

Introduction

Gordon Allport (1968) defined social psychology as “an attempt to understand and explain how the thoughts, feelings and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of others.” As limited as definitions are, this definition of social psychology captured the dynamism, focus, and direction of the discipline. Important to an understanding of social psychological behavior is taking into consideration not only what is happening socially to the person but also what is occurring internally and cognitively to the individual which, in turn, affects social behavior. From its genesis rooted in the work of William James’s *Principles of Psychology* to current development of the discipline, there has always been an emphasis on the individual within the social interaction paradigm. Theorization, therefore, within the discipline has fallen within this paradigm, which is now extended to include the neurological functioning of human beings within the social psychological context.

The early works on social psychology by the psychologist William McDougall (1908) and the sociologist Edward Ross (1908) weighted social behavior on instinctual or social factors, respectively. Later, Floyd Allport (1924) emphasized a behaviorist stimulus–response paradigm for the understanding of social psychological behavior. Theories of psychology and sociology during this early period seem to have been competing to understand a realm that had neither the theorization nor the research sophistication to claim discovery status. Much of the work undertaken in social psychology has been done within the discipline of psychology, with sociological social psychology contributions being relatively sparse. Notably, the discipline of sociology has contributed tremendously to the early development of the concept and theorization of self, especially via theories of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and, later, ethnomethodology. On the other hand, psychological social psychology’s contributions have been crucial to the genesis and development of both the pure and applied branches of the discipline.

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Social psychology has seen numerous studies testing hypotheses drawn from concepts or theories. However, less frequent in the literature is the emergence of theories – a renaissance that is much needed for the development and impetus of the discipline. However, many of the theories that currently exist within social psychology are as important to the discipline as they were over forty years ago. A renaissance starts with a reassessment of the efficacy of current theories.

Theories have the power of insight and understanding, allowing scientists to see phenomena that previously they would have been unable to conceptualize. Albert Einstein is quoted as saying, “Whether or not you can observe a thing depends on the theory you use. It is the theory which decides what can be observed.” The assumptions, propositions, hypotheses, and supporting confirmed “facts” all provide the theory with a power of vision. The assumptions are givens that the theorist is allowed to utilize in the construction of his theory. They are like the basic tools of a carpenter. These assumptions are grounded on some philosophy or principle, and are often not the bases on which a theory is criticized. However, assumptions give a theory direction. On the other hand, a theory’s power of vision is myopic, limited by the same tools that give the theory its power. This is a dilemma that the finite scientist must explore in any discipline. However, the beach-ball approach to the understanding of the world within one’s discipline is a compromise accepted by social psychologists. That is, it is recognized that a theory is an academic creation, in this sense, and has limitations. The adoption of a number of theoretical positions provides a more comprehensive understanding of the multidimensional nature of a phenomenon.

A theory can be criticized on a number of grounds, including consistency – how logically well the theory holds together with its propositions and hypotheses; external – standing up to criticisms of other theories (theory A vs. theory B); historical – temporal perseverance of the theory (e.g., does Freud’s psychoanalytical theory or Heider’s attribution theory still hold today?); applicability – the generalizing of findings from research to social situations; and methodological – the strengths and weakness of the methodology used in the construction of the theory, especially if the theory is an empiricist one.

The recent social psychological literature has been lacking a volume systematically dedicated to a range of theories within the discipline. The emphasis of this book, therefore, is on social psychological theories, with an evaluation of some of the main theories still discussed and relevant to understanding behavior. The volume is divided into four parts. Part I presents critical assessments of social cognitive theories – from their genesis to their current development.

Derek Chadee revisits Brehm’s theory of psychological reactance, identifying the genesis of this theory in the womb of cognitive dissonance theory. However, the baby grew with many different characteristics from the mother. Both theories of cognitive dissonance and psychological reactance are theories of motivational arousal and reduction. The theory of psychological reactance, however, attempts to explain people’s reactions to perceived or actual threat to loss of freedom. The theory builds on several assumptions of human behavior, with a major underlying assumption of human persistence in maintaining free behaviors and the consequences that arise as a result of threats to importantly defined free behaviors. The early emphasis of reactance theorizing and research was on psychological

reactance as being aroused by the situation. However, later studies have given emphasis to reactance as dispositional – a reactant personality. Numerous instruments have been designed to measure reactance as a disposition. The merit and demerits of these measures are discussed.

This first chapter critically assesses the relationship between reactance and dissonance, proposing reactance as a special case of dissonance though identifying the distinctness of reactance. Critical to this chapter is the identification of the systematic void in the literature concerning any discussion on affect in reactance. The last part of the chapter evaluates the relationship between affect and reactance, proposing a reactance emotion theory. Chadee concludes by noting that reactance theory is an important theory in the discipline of social psychology and has contributed to an understanding of reactance behavior to actual or perceived threats in a wide variety of settings. The theory is as useful today as it was over forty years ago. However, the theory needs modification.

Paul Nail and Kurt Boniecki critically assess Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance and related theories, from dissonance theory's inception and rise to prominence in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, to its near-death by the early 1980s, to its rebirth in the 1990s and 2000s. The original statement of the theory was stunning in its simplicity – that an unpleasant psychological state called cognitive dissonance exists whenever one important thought is in conflict with another. Yet this very simplicity was a major factor that has led to a large number of academic debates and controversies over the years. Nail and Boniecki describe how the germ of the theory got started when Festinger read of the events surrounding a massive earthquake that occurred in India in 1934.

They review Festinger's major theoretical constructs and how these gave rise, early on, to a series of counterintuitive predictions that were generally supported by the empirical evidence. Most famous is the finding of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) that research participants reported a greater liking for boring laboratory tasks if they were paid \$1 as opposed to \$20 for performing them. Nail and Boniecki summarize major paradigms that were created to test dissonance theory, followed by rival theoretical accounts, such as Bem's (1967) self-perception theory. The success of these accounts eventually caused interest in the theory to wane, but more recently has led to a flurry of empirical interest in dissonance and related phenomena, reviewed by Nail and Boniecki, which persists to the present day. One major focus of the chapter are the "self" theories of dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 1968, 2007; Steele, 1988), which hold that dissonance processes have their origins in the need for self-esteem rather than in a need for logic-like consistency, as originally conceived by Festinger (1957). Another focus is individual differences, e.g., how the different versions of dissonance theory make conflicting predictions for those varying in self-esteem. The chapter evaluates the theory in terms of its applicability, efficiency, heuristic value, and originality. Nail and Boniecki close by calling for new research that could possibly reestablish Festinger's (1957) version as the single most adequate account of dissonance phenomena.

Bertram Malle examines the history of research on behavior explanations, identifies missing pieces, and introduces a theoretical model that is meant to account for explanations at the conceptual, psychological, and linguistic levels. Heider (1958) was the first to examine systematically how people make sense of each others' behavior. He introduced the

notion of personal causality – ordinary people’s conception of how purposeful behavior works. When a behavior obeys personal causality, it is seen as caused by the agent’s intention, whereas such an intention is absent in behavior that obeys impersonal causality. Thus, Heider captured what was later called intentionality – a core distinction in people’s understanding of human behavior.

Subsequent attribution research turned to different directions. Jones and Davis (1965) shifted from considerations of intention inferences toward considerations of personality and attitude inferences. Kelley (1967) set aside Heider’s distinction between personal and impersonal causality and instead focused on a distinction between person (internal) and situation (external) causes. This internal–external dimension, however, applies only to people’s explanations of unintentional events, not to their explanations of intentional action.

Decades passed before Heider’s original concern with intentionality and people’s inferences of motives and reasons became a topic of research again. Committed to these concerns, the second part of the chapter introduces the folk-conceptual theory of behavior explanation (Malle, 1999, 2004). It locates explanations in the network of folk concepts people use to make sense of human behavior and specifies the psychological processes and linguistic manifestations of explanations. For example, people offer very different kinds of explanations for intentional and unintentional behavior. Unintentional behavior is explained by causes, which can be classified in a variety of ways, including an internal–external dimension. Intentional behavior, by contrast, is more complex. People offer either reason explanations (referring to the beliefs and desires in light of which the agent formed an intention to act) or causal history of reason explanations (referring to factors that led to those reasons in the first place – upbringing, personality, unconscious mental states, etc.). People’s choice between these two explanation modes reflects both cognitive and motivational processes and is sensitive to the explainer’s role (actors vs. observers), the type of agent (group vs. individuals), and the explainer’s impression-management goals.

Thus, the folk-conceptual theory tries to carve out the concepts and processes that matter when people construct and respond to explanations; and these distinctions reveal a rich, sophisticated system of folk-behavior explanations. Malle’s chapter is a dynamic contribution to the evolution of the field of attribution.

Benjamin Wagner and Richard Petty examine the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), which is a general theory of persuasion that is also applicable to social judgment (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM holds that people’s attitudes can be modified in both relatively effortful (central route) and non-effortful (peripheral route) ways. Persuasion via the central route depends on the strength and cogency of the arguments contained in the message and is determined by the number, valence, and confidence people have in their thoughts to the advocacy. Persuasion via the peripheral route is determined largely by reliance on simple cues and heuristics that are not necessarily central to the merits of the advocacy (e.g., being in a good mood). The extent of elaboration is the chief determinant of the route to persuasion, and several factors have been shown to influence the extent of thinking. Broadly speaking, these factors relate to motivation (e.g., personal relevance of the topic) and ability (e.g., knowledge about the topic) to think about the advocacy. With greater motivation and

ability comes an increased likelihood that a person will extensively elaborate a persuasive message and be less reliant on issue-irrelevant cues. Importantly, attitudes formed under the central route are generally more durable and impactful than are attitudes formed under the peripheral route.

An important component of the ELM is the idea that any variable can serve multiple roles in persuasion. Specifically, persuasion variables such as source expertise or momentary emotions can operate in five roles: (a) as simple cues to persuasion (e.g., “experts are usually right”), (b) as arguments that are relevant to a particular conclusion (e.g., “an expert’s endorsement speaks to the product’s quality”), (c) by biasing the thoughts that a person generates (i.e., expert sources lead to more favorable thoughts concerning the message than non-expert sources), (d) by affecting the amount of thinking a person does (i.e., expert sources enhance thinking about the arguments since they seem more worthy), and (e) by affecting whether people use their thoughts in response to the message in forming their attitudes toward the topic (i.e., “if my thoughts were provoked by an expert, they must be valid”).

The ELM has not only integrated research in persuasion but has also been applied in diverse areas of application such as consumer attitudes, health promotion, and legal domains. The model continues to generate interesting and important research findings, both at the basic and applied levels.

Social comparison has evolved and been modified since the 1950s. The social comparison process is a process that is present in numerous theories. Relative deprivation assumes the presence of social comparison. Both social comparison and relative deprivation are discussed in Part II.

Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler provide a comprehensive overview of social comparison theory. Social comparisons – comparisons between the self and others – are a fundamental psychological mechanism influencing people’s judgments, experiences, and behavior. In this chapter, they review the social psychological theorizing and research on social comparison. They start by summarizing the basic tenets of Leon Festinger’s seminal social comparison theory and continue by addressing three questions that are central to Festinger’s ideas and to the research that followed his initial work. The first question is: Why do people engage in social comparisons? While social comparison is mostly understood as a process which is engaged to fulfill fundamental needs like self-evaluation, self-enhancement, and self-improvement, the chapter discusses logical reasons for social comparisons and considers the efficiency advantage of comparative information-processing. The second question is: To whom do people compare themselves? The chapter explores how motivational concerns influence the selection of comparison standards and how routine standards can provide an efficient means to fulfill the need to self-evaluate. The third question is: How do social comparisons influence the self? The diverse factors that lead to assimilation or contrast of the self as a consequence of social comparison are reviewed. Furthermore, these factors are discussed in light of the Selective Accessibility Model, which explains them by the changes of accessible self-knowledge during social comparisons. Finally, Corcoran et al. address the role of social comparisons in health psychology and the impact of idealized media images on self-evaluation as applied examples of social comparison research. Their

review shows that comparative processes are marked by striking complexity and multifacetedness and that consequences of social comparisons span all core areas of human psychological functioning. They argue that future research could benefit from a perspective that integrates cognitive, motivational, and affective determinants and consequences of social comparisons.

Underlying the theory of relative deprivation is the social comparison process. Relative deprivation (RD) theory helps social scientists predict who will become dissatisfied under what conditions. RD theory is a theory of perceived social inequity which helps to explain why some people with paltry resources experience contentment while some others with abundant access to a wealth of resources are dissatisfied. Jenny Carrillo, Alexandra Corning, Tara Dennehy, and Faye Crosby review the history, development, and utility of RD. After detailing the initial writings about the concept of RD, they trace the development of various models of RD articulated from the 1960s to the 1980s and assess the more contemporary work on RD, focusing on the distinction between personal and group-based feelings of relative deprivation and on a validated means of measuring the construct that was presented in 2000. Directions for the future application of RD theory to social problems are considered.

Part III assesses two theories that start with the behavioral premise that human beings are hedonistic. The theories also assume that actions are governed by a reinforcement–punishment structure which extends into interpersonal interaction. The power dynamics of interpersonal interaction is absent from equity theory but elaborated in interdependency theory.

Denise Polk's chapter provides a useful understanding of equity theory. The theory stems from principles of reinforcement and basic principles of economics. The basic premise of the theory is that people evaluate their relationships in terms of inputs and outcomes. The principle of distributive justice is core to equity theory (Deutsch, 1985). Imbalances in input–outcome ratios result in inequity. Two types of inequity can occur. People may be underbenefited, or they may be overbenefited. However, according to equity theory, people are driven to restore equity once they perceive inequity. When people experience inequity, they may attempt to restore actual equity or psychological equity. Polk posits that because no magic formula for equity exists, relational partners must determine equity for themselves. Equity is a key consideration in relationships because people's perceptions about equity shape people's feelings, decisions, and actions toward their relational partners (Adams, 1965; Sprecher & Schwartz, 1994), so equity theory is appropriate to help explain the development, maintenance, and dissolution of relationships. Polk explores research which has tested equity for links with many variables including personality, emotions, gender, the distribution of domestic duties, and relational quality.

The chapter by Ann Rumble explores interdependence theory, as developed by John Thibaut and Harold Kelley. Thibaut and Kelley employed outcome matrices in order to understand an actor's available behavior choices and outcomes. The *given matrix* represents the choices and outcomes that are available to the actors in a specific situation, and through the transformation process develops into the *effective matrix* (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). By examining the components of the given and effective matrix, we will be

able to explain human behavior in a number of interdependent situations, including close relationships.

The final part of the book is devoted to theories related to self and identity and covers social identity, social categorization, symbolic interactionism, and impression management. Katharina Schmid, Miles Hewstone, and Ananthi Al Ramiah's chapter provides a general overview of social psychological theory on social identity, including social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). However, this chapter takes a somewhat more encompassing approach to portraying what is commonly referred to as the social identity perspective (Abrams & Hogg, in press). The authors thus not only focus on social identity theory and self-categorization theory but also pay particular attention to defining the concept of social identity, and consider the consequences of social identity phenomena for intergroup relations, above and beyond the predictions of social identity theory, taking into consideration the extent to which multiple categorization processes help explain intergroup relations.

The chapter is organized into four sections, the first two of which conceptually *define* self-categorization and social identification, whereas the last two examine the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are involved in, and help explain, intergroup relations. Section one of this chapter provides a brief definition of self-categorization and describes the theoretical foundations of self-categorization theory. The authors describe in detail what is meant by self-categorization, and how, why, and when individuals make use of social categories. In Section two, they define social identification as a psychological process associated with group membership and explain that identification is a multidimensional phenomenon. Section three presents a detailed description of social identity theory, with reference to the findings that emerged from the minimal group paradigm. Schmid, Hewstone, and Al Ramiah address, with reference to the predictions of social identity theory, the extent to which self-categorization and social identification are related to intergroup attitudes and behavior. Finally, Section four is devoted to an overview of multiple categorization and its consequences for intergroup relations, showing how more complex consideration of others and oneself in terms of multiple group memberships is associated with tolerance and improved intergroup relations.

Richard Crisp and Angela Maitner's chapter complements the previous chapter. They argue that in contemporary society the traditional boundaries that have previously defined social group memberships are being steadily eroded and replaced with more complex conceptualizations of identity. Crisp and Maitner review classic and contemporary theories of social categorization in the context of this increasing social and cultural diversity. They argue that broad-ranging and pervasive changes to the categorical structure of society have fundamental implications for how individuals perceive, represent, and understand their social environments. They review existing social cognitive, self-categorization, and situated cognition accounts, arguing that an increasing focus on the context-specific nature of social categorization reflects the more fluid and fluctuating nature of identity in contemporary society. They conceptualize a diversity-driven social categorization theory, arguing that the functional nature of human cognition implies that exposure to diversity must

change how individuals psychologically engage with their social worlds. The authors conclude that to understand fully the evolving nature of social categorization psychologists should seek to incorporate a broader multidisciplinary analysis of the changing nature of culture and society.

Andreas Schneider's chapter is a comprehensive overview of symbolic interactionism (SI). Today the framework of symbolic interactionism has been delineated into many theoretical approaches using qualitative and quantitative methods of investigation that are applied in numerous areas of research. SI has evolved a long way from early philosophies of North American pragmatism to the computer simulation of human interaction. Describing this path, this chapter overcomes dichotomies such as the Chicago school versus the Iowa school, or quantitative versus qualitative, that have been used in the past to pigeonhole one or the other line of research. Instead it portrays the development from the grandfathers and their philosophical backgrounds to explain the different agendas addressed by the founding fathers of the Chicago school. This historical context is necessary to understand contemporary contrasting schools of thought and their roots in social psychology, as well as sociology. This chapter then shows how ideas and methodologies of these qualitative and quantitative approaches are integrated into the most recent development of cybernetic control models in SI. Finally it is demonstrated how SI is applied in the fields of deviance, sexuality, children, gender, emotions, organization/management, cross-cultural comparison, and ethnomethodology/conversation analysis. Descriptions of these applications are supported by interviews of key researchers in the respective fields.

Meni Koslowsky and Shani Pindek's chapter on impression management (IM) is a refreshing contribution to the literature. They note that IM is an activity which takes place in many, if not most, interactions between people. In this chapter they start by exploring the different definitions of the construct, from a narrow view of IM as a set of manipulative behaviors, performed mainly in order to present them in a positive light, to a more expansive definition which assumes that all people unconsciously manage their impressions in ways that assist in achieving goals both at the individual and group level. This expansive view of IM allows us to deal with its association to constructs such as the self-concept, individuals' social identities, and other social phenomena.

When applying or measuring IM, behaviors are usually considered as belonging to one of several distinct subcategories. These categories include verbal/nonverbal behaviors, defensive/promotional, positive/negative, and several other related taxonomies. The chapter also explores specific antecedents and outcomes of IM. Prominent among the former are gender, self-monitoring, and self-regulation, as well as demographic and personality variables. In addition, research on situational antecedents and on IM outcomes has been conducted in applied settings such as human resource management. Since the work environment supplies the individual with many incentives as well as opportunities to benefit from impressions that are well managed, this area has been the focus of much of the research in recent years.

Finally, they identify several areas for future researchers to consider so as to better explain the phenomenon.

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