Chapter 1
Introduction to Military Intelligence and Planning

Good military intelligence is integral to planning. Military intelligence represents the epitome of attempts to fulfill Sun Tzu's admonition to know the enemy and know yourself in order to assure victory in battle.[1] While "knowing" is an important aspect, the key distinguishing feature of intelligence is that it is predictive in nature.[2] Intelligence provides insights into knowing what the enemy can do and how it can harm or impede friendly forces; knowing the enemy's objectives and values; and knowing relative strengths and weaknesses between two (or more) opposing sides. These things are necessary to forecast what the enemy might do whether as the initiator of a conflict to achieve their objectives or as a response to some action. From these strengths, weaknesses, and forecasts, analysts can identify those targets that will have the biggest impact upon the enemy. Intelligence reduces uncertainty about what to attack and protect. Once these forecasts are made, the collection enterprise serves the same purpose as Sun Tzu's spies: to understand the adversary's intent and monitor indications to judge the accuracy of the forecasts of enemy behavior as well as the impacts of friendly operations.

Planning, Intelligence, and the Art of War: Research Methods to Support Military Operations, First Edition. Michael W. Fowler. © 2026 Blackwell Publishing, Inc. All rights reserved, including rights for text and data mining and training of artificial intelligence technologies or similar technologies. Published 2026 by Blackwell Publishing, Inc.

This book is an exploration of the methods used to conduct intelligence at the operational level of war. In a sense, *it is a book on military intelligence research methods.* It provides a way of seeing, a way of thinking. It is a narrow theory of knowledge of intelligence craft at the operational level of war. It leverages a variety of academic theories to improve intelligence analysis. It is a search for the ability to understand world events, forecast the future, understand the capabilities and limitations of collection assets, and communicate these ideas to a decision-maker. This book is designed for every joint planner and analyst, particularly for those new to working at the level of a joint task force, component command, or combatant command. It will also be useful to those that work at the tactical level but have a strategic impact particularly air, maritime, cyber, space, and special operations. It will be extremely useful to the junior officer or enlisted, particularly for their transition to their first job as a planner, analyst, or collection manager. This book will also improve the insights of wargame designers, military hobbyists, armchair generals, and war correspondents. Finally, it is a good refresher for the seasoned planner or analyst to help them think from a multi-domain perspective.

This book focuses on planning and intelligence support to planning. It resides at the intersection of intelligence studies, strategic studies, war studies, defense studies, and military studies. The core of *this book drives towards learning how to create a forecast*: how a military force might be used to resolve a particular crisis. Forecasting, also known as anticipatory intelligence, is the analyst's primary contribution to operational success. Forecasting provides warning, informs targeting, and is integral to assessing a campaign's progress. Forecasting creates better plans. Planning, while imperfect, leads to more effective and efficient operations.

The remainder of this chapter explains the concept of operational intelligence, what planners and decision-makers want from it, and the structure of how the book is going to teach the reader how to succeed at conducting or using operational intelligence.

A Conceptual Definition of Operational Intelligence[3]

At the 2022 International Studies Association annual conference, after David Strachan-Morris presented his paper "Not an Oxymoron: Developing Theory on Military Intelligence," several national intelligence academic-practitioners argued that operational military intelligence requirements are irrelevant; that military operations could survive off strategic intelligence. The implication was that scraps from the strategic table should be sufficient to feed the dogs of war. While this might be conceptually possible, in practice the requirements for intelligence at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels are interrelated and inform each other, but each is distinct.

Conceptualizing the different types of intelligence can be viewed from the customer's perspectives. For all customers, intelligence is "*the mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities.*"[4] The purpose of intelligence is to *use information to reduce uncertainty for a decision maker*.[5] While it seems straightforward, there is a plethora of decision-makers and decisions to make.

For any junior officer at the tactical level, the difference becomes readily apparent after requesting analytical assistance from a higher headquarters. While the response might be professional and courteous, the products provided are often not useful to the tactical unit. The problem is not a lack of caring. The headquarters has an entirely different frame of reference based upon the decisions that their commander needs to make. The intelligence is related but at a different level of detail and a different emphasis (see Figure 1.1). Intelligence must be tailored to the customer's requirements making it difficult for great products at one level of war to be equally useful at the other levels of war.

Strategic warning is primarily concerned with forecasting the probability that an attack will occur and whether that attack might be nuclear, conventional, or unconventional.[7] National-strategic intelligence informs decisions and recommendations for policy and



Figure 1.1 Relationships between types of intelligence requirements.
SOURCE: Adapted from David Strachan-Morris 2024.[6]

national security strategy at the department (or ministry) level and above.[8] These drive policy decisions regard level of involvement (if any), response options, and spending priorities. Defense intelligence informs military procurement and resource allocation decisions between services and commands.[9] While national-strategic and defense intelligence are critical to enable forces to prepare, they are insufficient to improve the odds of a successful battle. Operational analysis forecasts how that attack might occur – an alignment of intent, capabilities, and feasibility. Tactical intelligence is primarily concerned with near-real time locating, positively identifying, and tracking enemy forces to support the units that execute missions. Over time, analysts can see patterns from training and combat employment enabling the ability to forecast how the enemy will act during future engagements.[10] To an extent, tactical intelligence forecasts the best way to engage and defeat an adversary unit. While tactical intelligence is essential, militaries that focus most of their effort on it can overlook critical operational cues. For example, during World War II, the German focus on tactical movements left

them with poor operational insight.[11] As early as 1918 and developed through the 1940s, the United States recognized the importance of forecasting.[12] Despite these lessons, after two decades of focusing on the tactical movements of terrorists, the US ability to conduct operational analysis atrophied.[13]

Operational intelligence is for military headquarters: joint task force, component commands (i.e., air, land, space, maritime, cyber, special operations), and combatant commands.[14] *Operational intelligence is the activities that forecast threats and opportunities to reduce a decision maker's risk towards achieving military objectives.* Operational intelligence is a different type of forecasting than strategic or tactical forecasting. Operational intelligence informs decision-makers about what to do with assigned forces and when to request additional forces. First, "what is the enemy going to do with all those tactical units and platforms?" Threat forecasts are a necessary prerequisite to developing an effective and efficient collection plan, targeting plan, and operational scheme of maneuver. An accurate forecast highlights things that need to be protected and methods to disrupt the enemy's intended actions. Second, is targeting. Targeting is a forecast of the impact of degrading, destroying, or affecting something. It is a forecast of the impact on future capability, intent, and behavior. For example, a target analyst may recommend destroying a certain bridge, forecasting that it will delay enemy armor units from crossing a key river for 24 hours as they wait for repairs or maneuver toward an alternate route. Or, an analyst might project that destruction of a certain uranium centrifuge factory would delay development of a nuclear weapon for six months.[15] Third, over time it is important for operational intelligence to track the accuracy of its forecast through regular assessments. Collection plans are used to confirm, refute, and test operational planning assumptions about both friendly and adversary actions.

Requirements for Operational Intelligence

While some will argue that the United States and NATO are adept at operational intelligence, recent evidence suggests otherwise. Predictions of how the Russian invasion of Ukraine would play out

were horribly inaccurate. Predictions of what a China invasion of Taiwan might look like are ambiguous or superficial. For example, one study that provides impressive details on China's military capabilities provides a forecast that is too generic to be useful.[16] During a recent wargame on a US defense of Taiwan, the game elected to avoid complex gaming issues such as information warfare, sabotage, cyber operations, and space warfare.[17] Ironically, Chinese doctrine emphasizes these elements as the key to any conflict with the United States.

Operational intelligence is central to military planning. Commanders and their planners want operational intelligence to reduce uncertainty about threats and opportunities. Reducing uncertainty requires an understanding of the operational environment and key stakeholders: international community, domestic public opinion (for all major countries involved in the conflict), neutral countries, partner countries, influential organizations, and threats. This understanding is a prerequisite to forecasting the actions of enemies, neutrals, and partners. Forecasting facilitates effective defense against attack and the creation of plans to neutralize those threats, mitigate the enemy strengths, and exploit enemy weaknesses.

Of the above factors, the most important is usually forecasts about threats: anything with the capability and intent to cause (or assist in causing) damage, death, or otherwise constrains military operations or impairs freedom of maneuver (the ability to do what you want to do where you want to do it).[18] Damage can be physical, cognitive, or informational. While threats often originate from adversaries, natural disasters, criminal operations, and civilian refugees can also constrain operations. Cyber and electronic warfare can inhibit freedom of action in their own domain and, to some extent, in the physical domains. A transport aircraft with no offensive weapons would still be considered a threat due to its ability to transport other capabilities that can employ offensive weapons. Of course, even transport with no weapons can drop explosives out of the back of the aircraft. Typically, the threat comes from the enemy but geospatial factors such as terrain, sea states, and weather can be considered a threat due to the potential to cause damage.

It takes a lot of effort to get products to match the operational requirements. In many cases, there is a lack of operational intelligence prior to the outbreak of hostilities. For example, for US and NATO operations in 2001 Afghanistan and 2011 Libya, both were intelligence black holes. Each went through a decade of being a bottom priority before war broke out. Even in cases where collection was well resourced, major gaps in operational intelligence remained. For, Operation Iraqi Freedom, the coalition had been watching Iraq for 10 years – collecting vast amounts of research on unit capabilities and their defenses. But, little was known about the power dynamics of local groups that would become the underpinnings for the insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Studying Operational Intelligence

There are a few minor challenges to studying operational intelligence. The terms are used in many ways. There is a vast breadth of topics to study. Strategic intelligence analysts belittle its relevance. Some bemoan research without access to classified sources. But each of these minor issues is easily overcome.

Military intelligence, colloquially known as intel, has multiple meanings. Depending upon the context, intel can refer to a process, a product, or an organization.[19] "Go get me some intel" – a request for an intel product. Often this request is amplified as "actionable intel" referring to a product that will result in an operational decision. "Go talk to intel" – in this case, intel is the division or organization that disseminates products to the decision-maker. For the intel organization to create intel products, it does intel, the process.

This provides the researcher of operational intelligence (a subset of military intelligence) with a wide variety of topics to pursue. There are several great books on national intelligence studies.[20] Unfortunately, there is little substantial research on operational intelligence. Books that focus on military intelligence tend to be historical in nature. Detailed historical case studies provide insights into important issues such as organizational design, bureaucratic politics, personnel management, security policies, and the impacts of

successful and unsuccessful operational intelligence.[21] Intelligence historiographies cover the evolution of military intelligence.[22] These leading books are frequently used in intelligence studies programs that cater to current intelligence professionals in the DC area or to preprofessional civilians.[23] Yet, they fall short in providing the contemporary analyst insights into how to replicate their analytic successes and *how to apply* these processes in a manner that will provide useful products to an operational military force.

During a recent conference, a national intelligence officer argued that military analysts could learn the job by reading intelligence doctrine. Certainly, doctrine (service, joint, or coalition) is useful for understanding general processes and organizational responsibilities. Yet, doctrine falls short in several regards. It tells the analyst that they should forecast the enemy's actions and assign intelligence assets to monitor it, but it does not explain *how.* Knowing that a task is required is quite different from understanding how to adequately perform that task. Furthermore, doctrine is rife with ambiguities and contradictions. While doctrine is supposed to represent the best ideas, it lacks academic rigor. Due to the extended timelines of crafting, reviewing, coordinating, and publishing government documents, doctrine is a lagging indicator of good ideas. Even then, it includes only the good ideas that are widely accepted and noncontroversial. While this book does not counter US or NATO doctrine, it goes into far more detail than doctrine and leverages academia to provide conceptual clarity and how-to details that are often missing in doctrine. This book fills the gap between military training manuals (which are often too broad and generic to be useful to the individual analyst) and national-strategic intelligence (for which there is a large literature but is not useful to the operational analyst).

Researchers and students often complain about lack of access to classified materials. Certainly, military intelligence has bureaucratic barriers to conducting interviews and surveys.[24] Yet, the principles and processes of intelligence and analysis are not classified. Additionally, most of the material needed to sharpen an analyst's skills are available on open source, though perhaps with less precision and timeliness. For example, there are several good books

on intelligence collection.[25] These books are a great reminder that academic books and journal articles that lack a classification stamp continue to be invaluable. Details of most intelligence collection assets are publicly available while sensor capabilities are frequently governed by basic physics. While this book can be used with classified, each chapter provides references to publicly available information that can facilitate learning and skill development at an unclassified level.

The Structure of the Book

The first third of the book presents a paradigm: how to think like an operational analyst. Chapter 2 introduces the basics of integrating intelligence into planning; what each step in the intelligence process (or cycle) does and how the various intelligence functions fit together to create intelligence products for planners and decision-makers. Chapter 3 sets the stage for the commander's requirements for threat analysis and predictive analysis. This chapter explains the advantages and disadvantages of the various analytic frameworks, or schema, which are commonly used to describe the operational environment in the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). Chapter 4 presents a unique take on applying an analytic framework to focus analysts on the factors that matter to the operational commander.

Part II introduces operational forecasting. It presents course of action (COA) development in a three-chapter sequence: creating rough COAs, partner COAs, and detailed COAs. Chapter 5 introduces the rough of courses of action (COA) based on goals, general capabilities, intentions, and priorities. Chapter 6 is a guide to forecast the level of cooperation of potential partner countries using a framework of willingness, contribution, and appropriateness. Chapter 7 provides insights into how to create detailed COAs based on specific capabilities and limitations.

Part III conducts a deep dive into analyzing military capabilities and estimating multi-domain COAs based on phases of conflict

or lines of effort. Chapter 8 provides a general framework for estimating COA feasibility and viability. Examples on how to apply this framework are covered in Chapters 9 through 14. Each chapter cuts through the chaff to highlight the key requirements for joint commanders and their staff. Emphasis is placed on helping you estimate the feasibility, suitability, and risk for specific military forces to conduct a forecasted COA.

While these chapters are primarily about analyzing adversaries, they provide an equally useful lens for considering neutral countries and partner forces. The chapters are organized in phases. This book conceptualizes warfare in four phases as potential steps in escalation. Chapter 9 focuses on information warfare across space and cyber. Chapter 10 considers additional hybrid activities by unconventional forces such as special operations and proxy forces. Chapters 11 and 12 represent a transition to conventional conflict as combatants conduct, and/or attempt to prevent, long-range strikes. Chapters 13 and 14 are the culmination of conventional conflict as maritime forces secure the seas, when necessary, and large land forces are brought to bear. While the phases may not occur in a linear fashion, organizing the analysis this way can help consider potential sequencing of an operation–identifying what tasks must first occur. This step enables a focus on narrowing down the potential options to those that the enemy perceives as adequate to achieve the objectives while maintaining an acceptable level of risk.

Every operation or operation-to-be has an associated collection plan to monitor those forecasts. That plan uses a set of priority intelligence requirements and supporting indicators to monitor and refine those forecasts. Chapter 15 lays out the process for identifying decision points, prioritized intelligence requirements (PIRs), and associated indicators. Once the forecast is linked to indicators, Chapter 16 explains how to match indicators to intelligence assets and monitor the forecasted COAs. The chapter provides a guide on how to build an intelligence collection plan that synchronizes assets across the domains: space, cyber, air, land, and sea.

The customer requires inputs to make an informed decision. Planners and intelligence analysts can provide this by creating a

phenomenal set of COAs with a supporting collection plan to monitor the adversary's behavior. Building these products requires a detailed understanding of adversary objectives and military capabilities. A holistic understanding is required to create a great product.

What Is This Book Not?

Written with operational intelligence analysts and planners centrally in mind, this book is best suited for junior personnel seeking to build skills in the industry and strategic or tactical analysts who can benefit from understanding intelligence at the adjacent level. While it can serve seasoned experts and interested nonprofessionals, this section sets expectations for readers to determine its fit for their goals. It clarifies what the book intentionally abstracts to concentrate on operational intelligence generation and implementation. It also forecasts which sections might be more valuable to experienced intelligence professionals to maximize their utility and time-saving.

First, with a firm focus on the operational level of intelligence, this book only marginally treats actors and processes dwelling at the national-strategic level (i.e., the seminal three-letter agencies of CIA, NSA, NGA, DIA, etc.). When it does, it is primarily from the vantage point of how strategic assets feed into operational intelligence activities. This is not to negate or downplay the immense importance of strategic intelligence, which serves a crucial role stand-alone and in bolstering operational intelligence. Yet with many exceptional research and practitioner products already available on strategic intelligence, this book aims to supplement rather than compete with them.

In terms of methods, the book takes a light historical touch. The evolution of the intelligence tradecraft is a fascinating field worthy of direct study. It undoubtedly informs modern understanding and practices. Aiming to offer a contemporary, practical guide, however, this book focuses on the current state of the art with occasional historical examples to provide context. Scholars interested in the origins and long arcs of the theories and practices advanced here

might prefer to read it in tandem with one of many well-sketched texts with a historical emphasis.

Finally, while careful not to contradict US military doctrine, the book avoids framing certain discussions with doctrinal concepts. Some are purposefully generalized, requiring significant context and assumptions to render them amenable to detailed, practical application at the operational level. Other doctrines are used contradictorily across different audiences, leaving open the possibility of confusion for readers. To offer as succinct, pragmatic, and clear a product as possible, I leave the work of doctrinal development and refinement to other excellent authors.

In respect of reader's time, I submit that experts will likely find that Part III too introductory and may wish to skip this segment devoted to fundamentals. That said, some may wish to omit chapters on their domain of expertise but brush up or reengage on other topics. To be sure, seasoned insurgency analysts will find the chapter on irregular warfare superficial yet might enjoy judiciously skimming sections on conventional warfare. Or land analysts, who routinely excel at terrain analysis, might prefer to jump to complex all-domain forecasting. Understanding how elements from each domain integrate in multi-domain warfare requires astute, systematized thinking that is not inherent in single-domain analysis. While talk of multi- or all-domain operations permeates the US military, training is still primarily done by the individual services leading many planners and analysts to have a siloed, my-domain-first perspective. This book broadens that paradigm to enable a holistic and balanced all-domain lens in intelligence procedures.

Conclusion

This book provides a practical guide on how to conduct analysis in support of planning military operations at an operational headquarters; to explain how a country would use military force to achieve national security objectives. This book provides practical steps to enable you to *apply* the techniques of military intelligence to the

operational planning process. In the United States and NATO, operational headquarters are often staffed with officers with proven tactical competence. Unfortunately, the transition to the operational level of war is often painful as officers must adjust to a different paradigm of decision making. Poorly trained staff lead to a dysfunctional headquarters.[26] This book serves to mitigate the adjustment process to the operational level of war by serving as a reference guide to both operational intelligence analysts and their planning customers. This book includes decades of lessons learned through grueling experience. Ideally, it helps planners and analysts avoid the same pitfalls and overcome obstacles that their predecessors had to struggle through by trial and error.

For customers of operational intelligence, this book provides insights into what to expect from operational intelligence. This is useful in managing expectations; a better understanding of what operational intelligence can and should provide. It combines unique academic insights from detailed studies with practical experience from the field.

Due to the inherent interactions between the levels of war, this book is also useful to those doing intelligence at the tactical and strategic level to get a better understanding of what the operational level of intelligence needs from and what it can provide to the other levels of war. However, uncertainty cannot be eliminated. The fog of war will always be present. Good intelligence products can help the commander understand the risk involved and enable sound decision making despite uncertainty.

Notes

1. For a detailed discussion on Sun Tzu, war, and intelligence, see Michael Warner, "The divine skein: Sun Tzu on intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 21, no. 4 (2006): 483–92.
2. Brett A. Friedman, *On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021), 75.
3. Mike Fowler, "Intelligence and operational warning: lessons from Ukraine," *Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism* (2024).

4. Italics in original, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Medford, MA: Polity Press, 2018), 19.
5. See Thomas Fingar, *Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Kristan J. Wheaton and Michael T. Beerbower, "Toward a New Definition of Intelligence," *Stanford Law & Policy Review* 17 (2006): 319–30; Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," *World Politics* 31, no. 1 (1978): 61–89; For other definitions of intelligence, see Michael Warner, "Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence," *Studies in Intelligence* 46, no. 3 (2002).
6. Derived from David Strachan-Morris, "Knowledge Gives Strength to the Arm: An Agenda for Studying Combat Intelligence as a Discrete Function Within Military Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 39, no. 7 (2024): 1158–75.
7. Strategic warning and operational warning designed to detect an initial attack is sometimes referred to as I&W (indications and warning).
8. For strategic intelligence, the discipline fits within "studies of government and foreign policy." See Stephen Marrin, "Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline," *Intelligence and National Security* 31, no. 2 (2016): 266–79.
9. Strachan-Morris.
10. Jim Mattis and Bing West, *Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead* (New York: Random House, 2019), 82.
11. R. A. Ratcliff, *Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 44–48.
12. During World War II, the German focus on tactical movements left them with poor operational insight – Ratcliff, *Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers*, 44–48. As early as 1918, the US recognized the importance of forecasting; see John F. Kries, ed. *Piercing the Fog of War: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II* (DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 15–16.
13. Patrick Bury and Michael Chertoff, "New Intelligence Strategies for a New Decade," *The RUSI Journal* 165, no. 4 (2020): 42–53.
14. With a direct line to the Pentagon and subordinate joint task force commanders, US combatant commands frequently need both strategic and operational intelligence.
15. The US Air Force considers the targeting of war-related industry a "strategic attack" – these tactical missions are intended to have strategic effects. This muddling of the levels of war convinces some that strategic intelligence should focus on war-related industry. See, Kries, 2.

16. 2023 Report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (CMPR) (defense.gov).
17. General David Deptula, personal communication 1 March 2023 at US Air Force Academy, Colorado.
18. Peter Gill, "Intelligence, Threat, Risk and the Challenge of Oversight," *Intelligence and National Security* 27, no. 2 (2012): 206–22.
19. This quickly becomes apparent to anyone that does military intelligence. For a more detailed explanation from an early master of the topic, see Sherman Kent, *The Intelligence Process* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949).
20. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, eds., *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies*, fourth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008); Richards J. Heuer and Randolph Pherson, *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2015); Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004); Gill and Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 2018; Central Intelligence Agency, *A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis* (2009), available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf
21. Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); F.H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds., *Codebreakers: The inside story of Bletchley Park* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.G.F. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, *British Intelligence in the Second World War* (Great Britain: H.M. Stationery Office, 1979); David Kenyon, *Bletchley Park and D-Day: The Untold Story of How the Battle for Normandy Was Won* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2019); Elliot Carlson, *Joe Rochefort's War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011).
22. Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History (DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014); John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence: History, Challenges, and Prospects (DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019).
23. Stephen Campbell, "A Survey of the US Market for Intelligence Education," *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 24, no. 2 (2011): 307–37; see also Stephen Coulthart and Matthew Crosston, "Terra Incognita: Mapping American Intelligence Education Curriculum," *Journal of Strategic Security* 8, no. 3 (2015): 46–68.

24. On the challenges of researching intelligence, see Stephen Coulthart, Michael Landon-Murray, and Damien Van Puyvelde, *Researching National Security Intelligence: Multidisciplinary Approaches* (DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 2. On the US military relationship with academia, see Joy Rohde, "Gray Matters: Social Scientists, Military Patronage, and Democracy in the Cold War," *The Journal of American History* 96, no. 1 (2009): 99–122; James Joyner, "Soldier-Scholar (Pick One): Anti-Intellectualism in the American Military," *War on the Rocks* (25 August 2020).
25. Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Collection* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014); Mark M. Lowenthal and Robert M. Clark, eds., *The 5 Disciplines of Intelligence Collection* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2016).
26. Friedman, *On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines*, 29.