CHAPTER 1

Introduction

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The sixth edition of the Handbook of Child Psychology was written approximately 8 years after the 1998 fifth edition. As was true for the last edition, the goal of the authors in this volume of the Handbook was to present state-of-the-art reviews of conceptual and empirical work on social, emotional, and personality development. Each author or set of authors has provided the reader with an integrative summary of the current status of an important topic within the domain of social and personality development and, to some degree, with a vision for the future. Although research on social, emotional, and personality development is a cumulative endeavor with few abrupt, dramatic changes in knowledge, the field does have a somewhat different look from 8 years ago, and differs greatly from that depicted in the fourth edition of the Handbook in 1983. In this chapter, I note some of the themes in this volume, with an eye to changes in themes in the past 20 or so years.

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In addition, based in part on the contemporary concern with context, diversity, biological substrates and predispositions, and indices of individual differences (see later discussion), there is considerable interest in moderating variables, that is, in variables such as sex, socioeconomic class, race/ethnicity, personality, prior socialization experiences, and type of situation that affect the direction or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To study moderation, investigators generally examine the interaction of the independent variable with the potential moderator (e.g., age, high or low level of regulation) when predicting an outcome or criterion variable or comparing the equivalence of structural models for different groups.

Mediating or moderating processes are discussed directly or indirectly by all chapter authors, but are a more central focus in some chapters. For example, in their discussion of relations of temperament to children’s adjustment, Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) explicitly discuss two types of indirect relations: mediated linkage, as when temperament influences transactions with the environment, which, in turn, shape the child’s developing adjustment, and moderated relations, as when temperament and some facet of the environment affect children’s adjustment. Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume) also explicitly emphasize moderation in the socialization process, and Dodge, Coie, and Lynam (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume) review studies of moderating effects, concluding that such research is essential for delineating the combinations of factors that predict antisocial behavior.

A few more specific examples of how authors discuss mediation and moderation illustrate the types of issues that are the focus of contemporary work in developmental psychology and related disciplines. First, consider mediation. Collins and Steinberg (Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume) conclude that the impact of pubertal maturation on adolescent psychosocial development is more likely to be interpersonally mediated than due to the direct action of hormonal changes on mood or emotional functioning. Similarly, multiple authors note that the quality of relationships or social interactions likely mediates between distal environmental factors (e.g., economic resources, quality of the neighborhood), family structure, or social institutions and youths’ adjustment and other socioemotional developmental outcomes (e.g., Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). Harter (Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume) argues for mediation by others’ approval of the relation between genes (as expressed, for example, in temperament or attractiveness) and self-esteem. Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume) discuss a number of biological systems that mediate between heredity or biological structures and psychological or behavioral responses, whereas Ruble, Martin, and Berenbaum (Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume) note that genes and hormones are often viewed as proximal mediators of the effect of evolutionary forces on gender differences. Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad (Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume) present data indicating that sympathy at least partly mediates the relations between moral judgment or perspective taking and children’s prosocial behavior, whereas children’s regulation mediates the relation between parental expression of negative emotion in the family and children’s sympathy. They also present a model in which a number of more proximal factors mediate the relations of more distal factors (e.g., biological factors, socialization, and antecedent sociocognitive and dispositional characteristics of the child) to prosocial behavior.

Mediation is invoked repeatedly in discussions of parenting, parent-child attachment, family variables, and developmental outcomes. After a review of the literature on attachment, Thompson calls for additional exploration of the mediators of the relations of attachment security to outcome variables. Rubin, Bukowski, and Parker (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume) present data indicating that lower levels of parental skill have been associated with higher levels of antisocial behavior and lower levels of academic performance, which in turn have been associated with higher levels of peer rejection. Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume) discuss social-cognitive processes as mediators of the relations between parenting (e.g., abuse) and offsprings’ externalizing behavior. They also argue that parenting is a mediator of the relation between the macrolevel variable of family poverty and children’s aggression. Wigfield, Eccles, Schiefele, Roeser, and Davis-Kean (Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume) suggest that a range of parental beliefs and practices mediate between family demographics and achievement-related outcomes. In their model, specific parental behaviors (e.g., time spent with the child, teaching strategies) at least partially mediate relations between parental general beliefs and behaviors (e.g., locus of control, gender-role stereotypes, parenting style) and children’s outcomes (e.g., goals, persistence, performance). Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume) examine a range of potential mediators in regard to the relation of socialization to developmental out-
comes, including children’s acquired ways of cognitively representing their social worlds, hormones (and neurotransmitters) involved in children’s responses to socialization experiences, and gene expression in the continuous reorganization of the brain in response to experience. Finally, Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume) discuss a variety of mediating processes related to personality and note the need for further investigation of both the proximal relationship-specific processes that mediate personality effects on relationship outcomes and mediators (e.g., parental attributions) of the association between parental personality and parenting behavior. The list could go on and on; what is impressive is how mediating processes have become such a central focus in work on socioemotional development.

Moderational processes are also repeatedly emphasized in this volume. For example, Bugental and Grusec discuss the ways that parental goals serve to moderate parent behavior (including their affective responses) on different occasions, as well as the role of culture as a moderator of the relation between socialization experiences and children’s development. Collins and Steinberg (Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume) cite evidence indicating that the impact of puberty on psychological functioning is moderated by the social context in which adolescents mature. They also cite research indicating that aspects of parenting—for example, parenting style and parenting practices—may interact with one another in the prediction of outcome variables such as youths’ adjustment. Numerous other authors in this volume review empirical interactions between children’s temperament (e.g., emotionality or regulation) or personality and their parenting experiences in predicting children’s behavior or socioemotional development (e.g., Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). Components of temperament or personality may also interact with one another: For example, Eisenberg et al. (Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume) summarize data indicating that the interaction of individual differences in emotionality and regulation predicts children’s prosocial behavior and sympathy better than the consideration of only the main effects of these predictors.

Demographic characteristics that reflect diversity are other common moderators of predictors of developmental outcomes. Wigfield et al. (Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume) suggest that competence-related beliefs and school performance may predict school performance for White but not African American children and that academic self-concept of ability is less predictive of general self-esteem for at least some African American children than for White American children. Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume) note that harsh discipline (but not abuse) is a predictor of later aggressive behavior for White but not African American children. Further, Ruble et al., Chapter 14, and Turiel and others, Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume, discuss ways in which the sex of the child may moderate the effects of social experience on various social behaviors (although authors did not always use the term moderation). Thus, moderators that have received substantial attention include temperament/personality, children’s sex, race, culture, and parenting style or support.

One moderator of the effects of the socializing environment that has received relatively little attention in the past is genetic differences between children. Recently, Caspi et al. (2002) reported such moderation for the long-term effects of maltreatment. Those children whose genotype resulted in high levels of MAOA (monoamine oxidase A, an enzyme that metabolizes neurotransmitters such as serotonin, and thus renders them inactive) were more likely than children without this genetic tendency to exhibit antisocial problems if they were maltreated (see Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). With the new wave of research on genes, neurotransmitters, and other biological factors, investigators are likely to obtain much more evidence of interactions between biological indices and environmental factors or experiences in the next decade (see Cadoret, Yates, Troughton, Woodworth, & Stewart, 1995). Such research, as well as research on interactions involving the kinds of variables already discussed, is producing a more differentiated understanding of “when” relations and processes occur—an issue that is an essential complement to the more basic mediational question of “why” relations occur (Parke, 2004). Moreover, as dynamical systems approaches become more popular, evidence of indirect, nonlinear relations among multiple variables is likely to be more common than at the present (e.g., Lewis, 2002).

A FOCUS ON EMOTION

The fifth edition of the Handbook (1998) was the first to include a chapter dedicated solely to the topic of emotion (rather than the more general topic of socioemotional development in infancy). The neglect of emotion in prior editions is not surprising given the history of the study of emotion in psychology in the past 50 years. Due to the influence of behaviorism and then cognitive approaches in psychology, emotion was considered a nuisance variable (and something of no relevance) for many
years. In the past 10 to 15 years, however, emotion has become central to the study of social development, as well as to many other topics in psychology.

The current emphasis on emotion is a dramatic departure from the previous view of emotions as intrapsychic events “which do not play a causal role in behavior and which are secondary by-products of more significant processes” (Campos, 1984, p. 148). Today emotions are viewed as motivational forces that play a role in much of our social behavior. As noted by Parke (1994), in contemporary psychology, emotions are viewed as “both products and processes of social interactions, relationships, and contexts” (p. 158).

The central role of emotion in contemporary developmental psychology is reflected in most of the chapters in this volume. This focus is, of course, most evident in Saarni, Campos, Camras, and Witherington’s chapter on emotional development (Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume). Saarni et al. take a functionalist perspective in which emotion is closely linked to the context and what a person is trying to do. Emotion is viewed as synonymous with the significance of a person-event transaction for the individual.

Due to the immense body of work relevant to emotion, Saarni et al. (Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume) limit their coverage, focusing primarily on the conceptualization of emotion, developmental changes in emotion and emotion communication, the role of culture in emotion in emotional development, and the components of emotional competence, their development, and their relations to adjustment and social competence. Saarni et al.’s review of this portion of the emotion literature demonstrates that children’s understanding of emotion and its expression, as well as children’s communication of, and coping with, emotion, change considerably with age. Moreover, emotional understanding and communication seem to have a profound influence on social interaction, although the relation between social interaction and these aspects of functioning is doubtlessly reciprocal. Saarni et al.’s review reflects major domains of interest in recent work on emotion and provides a contemporary, contextually oriented perspective on emotional development.

**Temperament, Personality, and Emotion**

Emotion can be viewed in both situationally specific and dispositional terms. In theory and research on temperament and personality, enduring individual differences in reactivity are fundamental constructs; thus, dispositional emotional tendencies are salient topics in the two chapters that deal with temperament (Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) and the chapter on personality (i.e., Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume).

Temperament is defined by Rothbart and Bates as constitutionally based individual differences in reactivity and self-regulation. Reactivity includes emotional responding, both in regard to specific emotions (e.g., fear) and more general constructs of emotion (e.g., negative emotionality or emotional intensity; see Larsen & Diener, 1987; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). Regulation pertains to the modulation of temperamental reactivity (Ahadi & Rothbart, 1994; Eisenberg, 2002; Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). Research on temperament/personality, and hence on emotional reactivity and self-regulation, has increased greatly in volume in the past 1 to 2 decades.

Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume) view temperament as a “biologically based bias for correlated clusters of feelings, thoughts, and actions that appear during childhood, but not always in the opening months, and are sculpted by varied rearing environments into a large but still limited number of traits that comprise an individual’s personality profile.” Thus, like Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), they include emotion in their definition of temperament. However, they do not emphasize regulatory components of temperament to the same degree as Rothbart and Bates, and they tie dispositional biases to thought patterns (Rothbart & Bates view the content of thought as personality rather than temperament), as well as to actions.

Dispositional emotionality also plays an important role in concepts of personality. In fact, Caspi (1998) defined personality as “individual differences in the tendency to behave, think, and feel in certain consistent ways” (p. 312). Personality theorists often include in personality not only traits, but also personal concerns (i.e., a wide array of motivational, developmental, or strategic constructs that are contextualized in time, place, or role) and life stories (McAdams, 1995). As noted by Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume), “personality is typically seen as including a wider range of individual differences in feeling, thinking, and behaving than is temperament.” Similarly, Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume) assert that, “the stable variation in behaviors and emotions observed in older children, ado-
lescents and adults are personality traits, not temperamental biases, although the latter make a contribution to the profile that emerges later in development.” Analogously, Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) note that, “Temperament represents the affective, activational, and attentional core of personality, whereas personality includes much more than temperament, particularly the content of thought, skills, habits, values, defenses, morals, beliefs, and social cognition. Social cognition includes the perception of the self, others, and the relation of self to objects, events, and others.”

Despite these definitional distinctions, as noted by Caspi and Shiner, there is a striking similarity between the constructs of temperament and personality. Both can be observed in animals (at least to some degree) as well as humans; both involve moderate genetic influence but are also affected by experience; and, importantly, “many traits from both domains are characterized by specific habitual positive and negative emotions” (Casp & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). If we view temperament as representing the building blocks from which personality develops (Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), these similarities are not surprising.

Casp & Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume; Caspi, 1998), as well as Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), speculate on how aspects of temperament in childhood are linked to the structure of adult personality (i.e., aspects of the “big five” components of personality). For example, temperamental negative emotionality is believed to contribute to the personality construct of neuroticism and agreeableness (inversely related) whereas temperamental positive affect or surgency (and sociability) are associated with agreeableness and extraversion in adults. In addition, aspects of temperament believed to be involved in the regulation or control of emotionality and emotionally driven behavior have been linked to personality. For example, temperamental behavioral inhibition (see Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume) is viewed as related to adult neuroticism and low levels of extraversion (Casp & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). Moreover, temperamental attentional regulation and inhibitory control likely contribute to the adult personality characteristic of constraint, and perhaps also agreeableness (although the latter may also have a more proximal temperamental correlate in childhood; see Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume).

Emotion and Social Behavior

In addition to playing a role in later personality, and consistent with much of the review in the Saarni et al.’s Chapter 5 (this Handbook, this volume) on emotion, individual differences in temperamental emotionality, including directly experienced negative emotions such as anger and vicariously induced emotion (e.g., sympathy or empathy), frequently have been found to predict variation among children in socioemotional development (see Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11; Turiel, Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume). For example, to a much greater degree than 8 years ago, there is empirical support for relations between dispositional emotionality—irritability/anger, fearfulness, and positive emotionality—and social competence or adjustment, including internalizing and externalizing problem behavior (see Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6; Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume). Moreover, much more often than a decade ago, investigators are identifying distinct relations between different types of negative emotions (e.g., anger versus anxiety or sadness, fear of novelty versus fear of strangers) and the prediction of specific internalizing and externalizing problems or related psychological problems (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2001, 2005; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume).

Ruble et al. (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume) noted an increased focus on emotion in the peer literature since the fifth edition of the Handbook. They list among topics recently introduced to the discipline the relation of jealousy and other emotional processes to the maintenance and dissolution of peer relationships. Dispositional emotionality clearly plays a role in the quality of social functioning in peer interactions and relationships; for example, emotional reactivity has been linked to social withdrawal (Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume; Spinrad et al., 2004), as well as information processing in social encounters, although there is relatively little research on the latter issue (see Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Crick & Dodge, 1994). Researchers have found that cheerful children appear to be relatively popular, whereas children prone to intense negative emotions are lower in social status (see Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume). Relations between peer interactions/relationships and emotion no doubt are reciprocal; as noted by Rubin et al. (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume), experiences with peers affect social, emotional, and cognitive
functioning beyond the influences of family, school, and neighborhood.

Contextually specific emotional reactions, in addition to dispositional emotionality, are seen as playing a major role in peer and other types of relationships. Rubin et al. (Chapter 10, this *Handbook*, this volume) define relationships as referring to the meanings, expectations, and emotions that derive from a succession of interactions between two individuals known to each other. As noted by Thompson (Chapter 2, this *Handbook*, this volume), “Emotion is a more salient feature of social interaction compared to most encounters with objects—including the emotions that precede social interaction and the changes in emotions that arise from interactive activity.” Thompson also notes that differences in attachment security are believed to affect early emotional development and the style of young children’s emotion regulation, and that these emerging aspects of the individual influence children’s social, emotional, and personality development in subsequent years. Thus, social relationships are affected by dispositional differences in emotionality as well as by emotions experienced when interacting with others, and the quality of social relationships with parents, peers, and others contribute to emerging individual differences in situational and dispositional emotionality.

**Emotion, the Self, and Goals**

Emotion is also an integral aspect of conceptions of the self. For example, low self-esteem seems to be highly related to feelings of depression and hopelessness (Harter, Chapter 9, this *Handbook*, this volume). Moreover, emotions tied to attachment status (e.g., Kochanska, 2001) may affect children’s self-esteem and working model of the self in relation to others. In addition, young children’s understanding of emotion (e.g., identification of emotions, knowing when various emotions are likely to occur) is viewed by both Harter and Thompson (Chapter 2, this *Handbook*, this volume) as affecting the child’s construction of the self.

In the 1998 edition of this volume, Eccles, Wigfield, and Schiefele concluded that the highest priority in the research on achievement was closer consideration of the influence of emotion on motivation. Although there is more work on this issue than a decade ago, there is not as much as one might expect. Nonetheless, as noted by Wigfield et al. (Chapter 15, this *Handbook*, this volume), emotional development plays a role in some theories regarding individual differences (and likely developmental change) in achievement-related beliefs, values, and goals. Success and failure are associated with emotional reactions; level of anxiety can affect performance; and emotion-related self-evaluations play a role in achievement-related behavior and vice versa. For example, high levels of trait-like intrinsic motivation appear to foster positive emotional experience and well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000), as well as self-esteem (Ryan, Connell, & Deci, 1985). Wigfield et al. (Chapter 15, this *Handbook*, this volume) note that there has been increasing interest recently in the research on relations between motivation and affect, and they expect the volume of work on this topic to increase.

**Emotion and Morality**

The role of emotion in the study of morality has varied greatly as a function of the conception of morality. In Kohlbergian work on moral reasoning, emotion traditionally plays a minor role in comparison to cognition (see Kohlberg, 1984; Rest, 1983). In contrast, emotions such as empathy-related reactions or guilt have been highlighted in some work on moral behavior, including theory and research on prosocial tendencies (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11, this *Handbook*, this volume; Hoffman, 2000), feelings of guilt (Saarni et al., Chapter 5; Thompson, Chapter 2, this *Handbook*, this volume; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990), and conscience (Thompson, Chapter 2, this *Handbook*, this volume). For example, in work on prosocial behavior, both enduring tendencies toward experiencing moral emotions (i.e., dispositional sympathy) and situational emotional reactions (e.g., situational sympathy or guilt) are viewed as motivating altruistic action (see Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11, this *Handbook*, this volume). And in recent work, emotional reactions such as guilt and empathy are one of two components of conscience (Aksan & Kochanska, 2005).

Some contemporary theorists, including Wilson (1993), assume that there is a biologically based emotional basis to morality (see Turiel, Chapter 13, this *Handbook*, this volume). According to Kagan (1984), moral principles are determined by the intensity of the community’s affective reactions to the specific content of the principle. Turiel recognizes the importance of emotion in morality, but also emphasizes cognition more than theorists such as Hoffman, Kagan, and Shweder, concluding, as he did in 1998, “As important as are emotions—especially sympathy, empathy, and respect—for moral functioning, emotions occur in and among persons
who can think about them with regard to other people and in relation to complicated social agendas, goals, and arrangements. The relationships among emotions, moral judgments, reflections, and deliberations require a great deal of attention in research and in theoretical formulations.” Thus, the magnitude of the role of emotion in morality is still an issue of discussion.

**Sex and Emotion**

In the past decade, investigators have not examined sex differences in measures of emotional functioning as much as might be expected. As one might expect, there are sex differences in the emotions that boys and girls tend to display—for example, girls tend to display more sadness, fear, shame, and guilt (Eisenberg, Martin, & Fabes, 1996; Ruble et al., Chapter 14, this *Handbook*, this volume)—although little is known about the degree to which boys and girls differ in internally experienced emotion (albeit adolescent girls report more anxiety and depression than do boys). Nonetheless, gender differences in the degree or type of expression of anger and frustration may be a factor in the gender difference in children’s externalizing behavior and aggression (see Dodge et al., Chapter 12, this *Handbook*, this volume). Findings regarding gender differences in empathy or sympathy are weaker, although some measures favor females (Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11, this *Handbook*, this volume). Guilt is another emotion that girls likely experience more than boys; if this is true, there are implications for both the development of conscience and for children’s adjustment (see Zahn-Waxler & Robinson, 1995). In addition, there is evidence that females are better at expressing and decoding emotions than are males (Ruble et al., Chapter 14, this *Handbook*, this volume), which has implications for gender differences in social communication and skills. Because of the centrality of emotion in recent research and theory on the quality of children’s social functioning, it is likely that investigators will attend more to gender differences in the experience and expression of emotion in the near future.

**Emotion in Socialization and the Socialization of Emotion**

Socialization is an area of study in which emotion has received increased attention in recent years (Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8, this *Handbook*, this volume). As noted by Parke and Buriel (1998), affect played a relatively minor role in socialization theories until the recent past. Until the 1980s, affect was discussed primarily in regard to the degree of warmth, support, and harmony versus conflict or hostility in the parent-child relationship or expressed in parents’ “parenting style” (see Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16, this *Handbook*, this volume). In contrast, the topic of affect/emotion permeates contemporary work on socialization, far beyond the emotional tone of parents’ interactions with their children.

Before highlighting some of the recently emerging topics in regard to emotion and socialization, it is noteworthy that nearly every chapter in this volume contains some discussion of the relation of the emotional climate in the home and/or school—that is, between parents and children, teachers and children, and/or between parents—to children’s social, emotional, or achievement-related development. Most authors of the chapters have noted that the emotional tone of the relationship between the socializing adult and a child is associated with the quality of children’s social behavior (e.g., social competence, prosocial and aggressive behavior, peer interactions), their conceptions of self and emotional autonomy, the quality of their interpersonal relationships, their academic-related outcomes, or their adjustment (e.g., chapters by Bugental & Grusec; Collins & Steinberg; Dodge et al.; Eisenberg et al.; Parke & Buriel; Rubin et al.; and Thompson, this *Handbook*, this volume). Indeed, one of the more consistent findings across domains of socioemotional development is the importance of supportive, positive (versus hostile) relationships with socializing adults for children’s healthy development. Although this is an old topic of study, investigators are still delineating the many ways in which the emotional tone of relationships with other people may affect the course of children’s development.

According to Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this *Handbook*, this volume), emotion is one outcome of socialization: “it [socialization] includes their [children’s] ability and motivation to acquire individual and culturally shared competencies at a social, emotional, and cognitive level.” Thus, in addition to providing an emotional context for socialization, socialization-related interactions are believed to affect the valence and degree of emotionality, in part through influencing children’s felt security and attachment, conceptions of the self, and the associations, interpretations, and attributions they make regarding people, contexts, and events in their lives.

In addition, Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this *Handbook*, this volume) suggest that emotion affects a variety of cognitive processes fundamental to the socialization process, including attentional focus, memory...
retrieval, appraisal and response selection, and the capacity for rational or reflective processing. These processes affect, for example, children’s responses to socialization attempts and parents’ reactions to their children’s negative behaviors. Bugental and Grusec’s conception of the role of emotion in socialization is more complex, multilayered, and encompassing than in most existing theory.

It is no surprise that emotion plays a central role in both biologically oriented and culturally oriented socialization theories. In biologically-based theories, affect and emotion are conceptualized as basic processes to be regulated, as regulators of relationships (e.g., attachment relationships), or as consequences of socializing relationships. One relatively recent focus has been the long-term influences of socialization practices on the regulation (or dysregulation) of the child’s neurohormonal responses, which often co-occur with emotional experience and are part of emotional responses. Emotional processes are also viewed as functional regulators of other processes central to socialization (see Bugental & Grusec, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume).

In recent sociocultural perspectives, the expression, experience, interpretation, and naming of emotions are derived, at least in part, from the culture (see Bugental & Grusec, Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume; Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Saarni et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume). Thus, socialization by the culture influences emotional reactions, as well as a range of social behaviors. Saarni et al. illustrate this point in their discussion of “how emotion communication accompanies and helps to inculcate cultural values, affects pre- and perinatal emotionality, determines the types of events to which an infant or child is exposed, and creates the ‘emotional climate’ within which a person is immersed.” As a consequence of the recent increased awareness of cultural contributions to emotional experience and expression, a number of our current conceptions of emotional development are likely to be challenged (see the discussion of culture that follows).

In summary, in the past 2 decades, the topic of emotion has moved to center stage in the study of social and personality development. This surge of interest in emotion has been accompanied by, and perhaps is related causally to, elevated interest in biological inputs to development and temperament. In addition, contemporary concern with culture and context has had a powerful influence on thinking about emotional development.

A FOCUS ON REGULATION

Because emotional experience and expression often involve regulation (or the lack thereof), contemporary discussion and research on emotion regulation also have been revitalized. Until the early 1990s, popular approaches to the topic of regulation included emphases on parental control and discipline; children’s compliance, delay of gratification, and resistance to temptation; children’s internalization of societal values regarding behaviors such as aggression and prosocial behavior; and the role of fear, anxiety, and guilt in fostering internalization or at least compliance (e.g., Hoffman, 1970, 1983; Maccoby & Martin, 1983; see Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11; Turiel, Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume). Although there is still considerable interest in these topics, in recent years investigators concerned with regulatory processes also have focused on mechanisms by which children regulate their emotion and emotion-driven behavior, and the relation of individual differences in regulation to social competence and adjustment. Even though children’s regulation was clearly an important emerging topic in the fifth edition of the Handbook (1998), more authors discuss this topic in this edition of the Handbook, and in considerably greater depth. Perhaps this is because many view the regulation of emotion, as much as the emotion itself, as related to quality of social behavior and relationships (Rubin et al., Chapter 10; Saarni et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume).

Contemporary Work on Regulation

Contemporary thinking on the aforementioned topics has diverse origins in the discipline. The work of the Blocks (Block & Block, 1980) on ego control has had an important impact on this topic of study. Also important is work by temperament theorists on constructs such as attentional control (e.g., the ability to shift and focus attention), impulsivity, and effortful control (i.e., superordinate self-regulatory systems that can assert control over the reactive and self-regulatory processes of other temperament systems; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & Fisher, 2001; Rothbart & Rueda, 2005). Similarly, mechanisms for adaptation discussed by coping theorists (e.g., Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) for decades can be viewed as modes of dealing with, or regulating, emotion and behavior in stressful contexts. In addition, some of the
adult personality work on constructs such as constraint or conscientiousness (Caspí & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume) is relevant to developmental scientists interested in regulatory processes.

Self-regulation is discussed, in one form or another, in most of the chapters in this volume. For example, Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume), as well as Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), discuss the temperamental (including physiological) basis of regulation of reactivity; in addition, Rothbart and Bates emphasize the attentional basis of some forms of self-regulation and review parts of the growing literature pertaining to the relations of temperamental regulation to adjustment. Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 5, Handbook, this volume) note that constraint is a component of all contemporary systems of personality, and highlighted the role of temperamental regulation in the emergence of personality traits such as constraint (or conscientiousness) and neuroticism. Saarni et al. focus on social communicative mechanisms used by infants to regulate their behavior (e.g., social referencing), as well as on the relation of emotion regulation to adjustment, coping, and emotional competence. They also discuss emotion and language as regulators of behavior.

Thompson (Chapter 2, Handbook, this volume) reviews the early development of self-regulation, whereas Rubin et al. (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume) summarized literature on the role of self-regulation in peer competence. The latter also note that peer interactions, especially friendships, provide opportunities to develop and use emotion regulation capacities. In addition, Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume) discuss the role of children’s emerging regulatory abilities in age-related changes in aggression; they also note the association of individual differences in children’s aggression with problems in emotion regulation, attentional deficits, and impulsivity. Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume) report findings consistent with the view that regulatory processes are intimately involved in the vicariously induced emotions of sympathy and personal distress, as well as in the performance of prosocial behavior. Further, Wigfield et al. (Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume) consider links between motivation and self-regulation and how motivation is translated into regulated behavior. They also discuss the importance of internally (versus externally) regulated motivation and behavior in the achievement of goals and learning, as well as academic performance.

Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume), Parke and Buriel (Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume), Dodge and Coie (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume), and Collins and Steinberg (Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume) focus, to varying degrees, on the socialization correlates of the development of children’s self-regulation—a topic that has flourished in the past decade. For example, Bugental and Grusec note the increasing interest in the long-term effects of socialization practices on the regulation (or dysregulation) of the child’s neurohormonal responses. They, as well other authors (e.g., Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume; also see “A Focus on Relationships” that follows), discuss the co-regulation of the protective care (attachment) system by parent and offspring. This protective care relationship (especially parental warmth), in turn, is viewed as facilitating the acquisition of self-regulation skills. Moreover, Bugental and Grusec briefly discuss socialization practices and behaviors most associated with children’s autonomous regulation. In addition, Parke and Buriel review literature on the potential role of emotional and attentional regulation as mediators between parenting and child outcomes and the likely mutual causal relations between socialization experiences and individual differences in children’s regulation.

The Development of Emotion-Related Regulation

Based on the literature reviewed in various chapters (e.g., Saarni et al., Chapter 5; and Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume), several developmental trends in emotion-related regulation are evident (also see Eisenberg & Morris, 2002; Thompson, 1994; Walden & Smith, 1997). First, with increasing age in early infancy and childhood, regulation of emotion and behavior is shifted gradually from external sources in the social world (e.g., socializers) to self-initiated, internal (i.e., child-based) resources. Caregivers soothe young children, manage young children’s emotion by selecting the situations they are in, and provide children with information (e.g., facial cues, narratives) to help the child interpret events (Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). With age and cognitive development, children are better able to manage emotion themselves. Second, mentalistic strategies for emotion regulation, such as thinking
about situations in a positive light, cognitive avoidance, and shifting and focusing attention, increase with use in age. The use of such strategies is probably facilitated by the development of children’s understanding of emotion, including the factors that elicit, maintain, and modulate emotion, as well as by other cognitive advances and physical changes. Third, with greater maturity, children develop greater capacity to modulate the course of their physiological and emotional arousal, for example, the intensity and duration of arousal, an ability that would be expected to have dramatic effects on behavior (e.g., aggression, venting of emotion, emotional expression). Fourth, with age, individuals likely become more adept at selecting, managing, and construing situations and relationships in a manner that minimizes the need to deal with negative emotions and stress (Carstensen, 1991; see Saarni et al., Chapter 5, this Handboook, this volume). Fifth, the ability to match strategies with the nature of stressors appears to improve with development. Thus, children improve in the ability to select appropriate coping solutions for everyday problems. Moreover, children appear to become better at distinguishing between stressors that can be controlled and those that cannot, and at choosing the most effective strategies for these stressors (e.g., emotion-management strategies such as blunting or cognitive distraction in uncontrollable contexts; see Saarni et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume). These developmental changes are likely to impact development in many aspects of social, emotional, and academic functioning.

Neurological changes, especially in the prefrontal cortex and cingulate gyrus, likely account for some of the age-related changes in self-regulation and executive attention (see Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). A topic of recent interest has been the continued growth and change in multiple regions of the prefrontal cortex throughout the course of adolescence, especially with respect to processes of myelination and synaptic pruning (both of which increase the efficiency of information processing; see Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume). These changes are believed to underlie improvements in executive functioning (long-term planning, metacognition, self-evaluation, and the coordination of affect and cognition; Keating, 2004), which plays a central role in self-regulation. Research on the neurological bases of self-regulation is clearly an important emerging area of work.

Modes of Regulation

Conceptual issues or empirical data related to different types of regulation or control were not discussed much in the 1998 Handbook (except in this introduction), and Rothbart and Bates note that this state of affairs has changed. Numerous authors at least address implicitly or explicitly, several types of children’s regulatory/controll capacities, including the regulation of attention, physiology, or behavior, as well as the social context. For example, in the discussion of temperament and/or personality (e.g., Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6; Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), authors review findings related to the abilities to effortfully manage attention and to effortfully activate or inhibit behavior as needed when necessary, especially when one is not inclined to do so. Developmental theorists frequently have highlighted constructs such as inhibitory control, self-regulation, constraint, and ego control, which involve the ability to modulate the behavioral expression of impulses and feelings (e.g., Block & Block, 1980; Kopp, 1982; Pulkkinen, 1982; Rothbart et al., 2001), and such abilities are addressed in numerous chapters in discussion of their relations to adjustment and social competence (e.g., Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6; Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3; Saarni et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume).

Another type of regulation—managing or regulating the stressful situation that elicited the emotional arousal—has been discussed primarily by coping theorists, who view problem-focused coping (efforts to modify the source of the problem) as an important type of coping (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). This type of regulation generally includes planning and direct problem solving or instrumental coping in response to the experience of emotion. In addition, people often proactively manage situations to reduce exposure to stress and negative emotion in the future (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; Carstensen, 1991). An example is when socially anxious individuals choose not to attend social events that elicit discomfort. Unfortunately, few investigators have examined children’s efforts to proactively shape or select their experiences; this remains an important gap in our knowledge.

Appropriate regulation depends, in part, on the particular context. Effective emotion-related regulation is viewed as flexible and relevant to one’s goals (Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994; Eisenberg & Morris, 2002). For
example, appropriate expression of emotion depends on the situation, and a person skilled in regulation adjusts his or her behavior accordingly. Moreover, it is important to differentiate between regulation and how it is measured. If regulation is operationalized as control or inhibition of behavior, particularly high levels are likely to be maladaptive (Block & Block, 1980). For example, some children appear to be highly inhibited temperamentally; these children are prone to fears, negative affect, avoidant behavior, and social withdrawal (see Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume), and are more likely than other children to develop anxiety disorders in adulthood (Rosenbaum et al., 1993). We (and, to some degree, Rothbart & Bates, 1998, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) have argued that it is important to differentiate between control (i.e., inhibition) that is more effortfully managed and that which is somewhat involuntary and, hence, often rigid and extreme so that only the former should be labeled as self-regulation (e.g., Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004; Eisenberg et al., 2004). In reality, the degree to which various control processes are effortful or not may usually vary on a continuum rather than categorically. Moreover, this distinction may not be as useful in regard to physiological regulation, although physiological processes related to emotion sometimes can be modulated by effortful processes (e.g., focusing attention away from a distressing event, thought, or person) and vagal processes may be involved in effortful regulation (see Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume).

One important reason for differentiating between more effortful and less voluntary aspects of control or regulation is that they may be combined in various ways that seem to be associated with different types of behavior in children (Eisenberg & Morris, 2002). For example, early in elementary school, externalizing problems have been linked to low levels of effortful attentional control and inhibitory control, as well as with reactive undercontrol (impulsivity). In contrast, younger children with internalizing behavior problems (not comorbid with externalizing) tend to be low in effortful attentional but not inhibitory control, and high on less voluntary overcontrol (e.g., very low in impulsivity; Eisenberg et al., 2001; also see Caspi, 2000; Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). As children move through elementary school, however, internalizing problems may no longer be linked to deficits in attentional control (Eisenberg et al., 2005). In contrast, children who are well adjusted tend to be high in attentional and inhibitory effortful control and moderate in impulsivity (Eisenberg et al., 2001, 2005).

In summary, a recent theme in the developmental literature has been on multidimensional, emotion-related conceptions of regulation. This work is a natural accompaniment to the current emphasis on emotion and temperament, as well as the concern with adjustment, stress, and coping in the larger domain of psychology. However, as is noted by Collins and Steinberg (Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume), the issues of both emotional development and self-regulation have attracted only tangential attention from adolescence researchers. Thus, the role of various aspects of regulation and control in healthy and maladaptive adolescent development is a natural area for future investigation.

A FOCUS ON COGNITION

Another trend in developmental psychology in recent years has been increased links between work on cognition with theory and empirical research on emotion and social behavior (Parke, 2004). Cognition plays an obvious and fundamental role in most aspects of emotional and social functioning. Saarni et al. (Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume) review the early emergence of a cognitive understanding of facial expressions and others’ emotions (e.g., social referencing). They also provide many examples of how cognitive advances in infancy and early childhood are reflected in emotion-related capabilities. For example, they note a number of competencies the child needs to be emotionally competent, including the following that involve social-cognitive skills: (a) awareness of one’s own emotional state; (b) the ability to discern and understand others’ emotions; (c) skill in using the vocabulary of emotion and expression terms commonly available in one’s subculture and at more mature levels skill in acquiring cultural scripts that link emotion with social roles; (d) the capacity for empathy and sympathy (which involves some understanding of others’ emotional states); (e) understanding that inner emotional state need not correspond to outer expression and that one’s emotional-expressive behavior may impact on another; and (f) awareness that the structure or nature of relationships is in large part defined by how emotions are communicated within the relationship. Related skills discussed by authors in this volume include the abilities to comprehend and take into account unique information
about others’ internal states (intentions, emotions, motivations, cognitions), to analyze elements of a social context and the consequences of various modes of action, and to devise appropriate cognitive strategies for sensitive social interaction in relationships, management of aggressive impulses, and altruistic behavior (Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11; and Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume).

In addition, conceptions of the self are in large part cognitive constructions, although they also are imbued with emotion (Harter, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume). In fact, Harter argued that developmental achievements in understanding others’ behaviors and cognitions (e.g., how others view the self), as well as emotional processes, underlie age-related changes in self-conceptions. Similarly Thompson (Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume) argues that a host of cognitive skills underlie the early emergence of the self and the understanding of self in relation to others.

In his chapter on moral development, Turiel (Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume) discusses a range of ways in which cognitions are integral to moral thinking. For example, cognition obviously is critical for differentiating moral from nonmoral (e.g., conventional and personal) concerns, in constructing conceptions about morality, in analyzing information about elements in a specific morally relevant situation, and in making morally relevant decisions based on situational information and values, beliefs, and goals. As is evident from the passage from Turiel’s chapter quoted earlier, he argues that cognition is central to moral development.

In his discussion of early socioemotional development, Thompson (Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume) reviews some of the ways in which young children’s working models of attachment figures and relationships are modified with the growth of understanding of psychological processes (e.g., work on the theory of mind). Individuals’ working models of relationships, which have a cognitive as well as an affective component, are expected to influence relationships not only in childhood (also see Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume), but later in life (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985; see Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume). In addition, Collins and Steinberg discuss cognitive and sociocognitive changes in adolescence—for example, in executive attention, decision-making processes, problem solving, abstract reasoning, and perspective taking—that are relevant to psychosocial changes during that period of life.

The role of cognition in the motivation to succeed has been a topic of considerable discussion. Wigfield et al. (Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume) organized their review of theory and research on the motivation to succeed around three broad questions: Can I do this task? Do I want to do this task and why? and What do I need to do to succeed on this task? It is obvious that cognition is central to assessing and dealing with all of these questions, although, of course, emotion also plays a critical role in achievement motivation. As an example of how cognitions affect the motivation to succeed, Wigfield et al. reviewed literature concerning the ways in which children’s understanding of competence-related constructs (e.g., ability, effort, task difficulty) affect motivation.

Interest in cognitive processes as explanatory mechanisms in socialization has changed markedly in recent years. In the past 2 decades, social learning theory accounts of socialization have become much more cognitive in orientation; in addition, cognitive constructs from the cognitive sciences and social psychology have been assimilated into developmental conceptions of socialization. In their chapter, Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume) argue that socialization interactions are organized by the ways experiences are represented at a cognitive level. Cognitions often mediate or moderate socialization processes, and cognitive processes involved in socialization may be deliberate and reflective or relatively automatic. They also discuss the role of children’s acquired ways of cognitively representing their social worlds (including conceptions of the self, family members, and peers) in mediating the effects of socialization on developmental outcomes, as well as how parental cognitions—for example, biases, attributions—affect the quality of parenting. In brief, socialization is achieved partly through caregivers’ influence on the development of children’s conceptions of relationships, and parents’ beliefs about children likely are influenced by their own working models of relationships (also see Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume).

Like Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume), Parke and Buriel (Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume) suggest that the role of cognition in socialization is varied and multilevel: “the role of cognition comes in many guises, including the child’s own cognitive capacities as a determinant of socialization strategies, as well as parents’ cognitions, beliefs, values and goals concerning their parental role as constraints on their socialization practices...” Equally important is the
A Focus on Contextual and Environmental Inputs to Development

Investigation of social and emotional development is becoming more differentiated and sophisticated in its conception of the social context. This change in the field is based, in part, on Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) early efforts to increase the field’s awareness of the multiple levels of the child’s social ecology and the need to consider the interaction between the larger social world (e.g., the neighborhood and culture) and the family and individual. The social environment provides affordances for the expression of individual characteristics—it is the niche for biologically based characteristics to operate (or not). And, as mentioned previously, the field is increasingly recognizing the importance of gene-environment interactions (i.e., when the effect on a person of exposure to a particular environment varies depending on their genotype or, conversely, when environmental experiences moderate gene expression).

Similarly, life-span psychologists also have heightened our awareness of the interplay of historical, cultural, biological, and psychological influences on behavior (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998; Baltes, Reese, & Lipsitt, 1980). From a life-span perspective, changes in the individual’s social context across the life span interact with the individual’s unique history of experiences, roles, and biology to produce an individualized developmental pathway. Further, increased interest in individual differences in temperament, personality, and social functioning sometimes has contributed to a focus on context as a possible explanation for these differences (e.g., Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume).

Diversity

One manifestation of current interest in the context of development is the recent emphasis in the discipline on recognizing and examining diversity (Parke, 2004). This trend is consistent with the life-span emphasis on individual variation in developmental trajectories. An emphasis on diversity can refer to a host of differences among people that are correlated with different life experiences, including differences in sex, sexual orientation, and masculinity/femininity; in culture and subcultural background/experiences; in socioeconomic status and associated living conditions; and in the composition and structure of families.

For years, many developmentalists have acknowledged that research on differences among various groups (e.g., cultures or subcultures) is valuable in delineating factors that influence diverse courses of development. However, in the past decade or two, we have moved beyond solely identifying differences between groups on particular variables.

Of particular importance, developmental scientists are acknowledging the value of studying differences in processes of development in different groups. Often in the past, the implicit assumption has been that the causes of development were similar or identical across groups but that various groups differed in degree of exposure to various causal agents or in biological predispositions. Thus, gender, ethnicity, and other group-level variables were considered unwanted error variance and were often treated as control variables—nonpsychological and nonbehavioral variables of little interest. Investigators are
finding that contributors to development, and the configuration and operation of influential factors, sometimes vary in different contexts and for different groups. Examples were provided in the prior discussion of moderation effects.

Types and Examples of Contextual Influence

The importance of the various types of contextual influences on social and emotional development is evident in many of the chapters in this volume. Consistent with the past Handbook chapters on socialization, Parke and Buriel (Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume) review in some detail the relations of aspects of the proximal family context (e.g., parental socialization-related practices and cognitions) to social, personality, and emotional development. This ongoing interest in the role of the proximal family environment is also reflected in a number of other chapters, such as those focused on early social, self-related and moral development (Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume), aggression (Dodge et al., Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume), prosocial development (Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume), peer relationships (Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume), achievement (Wigfield et al., Chapter 15, this Handbook, this volume), and socioemotional development in adolescence (Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume).

Parke and Buriel’s Chapter 8, Bugental and Grusec’s Chapter 7 (this Handbook, this volume) on socialization processes, and, to some degree, a number of other chapters include content pertaining to other aspects of context. These include family structure and organization (e.g., as assessed by parental employment status, marital status, and number of parents in the home) and subcultural and cultural factors. Although research on socialization in minority families and communities is still quite limited in quantity, such work has been assigned new importance in the past 2 decades (see Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume). Developmental scientists are increasingly acknowledging that the values, socialization goals, and strategies in ethnic minority families may differ in important ways from those in the majority culture. Moreover, there are unique issues and challenges with regard to socialization and development in contexts where children must interact effectively in two cultures (e.g., the cultures of the minority and majority groups), cultures that often conflict in particular values and expectations. Similarly, the context of poverty—a situation in which increasing numbers of families are finding themselves—is a topic of growing interest in the developmental community (see Parke, 2004; Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume).

Although developmental psychology has been influenced by cultural anthropology for a long time (e.g., Whiting & Whiting, 1975), interest in the role of culture in psychological development has increased in the past 15 years, particularly with regard to the study of emotion, the self, and moral development (e.g., Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeir, 2002; Turiel, Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume). As one example, Saarni et al. (Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume) proposed that culture plays a role in the construction of the meaning of events that can elicit emotion (e.g., in emotion-relevant appraisals of events and others’ behaviors and reactions) and in rendering some emotional responses more probable than others. Culture also influences how members of a society regulate and express emotion through a transactional process. Specifically, culture determines what one notices in the feedback from the body; influences communication patterns and, hence, socially induced affect; determines one’s role in society and, consequently, emotional experiences that are associated with roles; and influences the selection and expression of emotional responses. This view of emotion differs somewhat from the common perspective that emotional expression and feeling are strongly rooted primarily in biology and that many emotion-related processes are universal.

Given the links among emotion, perceptions of the self, and relationships (Harter, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume), it is not surprising that contemporary theorists expect culture to play a role in the development of the self. Harter (Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume) noted that the self is likely culturally saturated. Thus, the Western view of self may differ in important ways from that in cultures in which self-definition is deeply embedded in social relationships and obligations. This proposition is consistent with the contemporary argument that people in different cultures have different construals of the self due to cultural differences in concepts of individuality (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In some cultures (e.g., many Asian cultures), the self is viewed as interdependent and there likely is more em-
phasis on attending to others, fitting in, and harmony with others. In contrast, some have argued that in many Western cultures, independence from others rather than overt connectedness is valued. Although there may be more diversity within groups in regard to an emphasis on individualism than sometimes is acknowledged (Turiel, Chapter 13, this Handbook, this volume) so that distinctions between individualistic and collectivistic cultures do not hold (Oyserman et al., 2002), it appears that there is some variation across cultures in normative self-conceptions. This variation probably is reflected in processes underlying the development of self-perceptions early in life. For this reason and others (e.g., the content of certain items may not be relevant or meaningful; see Harter, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume), measures of self-perceptions developed in the United States may not be appropriate for use in non-Western or nonindustrialized cultures.

Culture is an especially salient theme in Turiel’s Chapter 13 (this Handbook, this volume) on moral development. Although coming from a predominantly cognitive perspective, Turiel notes the dynamic interplay among various personal and social (including cultural) goals in moral development. He also acknowledges that social reasoning is flexible and takes into account different and varied aspects of the social world. In discussing contrasting perspectives on cross-cultural findings, Turiel makes the point that differences in assumptions about reality (e.g., assumptions about practices that are harmful to the dead) and in informational assumptions (e.g., regarding the expected effects of physical punishment on children) are important to consider when interpreting cultural differences in moral and social conventional reasoning. As is evident in Turiel’s chapter, there is disagreement in the field in regard to the interpretation of some cross-cultural differences in reasoning about moral and social conventional issues, with Turiel viewing moral development as being more similar across cultures than do most cultural psychologists (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). However, Turiel emphasizes another aspect of context more than do most cultural psychologists; he argues that a focus on contextual variations between cultures has led to little consideration of variations in moral reasoning associated with contextual differences within cultures. Turiel and his colleagues’ work (e.g., Wainryb & Turiel, 1995) on the diversity of perspectives within cultures stemming from factors such as gender roles and status hierarchies is an important direction for research on moral development.

The emphasis on different groups within a society serving as different socialization contexts is echoed in recent work on the separate cultures of girls and boys (Maccoby, 1990). Segregation by sex in childhood seems to be a universal phenomenon, although it varies to some degree with variables such as the availability of same-sex peers and opportunities to choose one’s associates (Ruble et al., Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume). Within sex-segregated groups, girls and boys appear to develop different styles of interaction, goals, and values, as well as different perceptions of the self (Harter, Chapter 9; Ruble et al., Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume). These subcultural differences likely have substantial and long-term implications for social, emotional, and personality development.

Also evident in this volume of the Handbook is the increased recognition in recent decades of connections among contexts within a society, for example, among family, school, and peer cultures (e.g., Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16; Dodge et al., Chapter 13; Wigfield et al., Chapter 15; Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8; Rubin et al., Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume). However, these connections are seldom examined in empirical study of development and in theory, or acknowledged in the real world (e.g., there often is little communication between schools and parents). Culture doubtlessly has important effects on the nature of the connections across settings within a culture; for example, the links between parents and schools may be stronger in majority culture families than in some minority groups (especially in some neighborhoods) who feel little connection to the majority culture. However, research on the role of culture in the forging (or inhibiting) of connections across settings within cultures would enrich an ecological perspective of development.

A FOCUS ON BIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

There can be little doubt that there has been a resurgence of interest in individual differences, and especially the biological and constitutional bases of individual differences. Plomin (1994) noted that 78% of the text pages in the 1983 Handbook of Child Psychology were devoted predominantly (more than half the page) to normative or group difference approaches. In contrast, individual
differences were a major focus of attention in the 1998 edition of the Handbook and in this edition. Indeed, in three of the chapters in Volume 3, constitutionally based individual differences are the primary focus (i.e., Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6; Kagan & Fox, Chapter 4; Rothbart & Bates, Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume).

The current focus on constitutionally based individual differences is not unprecedented. After a period of heavy reliance on biological explanations of social behavior earlier in this century, biological perspectives appeared to go out of fashion in developmental and social psychology. Behaviorism and then social learning perspectives became more popular during the middle half of the century, whereas biologically based explanations of social behavior and personality were deemphasized. In the past 25 years, the pendulum has swung back once more.

Noticeable differences in the field between now and when the 1998 edition of the Handbook was published are in regard to the degree of acceptance of genetics and biological factors as major contributors to socioemotional development and, of equal importance, in the greater understanding that genetic contributions to development do not preclude environmental contributions. The field is more cognizant that genetic factors usually are moderated or mediated by the environment, including the social environment, and are not independent of environmental inputs to development. Thus, as was noted by Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume), in the past decade the pitting of nature versus nurture has increasingly come to a halt.

For the most part, developmental scientists now accept that both genetic and other biological factors affect development, and that even behaviors with a strong hereditary basis can be strongly affected by the environment in which the organism develops. Most also are aware of the relevant caveats in interpreting the results of behavioral genetics studies, two of which are aptly spelled out by Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume): “it is understood that genetic effects may be mediated environmentally through gene-environment transactions in which genes influence surrounding environments, which, in turn, influence phenotypic expression. . . . In behavior genetics studies, the effects of such transactions are included in the heritability estimates and not counted as environmental effects. Second, all estimates are context specific. That is, the influence of genes on behavior varies across social contexts, and a change in the social context may change the relative importance of genes and environment.” Increased understanding of these issues has led to a more balanced and complex view of the role of nature and nurture in socioemotional development.

Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume) suggest that the use of molecular genetic techniques is contributing to the trend to replace the nature-nurture conjunction “versus” with the more appropriate conjunction “and.” Other factors that have likely contributed to movement in this regard include sophisticated discussions of interpretational and statistical issues (e.g., Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Hetherington, & Bornstein, 2000; Rutter & Silberg, 2002; Turkheimer & Gottesman, 1996) in premier publication outlets, as well as studies demonstrating the complexity of relations between environmental and genetic or biological factors (see Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume, and the discussion of moderated relations later).

**Biology, Temperament, and Personality**

As noted previously, Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3), as well as Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume), focus primarily on issues related to temperament. It is often assumed that behaviors with a temperamental basis are inherited, but current definitions of temperament are more complex. Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3) define temperament as “constitutionally based individual difference in reactivity and self-regulation, in the domains of affect, activity, and attention. . . . By the term constitutional, we refer to the biological bases of temperament, influenced over time by heredity, maturation, and experience.” Thus, temperament is influenced not only by heredity, but by environmental factors that affect an individual’s biological being (e.g., trauma or drugs) and by the social context.

Similarly, for Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume), temperament “refers to a biologically based bias for correlated clusters of feelings, thoughts, and actions that appear during childhood, but not always in the opening months, and are sculpted by varied rearing environments into a large but still limited number of traits that comprise an individual’s personality profile.” Thus, they emphasize the role of both biological and environmental factors in children’s early dispositional characteristics. Similarly, Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume) argue that personality, viewed as social and cognitive elabora-
tions on temperament, is moderately influenced by both heredity and environment (especially unshared environmental factors that are not shared by twins or siblings). Thus, there is consensus among these authors on the importance of both hereditary and the environmental influences on temperament and personality.

Developmental scientists increasingly are using physiological/neurological measures of dispositional characteristics, situational reactivity, regulation, approach/avoidance tendencies, and various types of cognitive, attentional, or emotional processing related to temperament. For example, Kagan and Fox (Chapter 4, this Handbook, this volume) summarize research on cerebral asymmetry and its association with behavioral inhibition, other physiological correlates of inhibited and uninhibited behavior, and the relation of neurochemical systems in the brain to mood and action. They further note that people with different temperaments will not react in the same way, behaviorally or biologically, to a given experience. Accordingly, they suggest that we invent constructs that capture this fact—that we “replace the current constructs, which describe children and their environments (parents, sibling, school settings) separately, with single synthetic constructs that represent a particular temperamental type growing up in a particular set of contexts. . . . As environments shape children of varied temperaments into different phenotypes, it will be useful to invent new concepts, rather than rely on the language of ANOVA that describes interactions between the temperamental type of child and a rearing environment.”

Rothbart and Bates (Chapter 3, this Handbook, this volume) discuss associations of the major dimensions of temperamental reactivity (approach, fear, anger, etc.) and self-regulation (e.g., attention) with the neural systems identified as underlying these dimensions. They discuss neurological processes involved in effortful control, defined as “the efficiency of executive attention, including the ability to inhibit a dominant response and/or to activate a subdominant response, to plan, and to detect errors.” Rothbart and Bates also review research on the behavioral and emotional correlates of autonomic reactivity (e.g., heart rate, vagal tone, skin conductance) and cortisol responding, as well as hemispheric asymmetry, as a way of further examining the biological bases of temperament and their expression in behavior. These measures, which tend to be related to some indices of temperament, are sometimes used as proxies for temperament, and sometimes as separate constructs that inform us about aspects of temperament that relate to them.

After concisely summarizing the behavioral genetics literature, Caspi and Shiner (Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume) highlight recent work on molecular genetics and personality. They note that individual genes have not consistently mapped onto personality, but that this may be due (among other reasons) to personality being predicted by a combination of genes and gene X environment interactions. Caspi and Shiner believe that developmental psychologists can contribute to this line of work by helping to refine the measurement of psychological phenotypes for inclusion in genetic research and helping to measure developmental contexts and environmental risks that may interact with genetic factors to shape personality (or temperament) and its development.

**Biology and Socioemotional Development**

As is reflected in the chapters in this volume, much contemporary work on the biological bases of socioemotional development is based on complex frameworks that posit interconnected causal roles of biological/constitutional and environmental factors in human functioning. For example, Bugental and Grusec (Chapter 7, this Handbook, this volume) depict development as the result of a dynamic co-regulation of aspects of the individual (from neural to behavioral) and the environment (from physical to social). The emergence of structure in both people and their environments results from a process of mutual influence and regulation. They present literature consistent with the view that children are biologically prepared for socialization, and argue that biologically based differences in children (e.g., in temperament, physical attractiveness) elicit different socialization experiences from the environment. Similarly, biological factors that affect parenting are discussed, with a recognition that biologically influenced parental characteristics are played out in a social context. They further argue, using an evolutionary perspective, that humans may be designed for preferential receptivity to proximity-maintenance with specific others in the presence of distress (e.g., attachments), for the use and recognition of signals denoting power or dominance, for differentiating between in-groups and out-groups in social life, and for the reciprocal obligations associated with communal life. These biological predispositions are viewed as emerging in a social context in which cultural factors, as well as situational cognitive and emotional factors, act as mediators and moderators of their effects on
the socialization process and its outcomes. Thus, Bugental and Grusec view socialization in a complex process-oriented manner, influenced by the ongoing interaction of biological and environmental factors.

As is evident in Ruble et al.’s chapter (Chapter 14, this Handbook, this volume), biological approaches play an increasingly visible role in the study of gender-related development. They discuss possible evolutionary contributions to sex differences, as well as more proximal biological correlates or contributors—such as hormones and brain structure—to gender-related development and behavior. They conclude that prenatal androgens and hormones during early development appear to affect gender-related self-perceptions, preferences, or behaviors, and that the effects of sex hormones in adolescence are evident, but probably more modest. They further note that hormones have different effects on different characteristics; for example, prenatal androgen seems to have a large effect on some aspects of functioning (activities and interests), a modest effect on others (e.g., sexual orientation), and a small effect on others (gender identity). In addition, they conclude that gender socialization processes at home, at school, in interaction with peers, and through the media all contribute to gender differentiation in concepts, preferences, behaviors, and/or values, although relations often are found under some conditions. They conclude that biological and environmental factors interact in complex ways: “There is increasingly sophisticated understanding of biological effects, and recognition that they are not immutable. Genes are activated or suppressed by environmental factors. Hormones and brain functioning are almost certainly influenced by the different environments in which girls and boys are raised, by their different toy and activity choices, and by joint effects of biology and the social environment.”

In their chapter on aggression, Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume) conclude that there is indisputable evidence of the role of heredity in aggression (also see Rhee & Waldman, 2002), especially for those who develop aggressive tendencies early and are stable in their aggression into adulthood (also see Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). They further conclude that the contribution of shared or common environment is small whereas that of children’s nonshared environment is moderate. Thus, “person-specific” experiences of individuals in families appear to be an important environmental factor contributing to aggression and other antisocial behavior. Dodge et al. also review a large body of work linking environment factors such as family and peer factors to aggression and, more importantly in regard to causal conclusions, research indicating that prevention/intervention programs can reduce the incidence of antisocial behavior. Experimental interventions that involve random assignment are perhaps the best way to demonstrate that environmental factors contribute to antisocial tendencies in youth, despite the strong role of heredity. An issue that merits attention is how partly hereditary factors such as temperament influence the effectiveness of interventions in deterring antisocial behavior.

Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume) also discuss evidence for gene by environment interactions. For example, they highlight research demonstrating that children who are genetically predisposed to antisocial tendencies are especially likely to manifest them if they grow up in a risky social environment, such as one in which they are victims of maltreatment. Dodge et al. conclude that some of the most important discoveries in the next decade will come from studies of gene-environment interactions, as well as from experimental prevention/intervention studies.

Eisenberg et al. (Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume) view heredity as contributing to both the development of prosocial and empathy-related responding in the species and to individual differences in aspects of emotionality and regulation (e.g., attentional regulation) that contribute to prosocial behavior and empathy in childhood. Similar to Dodge et al. (Chapter 12, this Handbook, this volume), they review studies demonstrating links between environmental factors and prosocial development, as well as experimental prevention studies demonstrating that children’s prosocial tendencies can be modified by environmental interventions. However, it is likely that the effects of heredity are not as strong for prosocial as for antisocial behavior (e.g., Krueger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001), although heredity does contribute to empathy/sympathy (see Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume). For example, in a study of stepfamilies, Deater-Deckard et al. (2001) found that most of the variance in adults’ reports of children’s prosocial behavior was due to environmental rather than hereditary factors, especially aspects of the environment that were not shared by the children (although there was significant variance for shared environmental effects). Unfortunately, there has been little research conducted as yet on the prediction of prosocial tendencies from the interaction between heredity and the environment.
A FOCUS ON RELATIONSHIPS

As noted by Rubin et al. (Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume), interest in relationships other than the parent-child relationship has grown tremendously in recent decades. In addition, researchers studying the family increasingly have examined not just the parent-child dyad, but also the larger family unit, associations between the quality of parent-parent and parent-child relationships, and links between the quality of familial interactions and quality of sibling and peer relationships (Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume). For example, there is now evidence that marital discord is related to problems with children’s adjustment, social withdrawal, and low social competence, all of which compromise the quality of peer relationships. Moreover, investigators have begun to study the role of social relationships outside the family (e.g., as reflected in social support) for quality of interaction within the family (see Parke & Buriel; Rubin et al., this Handbook, this volume) and for the provision of social opportunities for children (e.g., adult social networks as a source of potential peer contacts for children). In addition, a relatively new emphasis in the literature in recent years has been the impact of settings such as schools, workplaces, volunteer activities, leisure pursuits, and neighborhoods on developmentally significant interpersonal experiences, especially in adolescence (Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16, this Handbook, this volume).

As is discussed in some of the chapters, it has been suggested that the oft-cited causal relation of emotion-related capacities with quality of relationships can be reversed (or more likely, can be bi-directional)—for example, that early attachment relationships play a role in the development of emotion regulation and reflect strategies for regulating emotion in interpersonal contexts (Saarini et al., Chapter 5; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). The securely attached infant whose parent is consistently and appropriately responsive to the infant’s distress signals is believed to learn that it is acceptable to express distress and to actively seek the assistance of others for comfort when upset. In contrast, avoidant infants, due in part to their parents’ nonresponsiveness to their distress signals, may learn to inhibit emotional expressiveness as well as other-directed self-regulatory strategies (e.g., contact-seeking and maintaining behaviors; Cassidy, 1994).

The internal working model developed in the context of early attachment relationships is believed to affect the quality of children’s subsequent relationships because of the assumptions and expectations about relationships that are inherent in internal working models (Bretherton & Waters, 1985; Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8; Rubin et al., Chapter 10; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). One way early attachment relationships may affect other relationships is through their influence on the developing sense of self in the infant as lovable or unworthy of love (Bretherton, 1991; Harter, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume).

Clearly, the topic of attachment and early parent-child relationships is still a central issue in the study of relationships in developmental psychology. Attachments are hypothesized to affect the development of the self, a range of cognitions relevant to quality of relationships, emotion regulation and emotions attached to various relationships, sympathetic and prosocial behavior with others, social competence with peers, and personality development (see Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 3; Harter, Chapter 9; Rubin et al., Chapter 10; Thompson, Chapter 2, this Handbook, this volume). However, most researchers no longer believe that working models consolidate in early childhood with little or no further modification. This broader conception of working models is reflected in Thompson’s discussion of some of the questions that require attention in the future, including the following: (a) to what extent is security of attachment definitive of the parent-child relationship? Are there important features of this relationship that are outside the scope of attachment? (b) How is it that attachment security becomes increasingly an attribute of the person, rather than of a specific relationship with maturity? Is it possible that both relationship-specific and person-specific features of attachment security coexist within the attachment-related representational systems that exist in adulthood? (c) How are multiple attachment relationships developmentally influential? How do the expectations arising from multiple attachments become integrated into coherent ways of relating to others, representing relationships, and self-understanding? and (d) why should attachment security be related to other features of psychological development? Some of these questions are related to issues raised by Harter (1998, Chapter 9, this Handbook, this volume) and merit additional attention in the next decade.

Close peer relationships such as friendships have been increasingly examined by developmental scientists in the past 2 decades and have been viewed as a source of support; a factor affecting self-perceptions; a context for
learning about emotions, conflict, social negotiation, and caring behavior; an impetus for cognitive, social, and emotional development; and an influence on the development of antisocial behavior and substance abuse (Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16; Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Harter, Chapter 9; Rubin et al., Chapter 10, this Handbook, this volume). However, a type of close peer relationship that has received relatively little attention until the last decade is romantic relationships. Collins and Steinberg conclude that relationships with peers are a primary context for the transmission and realization of expectations about romantic relationships. According to the research they review, the quality of romantic relationships, including aggression within them and feelings of rejection, is correlated with the quality of other relationships with peers and family members: Youth with healthy familial and peer (e.g., friendship or peer group) relationships tend to have more positive romantic relationships. They also note that the developmental outcomes of romantic relationships can be positive or negative, depending partly on the quality of these relationships. Consequently, the effects of early family and peer relationships on subsequent adjustment and well-being in adulthood (and in adult relationships) likely are partly mediated through experiences in adolescent romantic relationships. Moreover, partner relationships in late adolescence and early adulthood seem to play an important role in determining an individual’s trajectory in antisocial behavior (i.e., its cessation or continuation) in early adulthood (Caspi & Shiner, Chapter 6, this Handbook, this volume). Thus, the topic of romantic relationships would seem to be an important one for further study, especially as it relates to success in adult development.

A FOCUS ON APPLICATION

Another trend in the developmental research in the past 2 decades has been renewed interest in application and real-world problems. This emphasis in the discipline is reflected in the fact that for the first time, one volume of the 1998 Handbook (Volume 4) was devoted to applied issues, and that volume is also part of this edition of the Handbook. Although much of the applied work on socioemotional development is discussed in that volume, the contemporary concern with application is also reflected to some degree in this volume.

This concern can be seen in both the topics of study and the ways in which people are conducting research on certain topics. Work on aggression, regulation, coping, and social competence is burgeoning, for example, no doubt in part because of concern in society about children’s psychological health, violence, and related social issues (e.g., see Caspi et al., Chapter 6; Collins & Steinberg, Chapter 16; Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11; Rubin et al., Chapter 10; Saarni et al., Chapter 5, this Handbook, this volume). In the past decade or two, the focus on developmental psychopathology, in particular, has increased in the writings of developmental scientists. Moreover, investigators increasingly have been turning their attention to development in stressful contexts such as families in poverty, one-parent families, and families of divorce (Parke & Buriel, Chapter 8, this Handbook, this volume). Concern with clinical issues and prevention is not without precedent, of course; much of the early work in child development grew out of a desire to understand the origins of typical childhood problems.

In addition, work on topics that have been a focus of interest for a long time is increasingly being conducted outside the laboratory in real-world contexts so that findings have direct applicability to prevention, clinical, and policy issues. For example, developmental scientists are becoming involved in the process of obtaining knowledge that can be used to design programs that lessen the probability of negative effects from exposure to stressors (e.g., divorce, poverty) or that promote prosocial behavior or inhibit aggressive tendencies in school settings (Dodge et al., Chapter 12; Eisenberg et al., Chapter 11, this Handbook, this volume). Moreover, developmental scientists are deeply involved in evaluating programs such as day care that have implications for both families and policy (see Volume 4). It is likely that the increasing trend for developmental scientists to apply their theory and methods to real-life issues in real-world contexts will continue into the next decade and well into the 21st century.

SUMMARY

In general, the chapters in this volume highlight the emerging themes, constructs, and methods in the field, and a recent permeability in the intellectual boundaries of the field. Many of the changes in the study of social and emotional development in the past 2 decades can be characterized by increasing integration and differentiation. In this context, I am using the term integration to
mean the assimilation (usually with some accommodation) into the study of socioemotional functioning of ideas and methods from diverse approaches and topics in developmental psychology, other subdisciplines of psychology, and even other disciplines such as sociology, genetics, and anthropology. The integration of novel methods, constructs, and theoretical perspectives has broadened not only our understanding of social and emotional development, but also the entire framework on which we design and interpret research findings.

Differentiation within the field of socioemotional development may be viewed in terms of contexts, constructs, and causal inferences. As noted previously, the burgeoning interest in context in developmental psychology is reflected in the study of many levels of influence, including diversity in culture and subculture, race and ethnicity, biological sex and gender, types of families and groups, and genetic and constitutional influences. In regard to constructs, our thinking is becoming less global and more conditional, multifaceted, and complex. Similarly, proposed causal influences of various social processes are becoming more multifaceted. Mediated and moderated relations, as well as those based on dynamic systems perspectives, are more central in theory and research.

Moreover (and related), researchers are increasingly acknowledging and examining the multiplicative and co-varying contributions of various types of environmental and biologically based influences on socioemotional functioning. Increasingly children are being viewed as producers of their environment as well as the products of socialization; parents and children are viewed as co-regulators of each other’s behaviors and affective states; and development is characterized as a consequence of social interactions that are shaped by contextual factors and characteristics of all participants in the interaction. Although interactional and reciprocal causal models are not new, they are becoming a part of our everyday thinking about psychological phenomena. As one might expect, implementation of complex interactive models into research designs lags behind conceptual models. However, analytic methods for exploring reciprocal, additive, and interactive causal influences, as well as analyses for examining nonlinear relations and growth curves, are becoming more common, so developmental scientists are increasingly able to test complex conceptions of development empirically. The next decade, like the past one, will undoubtedly be an exciting time for the study of social, emotional, and personality development.

REFERENCES


