1

Introduction

Any history of the Diadochi, the Successors, the generals who inherited the empire of Alexander the Great, will of necessity be an adventure story of larger-than-life characters pursuing glory and empire. This was an age that arose directly out of the conquests of one of the most mercurial figures in world history. It is only by comparison to the great Conqueror himself that these individuals' exploits pale. After all, they were fighting over an empire, stretching from Greece to Egypt to India, that he had created, and that ultimately none of them singularly could hold. Yet it is in their struggles with each other over what might be called Alexander's estate that the Hellenistic world was created. This estate over which they contended was both material and mythical. On the one hand, there was the physical, territorial, empire, but on the other was the legend of Alexander himself. This myth that grew with each passing year was often the exemplar by which supporters of the various Diadochi would measure their generals and rulers. Alexander, however, himself was but a catalyst in the creation of this new age (Anson 2013b: 181–8). He set the stage; he conquered the old Persian nemesis that had haunted Greek affairs since the sixth century BC, but then he left that stage. In his leaving, he is supposed to have said, when asked to whom he left his empire, "to the strongest." He certainly had done little to ensure the empire's survival. In the words of Ernst Badian (1964a: 203), "Alexander was, essentially, not interested in a future without himself." He left a legacy of tremendous potential, but also one of administrative ambiguity and a world wedded to warfare as the means to virtually every end.

At his death, Alexander's potential heirs were a child, Heracles, by a mistress; a half-brother of dubious competence, and an as yet unborn son by his Bactrian or Sogdian wife Roxane (Heckel 2006: 187, 241). In short, there was to be no smooth transition in power, and, in the final analysis, Alexander's family, the Argeads, would not long survive the great king's death.

While his Successors contended in a world in which few parameters had been set, some of these were to resound until the fall of the various Hellenistic states to Rome, and in some cases to transcend even this conquest. These qualities were especially important given the personal nature of Alexander's empire and his

Alexander's Heirs: The Age of the Successors, First Edition. Edward M. Anson.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL

Successors' kingdoms. Unlike the later Roman empire, in which lands secured overseas by Roman armies redounded to the benefit of the Roman state, Alexander's conquests were regarded as his personal possessions won through his personal triumphs. For Alexander, Macedonia was a manpower resource only. His connection to his homeland grew dimmer with every new conquest and with every step he took further into the east. He even planned to center his empire on Babylon (Str. 15.3.9–10). This personal aspect of rule was one of Alexander's major legacies to his Successors. Alexander's kingdom was one won on the battlefield, and warfare was not just the backdrop of Alexander's initial conquests, but also that of the first forty years of the Hellenistic age. The ruler as general, ever attempting to increase his personal domains, is the history of the Hellenistic world, and, perhaps, the legacy of Alexander not just to his contemporaries, the Successors, about whom this book relates, but to the age as a whole.

This history is a story of vaulting ambition, treachery, and wars almost without cessation. It was this inheritance, first from Alexander, and then from his immediate true heirs, his generals, that formed the underpinnings of the entire Hellenistic period. Even after the establishment of relatively stable royal families in the kingdoms carved from Alexander's empire by the second and third generations of the Conqueror's successors, personal monarchy and warfare remained the staples of the new age. Alexander's generation was to serve as a transition from the conquest itself to the more settled world by comparison that appeared with the emergence of formal Hellenistic states. In part, these more settled conditions were the result of the emptying of the vast treasuries that had been captured from the Persians. These funds fueled the almost incessant warfare of the Successors.

While Alexander had not created an empire that was fixed by tradition or institutions, he had created a governmental pattern that was to be reinforced by his more successful Diadochs. Alexander had in the main copied the administrative structure of the Persian empire, which had the various regions divided up into provinces or satrapies, under the administrative authority of a governor or satrap, but Alexander's legacy was much more than the transmittal of some basic Persian administrative organization, and it was this inheritance that was continued and enhanced by his Successors. Alexander had created his empire in war and blood, and those who came after him fought for their share of this inheritance in the same fashion. The Successors had to demonstrate their fitness to rule on a regular basis, while their descendants owed their legitimacy, in the main, to their forebears. For Alexander the core of his empire was his increasingly polyglot army, with the military camp serving as his true capital. With few exceptions this was another way in which those who followed emulated the Conqueror. With respect to those territories brought under their aegis through conquest, the Successors mostly sought to dominate these areas through garrisons and often, again in the pattern of Alexander, with city foundations, but also through securing the loyalty of local elites. With regard to the last, Alexander had been most adept (Briant 2002: 870, 842–4, 1046–60), and among his Successors, Peucestas and Seleucus were noted for their acceptance of foreign

traditions and peoples. Peucestas, Alexander's satrap of Persis, wore Persian dress, learned the Persian language (Arr. *Anab*. 6.30.2–3), and treated many Persians as his close, personal, advisors and allies (Diod. 19.22.2). Later, in the second great contest of Alexander's Successors, Peucestas assembled an army that included 6000 Persian archers and slingers, 3000 heavy infantry made up of "men of many races … in Macedonian array," and 400 Persian cavalrymen (Diod. 19.14.5). Seleucus' later success in securing much of the east was tied to his ability "to find common ground with the native populations" (Olbrycht 2013: 168). In both Babylonia and Iran his "generosity" and "benevolence" secured the support of even the common people (Diod. 19.91.2, 92.5).

As part of this courting of the local elite, it was equally important for the successful Diadoch to recognize the nature of the military organization bequeathed by Alexander. This was no longer the national force of Macedonia, but rather a polyglot army of different nationalities, including increasing numbers of true mercenaries, but with all exhibiting many of the characteristics of mercenaries (Anson 1991: 230–47). Troops in this period tended to follow leaders who were both successful on the battlefield and excellent paymasters. Often, defeated armies would desert their now beaten general and enter service with the commander of the victorious force. The other aspect of these armies of the Diadochs was that, while they may have had Macedonian cores, the majority of the troops were Asians or Greek mercenaries. When Alexander died in Babylon in June of 323, his army only consisted of approximately 2000 Macedonian cavalry and 13,000 Macedonian infantry (Curt. 10.2.8). In addition to these Macedonians, there were present 30,000 infantry called the *Epigoni* or Offspring, young Asians armed and trained in the techniques of the Macedonian heavy infantry (Arr. *Anab*. 7.6.1; Curt. 8.5.1; Diod. 17.108.1–2; Plut. *Alex*. 47.3, 71.1), 20,000 Persian infantry armed in their traditional fashion, forces of Cossaeans and Tapurians (Arr. *Anab*. 7.23.1), 30,000 mercenary infantry and 6000 such cavalry brought from Greece prior to his voyage down the Indus (Diod. 17.95.4), and unspecified forces brought to Babylon shortly before his death from Caria and Lydia (Arr. *Anab*. 7.23.1). Moreover, it is unknown, other than the numbers of Macedonians, how many of the original force that entered India had survived the journey down the Indus, the crossing of the Gedrosian desert, or had been left behind in various garrisons. According to Curtius (8.5.4), the army that entered India contained 120,000 men (cf. Engels 1978: 150). Many of these were recruited in and around what is today Afghanistan (Curt. 8.5.1; Arr. *Anab*. 6.2.3, 8.2; cf. 4.17.3). While these Asian and Greek forces in the aftermath of Alexander's death are most often not specified ethnically by our sources, there are indications that they continued to serve in the armies of the various Diadochs in large numbers. Eumenes in 320 had an army composed of "men of many races" (Diod. 18.30.4). In the Battle of Paraetacene in 316, Eumenes' infantry contained 6000 mercenaries (presumably Greek), and 5000 "men of many races" armed in the Macedonian fashion, and in his opponent Antigonus' ranks, 9000 mercenaries, 3000 Lycians and Pamphylians, and 8000 "mixed troops in Macedonian equipment" (Diod. 19.27.6, 29.3; cf. 18.40.7). The cavalry fighting in Asia during

the wars of the Successors was predominantly of Asian horsemen (cf. Diod. 19.14.5–8, 20.3, 27.4, 29.2). In the early wars of the Diadochi, however, while Asian elements may have predominated numerically, it was the Macedonian veterans who served as the core of these armies (Roisman 2012). Over time this Macedonian importance decreased significantly.

While Alexander the Great's importance in the creation of the Hellenistic world is clear, what only in recent years has come to be fully appreciated is the contribution made by the Conqueror's father Philip II. For so many reasons the father deserves the epithet of Great as much as does his son, and in some ways, more so. Prior to Philip, Macedonia was a territorial region not a country. It was he who made it into a nation (Anson 2008a; 2013b: 43–81). Prior to this ruler, the authority of the king was circumscribed by his dependence on the landed aristocracy for both his government and his army. In a relationship accurately described as Homeric, the king shared power with his *hetairoi*, or companions. These were most often aristocratic Macedonian landowners, but did include a minority of those of other nationalities. With the Macedonian court lacking anything approaching a bureaucracy, all of the basic functions of government were entrusted to these *hetairoi*. They ruled their own lands as independent fiefdoms and served the king when it suited them or on those occasions when a king's personality could dominate them. This was in truth a very personal relationship. The companions were formally tied to the monarch by religious and social bonds; they worshipped, hunted, drank, and fought alongside the king. Indeed, the military of Macedonia was dominated by these individuals, who made up one of the best cavalry forces in the Greek world. Due to the fact that Macedonia was not much urbanized, with most of its coastal cities independent Greek city-states, and, therefore, chiefly without a Macedonian middle class, the infantry was made up of lightly armed and poorly trained peasants, the tenant farmers, small land-holders, and herders, who served their aristocratic masters. These features of Macedonia explain what is one of the more surprising aspects of the Classical Age. Despite the many resources of this northern part of Greece – the largest and most fertile plain in the peninsula, large mineral deposits, rich resources of timber, and, by the standards of other regions in the peninsula, a large population – Macedonia played only a marginal role in the fifth century. Most often these Macedonian resources were exploited by the southern city-states, such as Athens, with the Macedonian kings unable to resist their incursions. If these resources could ever be used exclusively by and for the Macedonians, then the nature of the power structure in the Greek world would be transformed.

While the Macedonian kings were so often at the mercy of foreign powers and their own native aristocracy, they were theoretically the possessors of great power. The king shared power officially with no one. Long-standing arguments that the Macedonian king shared power with an assembly of Macedonians (Granier 1931; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 161–2; Mooren 1983; Hatzopoulos 1996: 1:261–322), is not borne out by the evidence (see Errington 1978; Anson 1985: 303–16; 1991; 2013b: 26–42). When supposed assemblies from the reigns of Alexander the Great

and earlier Macedonian monarchs are examined, they turn out not to be constitutional entities but ad hoc assemblages called by the king for a variety of reasons, but in no case involving any mandatory requirement that they be summoned or that their decisions be followed. The king was, in the words of a contemporary of Philip II, "the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything" (Dem. 18.235). It was the king who officially declared war and made peace, commanded armies, and served as the intermediary between the people and their gods (Anson 1985: 304–7; Borza 1990: 238). The sacral nature of the monarchy was carried over even after death. Sacrifices were made to dead kings (Hammond 1970: 64–7; and Griffith 1979: 57). The sacral nature of the monarchy likely accounts for the success of the royal clan, the Argeads, in monopolizing the kingship. Even though kings were assassinated, from roughly 700 to 310, all kings came from this clan. If one of these kings could ever turn his theoretical powers into actual ones, such a monarch might dominate the Greek world.

Such a king was Philip II. However, in 359, his accession to the throne would seem anything but promising. In this year, an invading force from the northwest, the tribal Illyrians, had swept into Macedonia, joined with many of the Macedonian aristocrats, and prepared to contest control of the country with the king. Philip's brother, King Perdiccas III, gathered his forces and met the Illyrians somewhere in the northern upland regions of Macedonia, where his army was defeated, with 4000 dead including the king himself (Diod. 16.2.4–6). It was with an Illyrian army encamped in the northwest and threats of additional invasions from the north and east that Philip became King Philip II of Macedonia. At the time, none could have imagined that in twenty years he would turn this fragmented region into a nation that would dominate the southern Greek world with his victory at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 and his creation of the League of Corinth in 337, by which he exercised his control of the Greek city-states. It was with no exaggeration that the historian Diodorus of Sicily called Philip "the greatest of the kings of Europe in his time" (Diod. 16.95.1). While it was Alexander the Great and his conquest of the Persian Empire that set in motion the creation of the Hellenistic world, it was Philip who made Alexander's achievements possible.

Philip, also, transformed the Macedonian army, the army with which Alexander did conquer the Persian Empire, by creating a Macedonian heavy infantry to complement the traditionally strong aristocratic cavalry. Here, he changed the very nature of Greek warfare. Prior to Philip the core of every Greek army was its hoplite phalanx. These heavily armed infantry soldiers wore breastplates and greaves, carried a round shield, 3 feet in diameter, and a 7-foot-long thrusting spear, and fought typically shoulder to shoulder in a compact unit, the phalanx. Cavalry and light-armed troops played only a secondary role, protecting the flanks and rear of these formations. In Philip's new Macedonian phalanx, the infantryman was initially equipped with a 14- to 15-foot pike (the *sarissa*), and perhaps a 2-foot-diameter shield hung from the neck and shoulder, but little else in the way of defensive armor. Moreover, this new phalanx played a substantially different role in battle than its predecessor. Unlike the hoplite phalanx, this new

infantry formation's purpose was not to win battles, but rather to pin down the enemy's infantry, giving the Macedonian heavy cavalry, now outfitted with *sarissas*, albeit shorter than their infantry counterparts, of their own, the ability to probe the enemy for weaknesses, which they would then exploit. This new strategy has been called the "hammer and anvil" tactic, where the infantry is the anvil and the cavalry, the hammer. Over time Philip added numerous other units to his force, including skirmishers, archers, and mercenaries. With this new army Philip subdued his enemies, and his son Alexander conquered the Persian Empire.

This military change was closely tied to an even more dramatic change inaugurated by Philip. The new model army employed large numbers of the peasant population of Macedonia. Indeed, the origin of the *sarissa*-phalanx had much to do with the nature of the available manpower. Unlike the southern Greek city-states that depended on the middle class to supply their heavy infantry, with little in the way of such a class, Philip designed an infantry that required little in the way of material resources. In this new phalanx, the infantryman had virtually no expensive defensive armor. Moreover, a pike phalanx, when used primarily for defensive purposes, required little in the way of training, and whereas hoplite warfare demanded close-in fighting, for those unfamiliar with the horrors of warfare, the pike presented a measure of distance from your opponent. Unlike hoplites, in the words of one commentator on hoplite warfare, the pikeman could not "smell the breath" of his opponent.

To reward these new infantrymen and to free himself from total reliance on his aristocratic companions, Philip granted these new troops land, transforming many thousands of tenant farmers and dependent herdsmen into land-owning Macedonians, freeing them from their dependence on those landed aristocrats. As Arrian (*Anab*. 7.9.2), claiming to quote Alexander concerning his father, states: "Philip found you wandering and poor, wearing goatskins and grazing a few goats on the mountains … he brought you down from the mountains to the plains … and made you dwellers in cities." By so doing, Philip created a confident and exceedingly loyal population, loyal both to the monarch who had given them their land and who defended their possession of it, but also to the institution of monarchy itself. These holders of king's land became "citizen soldiers" (Diod. 18.12.2; Anson 2008a). Land for military service became a characteristic of the Hellenistic kingdoms that arose from Alexander's conquests. Most of the new cities created by the Successors were composed of just such settlers. This desire for land on the part of the landless or the small landowner encumbered by debt or obligation has sparked revolution across the centuries. Philip further cemented this new landed class to him by extending the concept of companionship to them as well. As the powerful aristocrats were the king's *hetairoi*, now the new citizen infantrymen became his *pezhetairoi*, his "foot companions."

Macedonian tradition made the relationship between king and people always one of informality and openness (Adams 1986). As part of this general lack of royal ceremony and decorum, even the title of king was apparently not an official part of Macedonian royal nomenclature prior to the reign of Alexander the Great

(Errington 1974). The king would simply be known by his given name, i. e. Philip, Alexander, etc. This personal aspect of rule was especially true in the army where in battle the king was literally the first to engage and the last to leave (Carney 1996: 28–31). Philip, with the creation of the *pezhetairoi*, changed informality into camaraderie. Alexander's Successors likewise maintained this close tie to their troops. As noted earlier, personal charisma was one very important key to a Diadoch's success.

Unlike Philip, who had created a Macedonian nation tied to the Argead monarchy, Alexander's actions were never about his homeland, but always about Alexander. In this regard, it was the example of Alexander and not Philip that the Successors followed. For the Diadochs, it was never about Macedonia, but about their personal domains. The Successors might be forgiven their lack of interest in the Macedonian nation. It must be remembered that it was only with Alexander's father, Philip II, that Macedonia had become permanently united under the authority of the Argead king. Moreover, these former generals of the Conqueror had been away from their homeland for more than a decade, and of their number few would ever return. Given that Alexander died without a clear and viable heir who could step in and take his place, given that he died far from Macedonia, and that his empire was personal, not national, it is understandable that his generals, his Successors, did not rally to the support of the nation.

While they did initially crown Alexander's surviving brother as King Philip III, and later, with the birth of Alexander's second son, crowned the newborn as king also, Alexander IV, the apparent unity was ephemeral. It would take forty years of incubation for this new age to emerge politically. In the final analysis, the evolution from one man's conquests to a number of stable political states would be accomplished in these roughly forty years of destruction and bloodshed. Out of these wars the new political realities of the Hellenistic world did emerge: Ptolemaic Egypt, Antigonid Macedonia, Seleucid Asia, and others. While these shared aspects of both Alexander's administration and that of his immediate Successors, there was finally no single model that fit all of the states that peopled the Hellenistic world. Each political entity had to accommodate the traditions of the populations that made up their states. Yet, in most every case, the structure was monarchical, heavily dependent on the military, and aggressive in foreign policy.

Before proceeding to these forty years of apparent chaos, the basis for our knowledge requires a brief examination. First, ancient writers were not guided by the modern rules of the profession, with anecdotal material often given the same weight as, or even greater weight than, more trustworthy accounts; they often used the past to excoriate or praise their own present, or to teach universal lessons, sometimes coloring their accounts to make the praise, blame, or lesson more profound. Moreover, in the special case of the period of the Diadochi, as it was for the career of the Conqueror himself, no contemporary narrative source survives. All of our chief sources date from the late Roman Republic or from the period of the Empire. Our principal source for much of this period is the universal history of Diodorus of Sicily, titled *The Library of History*. This author wrote during the last

half of the first century BC. With the loss of most of Diodorus' history concerning events after 302, our knowledge of the following years relies on other far less detailed sources. Indeed, this current history represents both the relative abundance of material for the age down to 301, and the dearth thereafter. This gives my work a rather disjointed aspect with greater attention to the earlier period, but I believe it is better to include all the evidence that is available even if it gives this account of the history of the Successors an unbalanced appearance, than to truncate these years in the interest of maintaining some sense of chronological uniformity in the narrative presentation.

Diodorus' narrative, despite its centrality to the history of this period, does have numerous shortcomings (Meeus 2013: 84–7). He is a secondary source, abbreviating extensive material not often too successfully, frequently inserting his own opinions of the role of fate and "moral utility" in historical causation (Sacks 1990: 24–35, 42–54). It is postulated that he, however, does in the main follow one source for extensive periods (Hornblower 1981: 2–3; Sacks 1990: 19, 21, 41, 158). Unfortunately, like most ancient historians he does not acknowledge his sources. While he may not have been a slavish abbreviator (so Stylianou 1998: 15, 49, 137–9), the writing style, at the least, has been claimed as his own (Palm 1955), there would appear to be a minimum of inserted additional material. In the case of the aftermath of Alexander's death down to the preliminaries to the Battle of Ipsus in 301, Diodorus is generally believed to be following the history of Hieronymus of Cardia, who was not only a contemporary historian of the period, but also an occasional participant in the events being described, and a confidant of three of the major players in this transitional period: Eumenes, from the historian's native city, Cardia in the Chersonese, and likely a relation (Hornblower 1981: 8; Billows 1990: 390; Anson 2004: 5 and n. 29); Antigonus Monophthalmus (One-eyed); and the latter's son Demetrius Poliorcetes (City-sacker), concluding his long career serving the son of Demetrius, Antigonus Gonatas, the founder of the Antigonid dynasty of kings who would rule Macedonia continuously from 276 (Chambers 1954: 386, 392) to the end of the dynasty in 168. Consequently, if the basis for most of the surviving accounts can be traced, through whatever tortuous path of transmission, back to Hieronymus, then some confidence can be assumed at least in the general outline of the surviving histories. But, with the dearth of surviving evidence, this desire for confidence in Diodorus' narrative may, indeed, foster a predilection among historians to accept Hieronymus as the ultimate source. There were other histories written at the time or shortly thereafter by other authors which also have not survived, but which may have descended to our surviving works. All of these exist only as suppositions; others as mere notices, and some in fragments. Like Hieronymus' history itself, the work called variously the *Histories*, *Macedonica*, or the *Hellenica* of Duris of Samos, also survives in fragments. While not a direct participant in the events, Duris did write an account of this period, and is seen by some modern historians as a major source for the surviving Diadochan histories, such as Diodorus' *Library*, that have survived (Landucci Gattinoni 1997: 9–28, 194–203).

Diodorus for the first twenty years of the Successor period presents a fairly detailed narrative. Our other surviving narrative account of the period comes from another Roman survival, *The Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*, composed by Marcus Junianus (or Junianius) Justinus, or simply and conventionally, Justin. Given that Diodorus' history only exists in fragments after 301, Justin's far more abbreviated account is the only surviving narrative for the entire period covered in this book. Trogus' work is most often dated to the period of the early Roman Empire; Justin's has been variously dated from the reign of Antoninus Pius in the second century AD to as late as that of Theodosius I in the fourth (Yardley and Develin 1994: 4). Little is known of Trogus, this despite the fact that he was included in the so-called canon of Latin historians, which included with Trogus, Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus (Yardley and Develin 1994: 3). In addition to Justin's epitome, brief undated "Prologues" (summaries) of Trogus' history also survive. While the history centered on the age ushered in by Philip and Alexander, it, through its digressions on various topics associated with the peoples of the lands that made up the Hellenistic world, apparently took on certain aspects of a universal history, and Justin refers to it as such: "encompassing the annals of every period, king, nation and people" (Preface 2). Justin's work, while most often termed an epitome, is not a simple condensation or abbreviation of Trogus' history. Justin excerpted that material he found "pleasurable" and excised that which did not serve a moral purpose (Preface 4). Justin's abbreviated work is far more truncated than that of Diodorus, and often more problematic.

Two additional Roman historians provide critical material for the earliest years: Quintus Curtius Rufus, who, in his *History of Alexander the Great of Macedon*, continued his narrative past the Conqueror's death to the emergence of Alexander's half-brother, Arrhidaeus, as King Philip III; and Flavius Arrianus (Arrian) of Nicomedia's *Events After Alexander*, a detailed history in ten books, covering events from 323 to 320, although now lost, fragments, a late summary, and a synopsis of another author's work based on Arrian's original survive.[1] These works supplement our knowledge mostly of events in the years from 323 to 319. In addition to Diodorus' and Justin's histories and Arrian's fragments, there also survive a number of biographies dating also from the Roman era, but presenting the lives of important individuals from the age of the Diadochi. These include the biographies of *Eumenes* and *Phocion* by Cornelius Nepos, a Roman writer of the first century BC, and those of the early second-century AD author, Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus, or simply Plutarch, including, his *Lives* of *Demosthenes*, *Eumenes*, *Phocion*, *Demetrius*, and *Pyrrhus*. In particular, Plutarch's biographies of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Pyrrhus become our chief sources for the latter part of this history of the Diadochi.

These histories and biographies, along with a sizable number of inscriptions from widely dispersed locations, but especially from the city-state of Athens, dated to or referencing events in this period, add short and often eclectic pieces of information to our knowledge. There also survive a brief account of the history of the Seleucid Empire prior to its confrontation with Rome by the Roman-era historian, Appian of Alexandria, a number of "stratagems" associated with the

Successors, reported by the second-century AD Macedonian writer, Polyaenus, occasional references in two geographer-travelers from the Roman era, the first-century AD Strabo, and the second-century AD Pausanias, to events in this period, tenth-century brief encyclopedia entries (the Suda), fragments from a thirteenth (?)-century codex known as the *Heidelberg Epitome*,[2] fragmentary cuneiform tablets from Babylonia, and bits and pieces of lost historians, quoted in other sources.

While these other sources provide additional material, and often critical information, Diodorus' narrative is by far the most complete down to shortly before the Battle of Ipsus in 301. Especially after the loss of Diodorus, but also even with him, as a colleague has written, much of the activity of a modern-day historian of the ancient world in general, and of this period in particular, is attempting to glean every possible "shred of source evidence for a matter they are dealing with … to toss one more gram of evidence onto the scales in promoting a tricky solution to a problem" (Wheatley 2013).

The story that follows is one of conflict and greed. Tradition and authority fell by the wayside (Heckel 2002: 87). No advantage would or could be avoided, no alliance was destined to last, and all quests for supremacy were doomed to failure. Out of it all did emerge a new world, in which stable governments came into existence and different cultures did interact, although clearly not as fully as once thought. But Greek colonists, mostly men, and these mostly soldiers, did intermarry with native women; Hellenic, Asian, and Egyptian elites did interact on a regular and important basis. Commerce produced relationships, if only at the level of business, technological innovation knew no ethnic boundaries and spread along the byways of an interconnected Hellenistic world, and the different intelligentsias shared philosophies and religious ideas. While Alexander created the stage upon which his Successors and their heirs performed, the play itself was written by those who came after the Conqueror's death. This work is an account of the first transitional generation, the Diadochi.

Notes

1 The epitome is by Photius, a ninth-century author, whose work is variously called *Bibliotheca* or *Myrobiblion*, which records 279 summaries of various works including that of Arrian. The three fragments of the original *Events After Alexander* are the "Vatican Palimpsest," which contains two brief extracts from Arrian's Book 7; a papyrus fragment, *PSI* 12.1284, and the *Gothenburg Palimpsest* (see Dreyer 2007: 251–5, for a new edition and translation), which contains excerpts from Book 10. Photius also summarized the work of Dexippus (ca. 210–273), *History of the Events after Alexander the Great's Death*, which in turn was heavily based on Arrian's *Events After Alexander*. Photius' summary of Dexippus only includes events derived from Arrian's Book 1 of the *Successors*, and references to Dexippus' summarized work will be designated as *Succ*. 1b; Photius' summary of Arrian's original is designated here as *Succ*. 1a for that material summarized from Book 1 and as *Succ*., without a letter designation, for subsequent references to Arrian's original.

2 For a recent edition of the text, with commentary and translation, see Wheatley 2013.