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THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1821–30)

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Independence from the Ottoman Turks came for the Greeks after almost a decade of bitter fighting and suffering. When the revolution broke out in Greece in March 1821, the insurgents possessed no agreed plan of military action and lacked an accepted leader. Revolts in the Morea in powerful and rich islands like Hydra and Spetses, as well as in various places in Continental Greece, but not in Constantinople, were the work of agents of a secret revolutionary society, the Society of Friends, whose membership in the previous few years had increased dramatically, so dramatically that there was a danger of its secret mission becoming public.

The revolts followed the apostasy of Ali Pasha of Ioannina in the summer of 1820 and the concentration of Ottoman forces in Epirus to suppress the rebel pasha, which left the Morea virtually free of Ottoman troops and at the same time created a serious vacuum of power in the southern Greek lands of Continental Greece and the Morea. Local militias of Christian Greeks, and Albanians in Continental Greece, Epirus, Thessaly, and southern Macedonia, in the service of the Ottomans till then, found themselves operating free of previous obligations and in situations in which employment favored divided, or even changing, loyalties. These local militias or armatoles played a key role both in the outbreak of the revolution and in its outcome. Initially, the only agreed upon aim of the insurgents was imposed by force of circumstances.

Independence from the Ottoman Turks came as a result of both great power intervention to stop the war between Greeks and Turks and the perseverance of the Greek insurgents, who refused to submit to their former masters, even when they suffered great setbacks and saw their families and properties destroyed. Independence came to fewer lands than the ones that had taken up arms against the Ottoman sultan;

indeed, more Greeks were left outside the first Greek nation-state than the three quarters of a million inhabitants of this fledgling state in 1830.

The Greeks had many grievances against their Ottoman masters; or, at least enough grievances, which in the context of the French Revolution's political and ideological legacy, seemed credible, indeed, irrefutable. The tyrannical regime of the Ottoman Sultan of course was no more tyrannical to the Greeks than to the other subject peoples of his anachronistic empire; in many respects the Greeks fared better than less developed Christian subjects of the Sultan, like the Bulgars or the Romanians, over whom Greek prelates or lay leaders exercised considerable authority. The Greek grievances, which however became the underpinnings of the demand for freedom, were formulated by elites already in place and in an atmosphere of rising expectations. The demand for national self-determination rested on a number of arguments which seemed irrefutable: i) The Greeks were a nation distinct and separate from the Turks; ii) The Greeks were subjects of masters who imposed obligations on their subjects but showed no respect for their rights; iii) The Greeks had been subjugated by force and had signed no treaty with their suzerain, who exercised illegitimate authority over them; iv) The Turks were foreign to the lands of Europe they lorded over and should be forced to abandon these European lands; v) The Greeks had the right to rejoin the European family of nations, which owed so much to the Greek classical legacy. The Greek national movement had been growing in the previous three or four decades in Greece proper but particularly in the Greek diaspora in Europe, primarily in such centers as Paris, Pisa, Trieste, Venice, Vienna, Budapest, Bucharest, Jassy, and Odessa, in which a powerful mercantile class lent its support to the growth of a considerable educational and publishing movement. There was a widespread belief among the people involved in this movement, among the Greek Enlighteners, that the Greek nation should undergo a thorough regeneration to free it from servile habits grown in the centuries of foreign and tyrannical rule. Education, in addition to preparing them for independent state, for nationhood, was expected to help the Greeks regain their true identity as cultural descendants of the classical Greeks. The Classicist and Romantic movements of the time favored these claims and made them credible and widely accepted.

Education would be a strong wind to the sails of freedom, and freedom would allow the Greeks to further cultivate the identity of their

illustrious ancestors and become again the rightful keepers of their great cultural heritage. Much of course was assumed, but the age favored such assumptions. Who were the Greeks and which were the Greek lands? These and similar questions were seldom asked, and when asked they were left unanswered. The secret revolutionary society, which eventually started the rising, seems to have opted for a more general rising of the Christian peoples of southeastern Europe and the islands of the Archipelago, under Greek leadership of course. Circumstances, however, made the rising an essentially Greek affair.

The times were inauspicious for revolutions like the one the Greeks were preparing. The Europe of the Classicists and the Romantics was also the Europe of Restoration, of triumphant monarchical legitimacy. Revolutionary France was brought to her knees by the united forces of Hapsburg Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain. The dethroned and dispossessed royalty and aristocracy were brought back to power and their privileges were restored – in most places. Count Ioannis Capodistria (1776–1831), the most renowned Greek of the time and best suited to lead the Greeks, advised against a revolution. He had no second thoughts turning down the leadership of the Society of Friends when its leaders offered it to him in 1818. Capodistria, a conservative, was in the service of Tsar Alexander I – he was the emperor's foreign minister – and considered a revolution at the time premature and condemned to failure. So did, in fact, the great Greek man of letters Adamantios Korais, a liberal established in Paris.

The Greek revolution was triggered by impulsive patriots of the Society, first in the Danubian Principalities by Alexander Ypsilantis, its nominal leader, and then in the Morea by some of the most reckless members of the society, such as Papaflesas, a defrocked deacon. Ypsilantis, a Phanariot Prince who held an officer's commission in the Russian army, crossed from Russia into Moldavia on February 24 at the head of a few hundred young Greeks who lived in Russia and proclaimed the Greek Revolution. In Bucharest and Jassy, as well as in other centers of the two autonomous principalities of the Ottoman Empire, there lived many Greeks in the service of the local elite, as well as several hundred Greek students in the famous Academies of Bucharest and Jassy. There were the first recruits of Ypsilantis, but local peasants and their leaders, foremost among them Tudor Vladimirescu, kept their distance from the insurgents, who alone faced the superior forces the Turks sent to suppress the uprising. The revolution which

Ypsilantis sparked in February 1821 was to be a Greek affair which also put an end to Phanariot rule in the two principalities.

The Phanariots were a Greek elite, which had provided rich and powerful members to the service of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and to that of the Ottoman Sultan. Several families competed with each other for the favors of the Ecumenical Patriarch, who was the spiritual leader of all Greek Orthodox Christians, and the Sultan, for high office. Ambassadors of the Porte to European great powers, marine ministers, and prime ministers, but above all ruling princes in Moldavia and Wallachia, the Phanariots constituted an aristocracy of talent, which held and wielded tremendous authority, as long as they kept the favors of their temporal master. Their positions of influence and power in the Ottoman imperial structure were subsequently used to argue that the Greek Revolution interrupted a long process of turning the Ottoman Empire into a joint Graeco-Turkish common *imperium*, which lived only in the minds of some disenchanted Philhellenes, who were disappointed by Greece's Western apprenticeship.

Another "victim" of the Greek Revolution was the imposed cohabitation of Greeks and Albanians. The latter, who for centuries were being Hellenized in the south and Serbianized in the north and were saved as a distinct nation by mass Islamization between the fourteenth and the seventeenth centuries, played for the Ottoman Turks in the Balkans the role the Kurds did in Asia Minor, that of the contracted armed henchmen. In the nineteenth century many Greeks believed that Greek–Albanian competition for military paid service with the Ottoman masters served to sharpen Greek braveness on the hard Albanian wetting stone. In fact, the case of the Greeks who became Ali Pasha's advisers and henchmen ill supports this belief, since the Albanian chieftain's tyrannical rule exercised a pernicious influence on all those Greeks who collaborated with him. Although the Albanians appear to have dragged their feet, when called by the Ottoman Government to shore up more energetically the effort to suppress the Greek insurgents, there is no reason to believe that they did so out of sympathy for the Greeks but in the context of their institutional blackmail of the central government to the benefit of their semi-feudal armed contractual service.

Recruiting an army of contracted armed irregulars required local knowledge and above all resources; keeping such an army in the field required, in addition to knowledge and resources, special skills and a

measure of unquestioned authority. Local knowledge and special skills were in abundance on both sides of the deadly contest, while resources and unquestioned authority were scarce, especially on the Greek insurgent side.

The Ottoman Turks chose to destroy two men who possessed the qualities required to suppress the insurrection, Ali Pasha of Janina and Khurshid Pasha, the initial commander in-chief. Ali Pasha, the Albanian despot of Janina, possessed the necessary resources, local knowledge, special skills and, until he was declared a rebel and an enemy of the Sultan, the authority to command obedience and respect or fear among friend and foe alike. Khurshid Pasha, a former Georgian Slave of the Sultan, who had risen to the top by his ability and character, was able to mobilize both men and resources in the initial and most crucial stage of the war. The Sultan sent Khurshid Pasha to undo the Albanian rebel and, after the latter was executed in January 1822, the former was offered the choice of facing the executioner or taking his own life. The proud Serasker, who had destroyed Ali Pasha and who had in all probability taken possession of Ali's considerable fortune, chose death by poisoning himself just as the Sultan's executioner closed in on Khurshid's headquarters in Larissa in December 1822.

By 1822, the insurgents had been able to face the Sultan's armies, not without some much needed victories in the field, and had seized most of the main centers and citadels in the Morea. The first year of the rising was one of unqualified success for the Greek cause: The insurgents had stood up against their former masters in the field, had dispossessed them of the cities and possessions, had been able amid endless quarrels to convene a constituent national assembly in December 1821 to produce in January of the next year a temporary constitutional charter, and all these without a commonly accepted leader. During the siege of a Moreot castle, a Turk on the defending side asked a Greek on the other side of the separating wall whether they really expected to succeed in the contest, in which they lacked a *Kirally* (lord or monarch); to which the Greek was at a loss for an answer.

Faced with the Greek uprising, the Ottoman Turks chose to construct their own reality, allowing their deep-seated contempt for the Greeks to influence their interpretation of events. From the very beginning they never brought themselves to perceive of the Greek uprising as anything more than a bandit affair. Even to this day Turkish historiography continues to refer to the Greek Revolution as the "Morea revolt." Contempt

and religious bigotry led Sultan Mahmud II to allow the Muslim mob in Constantinople and other centers of the empire with strong Greek presence to murder the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and scores of other ecclesiastical and lay Greek leaders when news of the Greek rising reached the seat of the empire. The Greek insurgents were quick to make capital of the hanging of the Patriarch, both among the Greeks of the empire and in European capitals, most notably in the Russian capital: The Turk was foreign to European civilization and sworn enemy of Christianity; the Greeks would never again trust the Turks nor agree to mediation to submit to Mahmud. If the Turks chose to construct their own reality about the Greek departure from the empire, so did the Greeks about this departure.

Was mediation possible, and who would undertake to play that role? The Ottoman Turks, it seems, expected the Greeks to eventually submit after exhausting themselves, as they had done in the past. In 1770, after a no less organized rising in the Morea and a generous blood-letting by Albanian irregulars, the Greeks had been humbled and driven to submission. Russia, who had pushed the Greeks to revolt to further its own designs in the Near East, was available to mediate. Russia was now unavailable, so were the other great powers of Europe. The Greek affair seemed to be another local disturbance caused by the unavoidable Christian grievances against Ottoman tyrannical administration. The novel feature of this Greek uprising, which seems to have eluded all those who came forward to mediate, was that behind the uprising was a conspiratorial society sworn not to submit once things were brought to a boil. Patriots of all descriptions and objectives rubbed shoulders with adventurers and cut-throats ready to cause a rupture by means designed to force the hand of these who had much to lose and were understandably reluctant to cause a break with the Turks. Higher clergy and lay notables, all of them having kin held at the seat of government in Tripolitsa as hostages in the hands of the authorities, were naturally reluctant to cause a break; moreover, in their capacity as leaders of the folk trusted to their protection, these local leaders were not suitable to act as rebels against the authorities.

Mahmud II and his government ruled out mediated peace and pursued the suppression of the insurrection, but not with the energy required for such an end of the affair. Khurshid Pasha was succeeded as commander-in-chief by Reshid Pasha, but no end of the fighting was in sight. Rumelian Turkish pashas were suspicious of Albanian pashas,

and the latter were openly uncooperative with both Rumelian and Anatolian Turkish commanders of all ranks. Albanian contractual irregulars, who were essentially hired bandits, habitually dragged their feet and prevaricated when it came to hiring their services to the Turks and sometimes did so to the Greek insurgents. Bulgarians, who were conscripted as cavalry auxiliaries, abandoned their Muslim masters for the Greek Christian side. Transportation of Anatolian armies by sea was perilous, in view of the havoc wrought on Ottoman shipping by Greek fireships, while land transportation was costly and forbiddingly long – so long that commanders dreaded the idea of having the responsibility of taking an army across the southern Balkans, via Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, Continental Greece, and across the Isthmus to the Morea.

The Greek insurgents, once the insurrection broke out and they succeeded in capturing Moreot citadels, had two main objectives: i) to survive the onslaughts of Ottoman power, and ii) to make the Greek Question a European Question. They realized both objectives, thanks to Mahmud's intransigence and the perseverance of the Greek irregulars against great odds. The longer they returned the heavy blows and refused to lay down their arms, the heavier became the Sultan's blows against the insurgents, and the greater the outcry in European countries against the persecution of a Christian people. The massacre of at least half of the 60,000 population of the prosperous island of Chios, in the summer of 1822, and the dispersion of the rest to various Greek islands and the mainland, harmed the Ottoman sultan's cause in Europe as probably no other violent action against vulnerable people did, throughout the ten-year war of Greek Independence, which was fought on both sides with all the savagery of the age. The liberal romantics of Europe seized upon this and other similar cruelties perpetrated by the Ottoman armies against undefended Greek communities and drummed up so much opposition in Europe that not even the Conservative governments of the time could afford to dismiss the issue.

The massacres of non-combatants suffered by the Greeks in this uneven conflict, projected by Western liberals to a West becoming gradually more and more sympathetic to the Greek cause, further strengthened the existing Philhellenic current in the West and in Russia; so did the feats of the Greek heroes. Theodoros Kolokotronis, Markos Botsaris, Odysseas Androutsos, Kitsos Tzavelas, and other freedom warriors became the heroes of a West lacking at the time similar heroes of its own. The Greeks, descendants and keepers of the great heritage of the

ancient Greek sages and heroes, were fighting for freedom from the Ottoman Empire and for Europe; indeed, they fought Europe's battles against Eastern despotism and barbarism. Forgotten were all the negative stereotypes about the Greeks' past religious quarrels and political antagonisms with the West. Western philanthropy, Classicism, and Romanticism contributed to the growth of the powerful ideological and political movement of Philhellinism, which outlasted the Greek war of independence, but not in the form of a secure endowment for the Greeks to draw upon, as the latter hoped. Was this Philhellenic movement an "extravagance" of Western liberalism, as a Western disenchanted Philhellene thought one century later? Or, was this extravagance a "curse" of the West upon the Greeks, which was responsible for not having gained what was expected of them? An extravagance it was no doubt, but it is more than doubtful that this was responsible for the reputed losses or missed gains of the Greeks following the break away from the Ottoman Sultan's empire.

This view of the West's "curse" on "eastern" Greece, which was put forward after the Greek Revolution and the formation of a Greek nation-state in parts of the historical Greek lands, was shared at the time only by some ultra-conservative ecclesiastical circles for whom the West was an anathema. This view, which was subsequently seized upon by sworn enemies of the liberal nation-state who constructed an Eastern Christian Eden in the Ottoman Empire until the Greek National Revolution, rests on rather weak premises: i) that the Greeks were anchored in the East and were wrenched away from their eastern moorings by Westernized elites bent on destroying "Greek identity," and ii) that national movements like the Greek one and the ones that followed could somehow be kept out of the Sultan's and the Ecumenical Patriarch's lay and ecclesiastical domains respectively, so that this Eastern Eden could be preserved. As developments in the twentieth century have shown, however, the Greek East was not so Eastern, nor was the West so Western, in terms of values and principles developed in the West, at least as far as liberal government of the nation-state is concerned. It seems that – *pace* Arnold Toynbee – the Western Philhellenic "extravagance" of the early nineteenth century was not a "curse" but rather a blessing in many tangible respects.

The Greeks of the time and subsequent decades renovated their nation on the premise that they were, in terms, of language and culture, the descendants of the ancient Greeks and that there has been a

continuity of the Greek language and culture since antiquity in the historical Greek lands; which raised at the time and still raises many eyebrows in the West as well as in the East. Disenchanted Philhellenes like George Finlay in the nineteenth century and Arnold Toynbee in the twentieth, as well as classicists and post-Modernists of all hues, have censured the Greeks for assuming about their identity more than the situation warranted, and have been reluctant to accept that the Greeks have no less a right to choose as their founding national myth a continuous Greek language and culture in what they have defined as historical Greek lands, than the Germans, the French, and the British to their own founding national myths. Indeed, this founding national myth has been successful in convincing the descendants of the non-Greek-speaking groups, no less than Greek- speaking ones of the historical Greek lands, that their claim to cultural descent from the ancient Greeks was not only irrefutable; it has proved a powerful adhesive force, which held the nation together, and has produced substantial cultural achievements in the space of less than two centuries. Constantine Paparrigopoulos, the great national historian of the nineteenth century who worked out the theory of the cultural continuity of the Greek nation since antiquity, provided his compatriots with the material for an identity that has proved lasting and modern; this identity, it should be noted, has been, even when other European identities allowed racism to creep in, ever open and inclusive. It remains to be seen whether this Greek national identity will survive in a multi-cultural Europe, in which even older and no less strong than the Greek identities have been showing signs of waning.

The Greeks of the days of the Revolution of 1821, however, in addition to winning independence and furthering the renovation of Greek identity, have been vindicated in another respect: in securing for Greece a place in the European family of nations. This objective, in fact, was one of the principal aims of the insurgents, for whom Europe was the great legatee of Western Civilization, a land in which the rule of law had secured for men unprecedented freedom, prosperity, and dignity. In the 1820s even to conceive the vision to place Greece safely within the pale of Western Civilization was a wild dream.

Before securing this prize, however, the Greeks did their utmost to win recognition as combatants, so as not to be treated by third parties as pirates. First the British in 1823 agreed to treat with the insurgents to prevent acts of piracy in the Ionian Sea, in which British shipping faced

serious problems. The previous year Lord Castlereagh, a staunch opponent of revolution, died and was succeeded by George Canning, who saw in the revolutions of the 1820s against the aging empires of the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs of Spain in Latin America an opportunity for British commerce. It was an important step in the direction of recognition of the Greeks as a separate nation fighting for their existence and freedom.

The following year, in 1824, the London Greek Committee of distinguished members of British society raised a substantial loan in the name of the revolutionary Greek Government. This loan, in addition to the previous funds made available to the Greeks at a most critical time, further projected the Greek insurgents onto the international scene as a distinct nation fighting for freedom. Philanthropy and the pursuit of commercial interests in a changing world gave the Greek revolution much-needed recognition. The hostilities caused serious problems to sea communications in the Eastern Mediterranean and before long the great powers stepped in with the intention of mediating or intervening in any way to put an end to hostilities which seriously harmed their interests. In 1825 Britain and Russia agreed to offer their services and generally to have their influence felt by the Greeks and the Turks with a view to ending hostilities. The following year France too joined Britain and Russia in the pursuit of its special interests, even as the French were deeply involved in modernizing the army of Mehhet Ali Pasha, Sultan Mahmud's ambitions Vice Regent of Egypt.

The most decisive event of the Greek war of independence was the naval battle between the united fleets of Britain, France, and Russia on the one side and on the other the Turkish–Egyptian fleet, inside Navarino Bay in the entrance to the Gulf of Pylos, on October 20, 1827. That most "untoward" event, according to the British Foreign Secretary, which was caused when the commander of the Turkish–Egyptian fleet refused to heed the order from the three European admirals not to attempt to leave the bay, whose exit was guarded by the European admirals, led to indiscriminate firing. In the ensuing battle, the European admirals obliterated the fleet of their opponents. The famous battle opened the way to Greek independence and at the same time attached Greece to the security system overseen by the great European powers and the three who played a decisive role in this to Greece as its guarantor or protecting powers. The same year, by vote of the insurgent National Assembly, Count Capodistria, one of the architects of Restoration

Europe, was invited to be Greece's first temporary president to prepare the country for the arrival of its first European monarch.

Capodistria, on arriving in insurgent Greece in early 1828, faced a Herculean task without Hercules' superhuman powers. Egyptian troops were still in control of most of the Morea; Albanian bands of irregulars roamed Continental Greece in search of contractual paid service; the revenue system was in the hands of captains who essentially raised revenue from their districts for the upkeep of their own forces; the shipowners of the Island of Hydra, who had suffered forbidding losses in the war, demanded equally forbidding indemnities from the insurgent government; hostilities flared up, not always between the main contestants; the wild district of Mani was outside the reach of the central government and refused to pay taxes or to accept government functionaries; bands of armatoles from Thessaly, Epirus, and Macedonia, in which the revolution was suppressed and in which they could not reclaim contractual armed paid service from the Ottoman authorities, burdened the insurgent government with demands impossible to satisfy.

Moreover, Capodistria had to negotiate Greece's independence and territory with the great European powers and the Porte. Which were the new country's frontiers and on what grounds and criteria? The three protecting powers asked Capodistria no sooner than he set foot on war-torn Greek soil questions which he had to answer convincingly. Capodistria proposed a defensible frontier running along the mountain line separating Thessaly from Macedonia and the greater part of Epirus, but the great powers were not prepared to be so generous to Greece and instead obliged him to accept a line to the south of Thessaly, running from the Gulf of Volos in the east to the Gulf of Arta in the west. The frontier did separate the two nations, in the sense that the Turks who lived before the revolution to the south of the frontier in such cities as Tripolitsa, Patras, Corinth, Athens, and Levadia, abandoned the insurgent districts to the custody of European consuls.

The new nation-state on the southeastern fringe of Europe with Capodistria at the helm did not include most of what were known at the time as the "historical Greek lands": Epirus, the Ionian Islands (which belonged to Great Britain), Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace, the Asia Minor west coast, and the adjacent islands, Crete and Cyprus. Perhaps more than two million Greeks lived outside the fledgling Greek nation-state, almost three times more than the three quarters of a

million of the state's estimated population. This nation-state of the Greeks, the first in their history, was destined to be the beacon of light of the New Israel, destined to enlighten the East, and liberate all its people from tyranny. It was not arrogance, but the strong conviction of an intelligentsia steeped in the Western "extravagance" to recreate "Hellas" from the "relics of departed worth." If Byron was convinced that this was not an unlikely task, so were those who were lionized by Byron and the other Romantics of the age as the living remnants of the glory that was once Greece.

Capodistria was no romantic and had no illusions about the extent to which the great powers were prepared to truncate the Ottoman Empire for the benefit of this romantic extravagance. He accepted what the great European powers were prepared to offer in terms of territory for the new state, in the hope that the monarch the protecting powers were to choose for Greece would be in a better position than himself to negotiate with those who looked after the European security system. Besides, territory was not Capodistria's main concern. He faced a devastated country and an economy in ruins. Raising precious revenue became one of his main concerns, as did the formation of regular state services. Both objectives taxed his abilities and energy, because few of those who exercised real authority outside the capital of Nauplion were willing to cooperate. The call for the formation of a regular army was left unheeded by captains and their bands of contracted armed irregulars; they preferred to raise revenue themselves instead of becoming salaried officers of the state. With the assistance, however, of a handful of enlightened and dedicated associates, Capodistria was able to lay the foundations of a modern state based on the states he had come to know in Europe. He was able to suppress piracy and banditry and to establish state primary and secondary education.

However, Capodistria's overriding objective of concentrating authority within the central government foundered on the rocks of strong local interests. Hydriot ship-owners burned the national war fleet in protest at his measures to place the warships under regular naval officers; northern captains and their bands of armed men refused to disarm and demanded salaries in arrears; the Maniot clans were in open rebellion. One of these clans murdered Capodistria on his way to church one Sunday in September 1831.

Capodistria, a man who believed in enlightened government, not necessarily democratic, united against him all the prewar elites, as well

as the Westernized groups of intellectuals, all of whom demanded a constitutional charter, the latter because they believed that a constitution would democratize Greek society and the former in order to regain power, which Capodistria's paternalistic rule had brought to an end in 1828. Capodistria believed that what Greece needed most was honest paternalistic rule, which would, in conjunction with education and the distribution of land to the peasantry, free the people from the influence and control of local tyrannical barons. He feared that the premature introduction of constitutional government would prove an impediment to modernization.

Capodistria's violent end ushered in a new bout of civil strife between different political sects, which fought for positions of influence and power before a monarch from Europe reached war-torn Greece. The Greek Question was finally settled in the summer of 1832, as expected by everyone concerned in the country by the three protecting European powers – Great Britain, France, and Russia – which signed two founding international treaties, one with the Bavarian royal dynasty of the Wittelsbach, which sent one of its princes to Greece as the country's first monarch, King Otto, and the second with the Porte, which recognized the independence and territorial integrity of Greece. By the same treaties, the three great powers assumed the role of the guarantor powers of Greece's independence and regime. For the Greeks of the time, this arrangement was a heaven-sent present and above even their wildest expectations.[1]