Chapter 1

THE CAMERA SEARCHING IN THE WORLD

Bad filmmakers have no ideas and good filmmakers have too many, while the greatest have but one. Set firm, it lets them hold the road as they pass through an ever-changing and always interesting landscape. The cost of this is well known: a certain solitude. And what about critics? It would be the same for them, [but all are unworthy]. All except one. Between 1943 and 1958 André Bazin was that one . . . In the postwar French world, Bazin was at once inheritor and precursor, figure de proue et passeur.

—(Serge Daney, Cahiers du cinéma, August 1983)

Is a Camera Essential?

Without any recording device whatever, Emile Reynaud projected moving images in his theater in 1889. Drawing and painting directly onto glass plates, he fashioned brief snippets of a dozen plates each. Ultimately, he came up with a way to roll the glass plates onto reels and made three sequences of 500 plates each. Luminously colored, these stand as precious early works of animation. Even after 1895, certain audacious “filmmakers” bypassed
the camera altogether. In the 1920s, Man Ray exposed and developed photographic paper on which he arranged an array of objects. His Rayographs have generally been displayed in museums alongside standard photographs, as if they were made in the same manner. Man Ray's process has been adapted by numerous experimental film artists – notably Stan Brakhage, who glued moths' wings and other matter onto raw film stock, then printed it for his sublime *Mothlight* (1963).

Such wonderful examples of film art stand out so vividly because they are imaginative and rare. They belong to what is aptly called the experimental mode, because they test the very definition and identity of the medium. But they also rely on the standard definition for part of their effect. What would happen to cinema if many, or even all, films dispensed with cameras? In the most technologically advanced films of the twenty-first century, such as *Beowulf* (2007), cameras play only an ancillary role. The screen seldom reflects the visual information that light originally carried through a camera lens; rather, what we see is the artifact of computer rearrangements of a number of contributing visual elements, only some of which begin with cinematography. The computer lays out a comprehensible view that may be further elaborated through virtual imaging. Thus a single long-take view (never actually shot by a single camera) becomes a master shot that orients successive views derived from it via geometrical realignments. The "scene" can be explored as if a camera has moved in for close-ups, or has cut to a 90-degree view, or has craned up and around in a spiral motion – yet all without a camera. The virtual reality installations that one encounters in museums or theme parks, as well as most video games, likewise employ cameras mainly as assists in the first stage of their production. In audiovisual entertainment, cameras are at best conveniences, potentially dispensable as computer technology improves.

Cel animation has always amounted to a camera-less cinema anyway. Designed on two-dimensional surfaces, thousands of pictures are then manipulated and sequenced to appear alive and moving in three-dimensional space when presented full-speed on
screen. This is one reason, though not the most essential, that Sean Cubitt has declared all cinema to be fundamentally a version of animation, rather than the reverse. If until recently cameras were required for the fabrication of animated as well as standard films, it was merely to conveniently render the artist's handiwork on celluloid for projection. Today, monitors display animation that has been designed directly on the computer, obviating cameras. Might all cinema someday follow? Cubitt's is among the most intelligent of the many provocative declarations instigated by the digital that are meant to utterly transform the theoretical landscape.

And indeed traditional theorists, realizing that moving pictures may be generated without a physical imprint, have experienced their foreboding escalate into panic. Does not cinema require a source or referent in the world? And even if captured by a (digital) camera, motion pictures can now be manipulated at will, as in animation. Yet the documentary has never been more in the forefront of discussion, as questions about the trace, visual memory, and authenticity – often alluding to André Bazin – have returned with real force. Philip Rosen and Thomas Elsaesser, for example, have deflated the apocalyptic rhetoric that accompanied the first digital cameras, arguing that in the main they serve the same function as did their analogue predecessors, to record the world set before them. As they generally have done in the past, internal cues or paratextual guarantees about the source of their images accompany most documentaries shot in digital, alerting the public as to their reliability. The aberrant genre called the mockumentary relies on the rule that it flaunts.

For the public has generally retained its credence in moving pictures. And why not? Countless parents purchase cameras to document the birth or birthdays of their children in home movies whose mode is far from animation. The camera is not only indispensable for domestic life, but the very fetish of family identity and solidarity. Reality TV names an entertainment obsession that is equally dependent on the camera. Far more than in the days of celluloid, today's cities are monitored by cameras. As the Rodney King beating made so vivid, the camera's purview has expanded,
for democratization makes potential reporters of the world’s entire population. Newsflashes broadcast the face of a robber caught in more-or-less distinguishable images by a hidden camera that some agency thought to install. Courts of law have had to reassess the status of audiovisual evidence because of such increase in the sources of visual evidence, and because, being manipulatable, it is suspect.\(^4\) The camera, it seems, ranks today as far more than a vestige of a fading cinema culture.

Fiction filmmakers quickly understood and have exploited the force of the digital camera. Werner Herzog’s *Grizzly Man* (2005) effectively embeds a digital record as primary data deep inside its celluloid inquiry into the life of its subject, an obsessive naturalist and amateur cameraman, eaten by a bear he loved to photograph.\(^5\) In *Ring* (*Ringu*, 1998), a videocassette spreads death to those who watch it. In these and many other examples, images from amateur camcorders vie with those shot on professional formats, representing two different ontological levels. Curiously, the electronic image almost always connotes a primal level of reality to which the celluloid fiction must adjust. Yes, “the ontology of the photographic image” has come center stage again, as the relevance of this ontology and the questions associated with cinema’s recording phase become increasingly acute.

**The Cahiers Axiom**

Let’s draw the line at camera-less animation. Indeed, let’s draw the line that separates one conception of cinema from another. What I call “the Cahiers line” amounts to the genealogy of an “idea of cinema” that preceded and now coexists with this “cinema as animated storyboard,” which is how I would characterize much of today’s audiovisual entertainment. Taking flight from that journal’s founder, André Bazin, the notorious gang of *Cahiers du cinéma* critics (Truffaut, Rivette, Rohmer, Chabrol, and Godard) passed this idea on to Serge Daney, Bazin’s most illustrious successor, right up to Jean-Michel Frodon, its editor during the period in
which I’ve been writing this book. It’s an idea embodied in the films of Rossellini and through him of the New Wave auteurs, four of them still working; it continues to inspire directors (like Arnaud Desplechin and Olivier Assayas in France, and like Hou Hsiao-Hsien, Abbas Kiarastami, Lars von Trier, Jia Zhang-ke, and many others around the world). This idea is based, Daney once claimed, on an axiom; so let’s start with that: “L’Axiome Cahiers: c’est que le cinema a rapport au réel et que le réel n’est pas le représenté—et basta.”6 (“The Cahiers axiom is this: that the cinema has a fundamental rapport with reality and that the real is not what is represented – and that’s final.”) Daney hurled this axiom in the face of the so-called “Cinéma du Look” of the 1980s, those winsome confections like Diva (1981) and Subway (1985) that came from the advertising industry, and would lead to Amélie (Le Fabuleux Destin d’Amélie Poulain, 2001). I throw it against an overconfident discourse of the digital.

The anxiety produced by the possibility of complete directorial control over the image and the spectator spurred proponents of realism like Annette Kuhn and Jean-Pierre Geuens, as well the Dogme 95 filmmakers, to deploy Bazin’s concepts in a defensive action to hold the wavering line against an onslaught of a swaggering post-filmic cinema that boasts of concocting images and manipulating both them and audiences at will. Against the all-powerful computer, traditionalists hold up the camera as a unique device that captures the visual configuration of a given moment, perhaps revealing its truth. This is the epiphanic view of cinema with which Bazin has always, but not quite accurately, been associated.

Geuens makes perhaps the strongest case for retaining this view today when he decries the way that the digital has shifted attention from shooting to postproduction.7 When a director in classical filmmaking yelled “Quiet on the set!” he subtracted everything inessential so as to isolate the sacred place and holy moment of creativity, to be permanently fixed on celluloid. Actors gave all they could, sometimes again and again until it came off well, while the camera and sound crew silently moved in exquisite
choreography to let the atmosphere of the set (in studio or on location) infuse the image while registering the minutest inflections of the performances, the significant moment when, whether rehearsed or inadvertent, a smile turns awkward or an eyelid flutters. Today, sets are noisy and a single bumbling take can become the basis of the final scene, rectified either by editing within the frames themselves (altering a faulty gesture, erasing a blemish) or by piecing the whole together out of fragments of takes to arrive at something that never really occurred. In the most expensive of today’s productions, shooting actors against green-screens often replaces their face-to-face interplay and their bodily response to the mise en scène. Cinema magic still exists – this is what draws millions to the theater – but its source is no longer on the set and in the moment when the camera registered something unrepeatable. The magic has migrated to the computer, where soundtracks are additive concoctions of scores of tracks, and pictures are composited, not composed.

The argument for traditional, photographic cinema was actually put forth in a movie sequence, dead center in Richard Linklater’s Waking Life (2001), ironically a work classified as animation. From a helicopter overview, the “camera” weaves its way downward to join the film’s main character, who approaches a movie theater with a marquee announcing the title of the sequence: “The Holy Moment.” As the character looks on from a theater seat, a garrulous intellectual (voiced and scripted by Caveh Zahedi) holds forth on the screen within the screen about André Bazin’s mystical worldview. Only the camera, Zahedi intimates, can bring us back to the full reality that we are surrounded by but generally ignore, reduced to our myopic personal projects. The camera can put us in touch with the everyday world of appearances and with a temporality of singular moments so rich that they mock the frenetic pace that our schemes demand of us. This amounts to a common enough view of Bazin’s ideas, to a simplified “Bazinism,”8 and Linklater must know it, for he undercuts the clichés by having them professed in rapid-fire monologue by a hyperactive character clearly full of himself, hardly someone to
whom revelations easily come. Second, Zahedi is scarcely a character at all, but a voice linked to an array of pulsing, wavy lines that outline a human shape; for *Waking Life* is rotoscoped from first to last. While this type of animation may be based on cinematography, it gives the impression of being manipulated, even as Zahedi preaches a “hands off” aesthetic.

Rather than to Bazin, Zahedi’s views might better be ascribed to Eric Rohmer, for whom cinema has always been an art of “showing.” His early essays, such as “The Classic Age,” praise cinema above literature for giving us not the significance of an action but the action’s visibility. We see a character (an actor) perform something, and we immediately register its aptness or falsity. No director has exploited more than Rohmer the “epiphany” in Joyce’s sense, whether it be the unveiling of a truth of nature [the silence preceding the dawn in *Four Adventures of Reinette and Mirabelle* (*4 Aventures de Reinette et de Mirabelle*, 1987); the color of the setting sun in *The Green Ray* (*Le Rayon vert*), 1986] or the truth of a social situation that a character thought he or she had understood (all six of the moral tales). Rohmer stages not just a drama between characters but one between heavily laden language and limpid images, as in the titular moment of *Claire’s Knee* (*Le Genou de Claire*, 1970), when Bernard describes, and tries to assess, the significance of a simple act to which the camera was witness, his touching a girl’s knee while they sheltered from a sudden rainstorm. Symptomatically, Rohmer’s collected criticism, *The Taste for Beauty*, concludes with a lengthy section on Jean Renoir, who, despite an opposite temperament, stands as his undeniable master. It was alongside Bazin that Rohmer learned to honor the sensual quality of Renoir’s shots, the timbre of sounds – always recorded *en direct* – and the irony of character myopia within an expansive and rich world.

But Rohmer’s view of Renoir is itself limited, as is his view of Bazin. For Renoir, the world of appearances can often deceive, and in any case does not amount to the truth. Just consider Christine’s mistake in spying her husband with his former mistress after the hunt in *The Rules of the Game* (*La Règle du jeu*, 1939). Despite her
binoculars – indeed, because of this apparatus, one that stands in for the camera – she misunderstands what she sees and brings ruin down upon everyone as a consequence. Bazin holds the same view when, in the “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” he writes “The debate between realism in art proceeds under a misunderstanding, under a confusion between aesthetics and psychology, between true realism, the need to give significant expression to the world both concretely and its essence, and the pseudorealism of a deception aimed at fooling the eye (or for that matter the mind); a pseudorealism content in other words with illusory appearances.” If appearances can be a pseudorealism in Bazin and Renoir (and in Rohmer, as well), what has become of the epiphany of the natural world rendered by the camera? Rohmer’s films are talky for good reason.

Undoubtedly, Bazin expressed a positive view of the un-adorned cinematic image. You can see this across many of his essays; yet he sides with directors who “put their faith” not in the image but in reality, and in case after case he demonstrates that the reality attained by a film is what precisely is not visible in its images. This is the Bazin for whom the screen is the photographic negative of reality, something essential but preliminary to the reality sought by the director. This “shadowy Bazin,” let’s call him, reentered serious film discussion thanks to Gilles Deleuze and Serge Daney, both of whom recognized his affinity with a philosophy of the virtual that has become the order of the day. Deleuze never hid his debt to the Cahiers line and explicitly to Bazin, as he

developed his theory of the virtual image in *L’Image-temps*. Daney reconverted to Bazin in the 1980s, just after he left *Cahiers* and began assessing the televisual society he found himself commenting on for the newspaper *Libération*. He wrote: “Bazin’s vision of cinema—ineradicably tied to the idea of cinema as ‘prise de vue’—is confronted today with a state of cinema where the image is not necessarily taken from the real. The electronic image ignores the (mirror’s) silver. Paradoxically, it is just because of this that he remains essential.”

So let’s go back to that *Cahiers* axiom: “cinema has a rapport with the real and yet the real is not the represented.” Daney in fact adapted this axiom from Rohmer, whose eulogy for Bazin in the January 1959 issue of *Cahiers* stated frankly that in Bazin’s collected writings “Each article, but also his entire ouevre, has the rigor of a real mathematical proof. All of Bazin’s work is centered on one idea, the affirmation of cinematic ‘objectivity,’ in the same way that geometry centers on the properties of the straight line.” Daney goes beyond Rohmer’s Euclidian view when he implies that Bazin’s understanding of cinema may be closer to a calculus where negative as well as imaginary values come into play and where approximation (the asymptote) is as close as one can get to objectivity. Bazin, he was among the first to recognize, is at least in great part a theorist of absence for whom the clear Sartrean categories of presence and absence give way to intermediate concepts with names like “trace,” “fissure,” and “deferral.” Remember, Bazin claimed that photographic portraits don’t represent their subjects; rather, they are “grey or sepia shadows, phantomlike . . . the disturbing presence of lives halted at a set moment in their duration.”

Cinema confronts us with something resistant, to be sure, but not necessarily with the solid body of the world. Through cinema, the world “appears”; that is, it takes on the qualities and status of an “apparition.”

Apparitions are exactly what Bazin takes up in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” considered by some the most influential essay ever written on film, a word it scarcely mentions. Imagine founding a film theory not only on the photograph but on the
spectral! The spectral reappears often in Bazin’s oeuvre, even in throwaway reviews of minor films. In a fugitive review of a couple of unimportant titles, he put his finger on a certain intangible value he sensed in them, finding that “like a cannon whose hollow bore is surrounded by bronze,” certain films are defined by the emptiness at their center. In French, the cannon’s bore is known as its “ame” or soul; thus, by analogy, the core of certain films can best be defined by the material around it, what is apparent on the screen portending an invisible spirit. For Bazin, the empty center of visual representation is the evacuated soul of the mummy, the figure with which Bazin begins his great essay: “At the origin of painting and sculpture there lies a mummy complex . . .” Encased in bandages, wound around it like meters of film, the mummy is laid deep inside a hollow pyramid, protected by a labyrinth (let’s call them plot lines) from grave-robbers (let’s call these critics). For years it has been said that Bazin’s naïve realism took the visible to be the real, the epiphanic image reached after solving or dissolving the maze of narrative; whereas it was ever the soul of the mummy that he sought through what appears on the screen. No wonder Bazin became the staunchest defender of Rossellini’s *Voyage to Italy* (*Viaggio in Italia*, 1953). In its climactic scene, plaster casts of two bodies being excavated in Pompeii gradually appear to address (and accuse) Ingrid Bergman and George Sanders. Thus does the emptiness at the core of cinema call up the fullness of a moral world that addresses us.
Bazin’s eleven-page “Ontology” essay is the most substantial of the two score pieces he penned during the Occupation. Next to the mimeographed cine-club tracts and the reviews in newspapers that were effectively broadsides, the “Ontology” essay was very different, prepared with great care for a special edition of the prestigious journal Confluences, called Problèmes de la peinture. Rather than the youthful energy of most of his early writing – just what one might expect from a 25-year-old enthusiast – one finds instead a morbidity in the essay on photography. And in fact the publication of this piece involved death and deferral, for the Milice raided the press in Lyon that was to have brought it out in May 1944; they executed the publisher, bringing about a delay of over a year in its appearance.15 I date the conception of the essay’s central thesis about the photographic trace to early 1944, since it exhibits a brilliant leap when compared to his rather academic piece of November 1943, “Pour une esthétique réaliste.” Perhaps the atmosphere of the Occupation took hold of him, with its deceptive veneer of calm, its whisperings and secret codes, its Resistance and disappearances. Incubating in cold rooms after curfew, the “Ontology” essay was written by an impoverished renegade, a failed academic, fascinated by existential phenomenology. But let us discard biography for philology so as to develop (in the photographic sense) the basis of this essay, which itself lies at the foundation of cinematic modernism.

Tracing Bazin’s Trace

At the ciné-club he ran within the Maison des Lettres near the Sorbonne, Bazin was occasionally thrilled to see Jean-Paul Sartre show up. Did he and Bazin engage each other? A few years hence the two would spar over Citizen Kane (1941), with Sartre generously publishing Bazin’s rebuke to him in Les Temps modernes.16 But in 1943 the young Bazin must have been content just to have Sartre lend his prestige to his fledgling club. This was the year of Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology;
but it was Sartre’s previous work, his superb essay on Faulkner and particularly the 1940 *L’Imaginaire,* that can be felt in Bazin’s slowly germinating essay, since at issue is a phenomenology of images that derive from painting and photography. *L’Imaginaire* can be felt throughout the “Ontology” essay. It would also help Roland Barthes germinate *Camera Lucida,* a book explicitly dedicated to *L’Imaginaire.* Indeed, Bazin’s “Ontology” mediates between Sartre and Barthes. Barthes, always niggardly in his references, cites him but once, yet it is dead center in *Camera Lucida.* We feel Sartre in Bazin and Bazin in Barthes. So passes the ghostly afterlife of textual presence.

That ghost appeared to me as I prepared the “Forewords” to the two reissued volumes of *What is Cinema?* I looked closely into Bazin’s personal copy of *L’Imaginaire,* which his widow had given me as a souvenir. Examining it page by page (except for those pages – very important – that he did not read: I know because they are uncut), I found his penciled underlinings, and some marginalia. Bazin seems to have bought this book right away, in its first year, 1940. Several of its phrases and examples crop up in the “Ontology” essay. Bazin’s bold assertion, “by its very genesis photography derives from the ontology of the model: it _is_ the model,” echoes Sartre, who begins a section of his book this way: “Through the photo of Pierre I envision Pierre . . . [the photo] acts upon us—almost—like Pierre in person. I say ‘This is a portrait of Pierre’ or, more briefly, ‘this is Pierre.’” (Bazin marked this section up thoroughly.)

In the second paragraph of the “Ontology” essay, one can feel Sartre hovering nearby. Bazin writes of “the arrow-pierced clay bear to be found in prehistoric caves, a substitute for the living animal that will ensure a successful hunt.” Sartre had used the same image, “the effigy of wax pierced by a pin, the holy bison painted on walls to make the hunt fruitful.” Bazin underlined this sentence and bracketed the whole passage, which he then reworked, for his own different purpose. I know Bazin fought this book, for there in his copy of *L’Imaginaire,* folded neatly at page 38, I discovered my own mummy, a sheet of notes that Bazin
carefully typed and headed: “Photographie; ‘représentant analogique’; ‘analogon’ (Sartre).” Bazin begins his notes accepting Sartre’s distinction between the photograph as a transparent nothing, a vehicle rendering the analogon of its object directly to consciousness, versus the photograph as a black and white something, whose material features (marks of lighting, shade) cause us to see it momentarily as an object like any other, like a carpet or piece of wallpaper. Neither Bazin nor Sartre cares about the photograph as object; the analogon is what interests them both, but the analogon points in two different directions and these men diverge in how they discuss it. Sartre lifts it instantly toward the imagination, where it triggers associations in a manner distinct from other types of image-consciousness. Bazin goes in the other direction, toward the photo’s source, characterizing how the photo’s analogon leads us back down to the world from which it was ripped. For Sartre, the photograph quickly fades into absence to the extent that it succeeds in getting us to attend to the analogon, which in turn is consumed by the freewheeling imagination where memory, emotion, and other images come into play. Bazin, less interested in the freedom of the imagination, focuses on the power of the photograph to amplify our perception, “teaching us” what our eyes alone would not have noticed. Photography extends what Sartre calls the apprenticeship of seeing, something he denied the mental image. Our imaginations, Bazin argues, can grasp at the reality that the photograph hints at. Take, for instance, the inadequate pictures shot during a moment of crisis or danger. In such cases the photograph may show us very little, but it functions all the same, as “the negative imprint” of the “adventure chiseled deep.”23 The cameraman could film nothing further of an event whose impact we feel all the stronger because of the shaky image and the ellipses. Horror films have learned to produce the effect of such uncertain images.

Bazin’s page of notes offers a cleverly chosen example of a photograph: the oven of Landru – Bluebeard. This notorious object had in fact been lifted by the police in 1921 from its actual context, Landru’s basement, to be dropped into the courtroom where
it testified for the prosecution. Now, two decades later, the photograph featuring this object has become a document in another case, a philosophical one. Thus the oven is doubly displaced from the context that it has been singled out to conjure up (those moments in the basement – ten, to be gruesomely precise – when it was allegedly fired up to dispose of female victims). Bazin terms the photograph a *document*, an intrusion from elsewhere that serves notice on the present, putting the freedom of imagination in perspective. Here Bazin is far closer to Breton, Dali, Bataille, and Benjamin than to Sartre. In 1943 his friends called Bazin a practicing Surrealist,24 and Georges Bataille would publish Bazin’s “Myth of Total Cinema” in 1946.25 As for Benjamin, Bazin never mentions him, but he must have been intrigued by Malraux’ footnote to Benjamin in the 1940 “Sketch for a Psychology of the Cinema,”26 an essay Bazin knew by heart and cites early in his “Ontology” piece. Indeed, Bazin’s own final footnote in his original 1945 version elaborates Benjamin’s famous ideas (without mentioning him) about paintings being overtaken by their photographed reproductions. Both men assiduously studied Baudelaire, that harbinger of modern, alienated self-consciousness. Both applauded what Baudelaire feared: the decline in importance of artistic genius under the avalanche of technological mass society. Both men registered, for instance, the shock that photographs from the past could administer to the present.27 Just as Bazin sought out films that brought to the screen phenomena that art was incapable of fully digesting, Benjamin culled discarded documents and other detritus of civilization to challenge the smooth “official stories” that novelists, historians, and of course politicians spin. Sensing himself an outsider, Benjamin was attracted to technologies like cinema and to avant-garde movements like Surrealism because they ignored or undermined classical culture. He took Breton’s *Nadja* to be crucial, because it relied on chance to raise neglected, forgotten, or invisible places and objects into view.28 Breton lodged photographs within the body of his novel, alien images of disturbing objects that, out of the blue or out of the night, interrupt his own prose and vision.
Landru’s oven is this type of photograph, whose voltage, accumulated within the situation that originally charged it, could flash up in lightning to shock the viewer with an inhuman power. The final page of the “Ontology” essay demonstrates Bazin’s allegiance: “For the surrealist, the logical distinction between the imaginary and the real was eliminated. Every image should be experienced as an object and every object as an image. Photography was thus a privileged technology for surrealist practice because it produces an image which shares in the existence of nature; a photograph is a really existing hallucination.” Here Bazin, following the Surrealists, explicitly confounds Sartre’s basic categories of presence and absence with the trace of an hallucination; for him, this is the ordinary condition of photography. Sartre would target surrealism with some of his most venomous attacks just after World War II. A philosopher of the classical stripe like Sartre could boil things down in 1943 to Being and Nothingness, but as Bazin responded years later, “for the man in the street . . . the word ‘presence’ today can be ambiguous . . . it is no longer as certain as it was that there is no middle stage between presence and absence . . . . It is false to say that the screen is incapable of putting us ‘in the presence’ of the actor. It does so in the same way as a mirror—one must agree that the mirror relays the presence of the person reflected in it—but it is a mirror with a delayed reflection, the tin foil of which retains the image.” Louis-Georges Schwartz takes this quote as a clear prophecy of Derrida’s philosophy of trace and deferral.

Bazin didn’t stop at the photograph, a medium he actually never again addressed head-on. In that page of notes he went immediately to the documentary which, he wrote, “fills out” the document by putting it into its spatial and temporal surround. The photograph could serve the Surrealists well because it is cut off from all context. Isolated from the body, Boiffard’s notorious close-up, “Big Toe,” published in Bataille’s journal Documents, acquires a bizarre power. Moreover, photos are ready-made to migrate to other contexts, as in photomontage. But each 35 mm frame of a documentary film is attached to its neighbor and every shot
implies relations of contiguity that describe a veritable interconnected world. Bazin makes us consider a pan shot in Landru’s basement, where this oven would take its place amongst items that the mysterious Bluebeard collected or used. Shots of him in his house might follow, then the building and neighborhood where he resided. This kind of classic documentary stabilizes its subject in space, though it is now absent from us in time. Marie-José Mondzain would say that the documentary visualizes rather than incorporates its subject, surrounding its absence with light and shadow.33

Photograph and film – document and documentary – are equally dislocated from their subjects in time. Shot one day, developed later on, they must be experienced at a temporal remove. The greater the remove, often the greater the charm of the image, as the soul of its subject seems caught by light and shadow that were themselves caught by the camera at a given, now distant moment. Television changes all this, as Bazin points out in the final surprising sentence of his page of notes; for if televised, “the documentary becomes contemporary with the spectator,” who is “led to participate in an event” taking place live before the camera. Today, television serves mainly to exhibit what has been previously recorded, but to Bazin, its theoretical significance lies in its potential for simultaneity, something still exploited in sporting events, the Oscars, newswashes during disasters, and so on. Especially toward the end of his short life, when he was frequently confined to bed, Bazin had a lot to say about TV, just as would Serge Daney, who left Cahiers du cinéma to take up television criticism. For both men, cinema’s delayed action is constitutive of its essentially reflective nature. The image bounces back to us after some time, echoing up from the past and permitting the spectator in turn to reflect on it, more than “participate in it” as we do with live TV. Television is present to us, the newscaster speaking at us in our homes at this very moment; whereas we head off to the cinema when we choose, and are then transported to another time “represented,” not “presented,” on a screen of reflection.
The modern cinema, from neorealism through the New Wave and up to our day, frequently exploits this difference in the temporal structure of the visual image. While *The 400 Blows* is remembered for its concluding still image, the photographic epitaph for the film, it also contains the remarkable sequence where Antoine Doinel responds to a social psychologist. The improvised dialogue, and the jumps in the image that mark ellipses in a single continuous take, simulate the directness of live TV and help establish Truffaut's particular sensitivity to the coexistence of spontaneity and elegy, of life and a recognition of its passing. Innumerable other constellations of image-oppositions can compete on the movie screen.\(^{34}\)

**Images Contested Today**

Despite what has been thought heretofore, the aesthetic line propelled by Bazin's theory and elaborated after the New Wave by Daney emphasizes not spectacle and presence but trace and delay. What I have called "the *Cahiers* line," while hardly a single thoroughfare, serves as a main conduit of this aesthetic. You can see it in the tastes of that journal, where, for example, in the 1980s and 1990s the minimalist films of an Abbas Kiarostami have been championed, while the popular "Cinéma du Look" was immediately suspect. Daney set the tone against the latter trend in diatribes targeting the postcard images of Jean-Jacques Beineix, Jean-Jacques Annaud, and Luc Besson. A profound narcissism engulfs *The Big Blue* (*Le Grand Bleu*, Besson, 1988), a solipsistic 70 mm dream in which the catatonic spectator bathes for hours in the cinematic equivalent of amniotic fluid, and confronts nothing. As for *The Bear* (*L'Ours*, Annaud, 1988), it evacuates human interaction altogether, obviating any *prise de conscience* on the part of filmmaker or spectator. The "Cinéma du Look" pleasures its spectators with an image filled to the brim with self-pleasure.

Daney's animosity exploded in a review of Annaud's *The Lover* (*L'Amant*, 1992, from the novel by Marguerite Duras). This
brilliant condemnation introduced him belatedly to English readers, for it was translated in *Sight and Sound* just as he died.\textsuperscript{35} *The Lover*, he intimated, is a visual confection, a self-confirming presentation of recognizable views and objects (the commodities that it displays and that, in fact, it becomes). Instead, the cinema should use the constituting absence at the heart of the image to probe the novel and the real. The cinema he cares about urges the viewer to position him- or herself beyond the image and to take a position regarding the reality that the image calls up but never becomes. *The Lover* is a film of the visual. Each shot steps forward on its own, presenting itself like a consumer product on a billboard. How can such pictures possibly connect to or imply neighboring shots, Daney asks, since they are given as self-sufficient? This is a cinema without windows, where everything shown is just what we want to see (or have already seen), a TV version of cinema where we congratulate ourselves by recognizing what is already familiar, the visual world that surrounds and reassures us. In a brilliant intuition, Daney notes the decline of secondary characters in French cinema since the New Wave. Such characters used to float like clouds across the screen, he wrote. Even while our eyes were fixed on the stars, we could glimpse the autonomous movement of secondary characters drifting into the frame, then out of the picture. Today such characters, when they appear at all, are tied down to do a job.

Daney died too early to have entered the debate over *Amélie*, but you can be sure he would have registered both its punctilious deployment of every character, minor and major, as well as the literally pinned-down clouds that take on cuddly shapes for our pleasure. In *Amélie* the entire world order – human, animal, natural – has been organized for our convenience. As delectable as it may be, full of art-history citations and imaginative cinematic figures, *Amélie* is there to flatter us. In the film’s prologue, Amélie plays up to us, describing herself as a film spectator with a prehensile eye: “I like noticing details that no one else does . . . ” she whispers from her seat in a movie theater. And to prove it she isolates an accident visible in a famous shot from Truffaut’s *Jules and
Jim (Jules et Jim, 1962), an insect that somehow made its way on camera, crawling on a glass in the rear plane of the shot seemingly right toward Jeanne Moreau’s sensuous mouth as it opens to receive Jim’s tender kiss. Truffaut caught the insect by surprise; or, rather, the insect caught Truffaut by surprise. I asked cinematographer Raoul Coutard about this “mistake.” It was, he claimed, the by-product of a miracle where nature (an unexpected and extraordinarily beautiful morning light) lined up with the fiction. Working hastily before the light evaporated, Coutard framed the lovers in silhouette only to have the insect make its unbidden entry. The shot was so expressive that Truffaut never considered a retake. This is the kind of happenstance dreamt of by the Surrealists.

Like Amélie, the Surrealists used to scan the movie screen for details unseen even by the director, exercising what Christian Keathley has dubbed “panoramic perception.”37 Shooting with an anamorphic format (2.35:1) to promote just this sort of perception and to encourage such miracles of happenstance, Truffaut avoids the kind of obsessive pre-planning that Jeunet stands for. The latter, wanting to break the thrall of the New Wave that he is on record as vilifying, not only scribbles on Jules and Jim, but he teleports a Truffaut actress to his own film: Claire Maurier, Antoine Doinel’s dissatisfied mother in The 400 Blows, was tapped to play Amélie’s boss, the world-wise café owner. The café on rue Lepic may well be situated close to where Antoine Doinel spied his mother – this same Claire Maurier – kissing her lover, (Cahiers critic Jean Douchet). And Amélie, for that matter, may live in a building adjacent to the dingy Doinel apartment in the Clichy neighborhood. Having made his start in advertising and in highly stylized studio films like Delicatessen (1991), Jeunet has consecrated his first “outdoor” effort, by citing the breakout of the New Wave onto the streets of Paris.

And yet, his Paris looks nothing like Truffaut’s or Rohmer’s or Godard’s. It’s been tidied up, and not only by André Malraux’ efforts to wash the city clean in the 1960s. Jeunet has digitally erased every unsightly or merely incongruous element, frame after frame. That insect that Amélie delighted to spot in Jules and Jim
would not have survived Jeunet's image scrubbing. The *Sight and Sound* review exults: "Beautiful images of cobble stone streets and steep Parisian stairways, corner bakeries and street markets abound; along with picture postcard views of Notre Dame, Le Sacre Coeur, the Pont des Arts, Parisian rooftops, intimate cafés, and art nouveau metro stations . . . Inhabiting these locations are the 'little people' of Paris."

Spectators may feel *Amélie* work its magic on them, but there was nothing magical about its production. Controlling every element of sound and picture, Jeunet engineered his fantasy with the precision of a watchmaker, each shot milled to move into position so as to engage the subsequent shot without friction. Truffaut, by contrast, sought friction at every stage of production. The script of each of his first three films he found too easy to accept, and so during shooting he worked against the tone of what he had written. Jeanne Moreau's Catherine, utterly loveable on paper, he made difficult to put up with toward the end of *Jules and Jim*. He also slowed the pace of that film to put its exuberant prologue in perspective and to add gravity to mystery. Neither gravity nor mystery distinguishes Audrey Tautou's character nor Jeunet's film, except in those black and white videos that *Amélie* sends to the reclusive painter Dufayal: babies swimming in slow motion, a blues singer, a peg-legged black man doing a soft shoe. Did Jeunet introduce these germs of video to contaminate the self-satisfaction of his carefully coiffed celluloid pictures? Disturbed by this message from a world outside his studio, Dufayal returns with renewed inspiration to his version of Renoir's “Le dejeuner des canotiers” (*The Boating Party*, 1871), determined to capture the mystery of one figure, “the girl holding the glass,” whose depth eludes him. *Amélie*, looking on from the rear plane, holds a glass. Where Dufayal's painting fails, Jeunet's cinema will in the end solve her riddle.

Jeunet here calls on Pierre-Auguste Renoir to bless *Amélie*, perhaps to copy his capacious sympathy, the grace of his gaze, and the transparency of his representations. He joins those who have always taken Renoir as a bon vivant, enchanted by the way men
and principally women look, by the beauty of flowers and landscapes, by the eloquence of gestures . . . in short, by the glorious appearance of the world. But Renoir, according to his son, was after something deeper. If any filmmaker copied Renoir, it was his son, in the way he, like his father, used sympathy and comeliness as a tactic to burrow into and through what he pictured. In the very first pages of his biography, *Renoir My Father*, Jean wrote: “I admired my father’s painting intensely, but it was a blind sort of admiration. To tell the truth, I was totally ignorant of what painting was. I was hardly aware of what art in general was all about. Of the world itself, all I could take in was its outward appearances. Youth is materialistic. Now I know that great men have no other function in life than to help us to see beyond appearances: to relieve us of some of the burden of matter—to ‘unburden’ ourselves, as the Hindus would say.”

Did Renoir learn this idea from Bazin’s great essays about his films and especially about his “Hindu” film, *The River* (*Le Fleuve*, 1951)? A decade before Jean wrote of his father, Bazin wrote of the son: “Renoir understands that the screen is not a simple rectangle but rather the homothetic surface of the viewfinder of his camera. It is the very opposite of a frame. The screen is a mask whose function is no less to hide reality than it is to reveal it. The significance of what the camera discloses is relative to what it leaves hidden.
This invisible witness is inevitably made to wear blinders.”\footnote{41} Those “blinders” are exactly what Renoir uses in the spyglass scene already mentioned from *Rules of the Game*. Christine uses her “camera” to look at birds and then by chance sights her husband in an “apparent” embrace with a mistress. Renoir, playing Octave, stands behind her and so seems to encourage her mistake, for she makes a mistake: the husband is in fact separating from his mistress for good so as to be true to Christine. This is the very turning point of the tragedy as Christine, believing from the visible evidence that her husband is traducing her, will throw off her naïve constancy and enter the whirling dance of untethered eroticism that leads to death and dispersion. Yet the image is not completely false, because the husband in fact had been having an affair with Geneviève. The camera provides a false trace of that truth.

Unlike Truffaut, and unlike Dufayal, Jeunet is an untormented artist; in his world everything can be pictured, each mystery unveiled. Indeed, the mechanism of discovery constitutes the chief pleasure of his aesthetic, rather like Amélie’s practical jokes. She calls Bretodeau to the phone booth and to an encounter with his childhood, which she watches from the wings; she interrupts the broadcast of a soccer match; she exhumes a conjugal love by constructing, then posting, a 20-year-old lost letter. Even the film’s one deep mystery, that of the phantom figure of the photomat, is explained in a trice at the end, but only after Amélie elaborately arranges an intrigue to force Nino to confront the source of the photos that haunt him. He discovers not a phantom, but a Wizard of Oz – the master of the apparatus – the photomat service man.

I take this photomat man to be Jeunet himself, a filmmaker who glues together strips of actors posing (24 poses a second, one might say) until they seem to move. And the album that holds these photos – the album whose loss and recovery triggers the love story – is the alpha and omega of the movie. Serving as storyboard and as casting agent’s portfolio, this album returns in the final credits, validating at the end the integrity of the original idea. In sum, *Le Fabuleux Destin d’Amélie Poulain* is contained in the
album from start to finish. A Cahiers du cinéma editorial nastily noted that each shot is forbidden the slightest ambivalence. In a way, Jeunet's cinema animates the publicity stills that comprise his storyboard.

Dufayal – like Père Tulipe in Le Million (1931) or Godochot in Diva – is potent, benevolent, supremely surveillant, and capable of putting things right. All three films test the prowess of their directors in key scenes of runaway action. In Le Million, René Clair orchestrates the mayhem of a struggle on the opera stage for a coat containing a lottery ticket. In Diva, Beneix has a motorbike career at full speed through, then under, Paris, into the tunnels of the Métro. As for Amélie, she climbs aboard a car on tracks at the amusement park where Nino works behind the scenes. This attraction is an allegory of the methods and pleasures of cinema. A paying spectator, Amélie is transported into a world constructed to amuse, frighten, and astonish her. A tenuous narrative literally motivates the wax or plastic figures she encounters around each bend; they reach toward her threateningly in a precisely timed sequence of special effects. Then the real-life Nino jumps on the back of her car to give her what is the thrill of her life. At the film's end, he sits in the driver's seat of his motorbike, while Amélie smiles, happy to have been put at last into someone else's plot, rolling and unrolling in a Paris full of other fabulous destinies.

Like the stone she sends skipping across the Canal Saint-Martin, Amélie bounces lightly over the surface of Paris. By contrast, as Anne Gillain brilliantly notes, in The 400 Blows Antoine Doinel would enter into Paris' dark body, his true mother, as when he shoves the empty milk bottle he had filched into a sewer and listens to it shatter underneath the streets in the city's bowels or womb. Amélie's picture-postcard Paris is precisely the one Jacques Tati had satirized with such comic obliquity in Play Time (1967): the Sacré Coeur that dominates Jeunet's film is merely glimpsed in Tati's, when it is momentarily reflected in the windows of the suburban office buildings that have become the new center of the capital. La Defense (Tati's target) is shielded to the west from Amélie's camera, and no one would suspect that dreary housing projects, home mainly to
immigrants, lie just beyond Montmartre (see the upper illustration on p. 53). Jamel Debbouze, the Moroccan comic actor who plays the stuttering Lucien, is anything but threatening; he adores Amélie, as does Nino, played by Mathieu Kassovitz, who directed *Hate (La Haine)* in those projects in 1995.

The film’s ethnic whitewashing triggered a spiteful debate in France, one that *Cahiers* joined in its own fashion, by excoriating *Amélie’s* aesthetic of the “look.” *Cahiers* has always tied ethics to aesthetics, perhaps submerging the former too deeply in the latter. In March 1959, Luc Moullet had declared in its pages that “Morality is a tracking shot,” shocking a young Serge Daney into an understanding of cinema’s responsibilities. Daney’s autobiographical *Postcards from the Cinema*, opens in fact with a chapter titled, “The Tracking Shot in *Kapo,*” where he excoriates that film’s director, Gillo Pontecorvo, for having aestheticized the Holocaust by moving in for a dramatic composition that perfectly frames the figure of a woman electrocuted on the wire fence of a concentration camp. Aesthetics is not the philosophy of beauty, but of art, and in our day, especially in the cinema, art involves the unsightly. Jeunet applied mascara to improve the look of a sullied city; he altered his movie’s “makeup,” including, as many noted, the ethnic makeup of France.

French cinema has been most compelling and complex when, just like Catherine in *Jules and Jim,* it has both applied and stripped away its makeup. Smudges mark a rift between face and soul that, ever since the New Wave, has been traced by such films as *Passion* (Godard, 1982), *Boyfriends and Girlfriends* (*L’Ami de mon amie*, Rohmer, 1987), *A Nos Amours* (Pialat, 1983), and *Vagabond* (*Sans toit ni loi*, Varda, 1985). Where *Amélie* (the film like its star) is pure face, a comely poster without depth, these films hold to the idea of cinema as a relay of images that open onto a larger reality with a contested political future, one that spectators, eyeing each other upon leaving the theater, can better imagine.

This idea applies to cinema everywhere, even if it has been convenient for me to dramatize it through the example of French film. The plenitude held out by the movies (“something special to see”) is ultimately satisfied neither by spectacle nor by the
artistically adorned image, but by the sense and process of discovery that occurs across and through (à travers) the screen. Bazin’s idea is ever to keep the subject of a film in view, even as it resists being represented by an image. Fascination comes not through dazzling presence but through haunting absence, as recorded traces of a subject lead us in search of it. This movement of spectator in relation to what is seen takes time, as recorded images are traversed in a more or less guided event . . . the cinema event, let me call it. What did Bazin and his followers think was needed to prepare such an event, to put it together and compose it? The answer to this requires that we shift from the cinematic image to the edited film.

Notes

1. It’s not unthinkable. See Nadia Bozak, “The Disposable Camera: Image, Energy, Environment,” Ph.D. dissertation, Toronto University, 2008. Bozak alerts us to the material costs involved in an industry based on nineteenth century machinery, including intractable problems of refuse, as thousands of cans of 35 mm prints must be disposed of each week. This problem does not evaporate with digital cameras, for enormous amounts of energy go into producing electronic circuitry, and their ubiquity adds up to a significant amount of metal and plastic. Moreover, they are dumped or recycled when more advanced models come out. Camera-less cinema may someday be a necessity.


8. Hervé Joubert-Laurencin gave me this term, meant to evoke the difference between Bergson’s philosophy and Bergsonism, the popularization of his views.
18. Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida* (New York: Noonday, 1981). I err in my “Foreword” to *What is Cinema?* I, in saying that Barthes fails to cite Bazin. In fact Bazin is mentioned on page 55. Joubert-Laurencin feels that Bazin is made to haunt Barthes’ entire text by appearing fugitively in this single instant. I disagree, since the citation concerns the screen as mask, not the “ontography of the image,” which Barthes writes about as though he were the first to conceive it.
27. Joubert-Laurencin imagines Bazin and Benjamin working side by side at the Bibliothèque nationale de France in 1938, where both were in fact pursuing research on Baudelaire. Might the BnF archives contain call slips from 1938 proving that they read the same books, perhaps on the same day? An excellent essay speculates on this relationship: Monica Dall’Asta, “From Benjamin to Bazin, Beyond the Image, the Aura of the Event,” in Dudley Andrew, ed., *Opening Bazin* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
33. See Marie-José Mondzain, “Can Images Kill?” *Critical Inquiry*, 36(1) (2009). Mondzain distinguishes between incarnation and incorporation. The former takes on the outer appearance of an absent thing, whereas the latter actually is fused to what it represents. Christ’s image pictured in an icon incarnates Him without His being there; but
for the believer He is incorporated in and as the Eucharist, which is
no longer a sign but the Person Himself.

34. For an inventory of, and brilliant meditation on, the interplay of pho-
tographs and films, see Garrett Stewart, Between Film and Screen:
Modernism’s Photosynthesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999).

35. Serge Daney, “Falling out of Love,” Sight and Sound, 2(3) (1992),
pp. 14–16.

36. Raoul Coutard, Interview with the author, February 27, 2003, New
Haven.

37. Christian Keathley adapts this concept from Wolfgang Schivelbush’s
Railway Journey (New York: Urizen, 1979) in Cinephilia and History,
or The Wind in the Trees (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006).


39. Truffaut used contradiction strategically. See, for example, his Le
and 167.


41. André Bazin, Jean Renoir (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973),
p. 87.

42. Charles Tesson, “Lara contre Amélie,” Cahiers du cinéma, July–Au-
gust 2001, p. 4.

43. Both Jeunet and his cameraman Bruno Debonnet insist on the prior-
ity of the storyboard in “The Look of Amélie,” featurette, disc two of
DVD, Amélie (zone 1 version only).

Hayward and G. Vincendeau (eds.), French Film: Texts and Contexts

45. Luc Moullet, “Sur les Brisées de Marlowe,” Cahiers du cinéma, 93
(March 1959). Often attributed to Godard, this celebrated sentence
was used by Antoine de Baecque as a title for a chapter on New
Wave politics and aesthetics in Cinéphilie, Invention d’un regard, his-

pp. 17–18. Actually, Daney recounts not his observation but Jacques
Rivette’s description of this “abject” camera movement.