as far as the Duero, let no man pursue him.' These were the blood-brothers of the Zamora shoemaker whom the king of León was unwilling to let go. For the time being, as well as defending their cities, their role was to engage in offensive warfare as *caballeros villanos*, members of the non-noble municipal militia. In their pursuit of that activity they regularly travelled prodigious distances, striking deep into Muslim territory.⁵⁸

Such was their role. But it was not the limit of their quest. The torching of the Zamora church by the shoemaker's friends was not an isolated

⁵⁶ Gautier Dalché, *Hist. urbana*, 74; Reilly, 64–7; Barrios García, *Estructuras agrarias*; Portela, 94–115; Powers, *Society*, 93–205; García de Cortázar, 55–121; CAI, II. 47, 84; *DrH*, VII. 14; Lourie, 59; Linehan, *History*, 262–7.

⁵⁷ *DrH*, VII. 14; Duby, 'Les "jeunes"', 221.

⁵⁸ *Crón. de Ávila*, 23; Sáez, 46, 190, 200; CAI, II. 2, 18; Blöcker-Walter, 151; Linehan, 'Spain', 494–5; Powers, *Society*, 1.

incident. In 1166 the pope was informed of the incineration of some three hundred of the faithful who had taken refuge in the church of San Nicolas at Medina (Salamanca). Nor did the cloth provide immunity. Five or six years later the same pope received news from the same diocese concerning the death of a priest at Candavera whose eyes had been plucked out and genitals torn off by assailants who had previously secured papal absolution by claiming that their victim had been living in sin with a female relative. Such scrupulousness for the letter of canon law was strikingly at variance with reality, not least at Sepúlveda itself where, in very much the same spirit of self-help as the townsmen of Vic were currently demonstrating, so aggrieved were the local clergy by Bishop Giraldo of Segovia's attempt in the early 1200s to deprive them of their concubines that they met, mutinied, and solemnly bound themselves to take their case to Rome.⁵⁹

A society in which a Christian ruler could be commended by one of his bishops for securing peace and justice by dropping his enemies from towers, and drowning, burning, cooking and skinning them alive, as well as by lavishing gifts upon monasteries, was a society of sharp contrasts, contrasts which were not defined by the division of Christian and Muslim. Nor was such savagery distinctively Spanish. While the bishop of Tuy was describing Alfonso IX of León in these terms – and Alfonso was not the only king who cooked people; in the same good cause so did his son the sanctified Fernando III, in pots⁶⁰ – in Portugal the bishop of Porto and celebrated canon lawyer, Pedro Salvadores, was being reported for selling Christian women and children 'as though they were Saracens'.⁶¹ Nor indeed was there anything crudely racial, and even less crudely partisan, about such negotiations. The noblemen 'de Ispania' delated to the pope in 1223 for pledging their womenfolk into Muslim servitude as security for Muslim loans were Christian noblemen of the diocese of Zaragoza, a diocese which had been 'liberated' from the Muslim yoke more than a century before.

⁵⁹ Martín Martín, *Documentos de Salamanca*, nos. 39, 51; Pastor de Togneri, 143–4; Linehan, 'Segovia'; Villar García, no. 245; Freedman, 'Another look', 180–1.

⁶⁰ *CM*, IV, 86; 'some he threw from towers, some he drowned in the sea, some he hanged, others he burned to death, or cooked in pots, or had skinned alive, and by means of various sorts of torture ensured that the kingdom remained in peace and justice' (Fernando III at Toledo, 1225): *Anales Toledanos II*, 408. According to the *Crónica de Ávila*, 20, Alfonso 'the Battler' of Aragón (d. 1134) had also cooked people. The fact that the place in which he did so was renamed 'Fervencia' (the name for the process of cooking criminals in pots) may imply that such occasions were memorably rare.

⁶¹ Costa, *Mestre Silvestre*, 382. For the bishop's scholarly contributions and the allegation that while at Bologna he had struck a cleric: Pereira, 'O canonista Petrus Hispanus'; Linehan, 'Juan de Soria', 386.

Lucas of Tuy would report similar *pro pace* practices from the reign of Mauregato in the 780s.⁶²

The prevalence of practices reminiscent of those of Christian Spain's lowest eighth-century ebb was an aspect of *convivencia* for which any account of the triumphant decades which followed the victory of Las Navas de Tolosa has to make due allowance. Now that papal decretals had so fiercely embargoed the provision of military material,⁶³ the Christian north's principal export to al-Andalus since the 1020s, other commodities not hitherto specified as forbidden had to be exploited.

To successive popes, reports such as those coming out of Zaragoza were of course incomprehensible. Popes had their own mind-set, one which bore striking resemblance to the idealized impression of the peninsular past preserved in amber in the Gothic myth, one in which a handful of Christians, Sarah's descendants, eventually decontaminated the land of the pollution of Hagar's menstruating spawn.⁶⁴ However, the sad truth (sad for the pope, that is) was that to the extent that the Spanish *reconquista* was part of the crusading movement, it was part of it on terms set by Spain's kings. And those terms were not negotiable.

Two Royal Minorities

Whether any of these considerations weighed much with those in whose hands control of Castilian fortunes came to rest at the outset of the reign of Alfonso VIII, we can only surmise. But that they weighed not at all with Alfonso VIII himself we can be sure. For in August 1158 the new king was not yet three years old, and between then and the mid-1160s the only question that mattered was that of who had possession of him. Yet that fact alone suggests that descent counted for much and that the principle of hereditary legitimacy counted for everything. It was of no consequence that Alfonso was never smeared with holy oil as the kings of France were smeared. His unsacral status was not lost on the Catalan troubadour Ramon Vidal de Besalú, who belonged to another tradition, when he remembered a visit he had made to the Castilian court shortly before Alfonso's death. Together with his English queen, Alfonso had been in his pomp. In his

⁶² Canellas López, no. 918; *CM*, IV, 12.

⁶³ X 5. 6. 6, 12.

⁶⁴ Thus Clement IV in March 1265: *Reg. Clem. IV*, no. 15 (SDSCL, no. 5). Papal correspondence with Spain's kings was full of such language: Southern, *Western Views of Islam*, 16–19; Catlos, 282.

'fabliau' *Castia-gilos* the poet sang the king's praises for his generosity and valour, his courtesy and chivalry, despite the fact that he was 'neither anointed nor consecrated'. He was 'crowned by merit', the poet insisted, 'and by sentiment, loyalty, valour and power'. Sentiment, loyalty, valour and power, not smearing, were the qualities and attributes that by the end of his long reign had raised Alfonso VIII to the summit of the hierarchy of Europe's monarchs.⁶⁵

But at its beginning the relaxation of royal authority which was the usual consequence of a royal minority had the effect of polarizing the political community and reopening fissures within it that the emperor had contrived to clamp shut. The fault lines were defined by ancient enmities of the principal families and clans whose hostilities were at least as venerable as any king's claim to the kingdom. There was 'greater disruption in Castile than there had been in many years', Bishop Juan of Osma observed seventy years on, while his contemporary Rodrigo of Toledo identified the 'cause of this sedition' as the instruction Sancho III gave to his magnates on his deathbed ('mandavit omnibus') that all that they held from him they should surrender to his successor when he reached his fifteenth birthday, that is to say in November 1169.⁶⁶ Students of English history may here be reminded of Henry I's dealings with his barons twenty-three years earlier in an equally problematic situation.⁶⁷ Different in many particulars though the circumstances of that event were, and ignorant as we are of the precise nature of the order given, the dying king's directive determined the course of events over the following twelve years, a period dominated by two grim realities: one the deeply embedded rivalries of the competing clans and their anxiety to realize their temporary advantage while the going was good; the other the king of León.

According to D. Rodrigo, with his last gasp Sancho III appointed Gutierre Fernández de Castro the toddler's tutor.⁶⁸ From this point on, the chronicle evidence and the documentary record, such as it is, rarely converge.⁶⁹ The course of events during the royal minority is obscure. When not merely sparse, the testimony of the chroniclers of the next century is demonstrably

⁶⁵ Appel, 27, lines 9–12. Cf. Menéndez Pidal, *Poesía juglaresca*, 121–2; Riquer, *Hist. de la literatura catalana*, 116–19.

⁶⁶ *DrH*, VII. 15, describing these as holdings 'pseudotemporalis', a technical flourish onto which scholars who attach importance to the question of twelfth-century Castile's feudal condition have eagerly seized. The author of the Latin Chronicle reports the dying king's wish without this gloss (ed. pp. 41–2).

⁶⁷ Garnett, 201–13.

⁶⁸ *DrH*, VII. 15.

⁶⁹ Such as it is, it is summarized by González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 150–74.

wrong. It was certainly not the case, for example, as the archbishop of Toledo twice reports, that Toledo was under Leonese control for as much as twelve years.⁷⁰ The fact that D. Rodrigo was so grossly misinformed about a matter so close to home should serve to raise questions about the credibility not only of his account but also of all those which depended on it thereafter, namely the Alfonsine History and its derivatives, regarding all twelfth-century particulars. Another odd feature about his chronicle is its failure to mention the condition of his predecessor, Archbishop Cerebrun of Toledo (1166–80), as godfather to the young king.⁷¹ The extent of the obligations acquired by the *padrinus* at the baptismal font, analogous to those created by the ceremony of dubbing to knighthood, were far-reaching.⁷²

In the late 1150s meanwhile it appears that, alongside and regardless of the appointment of Gutierre Fernández de Castro as tutor, Manrique Pérez de Lara assumed the regency. This set the scene for what followed. The enmity of the Castros and the Laras dated from the early years of the century.⁷³ Unaccountably, and before the year was out, Gutierre Fernández was prevailed upon to surrender the tutorship to García Garcés de Aza, a creature of the Laras. By March 1160 violence involving the two clans had erupted, and the Castros were engaged in conversations with Fernando II of León. In August 1162 Toledo was in Leonese hands with Fernando Rodríguez de Castro installed as governor – symbolically a highly significant turn of events – and the king of León had established a *de facto* tutorship over the young Alfonso just as he was to attempt to do in the following month over the also tender-aged ruler of Aragón.⁷⁴ Contrary to the report of Lucas of Tuy, however, Fernando II was unable to exercise control over all of Alfonso VII's empire. Nor did he retain the young king in his entourage, entrusting him instead to Manrique Pérez de Lara. Since he might well have done both things, there is no reason for supposing that he wished to do either. Far into Castile though his influence extended, as near to the confines of Aragón as Osma and Soria indeed, his practical ambitions seem to have been limited to a strategy of dynastic expansion, principally

⁷⁰ *DrH*, VII, 16, 18.

⁷¹ The relationship is stated in a Sigüenza charter of Oct. 1166: Minguella y Arnedo, I, 423. Cerebrun, a native of Poitiers, had been archdeacon of Toledo since at least 1139: Rivera, 199; Hernández, *Cartularios*, index.

⁷² Linehan, 'Alfonso XI', 130–2.

⁷³ Doubleday, 22. The careers of many of the individuals mentioned in the following pages are traceable in Barton, *Aristocracy*, 225–302.

⁷⁴ Documents of the Leonese chancery from 1162–3 refer to Alfonso as under his uncle's tutelage: González, *Fernando II*, 373–4; idem, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 162. Lucas of Tuy (*CM*, IV, 79) describes him as being in Fernando's care ('nutrierat').

by marrying his sister, doña Sancha, to the king of Aragón (September 1162). His involvement in the long-running dispute between the churches of Osmá and Sigüenza, into which he allowed himself to be drawn, he soon repented of, to the extent of seeking to bribe the king of France with dogs and hawks to get him off the papal hook.⁷⁵ Then, in 1163 if the story is to be believed, his nephew gave him the slip.

The story is one of the minor cameos of Spanish history. In Rodrigo of Toledo's description it runs as follows. Sometime in the summer of 1163 Fernando II had Manrique Pérez de Lara bring Alfonso to him at Soria to exact what (again according to D. Rodrigo) Sancho III had refused to accept from Fernando himself five years before. The king of Castile was to do homage to him and become his vassal. Courtesy of the *concejo* of Soria, however, to whose safekeeping the boy-king had been entrusted, none of this happened. The king of León was foiled because his nephew was hungry. He wanted his supper and began to cry, was removed from the scene in the arms of Pedro Núñez de Fuente Armevil, and spirited out of Soria wrapped in the cloak of that 'brave and faithful knight', and then moved to safety by Manrique de Lara's brother, Count Nuño.⁷⁶

On the face of it, both in general and as to particulars, the story as related by the archbishop may appear far-fetched, not least in respect of the supposed role of the *concejo* and the reportedly infantile behaviour of the now eight-year-old Alfonso. Yet the incident was to establish itself as a landmark in the popular memory: in an enquiry of 1215 concerning disputed jurisdiction two witnesses calculated their ages by reference to it. On the subject of vassalage contemporary records are wholly silent and the Latin Chronicle reports far less specifically that the ruler of León 'wanted to have control of the boy and care of the kingdom', an ambition frustrated 'by trickery (albeit laudable) as well as force'.⁷⁷ So the archbishop's story may have had more to do with the time in which he wrote it than with that in which it was set. Castile had survived its moment of peril. In describing the events of the 1160s in the 1240s perhaps the archbishop had in mind the 1180s, the decade in which the tables were turned and, to his eternal infamy as it proved, Fernando's son and successor submitted to the ruler of Castile.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Linehan, 'Royal influence', 37.

⁷⁶ *DrH*, VII. 17, whence *PCG*, c. 989.

⁷⁷ Fernández-Catón, *CD Catedral de León*, VI, no. 1849 (pp. 278, 279); González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 160–6; *Crón. latina*, c. 9

⁷⁸ Uncle and nephew were indeed both at Soria in September 1163: González, *Fernando II*, 376; Doubleday, 36–7.

All of which left Castile's reputation intact, but Manrique de Lara exposed to the wrath of Fernando II. The count had first delivered the king to his wicked uncle and had then lost him. According to the archbishop, it was on the latter account that he was arraigned before the Leonese court on charges of faithlessness and perjury, charges to which he replied: 'Whether I am faithful or am a traitor and perfidious I know not, but since I am a native of his domain ("eius domini naturalis") I have preserved my tender lord from undue servitude by whatever means I could.' Whereupon the count was acquitted 'by unanimous judgement'.⁷⁹

A likely story and an implausible conclusion to a bald and generally unconvincing narrative. Although the archbishop may have had reasons of his own for wishing to represent D. Manrique as a model of Castilian rectitude and the Leonese as a nation of rumour-mongers and bearers of tittle-tattle,⁸⁰ again the invocation of bonds of *naturaleza* is the currency of the 1240s or later, not the 1160s. Comparison of his extended account of the episode with the two-line account in Lucas of Tuy with its conclusion, 'Then King Fernando reigned in all the empire of his father, whence he was called king of the Spains', provides a further example of the former's aristocratic, by contrast with Lucas's monarchical, interpretation of the Spanish past.⁸¹ But despite the endorsement the expression of D. Manrique's sentiments reportedly received in León, when in 1166 an opportunity for employing such vocabulary arose in Castile itself, as will be seen it was not used.

On the death of Sancho III, followed in February 1159 by that of his aunt Sancha, the Infantazgo de Campos between Castile and León had been transformed from a buffer state into a war zone. Despite the combined interest of the Laras and Bishop Ramón II of Palencia, Alfonso VIII's Catalan great-uncle, in ensuring that the Castilian case did not go by default,⁸² the provisions of the treaty of Sahagún were now a dead letter. With both Aragón and Portugal allied to León (an alliance that left Ramón Berenguer IV free to attend to his Provençal interests), and Sanç VI of Navarre making common cause with Fernando II in 1165 the better to pursue his own ambitions in the Rioja, Leonese colonization of the entire region appeared inevitable. By then, however, the king of León was otherwise engaged towards the south-east, where in 1161 his establishment of a stronghold at Ciudad

⁷⁹ *DrH*, VII. 17.

⁸⁰ Thus *DrH* VII. 13, 24.

⁸¹ *CM*, IV. 79. Cf. Martin, *Juges de Castille*, 260–70, 286–90.

⁸² *DrH*, VII. 13; González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 72–3, 663–78. The Infantazgo had been entrusted to the Infanta Sancha (Alfonso VII's sister) by 1147.

Rodrigo (a measure intended both to counter Lara influence in that area of Extremadura and to isolate the Portuguese) had again demonstrated the critical effects of shortages of manpower. From Ávila ‘most of the city’s settlers and the best of them’ migrated to Ciudad Rodrigo, the Ávila chronicler reported, while at Salamanca the prospect of similar losses occasioned an uprising, enabling the Portuguese to occupy the place in the first half of 1163. Meanwhile, at Lugo to the north the local community was in rebellion against the temporal lordship of the bishop. Not until April 1165 was peace with Portugal restored by the treaty of Pontevedra, a settlement sealed by Fernando of León’s marriage to Urraca, the daughter of Afonso Enriques.⁸³

In Castile meanwhile hostilities between the rival families and their private armies continued unabated, with as many as five hundred knights girded by Gutierre Fernández de Castro, and culminating in the confrontation at Huete in July 1164 of his kinsman Fernando Rodríguez, the governor of Toledo, and Manrique de Lara, the king’s guardian, and the latter’s violent death. At which point a new force moved into the political void thus created. In what amounted to a late manifestation of the Peace of God, the Castilian episcopate now exerted itself. Churchmen had been intermittently active since the beginning of the reign, in particular Ramón II of Palencia, the ruler of his see for thirty-six years, whose emergence as Sancho III’s major chancellor at the time of the treaty of Sahagún provides the earliest evidence of that relationship between his native Catalonia, the Castilian chancery and the church of Palencia which was to bear rich fruit in the *studium* established there. ‘Not only a pastor but also the saviour of the kingdom’, the king’s citation would later read, and in mid-March 1166, in the face of an emergency regarded by them as a *national* emergency, the bishops under the leadership of Jean de Castellmorum, archbishop of Toledo (1152–66) and royal chancellor since at least 1160 (another significant development), took collective action, and in so doing momentarily played a role in national affairs unparalleled since before 711.⁸⁴

Indeed the very name ‘synod’ used to describe their assembly at Segovia had a seventh-century ring to it, though despite the antiquarian terminology its focus was the immediate present, a present in which the bishopric of Osma had been sold by the boy-king’s tutors in order to finance the defence of the city of Calahorra against the army of Sanç VI of Navarre.⁸⁵

⁸³ Ibid., I, 676–85, 786–91; *Crón. Ávila*, 23; González, *Fernando II*, 45–73.

⁸⁴ *DrH*, VII. 15; Lomax, ‘Don Ramón, bishop of Palencia’; Linehan, *History*, 291; Hernández, ‘Orígenes del español escrito’, 136, 138; González, *Alfonso VIII*, no. 327 (Sept. 1179).

⁸⁵ Linehan, ‘Royal influence’, 31.

Describing itself as a gathering of ‘all the bishops of the kingdom of King Alfonso’, the synod issued seventeen decrees. Thirteen of these reiterated measures with which the Western Church had long been familiar. It was the other four that gave the occasion its point. All those holding ‘honours’ of the king within the kingdom were required, upon pain of deprivation, excommunication and interdict, to do homage to him within six weeks. And the same spiritual penalties were threatened against all inhabitants, whether the king’s vassals or not, who either failed to respond to the king’s call to defend the kingdom against invasion by any invader whatsoever, or who made war within its confines. There is no evidence that the ‘saviour of the kingdom’ was present on this occasion and it is a measure of the inadequacy of the record available to Spain’s thirteenth-century historians of these years that none of them so much as mention the event.⁸⁶

As well as breaching the ancient principle, enunciated by Archbishop Rodrigo paraphrasing St Paul, that no Castilian warrior should be constrained to fight at his own expense, the measures taken at Segovia in 1166 assumed the existence of a nexus of obligations that hitherto only the *Usatici* of Barcelona had sought to exploit. But whereas in the case of those who, having no fief to lose, failed to hasten to their prince’s aid (‘since no man must fail the ruler in such a great matter and emergency’), the *Usatici* had had to resort to threats of deprivation of allodial property, the measures adopted by the Castilian bishops, as well as affecting ‘everyone in the kingdom’, were enforced by the sanction of excommunication. Thus the Peace of God reached central Spain. Moreover, as a territorial measure of universal application, the Segovia decree tended to undermine León’s temporary ascendancy in peninsular affairs, which – as attested by the alternative forms *rex Hispanorum*, as used on his seal for the rest of his reign, and *rex Hispaniarum* – remained uncertain of its own identity and unclear whether the hegemony it claimed was over persons or over territory.⁸⁷

When, five months after the Segovia assembly, Toledo was liberated from Leonese rule, the consequences for peninsular politics of the second reconquest of the place were critical. On the earlier occasion, in 1085, the ancient capital’s Mozarabic community had played an important part in the process, only to receive little or no reward thereafter for their services. Since 1085 they had found themselves alienated in their own city, excluded from high office both civil and ecclesiastical, marginalized by the French churchmen brought in to man the cathedral chapter, and at risk of being

⁸⁶ Idem, ‘Synod of Segovia’, *History*, 280–3.

⁸⁷ *DrH*, V. 3 (cf. I Cor. 9.7); *Usatges de Barcelona*, c. 64 (‘Princeps namque’; transl. Kagay, 80). Cf. Cowdrey, 66; Linehan, *History*, 280, 289.

deprived under Christian rule of the liturgical rite that had provided them with a psychological lifeline during the centuries of Muslim domination. Yet they had survived, and during the pontificate of the third French archbishop since 1085, Jean de Castellmorum, they became increasingly involved in the activities of the translators arriving there from all over Europe.' The early 1160s saw the first signs of an improvement in their condition and by 1164 the archbishop had appointed one of their number as urban archpriest of the city. Possibly at about the same time, and in the same spirit of calculated conciliation, it was decreed in Alfonso VIII's name that the provisions of the Mozarabs' distinctive *fuero* should henceforth apply to all Toledo's citizens. At any event, in August 1166, under the leadership of their *alguacil* Esteban Illán, the Mozarabs again took the lead in recovering the city for the Castilian king.⁸⁸ Whereupon Fernando II's ousted governor, Fernando Rodríguez de Castro, fled to al-Andalus to sell his services there.

More than any other single act to date, the recovery of Toledo, where both his father and grandfather were buried, secured the young king's future. In August 1166 he was approaching his eleventh birthday, already engaged in pursuing Castros and besieging castles in the company of his Lara tutor and the bishop of Palencia. On 11 November 1169 he entered his fifteenth year and the minority ended. Some days earlier he had marked his passage to manhood at the monastery of San Zoilo de Carrión, conferring knight-hood upon himself by arming himself with weapons taken from the altar of the church.⁸⁹ The unanointed king of Castile was ceremonially beholden to no man. But equally he had no ceremonial centre in which to perform the symbolical act. It was not too soon to give thought to the future of the dynasty.

In this regard, choice was more limited than it had been a century earlier. For reasons previously mentioned, the canonical requirements for valid marriage were now being more strictly observed. The decisive considerations were as much pragmatic as conscientious. As would be shown at the very end of the century, a breach of the rules could cause a determined pontiff to bring the conduct of national affairs to a standstill. However, in the late 1160s no conflict with the rules was necessary. The recent seizure of Castilian territory by Sanç VI of Navarre made a match with the Angevin ruler of Gascony the preferred course. The issue was probably considered

⁸⁸ Idem, 'Synod of Segovia', 34–6; Hernández, 'Mozárabes', 79–82; Olstein, 100–9; González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 174–6; d'Alverny, 445–6; García Gallo, 'Fueros de Toledo', 361–2, 438–45, 480; Linehan, *History*, chap. 9.

⁸⁹ The act was presumably performed while *en route* from Valladolid where he had been nine days before: González, *Alfonso VIII*, nos. 123–4.

at the first curia of the reign, at Burgos in November 1169, and within the year Eleanor, the ten-year-old daughter of Henry II of England, was installed as Queen Leonor of Castile.⁹⁰

Some of the consequences of the opening up of Castile, of which the Angevin marriage was both symptom and cause, will be considered in the following chapter. Meanwhile, an immediate result of Alfonso VIII's coming of age was the transformation of the peninsula's diplomatic alignments. In a reversal of the pre-1169 situation, it was now the king of León's turn to be isolated. The alliance concluded at Zaragoza in July 1170 by the two Alfonsos, the rulers of Castile and Aragón, paved the way for a resumption of a concerted anti-Navarrese campaign, the recovery of the territory recently appropriated by Sanç VI in Alava and Guipúzcoa, and in 1177 the referral of a dispute already more than a century old to the arbitration of Henry II of England. Imperfect though it was to prove, the settlement of these ancient scores in London (after negotiations in which the Castilian delegation was headed by the ubiquitous Ramón of Palencia) enabled Alfonso VIII to direct his attention to his western frontier. With the kings of Navarre and Portugal now his allies, in September 1178 for the first time in his reign he entered the Tierra de Campos.⁹¹

For the Latin chronicler of the 1230s (whose opinion of the Basques coincided with that of the author of the Pilgrim Guide: a sterile land, he observed, its inhabitants inconstant and faithless) Alfonso VIII's activity in the north was all a waste of time that diverted him from fighting the Almohads in the south. By obliging Angevin interests the king was endangering his own. With Sanç VII of Navarre the emir of Morocco's pensioner, Gascony threatened to prove Castile's graveyard. Striving to possess it was wasted effort, tantamount to ploughing the sea-shore, he protested, quoting Ovid. 'Happy day was it for Castile and one for eternal rejoicing', when in 1205–6 Castile's 'glorious king' freed himself from that obsession.⁹² What view the bishop took of the ruler of León's decisive intervention at Badajoz in 1169 has to be left to the imagination, for he appears to have been unaware that it was as the ally of the Almohad caliph Yūsuf I that Fernando II hastened thither to relieve the Moorish garrison from the siege led by the so-called Portuguese Cid and Scarlet Pimpernel of his age, Gerald the Fearless. A principal casualty of the occasion was King Afonso Henriques of Portugal who had his leg broken in the mêlée and never rode again.⁹³

⁹⁰ Ibid., I, 185–90.

⁹¹ Ibid., I, 687–91, 792–811.

⁹² *Crón. latina*, c. 17: an opinion closely paralleling that of some Aragonese regarding Provence.

⁹³ Ibid., c. 10. See below, 173 (Alfonso X).

Although by no means unique (as the history of his son Alfonso IX would demonstrate), the king of León's exploits at Badajoz may nevertheless be regarded as illustrative of the prevalence of territorial over confessional loyalties, a scale of values still intact in some quarters when the episcopal chroniclers wrote up the history of the 1160s seventy years after the event. For although in the eyes of the Castilian bishop-chronicler Christian disarray was a scandal and Castile Christendom's only hope, his Leonese colleague Lucas of Tuy, far from attempting to exculpate Fernando for his performance on this occasion, positively gloried in it, representing as an object lesson in royal magnanimity his treatment of the king who had 'sinned against God and himself' by encroaching on territory which the treaty of Sahagún had assigned to León.⁹⁴ Fernando had made his truce with the Almohads in order to facilitate his campaign against Nuño Pérez de Lara. Meanwhile his erstwhile governor of Toledo, Fernando Rodríguez de Castro, was negotiating with the enemies of the cross in Seville. 'It was to be noted', Lucas of Tuy commented of the assistance which the latter's son Pedro provided to the enemy at the battle of Alarcos in July 1195, 'that the Goths were virtually never defeated by the barbarians except when the barbarians had Goths assisting them'. By Goths he meant Christians of course. But he did not describe them as such. Like the Ávila contingents who, before setting off on campaign, as well as – or even instead of – confessing and communicating consulted the entrails of birds, the colouring of the bishop of Tuy's mind was not that of a Christian crusader.⁹⁵ Unequivocal black and white were not always present where they might have been most expected.

To Fernando II likewise the Almohads were potential auxiliaries capable of being recruited to assist in the contest that really counted, the struggle for ascendancy over his Christian neighbours and relations. Whereas a truce with Islam was (as it would remain until the reconquest of Granada) just a truce – a matter for report without comment⁹⁶ – a treaty with Islam was a constructive truce. When a papal legate was in the vicinity, the kings of Castile, León and Aragón were capable of discovering the resolve to collaborate.⁹⁷ But papal legates went as fast as they came. In 1157 al-Andalus

⁹⁴ *CM*, IV, 81: 'Truly I have sinned against both God and you', Afonso Enriques is made to say before offering to surrender his kingdom in expiation (an offer declined by Fernando, 'yielding to his customary piety' according to Rodrigo of Toledo: *DrH*, VII, 23).

⁹⁵ González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 902–3; *CM*, IV, 83; *Crón. de Ávila*, 24, 27.

⁹⁶ Thus the *Crón. latina* in 1197–8: 'Then a truce was made between the kings of Morocco and Castile' (c. 15).

⁹⁷ As in 1172 on the occasion of the visit of Cardinal Hyacinth (later Pope Celestine III): González, *Alfonso VIII*, I, 686.

comprised a congeries of nominal kingdoms, the detritus of the Caliphate of Córdoba. Inactive in isolation, only when a charge was put through them from across the Straits of Gibraltar were they capable of effective conduct. But the Almoravid gale having spent itself, fresh blasts from Africa had yet to gather force.⁹⁸

If Gerald the Fearless was the Portuguese Cid, ibn Mardanīsh was the Cid of the south-east. From his base in Valencia, and more often than not in alliance with the Christian rulers of Albarracín, the Wolf-king bestrode the affairs of al-Andalus with an absence of confessional conviction at least the equal of that of a king of León.⁹⁹ Throughout the 1160s he juggled Seville and Córdoba against Barcelona and wherever the kings of Castile and León happened to be at the time, and entered into and equally effortlessly resiled from agreements to pay the kings of Aragón quantities of gold such as had not been so much as mentioned since the 1030s. Above all, he survived. But on his deathbed in March 1172, after the caliph Yūsuf's brother the governor of Granada had cornered him in Murcia, he gave instructions that all that he controlled be deposited with the caliph.

The departure from the Spanish scene of the third and, for all his zigzagging diplomacy, its most consistent force produced an effect even greater than the numerous Castilian casualties suffered in 1161 when the Almohad caliph, Abd al-Mu'min, had crossed from Africa in order to superintend the foundation of the city of Gibraltar: sufficient indication of the significance of the caliph's ordinary absence. The effect of ibn Mardanīsh's death was no less galvanizing. Led by Abd al-Mu'min's son, Yūsuf, in June 1172 an Almohad army left Seville to set siege to the Castilian stronghold of Huete, mid-way between the Christian settlement at Madrid and the Muslim fortress of Cuenca. Prostrated by hunger and thirst, seven weeks later the caliph's army withdrew. Victory was credited to Alfonso VIII.

As recently as 1158 a *force de frappe* from Ávila, led by the veteran of twenty-six expeditions, the hunchbacked Sancho Jiménez, had succeeded in creating mayhem in Seville. But when Sancho Jiménez returned there in the spring of 1173 he was seen off with heavy losses. In future, such expeditions would be under royal command. A lesson had been learnt from the caliph who before returning to Africa in the autumn of 1173 blazed a trail of devastation through Extremadura to punish the king of León for breaking with him.¹⁰⁰ Despite Alfonso VIII's capture of Cuenca in September 1177, a feat which considerably strengthened his control of La Mancha,

⁹⁸ Le Tourneau, 3–47.

⁹⁹ For his pre-1157 activities see Reilly, 217ff.

¹⁰⁰ *Crón. de Avila*, 23–4; Powers, *Society*, 40–50; González, *Fernando II*, 107–9.

and which in the estimation of the bishop of Osma marked the arrival of royal manhood, the ruler of Castile remained just one Christian ruler amongst many. Events of the previous twenty years had undermined the system of hegemony envisaged by his father and grandfather. Despite the provisions of the treaties of Tudején and Sahagún, the kings of Aragón and Portugal continued to consolidate their power to east and west. Indeed, part of the Castilian's reason for besieging Cuenca when he did so was to pre-empt a possible Aragonese move in that direction. Moreover, the price of the assistance Alfonso of Aragón had provided at the siege had been release from the homage which since 1136 his Aragonese predecessors had owed for the kingdom of Zaragoza; and by the treaty of Cazola, as well as forming a pact of alliance and friendship against all other rulers, Moorish and Christian alike, 'but most particularly against the king of Navarre', in return for Alfonso VIII's relinquishment of all claims to fealty in respect of future Aragonese conquests, Alfonso II ceded the kingdom of Murcia to Castile.

In the opinion of the Catalan historian Ferrán Soldevila, writing in the 1930s, for Catalonia the deal done at Cazola in March 1179 sacrificed Aragonese rights in Murcia in return for the renunciation of a purely nominal overlordship, and was 'disastrous'. Scrupulous regard for feudal niceties had betrayed the interests of idealistic Catalonia to calculating Castile.¹⁰¹ It is a view still taken in 2007. However, if only on that symbolic level, the final severing of the threads of allegiance, of which there had at least been formal acknowledgement at Tudején, was not without significance for Castile either. Just two months later the extent of the rupture was fully revealed when Alexander III's bull 'Manifestis probatum' ratified the royal title of Alfonso of Portugal and his successors.¹⁰² The old order had indeed changed. It was time for a new dispensation.

¹⁰¹ *Hist. de Catalunya*, 208–11; Constable, 162–3 (text). The alternative view, advanced by Ventura (*Alfons 'el Cast'*, 193–4), that the separation would protect the Corona de Aragón from invasion by a heresy-hunting feudal suzerain, appears fanciful and anachronistic in equal measure.

¹⁰² Almeida, 83–6; Feige, 300–12.