

INTRODUCING ‘YAN DAUDU

Hajiya Asabe had a feminine name and a handsome, mustached face. In the room he rented in Kano’s infamous Sabon Gari neighborhood, he received a daily stream of visitors: girlfriends stopping by to gossip, out-of-town relatives seeking financial assistance, flirtatious boyfriends, hopeful suitors. People knew they could count on finding Hajiya Asabe in his room because, as a self-described *karuwa*, or ‘prostitute,’ he woke up late most mornings and stayed close to home during the day. Most evenings he spent at a nearby nightclub where a modestly upscale, male clientele came to listen to live performances of Hausa and Arab music, to drink beer or a non-alcoholic alternative, and to socialize with the women and ‘*yan daudu*, feminine men like Hajiya Asabe, who served as the club’s unofficial hosts. (Regular customers had to pay a door fee; women and ‘*yan daudu* did not.) Among the ‘*yan daudu* who frequented the club, Hajiya Asabe stood out with his stylish dress and a graceful, self-confident demeanor that was both charming and haughty. It was this demeanor that had made me notice him during my earliest visits to the club, and that made him so alluring to the men who sought his company.

One day late in the dry season in 1994, I went to pay Hajiya Asabe a visit. As I entered the cement courtyard, I found him kneeling on a small mat outside his room. Not wanting to disturb him as he performed the late-afternoon *la’asar* prayer, I took a seat on a nearby bench while the compound’s other residents – most of them non-Muslims from southern Nigeria – went about their regular activities. Once he finished praying, Hajiya Asabe joined me on the bench

and called for Mama Ayo, the middle-aged Yoruba woman who managed the compound, to bring me a cold beer. Hajiya Asabe did not drink alcohol, but he was unfailingly hospitable towards his guests, and in the early days of our friendship he always offered me a bottle of Gulder, the most expensive beer on the market, whenever I came by to visit. Although Hajiya Asabe and I had been casually acquainted for almost a year, we had only recently begun spending time together, so we were still getting to know one another. After the usual exchange of greetings and small talk, he complimented me on my command of Hausa, the major language of northern Nigeria, and suggested that all that remained for me to become a ‘complete Hausa’ [*cikakken Bahausha*] was to embrace Islam. He even offered to slaughter a ram in my honor if I were to convert. Hajiya Asabe’s religious zeal astonished me. After all, the social milieu in which I knew him was hardly one that most people would characterize as Islamically devout.

“But how could I become a Muslim?” I asked him, clutching my bottle of Gulder. “I like this,” I reminded him, pointing to the beer. “And I like *harka*” – the ‘deed’ – that is, sex between men.

“Come now, Sani,” Hajiya Asabe replied, addressing me by my Hausa name. “Muslims do these things too. They do them more than anyone!”

My first interpretation of this surprising exchange was that, for Hajiya Asabe, being a Muslim was less important than being Hausa, and had more to do with the performance of cultural rituals than it did with accepting the moral precepts of Islam. His irreverent claim that Muslims engaged in forbidden acts like drinking and homosexuality “more than anyone” was clearly facetious, yet I knew it was based on his experiences in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, where he had performed the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca, more than once. Like many other poor pilgrims, Hajiya Asabe had overstayed his visa on several occasions in order to live and work illegally in the port city of Jiddah. While most undocumented Nigerians take on menial jobs that are Islamically legal, Hajiya Asabe supported himself through what he called *karuwanci* [‘prostitution’], providing social and sexual companionship to men, some of whom might also enjoy the company of female prostitutes as well as marijuana, cocaine, or even alcohol. His most recent sojourn had ended over a year earlier, when he was arrested, deported and forced to leave behind most of the

wealth he had accumulated. The circumstances of Hajiya Asabe's expulsion from Saudi Arabia weighed heavily on him, yet his day-to-day practices signaled a decidedly positive attitude towards the country. He dressed in Saudi men's fashions, listened to cassette tapes of Arab music, and peppered his speech with expressions from Arabic. Though he was unable to read in any language, he kept Arabic-language magazines prominently displayed in his room, along with perfume bottles and other mementos. He also performed the five daily prayers more consistently, and more visibly, than most other 'yan daudu I knew.

Despite his apparent disregard of certain aspects of Islamic morality, I soon discovered that Hajiya Asabe's commitment to his faith was more sincere than I had initially thought; his irreverence had definite limits. Like many ethnographers, I learned of these limits accidentally, by transgressing them in a way that left me embarrassed but enlightened. On another visit to Sabon Gari, when Hajiya Asabe and I were sitting in his room to escape the midday sun, I sought to explain my ethnographic interest in the language practices of 'yan daudu. With my limited, graceless Hausa, I told him how I had initially come to Nigeria to learn about the speech of *malamai*, Islamic scholars, but that I had eventually lost interest in that topic. "Staying with them is not pleasurable," I said, "and their talk is not interesting." At this Hajiya Asabe's facial expression suddenly changed from that of a sympathetic listener to one showing hurt and indignation. "Sani," he reprimanded me quietly. "This is our religion."

Cultural and Sexual Citizenship in Northern Nigeria

In the Hausa-speaking region of Northern Nigeria, prevailing interpretations of *Shari'a*, Islamic law, mandate a strict separation of the sexes and different rules of behavior for women and men in virtually every facet of life. 'Yan daudu break those rules. As men who are said to talk and act 'like women,' they are widely perceived to be witty and clever, but they are also persecuted for their presumed involvement in heterosexual and homosexual prostitution. This book is about 'yan daudu (singular: *ɗan daudu*) in and around Kano,



Fig. 1.1 Approximate extent of Hausa city-states since 1810 C.E.

the economic and cultural center of Hausaland, whose government joined that of eleven other northern Nigerian states in officially adopting Shari'a in 2000.¹ (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2.) An ancient Islamic emirate that grew rich from the trans-Saharan trade, Kano today is one of Nigeria's and Africa's largest cities. It is also the hub of a transnational network of 'yan daudu, independent women, and other gender and sexual minorities that links cities and towns throughout northern Nigeria with Hausa-speaking communities in other regions and countries.

'Yan daudu are most visible in urban markets and motor-parks (taxi and bus stations) where they cook and sell food to male workers and



Fig. 1.2 Nigeria. Shaded area indicates the twelve states that have officially adopted Shari'a since 1999.

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travelers. Some ‘yan daudu live or spend time at ‘women’s houses’ where they and ‘independent women’ [*mata masu zaman kansu*, literally ‘women who live on their own’] entertain male visitors. The term *gidan mata* [‘women’s house’] is often translated as ‘brothel,’ reflecting the popular image of independent women as ‘prostitutes’ and of ‘yan daudu as their ‘pimps’ or as ‘homosexual prostitutes’ themselves. The translations are misleading. Some independent women, as they generally prefer to be called, and some ‘yan daudu, especially younger

ones, do sometimes have sex with (conventionally masculine) men in exchange for money or other gifts; and the women, ‘yan daudu or other men who facilitate these interactions are often given a kind of tip.² But *karuwanci* is not simply commercialized sex work. Rather, like the *malaya* prostitutes in colonial Nairobi,³ the independent women and ‘yan daudu who live and work at women’s houses provide a number of services other than sex: they serve food and drink, play cards and board games, and engage their visitors in friendly, flirtatious conversation.⁴

While cooking and serving food is considered women’s work, ‘yan daudu often describe their other feminine social practices – songs, dances, gestures, clothing and language – as ‘play’ [*wasal*]. ‘Play’ accurately reflects the pleasure these practices bring to ‘yan daudu and others, but it belies their serious, material consequences. ‘Women’s talk’ [*maganar mata*], for example, is useful for those ‘yan daudu who work as intermediaries [*kawalai*] between male patrons and independent women, for by engaging men in flirtatious banter ‘yan daudu are often able to make more satisfying, and potentially lucrative, matches. On a more covert basis, moving and talking ‘like women’ helps some ‘yan daudu attract their own friends, sex partners and patrons. These benefits are mitigated, however, by the material ways ‘yan daudu are made to suffer: they are regularly harassed and ostracized for their alleged immorality, and subject to abuse at the hands of police and young male hooligans, who can assault, rape, steal or extort money from them with impunity.

Nigeria – a member of OPEC – is rich with oil and other resources, but ‘yan daudu, like other Nigerians, are overwhelmingly poor and illiterate, and they suffer from the economic deterioration wrought by years of corruption and mismanagement by politicians, military dictators, businessmen, multinational corporations and international lenders.⁵ In addition to the impoverishment caused by this corruption, ‘yan daudu and karuwai are often scapegoated for it – accused of conspiring with corrupt ‘big men’ [*manyam mutane*] who use their ill-gotten wealth to satisfy their legendary appetites for sex and other pleasures. From a cosmological standpoint, many Hausa Muslims believe their collective suffering is God’s punishment for disobeying Him, and Muslim leaders commonly blame karuwai and ‘yan daudu for promoting such disobedience. In the last half of the twentieth century, if not earlier, Northern Nigerian states, emirates and municipalities

periodically enacted morality campaigns similar to the ones that accompanied the recent adoption of Shari'a; most of my 'yan daudu acquaintances had been arrested or worse at some time or other.⁶ What was different in 2000 was that these campaigns were not confined to a particular territory or jurisdiction, and they did not quickly dissipate; rather, they constituted a broad, and seemingly more durable, movement to construct a Northern Nigerian public – a kind of nation, often termed simply *Arewa* ['the North'] – supposedly unified by its adherence to orthodox Islam.

While 'yan daudu have been subject to both official and unofficial persecution for at least several decades, with the adoption of Shari'a they became even more vulnerable. Why have 'yan daudu been targeted? How, in the face of these and other challenges (including poverty and HIV/AIDS) have 'yan daudu's social networks managed to survive? What do 'yan daudu's experiences tell us about gender and sexuality, culture and nationalism, religion and power in Northern Nigeria, in other postcolonial societies, and in the contemporary world at large? As this book will show, the answers to these questions lie to a great extent in the ways 'yan daudu use language, their bodies, and other media to 'play,' as they put it, with the boundaries of what it means to be male and female. For better and for worse, 'yan daudu attract the attention of many Hausa Muslims because, in the time since Nigeria received its independence from Great Britain in 1960, Islamic norms of gender and sexuality have come to be seen as symbols of Northern Nigerian culture – a culture that some people imagine is threatened by, and in competition with, other parts of Nigeria and the Judeo-Christian West.⁷ Islamic reformists' ideas about how 'good' Muslim women and men should talk, dress and act are a central element of these norms, and it is to these ideologies that many people refer when they condemn 'yan daudu as 'bad' Muslims and 'worthless people' [*mutanen banza*].⁸

This book describes 'yan daudu's social practices as claims to and performances of *cultural citizenship*. The concept is similar to what is often called 'identity,' but I use it here to emphasize certain things. First, as defined in political theory, the concept of 'citizen' is defined in opposition to other social actors who do not enjoy full citizenship rights because of their age, gender, caste, race, disability, or other forms of embodied social difference. 'Citizenship' thus emphasizes the hierarchical nature of social constructions of identity, and

the negotiations and conflicts that inevitably take place over who can do what, where, when, with whom and with what resources. Second, while legal citizenship is defined with respect to political units (states), ‘cultural citizenship’ calls attention to the fact that identities are embedded within particular social fields and institutions, including religion, commerce, work and leisure. Collectively, these (non-state) social fields are known in political theory as ‘civil society’ and in communication theory as the ‘public sphere.’⁹ Third, the term ‘cultural’ reminds us that participation in social life is not solely a matter of power relations, but also needs to be understood in terms of aesthetics, emotions and beliefs.¹⁰

‘Cultural citizenship’ thus refers to the things different people do in their day-to-day lives (as well as the things they don’t or can’t do), and the effects their actions have for them and for others.¹¹ These effects can be understood at various scales of social and spatial organization, from small-scale ‘communities of practice’ such as households, workplaces and neighborhoods, where social interactions are often face-to-face,¹² to large-scale ‘imagined communities’ such as nations, religions, political movements, classes, genders and races.¹³ As an intermediate level of social-geographical organization, cities provide a focal point for empirical research and theorizing that link these smaller and larger scales.¹⁴ Insofar as participation in the public sphere is constrained by and reproduces differences of gender or sexuality, we can speak of *sexual citizenship* as an integral aspect of cultural citizenship.¹⁵

As a linguistic anthropologist, I am especially attentive to the importance of language as both a medium of social participation and an object of criticism and control. At the same time, I am mindful that language is one of many media that human beings use to fashion and transform the relationships, communities and institutions that are meaningful to them. With respect to ‘yan daudu, this book explores linguistic and bodily performances – ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine,’ playful and serious – that challenge the arguments of Islamic reformists, African nationalists and others who insist that ‘Islam’ or ‘African culture’ is inherently hostile to, or devoid of, gender and sexual minorities. I also aim to show how ‘yan daudu’s citizenship claims challenge the arguments of Western-educated scholars and activists who assume that ‘modern’ and ‘global’ constructions of gender and sexuality are inevitably based on Euro-American models.

Who are ‘Yan Daudu?’

When I describe ‘yan daudu as ‘feminine men’ to people from the USA and other Western societies, I am often asked, “Are they gay?” The answer is not straightforward. In the earliest days of my research, when all I knew about ‘yan daudu was what other people had written or said about them, I imagined I might, as a gay man, be able to become involved in their largely hidden social world. I was intrigued the first few times that I saw ‘yan daudu strolling and dancing at nightclubs and outdoor parties, and could not help but compare these images to gay life at home. Although subsequent events forced me to reconsider, but not to reject outright, the naive idea that ‘yan daudu were men with whom I could communicate on the basis of a shared sexuality, my interactions with them introduced me to a thriving social world of men who acknowledged and acted upon their sexual attraction to other men. These men comprise what could arguably be called a Hausa homosexual community, though their social life differs in important ways from gay life in the West.

One comparison that seemed apt in the 1990s was that, as drag queens and ‘fairies’ did for straight-acting gays in mid-twentieth-century New York City,¹⁶ ‘yan daudu’s visibility and social proximity to karuwai attracted conventionally masculine ‘men who seek men’ [*maza masu neman maza*] and permitted them to meet without blowing their cover. ‘Yan daudu often call these men ‘civilians’ [*fararen-hula*], ‘yan aras (an in-group term with no independent meaning), or simply ‘men’ [*maza*]. The men typically identify themselves as *masu harka* [‘people who do the deed’], a ‘secret’ code term that embraces both ‘yan daudu and ‘civilians’ and is preferred over the standard Hausa term, ‘yan ludu [‘sodomite,’ literally ‘people of Lot’]. Many masu harka, including those who speak little English, also describe themselves as *homos*, especially when talking to outsiders like me. (The word *gay* tends to be used only by more educated urbanites.)¹⁷ Some ‘civilians’ secretly self-identify as ‘yan daudu – talking and acting ‘like women’ in private, while maintaining a masculine occupation and appearance in public. Such men are called ‘yan daudun riga [‘shirted ‘yan daudu’], meaning they treat *daudu* – the practice of men acting ‘like women’ – like a shirt that can be put on or taken off at will. Unless otherwise noted, in this book

‘*yan daudu*’ refers to ‘men who act like women’ openly and are publicly recognized as such.

Unlike most Western men who describe themselves as gay, masu harka do not see homosexuality as incompatible with heterosexual marriage or parenthood, or vice versa. At some point in their lives most masu harka, including a majority of ‘*yan daudu*, marry women and have biological children. I have chosen not to use the term *bisexual* to refer to married masu harka because I understand bisexuality to refer to an individual’s capacity to be sexually attracted to both women and men, and to pursue that attraction socially and physically; this implies a degree of choice regarding sex and kinship which is not widely recognized in Hausa society. Specifically, most Hausa people do not see marriage as a choice, but rather as a moral and social obligation; my own refusal to marry based on my lack of sexual desire for women typically did not follow the cultural logic of my homo acquaintances, who did not see a necessary connection between marriage and heterosexual desire. ‘Bisexuality’ is thus expected of all masu harka, whether or not they actually desire or enjoy sex with women. Although many masu harka say they enjoy sex with women, these men do not constitute a distinct subgroup, since men who do not desire women sexually are unlikely to admit this except to their closest friends.

I have also chosen not to refer to ‘*yan daudu*’ as ‘transgendered’ or ‘trans.’ Although some writers and activists define *transgender* broadly, I generally hear it used to refer either to people who choose or feel compelled to embrace a gender identity ‘opposite’ or merely different from their ascribed biological sex (e.g., biological men who live as or become women).¹⁸ With the exception of a male ‘transvestite’ in Kano whose story circulated on the internet in 2004, I have never met or heard about a *ɗan daudu* who tried to pass as a woman socially.¹⁹ All the ‘*yan daudu*’ I have known – even those who were consistently referred to by feminine names – saw themselves as ‘real’ men and enjoyed the privileges that come from that identity, even while they were stigmatized for being ‘feminine.’

Another question I am often asked about ‘*yan daudu*’ is, “Are they accepted?” Many Westerners, it seems, have heard that there are some non-Western societies in which feminine men, or gender and sexual minorities in general, are supposedly treated with more

tolerance and respect than such individuals have historically found in ‘the West.’ The example of the *berdache*, an outmoded, colonial term for transgendered people in certain Native North American societies, is sometimes mentioned in this regard.²⁰ Another is the *hijra*, a term used in Hindi and other South Asian languages to refer to eunuchs and intersexed people who live as women.²¹ Without making explicit comparisons with such groups (whose histories are too complex to be easily summarized), I generally answer that ‘yan daudu’s presence is universally acknowledged – no one denies they exist – but that their degree of social acceptance has varied according to time, place and situation. To make my explanation more concrete and up-to-date, I sometimes add that in recent years, Islamic reform movements have grown more powerful in Northern Nigeria, and this has made life more difficult for many ‘yan daudu. “Oh,” I am then likely to hear, “Northern Nigeria is Islamic?!” At this point in the conversation I often feel as if the pendulum of cultural assumption has swung to the other extreme, for if some societies are presumed to be more open and tolerant than ‘the West,’ others have the opposite reputation; and Islamic and African societies usually top that unfortunate list, especially when it comes to gender and sexuality.

Literary scholar Edward Said has described Europeans’ long-standing fascination with gender and sexuality in the Muslim Middle East as *Orientalism*. In his book by that title and other works, Said argues that stereotyped images of belly-dancers, veiled women, sheikhs and terrorists, whether they appear in novels, travel writing or television news programs, have led people of European descent to imagine that they are part of a distinct culture – ‘the West’ – that is superior to the cultures of the Middle East; these images have been used to justify the efforts of Western governments and corporations to colonize Middle Eastern lands and exploit their resources.²² In a similar vein, Leila Ahmed has examined the ways British government officials used reports about the supposedly subordinate status of Egyptian women to justify colonial rule in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; yet many of those same (male) British officials opposed the granting of equal civil rights to women in their own country.²³ More recently, the US government used reports about the Taliban’s mistreatment of

women to justify the bombing of Afghanistan after the World Trade Center attacks in 2001; under US and allied ‘protection,’ however, the fate of most Afghan women has remained largely unchanged, and unnoticed.

US media coverage of Shari’a in Northern Nigeria shares many of the same Orientalist features. After the first Nigerian state (Zamfara) announced its intention to adopt Shari’a in late 1999, the *New York Times* published a photograph of a taxi with the image of a covered Muslim woman painted on its passenger door, indicating that the taxi was reserved for women only. The *Times* ran this photograph not once, but twice, reinforcing the equation of Shari’a with gender segregation.²⁴ Neither photograph was accompanied by a story documenting the difficulties women and other Nigerians face in finding adequate, safe and affordable transport of any kind. US media also gave prominent attention to the violence that erupted in Kaduna, a northern city with an ethnically and religiously mixed population, when Shari’a was introduced in early 2000, and again in 2002 when Nigeria hosted the Miss World beauty pageant in its capital, Abuja. In response to Muslim clerics who complained that the pageant objectified women’s bodies, a non-Muslim journalist from southern Nigeria wrote, as a kind of joke, that the Prophet Muhammad himself would probably have enjoyed the show and might have taken one of the contestants to be his wife. More than 200 people died in the ensuing clashes between Kaduna’s Muslims and Christians, the journalist received death threats and went into hiding, and the pageant was relocated to London. A few months later, the US magazine *Vanity Fair* ran a feature story detailing the events, with a focus on the experiences of the pageant’s non-African contestants, though the rioting had occurred over 100 miles away from their Abuja hotels.²⁵

Perhaps the most infamous story about Shari’a in Northern Nigeria was that of Amina Lawal, a divorced Hausa Muslim woman who was convicted of adultery by an Islamic court in her home state of Katsina and sentenced to death by stoning. The international attention generated by this case went well beyond press coverage to include a segment on *The Oprah Winfrey Show* and several petitions circulated on the internet, before Ms. Lawal was acquitted on a technicality in 2003. (The adultery trials of two other Northern Nigerian women also made headlines in the West, but not to the same extent.

Both women were acquitted.) Another international controversy erupted in August 2007 when 18 men were arrested at a hotel in the city of Bauchi for allegedly cross-dressing at a same-sex ‘wedding.’ Local protesters demanded that the men be prosecuted for sodomy (which, like adultery, carries the death penalty), while international gay-rights organizations sent representatives to assist in the men’s defense.

These stories are important, for they highlight the degree to which gender and sexuality have become important and controversial sites of cultural citizenship in Northern Nigeria and in much of the contemporary world at large. At the same time, because they tend to focus on spectacular, exotic or horrifying events, stories like these construct a distorted image of Northern Nigerian social life – not because the details aren’t true (though they sometimes aren’t), but because they tend to leave out the more common challenges and pleasures that Northern Nigerians experience on a day-to-day basis, as well as the social and historical factors that have led to these experiences and make them meaningful.

Because of their wide circulation, such images, along with other exoticizing portrayals of Islam and of Africa, have the potential to influence the way people interpret my accounts of Northern Nigerian life. This makes it challenging for me to talk about my research in nonacademic settings, such as when I’m socializing with family or friends who don’t use words like *exoticizing* on a regular basis. I face similar challenges in writing this book. In both cases my audience is similar: people educated in Western societies who are interested in other places and cultures, but who may have little or no scholarly training in African or Islamic studies, anthropology or linguistics. Whatever your background, in reading my stories about ‘yan daudu and others, you will undoubtedly be reminded of things you have heard elsewhere about gender and sexuality, language and culture, Africa and Islam. Some of my stories might sound similar to what you’ve heard; some will clash. Keep track of these reactions. My aim is not simply to debunk or confirm what you’ve previously been told or believed to be true. Rather, my hope is that you will rethink those ideas, and reconsider their implications: Where do they come from? Who told you about them, and why? How can you know if they’re true or false? And what difference does it make?

Encountering ‘Yan Daudu

Gender and sexual diversity were not on my professional agenda when I first traveled to Nigeria in 1991 to take a Hausa-language summer course at Bayero University, Kano (BUK), and to do preliminary research for a doctoral dissertation on the language practices of *mala-mai* (singular: *malam*), Hausa Islamic scholars and teachers. Yet even before I arrived in Kano I knew that local ideologies of gender and sexuality would figure prominently in my day-to-day experiences there. The directors of the language program sent out a letter advising me and my fellow students (14 Americans and one Dutch) that we would be living in the *birni* (also called ‘Old City’ or just ‘City’) inside Kano’s ancient walls, whose residents are known for their commitment to Islamic social norms. We were therefore instructed to show respect to our hosts by dressing modestly when we went outside – headscarves for women; no shorts or tank-tops for anybody – and to refrain from mixed-sex socializing. The women in our group were encouraged to get to know our female neighbors, most of whom were in seclusion [*auru kulle*, literally ‘locked-up marriage’] but could invite female guests into their homes. My female colleagues were also told that while they could greet our male neighbors, it would not be appropriate to shake hands. The men in our group were likewise encouraged to socialize with our male neighbors, but to refrain from greeting our female neighbors even in passing.

Outside the Old City these rules applied with varying consistency, depending on the religious, ethnic and generational affiliations of the people we met and the activities they were engaged in. At BUK, for instance, a predominantly Muslim campus on the outskirts of Kano, the majority of women (most of whom were students) wore colorful head-scarves and perhaps a shawl draped loosely over the head and shoulders; a small number wore their hair uncovered, sometimes with shape-revealing blouses and jeans; others wore a plain-colored headscarf pinned under the chin – a contemporary version of the Islamic *hijab* or ‘covering.’ (By the early 2000s, this kind of covering had become more prevalent.) Men at BUK displayed a similarly diverse array of clothing, head-coverings and facial hair (or lack thereof). And students of both sexes mingled, or refrained from mingling, in ways that did not correlate with dress in any obvious way.

I returned to Kano in 1992 to embark on my fieldwork with malamai. With the help of scholars and staff at BUK (where I taught one course) and the Kano State History and Culture Bureau, I set out to establish contacts with malamai throughout the city, whom I interviewed on the relative value of Islamic and Western-style education and on the pedagogical use of Arabic, Hausa and English. All these contacts were with men, but it did not occur to me at first to question the gender arrangements of my fieldwork or of Hausa society in general. Various experiences, however, led me to reconsider both the methodological approach and substantive focus of my research.

Some of the malamai I interviewed brought up the subject of women even though I had not asked about it directly. Many of my questions dealt with what is often described as a gap in educational achievement between northern and southern Nigeria: northern Nigerians are said to lag behind southerners in the federal, English-medium school system, and this makes it hard for northerners to find salaried jobs in the civil service and private sector. The gap is usually attributed to northerners' traditional preference for Islamic education and their historical distrust of Western schooling, known in Hausa as *boko* (from English 'book'). When I asked one malam to explain the reasons for this distrust, he offered the following illustration. If you go to a business office or government agency here in Kano, he said, you will find southern women working as secretaries and the like, because they have more *karatu* ['reading,' from Arabic *qara'a*], by which he meant *boko*. But in the south, he continued, you won't find northern women working in offices, even if they've had some *karatu*. Why? Because northern women have *ilimi* ['knowledge,' from Arabic *ilm*], by which he meant knowledge of Islamic scripture. According to this malam, Western schooling might yield practical, economically useful skills, but Islamic education was crucial to the maintenance of a moral social order; and gender segregation – keeping unrelated men and women separate – was a key symbol of that morality.

The prevailing practice of gender segregation affected my informal social interactions as well. Whereas, in the USA, I often spent time with women friends, in Kano, I initially found myself socializing almost exclusively with men, most of whom were, as I was, in their twenties and unmarried. I began to take notice of the ways these men talked about women. Speaking about marriage, for example,

many of my acquaintances focused intensely on the issue of control. A man needs to 'control' his wife, they said; at the very least he must be made to feel as if he were in control. This notion of control, especially the controllability of a potential wife, lay behind many young men's preferences for the type of woman they said they wanted to marry: village girls are more controllable than city girls, uneducated girls are more controllable than educated ones, and so on.

Conversations about courtship and marriage were challenging for me in a number of ways. Though I had lived more-or-less openly as a gay man in the USA since my late teens, when I went to Nigeria for my fieldwork, I retreated into what I had learned to call 'the closet': I got a short, conservative haircut, removed my earrings, and answered presumptuous questions – like why I wasn't married and whether I had a girlfriend – with evasive headshakes and shrugs. Most ethnographers, it seems, develop doubts about the feasibility of their projects when they go out of the library and into the field. When I began to have doubts, I thought first about how I might be able to bridge the religious and cultural differences between me and the people I was working with; but I also felt a growing desire to do research that would not require me to suppress the philosophical and political commitments I had embraced as an out gay man. My experience was similar in many ways to the challenges faced by other researchers, especially feminists, lesbians and gay men, who have sought to maintain respect for the people and communities they were working with, even when some of those people said or did things that offended the researchers' own beliefs and values.²⁶

As my circle of acquaintances grew and my relationships deepened over time, I made friends with whom I felt comfortable discussing culturally sensitive matters, and who helped me see that northern Nigerian society was far more diverse with respect to gender and sexuality than I had initially recognized. I was especially surprised to find out that Hausa society, and the city of Kano in particular, have a reputation for homosexuality. Many southern Nigerians, for example, deny that there might be men or women in their region who engage in homosexual behavior, and say it's only 'those Muslims' up north (along with decadent Westerners and Arabs) who do that sort of thing. For their part, Hausa people are less inclined to deny the existence of homosexuality in their society than they are to gossip about it, often but not always in disparaging terms. Living

in Kano, I heard rumors about the homosexual proclivities of prominent local men, read sensationalistic newspaper stories about homosexual scandals in boarding schools, and heard reports of police raids on bars and nightclubs frequented by homosexuals.

These social experiences led me back to the scholarly literature on Hausa history, society and culture, where I found tantalizing references to ‘yan daudu in relation to ‘prostitution’ [*karuwanci*] and *Bori*, the Hausa cult of spirit-possession whose practitioners are widely condemned by orthodox Muslims as ‘pagan’ [*arna*] or ‘heathen’ [*kafir*]. In most of these texts the term ‘yan daudu was translated as ‘homosexuals,’ ‘transvestites’ or ‘pimps,’ none of which turned out to be truly accurate, though they all convey a partial sense of ‘yan daudu’s activities and social identities. The most helpful source I found – and the only monograph devoted to ‘yan daudu – was a master’s thesis written by Salisu Abdullahi, a student of sociology at Bayero University, Kano, who later became a lecturer in that department.²⁷ With his encouragement and advice, I began to consider the possibility of changing the focus of my research from malamai to ‘yan daudu.

Academic references and personal contacts thus pointed me to places and events that were far removed, socially if not spatially, from Kano’s Old City, where I lived, and the largely conservative, scholarly circles I had been traveling in. I asked to be taken to *Bori* gatherings, which usually took place late at night in the outskirts of town; and I made my way to other parts of Kano, such as Sabon Gari, where ‘prostitution’ and mixed-sex socializing, along with alcohol and gambling, were more-or-less tolerated. These wanderings taught me a great deal about Hausa social and cultural geography – the ways people, institutions and activities were distributed in space, and the ways people talked about those places. From my previous visits and readings, I was already familiar with the basic distinction between Kano’s *birmi*, the area inside its ancient city walls, and the rest of the city, often called simply *waje* [‘outside’]. A more basic distinction is drawn throughout Hausaland between *gari*, a city or town of any size, and *ƙauye* [‘village, countryside’].²⁸ (A territory with few or no human inhabitants is called *daji* [‘forest, bush’].) These distinctions carry great moral weight, for it was in cities where Islam first established itself in Hausaland hundreds of years ago, while so-called ‘traditional’ [*gargajiya*] and ‘pagan’ [*arna*] customs continued to

dominate in rural areas well into the twentieth century. In Arabic-Islamic terms, the city represents *dār al-Islām*, the abode of Islam, an oasis of restraint surrounded by *dār al-kufr*, the abode of unbelief, where wild, immoral practices prevail. The moral and aesthetic prestige of the city is also expressed in the lexical distinction between people who are said to be *nağari* ['urbane, sophisticated'; literally, 'of town'], while *kauyanci* ['countryness'] denotes poor manners and a lack of sophistication.

While the city is seen as the cradle of Islamic civilization, cities also bring people and things together in ways that can undermine that exalted image. As we will discuss in Chapter 2, for hundreds of years, Muslim leaders in Kano and other Hausa cities have periodically sought to cast out individuals and practices that they define as contrary to Islam. After the British imperial conquest in the early 1900s, activities like drinking, mixed-sex socializing, and spirit-possession [*Bori*] came to be tolerated in newly constructed 'outside' areas such as Sabon Gari [literally, 'New Town'], a residential neighborhood for poor men who were brought from various parts of British West Africa to work in factories, railway yards and other wage-earning occupations. As happened in other colonial African cities, these areas – known in Hausa as *bariki* [from English 'barracks'] – also attracted young rural women whose prospects for work and marriage were derailed by colonial policies that made traditional forms of farming, trade and family life difficult or impossible. 'Prostitution' (a term that often referred to concubinage or other long-term intimate relationships) was one way these women could support themselves and their families of origin; it was also a way to meet potential husbands.²⁹

Sabon Gari was originally built in a rural, sparsely settled area east of the Old City, but as Kano continued to grow over the course of the twentieth century, its location became more geographically central. Only a few kilometers away from the Emir's Palace and the main Friday mosque, Sabon Gari today is adjacent to Kano's most commercially vibrant market and its busiest transportation hub. In addition to a diverse population of Muslim and Christian northerners, the area is home to a large community of migrants from neighboring countries and other parts of Nigeria, many of whom operate video stores, restaurants, barber shops (known in Nigerian English as *barbing saloons*), and auto-parts kiosks. The number of churches

rivals that of mosques, and the sounds of Hausa commingle with those of Igbo, Yoruba, Pidgin English, French, Arabic and other languages; and it is not uncommon – even after the adoption of Shari’a – to see men walking outside in shorts or women with their heads uncovered. (Bariki areas in other cities and towns have become less free-wheeling.)

In spite of its association with cultural ‘Others,’ the bariki is a quintessentially Hausa construct, defined both spatially and socially in opposition to more respectable and homogeneous urban neighborhoods. In day-to-day Hausa discourse, a neighborhood’s degree of moral respectability is often expressed in terms of the marital status of the women who live there. In Zakawa, for example, a roadside community on the outskirts of Kano with a high concentration of bars, hotels and women’s houses, I was told many times that the number of married women (as opposed to ‘prostitutes’) was no greater than ten out of a population of several hundred. This improbable claim reflected the town’s reputation, similar to Sabon Gari’s, as a kind of sin city, where men could go to indulge in alcohol and drugs, attend performances of traditional music and Bori, or meet women, ‘yan daudu or other men for companionship and sex. Barikis are said to be home to ‘worthless people’ [*mutanen banza*] – including karuwai, ‘yan daudu, drug-dealers and thieves – while ‘honorable people’ [*mutanen kirki*], that is, married men and their families, live in areas where ‘women’s houses’ are prohibited. If a married man is forced by poverty or other circumstances to set up his household in a bariki area, he may try to protect his own and his family’s honor by painting the words *MATAN AURE – BA’A SHIGA* [‘Married Women – Do Not Enter’] on the wall outside his home.

After my first personal contacts with ‘yan daudu in the spring of 1993, I spent 12 months over the next year and a half visiting women’s houses, nightclubs and restaurants in Kano. I also took periodic trips outside the city to attend *bikis*, festivities hosted by ‘yan daudu and independent women that are modeled after the parties organized by married Hausa women to celebrate weddings and the naming of babies. All these places and events were open to the (male) public. Over time I established friendly relations with ‘yan daudu in several locations that I began to visit on a regular basis. In addition to several spots in Sabon Gari, these locations included: a restaurant and some ‘yan daudu’s homes in Rijiyar Kuka, another ‘outside’ Kano

neighborhood; a restaurant in the Old City of Katsina, a smaller but equally ancient Hausa emirate located north of Kano, near Nigeria's border with the Republic of Niger; and the market area of Madari, a small town located approximately 200 km southeast of Kano. The overwhelming majority of 'yan daudu I met were Nigerian Hausa Muslims, though some had other ethnic affiliations, especially Fulani. A small number were Muslim, Arabic-speaking immigrants from Chad or Sudan, or Christians with roots in southern or central Nigeria who had been born, raised or educated in the North. I also became acquainted with masu harka, 'men who do the deed,' whose sense of 'honor' [*kirki*] and 'shame' [*kunya*] sometimes made them hesitant to associate publicly with 'yan daudu. One mai harka who was not so hesitant was Mai Kwabo, a married 'civilian' who had many friends and acquaintances in the bariki areas in and around Kano. Because his regular job required his services only intermittently, and because he enjoyed spending time in the bariki, he agreed to work as my assistant in 1993–94.

Mai Kwabo introduced me to a number of the 'yan daudu who helped me in my research, and was instrumental in orchestrating most of the audiotape recordings that are transcribed and analyzed in Chapters 3–5. The number of recordings I was able to make (eight) was limited by 'yan daudu's sensitivity to outside interference in their affairs, and by my hesitation to arouse their suspicions by forcing the issue. Most of my collaborators had had little or no formal education in either the Islamic or Western [*boko*] school systems, and were therefore unfamiliar with the idea of original academic research, especially on topics that are unrelated either to Islamic scripture or to 'modern' subjects such as English, medicine or engineering, which are seen to have practical applications. The very word *bincike* ['research'] was understood by many people to mean government-sponsored spying. It was thus helpful and accurate to emphasize that my interest in 'yan daudu had to do with their celebrated linguistic expertise. Indeed, the tapes I made with my 'yan daudu friends, along with our many unrecorded conversations, did more than help me improve my ability to speak and understand Hausa; they also helped me learn how to use the language to play with and influence others.

When I started to test the waters with respect to changing my research topic from malamai to 'yan daudu, I was concerned about how my local scholarly contacts would react to a shift of focus from

the most respected class of men in Hausa Muslim society to one of the most reviled. The process of changing my topic, therefore, involved not only trying to meet ‘yan daudu, but also paying attention to the ways other people reacted to my new-found interest in them. Following the advice of several Nigerian friends (and the examples of men from my Old City neighborhood whom I occasionally ran into in the bars of Sabon Gari), I was careful not to appear ‘too interested’ in ‘yan daudu, in order to avoid giving the impression that they were fixing me up with female karuwai, or that I was being sexually active with ‘yan daudu themselves. In this context, too, it was helpful and appropriate to frame my research interest in linguistic terms – to say, for example, that I hoped to learn more about the Hausa language from listening to the clever ways ‘yan daudu are said to use *karin magana* [‘proverbs’] and *habaici* [‘innuendo’] (see Chapter 4). As it turned out, my status as a foreigner made it relatively easy for me to move back and forth between places and social settings with different moral reputations. My white skin made me conspicuous, of course, but it often seemed to inoculate me from the social judgments that would likely be passed against a ‘respectable’ Hausa man who socialized openly with ‘yan daudu and other ‘people of the bariki’ [*mutanen bariki*]. (I say ‘seemed to inoculate’ because my sense of my moral reputation sometimes turned out to be naïve. Still, I was repeatedly told by many Nigerian friends that as a white man and foreigner I could get away with morally questionable behaviors that they could not.)

I also became sensitive to the fact that some Hausa Muslims are wary of the interest many Western researchers seem to take in religiously sensitive topics like polygamy and wife-seclusion, or in stigmatized aspects of Hausa culture such as Bori and prostitution. In recent decades, there has been a profusion of research on the lives and experiences of Hausa women;³⁰ there has also been considerable research on practices and institutions that appear to defy orthodox Islamic norms, such as the occupational choices of independent women,³¹ Bori spirit-possession practices;³² charismatic and ecstatic religious movements;³³ youth gangs;³⁴ and controversial genres of popular culture, such as romance novels and video-films.³⁵ Like other researchers, I knew that my questions about Hausa Muslim cultural and religious norms, especially with respect to gender and sexuality, could easily come across as disrespectful – not only towards the

society at large, but also towards the people who were helping me learn about it. This generated an ethical tension that lasted throughout my fieldwork and continues even today. While I have by no means resolved it, this tension has been intellectually and spiritually productive, for I came to see that many ‘yan daudu (and others) had a similarly contradictory relationship with ‘respectable’ Hausa Muslim society, adhering to beliefs and practices that conformed to dominant cultural values, while sometimes saying and doing things that appeared to deviate from those values.

After completing my doctoral fieldwork in 1994, I returned to Nigeria four times, in 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2006. These visits ranged from one to two months each, and occurred during northern Nigeria’s rainy season [*damina*] between the months of May and August. On each trip, I endeavored to revisit my earlier fieldsites in order to greet my friends and acquaintances, to find out how they were doing and how their lives and circumstances had changed. The changes I observed on these visits made me realize that the artifacts I had gathered in the early 1990s – audiotaped conversations, videotapes of bikis, newspapers, invitation cards, fieldnotes – were the products of a particular moment in the history of Kano, Northern Nigeria, and the world, and in the lives of particular individuals (including myself). With respect to the ethnographic statements I make in this book, therefore, when I use the present tense, I do so because it is my understanding that they describe Northern Nigerian social life at the moment of this writing. Otherwise, I use the past tense, in order to emphasize that my observations were historically specific, not timeless reflections of an unchanging Hausa Muslim culture.³⁶ I have also tried to refrain from referring to ‘cultures’ and ‘societies’ as naturally existing, monolithic entities (‘Hausa culture,’ ‘yan daudu society,’ ‘Western culture,’ etc.) except as these concepts have been imagined, talked and written about by others. When I do use such expressions, I hope not to overlook the fluid nature of ‘societies’ and ‘cultures’ or the diversity and inequality that inevitably exist within and between them.

One of the most important historical developments of the last decade, for ‘yan daudu and for all Nigerians, has been the explosion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Unlike eastern, central and southern Africa, where HIV/AIDS began decimating communities in the 1980s, West Africa did not experience the ravages of the disease on a wide

scale until the following decade. In the early 1990s, the Nigerian government was only beginning to address the epidemic and the topic was rarely discussed in the press or in everyday conversation. Among the ‘yan daudu and masu harka whom I met at that time, I knew of only one young man who was said to have died of *kanjamau* [‘slimming’], as AIDS is called in Hausa. (The word *AIDS* is also used.) By the time I returned in 1997, however, several of my friends and acquaintances had fallen ill or died with symptoms that seemed to indicate advanced HIV infection, though the cause of death was often described as emaciation [*rama*], tuberculosis [*tarin tibi*] or simply ‘lack of health’ [*rashin lafiya*].

Also in the last decade, historical developments occurred in two other social fields – politics and popular culture – that had a transformative effect on ‘yan daudu and on Northern Nigerian society at large. In the political realm, the sudden death in 1998 of Nigeria’s military dictator, Sani Abacha, paved the way for national elections in which Olusegun Obasanjo, an army general and former military ruler, was chosen to become the country’s first civilian president since the last one had been overthrown by a coup d’état in 1983. Abacha, like most of Nigeria’s previous heads of state, was a Hausa-speaking Muslim (born and raised in Kano), while Obasanjo is a Yoruba Christian. Less than five months after Obasanjo’s inauguration in May 1999, the state of Zamfara adopted Shari’a, and within a year and a half, eleven other states had followed suit. Although a number of political leaders and commentators insisted that the adoption of Shari’a violated constitutional provisions against the establishment of a state religion, the Obasanjo administration did not formally challenge it. The federal government thus averted a political crisis that some feared could escalate into civil war.

I arrived in Kano in June 2000 shortly before the state government staged an elaborate public ceremony ‘launching’ Shari’a. As the largest state in the region, its ceremony attracted hundreds of thousands of people (including several ‘yan daudu friends of mine) and a host of dignitaries from as far away as Libya and Saudi Arabia. In preparation for the ceremony the government mobilized police and posses of Shari’a-enforcers known as *hisbas* to go around the state warning bar-owners of the impending ban on alcoholic beverages and admonishing ‘prostitutes’ [*karuwai*] to get married or to leave the state. ‘Yan daudu were also targeted by this moral purification

campaign. According to the *New Nigerian*, a government-owned newspaper, ridding the state of ‘yan daudu and karuwai would “boost morals” and “check vices,” creating the social conditions necessary for the full implementation of Shari’a later that year; and the improvement of public morality along Islamic lines would lead to justice and prosperity for all.³⁷ A number of ‘yan daudu and independent women were evicted from the ‘women’s houses’ where they lived and worked. Some took refuge with family or friends, while others fled to states where Shari’a had not been adopted. Most remained in Kano, where they were vulnerable to harassment, arrest and occasional violence that was sponsored, or at least tolerated, by the state. Similar circumstances befell ‘yan daudu and independent women in other Northern states.

When I returned to Nigeria in 2002, I was apprehensive about how Shari’a might have affected my friends who were ‘yan daudu or independent women. Would I even be able to find them? In most cases, if they had left their old homes and places of work, I would have no easy way of tracking them down; they didn’t have telephones or mailing addresses. As things turned out, I did not manage to find most of my old friends, but Shari’a was not the main reason. HIV/AIDS and other illnesses had killed some of them; others had moved to other parts of Nigeria or to Saudi Arabia, usually for economic reasons. The consequences of Shari’a were uneven and contradictory, and fell harder on independent women than they did on ‘yan daudu. Independent women who ran restaurants in Kano and other large cities were generally left alone, while women who were believed to practice ‘prostitution’ had to get married or find a ‘legitimate’ occupation – no easy task for women who were poor, uneducated and estranged from their families. Independent women fared even worse in smaller towns like Madari, where they were forced to give up even ‘legitimate’ businesses.

Recent developments in media technology and popular culture have also proved challenging to the proponents of Shari’a. One such development is the Hausa-language film industry, which has grown exponentially since the late 1990s thanks to the widespread availability of inexpensive video production equipment, videocassette recorders and, most recently, digital video technology. Based in Kano, the Hausa video-film industry has produced hundreds of comedies and dramas and created a new class of film ‘stars’ [*taurari*] whose lives

are a matter of intense public interest. The Hausa film industry's success is one result of the liberalization of Nigeria's economy that has taken place in the past 20 years, largely at the behest of international financial institutions and multinational corporations. In Northern Nigeria, these changes have enhanced the influence of wealthy local businessmen, many of whom subscribe to Islamic reformist ideologies that privilege individual piety, and individual success or failure, as opposed to older Islamic movements, like the Sufi orders, that emphasize group worship and loyalty to traditional hierarchies.³⁸ Yet capitalist competition requires producers to attract mass audiences through marketing strategies that cultivate consumers' aesthetic and emotional desires, which can clash with the sober norms of reformist Islam. Tellingly, much as their predecessors did with respect to movie houses in previous eras, some Islamic clerics have condemned Hausa films for promoting immorality and have called for the closing of commercial video parlors.³⁹ For their part, the industry's executives and artists consistently defend their films as socially enlightening and consistent with Islamic principles. These responses highlight some of the cultural contradictions that have surfaced in recent years, complicating efforts by Islamic reformists to construct a Northern Nigerian public unified by its commitment to normative Islam.

Outline of the Book

Subsequent chapters are organized as follows.

Chapter 2: People of the Bariki surveys how representations of 'yan daudu, 'prostitutes' and Bori practitioners changed in the decades before this project began, and connects these changes with the rise of Islamic Northern Nigerian nationalism.

Chapter 3: Out in the Open considers the relationship between *daudu* as an occupation and *dān daudu* as a public identity by examining *dān daudu*'s stories about how they 'went into daudu' and the intimate relationships they formed with other 'yan daudu and with 'men.'

Chapter 4: Women's Talk, Men's Secrets describes how 'yan daudu use 'feminine' ways of speaking to convey 'secret' meanings about sex and other experiences, and relates these practices to

the in-group code used by ‘yan daudu and other ‘men who seek men.’

Chapter 5: Playing with Faith describes how ‘yan daudu use humor to ‘play’ with what it means to be Hausa and Muslim, and the ways they negotiate limits on what I call their ‘faithful irreverence.’

Chapter 6: Men on Film compares representations of ‘yan daudu in two audiovisual texts – a commercial feature film and videotape of a ‘dan daudu’s biki – and relates these to changing definitions of Northern Nigerian ‘nationhood’ and what it means to be a Hausa Muslim man.

Chapter 7: Lost and Found in Translation considers recent ‘exposés’ of ‘homosexuality’ in Northern Nigeria as evidence of a global trend toward sexual explicitness that is at odds with the playful, humorous practices of ‘yan daudu.

Epilogue: May God Keep a Secret describes the fates of the people and places whose stories you have read. (Note that pseudonyms are used for all people and places, except for public figures, large cities and Sabon Gari.)

Notes

- 1 Of the twelve Nigerian states that have adopted Shari’a, native speakers of Hausa form the majority in nine (Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara). Hausa is widely spoken as a second language and lingua franca in the remaining three (Borno, Niger, Yobe) and in several neighboring states (especially Adamawa, Nassarawa, Plateau, Taraba).
- 2 Kleis and Abdullahi (1983).
- 3 White (1990).
- 4 See Pittin (2003) for a richly detailed account of the lives of independent women in the northern Nigerian city of Katsina in the late twentieth century.
- 5 Okonta and Douglas (2001).
- 6 Pittin (2003); Umar (1993); Pierce (2003).
- 7 I use ‘Northern’ (with a capital ‘N’) to refer to the ethno-regional community whose members are imagined to be unified by adherence to Islam and proficiency in Hausa (as either first or second language). The former British Protectorate of Northern Nigeria included this region along with others – many in what is now called the Middle

- Belt – where the majority of residents were (and in many cases still are) neither Muslim nor native speakers of Hausa.
- 8 I use the phrase “Islamic reformist” to refer to social movements that seek to bring Muslims’ social practices into conformity with the norms that prevailed in the earliest Muslim community during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. To the extent that such movements advocate or engage in political action, I call them ‘Islamist’ (Soares 2005; Kane 2003; Umar 1993).
 - 9 Habermas (1989); Gal and Kligman (2000); Calhoun (1993).
 - 10 Hochschild (1983); Abu-Lughod (1986); Lutz and Abu-Lughod (1990).
 - 11 Stevenson (1997); Rosaldo (1997).
 - 12 Lave and Wenger (1991); Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992); Wenger (1998).
 - 13 Anderson (1991).
 - 14 Low (1999); Pellow (2008); Gregory (1999); Modan (2007); Harvey (2006); Sassen (2001).
 - 15 Evans (1993); Kaplan (1997); Leap (2004a).
 - 16 Chauncey (1994).
 - 17 For other ethnographic treatments of the use of *gay* and related terms in cross-cultural settings, see Johnson (1997); Kulick (1998); Murray (2000); Manalansan (2003); Sinnott (2004); Boellstorf (2005); Valentine (2007).
 - 18 Surgical transsexualism is not available in Nigeria and was unknown to many of the ‘yan daudu with whom I talked about the issue. I never heard any ‘yan daudu mention transsexualism as an option they would like to have available to them.
 - 19 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3615082.stm>
 - 20 Roscoe (1991); Williams (1986); Whitehead (1981); Epple (1998); Gilley (2006).
 - 21 Nanda (1990); Hall (1995a, 1997).
 - 22 Said (1978, 1981, 1993).
 - 23 Ahmed (1992). See also Stoler (1995).
 - 24 The photograph, taken by Ryan Lash, accompanied articles written by Norimitsu Onishi on December 8, 1999, and January 29, 2000.
 - 25 Bachrach (2003).
 - 26 Leap and Lewin (1996); Kulick and Willson (1995).
 - 27 Abdullahi (1984).
 - 28 Yusuf (1974).
 - 29 Cf. White (1990), Stoler (1995), Ferguson (1999).
 - 30 Callaway (1987), Coles and Mack (1991); Hutson (1999, 2001); Werthmann (1997, 2000); Cooper (1997); Nast (2005).

- 31 Pittin (1983, 2003); Cooper (1995); Masquelier (1995).
- 32 Besmer (1983); Masquelier (2001); O'Brien (2007); Krings (1999).
- 33 Casey (1998); Watts (1999); O'Brien (2007).
- 34 Last (1991); Casey (2008).
- 35 Whitsitt (1998); Larkin (2002b; 2008); Adamu (2006); Furniss (2003).
- 36 Fabian (1983).
- 37 *New Nigerian* (2000). See Last (2008) for a historical-ethnographic account of the *hisbas*.
- 38 Grégoire (1993); Kane (2003); Mahmood (2003); Soares (2005).
- 39 Larkin (2002a, 2008); Bauchi (2005).