Chapter 1

In Search of the Post-Cold War World Order: Questions, Issues, and Perspectives

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It has become somewhat trivial to argue against the thesis that we are living in an age characterized by “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). Now, roughly two decades since the Cold War ended and a new era dawned in international relations, we witness little in the way of a total and complete victory of democratic and capitalist forces and peaceful, wealthy, and harmonious relations between states. The US emerged as the dominant state in global politics but found itself fighting no fewer than four separate wars and mired in two of them. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) went to war for the first time in its history. Genocide raised its ugly head in Africa and Europe. Regional conflicts pared down efforts at collaboration in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and recently in Europe. International terrorism, all too familiar during the previous era, hit again nearly all regions of the world and uniquely in the US. Inequality within and between states has continued to increase. Norms of democratization, human rights, and nuclear non-proliferation are much more vigorously contested in a variety of regions than one would suspect in a time of peaceful and harmonious relations.

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Globalization has accelerated, yet unevenly, in terms of both scope and benefits. Climate change is no longer contested scientifically, and it augurs a dire future. Scarcity in natural resources, particularly water and oil, along with rising energy and food costs, threatens security. International cooperation between Northern and Southern states, developed within trade regimes of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), has appeared to have ground to a halt (at least for the Doha Round of negotiations). The near-collapse of the global financial system in late 2008 has shown that governance in this sector (or, the lack of it) has been inadequate, while globalization has caused the crisis to shift very swiftly from one company to another, from one sector to another, and from one country to another.

Unlike academics such as Fukuyama, policy makers never expected the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War to be a panacea for the world’s ills, and few expected the “end of history.” However one may wish to call this new era in global politics, it seems safe to argue that the world remains in many ways at least as troublesome as before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It appears as well that the ways and means of governing contemporary world issues are insufficient or inadequate for the challenges posed by the contemporary international community, and that there may be need for approaches to global governance different from the structures that limped in from the Cold War. The clearest articulation of an intention to build and manage a new world in the wake of the Cold War came from George H. W. Bush at the beginning of his term as the President of the United States:

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment … Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective – a new world order – can emerge: a new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony … Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we’ve known.¹ … [And six months later] … Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order.²

Of course, optimism about the emergence of “new” in international politics had much to do with the fact that the Soviet Union collapsed as a superpower.³ Yet, almost two decades on, there is still an ongoing debate among the policy makers and in the scholarly literature (Drezner, 2008; Ikenberry, 2003; Stein, 2008) on the following questions: What is or could
be this new world order? How different is it or can it be from the previous one? What are or may be its consequences for international relations?

The purpose of this book is to explore the features of this (emerging) new world order by addressing these and related fundamental questions. Previous answers in the literature vary greatly, and range from calls for reconsideration of the great power structure in the world, through arguments that the emerging new world order would be dominated by various transnational networks (Slaughter, 2004), to somewhat optimistic anticipation of “cosmopolitan democracy” as a foundation of the global institutional architecture (Held, 1995; Archibugi et al., 1998). It appears that the answers depend often on differences surrounding competing theoretical perspectives, the issues being considered as paramount in international relations, and access to available data.

Our conception of world order (new or old) is nearly as eclectic as the international relations literature. However, the tasks we pursue in this volume restrict the exploration of the order to the constellation of intergovernmental organizations being created – or failing to be created – in international and regional politics, and a range of effects that such creations have on the relations between states. We recognize (below and in Figure 1.1) that the concept of world order is far broader than our focus; we note where we fit into the larger conceptualization and we seek to extrapolate some of our findings beyond the constellation of organizations that promote cooperation between states. Yet we wish to stress the caveat that an examination of the entire order is beyond the scope of this (or most other single) volume(s).

By world order, we are referring to patterns of relationships over time that are structured by mechanisms and actors to make socio-political interactions across state boundaries predictable and manageable. There is much to include in such a generic definition, including the distribution and control of global military and economic capabilities, and the development and maintenance of norms, rules, institutions, and organizations. Furthermore, the definition is not meant to be deterministic: while distributions of global military/political/economic capabilities may reflect the potential for global or regional leadership by certain actors, we assume that there are far more factors at play in the creation and maintenance of global mechanisms that shape the contours of world order than material capabilities. Thus, in our conceptualization, while conditions of unipolarity or multipolarity may matter, they are not deterministic in identifying new or existing world orders.
In fact, the extent to which changing material capabilities and the actions of strong states can create new world order – new structures and, resulting from them, new norms, new patterns of relationships, and new methods of addressing global and regional issues, as articulated in the statements of President Bush – is a matter of much controversy and needs to be subjected to substantial empirical analysis. The work that follows seeks to slice into this broad definition by focusing on subsets of world order: changes in organizational structures and norms emanating from such organizational structures, and linking the presence or absence of such changes to patterns of relationships between states. In this manner, while we will not be able to assess whether or not all the dimensions of world order have changed, we will be able to scrutinize more closely whether or not salient subsets of world order have undergone change, and the consequences they may have produced for post-Cold War international relations.

**Conceptualizing World Order**

What is meant by world order and related concepts such as global governance depends in large part on one’s theoretical perspective and the assumptions such a perspective brings to the study of international politics. Neorealism, as the most influential theoretical approach in studying international relations, assumes that the international system operates under conditions of anarchy (Waltz, 1979). Accepting the anarchy assumption (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003:126) narrows the new world order focus to the distribution and control of military/political/economic resources and gives rise to debates about whether or not the new system is unipolar and conditions under which it will likely transform to bipolarity or multipolarity (Waltz, 1993).

While parsimonious, we find the approach driving the assumption of anarchy – the absence of such governance structures modeled on how states are organized – too narrow for understanding how governance operates in international affairs. It is clear that states struggle against anarchy, and, depending on their capabilities, desires, and the costs involved at any particular time, can succeed in various ways to create relatively enduring mechanisms that make governance at the system level consistently possible for significant periods of time. In turn, many states agree to abide by norms, rules, and procedural mechanisms created by institutions to resolve either
problems and conflicts or issues of coordination. Whether they do so because of enforcement mechanisms or because other alternatives are perceived to be more costly, these uses of global (and regional) governance mechanisms are not completely dissimilar to structures and processes in domestic political systems that lead citizens to opt generally to live within a system of rules for reasons other than the high probability of sanctions and central government enforcement.

This picture – suggesting varying ways that anarchy in international affairs can be reduced – may not conform to the idea of governance through a centralized government that has a monopoly on the distribution of goods and values in many domestic political systems. It is, however, a significant distance from the assumption of the constancy of anarchy. We recognize as well that governance mechanisms are supported and made possible by states, but we feel that this simply adds to the decentralized character of governance, rather than being equated with anarchy.

Thus, and consistent with much of the implicit emphasis in international relations scholarship, we suggest that rather than being a constant condition, anarchy should be treated as a variable that fluctuates with time, circumstance, the extent of decentralized organization of international politics, and the capability and willingness of states to create mechanisms of governance. Treating anarchy as a variable appears to be consistent with a variety of theoretical approaches to understanding international politics. Even those close to neorealists, including power transition theorists (Tammen et al., 2000) and long-cycle theorists (Rasler and Thompson, 1994), who either focus on hierarchies of power relations or on global leaders and challengers, nevertheless include as critical the articulation of sets of rules and norms established primarily by leading powers for the entire operation of the interstate system. Liberal institutionalists (Keohane, 1984; Ikenberry, 2001) offer a more decentralized view of global order, yet articulate as well constellations of organizations, institutions, regimes, etc., that when treated together appear to demonstrate substantial order to international politics. Social constructivists are even more dismissive of the anarchy assumption (Wendt, 1992, 1996). Taken as a whole, this scholarship seems not so much to suggest that anarchy is a constant, but to focus persistently on the question of variation: how much anarchy is there at any point in time and under what conditions does it vary?

For those who see anarchy as a constant, the conception of world order is quite narrow, and based around capabilities. For those who see anarchy as a variable, the conception of world order is quite complex, involving
broad-issue areas of governance with myriad organizations, institutions, regimes, norms, and laws created to facilitate interaction, cooperation, and coordination in international relations.

One Dimension of World Order: The Constellation of Intergovernmental Organizations

Classic realist theorists saw institutions, not as the product of cooperation, but as collusion among the most powerful states in the international system to codify rules that benefited the powerful to the detriment of others. Realist theory provided two mechanisms for explaining how intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) functioned: (1) organizations allowed powerful states to set the agenda and determine the distribution of gains among members and (2) they allowed powerful states to bind the policies of other states in a formal setting through the use of incentives given through issue-linkages (Schweller and Priess, 1997). A modified structural realist view holds that IGOs matter because they create stability by filling the gap between “rising political participation and weak governing institutions” and by offering reward incentives to member-states to avoid extreme destabilizing behavior, to manage nuclear proliferation, and to provide a forum for weaker states to voice concerns (Snidal, 1991). Both of the realist views, however, perceive institutions as primarily a reflection of the desires of the world leader(s) and as a means to preserve the status quo.

Rationalists hold that IGOs matter chiefly by facilitating information exchange, monitoring compliance, facilitating issue linkage, defining cheating, and thus promoting cooperation (Keohane, 1984; Katzenstein et al., 1998). The neoliberal institutionalist approach shares some of the realist mechanisms, such as monitoring and issue linkages, but also emphasizes that IGOs enhance cooperation through extending the shadow of the future and enhancing the reputation costs associated with behavior. Institutionalist theory focused a great deal of attention on the role of international organizations and cooperative agreements, but paid little attention until recently to distinctions among agreements and institutions. It is only lately that much more work has been done to focus on the nature of changing institutional designs both for organizations and for international agreements (Haftel, 2007; Boehmer et al., 2004).

The differentiation of IGOs by how they are designed at the micro level at times ignores the larger macro issues involved with the changing dynamics
of the international system. We recognize that our thicker conception of world order is multidimensional in nature and a full treatment of how the order has changed over time needs to address ultimately its various dimensions. Figure 1.1 seeks to illustrate the large universe of cooperative arrangements, containing spaces where both IGOs and NGOs may operate, within the context of bilateral and multilateral approaches, and intersected further by issue areas of concerns (two issue areas are noted as illustrations). We have noted as well in the figure differentiation of organizations based on both organizational design and geographical scope.

The international relations literature has yet to accomplish the enormous task of accounting for all of the arrangements at work in our illustration, and especially how different dimensions of cooperative arrangements are linked to each other. At this point, it would be difficult to establish whether changes across dimensions move in tandem or if they are driven by different factors and consequently some change more slowly and some not at all while others undergo dramatic changes in response to systemic turbulence and shifts in priorities in international politics. Limitations of resources, time, and expertise make that comprehensive analysis impractical here. Instead, we focus on only one dimension of world order – the constellation of IGOs operating in international politics – and explore the extent to which its architecture has changed from the previous era. Since the role of IGOs in the larger world order literature has been mixed at best, and to the extent that realists and neorealists have articulated conceptions of world order, the assumption of an international system that operates under conditions of anarchy has minimized the salience of IGOs. This book has been structured to address the importance of the IGO dimension, both formal institutional (functional) and normative (legal).

While we address a variety of IGOs in this book, a primary focus is on a subset of them that we have labeled formal intergovernmental organizations (FIGOs). FIGOs are differentiated from other IGOs over a variety of organizational attributes (e.g., centralization and autonomy) that are discussed in the following chapter, and contain characteristics that we expect to be associated with governance mechanisms in international relations that are most likely to produce a variety of effects on the behavior of states, their interactions with each other, and their abilities to coordinate and collaborate with each other. Some of the chapters below compare FIGO effects with the effects of more generic IGOs (nFIGOs); some of the chapters probe conditions under which FIGOs are not being created in sufficient numbers, or in some cases, not created at all.
Furthermore, while we note, where appropriate, findings from other researchers that may reflect similar or different outcomes from other dimensions, we recognize that the resulting picture we draw of change and continuity across two eras is limited to only one aspect of world order, and will require additional work to create a more comprehensive picture of global (and regional governance). So why focus on IGOs and in a narrower sense, FIGOs, at all? Several reasons make this dimension of governance salient for further consideration. First, arguably IGOs constitute an important aspect of the Kantian peace proposed by researchers studying interstate conflict (Russett et al., 1998; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Oneal and Russett, 1999). While far from uncontested, these findings suggest that dynamics operating inside IGOs ameliorate conflicts between states and therefore the constellations of IGOs operating in international politics appear to matter. Which IGOs, how much, and why they matter are far more controversial questions, but answers to these questions may create some significant insights into the extent to which varying constellations of IGOs may reduce the extent of anarchy operating in international politics.

Another reason to focus on IGOs is because states (and other actors) have invested heavily in the creation and maintenance of IGOs and these organizations have especially proliferated over the past half century. From a small handful in the early nineteenth century, the number of IGOs has grown over time and virtually exploded since the early 1960s. We assume that there is some salience in these numbers. IGO formation is expensive; furthermore, some organizations that have been created require at least minimal sacrifices to state sovereignty and at times may work against the interests of even their more powerful members. By their sheer numbers and the costs and risks involved in their creation and functioning, IGOs are presumably judged by states as being important and useful for the conduct of international relations, and for their own foreign policy objectives.

Another important argument in favor of studying IGOs is that over the past century, the pattern of IGO creation has marched in tandem with fundamental systemic change in global affairs and efforts to reconstruct the nature of world order. This was the case following the end of World War II as the US and its allies created a broad constellation of IGOs that would institutionalize both security and economic arrangements in the postwar order. As we note in the following chapter, the architecture of IGOs grew by some 67 percent in a 15-year period following the end of hostilities. Even after World War I, Woodrow Wilson’s efforts to create new principles of global order, while withering before the loss of domestic support in the US,
nevertheless led to the creation of a substantial constellation of new IGOs within 15 years after the end of that global conflict. It seems reasonable to assume that during a similar time frame following the end of the Cold War, we should be able to uncover a substantial set of changes in and growth of IGOs, reflecting the aspirations of foreign policy makers in key states to restructure the nature of world order.

Of course, the regional and global architecture is composed of more than simply FIGOs, and the extent to which they can function properly depends in large part on the interests of states that constitute the IGO membership. In fact, as with much of the literature, we differentiate between IGOs and other types of cooperative arrangements (as noted in Figure 1.1), such as ad hoc agreements, ongoing non-institutionalized collaborative meetings between states, sub-units of other IGOs, or institutions controlled by other IGOs or dominated by non-state members (NGOs). Yet, this does not imply that these cooperative arrangements carry no salience for the relationships between states. In fact, we point to areas where formal IGO development is being replaced by “looser” cooperative arrangements, as in the case of trans-boundary cooperation over water issues.

Finally, the literature on IGOs is only beginning to assess systematically the organizational architecture in the post-Cold War world. Previously, there have been three such stocktaking exercises that have sought to make an inventory of IGOs, either at one point in time (Jacobson et al., 1986), or to assess changes over time (Shanks et al., 1996; Cupitt et al., 1996). The two longitudinal studies cease their analyses at a very early point in the post-Cold War era, and consequently neither one of them has been able to compare systematically IGO architecture after the Cold War with the period prior. In addition to that, it is important to view IGOs as part of the international system; studying the institutional architecture in general, and IGOs in particular, in isolation from the processes that happen within and around them, would have little explanatory value. Thus, the present book complements the comparative analysis of the IGO architecture by placing patterns of change and continuity into the larger context of the roles taken by states in changing the nature of IGOs, and vice versa, before and after the Cold War.

Within such a framework, the present volume is primarily concerned with five mutually related sets of issues with regard to this particular dimension of world order, analyzed in the context of tectonic changes and marked by the end of the Cold War. The first is about conditions under which states are willing and able to create and sustain IGOs as a means to structure a
regional and/or global world order. The second concerns the readiness of states to participate actively, as members in IGOs and relevant cooperative arrangements, should issues that require collective action occur, especially when participation can create some significant costs for states. The third concern is about the impact that such IGOs have on the ongoing relationships between states, and the extent to which those impacts have changed as global conditions have changed. The fourth is about the willingness of states to honor commitments they had agreed to as members of IGOs and other cooperative arrangements or, in other words, whether or not states have been able and/or willing to help an institution achieve its basic goals (such as to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as put forth in Article I of the UN Charter). In exploring these issues, a final point becomes clear and is wedded throughout to our analyses: the absence of IGOs (in a region, an issue area, etc.) can convey as much information, and oftentimes more, about the state of international relations than their presence.

Answering these questions from the perspective of the development and performance of IGOs (and with an eye to other cooperative arrangements) will help us to conclude how much has really changed after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, in terms of both the institutional and normative architecture, and whether we have truly witnessed the emergence of a new global world order. As the reader will note in the chapters that follow, we do not find a radically changed constellation of cooperative institutions corresponding to what would be expected either from the pronouncements of policy makers or from the turbulence that was created by the end of the Cold War. However, before turning to a detailed description of what lies in the greater part of the book, we first look more closely at the concept of intergovernmental organizations, both theoretically and empirically, in order to provide a foundation for the coming chapters.

*Conceptualizing IGOs and FIGOs*

It has been noted that the counting of IGOs is a matter of definition. Numerous questions arise in choosing the relevant units of analysis: should one include those IGOs created by states or also those that are created by other IGOs (emanations); include those with two or more members or only those with more than two members; include those whose membership is primarily made up of states or allow a mix of state and non-state
members; include those that meet seldom as well as those that meet regularly;\textsuperscript{11} include only those with substantial bureaucracies or also those with minimal bureaucracies?\textsuperscript{12} In most large-N empirical studies, the operational definition of an IGO uses the Correlates of War (COW) definition, requiring that an organization be a formal entity, with three or more sovereign states as members, and possess a permanent secretariat or other “indication of institutionalization such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff” (Pevehouse et al., 2005:9–10). Depending on how one chooses to identify what an IGO is, the number, character, and potential effects of IGos change dramatically.

Unfortunately, too often the conceptual and operational definition of what constitutes an IGO is left to convention or the practical availability of an existing database that may have already defined the subject. The core concept of international organization, as it has evolved in the international relations literature, gives researchers a broad idea of the population of the universe, but provides few objective criteria by which observations can be identified. Although there is no single, consensual definition of IGos, the core concept can be found through induction of previous systematic attempts to classify and identify IGos. There have been three major efforts to quantify the population of IGos in the international system and each of these previous efforts employed empirical criteria (Wallace and Singer, 1970; Jacobson et al., 1986; Shanks et al., 1996; Pevehouse et al., 2003). Through the overlap of those criteria, there is a hint at the broader concept shared throughout the literature. These previous approaches sought to distinguish IGos from other events in international relations such as agreements, singular or ongoing meetings between states that are not institutionalized, or organizations that are either dependent on another institution or are controlled by non-state actors.

Abbot and Snidal (1998) provide much of the appropriate core concept. They identify two crucial dimensional aspects of formal\textsuperscript{13} IGos: centralization and independence – centralization of collective decision-making and the collective actions taken by member-states and independence for the organization to act with a degree of autonomy within a defined sphere. However, while their delineation of the core concept is generally in line with empirical observations, the core concept gives little guidance as to when an entity qualifies as an IGO. While the researcher can use the core concept to distinguish between the extremes – a summit meeting is not an IGO whereas the UN is – it provides little assistance in identifying those
that fall between the poles. The core concept also lacks direction on how to
delineate between types of organizations that share dimensional character-
istics that set them apart from others. Moreover, while the core concept
can be properly used to explain how IGOs affect the international system,
causal theory general enough to apply to the quasi-specified population of
organizations hinted at by the core concept cannot also explain the varia-
tion in organizational effects observed across temporal-spatial geography,
nor may it specify mechanisms that are unique to the different typologies of
IGOs. Addressing these concerns, researchers have turned to constructing
concepts with more field utility – systemized concepts that include specific
dimensional mechanisms that make definite identification of observations
possible and practical.

The construction of a systemized concept requires an adjusted balance
among a standard set of criteria (Gerring, 1999:367). Research on inter-
governmental organizations requires that special attention be paid to the
balance between coherence, differentiation, theoretical utility, and field
utility. The relevant population of institutions depends on the research
question at hand. Basing systematized concept construction off of the needs
of the theoretical question results in models that are more internally con-
sistent and that have improved predictive validity.

Systemic concepts are central to theories that seek to explain differences
between membership, effects, and operation of IGOs. Neo-liberals and
constructivists argue that the increasingly dense network of organizations
is altering state sovereignty and mediating environmental processes that
seek to undermine cooperation. For example, Beckfield (2003) demon-
strates that IGOs affect the world polity through formulation of economic,
military, and social policies and through the significant dedication of
resources by states which bind their policies to those of the IGO. This argu-
ment centers on specific dimensional characteristics of IGOs and should
necessarily group organizations accordingly. Other IGO research focuses
on the peace-encouraging effects of IGOs and is specifically concerned with
the effects of dispute resolution mechanisms, a clearly identifiable dimen-
sion that is not present among all IGOs (Smith, 2000; Russett et al., 1998).
Neorealist theory suggests that IGOs affect member-states through the
binding of policies via costly membership, information exchange, and issue
cross-linkage. Variance among these attributes is so broad that the theory
itself suggests a threshold below which membership will have few of the
expected effects and therefore the theory requires a concept that permits
differentiation.
Chapter 2 provides an illustration of the transition from core concept to the appropriate systematic concept. The chapter focuses on ascertaining the extent to which a formal, institutional dimension of a “new world order” is being created after the end of the Cold War. It thus broadly assumes that the creation of organizations with little bureaucratic organization and very limited autonomy are less useful in stabilizing a new world order than a network of organizations that are bureaucratically stable and autonomous (at least in terms of achieving a minimal threshold for both). Likewise, it may be far easier to construct organizations that have neither of these characteristics than ones that do. Including organizations with little or no autonomy or bureaucratic stability would dilute the predictive validity of a model that explains the importance of great power strength in formal institutional construction. As a consequence, the systematic concept developed with the appropriate field utility is that of FIGO.

Thus, due to the focus of our research, several of the authors in this volume are interested in a particular cross-section of IGOs. The organizations they concern themselves with represent the “strongest” of the IGO population. As we have already indicated, they require significant resources to be created. They involve major commitments by states to multilateral means by requiring not only some degree of sacrificed autonomy on the part of individual states but also recognition that a non-state entity in turn gains autonomy. Thus, the research questions we raise particularly in Chapters 2 and 3 about the changing nature of the world order direct us to a systematized conceptualization of IGOs that is likely to represent only a small portion of the total IGO population and unlikely to be spread evenly across issue/geographic areas.

It is important to note, however, that this class of IGO is not always the norm. In certain issue areas, states may prefer the flexibility provided by ad hoc agreements or less institutionalized organizations. This is likely to pertain to issue areas that are hotly contested by the relevant states, perhaps where a “one problem at a time” mentality dominates and extremely formalized and stylized interaction is unpalatable. Likewise, issue areas that experience rapid changes, such as in technology or environmental preservation, may be more closely associated with more flexible organizational forms (as we see below in Chapter 5). The presence or absence of major powers in the region, as well as outside powers penetrating the region, may greatly influence the degree of desired IGO “strength” by participants (noted in Chapter 8 on the Mediterranean “region”). Therefore, we have chosen to approach our inquiry by following the dynamics associated with the FIGO classification in Chapters 2, 3, and 6, while in Chapters 4, 5, 7, and 8 we
Thomas J. Volgy et al. explore the FIGO focus further by comparing the emergence of FIGOs (global, interregional, regional and subregional FIGOs, GIGOs, IRGOs, RGOs and SRGOs, respectively) with looser arrangements, or in the context of specific issue areas (transboundary water issues, acceptance of human rights norms). Critical and common to all these chapters is an awareness of the differences in IGO subpopulations and the extent to which such conceptual and empirical differentiation needs to be theoretically driven.17

Figure 1.1 illustrates the universe of cooperative arrangements. These range from the most informal, ad hoc agreements (represented by the area with dots) to more formal arrangements, such as IGOs and multilateral
treaties. We do not present Figure 1.1 as an argument for any specific theoretical question or framework. Rather, it serves as an illustration demonstrating a possible cross-section of organizations overlaid by pertinent issue areas for a hypothetical question. For this hypothetical question, there appears to be economic and security causal mechanisms that are driving the selection of organizations for analysis.

Coverage by issue area can and does range from utilizing all forms of cooperative agreements, as seen in the realm of human rights, to narrowly tailored issue areas as in the coordination of air-traffic between two neighboring countries, which would most likely only concern the bilateral treaty subset of institutions. Each issue area may have a different coverage area and the cooperative institution(s) involved will consist of different subsets. Across the universe of cooperative arrangements, the inclusion/exclusion of germane arrangements depends on the question at hand. Figure 1.1’s graphic representation of relevant institutions augments our theoretical argument regarding properly specified definitions and models. The graphic is also a much simplified version of the actual architecture; for example, some issue areas overlap, as does organizational development – while organizational infrastructure may be built for one issue area, it can be found to be useful (and utilized) for another (Powers, 2004).

Regarding the relative strength of organizations, it has been assumed that the creation of constellations of IGOs to help structure world order and to struggle against anarchy (which includes getting states to opt into these organizations and has effects on members’ foreign policies) cannot likely be accomplished through weak IGOs as long as states are still the primary units in international politics. Weak IGOs include those that are not created by states (emanations) and therefore not formally sanctioned by them. Furthermore, even if created by states, organizations differ in terms of their internal structure and functioning. Weak organizations lack the structural capacity to impact on the behavior and interaction of their members and on the organizations’ outputs. Likewise, organizations with highly circumscribed functions may have limited effects on the broader external environment as well as on the range of foreign policy behaviors of their members.

Chapters 4 and 6 illustrate further when FIGOs should be the pertinent conceptualization of intergovernmental organizational collaboration. In Chapter 4 the authors specifically examine the distinction between FIGOs and nFIGOs in analyzing a geopolitical space (post-Communist states in East Europe and Central Asia) undergoing redefinition in organizational architecture after the end of the Cold War and the struggle by Russia to
reestablish control over a physical area it had previously dominated. The FIGO classification provides a threshold by which the authors can point to serious commitments by members of that space in dedicating resources and binding policies, and the extent to which such constellations are working to minimize conflict between states newly emerging on the global scene.

Meanwhile, Chapter 6 specifically focuses on the ability of IGOs to serve as policy substitutions for member-states that do not wish to democratize yet want to receive the “dividends” that may come from democratization. Here, state joining behavior is dependent on the perceived effects of IGOs, which is in turn dependent on the capacity of organizations to affect behavior and compliance. In this context, FIGOs become highly significant since weak organizations would not be perceived as providing credible organizational commitments and substituting for democratizing regimes.

This does not mean, of course, that weak IGOs are unimportant in international politics. In fact, they may be useful in furthering certain efforts at collaboration, and/or they may, by creating greater opportunities for interaction, increase the range of opportunities for states to engage in conflicts as well as to cooperate. It may also be the case that under certain global conditions, states have as their most cost-effective option the creation of these weak IGOs rather than stronger organizations. In fact, one may argue that when states begin to opt for weak over strong organizational creation, some important changes are occurring in international affairs. A good example of such an IGO is the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the importance of which has been growing with the spread of awareness of the globality of environmental problems. However, UNEP may also indicate the importance of strong versus weak organizations: its structure may not be strong enough to accommodate substantial joint environmental collaboration and for some time now, several governments have been toying with an idea to build a World Environment Organization that would be built on the UNEP (Charnovitz, 2002:8).

The very absence of strong organizations, or FIGOs, may also create salient theoretical puzzles. In Chapter 5, the authors explore regional cooperation in the area of shared waters. Focused on this issue area of concern, they find virtually no FIGOs existing on their own to facilitate these regional agreements. The analysis clearly warrants both a broadening of the conceptual approach to IGOs in the issue area (as the authors do) and further probing of why the subject matter is divorced from formal organizational development. Note that this problem is similarly explored in Chapter 8.
where aspirations and identity for a common region appear to exist, but there is virtually no organizational architecture developing.

In Chapter 7, the focus of inquiry shifts to the effects of IGOs within the issue area of human rights, involving a substantial set of normative considerations. The formal requirements of the FIGO classification may be less well suited to determining the strength or effectiveness of organizations in regard to changes in normative beliefs in conflict. In fact, it is plausible that weaker organizations may be more adept at creating discussion among states and organizations where there may not be binding commitments required after some level of consensus is reached.

**The Varied Delineation of Regions**

The spatial clustering of both FIGOs and other IGOs, as well as the measure of state membership in the multi-layered institutional architecture (i.e., at the global, regional, and inter-regional levels), has required the creation of a classification of regions in international relations. Much like defining the concept of IGOs, the issue of what is a region is highly contested, and there is little consensus over terms among scholars, and consequently, over regional affiliation of a number of states. This is particularly the case for states that are geographically in the center of one region, but where a number of other issues (history, political affiliation, cultural links, economic cooperation) closely link it with another region, or make its regional affiliation a very contested political issue. Because important foreign policy and domestic political consequences exist for and against a state’s inclusion in the region, and consequently in the formal institutional structure that exists in the region, this can indeed be a hotly contested issue (perhaps best illustrated in the ongoing debate about Turkey and its entry into the European Union; see Diez, 2005).

Although the focus of this volume does not include resolving the conceptual issues related to the definition of regions, we do employ a two-step, bifurcated approach that is analogous to the one we employed in building the FIGO concept. The first step involves the selection of the underlying, general framework from which the regional concept is derived: the nature of the geography. Many studies utilize a physical-geographic region, but as mentioned supra, sometimes political, economic, social, or religious geography is more relevant. The studies included in this volume provide variation in geographic typology to illustrate this point.
The second step is the selection of an issue area that places the geography of the region within context. This step is further illustrated in Chapter 2, where the authors argue that the clustering of states into regions occurs as a function of geography plus one or more politically relevant considerations identifying the boundaries of geographical space. The second step depends on the subject matter at hand, indicating that the concept of region may vary with the issue of concern. A good example is the discussion of the role of IGOs in the post-Communist space (Chapter 4 in this volume). This space ranges from the Czech Republic through Kazakhstan. In this case, the boundaries of the space have been dictated by a combination of geography and historical/political dynamics shared by emerging new states. The danger with such an approach is that the issues of relevance, as a subjective category, may have a significant effect on the results, particularly with respect to inter-regional cooperation, but also in the terms of intra-regional behavior. This problem is partially addressed in our concluding chapter where we note commonalities within regions even when different regional definitions have been utilized.

Several chapters focus on physical-geographic regions that are differentiated by issue-specific contextual factors. For example, Chapter 2 compares changes to the architecture of global, inter-regional, and regional organizations during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Change measures are critically dependent on the identification of regional and inter-regional organizational clusters. Since the study classifies state membership in the network of organizations based in large part on opportunity and willingness to belong to organizations available to states for membership, the regions are classified based on both geography and broad political affiliation. For example, the Middle East is identified as a region of Muslim states, integrating North African states along with more traditional Middle Eastern countries. Nearly all states of North Africa have the opportunity to belong to most Middle Eastern IGOs/FIGOs. Whether or not they join is an issue of willingness. Israel, while physically situated in the Middle East, is excluded from nearly all organizations of the region;¹⁹ therefore, Israel is not classified as a Middle Eastern state. Iran is able to join those organizations open to Muslim states, but is barred from organizations open only to Arab states. These limitations notwithstanding, Iran can still be classified as part of the region. In a similar fashion, Turkey has been placed in the group of Middle Eastern countries, because it has more opportunity to join FIGOs in the Middle East than in Europe. Chapters 3, 4, and 6 also focus on a similar physical-geopolitical typology of regions.
Some issue areas, however, require alternatives to this type of regional differentiation. In Chapter 5, physical proximity to specified bodies of water is the primary dynamic that differentiates regions due to the particular issue area (international rivers). This chapter does not use any static geographic definitions of regions because to deal with shared-water issues, and to exclude Israel from the Middle East on the grounds of a broad political affiliation (and the opportunity to join organizations in the region), would make no sense if the underlying factor was objective physical location, given that the authors focus on ascertaining the development of cooperative arrangements around international rivers, or rivers that cross state boundaries. Instead, physical proximity to an object that is defined by the issue area is utilized in place of static geographic considerations.

In Chapter 7, which analyzes state behavior in the issue area of human rights, institutional affiliation (membership in a regional formal IGO that deals with the issue area of human rights protection) has been taken as the criterion for identification of regions. Physical geography alone as a basis for regional classification would not support the theoretical question of inquiry since in Chapter 7 the causal mechanisms revolve purely around institutional geography. Here, the focus of interest is the extent to which states are conforming to human rights norms to which they are institutionally linked, and therefore the regional definition needs to focus on this issue dimension. Thus, regions have been modeled according to state participation in regional international organizations with established human rights institutions and mechanisms. Such specific regional normative frameworks suggest that like-minded states (when it comes to the issue area in question) have cooperated extensively and bound themselves to the same normative framework, which they had created. Such shared commitments are taken as a sufficient starting point for determining the regional affiliation of individual states.

Using this type of approach to classifying regions yields somewhat different results for individual states. Israel is listed in the “other” group. Belarus is as well, since it is not a member of the regional organization holding the primary focus on human rights protection: the Council of Europe. For exactly that same reason, Turkey is designated as European, due to its long-standing membership in the Council. To validate their approach, the authors use block modeling (Doreian et al., 2005) in the second part of Chapter 7.

The chapter on the Mediterranean centers on a geographical area that is identified by two dimensions: first, geographical considerations and physical
characteristics of the area. Second, the author also considers the avowed aspirations of state and non-state actors to create a regional identity. This approach to delineating the boundaries of the region works for the theoretical question at hand: to ascertain why, when physical characteristics and identity issues converge, no significant organizational structures that accompany them seem to be able to delineate the political boundaries normally associated with regions in the modern era. In the parlance of the first three chapters in this volume, the Mediterranean constitutes inter-regional space; we consider it here as an important focus of inquiry as critical actors seek to create a formal “region” in what we consider an inter-regional area in our earlier formulation.

The Organization of the Chapters

The chapters in this volume exhibit an eclectic set of theoretical perspectives, research designs, and methods of empirical analysis. The complexity of the subject matter requires that the contributing authors remain agnostic about competing approaches to international relations. For example, Chapter 5 on international river cooperation affords a unique opportunity to test which if any of the competing state-based theoretical approaches can best match the reality of cooperative choices by states, before integrating elements of each into a more coherent theory. One of the approaches that the authors have used in their analyses (see Chapters 2 and 7, respectively), social network analysis, offers one particularly useful methodological approach for clustering IGOs, state memberships, and the behavior of states. The analysis allows for the integration of institutional and normative architecture into a dense intergovernmental network, and results in the drawing of maps that visually present the changes that have occurred in the network over time.

The volume begins, in Chapter 2, by discussing the conceptual variety of IGOs that have been created by both state and non-state actors to further collaboration, coordination, and cooperation in international politics. The authors’ definitions and assumptions are framed around the specified causal mechanisms associated with IGOs relevant to the theoretical questions they have set. Moving from concept to operationalization and building on the existing literature in the field, they identify steps to measure and count the existence and types of FIGOs operating in the post-Cold War
order and during the immediate period preceding it. The FIGO data are applied with a view to sketching out change and continuity in global, inter-regional, and regional architecture, highlighting the extent to which the networks of organizations have or have not changed after the end of the Cold War.

Chapter 3 continues the theme of changing effects across the Cold War versus post-Cold War periods by seeking to explain the outcomes found in Chapter 2, based on the loss of American strength to fashion the kind of new world order it desired. Then, the chapter moves on to examine the effectiveness of post-Cold War architecture by assessing the impact of IGO and FIGO memberships of states on their propensity to engage in conflict with each other. Treating relationships at the dyadic level, the authors test whether or not primarily Cold-War-based IGOs and FIGOs continue to have the same conflict-ameliorating effects on members after the end of the Cold War, or whether, as some have suggested (Forman and Segaar, 2006), this older architecture is beginning to lose its effectiveness under newly emergent global and regional conditions.

Chapter 4 continues to focus on IGO impact on states by narrowing the perspective to new states emerging from the ashes of the Cold War. Here, the analysis is on post-Communist states as they struggle through their early years of independence, in the midst of developing foreign policy machineries and (for nearly all but the Russian Federation) with little experience in foreign affairs. The authors explore the effects of choices made by these states to join IGOs on their conflict behavior toward each other, arguing that IGO co-membership creates greater opportunities to identify differences in policy orientations, and therefore, may actually increase conflicts between these states. Of particular interest in this research is the question of the role of a hegemon, whose active involvement in (inter)regional affairs may have important consequences for both increased conflicts and the creation and maintenance of IGOs and their effects on members.  

In contrast, Chapters 5 departs from the assumption that a hegemon typically would play a major role in forming and sustaining cooperative arrangements. In this respect, rather than tackling the issue from the standpoint of individual states or dyadic relationships, the unit of analysis here is the river basin and the effort is to uncover the conditions under which different types of structural arrangements are created to tackle the problem of cooperation around a critical and often shrinking resource. As the authors note, managing international rivers that cross political boundaries is a universal water governance dilemma – virtually every country in the world has
at least one international river within its borders. The authors explore the range of factors promoting and inhibiting cooperation in river basins. Based on strong empirical evidence through an original database, the authors use state-based theories of international relations to explain the birth and life of cooperative arrangements in international river basins.

Chapter 6 endeavors to explain the proclivity of nearly all states, despite widely varying capabilities and interests, to seek membership in IGOs, and in particular, in FIGOs. The authors focus on Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in an attempt to show similar joining behavior despite very divergent conditions that would intuitively elicit divergent outcomes. By treating FIGOs as policy alternatives for states, the authors suggest that developing non-democracies might utilize FIGOs to achieve policy and economic goals otherwise unachievable or enforce policies that would be otherwise prohibitively costly, by seeking membership in the very same organizations utilized by developed democracies. By turning classical assumptions about joining motivation and behavior on their head, this study seeks to explain joining behaviors that were previously relegated as being anomalous or that were explained under an enticing, and yet incomplete, umbrella of a democratization-based approach.

Chapter 7 shifts the focus back to the impact of IGOs on the behavior of their members. States join international organizations, but once they have become members, they are expected to act in accordance with the existing norms and rules and jointly achieve the goals of individual organizations. Focusing on the human rights issue area, Chapter 7 demonstrates that the goal formally established by the UN of respecting and protecting human rights has been achieved gradually, in terms of both the expansion of international legal norms and state participation in this ever more complex normative framework. In a few decades, human rights have become one of the most developed normative issue areas in the international community. However, not all regions have joined this normative framework at the same pace, and to the same extent. By using diverse methodological tools to address state behavior in this issue area, the authors are able to reject the assumption that like-minded or similar states, defined very broadly, act in the same way when it comes to their support of universal human rights norms. On the contrary, states from very different regions and with diverse attributes display highly similar attitudes and behavior toward human rights norms. This suggests that institutional membership has had diverse impact on state active participation in fulfilling the organization’s goals, and on the behavior of member-states in the issue area of human rights protection.
Chapter 8 approaches the issue of regional cooperation by asking why there is no Mediterranean region despite the aspiration of key actors to create one. As the chapter illustrates, even the end of the Cold War has failed to bring about the creation of formal intergovernmental networks of cooperation. Indeed, there has been a bottom-up regionalization process taking place since 1989. The process has led to a variety of informal arrangements, including only two organizations that have been sustained and many that have failed, along with the increasing role of non-governmental actors in the vacuum created by competing states and organizations outside of the region. The author argues that such a state of affairs is to be attributed to the external presence of influential actors in the Mediterranean area (during the Cold War and after) that have prevented a rise of a (legitimate) regional hegemon, which would enable a positive structural impetus for further regionalism projects. In this respect, the chapter offers important insights on the role that major powers play in the creation of organizational architecture, an issue that runs through Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Each of the chapters seeks to examine change between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. The specific time frames used depend on availability of data and the research design necessitated by the primary research question being raised. Accordingly, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on 15 years preceding the end of the Cold War (1975), at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and 15 years after the end of the Cold War (2004). These points in time give us comparable time frames of comparison for assessing changes during and after the Cold War, and they are time frames for which we have been able to assess a wide variety of evidence. These time frames are inappropriate for Chapter 4 where the focus is on states emerging from the Cold War in post-Communist space. Chapter 8, which allows for a longer time frame to examine aspirations versus the reality of creating a Mediterranean region, also allows for the inclusion of more recent events beyond 2004 without doing disservice to the inquiry.

Of course, it would be naïve to think that the institutional and normative architecture has stopped changing after 2004, and we do not mean to imply such with the use of these time frames. To the contrary, in some issue areas much has happened in a very short time span over the past decade or so. The volume therefore expands the analysis beyond 2004 where developments in the international community required such an extension, and does not do a disservice to the logic of the research design being utilized. This extension, where appropriate, is particularly important given the
events following 9/11, and especially given the war in Iraq, which has played a key role for the US and scores of other states.21

The final chapter revisits the nature of the post-Cold War order as seen from the standpoint of the organizational – both formal institutional and normative – architecture existing in international politics. Weaving together the findings regarding architectural creation, state decisions to join these networks of organizations, and the various effects we have noted as resulting from state participation in IGOs, a series of predictions and concerns are offered about the manner in which we expect the new world order to evolve in the decade to come. No meaningful work can be the final word on the subject, and part of its value is to raise additional questions that need to be explored further. That agenda for needed future research is addressed as well.

Notes


4 For example, by 2010 “the annual growth in combined national income from Brazil, Russia, India, and China – the so-called BRIC countries – will be greater than that from the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy combined” and by 2025, “it will be twice that of the G-7” (Drezner, 2007:34–5). Mearsheimer (2001) argues similarly.

5 For example, Chapter 4, focusing on the tendency of all IGOs under certain circumstances to exacerbate conflict, explicitly compares FIGOs and nFIGOs. This comparison would be less appropriate when focusing on the conflict-ameliorating functions of FIGOs; for a justification of this distinction, see Chapter 3.

6 Note the conflict between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Bush administration leading up to the second Iraqi war in 2003. The tense relationship had been renewed during the monitoring of the development of Iran’s nuclear technology. See “U.S. and El Baradei at odds over Iran’s nuclear program,” International Herald Tribune, 31 August 2007.

7 Note Kofi Annan’s statement that the UN can be as strong as its members want it to be. See “Transcript of Press Conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at UN Headquarters, New York, 18 December 2003.” SG SM 9009, 19 December 2003.
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8 The so-called “reasonable” definitions “yield numbers that are larger than 344 but less than 1,075” (Jacobson et al., 1986:144).

9 While some emanations are created by negotiations between states and, for some, state membership occurs by state consent, this is not the case for other emanations. Furthermore, many emanations are created in such a manner as to be subsidiary or subservient to the parent organization. Below, we note that those emanations that meet all the requirements of independence and autonomy lose their emanation status and become FIGOs in our classification. Emanations in general appear to be created and die at rates much faster than IGOs created by states, reflecting substantial differences between the two types of cooperative arrangements.

10 Typically, the cutoff for IGOs is a minimum of three members.

11 The cutoff for inclusion in the *Yearbook of International Organization* for “active organizations” is that they meet at least once every four years.

12 Most researchers require a headquarters or an executive for an IGO to be classified as such. However, numerous IGOs identified in the *Yearbook* have either no professional staff or a staff of one or two individuals.

13 The concept of “formal” as a version of “strong” intergovernmental organizations is further elaborated in Chapter 2 below.

14 This may be the source of much of the obfuscation that has risen out of incompatible concepts. The identifying characteristics are centralized but the underlying characteristics of the subgroup are not delineated.

15 (1) Familiarity – “How familiar is the concept?”; (2) Resonance – “Does the chosen term ring?”; (3) Parsimony – “How short is (a) the term and (b) its list of defining attributes?”; (4) Coherence – “How internally consistent are the instances and attributes?”; (5) Differentiation – “How differentiated are the instances and the attributes? How bounded, how operationalizable, is the concept?”; (6) Depth – “How many accompanying properties are shared by the instances under definition?”; (7) Theoretical Utility – “How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences?”; (8) Field Utility – “How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes?”

16 Such as, for example, emanations that are not created by states, and often lack autonomy and independent bureaucracies.

17 Of course, the differentiation between IGOs and FIGOs is not the only conceptual distinction that can be made between organizations. Organizations differ on a variety of other critical characteristics, ranging from the issues they address, the functions they perform, the degree of interconnectedness between organizations as networks – all in addition to the nature of their institutional designs – with significant consequences for having an impact on their members and on international politics (Boehmer et al., 2004; Gartzke et al., 2005).

18 The difference between IGOs and FIGOs alone is sufficient so that some 86 organizations in the year 2000 are IGOs but fail to meet the operational
measures associated with FIGOs (Volgy et al., 2008). In addition, there are hundreds of other entities entirely outside of even the IGO classification, ranging from ad hoc, collaborative arrangements through large constellations of emanations.

And especially so from all “formal” organizations, although it is included in organizations that are inter-regional and/or have quasi autonomous capacity, such as the Middle East and Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association (MEMTTA).

The chapter on the Mediterranean (Chapter 8) also puts forward an argument about the importance of strong regional states as an important explanatory variable in understanding the dynamics of the institutional development of a region.

We should note as well that for Chapters 2 and 3, we conducted an update of the database in search of new and “dying” organizations after 2004 and as of the June 2008, found virtually no net changes to the constellations we report for FIGOs.

References


